Migration and Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Diversity in Europe: An overview of issues and trends

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Preface

This Working Paper is a revised version of the State of the Art Report for Cluster B6 of the European Network of Excellence on Immigration, Integration and Social Cohesion (IMISCOE), funded by the European Commission. The original version of the report includes more details about each cluster member and the activities of the cluster. It can be found on www.imiscoe.org.
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To provide comprehensive theoretical and empirical knowledge that can form a reliable basis for policy, nineteen European research institutes have established a network entitled International Migration, Integration and Social Cohesion (IMISCOE; see www.imiscoe.org). The network brings together some 300 selected, highly qualified researchers. Based on their wide-ranging skills and experience in international comparative research, the institutes implement an integrated, multidisciplinary, rigorously comparative research programme with Europe as its central focus. The IMISCOE network constitutes one of the ‘Networks of Excellence’ supported by the European Commission’s Sixth Framework programme for research and development 2002-2006. IMISCOE is organised into eight thematic ‘research clusters’ that cross-cut personnel and activities throughout the nineteen constituent institutes. ‘Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Diversity’ represents one of these research clusters.

This document largely considers developments in Europe in recent years. Its purposes is to: (I) highlight some of the key issues surrounding ‘Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Diversity’ as they have emerged and engaged public debate and policy development in various national and local contexts, and (II) to give an overview of some of the academic literature concerning these key issues. We do not claim that this ‘state-of-the-art’ piece is comprehensive or exhaustive as to the issues and literature. It is intended to be only indicative of the major trends and topics. The topics discussed in this report reflect the various contributions of the cluster members themselves who work in many different fields of specialisation and whose expertise helped to cover a wide range of areas from an interdisciplinary perspective. Throughout the text we include ‘boxes’ highlighting research and findings relevant to the theme from within the IMISCOE network.
I. Public Discourse and the Governance of Diversity

The rise of diversity issues

Alongside the growth of immigrant communities in Europe (as well as in Australia, the USA and Canada), from the 1960s onwards there emerged a growing rejection of policies or public pressure calling for immigrant and ethnic minority assimilation – usually conceived as an expectation that migrants would discard their traditional values and practices and adopt those of the majority society. In various countries and contexts this rejection found voice among some politicians, academics and proponents of a broad civic rights movement. Significantly, the rejection of assimilationism was high on the agenda of nascent immigrant and ethnic minority movements and organisations themselves. This arose especially when, in the 1970s, family reunification and strategies toward long-term settlement came to change the nature of what had been previously thought of as mainly temporary, single male immigrant populations. Meanwhile, public authorities established frameworks through which such immigrant organisations could be consulted. From the 1960s through the 1970s much public discourse in immigrant-receiving societies highlighted notions of tolerance, representation, participation, and group/cultural/minority rights – including the freedom to congregate, worship, speak one’s own language, and engage in other cultural institutions and practices. Campaigns to promote such notions within policy, governance and public awareness came to be described as an emergent ‘politics of identity’ or ‘politics of recognition’, regarded by many advocates as a necessary counterpart to anti-racism and anti-discrimination. By the 1980s, many of these concerns around immigrants (now settled and considered ethnic minorities in many countries) and the growing cultural, linguistic and religious diversity they brought to receiving societies led to public measures that were subsumed under the broad rubric of ‘multiculturalism’.
Multiculturalism

The discourses of ‘multiculturalism’ described below became important throughout the public spheres of Australia, North America and Europe in the 1980s. The causes and processes through which the term arose are complex and context specific. In each case and context, the ideals and measures associated with multiculturalism have stimulated both positive and negative readings.¹

People who invoke ‘multiculturalism’ in a positive manner tend to associate the term with ideals of: tolerance, the right of ethnic minority groups to maintain aspects of cultural heritage and language; equal treatment, equal access and full participation with regard to matters of law, employment, education, social services, economic activity and political representation; rights to collective expression; and commitment by all, regardless of ethnic background, to a constitution or state and its rule of law.

People who invoke ‘multiculturalism’ in a negative way commonly view the agenda as representing ideas and policy measures which threaten core national societal values (such as republican citizenship); therefore, in their eyes, the term represents a recipe for the destruction of national identity and the breakdown of social cohesion (see below).

In any case, it is an illusion to consider ‘multiculturalism’ as being one philosophy, structure, discourse or set of policy measures. The term is invoked differentially to describe a number of discrete – albeit sometimes overlapping – phenomena. In this way multiculturalism can variously be understood as I) a way of describing the actual makeup of a society; II) a general vision of the way government and society should orient itself; III) a specific set of policy tools for accommodating minority cultural practices;

¹ The significance of ‘culture’ as an analytical concept is much contested, and has changed considerably in recent years with the emphasis now on dynamic interpretations (Kuper 1999, Grillo 2003b). For present purposes, however, it suffices to say that by ‘culture’ we understand the different ways of living associated with majority and minority ethnic populations in Europe, which are sometimes thought to be incompatible.
An 'Exceptional' Society?

Under the title 'The Portuguese “Exception”' a leader of the Lisbon Jewish community wrote in the foremost national daily newspaper: “Unlike what we have witnessed in other countries – even those closest to us – Portugal is currently living a climate of harmonious, even brotherly, coexistence between the different religious persuasions present within the national territory (...). This coexistence was manifest in the recent celebrations of the centenary of the Lisbon Synagogue, attended by representatives of the Catholic Church, the Evangelical Alliance, and the Islamic Community.” On that occasion the Sephardic Patriarch of Jerusalem reacted by commenting that perhaps only in Portugal was such a joint celebration currently possible.

This peaceful coexistence is not new, and one of its poles is the Sanctuary of Fatima, a site dedicated to the inter-ethnic cult to a “common holy mother”: “There are Portuguese Hindus who have been going to Fatima for 40 or 50 years, (...) to pray to the Holiest Mother, in the form of Our Lady of Fatima, (...) 22 years ago, one of the foremost Hindu preachers, Morari Bapu, prayed in Fatima. The Hindu holy man signed the book of visiting dignitaries on the same page as the Pope and Mother Theresa of Calcutta.” The Dalai Lama also visited Fatima in 2001, “as a pilgrim”. “Many Muslims – particularly Shiites – also feel that the place is special. In November 1995, a documentary broadcast on Iranian TV – which identified the holy shrine with the daughter of the Prophet (...) – led many Iranians to express a wish to visit Portugal”.

The CEMME-research project ‘Different Children of Different Gods’ confirms that the sanctuary not only receives Hindus, Sikhs, Sunni and Ismaili Muslims, but also the peregrinations of Gypsies and Africans belonging to the Catholic Church and various Protestant denominations. This ‘Portuguese exception’ has recently been the target of two attempts of destruction. The ‘Fatima Center’, a fundamentalist group of North American Catholics, “in May, bought advertising pages in the Portuguese press (...), claiming that the Pope should decree ‘the immediate end’ of the transformation of the sanctuary into a ‘supposed inter-confessional site’. The Fatima Center has also reached many thousands of Catholics with the message that the sanctuary was being desecrated”. The Portuguese authorities on their part confirm their intention for Fatima to continue, with the Pope's blessing, to be a space for the brotherly coexistence of believers of different religions who, in different guises, show devotion to the figure of the ‘Holiest Mother’. A more recent confrontation involved the interruption of the meeting of five cardinals with thousands of youths held during the International Congress for the New Evangelization (ICNE). A group of young supporters of cardinal Lefèbvre staged a protest inside and outside the Paris Cathedral, accusing the Cardinal of Lisbon of being a heretic for the same reason. In the Portuguese press, the cardinal dismissed the accident as: “Worth what it is worth, not at all representative.”

- Susana Pereira Bastos, Universidade Nova de Lisboa

Selected references
IV) specially created frameworks of governance allowing for the representation of immigrant and ethnic minority interests; and V) a variety of support mechanisms and funds for assisting ethnic minority communities to celebrate and reproduce their traditions.

1. demographic description. One prominent discourse invoking the term ‘multicultural’ is that describing a condition of ethnic diversity, usually following a recent historical period of mass immigration. Here, the presence of people whose origins are in another place is often said to make this or that country a ‘de facto multicultural society’.

2. broad political ideology. In 1967, the British Home Secretary Roy Jenkins made a famous speech in which he advocated a model of integration ‘not as a flattening process of uniformity but of cultural diversity, coupled with equal opportunity in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance.’ This view -- arising as an alternative to both models of exclusion and of assimilation -- could be seen as the foundation of a broad political ideology of multiculturalism. Its general tenets are an acceptance of ethnic pluralism as a long-term feature of society, and a recognition that ethnic minority communities will retain their own languages and cultures. Following such an ideology, politicians’ task, then, is to formulate and safeguard these ideals in law and public institutions.

3. socio-political policy. The policy discourse surrounding multiculturalism especially involves: identifying structural factors contributing to discrimination, disadvantage and exclusion (here, based especially on aspects of culture or religion) and formulating and implementing policies which facilitate equality of opportunity and outcome. Ethnic monitoring in employment and public services, too, falls within this kind of discourse. Other key aspects of ‘multicultural’ policy often include:

(a) Accomodation of ethnic minority needs in social services, the health service, legal and judicial systems. Examples include the permission for the ritual slaughtering of animals for Muslims and Jews, traditional clothing for Asian girls in schools or Asian women employees, turbans instead of motorcycle helmets or construction-site hard-hats for Sikhs;
(b) Provision, sometimes including state funds, for: language training, translation, interpreting facilities (in courts, healthcare facilities, social services) and linguistic assistance in schools; and for special ‘community’ workers, centres and organisations; and
(c) Education, perhaps the largest and main sphere directly invoking multiculturalism by way of policy. The central philosophy here, it is usually thought, is twofold: I) to raise the self-esteem of the ethnic minority child and; II) to create the basis for social understanding in the classroom which, it is hoped, will extend beyond this setting once children grow into adulthood.

4. Institutional restructuring. Once social and political policies were formulated in the name of multiculturalism, local and national institutions had to be created or restructured in order to operationalise policies aimed at fostering or safeguarding ethnic minority equality, access and participation. Foremost among these institutional measures have been:
   (a) Consultation through providing frameworks within which ethnic minority communities can speak on their own behalf. These have included special advocates for immigrants, liaison units in local government and/or a range of ad hoc bodies and other consultative forums for ethnic minority organisations. The traditional roles of all of these councils and boards set up on behalf of migrant minorities have been simultaneously as social welfare advisors, legal watch-dogs, and policy advocates;
   (b) Organisation of ethnic minority groups has proliferated throughout places like the Netherlands and Britain, especially during the 1980s when local government initiatives promoting multiculturalism exhibited a political drive towards pluralistic welfare provision by extending public resources to a range of ethnic groups. In this way, a vision of multiculturalism held sway according to which certain (presumed uni-cultural) communities would be ensured of equality, respect -- or at least tolerance -- and continuity of tradition by local government financing or other support of specific identity-based organisations; and
(c) Training for public sector workers, including social workers, healthcare practitioners, and police. The idea here has been to foster sensitivity to the values and practices of ethnic minorities by teaching about customs. While certainly doing much good (for instance, Muslims are less frequently offered pork on hospital or school menus), the training courses and materials have sometimes amounted to no more than catalogues of ‘facts’ and gross descriptions of the values and practices of migrant groups. Such collections may serve to further distance ethnic minorities by stressing their ‘otherness’, rather than serving to underscore their status as co-citizens.

5. resourcing cultural expression. Yet another discourse or set of programmes – in line with the ideal of fostering the maintenance and reproduction of ethnic minority traditions – has involved the extension of public resources for community cultural activities. In this way popular festivals, music and dance have come to characterise ethnic minorities and multiculturalism in the eyes of many within the majority population.

Given such a variety of meanings and measures associated with the concept of multiculturalism, it becomes clear that rather than offering sweeping generalisations, both advocates and critics of the notion (see below) need to be much clearer and more specific as to the particular dimensions, policies and frameworks of multiculturalism they are addressing.

Some of these particular dimensions include, for instance, culturally or religiously based concerns among immigrants and ethnic minorities that have engaged policy makers, such as matters surrounding:

- polygamy (multiple marriage partners) practised by some communities;
- talaq, a form of Islamic divorce initiated by pronouncing so three times;
- a wide range of forms of arranged marriage practised by a variety of immigrant communities;
Immigration, Cultural Diversity, and the Urban Imagination

There is a changing and often contradictory relationship between immigration, the increasing cultural diversity that follows immigration, and the development of global cities as desirable places. Of special interest then is the restaurant sector, believing that the landscapes of food distribution and consumption in global cities have been vital in helping such cities achieve international recognition. Immigrants have established many of these restaurants, and certainly most of the ones seen as exotic and exciting. The restaurants are operated mainly by immigrant chefs, cooks, and waiting staff. It can, therefore, be argued that immigrants and their economic activities are propulsive forces in the creation of global cities.

Many European cities contain a mosaic of distinct ethno-cultural neighborhoods, a rich variety of restaurants and cuisines, and a wide range of cultural events. The cosmopolitan landscapes of these cities allow citizens and visitors to experience the diversity of global cultures within close proximity. In Amsterdam, for example, one can easily move between places that reflect the influence of Chinese, Surinamese, Turkish and Moroccan cultures—all in a single day. The same is true of other cities, though the mix of cultures is somewhat different in each case. Increasingly, this type of cosmopolitanism is equated with urban vitality and livability, especially by the growing managerial and professional new middle class.

The growth in the supply of restaurants is matched by growth in the market eager to consume ‘ethnic’ food. Over the past few decades, in fact, this has happened in all European societies. This also requires explanation. Why has the mainstream diet of places like the Netherlands, Britain and Germany, which concentrated on bland meat, potatoes, and standard vegetables, expanded to embrace döner kebab, phở, peking duck, and chicken masala, for example? It is insufficient to simply say that these foods ‘taste good’ (although of course they do). We need to explore the cultural processes — orchestrated by what the American sociologist Sharon Zukin calls the critical infrastructure—that supports the growth in popularity of diverse cuisines by helping convince people to appreciate different tastes. This includes the popular media, the advertising industry, restaurant critics, and even the statements of celebrities who champion certain types of food. They help shape the urban imagination and create a growing enthusiasm for ‘interesting’ landscapes that have the potential to draw tourists and visitors. They also emphasize areas of the city that may interest local consumers or tourists, especially ethnic districts like Chinatown that contain restaurants and other services that appear ‘authentic’. These landscapes allow for the commodification of cosmopolitan lifestyles; and as such they are a vital resource for the prosperity of cities.

-Jan Rath, University of Amsterdam

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- marriages within various degrees of relationship -- for instance, among first cousins (this is widely practised among Pakistani Muslim families, for example);
- accommodating prescribed modes of dress, such as among Sikhs;
- demands for time-off of work for religious purposes (such as for visiting mosques to participate in Friday prayer) or for appropriate prayer facilities in the workplace;
- for Muslims, provision of halal (sanctioned) food or kosher food for Jews or vegetarian food for Hindus in schools and public institutions such as prisons and hospitals;
- ritual slaughter of animals;
- matters surrounding burial (such as gaining designated areas of public cemeteries for specific religious communities, obtaining permission for burial in a cloth shroud instead of a coffin, urging speedy issuing of death certificates for burial within twenty-four hours, and immersion in water the ashes of cremated persons);
- taking oaths on sacred scriptures (e.g., on the Qur'an for Muslims, on the Bhagavad Gita for Hindus, on the Guru Granth Sahib for Sikhs); and
- altering work and school uniform codes to allow women to wear particular forms of dress (including headscarves) in the interest of modesty.

Throughout Europe a variety of policy decisions have been made to accommodate (or not) such culturally and religiously based needs and interests of immigrants and ethnic minorities. These policies varied considerably not only between European countries but also within the nation-states between different regions and localities. However, it is noteworthy that in general, these myriad accommodations – indicating substantial frameworks for multiculturalism – are not known, not acknowledged or generally have not had a cumulative effect in changing public attitudes among the majority populations. That is, although many European local and national states demonstrate forms of multicultural accommodation, popular opinion – bolstered by politicians, religious leaders and certain quarters of
the media – still consider each national society to be centred on monocultural norms, perhaps peppered with exceptional pockets of what are often considered patterns of immigrant deviation. Hence it could be argued that the accommodation of diversity is a necessary, but insufficient, means toward creating a society truly multicultural in practice and identity.

**Some critiques of multiculturalism / the recognition of diversity**

Among both advocates and critics, it has been pointed out that ideologies and policies for the recognition or accommodation of cultural, religious and linguistic diversity may, despite good intention, ultimately have negative consequences. This may be due in part or combination to considerations such as the following:

- almost all discourses of multiculturalism entail a kind of ‘ethnisation’, or a process through which cultural values are presumed to imbue all interests among members of ethnic minority communities (that is, that immigrants are always drawing from an imported ‘cultural agenda’ rather than, for instance, basing their interests on the fact that they may be co-workers, neighbours, parents);
- political representation or consultation under multiculturalism may amount to a kind of internal neo-colonialism underpinning undemocratic forms of leadership within presumed bounded ‘communities’;
- these same forms of community consultation may lead to the local state freezing a specific kind of relationship with highly institutionalised minority groups and certain representatives, to the disadvantage of newer or less organised groups or other voices within a group;
- well-meaning multiculturalist policies which local government authorities initiated in the 1980s may work to the disadvantage of minorities by creating conditions of dependency among, and rivalry for state largesse between, ethnic minority groups;
• too much attention to cultural identity can divert attention from other issues of inequality surrounding racism, sexism, class, housing, unemployment, the justice system;
• multicultural policies may have the effect of putting ethnic minority populations into virtual cultural conservation areas like endangered species. In the name of a vague relativism and non-interference with tradition, culturally-defined no-go areas have been created among social workers, health care practitioners, police and other workers in the public realm who feel an inability to act because they think it is racist to interfere with ‘ethnic cultures’.

In sum, the understanding of ‘culture’ assumed and prescribed by many multicultural / diversity policies and discourses is one that may distance immigrants and minorities as much or more that it actually seeks to include them.

‘Culture’, in the sense entailed in many such measures, is presumed to be something forever distinguishing and separating immigrants and ethnic minorities from the rest of society. A ‘multi-cultural’ society, in this reasoning, is therefore a pool of bounded uni-cultures, forever divided into we’s and they’s.

We are left, then, with a conundrum: basing participation, representation and public service delivery on ‘culture’ can stigmatise people, thereby maintaining or exacerbating conditions of exclusion; yet ignoring ‘culture’ (and religion and language) can (a) neglect legitimate special needs (based on particular values and practices), and (b) perpetuate patterns of discrimination and inequality.

A long-asked question also remains: multiculturalism for whom? For the minorities, as a means of assisting in the reproduction of values and practices and for reaffirming their sense of worth? Or for the majority, as a means of education into the lifeways of the minorities who co-comprise society and may be (or become) fellow citizens? Or for society in the abstract, as a way of fashioning new ways of belonging, participating, living together?
‘A dismembered society’?

Opposition to Islam among Italian Catholics may be found at all levels, including the hierarchy. In 2000, Biffi, the Cardinal Archbishop of Bologna, responded to the idea that the future demographic and economic problems of Italy could be addressed through immigration by urging that only Catholics be admitted. ‘WELCOME IMMIGRANTS ONLY IF CATHOLIC. Shock proposal by Bologna’s Cardinal. No Muslims to safeguard national identity’, said the headlines in La Repubblica. Biffi declared: ‘Let us welcome only immigrants who are culturally compatible … To avoid much trouble and suffering for the Italian people, the government should regulate immigration giving preference to Catholic immigrants’. He also suggested that Italy’s 130 mosques should be closed, and no new mosques permitted, as a reciprocal measure to those applied to Christians in some Islamic countries.

Although not all Catholics shared Biffi’s views, those views were supported by Giovanni Sartori, a political scientist whose theories of liberal democracy are widely cited. His monograph (2002) defends the idea of pluralism from multiculturalists who he believes have misappropriated the term, and addresses the ‘particular and particularly important problem posed by Islamic immigration’. For Sartori ‘pluralism comes up against the problem of “foreigners”, people not “like us”’. The good society is an integrated society but immigration entails a ‘superabundance of diversity, an excess of alterity’. Integration requires immigrants who are integrable and giving citizenship to the unintegrable leads to disintegration. ‘Am I mistaken’, he asks, ‘in maintaining that the Muslim immigrant is, for us, the most “distant”, the most “foreign” and thus the most difficult to integrate?’ In Islam, he argues, ‘God is all’, and because of the way it is ‘anchored’ in the Koran, dialogue is very difficult.

For Sartori, pluralism assumes intersecting social and cultural divisions, multiculturalism cumulative cleavages. Its communitarian liberalism exacerbates the problem faced in Europe of saving the nation-state from the menace of profoundly different cultures which originate outside but which immigration has brought home.

Ralph Grillo, University of Sussex

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**Contra diversity**

In addition to the questions raised above, in recent years throughout Europe there have arisen other critiques of diversity and its accommodation. These critiques or debates against diversity have themselves been diverse, but in many ways they share common features. Rather than just a new variation of far right anti-immigrant sentiments, the new critiques have been voiced on both the right and, perhaps surprisingly, left of the political spectrum. Essentially the critiques commonly voice a fear that multiculturalism or the public recognition of cultural, religious and linguistic diversity will lead to a kind of ‘balkanisation’ or ethnic separatism marking a breakdown of societal concord. Parallel arguments have been made significantly in public arenas for instance by Paul Scheffer (2000) in the Netherlands, Giovanni Sartori (2002) in Italy, and Bob Rowthorne (2003) and David Goodhart (2004) in the UK. In these arguments ‘too much diversity’ disrupts a national identity, breaks down a society’s sense of cohesion, dissipates common values and undermines participatory institutions such as the welfare state. What is needed, such commentators urge, is an emphasis on historical continuity, citizenship, national symbols, a return to immigrant cultural assimilation and a kind of enforced integration by way of emphasizing a core set of national values over recognizing minority specificities.

Why have such calls contra diversity arisen of late? Answers to this are possibly many, and are likely specific to the national contexts in which they have arisen (although it is significant that such arguments have risen simultaneously across Europe). Some reasons may include the following.

1. **Immigrant indicators.** Recent national censuses and other instruments for measuring the socio-economic standing of communities have, in many countries, shown that immigrant groups and ethnic minorities - at least two or three generations since original migration - tend to show poor levels of education, quality of housing and degree of residential segregation, types of jobs or levels of unemployment and other indicators of low socio-economic attainment or mobility. Some commentators suggest that in the past or even currently, some recent immigrant groups do much better than others. Hence these commentators (including those mentioned above, as well...
as newspaper reporters and op-ed writers) claim there has been a ‘failure to integrate’, and therefore ask the question – does the ‘culture’ of poorly attaining groups, which has been underpinned by multicultural policies – actually have something to do with their underachievement? Or, does such culture either lead immigrants to consciously reject the prospects of integration – or indeed is their culture ‘unassimilable’? Often the contra diversity commentators’ answers to such questions each suggest ‘yes’ (while ignoring a range of historical and structural factors, including discrimination, that contribute heavily if not wholly for poor socio-economic standing).

2. The second generation. Along with the public concern about the kinds of indicators and questions mentioned above, some societies, including the UK, France, Germany and the Netherlands, have witnessed a kind of moral panic surrounding the place of the so-called ‘second generation’, marked by inter-ethnic tensions or violence, suspicions and some indicators of criminal activity and public disturbances or indeed riots. Again there are often attempts to explain these issues with reference to ‘culture’ (here, with ‘Islam’ usually considered a key mode of culture by way of attitudes, values and practices, rather than as ‘religion’ in terms of ritual, faith and morality). The viewpoint contra diversity sees the call for citizenship, common values and cohesion as the key way to remedy allegedly culture-fueled tensions and problems surrounding young people of immigrant and ethnic minority origin.

3. 9/11. Although perhaps too many of the world’s current problems are being laid upon the events of 11 September 2001, it is certainly not presumptuous to suggest that they play an important contributing role in the turning of the tide contra diversity. The ‘civilisational logic’ wrought by 9/11 – i.e. the Huntingtonian worldview that pits large scale ‘culture’ v. ‘culture’ in a struggle for dominance – is coming to filter people’s understanding of what is happening with immigrants and ethnic minorities on the streets of Berlin, Bradford, Rotterdam, Marseille and numerous other settings across Europe. Once more ‘Islam’ is conceived as the other ‘culture’ or civilisation most at odds with – and therefore most ‘unassimilable’ and ultimately threatening – the cohesion of a presumed national society. This ignores the fact that other minority groups such as Jews, Irish or Italians were once perceived as
unassimilable, and that the societies of modern nation-states have never been culturally homogenous. Hence policies and programmes promoting diversity come to be regarded as measures sure to undermine the collective well-being of immigrant receiving societies by supporting values, practices and entire communities which are inherently at odds with these societies. In this view, the majority society is being imagined as a linguistic, religious and cultural entity, as much stereotyped as immigrant communities themselves.

The kinds of concerns noted above are not only suggested broadly in newspaper essays, radio phone-ins and television talk shows, but ‘concretised’ in debates and policy decisions regarding what we might call some of the ‘iconic issues’ of diversity in our times. Particularly following some of the issues raised in the previous section, it is not surprising that various iconic issues of diversity (or purporting to indicate the breakdown of social cohesion) specifically involve Islam. Such iconic issues that are highly visible in public space include Muslim headscarves, the call for separate Muslim schools, the outrageous utterances of certain Imams, and the presence of young Muslims on lists of terrorist suspects. While such iconic issues grab headlines, there is still an open question as to whether most Europeans are actually so suspicious of immigrants, Muslim or not. For instance, an analysis of the Eurobarometer Survey 2000 on public attitudes toward ethnic minorities, carried out by the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (Thalhammer et al. 2001), shows a high level of positive value placed on cultural and religious diversity.
Such surveys beg many questions and must be interpreted broadly. Regional variations, assumptions in light of political persuasions and media consumption should also be considered alongside such gross national figures. And of course, this survey was taken before 9/11 and a number of other events (such as the recent murder of Theo Van Gogh in the Netherlands) may have tilted public opinion somewhat across Europe and in specific countries; however, it is unlikely to have changed dramatically from such positive levels into negative ones except in countries already highly indisposed toward cultural diversity.

Among the tasks for research networks such as IMISCOE, then, is to understand such trends in social process, public discourse and government policy affecting cultural, religious and linguistic diversity. The following section provides a broad look at some of the main lines of inquiry already undertaken by social scientists concerned with these issues in Europe.
‘We Are Not Racist, We Are Just Realist’

During 2002-3, the British Government, responding to popular moral panic about asylum-seekers, sought drastically to reduce the numbers seeking to enter the country. Long-term policy aimed to process all asylum applications overseas, but meantime this had to be undertaken in dispersed ‘induction centres’ in Britain itself. Most of these were to be located in country districts or suburban areas and the proposals to create such centres invariably met with opposition from local residents. Research has documented one such protest, in a seaside suburb along the South Coast of England.

The research investigated how those ‘localists’ opposed to the induction centre framed their opposition and how local and national politicians responded to their protests: eventually the proposal was dropped. In exploring how protesters sought to distance themselves from charges of racism, and from the extreme right British National Party, which also intervened in the dispute, the research examined the significance of such protests for our understanding of middle-class xenophobia in contemporary multicultural Britain.

Objections to the entry of asylum-seekers were sometimes expressed through a language of ‘race’, more often through one of ‘culture’, perhaps reflecting wider anxieties about the consequences of living in a neoliberal, globalized world undergoing a period of rapid, frequently bewildering, political and economic change. Most frequently, however, protesters, publicly, stressed their concern about the practical implications for social and economic resources in their locality and strenuously denied that their objections were in any way racist, or indeed culturalist. But what credence are we to give such denials? Are they simply obfuscation, as has been suggested is the case when ‘race’ is refashioned as ‘culture’? Or do objections reflect, as protesters argued, a ‘genuine concern’ for the welfare of their suburb, a sincere, if unwarranted, sense of relative deprivation?

-Ralph Grillo, University of Sussex

Selected Readings
II. Social Scientific Research on Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Diversity in Europe: Mapping the Field

Once more, this document does not represent an attempt to provide any kind of comprehensive examination of materials relating to the theme of cultural, religious and linguistic diversity in Europe. While the previous chapter looked at public and policy trends, this section provides a mere outline – a kind of mapping exercise – around some key works and issues as they have been approached by a range of social scientists.

Depending on the disciplinary field of research, social scientists have focused on various key sites in which issues of cultural, religious and linguistic diversity frequently intersect. One such site is the family, which figures prominently in debates about cultural difference in public policy statements, the speeches of politicians and religious leaders, the media and everyday conversations, not least among members of minority ethnic communities themselves. Another site which has become increasingly important as a field of research is public space, especially in urban settings which are constantly changing due to the dynamics of cultural, religious and linguistic differences (Rath 2005). Spatiality or the sites where multiculturalism actually takes place needs further attention in all areas of migration research.

Cultural diversity

Social scientists have discussed cultural diversity mostly in the context of ‘multiculturalism’ and ‘social cohesion’. While some scholars focus on general principles and philosophies of cultural diversity, others focus more concretely on specific aspects of diversity such as religion and language. In this section, we will first consider the general debates and a series of visions and ideas of cultural diversity in political philosophy, anthropology, sociology and other

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2 For a literature review on research on the role of the family in the context of integration see the State of the Art Report of IMISCOE cluster C8.
social sciences. We will then summarise some of the issues in the fields of religious and linguistic diversity and describe how religious and linguistic diversity is envisioned on a more practical level.

Multiculturalism as policy and philosophy has received considerable criticism since it came to the fore in the public sphere and in social sciences in the 1970s. Social scientists all over Europe are presently discussing models of the so called ‘new’ multiculturalism to overcome the problems of previous models (and ideologies) of cultural diversity. These previous or conventional models of multiculturalism have been widely discussed in the social sciences over the past twenty years and there is, of course, a considerable body of literature on the subject (see among others Castles 2000, Grillo 1998, 2000, Faist 2000, Gutmann 1994, Goldberg 1994, Kymlicka 1995, Favell 1998, Willett 1998, Parekh 2000a).

In a nutshell, multiculturalism represents a kind of corrective to assimilationist approaches and policies surrounding the national incorporation of immigrants (Castles 2000, Grillo 1998, Faist 2000). Most of today’s social scientists and policy makers agree on the impracticality and ‘out-datedness’ of such assimilationist approaches, which has led to a shift towards a greater acceptance of cultural diversity across Europe. However, religious, racial and ethnic ‘otherness’ are still perceived as threat or challenge in many national contexts, and multiculturalism is associated with many - sometimes divergent, sometimes overlapping – discourses (cf. Blommaert and Verschueren 1998, Vertovec 1998).

Drawing from various key texts concerned with multiculturalism (Amselle 1998, Baumann 1999, Martiniello 1997, Stolcke 1995), Grillo (1998:195) outlines some of the key problematics of multicultural theory and practice: (1) multiculturalism’s implicit essentialism; (2) the system of categorisation which underpins it; (3) the form that multicultural politics takes; (4) the ritualisation of ethnicity often associated with it; (5) the elision of race (and class) that it appears to entail; and (6) the attack on the ‘common core’ which it represents. ‘Many of these criticisms,’ Grillo rightly observes, ‘stem from a focus on “culture”’ (cf. Amselle 1998). This point is,
for example, taken up by Yasmin Alibhai-Brown (2000a) who is critical of what she identifies as consumer or boutique multiculturalism, artistic and style multiculturalisms, corporate multiculturalism and role model multiculturalism. All such minimalist, celebratory and tribal forms of multiculturalism, she claims, tend to ‘keep diversity in a box’ (ibid.: 42) and may end up doing more harm than good.

Such essentialised understandings of culture have been observed, over the past few decades, in multicultural programmes and frameworks mentioned in the previous chapter, for example educational curricula, media images, forums of ‘ethnic community leadership’, public funding mechanisms, and professional training courses and handbooks (for instance, in police or social services). Scrutiny of the cultural essentialism in multicultural policies and theories has been made in Canada (Kobayashi 1993), Australia (Castles et al. 1988, Hage 1998), Mauritius (Eriksen 1997), United States (Turner 1993), Germany (Radtke 1994), Sweden (Ålund and Schierup 1991) and Britain (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1993, Baumann 1996, 1999).

Closely linked to debates on the dangers of cultural essentialism inherent in multicultural theory and practice are the controversies between liberal pluralists and communitarians, though recent influential theoretical contributions have tried to transcend the opposition between normative multiculturalism and pure individualism (Kymlicka 1995, Parekh 2000b, Taylor and Gutmann 1992). Drawing from these theoretical contributions and confronted with the fact that at a descriptive level, all European societies are multicultural (Grillo 2004a, Martiniello 2004, Penninx et al. 2004b) scholars have tried to capture the variety of ways in which different societies and governments perceive and deal with diversity, or, in other words, the varieties of ‘multiculturalisms’. They have, for example differentiated between ‘de facto’ and ‘official multiculturalism’, distinguishing between a reality in most of today’s liberal, immigrant receiving states where multiculturalism is firmly entrenched at the level of individual rights and liberties protected by the constitutions, and the official recognition and protections of immigrants as distinct ethnic groups (Joppke and Morawska 2003).
Grillo (2004a) makes a similar distinction of ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ multiculturalism. In ‘weak’ multiculturalism, cultural diversity is recognised in the private sphere, while a high degree of assimilation is expected of immigrants and ethnic minorities in the public sphere of law and government, the market, education and employment. This is what Entzinger (2000) has called the ‘individual approach’ to cultural diversity, which is based on ideas of liberal pluralism. In this approach the state has a neutral attitude towards cultural diversity, and it limits public intervention to promoting a better understanding between members of different ethnic and religious groups. Entzinger points out that liberal pluralism often leads to assimilation within two or three generations, which can cause anomie and social exclusion for those who find it difficult to familiarise themselves with the dominant culture. In contrast to the individual approach, advocates of the ‘group approach’, or, in Grillo’s (2004a) terms, ‘strong multiculturalism’, promote the acknowledgement and institutionalised recognition of cultural differences in the public sphere including political representation (Entzinger 2000). We can observe such differential patterns when comparing immigrant and ethnic minority policies across Europe, particularly on local levels (Cuperus et al. 2003, Ireland 1994, Martiniello 1998b, Penninx et al. 2004a, Soysal 1994, Vertovec 1998).

‘Strong’, or ‘official’ multiculturalism has come under pressure in many European countries. The main question is how far states should recognize and support cultural pluralism and how they should define which elements of immigrant cultures are within certain limits defined by the law, and socially acceptable (Entzinger 2000). There has been an increasing fear that multiculturalism exacerbates diversity and undermines the common will. In this discourse, multiculturalism is perceived as producing difference and separateness and as being counterproductive to social cohesion. Taken to the extreme, these scholars fear that to move away from the strict principles of universal political citizenship and individual rights is ‘the first step down the road to apartheid’ (May 1999:15, for a summary of the discourse see Eriksen 2002, Grillo 2004a).
This problematisation of diversity has long been part of the governance of diversity in those states with immigrant policies based on liberal pluralism and assimilationist ideas, such as France. The French discourse about the ‘fear of communitarianism’ is one of the most prominent examples and has been illustrated in a large body of literature concerned with the long-lasting affair of the ‘headscarves’ (Favell 2001b, Freedman 2004, Silverman 1992, Todd 1994). In this discourse, the role of secularism and laïcité in the French conception of the nation-state became the centre of the debate and led to the establishment of a commission which, in the so-called Stasi report, discussed and reaffirmed the principles of laïcité in the public sphere (Stasi 2003). The legal enforcement of secularism, expressed by the ban of the headscarf, was justified by officials and scholars by ‘arguing that to proclaim publicly and loudly one’s private identities is to generate division and conflict in a society (Bowen 2004:34).

The French debate is paralleled in other European countries by discourses on ‘too much diversity’ (Britain) (Grillo 2004a, 2004b), the fear of ‘parallel societies’ (Germany) (Salentin 2004) or the ‘dismembering’ of society (Italy) (Sartori 2002). Even in countries with officially institutionalised multicultural policies, a shift away from group emancipation towards an emphasis on individual integration is taking place.

The two most prominent examples of this shift away from official multiculturalism are Sweden and the Netherlands, both countries having had well established multicultural policies (Entzinger 2003b, Joppke and Morawska 2003). The Dutch debate cumulated in a newspaper article about the ‘multicultural tragedy’ by the historian Paul Scheffer, who stated that an ‘ethnic underclass’ was emerging, consisting of (particularly Muslim) people who do not feel attached to Dutch society and who are not willing to integrate (Entzinger 2003b). Such statements illustrate that anti-diversity writers such as Scheffer or Sartori not only overlook or misrepresent actual policies, but have stereotypical or ‘essentialised’ views of the ethnic minority groups concerned.

The fear of self-exclusion or ‘groupism’, publicly expressed by blaming immigrants for non-integration, has probably been one of the most powerful
arguments against multiculturalism in recent years. Yet, there are further ‘troubles with multiculturalism’ such as those expressed by Alibhai-Brown (2000a): it is only about ‘ethnic minorities’; it has created a sense of white exclusion; its model of representation only deals with elites; it freezes change and can entrench inequalities; it erects group barriers; it is seen as ‘woolly liberalism’; it has not engaged with globalisation. Hence, ‘multiculturalism is something that black folk do’ (Alibhai-Brown 2004:52) According to Kymlicka (2003), this was clearly reflected in the public reactions to the Parekh report on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain (2000a) which suggested that British citizens need to rethink what it means to be British. These reactions, on the left and the right, implicitly or explicitly expressed that ‘the idea that multiculturalism might require individuals in the dominant group to re-evaluate (and hence temporarily destabilize) their inherited identities, heroes, symbols and narratives is apparently unthinkable’ (Kymlicka 2003:205).

The unthinkable prospect of re-evaluating the concept of a national culture and identity is reflected in yet another feature of much multicultural discourse and policy concerned with a bounded nation-building project. Via multiculturalism, Adrian Favell (1998) observes,

‘[E]thnic minorities are offered cultural tolerance, even “multicultural” rights and institutions, in exchange for acceptance of basic principles and the rule of law; they are imagined as culturally-laden social groups, who need to be integrated and individualised by a public sphere which offers voice and participation, transforming them from ”immigrants”, into full and free “citizens”; they are to become full, assimilated nationals, in a nationstate re-imagined to balance cultural diversity, with a formal equality of status and membership.’

Implicit in this process is what Favell sees as ‘an under-theorised, elite reproduction of a long-lost idea of national political community; papering over inequality, conflict and power relations with a therapeutical, top-down discourse of multicultural unity’ (ibid.). Similarly, Day (2004) points out that although states are:
'all too willing to give the often unwanted and generally meaningless gift of “cultural recognition”, multiculturalism as liberal theory and state policy remains staunchly silent on inequalities and injustices that are intimately entwined with the system of states it so desperately wishes to preserve...’

Hence, these scholars are critical of the way such an approach reappropriates a ‘functionalist, Parsonian idea of social integration’ purporting to ‘unite all classes, and all groups – whether majority or minority – around some singular ideas of national political culture’ (Favell 1998).

The premise here is what we might call the ‘container model’ of the nation state. In this, social cohesion, cultural belonging and political participation are mutually defined within the geographical and administrative boundaries of the state (cf. Brubaker 1989, Turner 1997, Vertovec 1999b, Faist 2000). This ‘container model’ persisted despite many social scientists taking a more transnational stance on migration, emphasizing the connections between places and the possibilities of belonging and engaging in several national contexts.

While ideas of cultural and territorial homogeneity of the nation, and the assimilationist approaches to immigrant incorporation built on these ideas were criticised and abandoned in multicultural discourse and policies, the expectation of common attachment to the encompassing nation-state went unchallenged. Hence, although the culturally essentialising model of multiculturalism has recently been rethought, multiculturalism’s relationship to the nation-state seems to remain as it was (Vertovec 2001).

Interestingly, although the scholars mentioned above do point to pre-existing power inequalities surrounding the system of the state and society in general, gender as one of the core categories regarding power relations is often ignored. If mentioned at all, it is mostly discussed in separate sections and its pervasive nature is thereby overlooked or downplayed. It is not the aim of this report to give an overview of those studies which include gender as a core category, but we want to advocate that gender be integrated into
both the future research within the IMISCOE network and in the various areas of migration research in general.³

Within the ideological and political debates on the governance of diversity, two of the most prominent areas of discussion are religious and linguistic pluralism, since they directly touch every day practice in both public and private institutions, but also within families and households.

**Religious diversity⁴**

Religion has been a key site of focus and discussion in the social sciences’ discourse on cultural diversity.

These debates have encompassed issues such as the provision of special diets to meet religious principles, the wearing of distinctive insignia (e.g. the Hijab), the building of places of worship (e.g. mosques) and so on (Grillo 2004b).

While lately, the debate on religious diversity has been more dominant in public discourse than that on linguistic diversity, immigrant-receiving states have shown more inclination towards religious rather than linguistic pluralism. This is simply because the state needs to demand linguistic choices, while a separation of church and state is possible and a reality in many liberal nation-states (Kymlicka 1995). According to Joppke and Moraw ska (2003), ‘the accommodation of religious diversity epitomizes the inevitable trend toward de facto multiculturalism in liberal states’. However, this trend has been accompanied by wide academic and public debates and controversies from diverse theoretical and normative perspectives.

Phenomena such as religious (particularly Islamic) fundamentalism which dominate public discussions are also on the forefront of many scientific discourses (Bergmann et al. 1993, Juergensmeyer 2003, Schiffauer 2001). Some observers try to explain and understand the emergence of religious

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³ For further discussion see the IMISCOE State of the Art Report of Cluster C8.
⁴ The literature on religious diversity draws from a conference program of an upcoming conference on ‘Accommodating religious diversity’, written by Prof. Ari Zollberg.
fundamentalism, influenced by and embedded in the political, social and cultural environments of specific national and ethnic contexts (Schiffauer 2001). Others depict ‘alien’ religions as confrontation of western liberal ‘values’ and are concerned with questions whether, for example, diversity is a threat to internal security (Huntington 1998).

But there has also been much engagement in more general, normative considerations regarding religious diversity, especially among political philosophers, legal scholars and political scholars who discuss issues such as the principles of secularism in increasingly plural societies (Kymlicka 1995, Parekh 2000b, Bader 1999, Bauböck et al. 1996).

Two of the main themes in these debates are the public manifestation and the institutional recognition of religion. Various scholars (i.e. Bader 1999, Parekh 2000b, S. Ferrari 2004a) criticise the ‘exclusion of religious reasons and arguments from public debate and politics in political liberalism’ as morally arbitrary and unfair (Bader 2003c). This criticism has been mirrored in research which has, for example, shown that the public manifestations of religion can serve as a crucial force in terms of collective belonging and identity, providing a tool for the management of social problems (Zachary 2003, Schiffauer 2004). Similarly, studies across Europe have shown that the institutional recognition of religious minorities, and the official inclusion of religious organisations into negotiations about the governance of diversity have had positive impacts on processes of integration (Sunier 1999, Heitmeyer et al. 1997, Penninx 2000). These studies have demonstrated that in states with official ethnic minorities’ policies such as the Netherlands, the recognition of Islamic and other immigrant organisations as potential partners in integration policies fostered positive attitudes of Muslims towards integration and engagement, especially on a local level. In contrast, in a state like Germany with less institutionalised initiatives to engage immigrants, a more inward oriented attitude could be observed (Penninx and Martiniello 2004).

All in all, researchers agree that although the legal instruments to deal with religious diversity, introduced on the grounds of experiences with other religious communities, exist, the ‘Muslim question’ poses new challenges to
Religious Diversity and Associative Democracy

Increasing religious diversity and the threat of religio-political fundamentalism create serious problems for states and pose serious challenges for political theory. Strict separation of organized religions from a presumed ‘religion-blind’ and strictly ‘neutral’ state is still the preferred model in liberal, democratic, feminist, and socialist theory. American political liberalism has dominated debates for some time now. It is characterized by a focus on limitations of religious arguments in public debate, by a secularist interpretation of liberal-democratic constitutions, and by a strictly separationist interpretation of the relations between organized religions and the state. Post-modernist critics and traditionalist religious organizations and leaders have refuted these ‘solutions’ but have also sacrificed principles like neutrality and equality.

This project asks whether, and if so how, it is possible to overcome this increasingly counterproductive confrontation. It aims both at a reformulation of liberal principles and at a more imaginative and productive institutional translation of these principles. At the level of principles it is argued that we should understand ‘neutrality’ as relational neutrality and that we should understand fairness in matters of culture and religion not as ‘hands-off’ but as ‘evenhandedness’ (Bader 1999). At the institutional level it is argued that we should reject mythical ‘strict separation’ and explore different varieties of democratic institutional pluralism, associative democracy in particular.

The theoretical and practical aim of the project is to demonstrate the superiority of associative democracy compared with other models: it recognizes religious diversity both individually and organizationally; it stimulates legitimate religious diversity; it prevents a hidden majority bias; and it provides a legitimate role for organized religions in the provision of a wide range of services, including education, on the one hand, and in the political process, on the other hand. That organized religions should be informed, heard, and consulted in contested issues should be a crucial component of democratic participation. This also might help prevent the development of religious fundamentalism.

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Selected Readings


liberal nation-states (S. Ferrari 2004a, Buijs and Harchoui 2003). To tackle these challenges, it is not only state-church relationships that should be addressed, but ‘the full, reciprocal relationships between society-culture-politics-nation-state and (organized) religions’ (Bader 2003c).

Sociologists, social anthropologists, religious studies’ scholars and some political scientists have tried to capture these relationships in various empirical in-depth studies in order to gain a better understanding of the conflicts and dilemmas resulting from religious diversity, but also to contribute to successful solutions for the realisation of religious freedom in plural societies. For instance, in the field of education, some of the research is geared towards practical solutions (A. Ferrari 2004b, Giovannini 1998, Cesari Lusso 2001, Alleman-Ghionda 1998), while other studies compare how assumptions of civil culture are inculcated in schools across Europe, and how religion is located in state education (Schiffauer et al. 2004).

Studies on religious diversity have concentrated either on one or more religious groups in one nation-state (Cesari 1997, A. Ferrari 2004c, Riccio 2001, Werbner 2002, van Niekerk 2000) or in several national contexts (S. Ferrari 2004a, Haddad 2002, Vertovec and Peach 1997, Baumann et al. 2003). An exception to studies focusing on specific collectivities in specific contexts is Baumann’s (1996) research that concentrates on an area in sub-urban London. He looks at how groups from various religious, cultural and linguistic backgrounds engage with each other and negotiate their identities, and how they deal with discourses of people who strongly engage in identity politics on the one hand, and with the local government, on the other.

There has also been increasing research on the transformation of religious groups and religiousness through the migration experience. These studies are particularly interested in processes of religious adaptation to new circumstances and the importance of collective aspects of religious life in the diaspora (Baumann 2000, Baumann et al. 2003, Krause 2004, Pereira Bastos 2001, Werbner 2002, Vertovec and Rogers 1998). Various studies have been looking at the organisational and congregational dynamics of religious communities in the diaspora (Baumann 2000, Lewis 1997, Vertovec 2001),
tackling, for example, how religious identities can be transformed and strengthened among second-generation youth participating in religious organisations (Schiffauer 2001, 2004).

There has been increasing interest in comparing the accommodation of different faiths in different societal and national contexts. These studies have, for example, been concerned with how religious freedom is negotiated and how different religions are incorporated into institutional contexts of the host countries (Allievi 2002, Cattacin 2003, Grillo and Pratt 2002, Heckmann and Schnapper 2003, Kastoryano 2002, Penninx and Martiniello 2004, Pfaff-Czarnecka 2004, Rath 2001).

Some scholars have compared states with public policies with a clear separation of church and state (France) and states where there is some state support for religious institutions (Germany, Netherlands, Belgium) or states where there is a state religion (Britain, Norway) (Kastoryano 2002, Shadid and Koningsveld 2002).

A large body of literature has been concerned with religious claims’ making, the politics of recognition and ethnic mobilisation (Cattacin 2003, Statham 2003, Zolberg and Long 1999). Prevalent in these studies are those concerned with Muslim communities and the emergence of new Muslim assertiveness in Europe. This is for example manifested by organisations of young Muslims who help to foster pro-active identities of the second generation, or as a new discourse of a common Islamic European identity (Modood 2003, Schiffauer 2004, Vertovec and Rogers 1998).

Whereas most research on religious diversity in Europe has been nationally focused and concerned with specific groups or issues in specific European nation-states, social scientists have recently began to develop a more comparative perspective regarding religious diversity in Europe (Kälin 2000, Schiffauer et al. 2004, Vertovec 1997). Such endeavors are very fruitful for a better understanding on both the institutional frameworks of nation-states’ and their strategies for the governance of diversity, and the dynamics of religious communities themselves. By comparing specific institutional solutions in specific contexts, the uncovering of broader societal implications, for example regarding the value attached to religion, or access
to religion in public space, can be facilitated. Furthermore, comparative analyses help us to better understand the ways in which religious minorities deal with, for example, authorities and neighbors in different contexts, and what kind of strategies, rationalities and modes of action they use.

The IMISCOE Cluster B6 is one example of such a comparative, interdisciplinary initiative, which will hopefully also direct us towards normative considerations concerning religious diversity in Europe. Though less subject to heated public debates, normative considerations as well as concrete institutional measures for immigrant integration have been equally important in the realm of language.

**Linguistic diversity**

While modern states can, at least theoretically, take a neutral stand in regard to religious matters, it is structurally impossible to be similarly neutral with regard to linguistic diversity. In order for state bureaucracies and services to function for the general public, but also regarding any kind of provision of information to facilitate participation, there has to be a standardised language which citizens are able to use (Heath 1983). Also, it is justifiable to require an immigrant to learn another language, whereas it is rather problematic to ask an immigrant to change his/her religion. Hence, language assimilation is generally interpreted to be more compatible with liberal values than religious assimilation because the acquisition of language does not prevent people from freely expressing their moral convictions (Bauböck 2003, Joppke 2003). Discourses on linguistic diversity focus both on normative questions regarding the governance of linguistic diversity according to principles of liberal states, and on practical solutions in state and private institutions confronted with the presence of an increasing variety of languages.

Bauböck (2003) suggests several principles as guidelines for public policy in various national contexts: linguistic liberty, assimilation, accommodation and recognition. Since these principles capture the main ideologies and the crucial points of discussion underlying empirical research
and debates on the governance of linguistic diversity, they will be summarised here.

Bauböck states that regarding *linguistic liberty*, liberal democracies must guarantee the right for immigrants to use their own languages in both the private and public sphere. Immigrants should not only have the right to use their languages for shop signs, advertising, private print or audiovisual media, but also as medium of instruction in private schools.

Whereas these liberal principles do not oblige the state to actively promote minority languages, *accommodation* and *assimilation* refer to the state’s tasks and responsibilities. According to Bauböck, especially for newly arriving immigrants, accommodation of linguistic difference is often more appropriate than assimilation into one of the official languages. Especially in institutional environments that are experienced as stressful, such as hospitals or police-stations, communication between immigrants and institutions should be fostered by providing translation and interpreter services, bilingual forms and ballots and information in immigrant languages.

Furthermore, Bauböck (2003) suggests that states should enhance linguistic assimilation by promoting the acquisition of the dominant language through public education for both children of immigrants and newcomers. Providing these skills is a public task because the need to earn money prevents many migrants from investing into language acquisition. This is a problem which has been particularly prevalent among post-war European labour migrants who, even after living in the host country for more than 30 years, still have difficulties speaking the dominant language. To prevent a policy which blames migrants for their failure to integrate, public institutions should provide language courses.

Empirically oriented research on linguistic diversity has taken place in two main areas. First, it has been concerned with how immigrants and their children cope with linguistic demands and expectations of the host society and, in the case of immigrant children, with bilingualism. Second, it has focused on the challenges which nation-states and their legal and public institutions face in regard to increasing linguistic diversity (Kaya 2002, Spencer 2004, Wilson 1999). Discussions surrounding the provision of
mandatory or non-mandatory language courses are among the most hotly debated in European discourses on the governance of linguistic diversity, and testing the language abilities of immigrants is getting increasingly important at every stage of the life cycle, beginning with preschool children and leading up to adult applicants for nationality or permanent residence (Mehlem et al. 2004).

At school level, the programme of international students’ assessment (PISA) demonstrated that being of immigrant background still constitutes a disadvantage with respect to school success, thus putting the responsibility on public schools to establish equal chances for every citizen (Mehlem et al. 2004). Issues of competence in the host language and of educational measures needed to deal with increasing numbers of immigrant children had already been discussed during the first waves of post-war immigration from post-colonial areas and from southern Europe during the 1970s and 1980s (Ager 1996, Kühlwein 1978, Twitchin and Demuth 1985, Verma and Bagley 1979, Verma 1989). Out of these debates came a considerable body of both scientific and policy-oriented literature such as the Swann Report (1985) in Britain, which thoroughly discussed these matters and focused on both internal and external difficulties concerning ethnic minority education. Hence, in contrast to earlier approaches to integrating immigrant children in the educational system, the problem was not anymore seen in the migrants and their children alone, but also in the school-system. This argument has also been raised in other contexts such as Germany, where researchers have pointed to the ‘institutionalised reproduction of inequality’ as factor for migrants’ and their children’s underachievement (Radtke and Gomolla 2002). Yet, despite this shift towards a more ‘balanced’ understanding of linguistic and educational integration barriers and difficulties, today, the old problems still exist and are therefore still subject to a considerable amount of research and literature (for a summary see Reich and Roth 2002).

Regarding linguistic integration of adult immigrants, there have been recent developments towards the introduction of language courses for adult migrants as an obligatory requirement for the right to stay in the country of settlement. In the framework of so called integration programmes, such
Literacy Practices in Bilingual Families and Classrooms: Moroccan Arabic, Occitan and French in France

Bilingual children have to deal with requirements originating from both of their languages respectively. The expected skills depend on specific language practices and attitudes of the language community. The linguistic-cultural competence of these language groups differs vastly depending on whether they have a migrant background or maintain an indigenous minority language. The first group is represented here by Moroccan-speaking families who settled down in Nîmes. The latter refers to French people who have their origins in the former Occitan-speaking South of France. In either case the children must accomplish both, acquire the national language which is an important precondition for a successful school performance and job career, and integrate in the preservation process of their linguistic family traditions. The children of two classes (third year of primary school) collaborated in an ethnographic and linguistic study on how children of Moroccan and Occitan origin in France deal with the literate and verbal language requirements.

First of all, the literate practices of children of Arabic and Occitan language communities were examined by means of an ethnographic survey. It investigated their reading and writing practices in school during Arabic and Occitan classes and in their families. In both areas, literate practices are integrated in extra-linguistic processes: Reading and writing accomplish practical goals of daily life when one has to deal with price tags, bills, notes on calendars, emails, etc. The scripture has differing forms and functions in French, Arabic and Occitan. After the ethnographic survey followed an orthographic study which focused on how these children utilize their acquired literate skills. In this part the children were asked to write down a picture story, first in Moroccan or Occitan, then in French. The French writings predominantly illustrate which literate resources the children possess and how they apply these. In contrast, the writings in the respective minority languages demonstrate that most of the children orientate themselves by the structures of the French language. For example, the writings show the solutions with which the children meet contradictory requirements of either of their languages. Most of the Moroccan children create single letter words – unacceptable in the Arabic orthographic tradition. While writing a story in Arabic Moroccan, they use the French writing system. The solutions of the Occitan children are different. As Occitan and French are familiar languages, some children write their Occitan stories in the French language structure. In addition, they mark their stories as "Occitan" by the use of specific orthographic signs. Thus, French is the dominant language in terms of the children's literate abilities.

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Selected Reading:
courses were established as an obligation for both the state and for the immigrant at the same time (Mehlem et al. 2004). While some European states have introduced such formal language and integration programmes for new migrants (e.g. Netherlands, Finland, Denmark, Germany, Austria, Sweden), other states built integration measures into mainstream services (e.g. Italy, Spain) (Spencer 2004, Westin 2000, Wolf and Heckmann 2003) or put the task on the shoulders of private associations such as NGOs (Italy) (Cingolani 2004).

According to Bauböck (2003), such linguistic assimilation policies are legitimate only ‘when they assume a convergence of public interests and private interests of the immigrants themselves’. Hence, mandatory language courses for adults must be justifiable ‘as a form of benign paternalism’. From this point of view, language courses can secure migrants’ long-term interests regarding social upward mobility as opposed to short-term interests in earning income in low-skilled jobs. However, the legitimacy of defining such interests ‘from above’, that is from outside migrant communities, remains questionable.

Whether language courses are mandatory or non-mandatory, in all national contexts there are important questions concerning their content. While some studies argue that it is crucial to teach the basis skills necessary for everyday conversations, others stress the importance of literacy and writing (Mehlem and Maas 2003). While acquiring the dominant language is crucial regarding integration on all levels (economic, social, cultural), implicit or explicit issues in debates on the governance of linguistic diversity in schools are also concerned with questions whether only teaching the official language makes sense when most of the pupils have other language backgrounds (Mehlem et al. 2004). These debates are closely linked to discourses on the politics of recognition (Bauböck 2003). Languages not only have a communicative value, but they are also crucial regarding the ways we see the world and as markers of individual and collective identities. To recognize immigrants as linguistic minorities, some nation-states have, for example, introduced optional
Multilingualism as a Burden for the Educational System?

The increasing multilingual reality in German schools goes along with a discourse on the needs and possibilities of language education. In interviews, undertaken as part of a recent project on the acquisition of written language by multilingual primary school children, arguments that were taken up by teachers may be described by two positions.

The first position is that, when starting their school career, children of migrant families talk in a ‘mixed language’. According to some teachers, they are speechless in the sense that they can barely express themselves in any language, neither in their home language nor in German. Therefore communication at lessons is hard. Hence, according to the teachers, languages apart from German should not be used. If pupils want to be successful at school, the primary goal is language competence in German. The presence of other languages distracts from this goal and delays the child’s achievement.

The second position is that German is the language of communication, but other languages should be integrated and used in classes. The linguistic resources of the children and the multilingual reality in most primary school classes can provide a useful starting point to teach diversity and tolerance. Teaching and using home languages support self-awareness, self-confidence, general learning ability and motivation, and possibly also second language learning.

So what determines one or the other attitude of the teachers towards multilingualism? One reason for differing approaches is that the pedagogical concept and the defined didactics of specific schools either limit or provide methods and materials to deal with multilingualism and second language learning. Individual pedagogical preferences are put to practice only within this frame. However, regardless of the different attitudes that lead to teaching methods reaching from consequent monolingual German to partly bilingual teaching, the actual needs and possibilities in language education were generally described as difficult or problematic. The problems ranged from complications of the teaching assignment and decreased educational quality because of restricted linguistic competences of the children, to difficulties to convince parents and administrations that it is profitable to teach languages like Turkish or Arabic which seem to be largely irrelevant to German society.

The perceived burden of teachers to deal with multilingualism reflects an ongoing transformation into a multilingual society. It takes place in one of the functional parts of society, the educational system, which has to deal with contrary requests: a state defined monolingualism and a multilingual reality.

Selected references

courses in immigrant languages in public schools for children of the second and third generation (e.g. Germany, Switzerland, Netherlands) (Bauböck 2003). In other states, the responsibility for teaching the language of origin has been passed to the private sector and migrant associations have taken up this task (e.g. Italy) (Cingolani 2004).5

The controversies raised in discussions regarding the official institutionalisation of mother tongue teaching are manifold and take place on ideological, institutional and practical levels. Also, they are not new and many of the issues discussed today have already been subject to debate during the 1970s and 1980s (see for example Dabène et al. 1984, Baker and Jones 1999, Tosi and Leung 1999). However, this earlier discourse in education and other social sciences was dominated by rather contrasting views of cultural and linguistic difference which presented other languages as an obstacle rather than a resource. Today, the one-sided focus on language competences in the official language as a central condition for integration is criticised (Reich 2001) and emphasis is put on inter- or multicultural pedagogy which tries to bridge cultural and linguistic difference and focuses on a more open minded approach that confronts the needs of pupils to act in multilingual contexts in their everyday lives (Mehlem et al. 2004).

On an ideological level, there have been debates about whether other languages than the dominant language form part of the nation or whether they ‘dismember’ the state. This debate is also relevant regarding autochthonous minority languages (France, Belgium) (Caubet 2004, Martiniello 2004, Mehlem et al. 2004). In fact, in many countries (e.g. Britain, France, Switzerland, Belgium, Sweden, etc.) the frameworks within which immigrant languages are discussed today have been shaped by earlier policy initiatives and ideologies concerning regional minority languages. Hence, already before the increase of linguistic diversity through immigration, most European states had achieved a concordat with regional minorities over the issue of minority languages, and some form of bi- or

5 For a discussion of the status of immigrant minority languages at home and at school see the UNESCO report on ‘Language and Diversity in Multicultural Europe’ (Extra and Yagmur 2002).
multilingualism was accepted as part of national unity. However, while autochthonous language communities participate in the welfare state and try to escape national homogenisation, allochthonous communities aim to enter the national social system (Castan 1984, Mehlem et al. 2004).

A problem for the politics of recognition in the realm of language is that recognition alone does not guarantee the preservation of minority languages and does not necessarily lead to wider value put on multilingualism (Caubet 2004, Dirim and Auer 2004, Mehlem et al. 2004).

Other important issues concern, for example, which community languages should be funded and supported. In some cases, the target languages are only the official languages of the home countries, whereas the migrants’ mother tongue may sometimes be persecuted and suppressed by the nationalist policy of the home country (like Kurdish in Turkey, and, although to a lesser extent, Berber in Morocco). Furthermore, the home language can be a non-Standard or substandard variety stigmatised by the foreign teachers (like Sicilian and south Italian dialects) (Gogolin 2002, Mehlem et al. 2004).

Decisions about which immigrant languages should be taught in public institutions are a typical example of the ‘essentialisation of minority cultures’ because governments need to define which the mother tongue of, for example, a Kurdish child from Turkey is (Closta et al. 2003, Entzinger 2000). In this realm, it is difficult not to fall into the trap of essentialism and not to define culture in substantialist terms.

Another controversy surrounds questions such as how far the education of community languages leads to the retreat of the minorities into their communities or encourages social integration beyond the family (Mehlem et al. 2004).

The practical difficulties of mother tongue teaching as well as ideological discourses on definitions of immigrant languages, and the positive or negative outcomes of institutionalised politics of recognition has led, in some countries, to the marginalisation of mother tongue teaching out of the official school curriculum (Sweden, Netherlands, Norway) (Dingu-Kyrklund
Writing Berber in Arabic Script in Germany – Literacy Practices as Cultural Integration

Ahmed is one of 75 children who collaborated in a project on ‘Literacy Acquisition of Moroccan Children in Germany: Resources and Obstacles’. Living in the old miner district of Essen, his family is confronted with unemployment and decreasing opportunities to find work without a good school degree. Ahmed still speaks Berber, his home language, with his parents and siblings, while inside his multi-ethnic peer group only German is used. Every Sunday he goes to Arabic lessons in a mosque run by a parents’ association. When asked to write down a little narrative he told us earlier in Berber, Ahmed didn’t hesitate to use the Arabic script. In his German teacher’s eyes, Ahmed’s strong allegiance to the Moroccan association shows a lack in integration.

The results of the project of Maas & Mehlem confirm exactly the opposite: In using Arabic script for the writing of Berber, Ahmed stepped out of tradition, and the way he is putting words and phrases together is deeply influenced by his experience of German writing conventions. Compared to a similar story written in the former home town of Ahmed’s family in Morocco, Nador, salient differences can be observed: Ahmed is separating sentences by full stops; he treats prepositions and demonstratives as independent words, which cannot be connected to nouns, and he even creates single letter words – unacceptable in the Arabic orthographic tradition. In the disguise of strange shapes, his text is not only indirect evidence of Ahmed’s quite good mastery of German orthographic principles, but also a document of cultural integration.

The majority of Moroccan children in Germany do not only succeed in acquiring basic or good orthographical notions of German – even with a certain delay – but also transferred this knowledge when spontaneously writing their home language. According to the “Programme of International Students’ Assessment” (PISA), the German school system is not effective enough in offering equal chances to minority groups. The report of Maas & Mehlem sheds some light on the resources that teachers could take into account in order to prevent school failure and exclusion.

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This marginalisation, however, also has to be interpreted in the context of increasing budgetary restrictions and the discourses on ‘too much diversity’ mentioned earlier. All in all, concerns surrounding linguistic diversity have played an important role in the realm of multiculturalism because immigrants’ linguistic competences are often used to benchmark the ‘success’ or ‘failure of integration’.

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6 For a detailed overview of the measures of European states regarding the cultural and linguistic integration of immigrant children into schools see the report of the European Commission: Eurydice (2004).
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