THE RELEVANCE OF MODELS FOR SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY

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IN MEMORIAM
A. R. RADCLIFFE-BROWN
FIRST CHAIRMAN AND LIFE PRESIDENT
OF THE ASSOCIATION OF SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGISTS
OF THE COMMONWEALTH
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Introduction

The several disciplines of modern anthropology - prehistoric archaeology, physical anthropology, social or sociological anthropology, cultural anthropology, and psychological anthropology - have separated out of a general anthropology which in the second half of the nineteenth century and into the twentieth century aimed to study man both as a biological and as a social being. There are still many general anthropologists, mainly in the United States but also in Europe; and the various aspects of anthropology are still taught in many universities as a combined degree. Nevertheless, by the 1930s the different disciplines were beginning to separate from one another, though some scholars were still eminent in more than one discipline. As each anthropological discipline separated out, its practitioners turned to other subjects, whose techniques and modes of analysis were more appropriate to their problems than were those of their erstwhile colleagues. Physical anthropologists depended more on the biological sciences; psychological anthropologists (who studied the interaction of culture and personality) on psychology, especially depth psychology, and psychiatry; and social anthropologists on sociology, history, political science, law, and economics. Cultural anthropologists alone continued to draw on the biological, psychological, and sociological sciences.

Outwardly the common mark of social, cultural, and psychological anthropology was that they all continued to be comparative and cross-cultural in outlook, with an emphasis on the small-scale tribal societies of the world; and for many years the study of such a society was virtually the initiation ceremony which admitted a scholar into the ranks of anthropology. Hence all anthropologists felt they had something in common, besides their joint membership in such organizations as the
American Anthropological Association and the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland.

We believe they had something more in common, drawn from their traditional unity, besides their previous, almost unique, concentration on the tribal societies. This was a continuing focusing of interest on customs, as having an interrelated dependence on one another, whether in forming cultural patterns, or in operating within systems of social relations, or in the structuring of various types of personality in different groups. This focus on customs in interdependence has continued to distinguish the disciplines of anthropology from the other subjects with which each branch is increasingly associated. The analysis of custom remains one of the distinctive contributions of all anthropological studies to the human sciences.

The extent to which anthropologists specialized in one or other aspect of the general subject varied in different countries. In Great Britain, the trend has steadily moved more and more to distinctive specialization as an archaeologist, a physical anthropologist, or a sociological-social anthropologist. In Oxford and Cambridge, where anthropology has been longest taught, regulations provide for general anthropological qualifications, but it is possible for students to qualify entirely in social anthropology and other social sciences, or at most to have minimal tuition in other types of anthropology. Compulsory training on the biological side is perhaps strongest for social anthropological specialists at University College, London. At other London colleges, and at the other British universities where social anthropology has been established since the last war, the subject has usually been placed in social science faculties or departments, with sociology, economics, and political science. In a few universities only are links strong with geography or psychology within a combined Honours degree.

The British Honours degree necessarily leads, except for the Cambridge Tripos system, to a reduction in the types of other subjects that can be taken by undergraduates specializing in social anthropology. This process does not operate in the American undergraduate schools of anthropology, and hence at that level students who wish to become social anthropologists take a much greater variety of subjects, and the anthropology they are taught tends to continue to cover several branches of the subject. This naturally influences graduate schools of anthropology, since their products have to be able to teach in more than one branch of anthropology, if they are appointed to small colleges (see Mandelbaum, Lasker, and Albert, 1963).

Nevertheless, in the United States most anthropologists are becoming as specialized as they are in British universities, and are correspondingly associating with various cognate disciplines according to their type of specialization. Owing to the greater size of the country, and the far greater number of universities and of anthropologists, there is in the United States a greater variety of types of anthropologist than in the British Commonwealth. It is in the States that cultural and psychological anthropology flourish in addition to the social anthropology, physical anthropology, linguistics, and prehistoric archaeology that are represented in Britain. The flourishing of these several branches of anthropology in the States is probably fertilized, too, by the absence of the Honours degree system: there is a more varied interdisciplinary contact, which continues beyond the undergraduate level.

The increasing specialization of British social anthropologists with a decreasing interest on their part in prehistoric archaeology, physical anthropology, and cultural anthropology, in 1946 led the practitioners of the subject in Britain—then under a score—to form the Association of Social Anthropologists of the (British) Commonwealth. Though they wished still to support the Royal Anthropological Institute, they considered that they had specific and limited interests, sufficiently distinct from those of general anthropology, to require the support of a specific organization. This has meant, for example, that social anthropologists in Britain have had an organized means of giving evidence on their own problems to commissions advising the British Government on higher education and research, besides evidence given by the Royal Anthropological Institute for anthropology in general. The process of partial separation from general anthropology continued until, in 1960, the social anthropologists joined with sociologists and social psychologists to form a new Sociology Section of the British Association for the Advancement of Science. Two of the five presidents of
the Section to date have been social anthropologists. Social anthropologists still participate in the older Anthropology and Archaeology Section, but they submit more papers to, and attend in greater numbers at, meetings of the new section.

Between 1946 and 1962 the Association of Social Anthropologists of the (British) Commonwealth increased its membership from under a score to over one hundred and fifty, even though election to membership required normally both the holding of a teaching or research post in the Commonwealth and the attainment of either a post-graduate degree (usually a doctorate) or substantial publication. Meetings of the Association in Britain ceased to be small gatherings of perhaps a dozen people, and were attended by between thirty and sixty members.

In 1962 Professor Raymond Firth, then Chairman of the Association, proposed that it should try to raise the funds to invite a dozen American social anthropologists to one of its meetings. He suggested that since the milieux in which American social anthropologists worked were so much more varied than the milieu of British social anthropologists, it would be profitable to see what was common between us and where we differed, in a series of papers on 'New Approaches in Social Anthropology'. He pointed out that though there were many individual contacts between some members of the Association and American colleagues, many British and Americans had not met one another: moreover, we had never had a joint, organized stocktaking. He further suggested that papers should be read only by scholars who had entered the subject since the war: so the phrase 'new approaches' signifies that the papers collected in these four volumes present the problems and views of a younger generation of anthropologists.

When the Association enthusiastically adopted Firth's proposal, there was no corresponding organization of social anthropologists in the U.S.A. with whom there could be discussions and arrangements. The Association therefore more or less thrust on Professor Fred Eggan of the University of Chicago the task of representing American social anthropologists. It did so for several reasons, besides his own standing as a social anthropologist. The late Professor A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, who had been for the first years of the Association's existence its Life President, and to whose memory this series of A.S.A. Monographs is dedicated, had taught at Chicago from 1931 to 1937. Eggan had succeeded, so to speak, to Radcliffe-Brown's position, and under the Roman rule of universal succession might be regarded as representing him. Above all, under Radcliffe-Brown's influence there had developed in Chicago perhaps the strongest single group of social anthropologists in the U.S.A. Eggan agreed to help organize the meeting, but insisted, of course, that his British colleagues should select the dozen American scholars whom they wished to hear. With great difficulty, the British, eventually by vote, chose a dozen from the large number they would have liked to invite. If there seems a bias to Chicago, or Chicago-trained Americans (as one or two of the others rather ironically suggested), the British are responsible, and not Eggan. The American Anthropological Association agreed to sponsor a request for support, and the National Science Foundation generously financed the Americans' journey to Britain.

The programme, to which twice as many British as Americans contributed papers, was divided into four main sections. Two to three papers were presented in a group, and discussion was then opened by either an American or a British anthropologist — again, those opening the discussions were selected from the post-war generation, though more senior anthropologists were allowed to join in the general discussion. But these Monographs are not a report on the proceedings of the Conference. They embody theoretical papers by twenty younger anthropologists, who have amended their arguments, where they felt it necessary, after listening to the comments of their colleagues. Effectively the papers present, therefore, growing-points in social anthropology as seen by a new generation of practitioners.

Two years passed between the time when Firth, as Chairman of the Association, made his original proposal, and the meeting itself, which was held in Jesus College, Cambridge, in June 1963. By that time Gluckman had succeeded Firth as Chairman, and on him, and the yet-again conscribed Eggan, has fallen the task of introducing the Monographs. It has been a difficult task: the papers cover a range of ethnographic areas and of problems which they cannot themselves compass competently.
Max Gluckman and Fred Eggan

Hence this Introduction makes no attempt to assess the substantive problems and solutions suggested in the papers. Instead, it tries to pull together the kinds of issue which crop up as interesting the contributors in several of the papers.

There was also a major technical difficulty. The papers are published in four separate volumes, covering, respectively:

1. The relevance of models for social anthropology;
2. Political systems and the distribution of power;
3. Anthropological approaches to the study of religion;
4. The social anthropology of complex societies.

Since the Introduction was planned to cut across all four volumes, we decided to write a single text and print it in each volume. Various readers may approach the series through any of the four. The arabic figures 1, 2, 3, and 4 indicate in which of the monographs is located an essay referred to in the Introduction.

**SPECIALIZATION AND SPREAD: LINKS WITH THE SOCIAL SCIENCES**

The specialization of social anthropologists in a separate discipline, and the extent to which they have turned to sociology and political science, are particularly marked in these monographs. This is not surprising in the volumes on political problems (2) and on complex societies, including both peasantry and urban areas (4), where the problems dealt with are common to the three disciplines. As it happens, the other disciplines that are commonly grouped in the social sciences - economics and law - are not cited.

This is partly a matter of chance. We could provide for only a limited number of papers, and arrangements had been made to have a paper on the use of economic models in social anthropology by Mrs Lorraine Baric; but at the crucial time she went to Yugoslavia to do field-research.

Two papers do deal with 'economic problems', in the widest but not the technical sense of 'economics'. The first is by Marshall Sahlins, 'On The Sociology of Primitive Exchange', in monograph 1. Though by its title this might be thought to deal with economic problems, its actual emphasis is on 'sociology'. It considers types of exchange in terms of degrees of reciprocity as these alter along a scale of contexts of tribal social relations, from the most personal to the least personal - if we reduce a complex analysis to a single sentence. Sahlins makes no reference to economic theorizing as such, and indeed part of the discussion of his paper turned on this point.

Eric Wolf carries out a somewhat similar analysis of morphological changes in 'Kinship, Friendship, and Patron-Client Relations in Complex Societies' (4). In this essay, Wolf examines the kinds of situation in terms of ecological and economic situations in which kinship, friendship, and patron-client relationships respectively are dominant outside the nuclear family. No more than with Sahlins, would one expect this problem to lead Wolf into the use of economic theory as such. Save for one citation from Schumpeter, he does not rely on the economists.

The absence of reference to economic theory in the papers hence means that one approach, whether it be new or old, is not covered in these four monographs. We think it is true to say that technical economics has had less influence on social anthropological research than other social sciences have had, possibly because of its highly abstract nature. In the Register of the Association of Social Anthropologists less than 3 in a 100 members list 'economics' among their special interests, and there are also few specialists in the U.S.A. Yet before the war, among other senior anthropologists, Firth, originally trained as an economist, had used the technical concepts of economics to good effect for a tribal society in his *Primitive Polynesian Economy* (1938) and, after the War, for a peasant society in his *Malay Fishermen* (1946). More recently, a number of younger anthropologists, some with training in economics, have used this training impressively. But this is perhaps more marked among those who have studied peasant societies, than among those who have studied tribes, as is shown, perhaps, in *Capital, Saving and Credit in Peasant Societies* (Firth & Yamey (eds.), 1964), a symposium containing essays by nine younger British social anthropologists, by four Americans, and by one Norwegian who was trained partly in Britain.
Max Gluckman and Fred Eggan

The Association of Social Anthropologists hopes in the near future to publish a Monograph in which the use of theoretical economics in recent work by British scholars will be considered.

When these symposia were planned, arrangements had also been made to have at least one paper on problems in the field of law. Illness prevented P. J. Bohannan from preparing this. The absence of any treatment of tribal law, and more generally of processes of social control, does not reflect the extent to which these problems have interested social anthropologists in recent decades, particularly since the publication of Llewellyn and Hoebel's The Cheyenne Way: Conflict and Case Law in Primitive Jurisprudence (1941). That book, and Hoebel's earlier work, inspired a number of studies on jurisprudential problems, particularly on juristic method in the judicial or arbitral process, among both American and British social anthropologists. This work has drawn largely, if sometimes indirectly, on American sociological jurisprudence. This field of research is therefore not covered in the Monographs.

Here, then, are two social sciences not drawn on for this symposium.

References outside those to the work of social anthropologists are clearly most numerous to sociologists - for example, to sociometric work and to the work of the sociologists Ginsberg, Homans, and W. F. Whyte, by Adrian Mayer in his treatment of 'The Significance of Quasi-Groups in the Study of Complex Societies' (4). J. Clyde Mitchell in the same volume discusses 'Theoretical Orientations in African Urban Studies' and he begins by stating that 'differences in behaviour as between people in the town and in the country have for long been the topic of study of sociologists and other social scientists in Europe and America...'. Though Mitchell cites only a few of these sociologists, their work clearly has influenced not only Mitchell, but also the numerous other anthropologists who have studied urban areas in Africa and who are cited by Mitchell.

But it would seem that, leaving aside Durkheim, whose school's influence on social anthropology has always been marked, the influence of Weber on younger social anthropologists in recent years has been considerable. If anything, that influence is under-represented in these essays: it has been very marked in a number of monographs, as in L. A. Faller's Bantu Bureaucracy (no date: about 1956). With the influence of Weber - and partly inspired by his writings - goes the influence of Talcott Parsons among modern sociologists.

Perhaps the most cited and influential of modern sociologists in these monographs is R. K. Merton. His discussions of levels of theory, and of the distinction between manifest and latent functions, have always been exploited by anthropologists; and Melford Spiro uses them in his essay on religion in Monograph 3. But generally it is the increasing interest in the more meticulous analysis of social roles (referred to below) which inspired the writers to draw on Merton's treatment of role-sets - Ward Goodenough in 'Rethinking "Status"' and "Role"' (1), Aidan Southall on roles in different political systems (2), and Ronald Frankenberg in an essay on the changing structure of roles in different types of British communities (4), use Merton, appreciatively and critically.

Parsons too has influenced anthropologists' thinking about this key concept. There are also indications of a growing importance here of Erving Goffman - himself influenced by the work of social anthropologists - on how people operate their roles. Goodenough has drawn markedly on Goffman's books on The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (1959) and Encounters (1961). Frankenberg argues that there is a convergence between the ideas of Goffman and those developed in British social anthropology, especially by Barnes, Gluckman, and Turner.

These references must be sufficient to show how much social anthropologists are now drawing on the cognate subject of sociology. The essays thus reflect, in research and analysis, the tendency in both countries for social anthropology and sociology to be taught either in one department or in closely linked departments.

The references above are to certain types of sociology. No essay makes use of demographic analysis - but Mitchell's and a couple of other essays refer to the importance of demographic analysis, which in general has been inadequately used by social anthropologists in their reports on communities. However, it is worth noting here that anthropologists such as Mitchell and
J. A. Barnes have, in their treatment of suitable problems, been contributing to theory in demographic studies.

In their Introduction to *African Political Systems* (1940), Fortes and Evans-Pritchard wrote that: 'We have not found that the theories of political philosophers [italics added] have helped us to understand the societies we have studied and we consider them of little scientific value ...' (at p. 5). At least one reviewer asked why they did not draw on the work of political scientists. Since Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, with *African Political Systems*, virtually established 'political anthropology', their successors have turned increasingly to political scientists for assistance in their analysis. We have already cited Fallers's use of Weber's hypotheses in his study of Sogs bureaucracy, and many other monographs on political problems have used Weberian ideas as well as works by those who are more specifically political scientists or constitutional historians. Every essay in Monograph 2 refers to works in political science. The most cited work is Easton's study of *The Political System* (1963), and his article on 'Political Anthropology' in *Biennial Review of Anthropology* (1959). Easton, in Lloyd's words (4), 'took time from his studies of modern societies to examine the progress made by social anthropologists. [Easton] castigates the failure of the anthropologists to develop any broad theoretical orientation to politics, ascribing this to their preoccupation with general problems of social control, conflict, and integration and their reluctance to define the respective limits of political and other - social, religious, economic - systems. Easton offers a classification of African political systems which is based upon the differentiation in political roles ...'

We are tempted to point out that in the kinds of societies traditionally studied by social anthropologists political, economic, religious, and social systems are in fact often not differentiated, and to reply that political scientists have not themselves made so clear a definition of political systems. But, reviewing the essays under consideration, Easton's own suggestion about the classification of political systems in terms of differentiation in roles fits in with a main concern of recent anthropology — marked in Aidan Southall's essay on 'A Critique of the Typology of States and Political Systems' (2).

Introduction

For the rest, the social anthropologist in his analysis of political problems seems to turn to whatever source, outside of anthropology, he feels can assist his specific analysis. Thus when F. G. Bailey considers 'Consensus as a Procedure for Taking Decisions in Councils and Committees: with special reference to village and local government in India' (2), he uses work by Morris-Jones, a political scientist, on India; Wheare's now classic survey of *Government by Committee* (1955); a study of contemporary parties and politics in Japan; and F. M. Cornford's witty analysis of Cambridge University politics, *Microcosmographia Academica* (1908). Nicholas, in a comparative analysis of 'Factions' (2), equally uses a small number of political science studies. We are not suggesting that these writers use all — or even the most important — relevant sources from political science: indeed, we ourselves know of others they might have used. We indicate here only that there is a readiness to turn to political science, and Bailey's essay has more references to works by political scientists than to works by other anthropologists. Political anthropology, at least, is linking up with its cognate discipline: and this clearly is not difficult, since the concepts and analytic framework of political science are not too diverse from those of social anthropology. No new techniques have to be learned to master them.

SPECIALIZATION AND SPREAD: LINKS WITH BIOLOGY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY

In contrast to this turn towards sociology of various kinds and to at least some fields of political science, plus the underrepresented use of economics and law, we note relatively few references to cultural anthropology, psychological anthropology, psychology, and the biological sciences. In the volume on religion (3) there are references to the work of Margaret Mead, partly in the particular ethnographic context of Bali in which she worked with Gregory Bateson. This is in Clifford Geertz's essay on 'Religion as a Cultural System'. He begins by stating that the detailed studies of religion in particular societies which have characterized social anthropology are in 'a state of general
stagnation', suffering under what 'Janowitz has called the dead hand of competence'. Geertz summarizes the achievements of anthropological study of religion as: 'Yet one more meticulous case-in-point for such well-established propositions as that ancestor worship supports the jural authority of elders, that initiation rites are means for the establishment of sexual identity and adult status, that ritual groupings reflect political oppositions, or that myths provide charters for social institutions and rationalizations of social privilege may well finally convince a great many people, both inside the profession and out, that anthropologists are, like theologians, firmly dedicated to proving the indubitable.'

We do not believe that these summary statements at the opening of Geertz's essay are quite fair assessments of the acute and complicated analyses actually made by social anthropologists of ancestor cults, initiation ceremonies, political rituals, and the social context of myths, exemplified in the three essays on religion in specific societies in the same volume - by V. W. Turner on 'Colour Classification in Ndembu Ritual', by R. Bradbury on 'Fathers, Elders, and Ghosts in Edo Religion', and by E. Winter on 'Traditional Groupings and Religion among the Iroquois'. Geertz has himself written a notable analysis (1960) of a single society's religions.

Geertz is clearly being critical of his own, as well as of his colleagues', work, in order to plead for a much wider treatment of the general 'cultural dimension of religious analysis'. And he is not unique among younger anthropologists in feeling that the social anthropological analysis of religion by itself is inadequate. We take it that this mode of analysis is restricted to examining the role of religion, with emphasis on custom, rite, and belief, in social relations; and we believe that those who follow this procedure realize that they are not explaining 'the whole of religion'. They accept that they are analysing religion in only one of its dimensions, and that other dimensions have to be analysed by other types of discipline, using different techniques and perhaps examining other types of data. Clearly any set of phenomena as complicated as religion - indeed any social complex - for total understanding has to be subjected to investigation by several disciplines.

We believe that most social anthropologists would accept this. Melford Spiro in his essay on 'Religion: Problems of Definition and Explanation' (3) states in his 'Conclusion' to his argument 'that an adequate explanation for the persistence of religion requires both psychological (in this instance, psychoanalytical) and sociological variables'. Religion, or family structure, or motivations, can be taken variously as independent or dependent variables. Spiro continues: 'But many studies of religion, however, are concerned not with the explanation of religion, but with the role of religion in the explanation of society. Here, the explanatory task is to discover the contributions which religion, taken as the independent variable, makes to societal integration, by its satisfaction of sociological wants. This is an important task, central to the main concern of anthropology, as the science of social systems. We seriously err, however, in mistaking an explanation of society for an explanation of religion which, in effect, means confusing the sociological functions of religion with the bases for its performance.' In his introductory paragraphs to his essay on Iraqw ritual (3) Winter makes the same clarification.

We have cited Spiro at length because it is in the study of religion that some social anthropologists have manifested a reluctance to accept that a specifically social anthropological analysis, giving an admittedly limited explanation, provides anything like an adequate explanation. The essays by Geertz and Spiro exhibit some of this feeling, which has appeared also in work published elsewhere, by Britons as well as Americans. Where they invoke psychology, not all of them follow Spiro in calling for some form of depth-psychology. The psychic framework employed may be an intellectualist one, in which the explanatory value for the observers is emphasized, as in the claim that the difference between tribal and universalistic rituals stems from the way people in tribal societies construct their model of the universe on the model they abstract from their own social relations (Horton, 1964).

Spiro and Winter clarify the issues involved. To understand religion, in a commonsense use of 'understand', [at least] both sociological and psychological explanations are required. The sociological - that is, the social anthropological - analysis alone
is an explanation of the role of religion in social relations; and a psychological analysis alone is an explanation of the role of religion in the functioning of the personality. Nevertheless, we note that there is this dissatisfaction with the limited extent of social anthropological analysis in this field, which does not show in the treatment of political and a number of other problems.

Spiro’s remains a general, abstract essay. Geertz’s, interestingly enough after his castigatory opening, is largely taken up with a penetrating analysis of a specific situation in Java. With all respect, we believe that there is not ‘a state of general stagnation’ in the subject: the evidence of several monographs shows that social anthropological understanding of religion and ritual in specific societies continues to advance. Geertz calls for a study of symbols: we consider this is illuminatingly achieved in Turner’s essay on colour symbolism among the Ndembu. Geertz ‘slights’ such well-established propositions as that ‘ancestor worship supports the jural authority of elders’: we consider that Bradbury’s essay on the role of ghosts and spirits among the Edo, in a comparative background, and Winter’s similar attempt to illuminate the specific variants of spirit-cult organization among the Iraqw, show by contrast how steady, deep, and wide is the penetration of the subject’s understanding here.

Moreover, a discipline may advance by the working out logically of basic theoretical propositions, some of which are perhaps based on observation. This applies to theoretical economics and to some aspects of Parsons’s theory of action in sociology. Social anthropology has not shown a corresponding development, save perhaps in some of Lévi-Strauss’s analyses. Advance may also be achieved by the formulation of a series of propositions, based on observation. In the natural sciences, a number of these propositions have been cumulatively brought under a hierarchy of increasingly embracing laws. Social anthropology, like sociology and political science, has numerous propositions at the first level. It may lack widely embracing laws to cover many of these, but, like sociology and political science, it does have some theories of the middle range, as Merton (1958), with others, has phrased the situation. These middle-range theories are applied within a ‘general orientation towards substantive materials’ (ibid., pp. 87-88).

The kind of general approach to their data which social anthropologists have developed is illustrated throughout these essays: an insistence by most that there are interdependencies between both social relations and customs, and further associations between these interdependencies. Analysis of these interdependencies is often set in an evolutionary framework, even if it be a morphological rather than a temporal one, as the essays by Sahlins on primitive exchange (1), Wolf on kinship, friendship, and patron-client relations (4), and Mitchell and Frankenberg on the rural to non-rural continuum (4) well illustrate. The same framework is used by Lloyd and Southall, to some extent, in their essays on the typology of political systems (2). Yet social anthropology, judging by these essays, still lacks the kind of fundamental orientation found, for example, in Marxist sociology.

Individual propositions, stated baldly out of the context of this orientation, and of both field situation and corpus of allied propositions, may appear to be truistic – and hence banal. But the skill of anthropologists, like that of practitioners of the cognate disciplines, lies to a large extent still in their ability to apply, and weigh the application of, selected propositions to specific situations. This may be done within a single situation, with comparative checking implicit, or it may be done with occasional explicit comparison, or it may be done outright as a comparative study. On the whole, these procedures, and attempts to develop them with refinement of the basic propositions, appear to us to dominate these essays on ‘new approaches’ in the subject. The striving is after clarification; elimination of muddles; clearing away of concepts that, though once useful, now appear to be too gross and too block analysis; and the formulation of better theories of the middle range. These tendencies are marked in the essays by Geertz and Spiro, though these are also the only essays which press for, and aim at, much higher-level theories.

One attempt to formulate further theories of the middle range is appropriately referred to in this section on links with psychology and cultural anthropology. Wolf’s analysis of the
contexts in which kinship, friendship, and patron-client relations are respectively dominant in complex societies (4), is in some respects complementary to Sahlin's essay on the changing contexts of exchange in tribal societies (1): basically, it is social anthropological in tackling its problems, with the emphasis on making a living, handling relations with authorities, etc. But at the end of the essay, Wolf suggests that the varying texture of relations with kin, friends, and patrons or clients may have 'a point of encounter with what has sometimes been called the national character approach'. Examining works in this field, he is struck by the fact that 'they have utilized - in the main - data on the interpersonal sets discussed in [his] paper, and on the etiquettes and social idioms governing them'. Wolf cites three instances, and concludes: 'It is obvious that such descriptions and analyses do not cope with the institutional features of national structure. Yet it is equally possible that complex societies in the modern world differ less in the formal organization of their economic or legal or political systems than in the character of their supplementary inter-personal sets. Using the strategy of social anthropology, moreover, we would say that information about these sets is less meaningful when organized in terms of a construct of homogeneous national character, than when referred to the particular body of social relations and its function, partial or general, within the supplementary or parallel structure underlying the formal institutional framework ... The integration of the great society requires the knitting of these interstitial relations.'

We have cited Wolf at length because he appears to us explicitly to map in outline common ground between several of the essays which deal with what can be the social anthropological contribution to the study of complex societies. It is clearly accepted that a study of large-scale institutional frameworks such as the economic, or the administrative and political, falls to the lot of economists, political scientists, and sociologists. With this acceptance, goes the assumption, to quote Wolf again, of a possibility 'that complex societies of the modern world differ less in the formal organization of their economic or legal or political system than in the character of their supplementary inter-personal sets'. Anthropologists of all kinds have always been fascinated by the variety of human behaviour, even when they have sought uniformity and generality in that variety. So that aside from their interest in the small-scale, which fits with their techniques of observation, they tend to concentrate on those features of complex - as of tribal - societies where there are some distinctive sets of customs which require to be explained. We think this tendency shows in Bailey's treatment of committees and Nicholas's of factions in modern India (2).

This tendency is particularly marked in Monograph 4, specifically devoted to complex societies. In his essay on 'Theoretical Orientations in African Urban Studies' Mitchell begins by stating that 'in Africa, as elsewhere, urban studies raise the same questions'. He continues by stating that 'the focus of sociological interest in African urban studies must be on the way in which the behaviour of town-dwellers fits into, and is adjusted to, the social matrix created by the commercial, industrial, and administrative framework of a modern metropolis - having regard to the fact that most African town-dwellers have been born and brought up in the rural hinterland of the city, in which the cultural background is markedly dissimilar from that of the city'. After discussing social surveys and intensive studies, he distinguishes between 'historical' or 'processive' change to cover overall changes in the social system, and 'situational change', which covers changes in behaviour 'following participation in different social systems'. In dealing with both these types of change, Mitchell emphasizes the importance of relations of kinship and friendship - thus he faces the same problems as Wolf. He is then concerned to distinguish structural from categorical relationships, before passing to emphasize the importance of studying 'the network of personal links which individuals have built around themselves in towns'. Seeing problems very similar to those seen by Wolf, he suggests that the study of networks may show 'the way in which norms and values are diffused in a community, and how the process of "feedback" takes place.' In these studies, gossip, joking relations, historical antecedents, can all be taken into account.

In Monograph 4 Adrian Mayer treats, with technical detail, a similar set of problems, in an essay on 'The Significance of
Quasi-Groups in the Study of Complex Societies. He too emphasizes the importance of networks and action-sets of relations, as against groups, and tries to clarify and refine those concepts. He applies them to an Indian electoral struggle. He concludes: ‘It may well be that, as social anthropologists become more interested in complex societies and as the simpler societies themselves become more complex, an increasing amount of work will be based on Ego-centred entities such as action-sets and quasi-groups, rather than on groups and sub-groups’ – the latter being, presumably, what Wolf calls ‘the formal organization’ of complex societies.

Burton Benedict, in the same monograph, considers ‘Sociological Characteristics of Small Territories’ such as Mauritius. He sets his task as an assessment of the relation between the scale of society and: the number, kinds, and duration of social roles; types of values and alternatives; magico-religious practices; jural relations; political structure; and economic development. The first three are traditionally in the field of social anthropology. What is more significant is that in handling the last two sets of problems, Benedict emphasizes that the elites involved are small, and, though not explicitly, we are back with the problems of quasi-groups, networks, and action-sets.

Frankenberg’s discussion (also in 4) of changes in the structure of social roles and role-sets in a range of British ‘communities’, from the truly rural to the housing-estate, hinges again on changes, in both groups and quasi-groups, which determine the structure of individuals’ varied roles; but he illustrates too the urgent need to study custom, belief, and ceremonial as our specific contribution.

We see here, then, a common orientation, and a drive towards a common set of concepts, as social anthropologists tackle the problems of urban societies and of changing tribal and peasant communities. Some of them argue explicitly that these concepts developed to handle ‘complex’ situations, would also illuminate studies of tribal societies. These studies deal with problems which social anthropologists share with sociologists and political scientists, rather than with other types of anthropologists, and it may be that the social part of the title ‘social anthropology’ will begin to outweigh the anthropology. Yet there remain speci-
may even block further analysis. The second is the feeling that more work should be done to pull together, in a comparative framework, observations that are discrete in terms of subject-matter or of ethnographic milieu. Obviously, these are the two possibilities that offer themselves, aside from carrying out studies that repeat what has been done before — and we do not regard such studies as useless. One can either penetrate more deeply into an area of problems, or pull together what has already been done.

There are many new ideas in these essays, but no author has tried to put forward an altogether new theoretical approach — or even to recast the basic orientations of the subject. In making the statement, we do so with full allowance for Spiro's insistence (3) that to study religion, as against studying society, a psychological approach is as essential as a social anthropological one. Geertz pleads (3) for a new look — via philosophy, history, law, literature, or the 'harder' sciences — at religion, but he nevertheless considers that 'the way to do this is not abandon the established traditions of social anthropology in this field, but to widen them'. He still looks to Durkheim, Weber, Freud, and Malinowski as 'inevitable starting-points for any useful anthropological theory of religion'. The specific problems he deals with — suffering, evil, chance, the bizarre, ethics — are not in themselves new fields of problems, though his proffered solutions to the problems may be new.

The basic orientation in these essays is therefore still the acceptance that the events which comprise human behaviour exhibit regularities whose forms are mutually interdependent, over and above their interdependence in the personality-behaviour systems of each individual actor. As Radcliffe-Brown put it, there are social systems whose structures can be analysed. An interdependence of cultural institutions, each of which has an elaborate structure, would perhaps be the parallel Malinowskian formulation. Given this general orientation, it seems to us that these social anthropologists have a much looser idea of a social system, or of a complex of institutions, than Radcliffe-Brown or Malinowski had. A social system is not seen in analogy with an organic system, whose structure is maintained by some customary procedure, as it was by Radcliffe-

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Brown. Nor is there acceptance of Malinowski's ideas of the function of institutions in relation to a hierarchy of needs: Spiro (3) specifically criticizes this approach.

These 'tight' models of social systems or cultures were abandoned by the inter-war generation of social anthropologists (see Redfield, 1955). But those anthropologists continued to worry about the nature of social systems and cultures, or the structure of social fields. On the evidence of these essays, the younger anthropologists no longer consider this worry justified: at least none of them has dealt with that kind of problem at length, or as basic to his analysis. Geertz (3) goes to some pains to discuss 'culture'. Spiro (3) has some discussion of what a system is. David Schneider, in an essay on 'Some Muddles in the Models: or, How the System Really Works' (1) considers the competing, and hotly argued, opposed views of two sets of anthropologists on descent and affinity: and he states that one cause of their disputation is that they need to be clearer about whether the theory is advanced to cover the structure of a social system, or whether it is about how the individual finds his way in that system. He feels that the argument will get nowhere, unless this point is clarified. That is, he asks for clarity on problems set, and he is not concerned with the epistemology of the subject. We hope that our younger colleagues feel that earlier disputation on the nature of social systems and social fields, or on the nature of culture, clarified the issues, if only through the substantive work done; and that the disputation was not always meaningless.

When we say there seems to be no new general orientation shown, but a determination to get on with the job with established orientations, we must mention the 'new' evolutionary school of Leslie White, represented here by Sahlins's essay on primitive exchange in Monograph 1. The evolutionary argument is not marked in this particular essay, and on the whole Sahlins's analysis is similar in structure to the arguments of Wolf about kinship, friendship, and patron-client relations (4), of Frankenberg about the association of role types with forms of British community (4), of Benedict about the characteristics of small-scale territories (4), and of Lloyd and Southall about the typology of African political systems (2). The type of argument is
Max Gluckman and Fred Eggan shown in the cautious hypothesis about primitive money which, among others, is advanced, by Sahlins: ‘it [primitive money] occurs in conjunction with unusual incidence of balanced reciprocities in peripheral social sectors. Presumably it facilitates the heavy balanced traffic’. This is precisely the sort of hypothesis about an association between social variables which is commonly sought by anthropologists, and is well illustrated in the four other essays just cited. But Sahlins continues: ‘The conditions that encourage primitive money are most likely to occur in the range of primitive societies called tribal and are unlikely to be served by band or chiefdom development ... Not all tribes provide circumstances for monetary development and certainly not all enjoy primitive money, as that term is here understood. For the potentiality of peripheral exchange is maximized only by some tribes. Others remain relatively inner-directed.’

We consider that, despite the turning against the simple evolutionary theories of the nineteenth century, some kind of evolutionary, or morphological, framework has been implicit in most comparative work in social anthropology. We say, ‘or morphological’, because many scholars have avoided an outright evolutionary statement in order to evade temporal implications. Radcliffe-Brown did this, but he believed strongly in social evolution. The result is that, aside from their important theses on the relation between use of energy and social forms, the new evolutionists, as Sahlins’s essay shows, are trying to handle associations of concomitant variations, rather than items of culture, in somewhat similar ways to their colleagues. Nevertheless, we note that this new evolutionary theorizing is here represented only in the interstices, rather than in the central part, of Sahlins’s essay.

REFINEMENT OF CONCEPTS

We have said that one main line of approach in these monographs, represented in several essays, is the refinement of standard concepts, in hopes of penetrating more deeply into the structure of social life. This tendency is marked in the several discussions of social roles. Even before Linton in 1936 advanced his definitions of ‘status’ and ‘role’, the handling of these phenomena was important in social anthropology: one has only to think of Radcliffe-Brown’s concern with social personality and persona. But Linton’s formulation, with the increasing interest of social anthropologists in sociological studies, focused attention more sharply on social structures as systems of roles (see, for example, Nadel, 1957). The work on social roles of Merton and Parsons, and later Goffman, as already cited, became influential. Some of the essays accept that, for certain purposes, ‘role’ can be used in analysis, as a general concept: but it is also subjected to a closer reexamination than almost anything else in the monographs.

This tone is set by the very first essay, Goodenough’s ‘Re-thinking “Status” and “Role”: Toward a General Model of the Cultural Organization of Social Relationships’ (1). Goodenough is dissatisfied with the impasse into which we have run through the use of status and role as, to use our own shorthand, ‘global’ concepts, covering types of facts which need to be clearly differentiated. At the same time, he is dissatisfied with the present tendency to look at structural relationships apart from their cultural content. Drawing analogies from structural linguistics, he therefore attempts to construct a means of establishing both vocabularies and a syntax of the rules of ‘roles’. To do this, he aims at a clearer specification of terms to describe the attributes of individuals and the relationships between them. He suggests, therefore, that status should not be, as he says Linton treated it, a means of reference to categories or kinds of persons, but that it should be confined to combinations of right and duty only. Social ‘positions’ in a categorical sense he calls ‘social identities’. Each person has several social identities, and in specific situations one is selected as appropriate: this Goodenough terms ‘the selector’s social persona in the interaction’.

We are not, in this Introduction, summarizing any of the essays, and the preceding sketch is intended only to indicate the drive for the refinement of concepts which in the past have been illuminatingly employed, in order to secure more penetrating analysis. Having specified his terms, Goodenough proceeds to outline different types of situation in which these clarify relations between various egos and alters. On the cultural con-
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tent side, he distinguishes the ranges of rights and duties, as against privileges and immunities—following here the terminology of the jurist, Hohfeld, which Hoebel has tried to get anthropologists to adopt. Goodenough thereupon proposes a technique by use of scalograms, to work out whether there are right-duty/privilege-immunity clusters in particular identity relationships as seen by single informants. Varied cultural demands—such as 'sleeping in the same house', 'joking sexually in public'—are taken, and the informant is asked whether each demand applies in a particular identity relationship. These combine to give specific composite pictures of duty-scales. Goodenough argues that owing to limitations on the cognitive power of individuals—here is another example of an author citing psychological research—the demands, each forming a 'status dimension', must be limited in number to seven or less. He suggests that these duty-scales can be powerful instruments of social analysis, since (as he demonstrates by examples) they will allow objective measurement of anger, insult, flattery, and the gravity of offences. The last point is illustrated by a situation where breach of norm on the part of one identity justifies severe breach of duty by another. This will lead to precision in the study of single societies, and in the comparison of different societies.

This summary does not set out all the intricacies of the argument; but we have discussed this essay in order to illustrate what we mean when we say several authors see one line of advance in an increasing refinement of established concepts, and specification of others, to replace single concepts which, in their traditional global form, have outlived their usefulness. Goodenough's essay is the most explicit treatment of 'status' and 'role' in this way; but it seems to us that similar procedures are at least implicit in those parts of Lloyd's and Southall's essays on political systems (2) which aim to relate changes in role patterns with changes in macroscopic political structures. The explicit reformulation of the ideas involved in social roles emerges again in Frankenberg's essay (4) on changes in roles with 'movement' from British rural areas, through villages and small towns, into cities. Like Goodenough, he concerns himself with patterns of interaction—and he turns to cybernetics for ideas to handle these patterns. Both of them find in Goffman's...
The urge to clarify and refine appears also in a different context in Barbara Ward's essay 'Varieties of the Conscious Model' (1), where she considers the situation of a group of boat-dwelling fishermen in Hong Kong. These people consider themselves to be Chinese; and, Ward asks, by what model can their Chinese identity be assessed? Her starting-point is Lévi-Strauss's distinction between culturally produced models and observer's models. The former, constructs of the people under study themselves, he calls conscious models; the latter, unconscious, models. Ward argues that to understand her field situation, she had to take into account several conscious models - that of Chinese society held by Chinese literati, that of the group under study held by themselves, those of this group held by other groups of Chinese - as well as the unconscious, the anthropologist's, model. She examines the relationship between these models, as set in the context of different areas of Chinese society, to assess where 'the uniformity and continuity of the traditional Chinese social system' lay; and she finds it in family structures.

The demand for rethinking, clarification, and refinement runs through all the essays in Monograph 1, that on 'models'. We have cited it from the essays by Goodenough, Sahlins, and Ward. It appears as strikingly in the other essays: by Joan Lewis on 'Problems in the Comparative Study of Unilineal Descent' and David Schneider on 'Some Muddles in the Models'. Lewis argues that if correlations are to be established in comparative work, it is necessary to measure the intensity of such a principle as unilineal descent. He attempts to do this by applying various criteria to four patrilineal societies. He comes to the conclusion after his survey that by these principles involved in unilineal descent, various societies scale differently, and hence he suggests that this kind of classification is difficult and probably unfruitful. He argues that the functional significance of descent varies too much, hence canons of descent may not be fruitful criteria. The lumping together of societies on the basis of patriliney or matriliney alone can only lead to confusion. The functional implications of descent are much more significant than whether descent is traced in the patri- or matri-line' - an argument advanced by Leach in Rethinking Anthropology (1961).

Since Lewis does not suggest alternative criteria, we take his essay to be an example of that important class of work which aims to prove that a particular line of research is fruitless. The implications of the final sentence are clear: more refined, multiple variables must be sought.

Schneider's essay is much more difficult to delineate. It deals with a heated controversy between anthropologists about relationships of descent, and relationships of marriage or alliance. The argument is complex, and difficult to follow without detailed knowledge of the background literature which is discussed - and at least one of us, a political anthropologist, frankly confesses his difficulties here. Nevertheless, for present purposes it is clear that Schneider is trying to clarify the terminological and other muddles that he considers obstruct agreement: he points out to the contestants where they are talking in fact about different things, when they appear to be talking about the same thing. For, he says, there are two categories of anthropologists involved, and though there may be differences between the members of each category, they are distinctive from the others. There are the descent theory anthropologists (Fortes, Gluckman, Goody), who look for actual groups of people who intermarry with one another, and alliance theory anthropologists (Lévi-Strauss, Leach, Needham), who are primarily interested in 'that construct or model which is fabricated by the anthropologist and which is presumed to have, as its concrete expression, the norms for social relations and the rules governing the constitution of social groups and their interrelations'. Schneider argues that aside from weaknesses in each theory, they both contain contradictions and obscurities in their formulations. Most of the disputants are not clear in their arguments with one another on how far they are erecting conceptual models, which do not refer to real segments of the society, and how far they are referring to actual segments, based mainly on ownership of property and other jural rights. He suggests that this is because each of the theories is elaborated for a different type of society. The alliance theory is formulated for systems (which Schneider calls segmental) in which marriages of women proceed always from one segment to another; the descent theory for systems (which Schneider calls segmentary)
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in which men in one segment can marry into a number of other segments.

Schneider feels that each protagonist is driven by the polemical situation to defend ‘his type’, and that leads to the ‘propagation of whole-system, over-simple typologies’. His own plea is for the use of typologies for specific problems, ‘not for sorting of concrete societies into unchangeable, inherent, inalienable categories’. Selection of various elements, rigorously defined, and examination of combinations, permutations, and recombinations of these elements in many constellations, will prove more profitable.

SPECIFICATION OF CONTEXT

Schneider’s essay contains also a plea for the clearer specification of more limited and varying contexts of relations, in order to assess the association of variables. Similar demands are present in a number of other essays on various subjects. They appear in every essay of the Monograph 2 on political problems. Bailey, in examining the alleged value, or rather ‘the mystique’, of ‘consensus’ in committees, distinguishes what he calls elite and arena councils, the size of councils, forms of external relations.

The Search for the Broad Hypothesis or Theory

It seems, then, that most of the contributors to this volume favour clarification, the breaking down, and the refinement, of standard concepts, together with closer specification of narrower social contexts, as likely to be a more fruitful line of advance than the search for sweeping generalizations. This is explicitly stated in a few essays, and is implicit in others. Since contributors were asked to write papers indicating where they thought new approaches would be fruitful, we believe we may assume that the essays in this series reflect the feeling of our younger colleagues, and that they did not merely submit to us essays on a problem on which they happened to be working. There was, of course, in the discussion on the papers, argument on this point: as there was plenty of abstract argument about scientific method. But it must be significant that perhaps only two out of a score of papers can be seen as arguing for a much wider treatment of a specific problem - and we are not sure that this is a correct interpretation of Geertz’s paper (3) when taken in its entirety, or of Spiro’s essay at clarifying the various dimensions involved in the study or religion. Both of them emphasize the close and meticulous analyses of facts in restricted contexts: their plea is rather for an increase in the disciplines whose techniques and concepts should be employed in analysis by social anthropologists.

All the essays in fact show that social anthropologists are ready to turn where they feel they can get help to solve a specific problem. But the one difference we find between British and American contributors is that the British on the whole confine themselves to a narrower range of other disciplines - those commonly grouped as the social sciences. As stated above, Loudon’s essay on ‘Religious Order and Mental Disorder’ (4) illustrates this restriction. Turner, in his analysis of Ndembu colour classification (3), is aware of how closely his problems raise issues treated by the psycho-analysts, but he eschews involvement in psycho-analytic interpretations. The American anthropologists are readier to move outside the restricted range of the social sciences to draw on disciplines which employ quite different techniques and concepts.

CONCLUSION

Overall, then, these essays, whether they consider a single society or make surveys over several societies, show the continu-
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ing balancing of detailed, meticulous analysis of limited social fields with comparative checking that has long characterized the subject. The meticulous analysis of a single situation dominates in Turner's essay on colour classification, as it does in Bradbury's on Edo and Winter's on Iraqw religion. It forms too a core to Geertz's paper (all in Monograph 3). The comparative survey dominates Sahlin's analysis of exchange (1) and Wolf's of kinship, friendship, and patronage. Both types of analysis are strongly present in all the essays.

We have not attempted in this Introduction to discuss the argument of each essay or to assess its merits. The field covered by the essays shows that, even setting aside ethnographic specialization, a social anthropologist now will find it difficult to be competent on political problems, economic problems, domestic life, religious action, etc. -- particularly as more and more is drawn from cognate disciplines. Therefore we are not competent to assess more than a few of the essays, and to do that would have been invidious. Instead, we have tried to delineate what we see as common in these new approaches, spread over a variety of problems and printed in four Monographs. Our own essay may be at least a guide to where readers can find the new leads that are being pursued by a younger generation of social anthropologists.

Acknowledgements

Finally, we have to thank, for our colleagues and ourselves, a number of people on whom this symposium has depended. Professor Raymond Firth conceived the plan and pushed through the preliminary arrangements, with Professor Fred Eggan. The Executive Board of the American Anthropological Association was kind enough to sponsor a request to the National Science Foundation which provided the financial support to enable the Americans to travel to Britain. Dr Michael Banton, as Honorary Secretary of the Association, organized the conference, and has acted as editor of the Monographs. The Fellows and domestic staff of Jesus College, Cambridge, provided a setting in which we met in great comfort amidst pleasant surroundings; and this side of our foregathering was admirably handled by Mr G. I. Jones, Lecturer in Social Anthropology in Cambridge University and Fellow of Jesus Col., re. Mr John Harvard-Watts and Miss Diana Burfield of Tavistock Publications have been invaluable and generous in help over publication.

A number of anthropologists worked hard in preparing openings to the discussion of each section. Some of the Americans who presented papers undertook this double duty. The following British anthropologists filled the role: Dr M. Banton, Dr P. Cohen, Dr J. Goody, and Professor P. M. Worsley. We had also the pleasure of the company of Professor G. C. Homans of Harvard, a sociologist who has worked with social anthropologists, and who effectively prevented us from developing too great ethnocentricity. He travelled especially from America to attend the meeting.

Finally, Gluckman insists, on behalf of the Association of Social Anthropologists of the British Commonwealth, on thanking Fred Eggan. As Firth inspired the meeting, Eggan, though acting as an individual, made it possible. In many ways, including his own presence as an American elder, supported only by the happy chance of Professor Sol Tax being in Britain, he contributed to what was a memorable occasion in the history of social anthropology -- which is permanently encapsulated in these four volumes. And Eggan wishes, on behalf of the American group, to express their appreciation of the fine hospitality of their hosts which went beyond the strict requirements of the occasion, and to thank Max Gluckman for the excellence of his chairmanship and for assuming the task of drafting this introduction. To the authors of the essays, our joint thanks are due.

References

INTRODUCTORY COMMENT

This examination of the concepts 'status' and 'role' arises from my concern with a problem in ethnographic description. It is the problem of developing methods for processing the data of field observation and informant interview so as to enhance the rigor with which we arrive at statements of a society's culture or system of norms such that they make social events within that society intelligible in the way that they are intelligible to its members. My thinking about this problem has been inspired largely by structural linguistics, a discipline that has achieved a high degree of rigor in formulating descriptive statements of the normative aspects of speech behavior. I have found it useful to look upon the cultural content of social relationships as containing (among other things) 'vocabularies' of different kinds of forms and a 'syntax' or set of rules for their composition into (and interpretation as) meaningful sequences of social events.

This orientation was explicit in my account of the social organization of Truk (Goodenough, 1951). Out of it developed my later work with 'compositional analysis' in what might be called descriptive or structural semantics (Goodenough, 1966, 1957), representing an approach to constructing valid models of the categorical aspects of social norms. Here, I shall elaborate another analytical method that was first suggested in my Truk report, one aimed at a grammatical aspect of normative behavior. Hopefully it will enable us to make systematic and exhaustive descriptions of the cultural domain embraced by the expressions 'status' and 'role'.

THE POINT OF DEPARTURE

Ralph Linton (1936, pp. 113-114) defined statuses as 'the polar
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On the Sociology of Primitive Exchange

In a discussion that has anthropological pretensions, 'provisional generalization' is no doubt a redundant phrase. Yet the present venture needs a doubly cautious introduction. Its generalizations have developed out of a dialogue with ethnographic materials - many of these are appended Tylorian fashion as 'illustrative materials' - but no rigorous tests have been applied. Perhaps the conclusions may be offered as a plea to ethnography rather than a contribution to theory, if these are not again the same thing. At any rate, there follow some suggestions about the interplay in primitive communities between forms, material conditions, and social relations of exchange.

I

MATERIAL FLOW AND SOCIAL RELATIONS

What are in the received wisdom 'noneconomic' or 'exogenous' conditions are in the primitive reality the very organization of economy. A material transaction is usually a momentary episode in a continuous social relation. The social relation exerts governance: the flow of goods is constrained by, is part of, a status etiquette. 'One cannot treat Nuer economic relations by themselves, for they always form part of direct social relations of a general kind', Evans-Pritchard writes: '... there is always between them a general social relationship of one kind or another, and their economic relations, if such they may be called, must conform to this general pattern of behavior' (1940, pp. 90-91). The dictum is broadly applicable (cf. White 1959, pp. 242-245).

Yet the connection between material flow and social relations is reciprocal. A specific social relation may constrain a given movement of goods, but a specific transaction - 'by the same token' - suggests a particular social relation. If friends make gifts, gifts make friends. A great proportion of primitive ex-
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change, much more than our own traffic, has as its decisive function this latter, instrumental one: the material flow underwrites or initiates social relations. Thus do primitive peoples transcend Hobbesian chaos. For the indicative condition of primitive society is the absence of a public and sovereign power: persons and (especially) groups confront each other not merely as distinct interests but with the possible inclination and certain right to physically prosecute these interests. Force is decentralized, legitimately held in severalty, the social compact has yet to be drawn, the state nonexistent. So peacemaking is not a sporadic intersocietal event, it is a continuous process within society itself. Groups must 'come to terms' - the phrase notably connotes a material exchange satisfactory on both sides:

In these primitive and archaic societies there is no middle path. There is either complete trust or mistrust. One lays down one's arms, renounces magic and gives everything away, from casual hospitality to one's daughter or one's property. It is in such conditions that men, despite themselves, learnt to renounce what was theirs and made contracts to give and repay. But then they had no choice in the matter. When two groups of men meet they may move away or in case of mistrust or defiance they may resort to arms; or else they can come to terms' (Mauss, 1954, p. 79).

Even on its strictly practical side, exchange in primitive communities has not the same role as the economic flow in modern industrial communities. The place of transaction in the total economy is different: under primitive conditions it is more detached from production, less firmly hinged to production in an organic way. Typically, it is less involved than modern exchange in the acquisition of means of production, more involved with the redistribution of finished goods through the community. The bias is that of an economy in which food holds a commanding position, and in which day-to-day output does not depend on a massive technological complex nor a complex division of labor. It is the bias also of a domestic mode of production: of household producing units, division of labor by sex and age dominant, production that looks to familial requirements, and direct access by domestic groups to strategic resources. It is the bias of a social

order in which rights to control returns go along with rights to a resource of production, and in which there is very limited traffic in titles or income privileges in resources. It is the bias, finally, of societies ordered in the main by kinship. Such characteristics of primitive economies as these, so broadly stated, are of course subject to qualification in specific instances. They are offered only as a guide to the detailed analysis of distribution that follows. It is also advisable to repeat that 'primitive' shall refer to cultures lacking a political state, and it applies only insofar as economy and social relations have not been modified by the historic penetration of states.

On a very general view, the array of economic transactions in the ethnographic record may be resolved into two types. First, those 'vice-versa' movements between two parties known familiarly as 'reciprocity' \((A \xrightarrow{\text{reciprocity}} B)\). The second, centralized movements: collection from members of a group, often under one hand, and redivision within this group

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This is 'pooling' or 'redistribution'. On an even more general view, the two types merge. For pooling is an organization of reciprocities, a system of reciprocities - a fact of central bearing upon the genesis of large-scale redistribution under chiefly aegis. But this most general understanding merely suggests concentration in the first place on reciprocity; it remains the course of analytic wisdom to separate the two.

Their social organizations are very different. True, pooling and reciprocity may occur in the same social contexts - the same close kinsmen pool their resources in household commensality, for instance, also individuals share things with one another - but the precise social relations of pooling and reciprocity are not the same. The material transaction that is pooling is socially a within relation, the collective action of a group. Reciprocity is a between relation, the action and reaction of two parties. Thus pooling is the complement of social unity and, in Polanyi's term, 'centricity'; whereas, reciprocity is social duality and 'symmetry'. Pooling stipulates a social center where goods meet and thence
flow outwards, and a social boundary too, within which persons (or subgroups) are cooperatively related. But reciprocity stipulates two sides, two distinct social-economic interests. Reciprocity can establish solidarity relations, in so far as the material flow suggests assistance or mutual benefit, yet the social fact of sides is inescapable.

Considering the established contributions of Malinowski and Firth, Chuckman, Richards, and Polanyi, it does not seem too sanguine to say that we know fairly well the material and social concomitants of pooling. Also, what is known fits the argument that pooling is the material side of 'collectivity' and 'centricity'. Cooperative food production, rank and chieftainship, collective political and ceremonial action, these are some of the ordinary contexts of pooling in primitive communities. To review very briefly:

The everyday, workaday variety of redistribution is familial pooling of food. The principle suggested by it is that products of collective effort in provisioning are pooled, especially should the cooperation entail division of labor. Stated so, the rule applies not only to householding but to higher-level cooperation as well, to groups larger than households that develop about some task of procurement — say, buffalo-impounding in the Northern Plains or netting fish in a Polynesian lagoon. With qualifications — such as the special shares locally awarded special contributions to the group endeavor — the principle remains at the higher, as at the lower, household level: 'Goods collectively procured are distributed through the collectivity.'

Rights of call on the produce of the underlying population, as well as obligations of generosity, are everywhere associated with chieftainship. The organized exercise of these rights and obligations is redistribution:

'I think that throughout the world we would find that the relations between economics and politics are of the same type. The chief, everywhere, acts as a tribal banker, collecting food, storing it, and protecting it, and then using it for the benefit of the whole community. His functions are the prototype of the public finance system and the organization of State treasuries of to-day. Deprive the chief of his privileges and financial benefits and who suffers most but the whole tribe?' (Malinowski, 1937, pp. 232-233).

This use for 'the benefit of the whole community' takes various forms: subsidizing religious ceremony, social pageantry, or war; underwriting craft production, trade, the construction of technical apparatus and of public and religious edifices; redistributing diverse local products; hospitality and succor of the community (in severity or in general) during shortage. Speaking more broadly, redistribution by powers-that-be serves two purposes, either of which may be dominant in a given instance. The practical, logistic function — redistribution — sustains the community, or community effort, in a material sense. At the same time, or alternatively, it has an instrumental function: as a ritual of communion and of subordination to central authority, redistribution sustains the corporate structure itself, that is in a social sense. The practical benefits may be critical, but, whatever the practical benefits, chiefly pooling generates the spirit of unity and centricity, codifies the structure, stipulates the centralized organization of social order and social action —

'... every person who takes part in the aγά [feast organized by a Tikopia chief] is impelled to participate in forms of cooperation which for the time being go far beyond his personal interests and those of his family and reach the bounds of the whole community. Such a feast gathers together chiefs and their clansfolk who at other times are rivals ready to criticize and slander each other, but who assemble here with an outward show of amity.... In addition, such purposive activity subserves certain wider social ends, which are common in the sense that every person or nearly every person knowingly or unknowingly promotes them. For instance, attendance at the aγά and participation in the economic contributions does in fact help to support the Tikopia system of authority' (Firth, 1950, pp. 230-231).

So we have at least the outline of a functional theory of redistribution. The central issues are now likely to be developmental ones, the specification by comparison or phylogenetic study of selective circumstances. The economic anthropology of
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reciprocity, however, 'not at the same stage. One reason, perhaps, is a popular tendency to view reciprocity as balance, as unconditional one-for-one exchange. Considered as a material transfer, reciprocity is often not that at all. Indeed, it is precisely through scrutiny of departures from balanced exchange that one glimpses the interplay between reciprocity, social relations, and material circumstances.

Reciprocity is a whole class of exchanges, a continuum of forms. This is specially true in the narrow context of material transactions— as opposed to a broadly conceived social principle or moral norm of give-and-take. At one end of the spectrum stands the assistance freely given, the small currency of everyday kinship, friendship, and neighborly relations, the 'pure gift' Malinowski called it, regarding which an open stipulation of return would be unthinkable and unsociable. At the other pole, self-interested seizure, appropriation by chicanery or force required only by an equal and opposite effort on the principle of lex talionis, 'negative reciprocity' as Gouldner phrases it. The extremes are notably positive and negative in a moral sense. The intervals between them are not merely so many gradations of material balance in exchange, they are intervals of sociability. The distance between poles of reciprocity is, among other things, social distance:

'Unto a stranger thou mayest lend upon usury; but unto thy brother thou shalt not lend usury' (Deuteronomy xxiii, 21).

'Native [Sinai] moralists assert that neighbors should be friendly and mutually trustful, whereas people from far-off are dangerous and unworthy of morally just consideration. For example, natives lay great stress on honesty involving neighbors while holding that trade with strangers may be guided by caveat emptor' (Oliver, 1955, p. 82).

'Gain at the cost of other communities, particularly communities at a distance, and more especially such as are felt to be aliens, is not obnoxious to the standards of homebred use and wont' (Veblen, 1915, p. 46).

'A trader always cheats people. For this reason intra-regional trade is rather frowned upon while inter-tribal trade gives to the [Kapsuku] businessman prestige as well as profit' (Pospisil, 1958, p. 127).

II

A SCHEME OF RECIPROCITIES

A purely formal typology of reciprocities is possible, one based exclusively on immediacy of returns, equivalence of returns, and like material and mechanical dimensions of exchange. The classification thus in hand, one might proceed to correlate subtypes of reciprocity with diverse 'variables' such as kinship distance of parties to the transaction. The virtue of this manner of exposition is that it is 'scientific', or so it would seem. Among the defects is that it is bogus, really just a metaphor of exposition, not a true history of experiment. It ought to be recognized from the beginning that the distinction of one type of reciprocity from another is more than formal. A feature such as the expectation of returns says something about the spirit of exchange, about its disinterestedness or its interestedness, the impersonality, the compassion. Any seeming formal classification conveys these meanings: it is as much a moral as a mechanical scheme. (That the recognition of the moral quality prejudges the relation of exchange to social 'variables', in the sense that the latter are then logically connected to variations in exchange, is not contested. This is a sign that the classification is good.)

The actual kinds of reciprocity are many in any primitive society, let alone in the primitive world taken as a whole. 'Vice-versa movements' may include sharing and counter-sharing of unprocessed food, informal hospitality, ceremonial affinal exchanges, loaning and repaying, compensation of specialized or ceremonial services, the transfer that seals a peace agreement, impersonal haggle, and so on and on. We have several ethnographic attempts to cope typologically with the empirical diversity, notably Douglas Oliver's scheme of Sinai transactions (1955, pp. 229-231; cf. Price, 1962, pp. 37 f; Spencer, 1959, pp. 194 f; Marshall, 1961; and others). In Crime and Custom, Malinowski wrote rather broadly and unconditionally about
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reciprocity; in the Argonauts, however, he developed a classification of Trobriand exchanges out of manifold variations in balance and equivalence (Malinowski, 1922, pp. 176-194). It was from this vantage-point, looking to the directness of returns, that the continuum which is reciprocity was revealed:

'I have on purpose spoken of forms of exchange, of gifts and counter-gifts, rather than of barter or trade, because, although there exist forms of barter pure and simple, there are so many transitions and gradations between that and simple gift, that it is impossible to draw any fixed line between trade on the one hand, and the exchange of gifts on the other... In order to deal with these facts correctly it is necessary to give a complete survey of all forms of payment or present. In this survey there will be at one end the extreme cases of pure gift, that is an offering for which nothing is given in return [but see Firth, 1957, pp. 221, 222]. Then, through many customary forms of gift or payment, partially or conditionally returned, which shade into each other, there come forms of exchange, where more or less strict equivalence is observed, arriving finally at real barter' (Malinowski, 1922, p. 176).

Malinowski's perspective may be taken beyond the Trobriands and applied broadly to reciprocal exchange in primitive societies. It seems possible to lay out in abstract fashion a continuum of reciprocities, based on the 'vice-versa' nature of exchanges, along which empirical instances encountered in the particular ethnographic case can be placed. The stipulation of material returns, less elegantly, the 'sidedness' of exchange, would be the critical thing. For this there are obvious objective criteria, such as the toleration of material unbalance and the leeway of delay: the initial movement of goods from hand to hand is more or less requisite materially and there are variations too in the time allowed for reciprocation (again see Firth, 1967, pp. 220-221).

Put another way, the spirit of exchange swings from disinterested concern for the other through mutuality to self-interest. So expressed, the assessment of 'sidedness' can be supplemented by ethnographic observation in addition to those of immediacy and material equivalence: the initial transfer may be voluntary, involuntary, prescribed, contracted; the return freely bestowed, exacted, or dunned; the exchange haggled or not, the subject of accounting or not; and so forth.

The spectrum of reciprocities proposed for general use is defined by its extremes and mid-point:

1. Generalized reciprocity, the solitary extreme (A ↔ B)
   'Generalized reciprocity' refers to transactions that are putatively altruistic, transactions on the line of assistance given and, if possible and necessary, assistance returned. The ideal type is Malinowski's 'pure gift'. Other indicative ethnographic formulae are 'sharing', 'hospitality', 'free gift', 'help', and 'generosity'. Less sociable, but tending toward the same pole are 'kinship dues', 'chiefly dues', and 'noblesse oblige'. Price (1962) refers to the genre as 'weak reciprocity' by reason of the vagueness of the obligation to reciprocate.

   At the extreme, say voluntary food-sharing among near kinsmen – or for its logical value, one might think of the suckling of children in this context – the expectation of a direct material return is unseemly. At best it is implicit. The material side of the transaction is repressed by the social: reckoning of debts outstanding cannot be overt and is typically left out of account. This is not to say that handing over things in such form, even to 'loved ones', generates no counter-obligation. But the counter is not stipulated by time, quantity, or quality: the expectation of reciprocity is indefinite. It usually works out that the time and worth of reciprocation are not alone conditional on what was given by the donor, but also upon what he will need and when, and likewise what the recipient can afford and when. Receiving goods lays on a diffuse obligation to reciprocate when necessary to the donor and/or possible for the recipient. The requital thus may be very soon, but then again it may be never. There are people who even in the fullness of time are incapable of helping themselves or others. A good pragmatic indication of generalized reciprocity is a sustained one-way flow. Failure to reciprocate does not cause the giver of stuff to stop giving: the goods move one way, in favor of the have-not, for a very long period.

2. Balanced reciprocity, the midpoint (A ↔ B)
   'Balanced reciprocity' refers to direct exchange. In precise
balance, the reciprocation is the customary equivalent of the thing received and is without delay. Perfectly balanced reciprocity, the simultaneous exchange of the same types of goods to the same amounts, is not only conceivable but ethnographically attested in certain marital transactions (e.g. Reay, 1959, pp. 95 f), friendship compacts (Seligman, 1910, p. 70), and peace agreements (Hogbin, 1939, p. 79; Loeb, 1926, p. 204; Williamson, 1912, p. 183). 'Balanced reciprocity' may be more loosely applied to transactions which stipulate returns of commensurate worth or utility within a finite and narrow period. Much 'gift-exchange', many 'payments', much that goes under the ethnographic head of 'trade' and plenty that is called 'buying-selling' and involves 'primitive money' belong in the genre of balanced reciprocity.

Balanced reciprocity is less 'personal' than generalized reciprocity. From our own vantage-point it is 'more economic'. The parties confront each other as distinct economic and social interests. The material side of the transaction is at least as critical as the social: there is more or less precise reckoning, as the things given must be covered within some short term. So the pragmatic test of balanced reciprocity becomes an inability to tolerate one-way flows; the relations between people are disrupted by a failure to reciprocate within limited time and equivalence leeways. It is notable of the main run of generalized reciprocities that the material flow is sustained by prevailing social relations; whereas, for the main run of balanced exchange, social relations hinge on the material flow.

3. Negative reciprocity, the unsociable extreme (A ~ B)

'Negative reciprocity' is the attempt to get something for nothing with impunity, the several forms of appropriation, transactions opened and conducted toward net utilitarian advantage. Indicative ethnographic terms include 'haggling' or 'barter', 'gambling', 'chicanery', 'theft', and other varieties of seizure.

Negative reciprocity is the most impersonal sort of exchange. In guises such as 'barter' it is from our own point of view the 'most economic'. The participants confront each other as opposed interests, each looking to maximize utility at the other's expense. Approaching the transaction with an eye singular to the main chance, the aim of the opening party or of both parties is the unearned increment. One of the most sociable forms, leaning toward balance, is haggling conducted in the spirit of 'what the traffic will bear'. From this, negative reciprocity ranges through various degrees of cunning, guile, stealth, and violence to the finesse of a well-conducted horse-raid. The 'reciprocity' is, of course, conditional again, a matter of defense of self-interest. So the flow may be one-way once more, reciprocation contingent upon mustering countervailing pressure or guile.

It is a long way from a suckling child to a Plains Indians' horse-raid. Too long, it could be argued, the classification too widely set. Yet 'vice-versa movements' in the ethnographic record do grade into each other along the whole span. It is well to recall, nevertheless, that empirical exchanges often fall somewhere along the line, not directly on the extreme and middle points here outlined. The question is, can one specify social or economic circumstances that impel reciprocity toward one or another of the stipulated positions, toward generalized, balanced, or negative reciprocity? I think so.

III

RECIPROCITY AND KINSHIP DISTANCE

The span of social distance between those who exchange conditions the mode of exchange. Kinship distance, as has already been suggested, is especially relevant to the form of reciprocity. Reciprocity is inclined toward the generalized pole by close kinship, toward the negative extreme in proportion to kinship distance.

The reasoning is nearly syllogistic. The several reciprocities from freely bestowed gift to chicanery amount to a spectrum of sociability, from sacrifice in favor of another to self-interested gain at the expense of another. Take as the minor premise Tylor's dictum that 'kindred goes with kindness, 'two words whose common derivation expresses in the happiest way one of the main principles of social life'. It follows that close kin tend to share, to enter into generalized exchanges, and distant and non-kin to deal in equivalents or in guile. Equivalence becomes
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compulsory in proportion to kinship distance lest relations break off entirely, for with distance there can be little tolerance of gain and loss even as there is little inclination to extend oneself. To nonkin - 'other people', perhaps not even 'people' - no quarter must needs be given: the manifest inclination may well be 'devil take the hindmost'.

All this seems perfectly applicable to our own society, but it is more significant in primitive society. Because kinship is more significant in primitive society. It is, for one thing, the organizing principle or idiom of most groups and most social relations. Even the category 'nonkin' is ordinarily defined by it, that is, as the negative aspect of it, the logical extreme of the class - nonbeing as a state of being. There is something real to this view; it is not logical sophistry. Among ourselves 'nonkin' denotes specialized status relations of positive quality: doctor-patient, policeman-citizen, employer-employee, classmates, neighbors, professional colleagues. But for them 'nonkin' principally connotes the negation of community (or tribalism); often it is the synonym for 'enemy' or 'stranger'. Likewise the economic relation tends to be a simple negation of kinship reciprocities: other institutional norms need not come into play.

Kinship distance, however, has different aspects. It may be organized in several ways, and what is 'close' in one of these ways need not be so in another. Exchange may be contingent on genealogical distance (as locally imputed), that is, on interpersonal kinship status. Or it may hinge on segmentary distance, on descent group status. (One suspects that where these two do not correspond the closer relation governs the reciprocity appropriate in dealings between individual parties, but this ought to be worked out empirically.) For the purpose of creating a general model, attention should also be given to the power of community in stipulating distance. It is not only that kinship organizes communities, but communities kinship, so that a spatial, coresidential term affects the measure of kinship distance and thus the mode of exchange.

'Mankind [to Siuai] consists of relatives and strangers. Relatives are usually interlinked by both blood and marital ties; most of them live nearby, and persons who live nearby are all relatives. . . . Transactions among them should be carried out in a spirit devoid of commerciality - preferably consisting of sharing [i.e., "pooling" in terms of the present discussion] nonreciprocable giving, and bequeathing, among closest relatives, or of lending among more distantly related ones. . . . Except for a few very distantly related sibs, persons who live far away are not relatives and can only be enemies. Most of their customs are unsuitable for the Siuai, but a few of their goods and techniques are desirable. One interacts with them only to buy and sell - utilizing hard bargaining and deceit to make as much profit from such transactions as possible' (Oliver, 1955, pp. 454-455).

Here is one possible model for analyzing reciprocity: a tribal plan can be viewed as a series of more and more inclusive kinship-residential sectors, and reciprocity seen then to vary in character by sectoral position. The close kinsmen who render assistance are particularly near kinsmen in a spatial sense: it is in regard to people of the household, the camp, hamlet, or village that compassion is required, inasmuch as interaction is intense and peaceable solidarity essential. But the quality of mercy is strained in peripheral sectors, strained by kinship distance, so is less likely in exchanges with fellow tribesmen of another village than among co-villagers, still less likely in the intertribal sector. Kinship-residential groupings from this perspective comprise ever-widening comembership spheres: the household, the local lineage, perhaps the village, the subtribe, tribe, other tribes - the particular plan of course varies. The structure is a hierarchy of levels of integration, but from the inside and on the ground it is a series of concentric circles. Social relations of each circle have a specific quality - household relations, lineage relations, and so on - and except as the sectoral divisions be cut through by other
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organizations of kinship solidarity—say, nonlocalized clans or personal kindreds—relations within each sphere are more solidary than relations of the next, more inclusive sector. Reciprocity accordingly inclines toward balance and chicane in proportion to sectoral distance. In each sector, certain modes of reciprocity are characteristic or dominant: generalized modes are dominant in the narrowest spheres and play out in wider spheres, balanced reciprocity is characteristic of intermediate sectors, chicane of the most peripheral spheres. In brief, a general model of the play of reciprocity may be developed by superimposing the society's sectoral plan upon the reciprocity continuum, something like this (Figure 1):

FIGURE 1—Reciprocity and Kinship Residential Sectors.

The plan does not rest alone upon the two terms of sectoral division and reciprocity variation. Something is to be said for the embedded third term, morality. 'Far more than we ordinarily suppose,' Firth has written, 'economic relations rest on moral foundations' (1961, p. 144). Certainly that must be the way the people see it—'Although the Siuai have separate terms for 'generosity', 'cooperativeness', 'morality' (that is, rule abiding), and 'generality', I believe that they consider all these to be closely interrelated aspects of the same attribute of goodness... (Oliver, 1955, p. 78). Another contrast with ourselves is suggested, a tendency for morality, like reciprocity, to be sectorally organized in primitive societies. The norms are characteristically relative and situational rather than absolute and universal. A given act, that is to say, is not as much in itself good or bad, it depends on who the 'Alter' is. The appropriation of another man's goods or his woman, which is a sin ('theft', 'adultery') in the bosom of one's community, may be not merely condoned but positively rewarded with the admiration of one's fellows—if it is perpetrated on an outsider. The contrast with the absolute standards of the Judeo-Christian tradition is probably overdrawn: no moral system is exclusively absolute (especially in wartime) and none perhaps is entirely relative and contextual. But situational standards, defined often in sectoral terms, do seem to prevail in primitive communities and this contrasts sufficiently with our own to have drawn repeated comment from ethnologists. For instance:

'Navaho morality is... contextual rather than absolute... Lying is not always and everywhere wrong. The rules vary with the situation. To deceive when trading with foreign tribes is a morally accepted practice. Acts are not in themselves bad or good. Incest [by its nature, a contextual sin] is perhaps the only conduct that is condemned without qualification. It is quite correct to use witchcraft techniques in trading with members of foreign tribes... There is an almost complete absence of abstract ideals. Under the circumstances of aboriginal life Navahos did not need to orient themselves in terms of abstract morality... In a large, complex society like modern America, where people come and go and business and other dealings must be carried on by people who never see each other, it is functionally necessary to have abstract standards that transcend an immediate concrete situation in which two or more persons are interacting' (Kluckhohn, 1959, p. 434).

The scheme with which we deal is tripartite: social, moral, and
economic. Reciprocity and morality are sectorally structured — the structure is that of kinship-tribal groupings.

But the scheme is entirely a hypothetical state of affairs. One can conceive circumstances that would alter the social-moral-reciprocal relations postulated by it. Propositions about the external sectors are particularly vulnerable. (For 'external can conceive circumstances that would alter the social-moral­
sector' one can generally read 'intertribal sector', the ethnic
is the normal in-group expectation.) Transactions in this sphere may be consummated by force and guile, it is true, by wabuwabu,
to use the near-onomatopoeic Dobuan term for sharp practice. Yet it seems that violent appropriation is a resort born of urgent requirements that can only, or most easily, be supplied by mili­tant tactics. Peaceful symbiosis is at least a common alternative.

In these nonviolent confrontations the propensity to wabuwabu no doubt persists; it is built in to the sectoral plan. So if it can be socially tolerated — if, that is, countervailing peace-enforcing conditions are sufficiently strong — hard bargaining is the institutionalized external relation. We find then gimwali, the mentality of the market place, the impersonal (no-partnership) exchange of Trobriand commoners of different villages or of Trobrianders and other peoples. But still gimwali does suppose special conditions, some sort of social insulation that prevents the economic friction from kindling a dangerous conflagration.

In the ordinary case, haggling is actually repressed, particularly, it appears, if the exchange of the border is critical to both sides, as where different strategic specialties move against each other. Despite the sectoral distance, the exchange is equitable, utu, balanced: the free play of wabuwabu and gimwali is checked in the interest of the symbiosis.

The check is delivered by special and delicate institutional means of border exchange. The means sometimes look so pre­posterous as to be considered by ethnologists some sort of 'game' the natives play, but their design manifestly immunizes an important economic interdependence against a fundamental social cleavage. (Compare the discussion of the kula in White, 1959, and Fortune, 1932.) Silent trade is a famous case in point — good relations are maintained by preventing any relations. Most

common are 'trade-partnerships' and 'trade-friendships'. The important thing in all varieties is a social suppression of negative reciprocity. Peace is built in, haggling outlawed, and, conducted as a transfer of equivalent utilities, the exchange in turn under­
writes the peace. (Trade-partnerships, often developed along lines of classificatory or affinal kinship, particularly incapable external economic transactions in solidary social relations. Status relations essentially internal are projected across community and tribal boundaries. The reciprocity then may lean over back­ward, in the direction not of wabuwabu but something to the generalized side. Phrased as gift-giving, the presentation admits of delay in reciprocation: a direct return may indeed be un­seemly. Hospitality, on another occasion returned in kind, accompanies the formal exchange of trade goods. For a host to give stuff over and above the worth of things brought by his partner is not unusual: it both befits the relation so to treat one's partner while he is traveling and stores up credits. On a wider view, this measure of unbalance sustains the trade partnership, compelling as it does another meeting.)

Intertribal symbiosis, in short, alters the terms of the hypo­thetical model. The peripheral sector is breached by more sociable relations than are normal in this zone. The context of exchange is now a narrower co-membership sphere, the exchange is peaceful and equitable. Reciprocity falls near the balance point.

Now the assertions of this essay, as I have said, developed out of a dialogue with ethnographic materials. It seems worth while to append some of these data to appropriate sections of the argument. Accordingly, Appendix A (below, pp. 186-200) sets out materials relevant to the present section, 'Reciprocity and Kinship Distance'. This is not by way of proof, of course — there are indeed certain exceptions, or seeming exceptions, in the materials — but by way of exposition or illustration. Moreover, since the ideas only gradually came over me and the monographs and articles had been in many instances consulted for other purposes, it is certain that data pertinent to reciprocity in the works cited have escaped me. (I hope this is sufficiently apologetic and that the ethnographic notes of Appendix A are of interest to someone besides myself.)

Whatever the value of these notes as exposition of the asserted
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relation between reciprocity and kinship distance, they must also suggest to the reader certain limitations of the present perspective. Simply to demonstrate that the character of reciprocity is contingent upon social distance - even if it could be demonstrated in an incontestable way - is not to traffic in ultimate explanation, nor yet to specify when exchanges will in fact take place. A systematic relation between reciprocity and sociability in itself does not say when, or even to what extent, the relation will come into play. The supposition here is that the forces of constraint lie outside the relation itself. The terms of final analysis are the larger cultural structure and its adaptive response to its milieu. From this wider view one may be able to stipulate the significant sectoral lines and kinship categories of the given case, and to stipulate too the incidence of reciprocity in different sectors. Supposing it true that close kinsmen would share food, for example, it need not follow that the transactions occur. The total (cultural-adaptive) context may render intensive sharing dysfunctional and predicate in subtle ways the demise of a society that allows itself the luxury. Permit me to quote in extenso a passage from Fredrik Barth's brilliant ecological study of South Persian nomads. It shows so well the larger considerations that must be brought to the bar of explanation; in detail it exemplifies a situation that discounts intensive sharing:

"The stability of a pastoral population depends on the maintenance of a balance between pastures, animal population, and human population. The pastures available by their techniques of herding set a maximal limit to the total animal population that an area will support; while the patterns of nomadic production and consumption define a minimal limit to the size of the herd that will support a human household. In this double set of balances is summarized the special difficulty in establishing a population balance in a pastoral economy: the human population must be sensitive to imbalances between flocks and pastures. Among agricultural, or hunting and collecting people, a crude Malthusian type of population control is sufficient. With a growing population, starvation and death-rate rise, until a balance is reached around which the population stabilizes. Where pastoral nomadism is the predominant or exclusive pattern, the nomad population, if subjected to such a form of population control, would not establish a population balance, but would find its whole basis for subsistence removed. Quite simply, this is because the productive capital on which their subsistence is based is not simply land, it is animals - in other words, food. A pastoral economy can only be maintained so long as there are no pressures on its practitioners to invade this large store of food. A pastoral population can therefore only reach a stable level if other effective population controls intervene before those of starvation and death-rate. A first requirement in such an adaptation is the presence of the patterns of private ownership of herds, and individual economic responsibility for each household. By these patterns, the population becomes fragmented with respect to economic activities, and economic factors can strike differentially, eliminating some members of the population [i.e., through sedentarization] without affecting other members of the same population. This would be impossible if the corporate organization with respect to political life, and pasteur rights, were also made relevant to economic responsibility and survival" (Barth, 1961, p. 124).

Now, about the incidence of reciprocity in the specific case, here is something else to consider - the people may be stingy. Nothing has been said about sanctions of exchange relations nor, more importantly, about forces that counteract. There are contradictions in primitive economies: inclinations of self-interest are unleashed that are incompatible with the high levels of sociability customarily demanded. Malinowski long ago noticed this and Firth (1926) in an early paper on Maori proverbs skilfully brought to light the clash, the subtle interplay, between the moral dictates of sharing and hedonist personal interest. The widespread mode of family production for use, it might be remarked, acts to brake outputs at comparatively low levels even as it orients economic concern inward, within the household. The mode of production thus does not readily lend itself to general economic solidarity. Suppose sharing is morally called for, say by the destitution of a near kinsman, all the things that make sharing good and proper may not evoke in an affluent man the inclination to do it. And even as there may be little to gain by assisting others,
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there are no iron-clad guarantees of such social compacts as kinship. The received social-moral obligations prescribe an economic course, and the publicity of primitive life, increasing the risk of evoking jealousy, hostility, and future economic penalty, tends to keep people on course. But, as is well known, to observe that a society has a system of morality and constraints is not to say that everyone acquiesces in it. There may be biكا­baša times, 'particularly in the late winter, when the household would hide its food, even from relatives' (Price, 1962, p. 47).

That biكا­baša is the pervasive condition of some peoples is not embarrassing to the present thesis. The Siriono, everyone knows, parley hostility and crypto-stinginess into a way of life. Interestingly enough, the Siriono articulate ordinary norms of primitive economic intercourse. By the norm, for instance, the hunter of chieftainship of, so that 'The bigger the catch the more sullen the hunter' (Holmberg, 1950, pp. 60, 82; cf. pp. 36, 38-39). The Siriono are not thereby different in kind from the run of primitive communities. They simply realize to an extreme the potentiality elsewhere less often consummated, the possibility that structural compulsions of generosity are unequal to a test of hardship. But then, the Siriono are a band of displaced and deculturated persons. The whole cultural shell, from rules of sharing through institutions of chieftainship and Crow kinship terminology, is a mockery of their present miserable state.

IV

RECIPROCITY AND KINSHIP RANK

It is by now apparent – it is made apparent by the illustrative materials of Appendix A – that in any actual exchange several circumstances may simultaneously bear upon the material flow. Kinship distance, while perhaps significant, is not necessarily decisive. Something may be said for rank, relative wealth and need, the type of goods whether food or durables, and still other 'factors'. As a tactic of presentation and interpretation, it is useful to isolate and separately consider these factors. Accordingly, we move on to the relation between reciprocity and kinship rank. But with this proviso: propositions about the covariation of kinship distance or of kinship rank and reciprocity can be argued separately, even validated separately to the extent to which it is possible to select instances in which only the factor at issue is in play – holding 'other things constant' – but the propositions do not present themselves separately in fact. The obvious course of further research is to work out the power of the several 'variables' during combined plays. At best only the beginnings of this course are suggested here.

Rank difference as much as kinship distance supposes an economic relation. The vertical, rank axis of exchange – or the implication of rank – may affect the form of the transaction, just as the horizontal kinship-distance axis affects it. Rank is to some extent privilege, droit du seigneur, and it has its responsibilities, noblesse oblige. The dues and duties fall to both sides, both high and low have their claims, and feudal terms indeed do not convey the economic equity of kinship ranking. In its true historic setting noblesse oblige hardly cancelled out the droits du seigneur. In primitive society social inequality is more the organization of economic equality. Often, in fact, high rank is only secured or sustained by o'recorwdning generosity: the material advantage is on the subordinates' side. Perhaps it is too much to see the relation of parent and child as the elemental form of kinship ranking and its economic ethic. It is true, nevertheless, that paternalism is a common metaphor of primitive chieftainship. Chieftainship is ordinarily a relation of higher descent. So it is singularly appropriate that the chief is their 'father', they his 'children', and economic dealings between them cannot help but be affected.

The economic claims of rank and subordination are interdependent. The exercise of chiefly demand opens the way to solicitation from below, and vice versa – not uncommonly a moderate exposure to the 'larger world' is enough to evoke native reference to customary chiefly dues as local banking procedure (cf. Ivens, 1927, p. 32). The word then for the economic relation between kinship ranks is 'reciprocity'. The reciprocity, moreover, is fairly classed as 'generalized'. While not as sociable as the run
of assistance among close kinsmen, it does lean toward that side of the reciprocity continuum. Goods are in truth yielded to powers—that-be, perhaps on call and demand, and likewise stuff may have to be humbly solicited from them. Still the rationale is often assistance and need, and the supposition of returns correspondingly indefinite. Reciprocation may be left until a need precipitates it; it bears no necessary equivalence to the initial gift, and the material flow can be unbalanced in favor of one side or the other for a long time.

Reciprocity is harnessed to various principles of kinship rank. Generation-ranking, with the elders the privileged parties, may be of significance among hunters and gatherers not merely in the life of the family but in the life of the camp as a whole, and generalized reciprocity between juniors and seniors a correspondingly broad rule of social exchange (cf. Radcliffe-Brown, 1948, pp. 42-43). The Trobrianders have a name for the economic ethic appropriate between parties of different rank within common descent groups—pokala. It is the rule that 'Junior members of a sub-clan are expected to render gifts and service to their seniors, who in return are expected to confer assistance and material benefits on the juniors' (Powell, 1960, p. 126). Even where rank is tied to genealogical seniority and consummated in office—chiefship properly so called—the ethic is the same. Take Polynesian chiefs, office-holders in large, segmented polities: supported on the one hand by various chiefly dues, they are freighted, as many have observed, with perhaps even greater obligations to the underlying population. Probably always the 'economic basis' of primitive politics is chiefly generosity—at one stroke an act of positive morality and a laying of indebtedness upon the commonality. Or, to take a larger view, the entire political order is sustained by a pivotal flow of goods, up and down the social hierarchy, with each gift not merely connoting a status relation but, as a generalized gift not directly requited, compelling a loyalty.

In communities with established rank orders, generalized reciprocity is enforced by the received structure, and once in operation the exchange has redundant effects on the rank system. There is a large range of societies, however, in which rank and leadership are in the main achieved; here reciprocity is more or less engaged in the formation of rank itself, as a 'starting mechanism'. The connection between reciprocity and rank is brought to bear in the first case in the form, 'to be noble is to be generous', in the second case, 'to be generous is to be noble'. The prevailing rank structure influences economic relations in the former instance; the reciprocity influences hierarchical relations in the latter. (An analogous feedback occurs in the context of kinship distance. Hospitality is frequently employed to suggest sociability—this is discussed later. John Tanner, one of those 'feral Whites' who grew to manhood among the Indians, relates an anecdote even more to the point: recalling that his Ojibway family was once saved from starvation by a Muskogean family, he noted that if any of his own people ever afterwards met any of the latter 'he would call him "brother", and treat him as such' (Tanner, 1956, p. 24.).

The term 'starting mechanism' is Gouldner's. He explains in this way how reciprocity may be considered a starting mechanism:

'...it helps to initiate social interaction and is functional in the early phases of certain groups before they have developed a differentiated and customary set of status duties... Granted that the question of origins can readily bog down in a metaphorical morass, the fact is that many concrete social systems—perhaps "relations and groups" is more apt—do have determinate beginnings. Marriages are not made in heaven... Similarly, corporations, political parties, and all manner of groups have their beginnings... People are continually brought together in new juxtapositions and combinations, bringing with them the possibilities of new social systems. How are these possibilities realized?... Although this perspective may at first seem somewhat alien to the functionalist, once it is put to him, he may suspect that certain kinds of mechanisms, conducive to the crystallization of social systems out of ephemeral contacts, will in some measure be institutionalized or otherwise patterned in any society. At this point he would be considering "starting mechanisms". In this way, I suggest, the norm of reciprocity provides one among many starting mechanisms' (Gouldner, 1960, pp. 176-177).
Economic imbalance is the key to deployment of generosity, of generalized reciprocity, as a starting mechanism of rank and leadership. A gift that is not yet repaid in the first place 'creates a something between people': it engenders continuity in the relation, solidarity - at least until the obligation to reciprocate is discharged. Secondly, falling under 'the shadow of indebtedness', the recipient is constrained in his relations to the giver of things. The one who has benefited is held in a peaceful, collaborative, circumspect, and responsive position in respect to his benefactor. The 'norm of reciprocity', Gouldner remarks, 'makes two interrelated minimal demands: (1) people should help those who have helped them, and (2) people should not injure those who have helped them' (1960, p. 171). (Or, as Hobbes put it: 'As justice dependeth on antecedant covenant; soe does gratitude depend on antecedant grace; that is to say, antecedant free gift; and is the fourth law of nature; which may be conceived in this form, that a man which receiveth benefit from another of mere grace, endeavour that he which giveth it, have no reasonable cause to repent him of his good will.') These demands are as compelling in the highlands of New Guinea as in the prairies of Peoria - 'Gifts [among Gahuka-Gama] have to be repaid. They constitute a debt, and until discharged the relationship of the individuals involved is in a state of imbalance. The debtor has to act circumspectly towards those who have this advantage over him or otherwise risk ridicule' (Read, 1959, p. 429). The esteem that accrues to the generous man all to one side, generosity is conceived in this form, as Hobbes put it: 'Wealth in this finds him friends,' Denig writes of the aspiring Assiniboine, 'as it does on other occasions everywhere' (Denig, 1928-29, p. 525).

Apart from highly organized chiefdoms and simple hunters and gatherers, there are many intermediate tribal peoples among whom pivotal local leaders come to prominence without yet becoming holders of office and title, of ascribed privilege and of sway over corporate political groups. They are men who 'build a name' as it is said, 'big-men' they may be reckoned, or 'men of importance', or 'bulls' who rise above the common herd, who gather followers, who achieve authority. The Melanesian 'big-man' is a case in point. So too the Plains Indian 'chief'. The process of gathering a personal following and that of ascent to the summits of renown is marked by calculated generosity - if not true compassion. Generalized reciprocity is more or less enlisted as a starting mechanism.

In diverse ways, then, generalized reciprocity is engaged with the rank order of the community. Yet we have already characterized the economics of chiefdom in other transactional terms, as redistribution (or large-scale pooling). At this juncture the evolutionist question is posed: 'When does one give way then to the other, reciprocity to redistribution?' This question, however, may mislead. Chiefly redistribution is not different in principle from kinship-rank reciprocity. It is, rather, based upon the reciprocity principle, a highly organized form of that principle. Chiefly redistribution is a centralized, formal organization of kinship-rank reciprocities, an extensive social integration of the dues and obligations of leadership. The real ethnographic world does not present us with the abrupt 'appearance' of redistribution. It presents approximations and kinds of centricity. The apparent course of wisdom is to hinge our characterizations - of rank-reciprocities vs. a system of redistribution - on formal differences in the centralization process, and in this way to resolve the evolutionist issue.

A big-man system of reciprocities may be quite centralized and a chiefly system quite decentralized. A thin line separates them, but it is perhaps significant. Between centricity in a Melanesian big-man economy such as Siuai (Oliver, 1955) and centricity in a North-west Coast chiefdom such as the Nootka (Drucker, 1951), there is little to choose. A leader in each case integrates the economic activity of a (more or less) localized following: he acts as a shunting station for goods flowing reciprocally between his own and other like groups of society. The economic relation to followers is also the same: the leader is the centralrecipient and bestower of favors. The thin line of difference is this: the Nootka leader is an office-holder in a lineage (house group), his following is this corporate group, and his central economic position is ascribed by right of chiefly due and chiefly obligation. So centricity is built into the structure. In Siuai, it is a personal achievement. The following is an achievement - a result of generosity bestowed - the leadership an achievement, and the
whole structure will as such dissolve with the demise of the pivotal big-man. Now I think that most of us concerned with 'redistributive economies' have come to include Northwest Coast peoples under this head; whereas assigning Siuai that status would at least provoke disagreement. This suggests that the political organization of reciprocities is implicitly recognized as a decisive step. Where kinship-rank reciprocity is laid down by office and political grouping, and becomes *sui generis* by virtue of customary duty, it takes on a distinctive character. The distinctive character may be usefully named—chiefly redistribution.

A further difference in economies of chiefly redistribution is worth remarking. It is another difference in centricity. The flow of goods both into and out of the hands of powers-that-be is for the most part unintegrated in certain ethnographic instances. Subordinates in severalty and on various occasions render stuff to the chief, and often in severalty receive benefits from him. While there is always some massive accumulation and large-scale handout—say during rites of chieftainship—the prevailing flow between chief and people is fragmented into independent and small transactions: a gift to the chief from here, some help given out there. So aside from the special occasion, the chief is continuously turning over petty stocks. This is the ordinary situation in the smaller Pacific island chiefdoms—e.g. Moala (Sahlins, 1962), apparently Tikopia—and it may be generally true of pastoralist chiefdoms. On the other hand, chiefs may glory in massive accumulations and more or less massive dispensations, and at times too in large stores on hand congealed by pressure on the communality. Here the independent act of homage or *noblesse oblige* is of less significance. And if, in addition, the social scale of chiefly redistribution is extensive—the polity large, dispersed, and segmented—one confronts a measure of centricity approximating the classical magazine economies of antiquity.

Appendix B (pp. 200-215, below) presents illustrative ethnographic materials on the relation between rank and reciprocity. (See the citation from Malo under B.4.2 and from Bartram under B.5.2 on magazine economies of various scale.)

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*On the Sociology of Primitive Exchange*

**Reciprocity and Wealth**

According to their [the Yukaghir] way of thinking, 'a man who possesses provisions must share them with those who do not possess them' (Jochelson, 1926, p. 43).

'This habit of share and share alike is easily understandable in a community where everyone is likely to find himself in difficulties from time to time, for it is scarcity and not sufficiency that makes people generous, since everybody is thereby ensured against hunger. He who is in need to-day receives help from him who may be in like need tomorrow' (Evans-Pritchard, 1940, p. 86).

One of the senses of previous remarks on rank and reciprocity is that rank distinctions, or attempts to promote them, tend to extend generalized exchange beyond the customary range of sharing. The same upshot may come of wealth differences between parties, often anyhow associated with rank differences.

If one is poor and one's comrade is rich, well, there are certain restraints on acquisitiveness in our dealings—at least if we are to remain comrades, or even acquaintances, for very long. There are particularly restraints on the wealthier, if not a certain *richesse oblige*.

That is to say, given some social bond between those who exchange, differences in fortune between them compels a more altruistic (generalized) transaction than is otherwise appropriate. A difference in affluence—or in capacity to replenish wealth—would lower the sociability content of balanced dealing. As far as the exchange balances, the side that cannot afford it has sacrificed in favor of the side that did not need it. The greater the wealth gap, therefore, the greater the demonstrable assistance from rich to poor that is necessary just to maintain a given degree of sociability. Reasoning further on the same line, the inclination toward generalized exchange deepens where the economic gap amounts to oversupply and undersupply of customary requirements and, especially, of urgent stuff. The thing to look for is food-sharing between have-nots and have-nots. It is one thing to
demand returns on woodpecker scalps, yet one spares a dime—brother!—for even a hungry stranger.

The 'brother' is important. That scarcity and not sufficiency makes people generous is understandable, functional, 'where everyone is likely to find himself in difficulties from time to time'. It is most understandable, however, and most likely, where kinship community and kinship morality prevail. That whole economies are organized by the combined play of scarcity and differential accumulation is no secret to economic science. But then the societies involved do not wrest a livelihood as limited and uncertain as the Nuer's (and many another primitive group's), nor do they meet hardship as kinship communities. It is such circumstances precisely that make invidious accumulation of fortune intolerable and dysfunctional. And if the affuent do not play the game, they ordinarily can be forced to disgorge, in one way or another:

'A Bushman will go to any lengths to avoid making other Bushmen jealous of him, and for this reason the few possessions the Bushmen have are constantly circling among members of their groups. No one cares to keep a particularly good knife too long, even though he may want it desperately, because he will become the object of envy; as he sits by himself polishing a fine edge on the blade he will hear the soft voices of the other men in his band saying: “Look at him there, admiring his knife while we have nothing.” Soon somebody will ask him for his knife, for everybody would like to have it, and he will give it away. Their culture insists that they share with each other, and it has never happened that a Bushman failed to share objects, food, or water with other members of his band, for without very rigid co-operation Bushmen could not survive the famines and droughts that the Kalahari offers them' (Thomas, 1959, p. 22).

Should the condition of poverty be extreme, as for food collectors such as these Bushmen, it is best that the inclination to share out one's abundance be made lawful. Here it is a technical condition that some households day in and day out will fail to meet their requirements. The vulnerability to food shortage can be met by instituting continuous sharing within the local community. I think this the best way to interpret tabus that prohibit hunters from eating game they bring down, or the less drastic and more common injunction that certain large animals be shared through the camp—"the hunter kills, other people have", say the Yukaghirs (Jochelson, 1926, p. 124). Another way to make food-sharing the rule, if not a rule, is to freight it heavily with moral value. If this is the case, incidentally, sharing will break out not merely in bad times but especially in good. The level of generalized reciprocity 'peaks' on the occasion of a windfall: now everyone can cash in on the virtues of generosity:

'They gathered almost three hundred pounds [of tsi nuts]... When the people had picked all they could find, when every possible bag was full, they said they were ready to go to Nama, but when we brought the jeep and began to load it they were already busy with their endless preoccupation, that of giving and receiving, and had already begun to give each other presents of tsi. Bushmen feel a great need to give and receive food, perhaps to cement relationships with each other, perhaps to prove and strengthen their dependence upon each other; because the opportunity to do this does not occur unless huge quantities of food are at hand, Bushmen always exchange presents of foods that come in huge quantities, these being the meat of game antelope, tsi nuts, and the nuts of the mangetti trees, which at certain seasons are scattered abundantly all through the mangetti forests. As we waited by the jeep Dikai gave a huge sack of tsi to her mother. Her mother gave another sack to Gao Feet's first wife, and Gao Feet gave a sack to Dikai. Later, during the days that followed, the tsi was distributed again, this time in smaller quantities, small piles or small bagfuls, after that in handfuls, and last, in very small quantities of cooked tsi which people would share as they were eating...' (Thomas, 1959, pp. 214-215).

The bearing of wealth differences upon reciprocity, of course, is not independent of the play of rank and kinship distance. Real situations are complicated. For instance, wealth distinctions probably constrain assistance in some inverse proportion to the kinship distance of the sides to exchange. It is poverty in the in-group particularly that engenders compassion. (Conversely,
helping people in distress creates very intense solidarity – on the principle of 'a friend in need'. On the other hand, material distinctions between distant relatives or aliens may not commensurately, or even at all, incline the affluent party to be charitable. If the interests had been opposed to begin with, well now the desperate traffic will bear more.

The observation is frequently made that any accumulation of wealth – among such and such people – is followed hard upon by its disbursement. The objective of gathering wealth, indeed, is often that of giving it away. So, for example, Barnett writes of Northwest Coast Indians that 'Accumulation in any quantity by borrowing or otherwise is, in fact, unthinkable unless it be for the purpose of immediate redistribution' (1938, p. 353). The general proposition may be allowed that the material drift in primitive societies tends on the whole away from accumulation towards insufficiency. Thus: 'In general it may be said that no one in a Nuer village starves unless all are starving' (Evans-Pritchard, 1951, p. 132). But in view of foregoing remarks there must be qualification. The incline toward have-nots is steeper for more urgently than for less urgently required goods, and it is steeper within local communities than between them.

Supposing some tendency to share in favor of need, even if qualified by community, it is possible to draw further inferences about economic behavior in general scarcity. During lean food seasons the incidence of generalized exchange should rise above average, particularly in the narrower social sectors. Survival depends now on a double-barreled quickening of social solidarity and economic cooperation (see Appendix C, e.g. C.1.3). This social and economic consolidation conceivably could progress to the maximum; normal reciprocal relations between households are suspended in favor of pooling of resources for the duration of emergency. The rank structure is perhaps mobilized and engaged, either in governance of pooling or in the sense that chiefly food reserves are now put into circulation.

Yet the reaction to depression 'all depends': it depends on the social structure put to test and on the duration and intensity of the shortage. For the forces that countervail are strengthened in these biza-baka times, the tendency to look to household interests especially, and also the tendency for compassion to be more-than-

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proportionately expended on close kin in need than on distant kin in the same straits. Probably every primitive organization has its breaking-point, or at least its turning-point. Every one might see the time when cooperation is overwhelmed by the scale of disaster and chicanery becomes the order of the day. The range of assistance contracts progressively to the family level; perhaps even these bonds dissolve and, washed away, reveal an inhuman, yet most human, self-interest. Moreover, by the same measure that the circle of charity is compressed that of 'negative reciprocity' is potentially expanded. People who helped each other in normal times and through the first stages of disaster display now indifference to each others' plight, if they do not exacerbate a mutual downfall by guile, haggle, and theft. Put another way, the whole sectoral scheme of reciprocities is altered, compressed: sharing is confined to the innermost sphere of solidarity and all else is devil take the hindmost.

Implicit in these remarks is a plan of analysis of the normal sectoral system of reciprocities in the given case. The prevailing reciprocity scheme is some vector of the quality of kin-community relations and the ordinary stresses developing out of imbalances in production. But it is the emergency condition that concerns us now. Here and there in the illustrative materials to this section we see the two predicted reactions to depressed food supplies, both more sharing and less. Presumably the governing conditions are the community structure on one side and the seriousness of shortage on the other.

A final remark under the head of reciprocity and wealth. A community will, if suitably organized, 'tighten' not only under economic threat but in the face of other present danger, of external political-military pressure, for example. In this connection, two notes on the economies of native war parties are included in the illustrative materials appended to the present section (Appendix C: C.1.10 and C.2.5). They illustrate an extraordinary intensity of sharing (generalized reciprocity) between haves and have-nots during preparations for attack. (Likewise, the experience of recent wars would show that transactions move a long way from yesterday's dice game in the barracks to today's sharing of rations or cigarettes on the front line.) The sudden outbreak of compassion is consistent with what has been said of
VI

RECIPROCITY AND FOOD

The character of the goods exchanged seems to have an independent effect on the character of exchange. Staple foodstuffs cannot always be handled just like anything else. Socially they are not quite like anything else. Food is life-giving, urgent, ordinarily symbolic of hearth and home, if not of mother. By comparison with other stuff, food is more readily, or more necessarily, shared; barkcloth and beads more readily lend themselves to balanced gift-giving. Direct and equivalent returns for food are unseemly in most social settings: they impugn the motives both of the giver and of the recipient. From this several characteristic qualities of food transfers appear to follow.

Food dealings are a delicate barometer, a ritual statement as it were, of social relations, and food is thus employed instrumentally as a starting, a sustaining, or a destroying mechanism of sociability:

'Food is something over which relatives have rights, and conversely relatives are people who provide or take toll on one's food' (Richards, 1939, p. 200).

'The sharing of food [among the Kuma] symbolizes an identity of interests... Food is never shared with an enemy... Food is not shared with strangers, for they are potential enemies. A man may eat with his cognatic and affinal relatives and also, people say, with the members of his own clan. Normally, however, only members of the same subclan have an unequivocal right to share each other's food... If two men or the members of two sub-subclans have a serious and lasting quarrel, neither they nor their descendants may use one another's fires... When
the present purview: the point is that where some coming to sociable terms with visitors is desirable, hospitality is an ordinary way of doing it. And the Dobuan syndrome is by no means typical. Ordinarily, 'Savages pride themselves in being hospitable to strangers' (Harmon, 1957, p. 43).

Consequently the sphere of generalized exchange in food is sometimes wider than the sphere of generalized exchange in other things. This tendency to transcend the sectoral plan is most dramatized in the hospitality afforded trade partners, or any kinsmen from afar, who make visits the occasion for exchanging presents (see examples in Appendix A). Here are people whose dealings in durables are consciously balanced out – or even potentially run on caveat emptor – by some miracle charitably supplying one another with food and shelter. But then hospitality counters the wabuwabu lurking in the background and provides an atmosphere in which direct exchange of presents and trade goods can be equitably consummated.

There is logic in an undue tendency to move food by generalized reciprocity. Like exchange between rich and poor, or between high and low, where food is concerned a greater inclination to sacrifice seems required just to sustain the given degree of sociability. Sharing needs to be extended to more distant relatives, generalized reciprocity broadened beyond ordinary sectoral limits. (It might be recalled from the Appendices to previous sections that generosity is distinctively associated with food dealing.)

About the only sociable thing to do with food is to give it away, and the commensurably sociable return, after an interval of suitable decency, is the return of hospitality or assistance. The implication is not only a rather loose or imperfect balance in food dealing, but specifically a restraint on exchanges of food for other goods. One notes with interest normative injunctions against the sale of food among peoples possessed of primitive currencies, among certain Melanesian and California tribes for instance. Here balanced exchange is run of the mill. Money tokens serve as more or less general equivalents and are exchanged against a variety of stuff. But not foodstuff. Within a broad social sector where money talks for other things, staples are insulated against pecuniary transactions and food shared perhaps but rarely sold.

Food has too much social value – ultimately because it has too much use value – to have exchange value.

'T Food was not sold. It might be given away, but being "wild stuff" should not be sold, according to Pomo etiquette. Manufactured articles only were bought and sold, such as baskets, bows and arrows' (Gifford, 1926, p. 329; cf. Kroeber, 1925, p. 40, on the Yurok – same sort of thing).

'[To the Tolowa-Tututni] food was only edible, not saleable' (Drucker, 1937, p. 241; cf. DuBois, 1936, pp. 50-51).

'The staple articles of food, taro, bananas, coconuts, are never sold [by Lesu], and are given to kindred, friends, and strangers passing through the village as an act of courtesy’ (Powdermaker, 1933, p. 195).

In a similar way, staple foodstuffs were excluded from balanced trading among Alaskan Eskimo – ‘The feeling was present that to trade for food was reprehensible’ – and even luxury foods that were exchanged between trade partners were transferred as presents and apart from the main trading (Spencer, 1959, pp. 204-205).

It would seem that common foodstuffs are likely to have an insulated ‘circuit of exchange’, separate from durables, particularly ‘wealth’ (see Firth, 1950; Bohannan, 1955; Bohannan & Dalton, 1952, on ‘spheres of exchange.”) Morally and socially this should be so. For a wide range of social relations, balanced and direct food-for-goods transactions (conversions) would rend the solidary bonds. Distinctive categorizations of food vs. other goods, i.e. ‘wealth’, express the sociological disparity and protect food from dysfunctional comparisons of its worth – as among the Salish:

'Food was not classed as "wealth" [i.e. blankets, shell ornaments, canoes, etc.]. Nor was it treated as wealth ... "holy food", a Semiahmoo informant called it. It should be given freely, he felt, and could not be refused. Food was evidently not freely exchanged with wealth. A person in need of food might ask to buy some from another household in his com-
munity, offering wealth for it, but food was not generally offered for sale' (Suttles, 1960, p. 301; Vayda, 1961).

But an important qualification must in haste be entered. These food and nonfood spheres are sociologically based and bounded. The immorality of food-wealth conversions has a sectoral dimension: at a certain socially peripheral point the circuits merge and thus dissolve. (At this point, food-for-goods exchange is a 'conveyance' in Bohannan and Dalton's usage.) Food does not move against money or other stuff within the community or tribe, yet it may be so exchanged outside these social contexts, and not merely under duress but as use and wont. The Salish did customarily take food, 'holy food', to affinal relatives in other Salish villages and received wealth in return (Suttles, 1960). Likewise, Pomo did 'buy' — at any rate gave beads for — acorns, fish, and like necessities from other communities (Kroeber, 1925, p. 260; Loeb, 1926, pp. 192-193). The separation of food and wealth cycles is contextual. Within communities these are insulated circuits, insulated by community relations; they are kept apart where a demand of return on necessities would contradict prevailing kinship relations. Beyond this, in the intercommunity or intertribal sector, the insulation of the food circuit may be worn through by frictions of social distance.

(Foodstuffs, incidentally, are not ordinarily divorced from the circuit of labor assistance. On the contrary, a meal is in the host of primitive societies the customary return for labor solicited for gardening, housebuilding, and other domestic tasks. 'Wages' in the usual sense is not at issue. The feeding amounts to an extraordinary extension to other relatives and to friends of the household economy. Rather than a tentative move toward capitalism, it is perhaps better understood by a principle something to the opposite: that those who participate in a productive effort have some claim on its outcome.)

VII

ON BALANCED RECIPROCITY

We have seen generalized reciprocity in play in instrumental ways, notably as a starting mechanism of rank distinction and also, in the form of hospitality, to mediate relations between persons of different communities. Balanced reciprocity likewise finds instrumental employments, but especially as formal social compact. Balanced reciprocity is the classic vehicle of peace and alliance contracts, substance-as-symbol of the transformation from separate to harmonious interests. Group prestations are the dramatic and perhaps the typical form, but there are instances too of interpersonal compact sealed by exchange.

Here it is useful to recall Mauss's dictum: 'In these primitive and archaic societies there is no middle path... When two groups of men meet they may move away or in case of mistrust or defiance they may resort to arms; or else they can come to terms.' And the terms ought to balance, insofar as the groups are 'different men'. The relations are too tenuous to long sustain a failure to reciprocate — "'Indians notice such things'" (Goldschmidt, 1951, p. 338). They notice a lot of things. Goldschmidt's Nomlaki Indians in fact articulate a whole set of glosses and paraphrases of Maussian principle, among them:

'When enemies meet they call to one another. If the settlement is friendly they approach closer and spread out their goods. One man would throw something in the middle, one man from the other side would throw in something for it and take the traded material back. They trade till one side has traded everything. The ones that have some left make fun of those who have run out, bragging about themselves... This trade takes place on the border line' (Goldschmidt, 1951, p. 338).

Balanced reciprocity is willingness to give for that which is received. Therein seems to be its efficacy as social compact. The striking of equivalence, or at least some approach to balance, is a demonstrable foregoing of self-interest on each side, some renunciation of hostile intent or of indifference in favor of mutuality. Against the preexisting context of separateness, the material balance signifies a new state of affairs. This is not to deny that the transaction is ever consequential in a utilitarian sense, as it may well be — and the social effect perhaps compounded by an equitable exchange of different necessities. But whatever the utilitarian value, and there need be none, there is always 'moral' purpose, as Radcliffe-Brown remarked of certain Andaman transactions:
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‘to provide a friendly feeling ... and unless it did this it failed of its purpose’.

Among the many kinds of contract closed as it were by balanced exchange, the following seem most common:

1. Formal friendship or kinship
These are interpersonal compacts of solidarity, pledges of brotherhood in some cases, friendship in others. The alliance may be sealed by exchange of identical goods, the material counterpart of some exchange of identities, but at any rate the transaction is likely to balance and the exchange is of distant for close relationship (e.g. Pospisil, 1958, pp. 86-87; Seligman, 1910, pp. 69-70). An association once so formed may well become more sociable over time, and future transactions both parallel and compound this trend by becoming more generalized.

2. Affirmation of corporate alliances
One may place in this category the various feasts and entertainments reciprocally tendered between friendly local groups and communities, such as certain of the interclan vegetable-heap presentations in the New Guinea Highlands or inter-village social feasts in Samoa or New Zealand.

3. Peace-making
These are the exchanges of settlement, of cessation of dispute, feud, and warfare. Both interpersonal and collective hostilities may be thus quieted by exchange. ‘When an equivalence is struck’ parties to an Abelam argument are satisfied: “‘talk is thrown away’” (Kaberry, 1941-42, p. 341). That is the general principle.

One may wish to include wergeld payments, compensations for adultery, and other forms of compounding injury in this category, as well as the exchanges that terminate warfare. They all work on the general principle, the principle of fair trade. (Spencer provides an interesting Eskimo example: when a man received compensation from the abductor of his wife the two men ‘inevitably’ become friendly, he writes, ‘because they had conceptually effected a trade’ (1959, p. 81). (See also Denig, 1928-29, p. 404; Powdermaker, 1933, p. 197; Williamson, 1912, p. 183; Deacon, 1934, p. 236; Kroeber, 1926, p. 232; Loeb, 1926, pp. 204-205; Hogbin, 1939, pp. 79, 91-92; etc.).

4. Marital alliance
Marriage prestations are of course the classic form of reciprocity as social compact. I have little to add to the received anthropological discussion, except a slight qualification about the character of reciprocity in these transactions, and even this may be superfluous.

It does seem to miss the point, however, to view marital exchange either as ‘total’ or as perfectly balanced prestation. The transactions of marriage, and perhaps contingent future affinal exchange as well, are ordinarily not exactly equal. For one thing, asymmetry of exchange is commonplace: women move against hoes or cattle, toga against oloa, fish against pigs. In the absence of some secular convertability, or of a mutual standard of value, the transfer seems to an extent one of incomparables; neither equivalent nor total, the transaction may be of incommensurables. In any event, and even where the same sorts of things are exchanged, one side or the other may be conceived to benefit unduly, at least for the time being. This lack of precise balance is socially of the essence.

First, unequal benefit sustains the alliance as perfect balance could not. Truly, the people concerned – and/or the ethnographer – might muse that in the fullness of time accounts between affines even out. Or losses and gains may be cancelled by cyclical or statistical patterns of alliance. Or some balance in goods, at least, may obtain in the total political economy, where the flow of payments upwards (against a flow of women downwards) through a series of ranked lineages is reversed by redistribution from the top (cf. Leach, 1951). Yet it is socially critical that over a long term, and perhaps forever, the exchange between two groups united by a marriage has not been balanced. In so far as the things transferred are of different quality, it may be difficult ever to calculate that the sides are ‘even-steven’. This is a social good. The exchange that is symmetrical or unequivocally equal carries some disadvantage from the point of view of alliance: it cancels debts and thus opens the possibility of contracting out. If neither side is ‘owing’ then the bond between them is comparatively
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fragile. But if accounts are not squared, then the relationship is maintained by virtue of 'the shadow of indebtedness', and there will have to be further occasions of association, perhaps as occasions of further payment.

Secondly, and directly related, an asymmetrical exchange of different things lends itself to alliance that is complementary. The marital bond between groups is not always, maybe not even usually, some sort of fifty-fifty partnership between homologous parties. One group surrenders a woman, another gets her; in a patrilineal context the wife-receivers have secured continuity, something at the expense of the wife-givers, at least on this occasion. There has been a differential transfer: the groups are socially related in a complementary and asymmetrical way. Likewise, in a ranked lineage system the giving of women may be a specification of the set of subordinate-superordinate relations. Now in these cases, the several rights and duties of alliance are symbolized by the differential character of transfers, are attached to complementary symbols. Asymmetrical prestations secure the complementary alliance once again as perfectly balanced, symmetrical, or all-out total prestations would not.

The casual received view of reciprocity supposes some fairly direct one-for-one exchange, balanced reciprocity, or a near approximation of balance. It may not be inappropriate, then, to footnote this discussion with a respectful demur: that in the main run of primitive societies, taking into account directly instrumental as well as instrumental transactions, balanced reciprocity is not the prevalent form of exchange. A question might even be raised about the stability of balanced reciprocity. Balanced exchange may tend toward self-liquidation. On one hand, a series of honorably balanced dealings between comparatively distant parties builds trust and confidence, in effect reduces social distance, and so increases the chances for more generalized future dealings – as the initial blood-brotherhood transaction creates a 'credit rating', as it were. On the other hand, a renegade acts to sever relations – as failure to make returns breaks a trade-partnership – if it does not actually invite chicanery in return. May we conclude that balanced reciprocity is inherently unstable? Or perhaps that it requires special conditions for continuity?

On the Sociology of Primitive Exchange

The societal profile of reciprocity, at any rate, most often inclines toward generalized modes. In the simpler hunting groups the generalized assistance of close kinship seems usually dominant; in neolithic chiefdoms this is supplemented by kinship-rank obligations. There are nonetheless societies of certain type in which balanced exchange, if not exactly dominant, acquires unusual prominence. Interest attaches to these societies, not alone for the emphasis on balanced reciprocity, but for what goes with it.

The well known 'labor exchange' in Southeast Asian hinterland communities brings these immediately to mind. Here is a set of peoples who, placed against the main run of primitive societies, offer departures in economy, and social structure as well, that cannot fail to kindle a comparative interest. The well-described Iban (Freeman, 1955, 1960), Land Dayak (Geddes, 1964, 1967; cf. Provine, 1937) and Lamet (Izikowitz, 1951) belong in the class – some Philippine peoples may as well, but I am uncertain as to how the analysis about to be suggested will work for the Filipinos.

Now these societies are distinctive not only for uncommon internal characteristics of economy but for unusual external relations – unusual, that is, in a strictly primitive milieu. They are hinterlands engaged by petty market trade and perhaps also by political dominance (e.g. Lamet) – to more sophisticated cultural centers. From the perspective of the advanced centers, they are backwaters serving as secondary sources of rice and other goods (cf. VanLeur, 1955, especially pp. 101 f, for some hints about the economic significance of hinterland provisioning in Southeast Asia). From the hinterlands view, the critical aspect of the intercultural relation is that the subsistence staple, rice, is exported for cash, iron tools, and prestige goods, many of the last quite expensive. It is suggested – with all the deference that must be supplied by one who has no research experience in the area – it is suggested that the peculiar social-economic character of Southeast Asian hinterland tribes is congruent with this unusual employment of household subsistence surpluses. The implication of an external trade in rice is not merely an internal ban on sharing it, or a corresponding requirement of quid-pro-quo in intra-community dealings, but departure from ordinary characteristics of primitive distribution in virtually all respects.
The engagement with the market makes a key minimal demand: that internal community relations permit household accumulation of rice, else the amounts required for external exchange will never be forthcoming. This stipulation must prevail in the face of limited and uncertain modes of rice production. The fortunate households cannot be responsible for the unfortunate; if internal leveling is unleashed then the external trade relations are simply not sustained.

The set of consequences for the economy and polity of the hinterland tribal communities appear to include: (i) Different households, by virtue of variations in number of effective producers, amass different amounts of the subsistence-export staple. The productive differences range between surplus above and deficit below family consumption requirements. These differences, however, are not liquidated by sharing in favor of need. Instead (ii) the intensity of sharing within the village or tribe is low, and (iii) the principal reciprocal relation between households is a closely calculated balanced exchange of labor service. As Geddes remarks of the Land Dayak: ‘...co-operation beyond the household, except on business lines where every service must have an equal return, is at a low level’ (1954, p. 34). Balanced labor-exchange, of course, maintains the productive advantage (accumulation capacity) of the family with more adult workers. The only goods that customarily move in generalized reciprocity are game and perhaps large domestic animals sacrificed in family ceremonies. Such items are widely distributed through the community (cf. Izikowitz, 1961), much as hunters would share them, but the sharing of meat is not as decisive in structuring interfamilial relations as the lack of sharing decreed by export of staples. (iv) Even household commensality may be rather rigidly supervised, subjected to accounting of each person’s rice dole in the interest of developing an exchange reserve, hence less sociable than ordinary primitive commensality (compare, for example, Izikowitz, 1961, pp. 301-302 with Firth, 1936, pp. 112-116). (v) Restricted sharing of staples, demanded by articulation with the siphoning market, finds its social complement in an atomization and fragmentation of community structure. Lineages, or like systems of extensive and corporate solidary relations, are incompatible with the external drain on household staples and the corresponding posture of self-interest required vie-d’vie other households. Large local descent groups are absent or inconsequential. Instead, the solidary relations are of the small family itself, with various and changing interpersonal kin ties the only such nexus of connection between households. Economically, these extended kin ties are weak ones:

‘A household is not only a distinct unit, but one which minds its own business. Perforce, it has to do so, because it has with other households no formal relations, sanctioned by custom, on which it can rely for certain support. Indeed, the absence of such structured relationships is a condition of the society as at present organized. In the main economic affairs, cooperation with others is based upon contract and not primarily upon kinship... As a result of this situation, ties which persons have with others in the community tend to be widespread, but limited to sentiment and sociability, often sadly so’ (Geddes, 1954, p. 42).

(vi) Prestige apparently hinges upon obtaining exotic items – Chinese pottery, brass gongs, etc. – from the outside in exchange for rice or work. Prestige does not, obviously cannot, rest on generous assistance to one’s fellows in the manner of a tribal big-man. The exotic goods figure internally as ceremonial display items and in marriage prestations – thus insofar as status is linked to them it is principally as possession and ability to make payments, again not through giving them away. (‘Wealth does not help a man to become chief because it gives him power to distribute largesse. Riches rarely incline a Dayak to charity, although they may to usury’, Geddes, 1954, p. 50.) No one then obligates others very much. No one creates followers. As a result there are no strong leaders, a fact which probably contributes to the atomization of the community and may have repercussions on the intensity of land use (cf. Izikowitz, 1951).

In these Southeast Asian communities, the prevalence of balanced reciprocity does seem connected with special circumstances. But then the circumstances suggest that it is not legitimate to involve these peoples in the present context of tribal economics. By the same token, their use in debating issues of primitive economics, as Geddes uses the Land Dayak to argue
against 'primitive communism', seems not quite cricket. Perhaps they are best classed with peasants - so long as one does not thereupon suggest, as is unfortunately often done under the label 'economic anthropology', that 'peasant' and 'primitive' belong together in some undifferentiated type of economy distinguished negatively as whatever-it-is that is outside the province of orthodox economic analysis.

There are, however, incontestable examples of societal emphasis on balanced reciprocity in primitive settings. Primitive monies serving as media of exchange at more or less fixed rates argue this. The monies amount to the suggested special mechanisms for maintaining balance. It is worthwhile to inquire into their incidence and their economic and social concomitants.

Yet this is not to be hazarded without some formal definition of 'primitive money', a problem approaching the status of a classic dilemma in comparative economics. On one side, any thing that has a 'money use' - as we know money uses: payments, exchange, standard, etc. - may be taken for 'money'. If so, probably every society enjoys the dubious benefits, inasmuch as some category of goods is usually earmarked for certain payments. The alternative is less relativistic and therefore seems more useful for comparative generalizations: to agree on some minimal use and quality of the stuff. The strategy, as Firth suggests, is not to question "What is primitive money?" but "What isn't useful to include in the category of primitive money?" (1969, p. 39). His specific suggestion, which as I understand it centrally involves the medium-of-exchange function, does indeed appear useful. ('My own view is that to entitle an object to be classified as money, it should be of a generally acceptable type, serving to facilitate the conversion of one object or service into terms of another and used as a standard of value thereby,' Firth, 1959, pp. 38-39).

Let 'money' refer to those objects in primitive societies that have token value rather than utility and that serve as means of exchange. The exchange use is limited to certain categories of things - land and labor are ordinarily excluded - and is brought to bear only between parties of certain social relation. In the main it serves as an indirect bridge between goods ('C-M-C') rather than commercial purposes ('M-C-M'). These limitations would justify the phrase 'primitive money'. If all this is agreeable, it further appears that pristine developments of primitive money are not broadly spread through the ethnographic scene, but are restricted to certain areas: especially western and central Melanesia, aboriginal California, and certain parts of the South American tropical forest. (Monies may also have developed in pristine contexts in Africa, but I am not expert enough to disentangle their distribution from archaic civilizations and ancient 'international' trade.)

This is also to say that primitive money is associated with an historically specific type of primitive economy, an economy with a marked incidence of balanced exchange in peripheral social sectors. It is not a phenomenon of simple hunting cultures - if I may be permitted, cultures of a band level. Neither is primitive money characteristic of the more advanced chiefdoms, where wealth tokens though certainly encountered tend to bear little exchange load. The regions noted - Melanesia, California, South American tropical forest - are (or were) occupied by societies of an intermediate sort, such as have been called 'tribal' (Sahlins, 1961; Service, 1969) or 'homogeneous' and 'segmented tribes' (Oberg, 1965). They are distinguished from band systems not merely for more settled conditions of life - often associated with neolithic vs. paleolithic production - but principally for a larger and more complex tribal organization of constituent local groupings. The several local settlements of tribal societies are bound together both by a nexus of kin relations and by cross-cutting social institutions, such as a set of clans. Yet the relatively small settlements are autonomous and self-governing, a feature which in turn distinguishes tribal from chiefdom plans. The local segments of the latter are integrated into larger polities, as divisions and subdivisions, by virtue of principles of rank and a structure of chieftainships and subchieftainships. The tribal plan is purely segmental, the chiefdom pyramidal.

This evolutionary classification of social-cultural types is admittedly loose. I hope not to raise an issue over it, for it has been offered merely to direct attention to contrasting structural features of primitive-money areas. They are precisely the kinds of features that, given previous argumentation, suggest an unusual incidence of balanced reciprocity. A greater play of
balanced exchange in tribal over band societies is argued in part by a greater proportion of craft goods and services in the societal economic output. Foodstuffs, while still the decisive share of a tribal economic product, decline relatively. Transactions in durables, more likely to be balanced than food transactions, increase. But more important, the proportion of peripheral-sector exchange, the incidence of exchange among more distantly related people, is likely to be considerably greater in tribal than in band societies. This is understandable by reference to the more definite segmental plan of tribes, which is also to say more definite sectoral breaks in the social structure.

The several residential segments of tribes are comparatively stable and formally constituted. And a corporate political solidarity is as characteristic of the tribal segment as it is lacking in flexible camp-and-band arrangements of hunters. Tribal segmental structure is also more extensive, including perhaps internal lineage groupings in the political segments, the set (and sometimes segmentary subsets) of political segments, and the tribal-foreigner division. Now the accretion over band organization is particularly in peripheral structure, in the development of the intratribal and intertribal sectors. Here is where exchange encounters increase, whether these be instrumental, peace-making exchanges or frankly materialistic dealings. The accretion in exchange then is in the social areas of balanced reciprocity.

A chiefdom, in further contrast, liquidates and pushes out peripheral sectors by transforming external into internal relations, by including adjacent local groups within enclaving political unions. At the same time, the incidence of balanced reciprocity is depressed, in virtue of both the ‘internalization’ of exchange relations and their centralization. Balanced exchanges should thus decline in favor of more generalized with the attainment of a chiefdom level. The implication for primitive money is perhaps illustrated by its absence in the Trobriands, despite the fact that this island of chiefdoms is set in a sea of money-using tribes, or by the progressive attenuation in exchange uses of shell beads moving northward from tribal California to protochiefdom British Columbia.

The hypothesis about primitive money - offered with due caution and deference – is this: it occurs in conjunction with unusual incidence of balanced reciprocity in peripheral social sectors. Presumably it facilitates the heavy balanced traffic. The conditions that encourage primitive money are most likely to occur in the range of primitive societies called tribal and are unlikely to be served by band or chiefdom development. But a qualification must in haste be entered. Not all tribes provide circumstances for monetary development and certainly not all enjoy primitive money, as that term is here understood. For the potentiality of peripheral exchange is maximized only by some tribes. Others remain relatively inner-directed.

First, peripheral sectors become scenes of intensive exchange in conjunction with regional and intertribal symbiosis. An areal ecological regime of specialized tribes, respective families and communities of which are in trade relation, is probably a necessary condition for primitive money. Such regimes are characteristic of California and Melanesia—about South America I am not prepared to say—but in other tribal settings symbiosis is not characteristic and the intertribal (or interregional) exchange sector comparatively underdeveloped. Perhaps just as important are circumstances that put premiums on delayed exchange and so on tokens that store value in the interim. The outputs of interdependent communities, for example, may be unavoidably unbalanced in time—as between coastal and inland peoples, where an exchangeable catch of fish cannot always be met by complementary inland products. Here a currency acceptable on all sides very much facilitates interdependence—so that shell beads, say, taken for fish at one time can be converted for acorns at another (cf. Vayda, 1954; Loeb, 1926). Big-man leadership systems, it would seem from Melanesia, may likewise render delayed balanced exchange functional. The tribal big-man operates on a fund of power consisting of food, pigs, or the like, stuffs with the common quality that they are not easy to keep around in large amounts over long periods. But, at the same time, the extractive devices for accumulating these political funds are underdeveloped, and collection of goods for a climactic giveaway would have to be gradual and thus technically difficult. The dilemma is resolvable by monetary manipulations: by converting wealth into tokens and by calculated deployment of money in
loans and exchange, so that a time will come when a massive call on goods can be made and the whole pile of stuff, given away, converted into status. That's the way the money goes.

VIII
AN AFTERTHOUGHT
It is difficult to conclude with a dramatic flourish. The essay has not a dramatic structure — its main drift seems downhill. And a summary would be needlessly repetitive.

But there is a curiosity worth remarking. Here has been given a discourse on economics in which 'economizing' appears mainly as an exogenous factor! The organizing principles of economy have been sought elsewhere. To the extent they have been found outside man's presumed hedonist propensity, a strategy for the study of primitive economics is suggested that is something the reverse of economic orthodoxy. It may be worth while to see how far this heresy will get us.

APPENDIX A
Notes on Reciprocity and Kinship Distance

A.1.0 Hunters and Gatherers — Generally: sectoral breaks in reciprocity not always as definite as for neolithic peoples, but variation in reciprocity by interpersonal kinship distance apparent. Generalized reciprocity often consists of specific obligations to render goods to certain kinsmen (kinship dues) rather than altruistic assistance. Notable differences between the handling of foods and durables.

A.1.1 Bushmen — The Kung term lack of generosity or failure to reciprocate ‘far-hearted’ — a felicitous choice of words, from our perspective.

Three social-material breaking points in reciprocity are apparent in Marshall's (1961) paper on Kung exchange: (i) a range of close kin in the camp with whom meat is shared, often as customary obligation; (ii) more distant kin within the camp and other Bushmen, with whom economic relations are characterized by 'gift-giving' of durables in a more balanced fashion and transactions in meat that approximate 'gift-giving'; (iii) 'trade' with Bantu. Marshall's materials are rich and indicate the play of various social considerations and sanctions determining specific transactions. Large game moves through a camp in several waves. Initially it is pooled in the hunting party by the taker, with shares going also to the arrow. In the second distribution [here we move into reciprocity proper] close kinship is the factor which sets the pattern of the giving. Certain obligations are compulsory. A man's first obligation at this point, we were told, is to give to his wife's parents. He must give to them the best he has in as generous portions as he can, while still fulfilling other primary obligations, which are to his own parents, his spouse, and offspring [note, these cook and eat meat separately]. He keeps a portion for himself at this time and from it would give to his siblings, to his wife's siblings, if they are present, and to other kin, affines, and friends who are there, possibly only in small quantities by then. Everyone who receives meat gives again, in another wave of sharing, to his or her parents, parents-in-law, spouses, offspring, siblings, and others. The meat may be cooked and the quantities small. Visitors, even though they are not close kin or affines, are given meat by the people whom they are visiting' (Marshall, 1961, p. 238). Beyond the range of close kin, giving meat is a matter of individual inclination in which friendship, obligation to return past favors and other considerations come into account. But this giving is definitely more balanced: 'In the later waves of sharing when the primary distribution and the primary kinship obligations have been fulfilled, the giving of meat from one's own portion has the quality of gift-giving. /Kung society requires at this point only that a person should give with reasonable generosity in proportion to what he has received and not keep more than an equitable amount for himself in the end, and that the person who receives a gift of meat must give a reciprocal gift some time in the future' (p. 239). Marshall reserves 'gift-giving' to the exchange of durables; this occurs also, and importantly, between Kung of different bands. One should neither refuse such gifts nor fail to make a return. Much of the gift-giving is instrumental, having principally social effects. Even asking
for thing, claimed one man, 'formed a love' between people. It means 'he still loves me, that is why he is asking'. And Marshall adds laconically, 'At least it forms a something between people, I thought' (p. 245). 'Gift-giving' is distinguishable from 'trade' both in form of reciprocity and social sector. 'In reciprocating [a gift] one does not give the same object back again but something of comparable value. The interval of time between receiving and reciprocating varied from a few weeks to a few years. Propriety requires that there be no unseemly haste. The giving must not look like trading' (p. 244). The mechanics of trading are not specified. 'Negotiation' however is mentioned; the implication is of haggle. The social sphere is in any case clear: 'The /Kung do not trade among themselves. They consider the procedure undignified and avoid it because it is too likely to stir up bad feelings. They trade with Bantu, however, in the settlements along the B.P. border. . . . The odds are with the Bantu in the trading. Big, aggressive, and determined to have what they want, they easily intimidate the Bushmen. Several /Kung informants said that they tried not to trade with Herero if it was possible to avoid it because, although the Tswana were hard bargainers, the Herero were worse' (p. 242).

Intense generalized reciprocity within Bushman camps and bands - especially food-sharing - is also indicated by Thomas (1959, pp. 22, 50, 214-215) and Schapera (1930, pp. 98-101, 148). Interband exchange, however, is characterized as 'barter' by Schapera (1930, p. 146; cf. Thomas's amusing anecdote of the trouble that developed between a man and woman of different groups over an unrequited gift presented to the father of the former by the woman's father, 1959, pp. 240-242).

Theft reported unknown to them (Marshall, 1961, pp. 245-246; Thomas 1959, p. 206). However, Schapera implies it exists (1930, p. 148).

A.1.2 Congo Pygmies - In general, the scheme of reciprocity looks very much like the Bushmen's, including a rather impersonal exchange with 'Negroes' (Putnam, 1963, p. 322; Schebesta, 1933, p. 42; Turnbull, 1962). Hunting spoils, large game especially, are shared out in the camp on a kinship-distance basis it appears - Putnam implies that first the family shares, then the 'family group' gets shares (1963, p. 332; cf. Schebesta 1933, pp. 68, 124, 244).

A.1.3 Washo - 'Sharing obtained at every level of Washo social organization. Sharing also decreased as kinship and residence distances increased' (Price, 1962, p. 37). It is difficult to say where 'trade' leaves off and 'gift-giving' begins, but 'In trade there tended to be immediate reciprocation while gift exchange often involved a time lapse. Trade also tended to be competitive and to increase with less intense social ties. Trade involved explicit negotiation and social status was secondary as a factor in the transaction' (p. 49).

A.1.4 Semang - Sharp sectoral break in reciprocity at the 'family group' (band) border: 'Each family contributes from its own food, already cooked and prepared, to every other family. If one family on any particular day is unusually well supplied, they give generously to all kindred families, even if it leaves them with too little. If other families not belonging to the group are in the camp, they do not share, or only to a very small extent, in the distribution' (Schebesta, n.d., p. 84).

A.1.5 Andamans - Radcliffe-Brown's (1948) account suggests a higher level of generalized reciprocity within the local group, particularly in food dealings and in transactions between junior and senior generations (cf. pp. 42-43), and more balanced forms of reciprocity between people of different bands, particularly in durables. The exchange of presents is characteristic of interband meetings, an exchange that could amount to swapping local specialities. In this sector, 'It requires a good deal of tact to avoid the unpleasantness that may arise if a man thinks he has not received things as valuable as he has given' (p. 43, cf. pp. 83-84; Man, n.d., p. 120).

A.1.6 Australian Aborigines - A number of formal, compulsory kin dues and also formal precedence-orders for sharing food and other goods with relatives of the camp (see Elkin, 1964, pp. 110-111; Meggitt, 1962, pp. 115, 120, 131, 139, etc.; Warner, 1937, pp. 63, 70, 92-95; Spencer & Gillen, 1927, p. 490).

A strong obligation to share out food in the horde (Radcliffe-Brown, 1930-31, p. 458; Spencer & Gillen, 1927, pp. 37-39).

Yir-Yiront exchange seems to parallel the Bushman scheme (above). Sharp notes that reciprocity varies on both sides of the set of customary kin dues, toward balance beyond and toward generalized reciprocity in the narrowest sphere of closest kin. Giving to persons outside the range of these
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entitled dues 'amounts to compulsory exchange. . . . But there is also irregular giving, though within a relatively narrow social range, for which the incentives seem to be chiefly sentimental, and which may be considered altruistic; this may lead to a desire to acquire property in order to give it away' (Sharp, 1954-35, pp. 37-38).

On the connection between assistance and close kinship: Meggitt observes of the Walbiri that '... a man who has several spears parts with them willingly; but, should he have only one, his son or father should not ask for it. If he is asked, the man usually gives the single article to an actual or close father or son, but he refuses distant “fathers” and “sons”, ' (Meggitt, 1962, p. 120).

Balanced reciprocity, in various specific guises, is characteristic of the well-known interband and intertribal trade exchange, which is often effected by trade partners who are classificatory kin (see, for example, Sharp, 1952, pp. 76-77; Warner, 1937, pp. 85, 145).

A.1.7 Eskimo - High level of generalized reciprocity in the camp, associated by Birket-Smith with 'the fellowship of the settlement'. This concerns food in the main, particularly large animals, and especially during the winter season (Birket-Smith, 1959, p. 146; Spencer, 1959, pp. 150, 153, 170; Boas, 1884-85, p. 562; Rink, 1875, p. 27).

Taken all in all, Spencer's study of the North Alaskan Eskimo suggests significant differences between the reciprocity appropriate among kinsmen, among trade partners and among non-kin who are also not trade partners. These variations concern durables, especially trade goods. Non-kin within the camp would presumably be given some food if they are short, but trade goods are exchanged with them, as well as with outsiders (who are not trade partners), in an impersonal 'bidding' transaction (reminiscent of Brazilian Indians' 'trade game'). Trade partnerships are formed - on quasi-kin or institutional-friendship lines - between coastal and inland men; the exchange is of local specialties. Partners deal without haggle, indeed try to extend themselves, yet without balance (or near balance) in exchange the partnership would dissolve. Trade relations are specifically distinguished by Spencer from kinship-generalized reciprocity. Thus kinsmen do not need to enter into partnership, he says, for 'A relative would always be of assistance, an arrangement which pointed primarily to

A.1.8 Shoshoni - When a family did not have a great deal to share out, as when only seeds or small animals had been taken, that given out was to close relatives and neighbors (Steward, 1938, pp. 74, 231, 240, 263). There seems to have been a fairly high level of generalized reciprocity in the village, which Steward links to the 'high degree of [kin] relationship between village members' (p. 239).

A.1.9 Northern Tungus (mounted hunters) - Much sharing within the clan, but food sharing most intense within the few families of a clan that nomadized together (Shirokogoroff, 1929, pp. 195, 200, 307). According to Shirokogoroff, gift-giving among Tungus was not reciprocal, and Tungus resented Manchu expectations on this head (p. 99); however, he also wrote that gifts were given to guests (over and above ordinary hospitality) and these items should be reciprocated (p. 333). Reindeer sold only outside the clan; inside, pass as gifts and assistance (pp. 35-36).

A.2.0 Oceania - The sectoral system of reciprocities is often more clear and more definite, especially in Melanesia. In Polynesia it is overridden by centralization of reciprocities in chiefly hands or by redistribution (see Section IV, pp. 158-164 above).

A.2.1 'Gawa (Busama) - A full set of data illustrative of the present thesis. Hogbin contrasts maritime intertribal trade through partnerships and inland trade with unrelated peoples, saying of the latter exchange: 'The parties seem slightly ashamed, however, and conclude their arrangements outside the village. [Note the literal exclusion of impersonal exchange from the 'Gawa village:] Commerce it is considered, should be carried on away from where people live, preferably alongside the road or the beach (the native-owned store at Busama is located fifty yards from the nearest dwelling). The Busama sum up the situation by saying that the maritime people give one another presents but insist on a proper return from the bushmen. The basis of the distinction is that on the coast activities are confined to relatives, but so few of the beach folk have kinsmen in the hill country that most transactions take place of necessity between comparative strangers. [Hogbin mentions
elsewhere that the bush trade is recent.] A certain amount of migration and intermarriage has taken place around the seashore, and every coastal native has kinsmen in some of the other shore villages, especially those close at hand. When trading by sea it is with these, and these only, that he makes exchanges. Kinship ties and bargaining are considered to be incompatible, and all goods are handed over as free gifts offered from motives of sentiment. Discussion of values is avoided, and the donor does the best he can to convey the impression that no thought of a counter gift has entered his head. Yet at a later stage, when a convenient opportunity arises, hints are dropped of what is expected, whether pots, mats, baskets, or food. Most of the visitors go home with items at least as valuable as those with which they came. Indeed, the closer the kinship bond the greater the host's generosity is, and some of them return a good deal richer. A careful count is kept, however, and the score is afterwards made even. [The account goes on to give examples and to note that failure to balance will cause termination of the partnership. Now, contrast the foregoing with reciprocity in the intravillage sector:] It is significant that when a Busama acquired a string bag from a fellow villager, as has recently become possible, he always gives twice what he would pay to a more distant relative [i.e., trading partner] on the north coast. "One is ashamed," the people explain, "to treat those with whom one is familiar like a tradesman" (Hogbin, 1961, pp. 83-86). The variation in reciprocity by linear-kinship distance is also worth noting: 'A presentation [of a pig] from a close relative imposes the usual obligation to return an animal of equivalent size on some future occasion, but no money changes hands either when the original gift is made or later. A similar obligation exists between distant kinsmen, but in this case each pig has also to be paid for at its full market price. The transaction is in line with earlier practice, except that dog's teeth then served as payment. The members of the purchaser's group help him nowadays with a few shillings, just as formerly they would have given him a string or two of teeth' (p. 124).

A.2.2 Kuma - Generalized reciprocity within such small-scale descent groups as the 'sub-subclan'-a bank and a labour force for its members (Reay, 1959, p. 29) - and the subclan (p. 70). The interclan sector is characterized by balanced exchange, by 'the general emphasis on exact reciprocity between groups' (p. 47, see also pp. 56, 66-69, 126). In the external sector, balance is appropriate between trade-partners, but without a partnership the transaction inclines toward negative reciprocity: 'In Kuma trading, there are two distinct forms: institutionalized transactions through trading partners, and casual encounters along the trade routes. In the former, a man is content to conform to the ruling scale of values ... but in the latter he haggles for a bargain, trying to gain a material advantage. The term for "trading partner" is, most significantly, a verb form, "I together I eat." ... He is, as it were, drawn into the "in-group" of clansmen and affines, the people who should not be exploited for private ends' (pp. 106-107, 110). Hospitality runs alongside the balanced exchange of trade goods between partners, and 'to exploit a partner for material gain is to lose him' (p. 109). Nonpartnership exchange is mostly a recent development.

A.3.3 Buin Plain, Bougainville - Sectoral distinctions in reciprocity among the Siuai have been indicated in previous textual citations. A few further aspects can be mentioned here. First, on the extremely generalized reciprocity appropriate among very close kinship: 'Gift-giving among close relatives over and beyond the normal expectations of sharing ['sharing' as Oliver defines it is the 'pooling' of the present essay] cannot entirely be reduced to conscious expectation of reciprocity. A father might rationalize the giving of tidbits to his son by explaining that he expected to be cared for by the latter in his old age, but I am convinced that some giving between, say, father and son does not involve any desire or expectation for reciprocation' (Oliver, 1955, p. 230). Loans of productive goods normally brought over-and-above returns ('interest'), but not from close relatives (p. 229). Exchange between distant relatives and trade partners is oto: it is characterized by approximate equivalence but is distinguished from 'sales' involving shell money (as the sale of craft goods) by the possibility of deferring payments in oto (pp. 230-231). In trade-partner transactions, also, giving above going rates is creditable, so that balance is achieved perhaps only over the long term (see pp. 297, 299, 307, 350-351, 367-368).

Sectoral variations in the economy of the Buin neighbors of the Siuai (the Terei, apparently) so impressed Thurnwald that he suggested the existence of three 'kinds of economies': (1) the
husbandry [pooling] within the family . . . ; (2) the inter-individual and inter-familial help among near relatives and members of a settlement united under a chief; (3) the inter-communal relations manifested by barter between individuals belonging to different communities or strata of society' (Thurnwald, 1924-35, p. 124).

A.2.4 Kapauku — The difference in reciprocity between interregional and intraregional sectors of the Kapauku economy has been noted in textual citation (above). Also notable is the fact that kinship and friendship ties lower customary rates of exchange in Kapauku shell-money dealings (Pospisil, 1958, p. 122). The Kapauku data are rendered obscure by an inappropriate economic terminology. So-called 'loans', for example, are generalized transactions — “take it without repayment in the immediate future” (p. 78, see also p. 130) — but the social context and extent of these ‘loans’ is not clear.

A.2.5 Mafuia — Excepting pig-exchange, which the ethnographer discounts as a ceremonial affair, 'Exchange and barter is generally only engaged in between members of different communities and not between those of the same community' (Williamson, 1912, p. 292).

A.2.6 Manus — Affinal exchanges, ordinarily between Manus of the same or different villages, are distinguished by long-term credit, compared with the short-term credit of trade friendship or market exchange (Mead, 1937, p. 218). Trade-friendship exchange, while more or less balanced, is in turn to be differentiated from the more impersonal 'market' exchange with Usiai bushfellows. The trade friendships are developed with people of distant tribes, sometimes on long-standing kinship ties. Some credit is extended trade friends, as well as hospitality, but market exchange is direct: the Usiai are viewed as furtive and hostile, 'whose eye is ever on driving a sharp bargain, whose trade manners are atrocious' (Mead, 1930, p. 118; see also Mead, 1934, pp. 307-308).

A.2.7 Chimo — Mutual help and sharing characterize relations among subclan members. A man may call upon a fellow subclansman for help whenever he needs it; he may ask any wife or daughter of a member of his subclan to give him food when she has some . . . However, it is only the most prominent men who can count on such services from persons outside their own subclan (Brown & Brookfield, 1959-60, p. 59; on the exception

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of 'prominent men', compare pp. 162-164 and 200-215 on Reciprocity and Kinship Rank). The pig-exchanges and other exchanges between clans argue balance in the external sector here, as elsewhere in the New Guinea Highlands (compare, for example, Bulmer, 1960, pp. 9-10).

A.2.8 Buka Passage — The total of internal reciprocity seems limited by comparison with external trade, but there are some indications of generalized exchange in internal sectors as contrasted with balanced, though not haggled, external exchange. In Kurtatchi village, requests from own sibmates of the same sex for areaa or coconuts are honored without repayment though the recipients are open to counter request; otherwise, no giving of something for nothing — save that near relatives may take a man's coconuts (Blackwood, 1935, pp. 452, 454; compare p. 439 f on trade).

A.2.9 Lesu — 'Free gifts' (generalized reciprocity) are especially rendered relatives and friends, most especially certain types of kinsmen. These gifts are food and betel. Between villages and moieties there are various balanced transactions (Powdermaker, 1933, pp. 195-203).

A.2.10 Dobu — As is well known, a very narrow sector of economic trust and generosity, including only susu and household. Outside of this, theft a possibility. Intervillage affinal exchanges more or less balanced, with village mates helping the sponsoring susu meet its obligations (Fortune, 1932).

A.2.11 Trobriand — The sociology of the reciprocity continuum described by Malinowski is only partly sectoral; rank considerations (compare below) and affinal obligations notably intrude. 'Pure gift,' however, is characteristic of family relations (Malinowski, 1922, pp. 177-178); 'customary payments, re-paid irregularly, and without strict equivalence' include usi-gubs and contributions to a kinsman's mortuary-ceremony fund (p. 180); 'gifts returned in economically equivalent form' (or almost equivalent form) include intervillage presentations at visits, exchanges between 'friends' (apparently these are especially or exclusively outside the village), and, it seems, the 'secondary' trade in strategic goods between kula partners (pp. 184-185); 'ceremonial barter with deferred payment' (not haggled) is characteristic between kula partners and between partners in the inland-coastal, vegetables vs. fish exchange (ussi) (pp. 187-189; cf. p. 42); 'trade,
pure and simple', involving haggling, mainly in nonpartner exchange between members of 'industrial' and other villages within Kiriwina (pp. 189-190). The last type is *ginuwali*; it is characteristic also of vegetable-fish exchange in the absence of partnership and overseas exchange accompanying *kula*, again in the absence of partnership (cf. pp. 361 f).

A.2.12 Tikopia - Near kinsmen and neighbors are privileged economically (e.g. Firth, 1936, p. 399; 1950, p. 203) and are expected to render economic assistance in various ways (e.g. Firth, 1936, p. 116; 1950, p. 292). The necessity of a *quid pro quo* seems to increase with kinship distance - thus 'forced exchange' (also known ethnographically as 'coercive gift') is a transaction of the more distant sector: 'The importance of the social category comes out...in cases such as when a man wants a coconut-grating stool. If he knows of a close kinsman who has an extra one, he goes and asks for it and should get it without ceremony. "You give me a stool for myself; your stools are two." It is said that the kinsman "rejoices" to give it because of the tie between them. Sooner or later he in turn comes and asks for something he fancies and this too will be handed over freely. Such freedom of approach obtains only between members of a small kinship group and depends upon the recognition of a principle of reciprocity. If a man is going to apply to someone not of his own kin, a "different man" as the Tikopia say, then he cooks food, fills a large basket, and tops it off with an ordinary piece of bark-cloth or even a blanket. Armed with this he goes to the owner and asks for the coconut-grating stool.

A.2.13 Maori - A large part of the internal circulation, here of the village especially, was centralized in chiefly hands - it was generalized enough but run on the principles of chiefly due and noblesse oblige (cf. Firth, 1959). The external exchanges (intervillage, intertribal) involved more direct and equivalent reciprocation, although prestige of course accrued to liberality (cf. Firth, 1959, pp. 336-337, 403-409, 422-423). Maori proverb: 'In winter a relation, in autumn a son; signifying "he is only a distant relative at the time of cultivation when there is heavy work to be tackled, but in the time after harvest when all is finished, and there is plenty of food to be eaten, he calls himself my son"' (Firth, 1926, p. 251).

A.3.0 Notes from here and there.

A.3.1 Pilaga - Henry's well-known study (1951) of food-sharing in a Pilagá village is here cited with caution. We have to deal with a disrupted and resettled population. Also, during the period of Henry's observations a great portion of the men were away working on sugar plantations. It was, moreover, the 'hungry time' of the Pilagá year. Thus we are dealing with an economic system from which a considerable number of productive persons had been withdrawn, and during a period of scarcity, with the society functioning at low ebb' (Henry, 1951, p. 193). (The intense food-sharing under these miserable conditions is consistent with propositions developed below on the relation between reciprocity and need.) I assume that most if not all the instances of sharing were of the generalized reciprocal sort, the giving out of larger stocks that had come to hand, rendering assistance and the like. The assumption is consistent with examples offered by Henry and with the lack of balance he records in individuals' outgo and income. Trade with other groups, reported by Henry to have occurred, is not considered in the study in question. The principal value of this study for the present discussion is its specification of the incidence of food-sharing by social distance. The obligation to share food is highest among those closest in kinship-residential terms. 'Membership in the same household [a multifamily and multidwelling group making up a section of the village] constitutes a very close tie; but membership in the same household plus a close kinship tie is the closest of bonds. This is objectified in food-sharing, those having the closest bond sharing food most often' (p. 188). The conclusion is supported by analysis of particular cases. (In one of these, the association between sharing and close relations was working the other way around - a woman was sharing food heavily with a man whom she wanted to, and eventually did, marry.) The cases reviewed so far concerning distribution within the household [section of the village] may be summarized as follows: the answer to the question, to which individual or family did each individual or family give most often? can be answered only through quantitative analysis of the behavior of individuals and families. When this is done four points emerge: (1) The Pilagá distributes most of his product to members of his own household. (2) He does not distribute equally to all. (3) A variety of factors enter to prevent his distributing equally to all; (a) differences in genealogical ties, (b) differences of obligations among the people of the household with respect to their
obligations outside it, (c) stability of residence, (d) dependency needs, (e) marital expectations, (f) fear of shamans, and (g) special food taboos. (4) When common residence and close genealogical ties combine, the highest rate of interchange of products between families so related is present' (p. 207). The sectoral incidence of food-sharing is shown in the following chart (adapted from Henry's Table IV, p. 210).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family</th>
<th>Per cent of Times Sharing Food with Families in</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Own household section of village</td>
<td>The other household section of the village</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The other section of the village, for which Henry did not have as numerous records – because they were wandering about the forest a good deal – does not show the same trend (also Table IV). The second column is in three of four instances larger than the first – more sharing across the village than within the ‘household’ section. But this section of the village is not comparable to the other (tabulated above) because in the former people were 'more closely integrated (i.e. closely related) than those at the other end, thus much of what takes the form of distribution, the transfer of produce from the producer to another person, in No. 28's part of the village [tabulated above], takes the form of commensality at No. 14's end of the village. Hence the percentage of product distributed by No. 14's people to persons within the section . . . appears low, while that distributed to other classes [sectors] seems high' (p. 211; Henry's emphases). Since Henry does not consider commensality among different families of the same 'household' as food-sharing, the seeming exception may be in fairness disregarded.

A.3.2 Nuer – Intensive food-sharing, hospitality, and other generalized reciprocities in Nuer smaller local groups (hamlet sections of the village) and cattle camps (Evans-Pritchard, 1940, pp. 21, 84-85, 91, 183; 1951, pp. 2, 131-132; Howell, 1964, p. 201). Not much exchange in the intratribal (extra-village) sector except the instrumental transactions of bridewealth and feud settlement (as compensations, of their nature balanced). Nuer specifically distinguish internal reciprocity from trade with Arabs by the directness (temporally) of the latter exchange (Evans-Pritchard, 1956, p. 223f). Relations with neighboring tribes, especially Dinka, notoriously appropriative, amounting in the main to seizure of loot and territory through violence.

A.3.3 Bantu of North Kavirondo – Intensive informal hospitality among neighbors. Exchanges of balanced sort are principally in durables, with craftsmen, but the rates most favor neighbors; clansmen, are higher for the clansman w/o is not a neighbor, most dear for strangers (Wagner, 1956, p. 161-162).

A.3.4 Chukchee – Certain amount of generosity: aid assistance within Chukchee camps (see citations in Sahlins, 1960). Theft from the herds of other camps common (Bogoras, 1904-09, p. 49). Aboriginal trade between maritime and reindeer Chukchee, and some trade across the Bering Straits: apparently the trade more or less balanced; some of it was silent and all of it conducted with considerable mistrust (Bogoras, 1904-09, pp. 53, 95-96).

A.3.5 Tiv – Clear differentiation at least between external ('market') and internal spheres. A 'market' distinguishable from the several varieties of gift: the last imply a relationship between the two parties concerned which is of a permanence and warmth not known in a “market”, and hence – though gifts should be reciprocal over a long period of time – it is bad form overly to count and compete and haggle over gifts' (Bohanan, 1956, p. 60). A 'market' is competitive and exploitative: 'In fact, the presence of a previous relationship makes a “good market” impossible: people do not like to sell to kinsmen since it is bad form to demand as high a price from kinsmen as one might from a stranger' (p. 60).

A.3.6 Bemba – A centralized system of reciprocities (chiefly redistribution) is, analogously to Polynesia, the main part of the larger economy; a very limited inter-tribal exchange sector (Richards, 1939, pp. 221 f). Various dues to close relatives by kin type (pp. 188 f). Apart from hospitality to visiting kinsmen, chiefs and, nowadays, strangers, food-sharing is ordinarily characteristic in a narrow circle of close kin – but...
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apparently in a wider circle during scarcities (pp. 108-109, 136 f, 178-182, 186, 202-203). The money that has been introduced is not much used in internal exchange, but when it is, 'People buying from relatives pay less than the normal rate, and usually add some service to the transaction' (p. 220). '... I have often seen women take a pot of beer and conceal it in a friend's granary on the reported arrival of some elderly relative. To refuse hospitality with a pot of beer sitting on the hearth would be an impossible insult, but a bland assertion that "Alas, Sir, we poor wretches... We have nothing to eat here" is sometimes necessary. This would not be done in the case of a near relative, but only with a more distant kinsman of a classificatory type, or one of the well-known 'cadgers' of a family' (p. 202).

APPENDIX B

Notes on Reciprocity and Kinship Rank

These materials deal with kinship-rank reciprocities both in simple form and in the context of chiefly redistribution.

B.1.0 Hunting-Gathering Peoples.

B.1.1 Bushmen - 'No Bushman wants prominence, but Toma [a band headman] went further than most in avoiding prominence; he had almost no possessions and gave away everything that came into his hands. He was diplomatic, for in exchange for his self-imposed poverty he won the respect and following of all the people there' (Thomas, 1959, p. 183). 'We did hear that a headman may feel that he should lean well to the generous side in his giving, for his position as headman sets him out from the others a little and he wants whatever attention this attracts not to be envious. Someone remarked that this could keep a headman poor' (Marshall, 1961, p. 244).

B.1.2 Andamans - 'Generosity is esteemed by the Andaman Islanders as one of the highest of virtues and is unremittingly practiced by the majority of them,' Radcliffe-Brown writes (1948, p. 43). He notes that the person who does not work and must needs be given food sinks in esteem, while Man remarked that the generous person rises in esteem (Man, n.d., p. 41). There is a definite generation-status influence on reciprocity. Although

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at least sometimes appearing as givers of food - on occasions of collective sharing of game - elders are privileged in regard to juniors: 'It is considered a breach of good manners ever to refuse the request of another. Thus if a man be asked by another to give him anything that he may possess, he will immediately do so. If the two men are equals a return of about the same value will have to be made. As between an older married man and a bachelor or a young married man, however, the younger would not make any request of such a nature, and if the older asked the younger for anything, the latter would give it without always expecting a return' (Radcliffe-Brown, 1948, pp. 42-43).

B.1.3 Eskimo - Influence and prestige accrued to the North Alaskan Eskimo whale boat leader or caribou hunting leader at least in part by virtue of the stuff he doled out in ostensively generous fashion (Spencer, 1959, pp. 144, 152 f, 210 f, 335-336, 351). Great men noted for their great generosity (pp. 154-155, 157). Stinginess as usual deplorable (p. 164).

B.1.4 Carrier - A big-man, slighted by a fur trader, boasts that he is just as good a chief as the trader: ' "When it is the proper season to hunt the beaver, I kill them; and of their flesh I make feasts for my relations. I, often, feast all the Indians of my village; and, sometimes, invite people from afar off, to come and partake of the fruits of my hunts ... " ' (Harmon, 1957, pp. 143-144, cf. pp. 253-254).

B.2.0 Melanesia - I have elsewhere presented a general study of the economics of big-man leadership in western Melanesian societies (Sahlins, 1963). Generalized reciprocity is here the decisive 'starting mechanism' of ranking. A following is developed through private assistance to individuals, a tribal name (renown) through large-scale giveaways, often of pigs and vegetable foods. The wherewithal for his generosity comes initially from the aspiring big-man's own household from his nearest relatives: he capitalizes in the beginning on kinship dues and by finessing the generalized reciprocity appropriate among close kin. He often enlarges his household at an early phase, perhaps by taking additional wives - ' "Another woman go garden, another woman take firewood, another woman go catch fish, another woman cook him - husband he sing out plenty people come kaikai" ' (Landman, 1927, p. 168). A leader's career is well under way when he is able to link other men and their families to his
faction, to harness their production to his ambition by helping them in some big way. He cannot, however, extend these people too far: some material benefits must accrue to followers on pain of encouraging their discontent and his downfall.

Most examples that follow are of big-man systems. The concluding cases are different: chiefdoms or protochiefdoms in which generalized reciprocity between ranks is apparent in a redistributive context.

B.2.1 Siuai – The most thorough exposition of Melanesian big-man economies is Oliver’s (1955) study. The development of influence and prestige through generalized transactions is richly described. There are several peripheral features likewise of interest in the present context. Notable is the influence of rank on customary rates of balance in shell money dealings: ‘One great advantage of being a leader lies in one’s ability to buy things more cheaply (“When a mumi [big-man] sends out thirty spans of mauai to purchase a pig for a feast, the pig owner would be ashamed to send along a pig worth less than forty”). On the other hand, this commercial advantage of the leader is usually counterbalanced by the traditional exercise of noblesse oblige’ (p. 342). So, ‘the most praiseworthy thing a man can do is to exceed the transactional requirements of ordinary trade and kin relationships by paying generously (in goods) for all goods and services he receives, by giving goods to persons to whom he is not directly obligated, and by doing these things after the manner of great leaders of the past’ (p. 456, cf. pp. 378, 407, 429-430).

Thurnwald writes of another Buin Plain people that mamoko, the reward given by a big-man to his followers, ‘is considered an act of liberality, for which there is no obligation. Any gift of friendship is described by the same name. A surplus payment over the price agreed is also called mamoko. Totokai is the excess payment of a kitere [follower] to his mumi [leader] for ensuring his good will and his willingness to credit him with abuta [shell money] on another occasion. Dakai designates a payment for reconciliation or reparation between men of equal position’ (Thurnwald, 1934-35, p. 135). The variation of reciprocity by rank difference is clear.

B.2.2 Gawa (Busama) – Clubhouse leaders and, especially, outstanding village leaders are typical western Melanesian bigmen. Hogbin writes: ‘The man who is generous over a long period thus has many persons in his debt. No problem arises when these are of the same status as himself – the poor give one another insignificant presents, and the rich exchange sumptuous offerings. But if his resources are greater than theirs they may find repayment impossible and have to default. Acutely conscious of their position, they express their humility in terms of deference and respect . . . The relation of debtors and creditors forms the basis of the system of leadership’ (Hogbin, 1961, p. 122). The leaders were ‘men who ate bones and chewed lime’ – they presented the best meat to others, leaving only scraps for themselves, and were so free with areca nuts and pepper that they had no betel mixture left. Folk-tales about legendary headmen of the past relate that, although these men had ‘more pigs than anyone could count and bigger gardens than are made now’, they gave everything away’ (p. 123, cf. pp. 118 f). The main run of clubhouse leaders were reluctantly placed in that position. The work was hard – ‘His hands are never free from earth, and his forehead continually drips with sweat’ (p. 131) – and the material rewards nil. The principal big-man of the village, however, was ambitious. ‘It is frequently insisted that the headmen were so jealous of their reputation that they went to the trouble of inventing excuses for giving food away’ (p. 139). Low rank was the reward of stinginess, and he who is prepared to take advantage of others, ‘He sinks to the bottom of the social ladder . . . ’ (p. 126).

B.2.3 Kaoka (Guadalcanal) – A main-run big-man economy (Hogbin, 1933-34, 1937-38). ‘Reputation . . . is enhanced not by accumulating wealth in order to use it for one’s self but by giving it away. Every event of importance in a person’s life – marriage, birth, death and even the construction of a new house or canoe – is celebrated by a feast, and the more feasts a man gives, the more lavish he is in providing food, the greater is his prestige. The social leaders are those who give away most’ (Hogbin, 1937-38, p. 290).

B.2.4 Kapauku – Described by the ethnographer as sort of upland New Guinea capitalists. The big-man pattern, however, is an ordinary (sweet potato) garden variety. ‘Loans’ and ‘credit’ put out by Kapauku big men (towut, ‘generous richman’) are not interest bearing in the standard sense (see above A.2.4); they are means of developing status through generosity (Pospisil, 1958, p. 120). ‘The society views its ideal man as a most generous individual, who through the distribution of his
fortune satisfies the needs of many people. Generosity is the highest cultural value and an attribute necessary for acquiring followers in political and legal life (p. 57). The big-man’s status sinks if he loses the wherewithal for generosity (p. 59); if he is excessively demanding he is likely to face an egalitarian rebellion—‘... you should not be the only rich man, we should all be the same, therefore you only stay equal with us’—was the reason given by the Papuan people for killing Mote Juwapija of Madi, a towonei who was not generous enough’ (p. 80, cf. pp. 108-110). Wealth is not enough: ‘... a selfish individual who hoards his money and does not lend [sic] it, never sees the time when his word will be taken seriously and his advice and decisions followed, no matter how rich he may become. The people believe that the only justification for becoming rich is to be able to redistribute the accumulated property among one’s less fortunate fellows, a procedure which also gains their support’ (pp. 79-80). Big-men buy more cheaply than prevailing rates (p. 122). One big-man summed up well, if cynically, the rank-generating impetus delivered by generalized reciprocity: ‘I am a headman,’” he said, ‘‘not because the people like me but because they owe me money and are afraid’’ (p. 96).

B.2.5 New Guinea Highlands—The big-man pattern, here worked out in a segmented lineage context, is general in the Highlands.

The Kuma ‘‘big men’’ or ‘‘men of strength’’... who can command much wealth, are entrepreneurs in the sense that they control the flow of valuables between clans by making fresh presentations on their own account and choosing whether or not to contribute to others. Their profit in these transactions is incremental reputation... The aim is not simply to be wealthy, nor even to act as only the wealthy can act: it is to be known to be wealthy. Further, a man does not really achieve his ambition until he can be seen to act as if wealth itself were of no account’’ (Reay, 1959, p. 96, see pp. 110-111, 130). There is also the usual Melanesian corollary of the big-man, the ‘‘rubbish man’’: ‘‘A man is a “rubbish man” of no consequence if he has not enough food to offer many friends and relatives as well as meet his personal requirements’’ (p. 23).

The use of generalized reciprocity as a mechanism of status differentiation in another Highland instance (Kyaka) is succinctly put by Bulmer: ‘‘These supporters of a leader are normally in a state of mutual obligation with him, having been helped by him with bridewealth payment and the like, or expecting help of this kind. Such assistance obligates them to channel through him such pigs of their own as they are putting into the Moka [interclan pig-exchange]’’ (Bulmer, 1960, p. 9).

B.2.6 Lesu—‘A rich man might pay five tsera for a pig for which another man would pay four. The more he pays the more prestige the buyer has. Everyone then knows he is a rich man. On the other hand, the owner of a pig would gain prestige if he sold it for four tsera when he might have received five’’ (Powdermaker, 1933, p. 201).

B.2.7 To’ombaita (N. Malaita)—Another good description of a typical big-man order, conforming in all essential respects to those already discussed (Hogbin, 1939, esp. pp. 61 f; 1943-44, pp. 258 f).

B.2.8 Manus—The Manus have—or had, in their ‘‘old lives’’—a big-man pattern (Mead, 1934, 1937). Their clans, however, were also ascriptively divided into two ranks, lapan (high) and lau (low). This ranking was according to Mead not of great political significance, but its economic side is of interest nonetheless. ‘‘Between lapan and lau there is a type of mutual helpfulness expected, not unlike a slight version of the feudal relationship—the lapan takes care of the economic needs of the lau and the lau works for the lapan’’ (Mead, 1934, pp. 335-336).

For discussion of other big-men systems see Sahlin 1963. Among the well-described ones are the Arapesh (Mead, 1937a, 1938, 1947), the Abelam (Kaberry, 1940-41, 1941-42), and Tangu (Burridge, 1950). Deacon struck the general note: ‘‘Yet for all that the Malekulan is, as has been said, grasping and bourgeois in his attitude toward wealth, generosity and consideration for one’s debtors are held up as virtues... To be stingy is to sink in public esteem; to be openhanded is to acquire fame, honour, and influence’’ (Deacon, 1934, p. 200).

B.2.9 Sa’a—The generalized reciprocity principle in the context of a small scale redistributive system. The good chief and the commoners regarded one another as mutually dependent on each other, and the people loved a chief who by his feasts brought glory on the place, and one of the reasons why [the chief] Wate’onon was called... ‘‘he who keeps the canoe on a straight course’’, was because he was good at feasts’’ (Ivens, 1927, p. 255). ‘‘Stowed away safely in the lodge in bags is the chief’s possession in money, which in a measure is what
Dorsádi called the "panga", the "bank" of the village because it is drawn on for communal purposes such as feasts or the payments of blood money. The Sa'a chiefs were wealthy men owing to the contributions made to them on public occasions by the commoners' (p. 32). 'Chief and priest were exempted from the obligation to make a return for gifts received which held always in the case of commoners' (p. 8). 'Chiefs were said to kulu kie kāne, succour the land, to draw the people up who came to them for protection, and the word kulu, draw or lift up, appears in the compound mānsikulu'e, glorious, a word associated with feasts and chiefs' (p. 129, cf. pp. 145, 147-148, 160 f, 221 f).

B.2.10 Trobriands - Generalized rank reciprocity organized as redistribution. The underlying ethic was reciprocal assistance between chiefs and people. Malinowski's many statements of the economic obligations of chieftainship include several which highlight the status implications of generosity. For example: '...to possess is to be great, and ...wealth is the indispensable appanage of social rank and attribute of personal virtue. But the important point is that with them to possess is to give. ...A man who owns a thing is naturally expected to share it, to distribute it, to be its trustee and dispenser. And the higher the rank the greater the obligation. ...Thus the main symptom of being powerful is to be wealthy, and of wealth is to be generous. Meaness, indeed, is the most despised vice, and the only thing about which the natives have strong moral views, while generosity is the essence of goodness' (1922, p. 97). Again: 'Not in all cases, but in many of them, the handing over of wealth is the expression of the superiority of the giver over the recipient. In others, it represents subordination to a chief, or a kinship relation or relationship-in-law' (p. 175). 'Relationship between Chiefs and Commoners. - The tributes and services given to a chief by his dependents or his relatives or the rich, upon whom he can draw at any time he be in need' (pp. 449, cf. pp. 432, 438, 547-548, 563; on the element of calculation in Assiniboine generosity, see pp. 475, 514-515).

B.3.1 Assiniboine - 'The chief of a band is little more than the nominal father of all and addresses them as his children in a body' (Denig, 1928-29, p. 431). 'A chief must give away all to preserve his popularity and is always the poorest in the band, yet he takes good care to distribute his gifts among his own relatives or the rich, upon whom he can draw at any time he be in need' (p. 449, cf. pp. 432, 525, 547-548, 563; on the element of calculation in Assiniboine generosity, see pp. 475, 514-515).

B.3.2 Kansa-Osage - 'The chiefs and candidates for public preferment render themselves popular by their disinterestedness and poverty. Whenever any extraordinary success attends them in the acquisition of property, it is only for the benefit of their meritorious adherents, for they distribute it with a profuse liberality, and pride themselves in being esteemed the poorest man in the community' (Hunter, 1823, p. 317).

B.3.3 Plains Cree - 'It is not an easy thing to be a chief. Look at this chief now. He has to have pity on the poor. When he sees a man in difficulty he must try to help him in whatever way he can. If a person asks for something in his tipi, he must give it to him willingly and without bad feeling' (Mandelbaum, 1940, p. 222, cf. pp. 195, 206, 221 f, 270-271).


B.3.5 Comanche - 'The same (Wallace & Hoebel, 1952, pp. 36, 131, 208 f, 240).

B.4.0 Polynesia - I have elsewhere offered studies of the economies of Polynesian chieftainship (Sahlins, 1958, 1963). Redistribution is the transactional form, generalized reciprocity the principle. The few notes here highlight particularly the principle.
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B.4.1 Maori — Firth's excellent analysis of Maori economies provides the mise en scène for considerations of rank-reciprocity in Polynesia. I cite two long passages: 'The prestige of a chief was bound up with his free use of wealth, particularly food. This in turn tended to secure for him a larger revenue from which to display his hospitality, since his followers and relatives brought him choice gifts.... Apart from lavish entertainment of strangers and visitors, the chief also disbursed wealth freely as presents among his followers. By this means their allegiance was secured and he repaid them for the gifts and personal services rendered to him. All payment among the Maori was made in the form of gifts. There was thus a continual reciprocity between chief and people. The chief also acted as a kind of capitalist, assuming the initiative in the construction of certain "public works" if the term may be so used. It was by his accumulation and possession of wealth, and his subsequent lavish distribution of it, that such a man was able to give the spur to these important tribal enterprises. He was a kind of channel through which wealth flowed, concentrating it only to pour it out freely again' (Firth, 1959, p. 133). 'The quantity and quality of... gifts received tended to increase with the rank and hereditary position of the chief in the tribe, his prestige, and the following which he was able to gather around him. But the relationship was by no means one-sided. If the income of a chief was largely dependent on his prestige and influence and the regard of his people, this in its turn was contingent upon his liberal treatment of them. There were constant calls upon his resources. His slaves and immediate dependents had to be fed, he was expected to assist those of his tribesmen who came to him in need, a crowd of relatives — and the Maori bonds of kinship stretched far — looked to him for a generous repayment of all the small social services they rendered him, and for an occasional douceur as a mark of appreciation of their loyalty. When presents of foodstuffs were made to him by people of other tribes his regard for his reputation required that he should distribute a considerable portion of them among his tribespeople. For all gifts made to him a return was expected, of equivalent or even greater value. ... Again, the calls of hospitality were never ending. Entertainment had to be provided on a lavish scale for visiting chiefs and their adherents. ... Moreover, on occasions of the birth, marriage or death of any people of rank in the village his personal resources were drawn upon to a serious extent, while the occasional provision of a large feast also drained him of food supplies. In this connection he seems to have exercised control of the communal stores of food which he commanded to be disbursed as required. If the chief's use of wealth be reviewed, then, it is seen that to the varied sources which provided him with his stores of goods corresponded a number of serious liabilities. The result was that a sort of equilibrium was maintained between income and expenditure. In general, at no time was the chief the possessor of enormous quantities of valuables, though the system of receipts and redistribution of goods allowed a great quantity of them to flow through his hands' (pp. 297-298, cf. pp. 150 f, 294 f, 345-346).

B.4.2 Hawaii — Chiefs had extensive call on the labor, the resources and products of the underlying makaainana population, as well as control over certain specialists and enjoyment of certain sumptuary perquisites. The chieftom, often embracing the whole of a large island, was an elaborate collection-redistribution apparatus. 'It was the practice for kings, i.e. paramount chiefs of individual islands, to build storehouses in which to collect food, fish, tapas [bark cloth], malos [men's loin cloths], pa-us [women's loin skirts], and all sorts of goods. These store-houses were designed by the Kalaimoku [chief's executives] as a means of keeping the people contented, so they would not desert the king. They were like the baskets that were used to entrap the hinalea fish. The hinalea thought there was something good within the basket, and he hung round the outside of it. In the same way the people thought there was food in the storehouses, and they kept their eyes on the king. As the rat will not desert the pantry... where he thinks food is, so the people will not desert the king while they think there is food in his storehouse' (Malo, 1951, p. 195). The tendency at the highest levels of chieftainship, however — and despite well meaning advice of counselors — was to press too heavily on the lesser chiefs and people, with the result that, as Malo puts it, 'Many kings were put to death by the people because of their oppression of the makaainana [commonalty]' (p. 195, cf. pp. 88, 61; Fornander, 1880, pp. 76, 88, 100-101, 200-202, 227-228, 270-271).

B.4.3 Tonga — A fine native statement of the chiefly economic ethic, attributed by Mariner to the chief Finau upon Mariner's explanation of the value of money: 'Finow replied that the
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explanation did not satisfy him; he still thought it a foolish thing that people should place a value on money, when they either could not or would not apply it to any useful (physical) purpose. "If", said he, "it were made of iron, and could be converted into knives, axes and chisels, there would be some sense in placing a value on it; but as it is, I see none. If a man," he added, "has more yams than he wants, let him exchange some of them away for pork or gnoato [bark cloth]. Certainly money is much handier, and more convenient, but then, as it will not spoil by being kept, people will store it up, instead of sharing it out, as a chief ought to do, and thus become selfish; whereas, if provisions were the principal property of man, and it ought to be, as being both the most useful and the most necessary, he could not store it up, for it would spoil, and so he would be obliged either to exchange it away for something else useful, or share it to his neighbors, and inferior chiefs and dependents, for nothing." He concluded by saying "I understand now very well what it is that makes the Papalangi ["Europeans"] so selfish — it is this money!" (Mariner, 1827 i, pp. 213-214).

Conversely, the upward flow: "... the practice of making presents to superior chiefs is very general and frequent. The higher class of chiefs generally make a present to the king, of hogs or yams about once a fortnight. These chiefs, about the same time, receive presents from those below them, and these last from others, and so on, down to the common people" (p. 210; cf. Gifford, 1929).

B.4.4 Tahiti — From indications of the Duff missionaries, it looks as if Ha’amanimani, the Tahitian priest-chief, acted faithfully to the ideal expressed by Finau: 'Manne Manne was very urgent for sails, rope, anchor, etc. for his vessel, none of which articles we had to spare: on which account, though the captain gave him his own cocked hat and a variety of articles, he was still discontented; saying, "Several people told me that you wanted Manne Manne, and now I am come, you give me nothing." An observation similar to this he once made to the missionary: "You give me," says he, "much parow (talk) and much prayers to the Eatooa, but very few axes, knives, scissors, or cloth." The case is, that whatever he receives he immediately distributes among his friends and dependents; so that for all the numerous presents he had received, he had nothing now to shew, except a glazed hat, a pair of breeches, and an old black coat, which he had fringed with red feathers. And this prodigal behaviour he excuses, by saying that, were he not to do so, he should never be a king, nor even remain a chief of any consequence" (Duff missionaries, 1799, pp. 224-225). For all this it is apparent from the Duff journal as well as other early reports (e.g. Rodrigues, 1919) that Tahitian high chiefs might accumulate considerable stocks of goods and especially that they had very considerable power to demand foodstuffs from the underlying population. The traditional counsel was the same as in Hawaii — Your household must not be accused of food hiding. Let not your name be associated with hidden foods or hidden goods. The hands of the Arii must be always open; on these two things rest your prestige' (Handy, 1930, p. 41) — but apparently Tahitian chiefs were inclined as it is said, to 'eat the powers of the government too much.' (Yet see also Davies, 1961, p. 87 note 1.)

B.4.5 Tikopia — A stream of gifts flow from below to the Tikopia chief, but then his obligation to be generous is at least as great as his ability to accumulate things. Generosity indeed was a jealously guarded chiefly prerogative: 'Chiefs are recognized as being proper persons to control large quantities of food, to have a number of valued objects stored away in their houses. ... But the stocks which they accumulate are expected to be dispersed in a manner which will yield benefit to their people. Great accumulation by a commoner must also be followed by a corresponding dispersal. But such a man would incur the charge from the chiefly families of fia paatiki "desiring to boast", and would be watched by them lest he attempt to usurp some of their privileges. According to precedent in Tikopia history they would probably take an opportunity either to seize his goods or to kill him' (Firth, 1950, p. 243). The Tikopia chiefs, in short, would not tolerate starting mechanisms. This is not true throughout Polynesia. In the Marqueesas, for example, upward mobility through 'accumulating and dispensing wealth' was possible (Linton, 1939, pp. 150, 153, 156-157; Handy, 1923, pp. 36-37, 48, 63). (On other aspects of the reciprocity between Tikopia chiefs and people see Firth, 1936, pp. 382-383, 401-403; 1950, pp. 34, 58, 109 f, 172, 188, 190, 191, 196, 212 f, 321.)

B.5 Miscellaneous.

B.5.1 Northwestern North America — Generalized reciprocity permeated the political economy of the Northwest Coast

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Indians, both in the potlatch giveaways between chiefs and in the internal relation of chiefs and their respective followers. The Nootka are a clearly described case in point. Chiefs acquired a variety of dues: from the first catch of salmon traps, early pickings of berry patches, from large catches of fish taken by their people, and the like (e.g. Drucker, 1951, pp. 56-57, 172, 255, 272, et passim). Conversely, "Every time a chief gets a lot of food of any kind, he gave a feast to give it away to his people" (p. 370) (see also Sutcliffe, 1960, pp. 299-300; Barnett, 1938; Codere, n.d.).

The Tolowa-Tututni political economy is the same in principle as that prevailing to the north, albeit a slighter version. Drucker characterizes the chief-follower relation as "symbiotic"—"The relationship uniting the rich-man and his kinsfolk was essentially a symbiotic one. It is said that some of the richest men never worked; their henchmen hunted and fished for them. In return the rich-man gave feasts, and in lean times would share his stores with his people. He bought wives for the young men, or at least contributed most of the payment; but it was also he who accepted and held the bride prices paid for their sisters and daughters. Perhaps most important of all; it was the rich-man who was obliged to pay compensation for wrongs his henchmen committed, to save them, and himself, from retaliation... he received a lion's share of any indemnities paid for injuries to one of them" (Drucker, 1937, p. 245; for indications of similar rank-reciprocity in California see Kroeber, 1925, pp. 3, 40, 42, 55; Goldschmidt, 1961, pp. 324-325, 365, 413; Loeb, 1926, pp. 238-239).

B.5.2 Creek—One of the prettiest descriptions of chiefly redistribution, again run on the underlying principle of generalized reciprocity, appears in W. Bartram's late eighteenth-century account of the Creek: "After the feast of the busk is over, and all the grain is ripe, the whole town again assemble, and every man carries of the fruits of his labour, from the part [of the town field] first allotted to him, which he deposits in his own granary; which is individually his own. But previous to their carrying off their crops from the field, there is a large crib or granary, erected in the plantation, which is called the king's crib; and to this each family carries and deposits a certain quantity, according to his [apparently meaning "their"] ability or inclination, or none at all if he so chooses, this in

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appearance seems a tribute or revenue to the mico [chief], but in fact is designed for another purpose, i.e. that of a public treasury, supplied by a few and voluntary contributions, and to which every citizen has the right of free and equal access, when his own private stores are consumed, to serve as a surplus to fly to for succour, to assist neighboring towns whose crops have failed, accommodate strangers, or travellers, afford provisions or supplies, when they go forth on hostile expeditions, and for all other exigencies of the state; and this treasure is at the disposal of the king or mico; which is surely a royal attribute to have an exclusive right and ability in a community to distribute comfort and blessings to the necessitous" (Bartram, 1958, p. 326; cf. Swanton, 1928, pp. 277-278).

B.5.3 Kachin—"In theory then people of superior class receive gifts from their inferiors. But no permanent economic advantage accrues from this. Anyone who receives a gift is thereby placed in debt (hka) to the giver... Paradoxically therefore although an individual of high-class status is defined as one who receives gifts... he is all the time under a social compulsion to give away more than he receives. Otherwise he would be reckoned mean and a mean man runs the danger of losing status" (Leach, 1954, p. 163).

B.5.4 Bemba—"A classic redistributive economy, a classic generalized reciprocity between chief and people. '... the distribution of cooked food is an attribute of authority, and therefore prestige, and... its reception puts a man under an obligation to return to the giver respect, service, or reciprocal hospitality' (Richards, 1939, p. 135). The paramount is most engaged in the distributive process, and this 'is of course necessary to the chief if he is to make gardens and conduct tribal business through his councillors. But it is more than this. The giving of food, as in most African tribes, is an absolutely essential attribute of chieftainship, just as it is of authority in the village or household, and the successful organization of supplies at the capital seems to be associated in the Bemba mind with the security and well-being of the whole tribe itself... The whole institution of the kamitembo [the sacred kitchen and storeroom of the tribe] illustrates to my mind that close association between authority and the power to distribute provisions on which the tribal organization depends. The chief owns the food and receives tribute, and the chief..."
provide for his subjects and distributes cooked food to them. Both of these attributes are symbolized in the *kamitombo* house (pp. 148, 150). I never heard a chief boast to another about the size of his granaries, but often about the amount of food brought to him and distributed by him. In fact chiefs particularly valued the fact that some of their food was brought to them and not grown in their gardens, for it gave them some kind of resource to fall back upon. The Bemba say: "We will shake the tree until it gives up its fruit", that is to say, we will nag the big man until he divides his supplies. If a chief attempted to dry meat and keep it for subsequent division his followers would sit and stare at it and talk about it until he was forced to give them some, but supplies brought irregularly from other villages provided constant fresh resources (p. 214). The people still definitely prefer their ruler to have a big granary. It gives them, I think, a sense of security—a feeling of certainty that there will be food at the capital and a knowledge that they are working for a powerful and successful man.

... Besides this, a hungry man has technically the right to call upon his chief for help. I did not hear of this claim being made very often, but still, in a sense, the *usul kale* [tribute-labour] garden and *usul kale* granary are recognized as belonging to the people. A man can steal from the tribute garden of a chief, but not from those of his wives, and I have sometimes heard old natives speak with pride of "our" granary, adding, "It was we who filled it to overflowing". Thus the commoner got by his labour the sense of supernatural support, a personal approach to his chief, food in return for his work, support in time of starvation, and leadership in economic pursuits. The chief in return got extra supplies of food to distribute, the means of supporting his tribal council, the necessary labour for tribal undertakings such as road-building, and last, but not least, prestige (p. 261; cf. pp. 138, 169, 244).

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B.5.5 *Pilag* — Generosity is no starting mechanism, but it is a sustaining mechanism of rank. In Henry's tables (1951, pp. 194, 197, 314) it is the chief who gives more goods (and to more people) than anyone else. Henry comments regarding this: "It will ... be observed that in no case is the contribution of his [i.e. the chief's] family to any family equaled or exceeded by any other family. As a matter of fact, No. 28 [the chief] himself alone contributes on an average of 35% of the income, i.e. food received of each family. Thus the role of the chief and his family in Pilag society is to support others. The chief and his family thus become the unifying factor in the village. It is this that gives meaning to the use of the father term for the chief and the child term for the members of the village. ... The position of the chief, despite the "prestige" it carries also entails burdens. All the people are his children (koko teto) for whom he is responsible. Hence the word for chief, *salyaramak*, signifies one who is heavy (pp. 214-215).

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**Notes on Reciprocity and Wealth**

Reciprocity and Wealth — The following notes mostly concern societies already considered in other contexts. The citations illustrate particularly the association between wealth differences and generosity (generalized reciprocity). That food is the item so often shared is significant. Examples that indicate sharing in favor of need between socially distant parties—those who would ordinarily enter balanced exchange—especially underscore the assertions of this section.

C.1.0 Hunters and gatherers.

C.1.1 Andamanese — It has been stated above that all food is private property and belongs to the man or woman who has obtained it. Everyone who has food is expected, however, to give to those who have none. ... The result of these customs is that practically all the food obtained is evenly distributed through the whole camp ... (Radcliffe-Brown, 1948, p. 43).

C.1.2 Bushmen — "Food, whether vegetable or animal, and water are also private property, and belong to the person who has obtained them. Everyone who has food is, however, expected to give to those who have none. ... The result is that practically all the food obtained is evenly distributed through the whole camp" (Schapera, 1930, p. 143). Compare these last two quotations! It is an extremely rare fortune in anthropology, and fills one with humble awe, to enter the presence of a great natural law. Actually, the elided parts of these citations indicate some difference in manner of distribution. An older married man...
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among the Andamanese will share out food after he has reserved sufficient for his family; a younger man hands over the pigs to elders for distribution (see also Radcliffe-Brown, 1948, pp. 37-38, 41; Man, n.d., pp. 129, 143 note 6). The one who takes game or veldkos among the Bushman does the sharing out, according to Schapera.

The Andamanese who is lazy or helpless is still given food, despite the probability or certainty of no reciprocation (Radcliffe-Brown, 1948, p. 50; Man, n.d., p. 25). A lazy hunter fares badly among the Bushmen; a crippled one is abandoned by all save his nearest relations (Thomas, 1959, pp. 167, 246; see also Marshall, 1961, on Bushman sharing).

C.1.3 Eskimo — The Alaskan seal-hunter is often solicited for meat, especially in lean winter months, and these requests are very rarely refused (Spencer, 1959, pp. 58, 148-149). 'In times of food shortage, it was the successful hunter and his family who might go hungry, since in his generosity he gave away whatever he had at hand' (p. 164). Notable are the obligations of the fortunate toward non-kin in the camp: 'Generosity was a primary virtue and no man could risk a misedly reputation. Thus anyone in the community, whether inland or coastal, could ask aid of a man of wealth and it was never refused. This might mean that the men of wealth would be obliged to support an entire group in times of stress. Here, too, aid was extended to non-kin' (p. 163; presumably these non-kin might at other times enter balanced exchanges, as in the 'bidding game' — see A.1.7). Lazy people take advantage of a hunter's bounty, and do not necessarily reciprocate even if they have their own stores (pp. 164-165; see also pp. 345-351, 150-167 for giveaways in which poor stand to gain materially).

Generally among Eskimo large game is 'common property', though smaller animals are not, yet the hunter might in any case invite people of the camp to a meal (Bink, 1875, pp. 28 f; Birket-Smith, 1959, p. 146; see also Boss, 1884-85, pp. 562, 574, 582; Weyer, 1932, pp. 184-186).

Spencer's note of the reaction of Alaskan Eskimo to the Great Depression of the 1930s is of interest in the context of economic behavior during general shortage: 'More so than in a time of prosperity, the community sense of in-group consciousness appears to have developed. Those who did engage in hunting were obliged by custom to share their catch — seal, walrus, caribou, or any other game — with the less fortunate members of the community. But while this factor of sharing operated between non-kin, the socioeconomic circumstances of the period furthered the aboriginal family system as a cooperative institution. Families worked together and extended their joint efforts to the benefit of the community at large. The return to the aboriginal social patterns at a time of economic stress appears to have lent the family system a force which it still possesses. As may be seen, however, the cooperative arrangement between non-kin in the community tends to break down with the addition of new wealth' (Spencer, 1959, pp. 361-362).

C.1.4 Australian Aborigines — Local communities of Walbiri or of friendly tribes could drop in on neighboring Walbiri when in need. They were welcomed, even if the hosts' supplies were limited, but there was some degree of balance in the economic relationship. The requests of hungry communities 'often took the form of appeals to actual kinship ties and, couched in these terms, could hardly be refused. The suppliants, then or later, made gifts of weapons, hair-string, red ochre and the like to express their gratitude and, equally important, to rid themselves of feelings of shame or embarrassment' (Meggitt, 1962, p. 52). In lean seasons among the Arunta, everyone shared in available supplies, ordinary generation, sex and kinship-status considerations notwithstanding (Spencer & Gillen, 1927 i, pp. 38-39, 400).

C.1.5 Luzon Negritos — Large quantities of food are shared; whenever a good find is made neighbors are invited to partake until it is eaten up (Vanoverbergh, 1925, p. 409).

C.1.6 Naskapi — The same (e.g. Leacock, 1954, p. 33).

C.1.7 Congo Pygmies — A hunter cannot very well refuse — in view of public opinion — to share out game in the camp (Putnam, 1953, p. 333). Larger animals, at least, were generally shared through extended family groups; vegetables were not so distributed unless some family had none and then others 'come to their assistance' (Schebesta, 1933, pp. 68, 125, 244).

C.1.8 Western Shoshoni — Essentially the same customary sharing of large game, and of lesser family supplies in favor of need, in the camp (Steward, 1938, pp. 60, 74, 231, 253; cf. also pp. 27-28 on helping families whose traditional pithon haunts were not bearing).

C.1.9 Northern Tungus (mounted hunters) — The hunting spoil, by the custom of nimadif, went to the clan — 'in other words, the
fruit of the hunting does not belong to the hunter, but to the 
clan' (Shirokogoroff, 1928, p. 195). There was great readiness 
to assist clansmen in need (pp. 200). Reindeer were allocated to 
the poor of the clan following epizootics, with the result that 
families holding over sixty deer were not to be seen (p. 296). 

C.1.10 Northern Chipewyan and Copper Indians - Samuel Hearne 
notices an outbreak of 'disinterested friendship' among 
members of his crew as they prepare to attack some Eskimos: 
'Never was reciprocity of interest more generally regarded 
among a number of people, than it was on the present occasion 
by my crew, for not one was a moment in want of anything 
that another could spare; and if ever the spirit of disinterested 
friendship expanded the heart of a Northern Indian, it was 
here exhibited in the most extensive meaning of the word. 
Property of every kind that could be of general use now ceased 
to be private, and every one who had any thing that came 
under that description seemed proud of an opportunity of 
giving it, or lending it to those who had none, or were most in 
want of it.' (Hearne, 1855, p. 98).

C.2.0 Plains Indians - In many northern tribes there was insuffici­
cy of good buffalo horses and unequal possession of them. 
Those without horses, however, did not suffer for food in con­
sequence; the meat circulated to have-note, in various ways. 
For example:

C.2.1 Assiniboine - Denig notes that in a large camp men who lacked 
horses, and the old and infirm as well, would follow the hunt, 
taking meat as they would but leaving the hide and choice 
parts for the hunter, and they got as much meat as they wanted 
(Denig, 1928-29, p. 466, cf. p. 532). When food was scarce 
people would spy out lodges that were better supplied and 
drop in at meal times, as "No Indian eats before guests without 
offering them a share, even if it is the last portion they possess" 
(p. 506; cf. p. 518). The successful horse raider might be 
flattered so by old men upon his return from the raid that by 
the time he reached his lodge he ('frequently') had given all the 
loot away (pp. 547-548).

C.2.2 Blackfoot - The poor in horses might borrow from the wealthy 
- the latter thus adding to the number of followers - and people 
whose herds had been depleted by misfortune were particularly 
so helped by those more fortunate (Ewers, 1956, pp. 140-141). 
A person who borrowed a horse for a chase might return the 
owner the best of the meat taken, but this evidently was con­
ditional upon the horse-owner's own supply (pp. 161-162). If 
borrowing was not possible, the man would have to rely on the 
'rich' for meat and usually had to take the lean (pp. 162-163, 
but see pp. 240-241). A case cited of an amputee warrior there­
after supplied with a lodge, horses and food by his band (p. 
213). Those who captured horses on raids were supposed after­
ward to share their loot with less fortunate comrades, but 
arguments were frequent here (p. 188; compare with Plains 
Ojibway generosity before the raid, C.2.5). Note how wealth 
differences generalize exchange: in intratribal trading, rich 
men paid more dearly for things than did others; the average 
man, for example, gave two horses for a shirt and leggings, 
the rich man three to nine horses for the same thing (p. 218). A 
man, in addition, frequently gave horses to the needy 'to get 
his name up', and the poor might take advantage of the rich 
by giving small presents to the latter or simply praising them 
loudly in the hopes of a horse return (p. 255). Ewers thus 
summarizes the economic relation between rich and poor: 
'Generosity was felt to be a responsibility of the wealthy. They 
were expected to loan horses to the poor for hunting and mov­
ing camp, to give food to the poor, and to give away horses 
occasionaly. They were expected to psy more in intratribal 
barter than were Indians who were not well to do. If the man 
of wealth had political ambitions it was particularly important 
that he be lavish with his gifts in order to gain a large number 
of followers to support his candidancy' (p. 242).

The reaction to general shortage was heightened sharing. 
Lean winter periods were common: 'Then the wealthy, who 
had put up extensive winter supplies the previous fall, had to 
share their food with the poor' (Ewers, 1955, p. 167). The rank 
structure of the band was also engaged to organize, relief: 
hunters had to turn over their bag to the band chief, who had 
it cut up and divided equally to each family. When game 
became more plentiful, this 'primitive form of food rationing' 
was discontinued and the chief stepped out of the central dis­
tributive role (pp. 167-168).

C.2.3 Plains Cree - The same inclination of those better off to share 
meat to people without horses, to give horses away on occasion 
- for which from the poor one received in return not meat but 
fealty (Mandelbaum, 1940, p. 196) - and other generosities 
found in the Plains in connection with wealth differences 
(pp. 204, 221, 222, 270-271; see also Wallace and Hoebel,
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1952, p. 75 et passim on the Comanche; Cones on the Mandan (village Indians), 1897, p. 337.

C.2.4 *Kansas*—Hunter writes that if one party to an agreed exchange could not meet his obligations due to ill health or bad hunting luck, he was notunned, nor did friendly relations with his creditors cease. But one who failed of his obligations for reason of laziness was a bad Indian and would be abandoned by his friends—such types, however, were rare (Hunter, 1823, p. 295). Moreover, '... no one of respectable standing will be allowed to experience want or sufferings of any kind, while it is in the power of others of the same community to prevent it. In this respect they are extravagantly generous; always supplying the wants of their friends from their own superabundance' (p. 296).

Generalized reciprocity apparently intensified during shortage. 'Whenever a scarcity prevails, they reciprocally lend, or rather share with each other, their respective stores, till they are all exhausted. I speak now of those who are provident, and sustain good characters. When the case is otherwise, the wants of such individuals are regarded with comparative indifference; though their families share in the stock, become otherwise common from public exigency' (p. 298).

C.2.5 *Plains Ojibway*—Tanner and his Ojibway family, destitute, reach a camp of Ojibway and Ottawa; the chiefs of the camp meet to consider their plight and one man after another volunteers to hunt for Tanner's people; Tanner's FaBrWi is stingy to them, but her husband beats her for it (Tanner, 1956, pp. 30-34). In similar circumstances, an Ojibway lodge insisted on silver ornaments and other objects of value in return for giving Tanner's family some meat one winter. This insistence on exchange struck Tanner as despicable, for his people were hungry—'I had not before met with such an instance among the Indians. They are commonly ready to divide what provisions they have with any who come to them in need' (p. 47), see also pp. 49, 60, 72-73, 75, 118, 119.

During a period of epidemic and general food shortage in an Ojibway camp, Tanner and another hunter managed to kill a bear. 'Of the flesh of this animal,' he wrote, 'we could not eat a mouthful, but we took it home and distributed to every lodge an equal portion' (p. 95). On another similar occasion, an Indian who had shot two moose tried to get Tanner to secretly share them, keeping the meat from the rest of the camp.

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Tanner, a better Indian than this, refused, went out hunting, killed four bears and distributed the meat to the hungry (p. 163).

On special economic behavior of the warpath: if a man of the war party was short of mocassins or ammunition he took out one of that object and walked about the camp before a person well supplied; the latter ordinarily gave over the thing desired without the necessity of anyone speaking, or else, the leader of the party went from man to man taking what was needed by the person who was short (p. 129).

C.3.0 *Miscellaneous.*

C.3.1 *Nuer*—See the citations in the text of this section. 'Kinsmen must assist one another, and if one has a surplus of a good thing he must share it with his neighbors. Consequently no Nuer ever has a surplus' (Evans-Pritchard, 1940, p. 183). Generalized reciprocity characteristic between haves and have nots, especially if close kin and neighbors, in the compact dry season camps, and during seasons of generally low supplies (pp. 21, 25, 94-95, 90-92; 1951, p. 132; Howell, 1954, pp. 16, 185-186).

C.3.2 *Kuikuru (upper Xingu)*—The contrast between the handling of the major crop, manioc, and the disposition of maize is an instructive illustration of the relation of sharing to supplies on hand. Kuikuru households are in general self-sufficient; there is little sharing between them, especially of manioc which is produced with ease and in quantity. But during Carneiro's stay, maize was planted by only five men of the village, and their harvest was divided through the community (Carneiro 1957, p. 162).

C.3.3 *Chukchee*—Despite an anthropological reputation something to the contrary, the Chukchee are remarkably generous 'toward everyone who is in need' (Bogoras, 1904-09, p. 47). This includes aliens, such as poor Lamut families who got sustenance from neighboring rich Chukchee without payment, and also starving Russian settlements in whose favor Chukchee have slaughtered their herds for little or no return (p. 47). At the annual fall slaughter, about one-third of the deer were given to guests, who need not make returns, especially if poor; neighboring camps, however, might exchange slaughtered beasts at this time (p. 375). At serious setbacks to herds, neighboring camps—these need not be related—might render assistance (p. 628). Tobacco is highly valued by Chukchee.
but is not hoarded when scarce; '... the last pipeful be divided or smoked by turns' (p. 549, cf. pp. 615 f, 624, 636-638).

C.3.4 California-Oregon - The Tolowa-Tututni 'rich-man' was, as we have noted, a source of aid to his people (Drucker, 1937). Poorer people depended on the bounty of richer. 'Food was shared by the provident with the improvident within the village group' (DuBois, 1936, p. 51). Of the Yurok, Kroeber writes that food was sometimes sold, 'but no well-to-do man was guilty of the practice' (1925, p. 40), implying that the exchange would be generalized rather than balanced (selling) in this case. Similarly Kroeber remarks that small gifts among the Yurok were ordinarily reciprocated, as 'Presents were clearly a rich man's luxury' (p. 42, cf. p. 34 on the liberal disposition of fish by successful fishermen). Meat, fish and the like taken in large quantities by Patwin families went to the village chief for distribution to families most in need; a family, moreover, might demand food of fortunate neighbors (McKern, 1925, p. 245).

C.3.5 Oceania - The Melanesian big-man complex, wherever it exists, argues the prevalence of generalized reciprocity in exchange between people of different fortune.

The Duff missionaries' description of Tahitian generosity, especially of riches oblige, is probably too good to be true, anyhow too good to be analytically adequate: 'All are friendly and generous, even to a fault; they hardly refuse anything to each other if importuned. Their presents are liberal, even to profusion. Poverty never makes a man contemptible; but to be affulent and covetous is the greatest shame and reproach. Should any man betray symptoms of incorrigible avariciousness and refuse to part with what he has in time of necessity, his neighbors would soon destroy all his property, and put him on a footing with the poorest, hardly leaving a house to cover his head. They will give the clothes from their back, rather than be called paio, pioe, or stingy' (1799, p. 334).

Firth's discussion of Macari sharing in favor of need is more measured: 'At a time of shortage of provisions . . . persons did not as a rule keep to themselves the product of their labour, but shared it out among the other people of the village' (Firth, 1959, p. 162). It is as true in the forests of New Zealand as the savannahs of the Sudan that 'Starvation or real want in one family was impossible while others in the village were abundantly supplied with food' (p. 290).
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their size and their wealth in land. But in one respect the strength of kin ties was manifested, in the common practice of pooling supplies, especially where food—though scarce—was not desperately short. Closely related households “linked ovens” (law umu) by each drawing upon its own stock of food and then sharing in the work of the oven and in a common meal . . . the Tikopis avoided where possible their general responsibility or undefined responsibility for kin during the famine but showed no disposition to reject responsibility which had been specifically defined by the undertaking. What the famine did was to reveal the solidarity of the elementary family. But it also brought out the strength of other kin ties personally assumed . . .” (Firth, 1959, pp. 83-84).

C.3.6 Bemba—High incidence of generalized reciprocity associated with differential food stocks, and also during general hunger seasons. Thus, “If a man’s crops are destroyed by some sudden calamity, or if he has planted insufficient for his needs, relatives in his own village may be able to help him by giving him baskets of grain or offering him a share in their meals. But if the whole community has been visited by the same affliction, such as a locust swarm or a raided elephant, the household will move himself and his family to live with other kinmen in an area where food is less scarce. . . . Hospitality of this sort is commonly practiced in the hunger season, when families go all over the country “looking for porridge” . . . or “running from hunger” . . . Hence the legal obligations of kinship result in a particular type of food distribution, both within the village and the surrounding neighbourhood, which is not found in those modern communities in which a more individual domestic economy is practiced” (Richards, 1938, pp. 106-109). “The economic conditions under which [a Bemba woman] lives necessitate reciprocal sharing of foodstuffs, rather than their accumulation, and extend the individual’s responsibility outside her own household. Plainly, therefore, it does not pay a Bemba woman to have very much more grain than her fellows. She would merely have to distribute it, and during the recent locust scoure the villagers whose gardens escaped destruction complained that they were not really better off than their fellows for “our people come and live with us or beg us for baskets of millet” ” (pp. 201-202).

C.3.7 Pilaga—Henry’s Table I (1951, p. 194) indicates that all unproductive persons in the village studied—it was, recall

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a period of very low supplies—received food from more people than they gave food to. The ‘negative’ balance of these cases—old and blind, old women, etc.—varies from -3 to -15 and the eight persons listed as unproductive make up more than half of those showing such negative balance. This is contrary to the general Pilaga trend: ‘It will be at once clear from the tables that the Pilaga on the whole gives to more people than he receives from, but that, with the unproductive Pilaga the situation is reversed’ (pp. 195-197). The negative balance of unproductive people shows as well in the number of transactions as in the number of people given to minus received-from (p. 196). In Table III, presenting the approximate ratios of food quantity received to food quantity given away, ten persons are listed as unproductive and for eight of these income exceeded out-go; six persons are listed as very or exceptionally productive and four had out-go over income, one had income over out-go and one had income= out-go (p. 201). I take these figures to mean that those who had food shared it out to those who had none, in the main.

NOTES

1. I am indebted to Eric Wolf for many suggestions concerning this paper, and to the Social Science Research Council (Washington, D.C.), which in it may finally see some return on a most generous Faculty Research Fellowship.
2. These materials appear as Appendices to the present volume, pp. 186-225.
3. For the present purpose ‘economy’ is viewed as the process of provisioning society (or the ‘socio-cultural system’). No social relation, institution, or set of institutions is of itself ‘economic’. Any institution, say a family or a lineage order, if it has material consequences for provisioning society can be placed in an economic context and considered part of the economic process. The same institution may be equally or more involved in the political process, thus profitably considered as well in a political context. This way of looking at economics or politics—or for that matter, religion, education, and any number of other cultural processes—is dictated by the nature of primitive culture. Here we find no socially distinct ‘economy’ or ‘government’, merely social groups and relations with multiple functions, which we distinguish as economic, political, and so forth.

That economy thus presents itself as an aspect of things is probably generally acceptable. That the emphasis be the provisioning of society may not prove so acceptable. For the concern is not how individuals go about their business: ‘economy’ has not been defined as the application of scarce available means against alternative ends (material ends or otherwise). From means to end ‘economy’ is conceived as a component of culture rather than a kind of human action, the material life process of society rather than a rational, need-
satisfying process of individual behavior. Our purpose is not to analyze entrepreneurs but to compare cultures. We reject the historically specific Business Outlook. In terms of controversial positions recently developed in the American Anthropologist, the stand adopted is much more with Dalton (1961; cf. Sahlin, 1980) than with Burling (1963) or LeClair (1962). Also, solidarity is here affirmed with houswives the world over and Professor Malinowski. Professor Firth upbraid Malinowski’s impotence on a point of economic anthropology with the observation that ‘This is not the terminology of economics, it is almost the language of the housewife’ (Firth, 1967, p. 290). The terminology of the present effort similarly departs from economic orthodoxy. This may be justly considered a necessity born of ignorance, but something is to be said as well for the appropriateness, in a study of kinship economies, of the housewife’s perspective.

Economy has been defined as the process of (materially) provisioning society and the definition opposed to the human act of satisfying wants. The great play of instrumental exchange in primitive societies underscores the usefulness of the former definition. Sometimes the peice-making aspect is so fundamental that precisely the same sorts of stuff change hands: the renunciation of opposed interest is in this way symbolized. On a strictly formal view the transaction is a waste of time and effort. One might say that people are maximizing values, social values, but such is to misplace the determinant of the transaction, to fail to specify the circumstances which produce different material outcomes in different historical instances, to hold fast to the economizing premise of the market by a false assignment of pecuniary-like qualities to social qualities, to take the high road to taxicology. The interest of such transactions is precisely that they do not materially provision people and are not predicated on the satisfaction of human material needs. They do, however, decidedly provision society: they maintain social relations, the structure of society, even if they do not to the least advantage the stock of consumables. Without any further assumptions, they are ‘ecomics’ in the suggested meaning of the term.

The reader familiar with recent discussions of primitive distribution will recognize my indebtedness to Polanyi (1944, 1957, 1959) on this score, and likewise the departures from Polanyi’s terminology and tripartite scheme of the present essay. It is also a pleasure to affirm with Firth that ‘every student of primitive economy, in fact, gratefully builds upon the foundations which Malinowski has laid’ (Firth, 1959, p. 174).

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