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Citizenship was long a neglected subject in the social sciences, but in a dramatic reversal it has more recently become a focal point for wide-ranging and varied discussions concerning the democratic prospect in an increasingly global society. Indeed, it is fair to say that we are currently witnessing an efflorescence of interest in the future of citizenship, or what David Scobey (2001: 20) has referred to as the “return of the citizen” in public and policy discourse.” Moreover, this efflorescence is a reflection of a growing belief in many quarters that we are living in what sociologist and former President of Brazil Fernando Henrique Cardoso (2000) has referred to as “an age of citizenship.”

This renewed concern stems from two interrelated and shared convictions on the part of those who have entered into the fray: first, citizenship is important, and second, citizenship is changing. However, commentators begin to part company with others when it comes to specifying in what ways citizenship is presumed to be important and similarly over identifying the changes that are thought to be transforming – for better or worse – its significance and character. Not surprisingly, the normative evaluations attached to various prognostications also vary considerably, as do the emotional reactions, which range from deep pessimism to a rather rosy optimism.

At one level, citizenship can be succinctly defined in terms of two component features. The first is that it constitutes membership in a polity, and as such citizenship inevitably involves a dialectical process between inclusion and exclusion, between those deemed eligible for citizenship and those who are denied the right to become members. In its earliest articulation in ancient Greece, the polity in question was the city-state. In the modern world, it was transformed into the nation-state. Second, membership brings with it a reciprocal set of duties and rights, both of which vary by place.
and time, though some are universal. Thus, paying taxes and obeying the law are among the duties expected of citizens in all politics, while the right to participate in the political process in various ways—by voting, running for office, debating, petitioning, and so forth—is an inherent feature of democracy.

However, at another level, when one begins to look more closely at the substance of citizenship in the world today, it quickly becomes quite clear that there is no singularly agreed-upon answer to the question Derek Heather (1999) posed in the title of his book *What is Citizenship?* A rather cursory review of the literature reveals something of the capacious nature of recent discussions about contemporary citizenship. In an effort to capture that which is deemed to be novel about the present situation, a proliferation of adjectives are evident in that literature aimed at describing peculiar features of citizenship today. Thus, we find treatments of world citizenship (Heater 2002), global citizenship (Falk 1994), universal citizenship (Young 1989), cosmopolitan citizenship (Linklater 1998), multiple citizenship (Heid 1995), postnational citizenship (Sossyl 1994), transnational citizenship (Johnston 2001), dual citizenship (Miller 1991), nested citizenship (Faist 2000a and 2000b), multilayered citizenship (Yuval-Davis 2000), cultural citizenship (Stevenson 1997), multicultural citizenship (Delgado-Moreira 2000), cybercitizenship (Tambini 1997), environmental citizenship (Jelin 2000), feminist citizenship (Lister 1997), gendered citizenship (Seidman 1999), flexible citizenship (Ong 1999), traditional citizenship (Bloomraat 2004), intimate citizenship (Plummer 2003), and protective citizenship (Gilbertson and Singer 2003). And the list could go on.

To further illustrate the multiplicity of terms used to depict citizenship today, one can simply turn to Isin and Wood’s *Citizenship and Identity* (1999), where the authors describe a contemporary multifaceted citizenship that they characterize as being at once modern, diasporic, aboriginal, sexual, cosmopolitan, ecological, cultural, and radical. All of this clearly signals a conviction on the part of these two scholars that citizenship today is vital, malleable, in many ways novel, and inherently complex. Without necessarily agreeing with all of the particulars of this framing of the contemporary situation, many others concur with this general sensibility regarding an increasingly complex and variegated character of citizenship.

Others, however, offer a considerably less sanguine assessment. From their perspective, citizenship is being threatened by one of a variety of perceived forces that are seen as undermining its salience. The list of culprits is varied, including changes in the nation-state itself, which some have depicted as withering, while for others it is brought about by the shift from welfare capitalism to neoliberalism. Some point to changes in the citizenry itself, claiming that as a consequence of the individualistic tendencies of modern societies, increasing numbers of people no longer possess a willingness to become involved in public life. Still others would locate the source of the problem in larger, macro-level factors generally depicted in terms of the effects of globalization (Putnam 2000; Touraine 2001; Turner 2001; Dower 2003). In contrast to the vibrancy inherent in the preceding perspective, scholars operating with a conviction that citizenship is in trouble typically describe it as anemic, thin, or as merely instrumental.

**Expansion or Erosion?**

As we sifted through the large—and rapidly growing—body of recent scholarly work on citizenship, largely from the interrelated fields of sociology, political science, philosophy, and cultural studies, we initially distinguished what we identified as two major discourses on the topic: as noted above, the first is concerned with the erosion of citizenship, the second with its expansion. We have also been struck by the fact that spokespersons for each of these positions seem deaf to the other discourse. Thus, at the outset we saw as our intention in this brief inquiry into the problems and prospects of contemporary citizenship to bring the two discourses into fruitful dialogue, a task we realized was far more easily stated than achieved. To accomplish this objective, we thought that we would first subject each of the two discourses to critical analysis. Next, we would attempt to bring the two into contact with each other. This would lead to our final task, which would have been to distill from these first two tasks our own assessment of the future of citizenship.

However, our self-defined task proved to be more intricate and complicated than we had anticipated. As we looked at the erosion camp, we became increasingly aware that there are in fact two different, though sometimes interconnected, concerns that have been voiced about what is seen as a decline in the efficacy and salience of citizenship: one concerns the rights that accrue to individuals as citizens and the other attends to issues surrounding the obligations of citizenship. In terms of rights, a lively debate is currently underway that addresses the assault on social citizenship brought about by the rise of neoliberal political regimes since the 1970s. Appropriately, this debate is usually framed in terms of T. H. Marshall’s (1964) paradigm of the evolution of citizenship that is linked to the rise and expansion of the modern welfare state. Less explicit in Marshall’s account, but there nonetheless, is a view of the citizen in the modern welfare state as essentially passive—a recipient of rights due to the evolution of an expanded view of what citizenship entails, but not an active participant in democratic decision making (Turner 1993; 2001).

This touches on the obligation side of the coin. Generally without reflecting on Marshall, a number of contemporary theorists have raised
concerns about what they perceive to be the steady decline in involvement in public life by ordinary people. This particular topic has been of major concern to those interested in the fate of the public sphere or civil society. Thus, a rather disparate group of thinkers -- including but certainly not limited to Benjamin Barber, Robert Bellah, Amitai Etzioni, Anthony Giddens, Jürgen Habermas, Robert Putnam, Theda Skocpol, Alain Touraine, and Bryan Turner -- have raised in different ways, from different political perspectives, and with different valences, concerns about the decline in civic participation.

If the erosion of citizenship discourse generally offers a rather pessimistic prognosis for the future (even when various nostrums are proposed to combat the problem), the other discourse views citizenship, not as anemic, but as expanding, vibrant, and susceptible to reinvention in ways appropriate to the dictates of globalization. But here too, we discovered that there are actually two, though again sometimes interconnected, discourses. On the one hand, the expansion of citizenship is seen in terms of the progressive inclusion of heretofore marginalized and excluded groups. This particular aspect of expansion pays primary attention to the changing significance of gender and race in shaping an understanding of who is to be incorporated into full membership in the body politic.

One account, seen most explicitly in Talcott Parsons's (1971) evolutionary functionalism, suggests that among the master trends shaping modern societies is a growing capacity and societal interest in inclusivity. From such a perspective, citizenship serves as a particularly significant mode of identity and solidarity in modern pluralist societies. A competing account, especially evident among social movement scholars, stresses the struggles of marginalized groups in gaining entry to the public sphere as equals possessing all of the rights of citizens. Be it a focus on the women's movement, the black civil rights movement in the United States, or similar struggles elsewhere on the part of excluded racial or religious minorities, the main thrust of this approach tends to be reflective of what the American labor leader and civil rights activist A. Philip Randolph once said: "Rights must be taken."

Both of these accounts of inclusion share one thing in common: they presuppose that the locus of citizenship is the nation-state. This assumption has been increasingly challenged by scholars who have raised questions about what they claim to be the erosion in the efficacy of the nation-state while simultaneously pondering whether various trans-state entities such as the United Nations or, at a more regional level, the European Union might be capable of developing notions of citizenship that, in effect, burst the boundaries of the nation-state (Jacobson 1996; Soysal 1994). In part, the argument draws a parallel between the premodern and the modern loci of citizenship. In the former, it was the city-state, while in the latter it became the nation-state. The assumption underpinning this argument is that as we enter what some see as late or advanced modernity (Giddens 1990) and others as the postmodern (Harvey 1989), a similar shift occurs in the locus of citizenship regimes. Given the embryonic character of these emergent trends, it is not surprising that there is little agreement about whether the future suggests the development of a global state (Heather 1999, 2002) or what John Hoffman (2004) refers to as "citizenship beyond the state" -- by which he means not only beyond the nation-state, but beyond any sort of trans-state.

The discussions about transcending the boundaries of the nation-state can be seen in the wide-ranging discussions today, not only among scholars but also among politicians and policy makers, about dual or multiple citizenship. Given the reality of expanding numbers of dual citizens residing around the world, it is not surprising that this topic has been of particular interest of late. Much of this discussion is about individuals going beyond the boundaries of any particular nation-state by becoming members of two or more states. As such, at one level the legitimacy or efficacy of the existing global order of states is assumed and not questioned.

A topic that has received somewhat less attention, but is nonetheless equally central to this general line of inquiry, is nested citizenship. It has received less attention because it is a concrete phenomenon only in Europe at the moment, and does not appear relevant to North America, Asia, or elsewhere. However, it should be recalled that the European Community as it was conceived at its founding in the post-World War II period was primarily an economic entity designed to give Western Europe greater clout in world markets, particularly in response to American economic hegemony. It was over the course of several decades that its potential political implications began to emerge, and with it the idea that one might be a citizen of a particular European nation while simultaneously being a citizen of Europe. One question nested citizenship theory raises is whether, for example, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which is in its early years and is at the moment viewed solely as an economic treaty, might over time evolve into something resembling the European Union (EU). Likewise, might something similar occur elsewhere, be it in the form of pan-Africanism, strategic alliances among the economic powerhouse of East Asia, or in Latin America? These are questions that the idea of nested citizenship raises.

At another level, the transcendence of the nation-state is seen to open up the prospects of world citizenship (Heather 2002). While much of this particular conversation occurs at the philosophical level, the impact of universal human rights regimes and the idea that organizations such as the United Nations have a role to play in insuring the protection of those rights -- including the interventions of various sorts into nations
accused of rights violations – also gives it real-world evidence to examine and interpret.

FOUR THEMES

The objective we have staked out for this book is in our estimation both modest and important. It is modest insofar as we do not seek to lay out alternative explanations, develop new types of citizenship to add to the already expansive list, or provide a lengthy and sustained argument about what we think the future of citizenship in the next quarter of a century or so is likely to be. Rather, our purpose is, first, to offer an analytical assessment that is useful in locating and making sense of the various thematic discourses on citizenship, and, second, to provide guidance in pulling together those discrete themes into a larger, more comprehensive framework of analysis that is capable of taking all of them into account. We think this is important insofar as it permits a more constructive dialogue across these various discourses.

To that end, the following four chapters will take up the concerns discussed above, structured into the following broad themes: (1) inclusion, (2) erosion, (3) withdrawal, and (4) expansion. In each instance, we make no effort to provide a comprehensive account of the body of scholarship dealing with each theme. Rather, the focus is on the main contours of the state of the argument, and to get at those contours, we have intentionally selected what we think are among the most important works to date – works that have become touchstones for others working in the area. In some cases, we will stay close to the texts themselves by providing excerpts of these works, seeking not only to identify and critically evaluate that which the authors say, but also to point to authorial silences. Some of the texts in question are theoretical while others are chiefly the products of empirical research. There is a decided focus on the Anglo-American world, and in some instances, as with the first half of the chapter on inclusion and the chapter on erosion, the focus is primarily on the United States. In other places, such as the discussion of dual citizenship, we will make use of a somewhat broader range of sources and will survey the current state of the literature. While this might suggest to some readers an arbitrariness in our selections, we think we have managed to tap into the most salient works available to help us to capture each theme’s key features.

Inclusion

Inclusion, the first major theme we address, is an expansive topic that concerns itself both with, on the other hand, the incorporation of people into the ranks of citizens and, on the other, the terms of incorporation. What E. J. Hobsbawn (1962) called the “age of revolution” – framed by the French Revolution and the failed revolutionary upheavals of 1848 – resulted in the triumph of bourgeois democracy. Who precisely was to be included in the system as citizens varied by country, but in general there were efforts – sometimes more successful, sometimes less successful – to effect closure in order to prevent certain categories of persons from achieving full citizenship. In some places, this meant that the working class and the poor were to be excluded. In other places, racial criteria were used to differentiate citizens from those who were excluded from full societal membership. In all instances, women were denied the rights of full citizenship by being denied access to the public sphere. Thus, part of the issue of inclusion involves the manner by, and extent to which, heretofore-excluded categories of people have managed to gain entrance into the polity by being accorded full citizenship rights, while at the same time the state has preserved its monopoly on dictating the terms of inclusion and exclusion.

However, more recently, citizenship debates have concentrated on issues related to the terms of incorporation. Of particular significance is the conversation about multiculturalism as a mode of inclusion. Although its meaning is varied and contested, there is general consensus that multiculturalism involves valorizing ethnic and cultural diversity, induced by the presence and activities of ethnonational minorities and aboriginal groups within nation-states and by the impact of immigration. Related to this, considerable attention has been devoted to the matter of “group-differentiated rights” (Young 1989, 2000; see also Kymlicka 1995, 2001), which would include all categories of citizens that do not belong to the majority mainstream, which in the nations of the West has historically meant white males. Among the questions that advocates of group-differentiated rights must wrestle with is whether, to what degree, and for which categories of citizens should such rights be seen as a constitutive part of citizenship. In the somewhat narrower realm of cultural rights, central concerns involve claims pertaining to religion, language, and education. Even more contentious is the matter of granting rights that promote self-government and partial forms of political autonomy for recognized minorities.

Both exogenous and endogenous factors have played a role in stimulating tendencies towards the expansion of cultural rights. In the case of ethnonational minorities, for instance, European integration has in some cases fostered subnational tendencies towards regionalism (as can be seen, for instance, with the Scots and the Welsh in Britain, the Basques and Catalonians in Spain, and the Lega Nord in Italy). Endogenous factors likewise have had similar consequences. Over the past several decades, for example, religious exemption rights have been increasingly granted to members of various immigrant groups, be it exempting Sikhs from wearing
motorcycle helmets in Canada or offering halal food in British state school cafeterias. Still, there is much controversy over the granting of such rights. This is evident in the controversy over whether the wearing of headscarves by Muslim schoolgirls in France and women teachers in Germany should be permitted. Both cases remain disputed at the moment. Overall, religious exemption rights are covered by the constitutions of the various liberal democracies, albeit somewhat differently from nation to nation. There is evidence of a path-dependent development towards a convergence of such rights. However, the situation is far less clear when it comes to rights associated with limited self-government, greater autonomy, or even the prospect of independence for ethnonational minorities.

Erosion

The second topic concerns the social rights aspect of citizenship – more specifically, the relationship between citizens and the welfare dimension of modern states. In all of the world’s liberal democracies, providing for the well-being of citizens has entailed the creation of a wide range of enforceable rights that all citizens possess, including social security and pension provisions, unemployment schemes, health insurance, access to education, and so forth. Not only does the range of rights vary from nation to nation, but so does the scope of those rights. Some states – with the United States being the most obvious instance – created relatively thin welfare regimes, while others – with the Scandinavian countries serving as paradigmatic examples – established and have maintained comparatively thick ones. Nevertheless, in all of these nations, citizens have become more, not less, reliant on state protection (Béland 2005).

What is interesting for our purposes are the shifting assumptions about the current condition and the future prospects of the welfare state. As an examination of the relevant social scientific literature reveals, by the middle of the twentieth century the received wisdom was that the welfare state was here to stay, having managed to deal with the most negative effects of inequality while also succeeding in reducing previous levels of class conflict. A typical argument was that during the early phase of industrialization, the primary economic role played by the state involved the facilitation of capital accumulation, which yielded ever-increasing levels of economic productivity. In contrast, once an industrial society reached a mature state of development, this role for the state progressively gives way to a new role wherein the primary task becomes, as A. F. K. Organski, in an emblematic expression of modernization theory, The Stages of Political Development (1965), put it, “to protect the very people who were the greatest sufferers in the earlier stage of industrial society.” In short, the welfare state was a path-dependent consequence of the internal logic of capitalist development. First, with the assistance of the state, economic structures were put in place to stimulate accumulation and enhance productive capacity. Once that had occurred, it became possible to begin to address the primary unintended consequence of industrialization, which is the generation of unacceptable levels of inequality (the matter of environmental degradation in the early period was not a major topic of concern for modernization theorists).

Within a decade of Organski’s thesis, critics from both the left and right began to question the legitimacy and the economic viability of the welfare state. As the critics point out, the pressures on the welfare state are both exogenous and endogenous. Certainly, the pressure on state-citizen relations concerning social rights has been exacerbated by the effects of globalization on welfare states seeking to compete in international markets in a situation characterized by, as Saskia Sassen (1996: 6) put it, the “global footlooseness of corporate capital.” Globalization has been identified as a factor contributing to the reduction of benefits and the general trend to constrict rather than expand or preserve existing social rights. In terms of endogenous factors, numerous critics of liberal democratic welfare states have contended that the pervasive provision of guaranteed benefits has resulted in an unwelcome and unintended side effect: namely, it has tended to undermine individual autonomy and the capacity of citizens to care for themselves and their families – becoming, in short, increasingly dependent on the various provisions which were designed to enable them to become independent.

In the midst of these intellectual and ideological challenges, the triumph of neoliberalism signaled the advent of a significant attack on existing welfare state policies and programs. While radical exponents of neoliberalism, such as the influential American neoconservative Grover Norquist, suggest in colorful language that their goal is to “strangle,” “starve,” or “drown” the welfare state, other neoliberals are content to cut away at it, reducing as much as is politically feasible its influence over the lives of citizens. In either case, the goal of neoliberalism is the erosion of the welfare state, a goal that has met various levels of success during the past few decades in all of the industrial nations.

Somewhat provocatively, Alain Touraine (2001: 9) has argued that “we have moved from a form of socialism to a form of capitalism, and that the market has replaced the state as the principal regulatory force” [italics in original] in neoliberal regimes. Clearly, neoliberalism calls into question the central claim of postindustrial theory, be it Touraine’s leftist version or Bell’s centrist account, about the central role accorded to the state in directing society. Neoliberal ideology, as Touraine points out, calls for replacing the state by corporate capitalism. Insofar as it succeeds in doing
so, the question arises about the future of social rights. If the recent past has entailed the progressive erosion of such rights, does the future suggest more of the same, or is it possible, given the proper constellation of political forces emanating from the new social movements, for there to be a return of a welfare state, albeit a reformulated one, that takes us, in Touraine's words (2001), "beyond neoliberalism?"

Withdrawal

A third major field of public debate and contention concerning citizenship focuses on the matter of democratic participation and, underlying that, on the question of what it means to speak of the civic virtues of citizens. The first part of this debate is grounded in empirical observation. For decades, political scientists have pointed out that most citizens in representative democracies are neither well informed nor particularly interested in political matters. As the classic study The American Voter (Campbell et al. 1960) revealed, citizens' familiarity with current political events and issues is severely limited. The United States is not all that unique in this regard. Given this general tendency to remain aloof from political engagement, the claim has been advanced that during the last quarter of the past century there has been a growing tendency to withdraw from the public sphere (Putnam 2000). It is quite clear that in many Western democracies, voter turnout has been decreasing in recent decades. Likewise, other sorts of involvements in both strictly political activities (writing letters to politicians, demonstrating, lobbying, etc.) and in more general sorts of civic activities (joining community organizations, volunteering, etc.) have also experienced declines, sometimes quite dramatic ones.

While traditional political liberalism has been more concerned with protecting individual rights from unwarranted governmental intrusions, and not particularly or primarily concerned with the obligations of citizens to participate in public life, such is not the case with those who embrace classic republican ideals or, more recently, communitarianism. If today's liberal thinkers, such as those who self-identify as libertarians, express little concern about what the withdrawal of citizens from public life might mean to democratic practice, this has become a major preoccupation of contemporary thinkers who identify as republicans or communitarians. In their view, democracy is not possible without an informed and active citizenry. Thus, they are concerned that the foundation of democratic practice is endangered. Making sense of this particular claim involves two facets. First, it requires assessing the empirical adequacy of the case that is being made that the trend to withdraw from the civic arena is far more pronounced at present than in both the recent and distant past. Second, it entails a critical assessment of the causal factors that have been identified as the main culprits contributing to this withdrawal.

Expansion

Finally, it is the location of citizenship that is at stake. The most characteristic form of citizenship in modern democracies until the present has been single and exclusive citizenship in a nation-state. Some have argued that nation-states have become increasingly weakened and anachronistic as a consequence of globalization, and that we are on the cusp of a new, postnational age (Sossal 1994). In such a novel set of circumstances, new loci for citizenship are seen to emerge. In a similar vein, among those who do not think the nation-state is in danger of disappearing (for better or worse), there is a growing sense that the typical form is increasingly coexisting with novel forms of citizenship located in some fashion beyond the nation-state. Given that much of the postnational discourse transpired before the events of 9/11 and the subsequent dramatic assertiveness of powerful nation-states, the dialogue at the moment is chiefly shaped by the question of whether and to what extent single-state, exclusive citizenship can coincide with other forms of citizenship.

The most common newer form of citizenship - with deeper roots than the other forms - is dual or multiple citizenship (as we shall see below, multiple is used in two distinct ways). It is defined as a form of overlapping membership in which an individual has full membership in at least two nation-states. A growing number of states have passed legislation permitting dual citizenship, and even in nations that do not permit it, except in limited circumstances, a growing tolerance of such identities is evident. At the very least, nations that do not officially legitimate dual or multiple citizenship are not inclined to prosecute people for holding two or more passports.

This development, it should be noted, marks a significant departure from the received understanding of dual citizenship, which was that it was to be avoided as much as possible in order to prevent the potential problem of dual loyalties. For example, such a view was enshrined in the nineteenth century in the Bankoff Treaties enacted between the United States and various European states and in the Hague Convention of 1930.

It was only three decades ago that Raymond Aron (1974: 638) pondered the question, "Is multinational citizenship possible?" His response was to conclude that he continued to believe "that my initial reaction - that the idea of multinational citizenship is a contradiction in terms - was correct." However, he added the following proviso that reflected his sense that this was not quite as simple a matter as he had thought: "Yet I admit that the question can arise: the various rights of citizenship are not all of a piece,
and do not all relate to the state in the same way." Since Aron’s speculative essay, the proliferation of dual citizenship regimes has meant that rather than contemplating the prospects of dual citizenship, social scientists today address its reality and the growing demand for its expansion. Not surprisingly, much that has been written in recent years about dual citizenship focuses on state policy making, with an extremely limited literature to date taking up the issue of what it is like to live as a dual citizen in an increasingly globalized world system.

The second new form of citizenship that has become a topic of interest, particularly among Europeans, is that of emerging forms of supranational citizenship. Thomas Faist (2000a: 13 and 2000b) has referred to this type as “nested citizenship.” Describing this as resembling Russian dolls, citizenship is articulated at both the national and the supranational levels. Thus, a person is a French citizen and simultaneously a citizen of Europe — or more specifically of the European Union. David Held (1995) has used the term “multiple citizenship” to describe such a situation, a term that connotes full membership on multiple governance levels. Given that similar forms of citizenship have not arisen elsewhere, the European model has been the sole focus of scholarly attention.

As with dual citizenship, much attention has been devoted to the policy level. However, the idea of nested citizenship has also raised questions about the implications of European citizenship for the more emotive aspects of belonging to particular nations. It has also raised in some places the issue of the relationship between the nation-state and ethnonationalist movements within states. Scottish nationalists, for instance, have argued that they view Britain as an antiquated mode of identity. The goal of those in favor of an independent Scotland is to scuttle the relationship of the region to Britain and instead to embrace the ideal of locating Scotland within Europe. Thus, residents of Scotland would be at once citizens of Scotland and Europe, but no longer of the United Kingdom (Nairn 2000).

Related terms intended to reflect the expansive character of contemporary citizenship include transnational citizenship, global citizenship, cosmopolitan citizenship, and world citizenship. While the first of these most closely approximates dual or multiple citizenship — with a concern for definitions of belonging that involve one or more specific nation-states — the others in various ways are deemed to reflect the emergence of citizenship, or at least citizenship-like features, at a global level. The role of supranational organizations such as the United Nations and the proliferation of INGOs (international nongovernmental organizations) working to advance the idea of universal human rights points to the fact that people are increasingly inclined to turn to supranational organizations to seek redress for perceived infringements of basic human rights (Tsutsui and Wotipka 2004). While many of these trends are in an early stage of development and much remains unclear about where they might lead, part of the discourse on the expansion of citizenship must reckon with them.

**The Future of Citizenship**

These four themes — inclusion, erosion, withdrawal, and expansion — reflect the foci of contemporary discourses on citizenship. The renewal of concern in citizenship studies that we noted at the outset is reflected in the various ways that each of these themes has taken shape in recent decades. As the short sketches of these four main fields of debate indicate, citizenship is a pivotal contested concept in contemporary social science theory, but also in political practice. As is true of all contested concepts, discourses about citizenship inevitably have two dimensions, the normative (what should be) and the empirical (what actually is). Citizenship, as we have noted, is a relationship between a citizen and the state, or some entity that is state-like in key respects.

As will become evident in the following chapters, citizenship is at the moment undergoing a significant process of redefinition, following from the claims-making practices of ordinary people, the articulation of the obligations of citizens as prescribed by the state, and the recognition of various rights granted by the state. These three features in tandem point toward the idea of citizenship as status, defined in terms of legally enforceable rights accruing to citizens and a set of obligations, some but not all of which are legally mandated, that citizens are expected to fulfill.

Citizenship establishes the boundaries of the political community. It defines that which is public and that which is private. It also tells us who is in and who is outside of the political community. The boundaries of citizenship are set by the interactive combination of three pivotal dimensions of citizenship in a particular time and place: (1) democratic self-governance (including access to political life); (2) the particular constellation of citizens’ rights and responsibilities; and (3) the matter of identity that comes with the sense of belonging to or being affiliated with a political community.

Finally, we make the following claim. Although all contemporary states define their legal inhabitants as citizens, it is our view that citizenship cannot be conceived without its twin sibling: democracy. In nondemocratic regimes, the legal residents of the state remain subjects rather than being citizens. They have membership and certain duties are required, but they lack the rights of democratic citizenship. Thus, just as manifestly antidemocratic nations have laid claim to the democratic label (witness the former Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact satellites), so they have sought
to view their inhabitants as citizens. We think the distinction is important: democracies alone have citizens. That being said, it is also true that real existing nations exist on a continuum, with some being more democratic than others. This clearly has implications for the form and especially the content of citizenship.

It is our sense that the four themes we have identified speak to the major issues pertaining to citizenship in liberal democracies. We are convinced that the discourses we will review in the following chapters are critical to any effort to make sense of the future of citizenship. At the same time, one of the unfortunate but perhaps inevitable consequences of the way these distinct discourses have developed is that there has been little effort to provide an overarching analysis of the condition of and prospects for citizenship, an analysis that incorporates the central thrust of each of the themes while bringing these discrete themes into contact with the other themes. For instance, what does the discourse on the withdrawal from civic involvement mean for the salience of dual citizenship? What does the discourse on the erosion of social rights mean to notions of global citizenship? While we do not propose to conclude this brief book with anything remotely meant to offer definitive answers to these and the multitude of related questions, we do hope to offer a framework that will help to make possible a more expansive and coherent discourse on the future of citizenship in an increasingly interconnected and interdependent world.

2

Inclusion

This chapter explores two distinct but nonetheless interrelated matters. The first involves the question of who is to be included among the ranks of citizens and (the reverse side of the coin) who is to be excluded. The second involves the matter of the terms or the modes of inclusion. Although there is considerable overlap between these two topics, it is also true that the first received substantially more attention during the nineteenth century and the first two-thirds of the twentieth century than the second, while with the rise of multiculturalism as a highly contested and variable type of incorporation the second has become a major theme in both academic discourse and in concrete social practices and public policies (Kivisto 2005).

As such, the first topic requires a look to the past, while the second more explicitly and evidently concerns the present and its implications for the future. Given that this book is concerned with contemporary citizenship, our examination of the past is not intended to offer anything resembling a comprehensive historical overview of the processes of exclusion or the movements aimed at advancing the cause of expanding inclusion. Rather its purpose is to indicate in what ways inclusion in the former sense of the term remains an unrealized goal and to understand the relevance of inclusion for the emergence of multiculturalism as a new mode of societal incorporation.

The democratic cultures that came to shape the modern nation-states in Western Europe and North America, certainly by the eighteenth century, revived and redefined the idea of citizenship. This involved, at the philosophical level, inheriting and embracing elements of citizenship's ancient origins in the Greek city-state and in the Roman Empire, while at the same time, at the political level, repudiating and replacing the autocratic model of subjecthood that characterized the feudal era with the idea of the citizen
If we take seriously the disparate discourses on citizenship in the world's long-established democracies that we have analyzed in the preceding four chapters, we are led to ask what these discourses – individually and taken together – suggest about future trends of citizenship. To ask such a question is not the same as seeking to predict the future. We are acutely aware, as Erving Goffman (1983: 2) pointedly reminded us some time ago, that sociology (and the other social sciences) has had at best a checkered history as a predictive science. Indeed, we would argue (as he did) that, given the complexity and interactive nature of the key variables involved in shaping modern citizenship, attempting to predict the future is a fool’s errand. That being said, this does not prevent us from drawing conclusions about certain trends that can be seen as path dependent or from identifying certain social factors that are playing a singularly prominent role in supporting or undermining democracy, and, in the process, in shaping the form and content of citizenship.

As the cumulative impact of the four discourses on citizenship indicates, its importance revolves around its capacity to establish who belongs and who is excluded from membership in a polity. This is crucial insofar as in the modern era nation-states have held a monopoly on defining the rights and obligations associated with belonging (Weber 1968 [1921]). In this regard, the chapters devoted to the discourses on inclusion, erosion, and withdrawal are concerned with developments that have occurred within the modern nation-state. They have focused on indications of social forces that have shaped and continue to reconfigure citizenship within the boundaries of particular states. The particular outcome of specific cases varies due to the differing configurations of forces at play. Nonetheless, our general sense is that to a large extent a convergence is occurring such that the similarities across states have become more pronounced over time.

Citizenship has evolved since the eighteenth century when the spirit of democratic revolution grew and took hold of the nations of Western Europe, North America, and elsewhere. However, as John Markoff (1996) has persuasively illustrated, the history of democracy cannot be described in terms of its slow, gradual, linear and progressive expansion, not only in terms of an expansion of the geography of democratic regimes, but also in terms of the depth and substance of democracy. Rather, as he contends, we ought to understand the history in terms of waves of democracy, waves that have been periodically threatened by anti-democratic movements. Thus, democracy ought not to be seen as a fait accompli in existing democracies and as the inevitable future of those parts of the world with little or no history of democratic penetration. Rather, it should be construed as an ongoing accomplishment. Democracy, to persist, must be perpetually re-invented, which requires an active citizenry committed to the practice of participatory democracy, being prepared to engage in, as Francesca Polletta (2004) puts it, “an endless meeting.”

If this is the case, what do the three discourses concerned with internal factors contributing to the form and content of citizenship tell us about the prospects of democracy?

Inclusion

During the past two centuries or so, the efforts of elites to limit access to citizenship – using Weberian language, to effect closure – have been challenged by previously excluded groups. In particular, those who had heretofore been denied full citizenship status have challenged class, gender, and race/ethnicity as criteria for exclusion. As Chapter 2 indicated, the first successful challenges emanated from an organized working class (in the US case, the white working class). As an example of a mobilized working class, the Chartist movement in Britain provided an articulate set of demands that were designed to permit the incorporation of the working class into the ranks of the citizenry, thereby giving voice to the concerns of those most adversely impacted by rapid industrialization and allowing them a say in the direction of social change. Although Chartism was a movement specific to one nation, its aspirations found parallel expression in the other industrializing nations of Western Europe and North America, along with Australia and New Zealand. By the beginning of the twentieth century, the trend was clear: class would no longer be a permissible ground for excluding people from the rights of citizenship. However, in this process
of inclusion the state would extract a price from the working class in the form of the institutionalization and pacification of working-class militancy; inclusion into the polity represented an attempt to reduce challenges to the ruling class by an organized and radicalized working class (Mann 1987; Turner 2006: 147).

Although the inclusion of women and racial and ethnic minorities had been raised as an issue in the nineteenth century, gender and racial/ethnic criteria continued to be employed to exclude significant sectors of national populations from the rights of citizenship into the twentieth century — indeed, in many instances well into the century. Thus, although the first quarter of the last century witnessed a proliferation in the number of nations granting voting rights to women, in some instances this development occurred much later, with recalcitrant Swiss cantons holding out until as late as 1990. In the case of racial minorities, the situation was much the same. Thus, in the USA, although blacks were formally granted citizenship rights as a result of the post-Civil War amendments to the constitution, in fact a system of de facto racial subordination would emerge after the failure of reconstruction and blacks would be denied equal citizenship status for another century, until the impact of the civil rights movement began to be felt by the late 1960s (Katznelson 2005; Kivisto and Ng 2005: 181–91). In both Canada and Australia, the explicitly racist immigration policies of “white Canada” and “white Australia” persisted into the 1960s, as well (Kivisto 2002: 84–115). In the Australian case, the aboriginal residents of the continent were likewise denied full citizenship rights until the latter part of the twentieth century. The point is that these developments have occurred relatively recently, and their longer-term impacts are only now beginning to be felt.

One conclusion that might be drawn is that Parsons’s (1971) characterization of modern societies as being more inclusive than their premodern counterparts is borne out by the empirical evidence. That being said, what we are speaking about here is inclusion in the formal sense alone. In other words, class, gender, and race/ethnicity are in principle no longer viewed by liberal democracies as appropriate aspects of identity in determining who is to be included and who excluded from citizenship. However, in current social practices, particularly evident in current debates about immigration, it is clear that reality often diverges from principle. Thus, unlike Parsons, we want to stress the incomplete and contradictory nature of inclusion. Once we turn to the more substantive aspect of inclusion, it is quite clear that the salience of these identities persists. If we look, for example, at the representation of people from working-class backgrounds, women, or racial/ethnic minorities in legislative bodies, it is clear that they remain underrepresented in positions of authority. Left unresolved in all of the liberal democracies is the matter of how it might be possible to remedy the historically embedded inequities that have, to borrow from Orwell (1987 [1945]: 90), created a situation in which some people “are more equal than others.” In what ways is it possible to address the fact that people do not enter the public sphere with equal voices because of inequalities in financial resources, human capital, cultural capital, and social capital? Can equal opportunity be achieved without recourse to remedial and/or redistributive programs? We think not.

In this regard, the debates over affirmative action in the USA and its counterparts elsewhere point to the tensions and conflicts between those committed to forging more egalitarian democracies and those who are resistant to such a goal. While this conflict can be seen in all of the nations considered herein, the riots in France in the fall of 2005 offer a particularly poignant illustration of the potential for conflict due to high levels of inequality and marginalization. The riots were the result of anger created by the persistent exclusion of people of color from the French mainstream and from the daily confrontation with manifestations of racism (Ireland 2005). The official integrationist ideology of the nation, which asserts that citizenship is open equally to all who are prepared to embrace the ideals of the nation, has been forced to confront a reality quite at odds with that ideal. The question becomes how the nation ought to proceed to combat exclusionary practices shaped by racism. At this writing, the French government insists that anything that smacks of affirmative action is out of bounds. Whether or not the French political establishment — left and right — can continue to avoid confronting the disjunction between ideals and reality by resisting state intervention to insure equal opportunity remains an open question. In this regard, France is not alone. Both nations with affirmative action programs and those that have resisted them will confront demands from the excluded and marginalized to be incorporated into the society as full and equal partners. This constitutes one of the enduring fault lines of all these societies.

In this regard, as the second half of the chapter on inclusion indicates, a major challenge to existing policies arises from debates about what is construed to be the most appropriate mode of incorporation of excluded minorities, including immigrants, indigenous peoples, and ethnonationalist groups. Specifically, during the past three decades, the idea of multiculturalism as official state policy and/or as a practice emanating from a general sentiment that stresses the valorization of difference has become a major topic of dispute. Given the fact that multiculturalism means different things to different people and in different contexts, and that it can take different forms, we sought to clarify the terms of the debate. In so doing, we made use of the theoretical contributions to the topic offered by Alexander (2001) and Hartmann and Gerteis (2005). In summary, we concurred with their typologies, which in terms of actual state policies and
societal practices (as opposed to competing theories) can be seen as a divide between incorporation regimes opposed to multiculturalism - in their typology this is called assimilation - and varieties of multiculturalism. Hartmann and Gerteis identify two types of real-world multiculturalism: cosmopolitanism and interactive pluralism. We pointed to concrete cases that most closely illustrated these types. France is the clearest example of an assimilationist incorporation regime; Britain and the USA are instances of cosmopolitan multiculturalism; and Canada and Australia are examples of the interactive pluralist version of multiculturalism.

Multiculturalism remains highly contested, with significant challenges arising in some nations that have embraced multicultural policies and/or practices. Thus, after the murders of the populist politician Pym Fortuny and the controversial filmmaker Theo Van Gogh in the Netherlands, and the series of bombings on London public transportation on July 7, 2005, a growing chorus of commentators has declared multiculturalism to be a failure. This emanated not only from the nationalist right, but in many instances from the center left, as well. Assimilation was once again put forth as a preferable alternative to multiculturalism. However, in the immediate aftermath of the riots in France, assimilation quickly lost its luster.

In a discussion in the Open Democracy Forum, Tariq Modood (2003b) has offered a vigorous defense of multiculturalism. We concur with the general thrust of his argument; as our discussion in Chapter 2 was meant to indicate, if properly understood, multiculturalism serves a dual purpose: (1) by promoting a politics of recognition, it valorizes difference and as such recognizes heterogeneity as a characteristic feature of society that is to be embraced rather than overcome; and (2) it provides a vehicle for the incorporation or inclusion of individuals into full societal membership. It is our view that in the foreseeable future, the debates over multiculturalism will continue unabated, with some nations rejecting and others accepting it as a mode of incorporation. When societies persist in resisting multiculturalism in any form, they will reinforce a sense of marginality and exclusion on the part of minority group members. On the other hand, if societies are prepared to promote a politics of recognition, they will find themselves in a far more advantageous situation in their efforts to become more inclusive.

Erosion

However, a politics of recognition is in itself insufficient to create a democratic society wherein citizens qua citizens are equals. As we noted in Chapter 3, some on the democratic left, concurring with Nancy Fraser (1995), have voiced concern about the prospect that a politics of recognition has usurped a politics of redistribution. Put another way, the concern is that multiculturalism might be an essentially symbolic enterprise lacking any sustained attempts to overcome the inequalities generated by capitalist economies. If this is the case, citizenship ends up being devalued, and the significance attached to citizenship by T. H. Marshall (1964) and his progenitors is called into question.

The central focus of the Marshallian theory of citizenship is that there is a tension between the idea of democracy predicated on the equal status of citizenship and the inequalities created by capitalism. Marshall's thesis is that with the expansion of the rights associated with citizenship, particularly with the expansion of social rights during the twentieth century, it was possible to conceive of an historic compromise between contesting classes in capitalism. This is what he referred to as class abatement, a state in which the inequalities produced by an unfettered market are mitigated by government interventions that are designed to limit the range of inequality and to ensure that those who are most disadvantaged are offered programs and policies that are designed to achieve equal opportunity. This, in short, became the rationale underpinning the welfare state, providing the basis for the claim that as citizens people were capable of functioning as equals while simultaneously the circumscribed inequalities in other spheres of life were regarded as legitimate and did not undermine the promise of equality among citizens.

It is precisely this historic compromise that has come under attack by neoliberal policies, which constitute a frontal assault on the welfare state. The result is that as neoliberal regimes have come to power, social rights have eroded. The redistributive goals of the welfare state have been challenged, with varied levels of success depending on how expansive and institutionally embedded the welfare state was in the first place. Thus, in the USA, with its comparatively weaker and thinner system of welfare provision, the rollback of the welfare state has been more successful. On the other hand, in the social democratic nations of Scandinavia, the welfare states have managed to date to remain relatively intact. In those nations where neoliberalism has been most successful, the result has been a substantial increase in levels of inequality - again the USA is the key example - while the social democracies have managed to maintain their egalitarianism.

Thus, the politics of redistribution is being played out over debates concerning the proper role of the state in remedying the inequalities produced by capitalism. It is by no means clear what the future portends. On the one hand, as the vaguely left-of-center Blair government in Britain suggests, “modernization” needs to be furthered, meaning that the older notion of the welfare state that arose after World War II needs to be replaced in significant ways. Blair's social policies are intended to effect this transformation. Likewise, the election of Angela Merkel in Germany
suggests that even in this bastion of social democracy, neoliberal ideas are making deep inroads. On the other hand, it is not clear whether such policies have a limit in terms of what the electorate will permit. In the USA, Social Security has often been described as the “third rail” of American politics, which means that if one tampers with this New Deal program, it spells political death. While perhaps exaggerated, Ronald Reagan discovered that when he attempted to introduce “reforms” into Social Security, he was met with stiff opposition that forced him to climb down from his position. Two decades later, George W. Bush’s efforts to partially privatize Social Security by creating individual retirement accounts has generated intense opposition that to date has been successful in stymieing such efforts. This suggests that the neoliberal experiment may be forced to confront the demands of an electorate for a continuing role for the state in protecting citizens from the vicissitudes of the market and the exigencies of life (e.g., illness, accidents, natural disasters).

In this regard, it is our view that the politics of multiculturalism are far more connected to debates over the erosion of social rights than is often appreciated. Indeed, as the debate over affirmative action suggests, a politics of recognition amounts to little more than a symbolic gesture if it is not accompanied by policies designed to offer the marginalized, new citizens and long-standing second-class citizens alike the varied forms of capital necessary to create an equal opportunity society.

Withdrawal

The emphasis in our language above has been on politics. Both multiculturalism and the welfare state are the products of political decision making, which in representative democracies relies not only on the actions of elected officials, but also on the involvement of the citizenry. The third discourse discussed in this book revolves around a widely held belief that in recent decades there has been an appreciable disinclination on the part of growing sectors of the citizenry to become involved in political and civic life. While the focus of much of this discussion has been on the USA, as is evident in the work of Bellah and his colleagues (1985) and the recent influential debates over “bowling alone” initiated by Putnam (1995, 2000), it has been seen as applicable in varying degrees to all of the world’s liberal democracies.

As we indicated, part of the response to the withdrawal thesis is that it is overstated, that citizens today are perhaps less involved than was true in the recent past, but the differences between past and present have been overstated by Putnam and like-minded scholars (e.g., Skocpol 2003). This, for example, is the argument Turner (2001) makes, and moreover an argument that receives some confirmation in the comparative project edited by Putnam (2002). That being said, nobody appears prepared to argue that withdrawal has not occurred. The debate is primarily about the extent to which withdrawal has occurred. We are prepared to agree with Turner’s general assessment. If one avoids romanticizing the past, as is Putnam’s tendency, it can be argued that the problem with both past and present is that the opportunities for genuine engagement by the citizenry have been stymied by elites who benefit from a paucity of democratic involvement. To his credit, this appears to be something Giddens is aware of and it explains his call for the expansion and deepening of democratic participation.

In our discussion, the primary concern was with the explanations that have been proposed to account for why withdrawal is taking place. Specifically, we questioned Putnam’s claim that the primary culprits are television and generational succession, arguing that his work is part of a tradition of social criticism that refuses to link what have been identified as social problems to the shifting nature of capitalist industrial society (this is a tendency evident in Bellah et al.’s work as well). Instead of accepting Putnam’s description of capitalism as essentially static, we suggested that it ought to be viewed as having taken various forms throughout its fateful history. Indeed, as we pointed out, the rise of neoliberalism occurred during a period of capitalist restructuring that commenced in the 1960s and began to be felt in significant ways in the following decade. The widespread deindustrialization of the historic centers of capitalist industrial society – Manchester, Detroit, Lyon, the Ruhr Valley – during the heyday of manufacturing signaled the erosion of the power of the working class, especially through their chief instrument of political will, labor unions.

Michael Moore spotlighted the fate of Flint, Michigan, the birthplace of General Motors, in his documentary film Roger and Me. The experience of deindustrialization in that city can be seen as a synecdoche for manufacturing centers in general. Flint’s history was intimately connected to the American automotive industry, and when GM slashed its American-based workforce, the city quickly entered a period of social decline. Unemployment, of course, rose dramatically. With it, myriad social problems increased, while the local resources to tackle those problems declined. As Steven Durlauf’s (1996) analysis of responses to the crisis revealed, nothing worked. Those who sought to return to the status quo ante, to the so-called “golden age” of the post-World War II decades (Michael Moore included), were engaged in romantic wishful thinking. Militant unionists found themselves as powerless as their mainstream union counterparts who hoped to negotiate with the corporation in order to salvage as many jobs as possible. Both militant and mainstream unions were incapable of challenging what had become a multinational corporation with more
employees residing outside of the USA than inside. More utopian visions of freeing workers from the necessity of alienating work—reflected, for example, in the program advanced by University of Michigan philosopher Frithjof Bergmann—were similarly unsuccessful in gaining a voice in determining the economic future of the city. The boosterism of local middle-class civic leaders, seeking, for example, to make Flint a tourist destination, also failed.

It is not surprising that, in such a context, a growing feeling of powerlessness would be felt by Flint’s citizens, the poor and working class first, but the rest of the community as well. What would become clear to many was that Flint’s future was not going to be determined locally or even nationally. Instead, the city was enmeshed in an increasingly globalized economy that pitted workers rooted in particular places against footloose corporations that have become part of the transnational capitalist class (Sklair 2001). The consequence was that the rules of the game that had defined the inherent conflicts between capital and labor during the era of the historic compromise no longer pertained. The erosion of the working classes’ political voice can go some way in explaining withdrawal from civic and political involvement. To the extent that a similar sense of political alienation penetrates the middle classes, a similar withdrawal could be expected.

While this takes us beyond Flint, the phenomenon known as corporate downsizing has increasingly placed white-collar professionals in a parallel situation to that which their working-class counterparts have confronted. The new corporate model is one in which employers no longer guarantee job security to their professional employees, who, therefore, can no longer assume that corporations will operate with a norm of reciprocity that is defined in terms of long-term expectations of mutual obligations. Insofar as this is the case, vulnerable sectors of the middle class, too, can come to view the world as increasingly beyond their control; the situation can go far to explain why increasing insecurity within the middle class might result in a tendency to withdraw from civic and political engagements.

**Citizenship and Globalization**

Chapter 5 was devoted to new modes of citizenship that have in various ways called into question the assumption that citizenship is a mode of identity and belonging that is linked solely to the nation-state. While we do not doubt that the nation-state remains the most significant institution with the power to decide who is and who is not considered to be a member of a polity, and which defines rights and obligations, we have attempted to indicate that its historic monopoly is being challenged. Much of our effort was devoted to describing the two forms that this challenge has taken: (1) the dramatic expansion of dual (or multiple) citizenship; and (2) the European Union’s project of nested citizenship.

Dual or multiple citizens do not question the legitimacy of states defining membership except insofar as that process of defining contends that an individual can be a member of one, and only one, state. Such a goal has never been achieved by any nation-state, due to the complex interplay of competing citizenship regimes. Many people were dual citizens by default. However, in recent years, with the expansion of transnational ties (Portes 1996; Faist 2000b; Kivisto 2001; Levitt 2003), where immigrants live with one foot in their homeland and one foot in the host society, and in the process create an ethnic community that transcends national boundaries, immigrants themselves have resisted efforts to force a severing of past ties as a prerequisite for achieving membership in a new polity. Moreover, nations of emigration have found that it is often in their own interest to permit their departing citizens to retain homeland membership even when naturalizing elsewhere. The result is that the number of individuals with dual or multiple citizenships has increased dramatically and we can reasonably assume that this trend will continue into the indefinite future.

The nested citizenship created by the European Union was depicted as a unique cosmopolitan experiment in which the national sovereignties of the EU’s constituent states are not lost, but rather are reconfigured. Citizens remain members of distinct nations, but at the same time they share a common identity as citizens of Europe. Particularly with the expansion of the EU to the east, and the possible inclusion of Turkey, the EU has used the leverage it has to require that member states promote human rights in accordance with the Declaration of Human Rights. Thus, member states are expected to abolish the death penalty, to prohibit torture, and in other ways to ensure that human rights are respected. At the same time, member states are expected to abide by the rule of law and in the process to weed out corruption. On the other hand, as critics often point out, the EU is a highly bureaucratic institution that appears to be quite distant from the lives of ordinary Europeans. This is the current challenge confronting the institution as it nears its half-century mark, a challenge that calls for becoming more democratically responsive to its members. While we do not think that a similar organization is likely to emerge elsewhere in the world, the EU’s impact is felt well beyond its borders.

Turning to the issues that preoccupied us in Chapters 2, 3, and 4, which we described in terms of the internal dynamics of particular nations, it is clear to us that the factors shaping inclusion—the debates over multiculturalism, erosion, and withdrawal—are all increasingly being influenced by global factors. Multiculturalism, for example, is being shaped by transnationalism, with its border-transgressing features. The erosion of rights—
particularly social rights — that has been the hallmark of neoliberalism must be seen in terms of deindustrialization and the global restructuring of capitalism. Labor unions are discovering this fact. Whereas the union movement in the advanced industrial nations once sought to combat job losses by pressing for protectionist policies and by restricting immigration, now the futility of such efforts is becoming increasingly apparent. Thus, unions have come to recognize that their futures are tied to the unionization of workers in the nations of the South and to the promotion of decent wages and living standards for workers in those developing economies. Moreover, rather than restricting immigration, they have come to see immigrants as potential recruits to the union movement.

Likewise, the issue that we defined as withdrawal should be seen in terms of the impact of forces that transcend national borders. Put another way, one reason for explaining the withdrawal from civic and political involvements at the local and national level is that people increasingly feel that their ability to possess a genuine voice in decision making is constricted. Part of the reason for this feeling is that the decisions with the greatest impact on their lives can no longer be addressed satisfactorily simply at the level of the nation-state. In this regard, Derek Heater (2002: 24) provocatively points to the novelty of the present moment when he writes that, “there is mounting evidence that [the nation-state] cannot perform all of the functions it has accumulated since the seventeenth century; the Westphalian system is crumbling. If the state is not guaranteeing its citizens’ rights, perhaps it also has not the strength to resist attempts to supplement its duties.”

To the extent that he is right, what does this point to? If citizenship is to retain the salience accorded to it in varied ways by liberal, republican, and communitarian theorists, democracy needs to be deepened and strengthened in the existing liberal democracies, while at the same time democracy must expand beyond the boundaries of these discrete nations, penetrating into societies which heretofore have had no historical experience of democratic rule. We are at the cusp of a new era wherein the nation-state will no longer be the sole arbiter of defining the meaning of citizenship. What that world will look like will depend on the political will of those committed to self-rule and the outcome of their interaction with powerful opponents.

References