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Primordialist and constructivist authors have debated the nature of ethnicity “as such” and therefore failed to explain why its characteristics vary so dramatically across cases, displaying different degrees of social closure, political salience, cultural distinctiveness, and historical stability. The author introduces a multilevel process theory to understand how these characteristics are generated and transformed over time. The theory assumes that ethnic boundaries are the outcome of the classificatory struggles and negotiations between actors situated in a social field. Three characteristics of a field—the institutional order, distribution of power, and political networks—determine which actors will adopt which strategy of ethnic boundary making. The author then discusses the conditions under which these negotiations will lead to a shared understanding of the location and meaning of boundaries. The nature of this consensus explains the particular characteristics of an ethnic boundary. A final section identifies endogenous and exogenous mechanisms of change.

TOWARD A COMPARATIVE SOCIOLOGY OF ETHNIC BOUNDARIES

Beyond Constructivism

The comparative study of ethnicity rests firmly on the ground established by Fredrik Barth (1969b) in his well-known introduction to a collection...
of ethnographic case studies. Barth broke away from the Herderian canon in anthropology, according to which each ethnic group represented a historically grown, uniquely shaped flower in the garden of human cultures. Instead of studying each of these cultures in a separate ethnography, Barth and his collaborators observed how the boundaries between two ethnic groups are maintained, even though their cultures might be indistinguishable and even though individuals and groups might switch from one side of the boundary to the other. Barth’s approach to ethnicity thus no longer resembled an exercise in Linnean taxonomy but in social ecology.

Barth pioneered what later became known as “constructivism”: the claim that ethnicity is the product of a social process rather than a cultural given, made and remade rather than taken for granted, chosen depending on circumstances rather than ascribed through birth. In the following two decades, prolonged battles emerged between devotees of this constructivist perspective and adherents to older views that were more in line with Herderian notions of the binding power of ethnicity and culture. This debate has often been framed in dichotomous terms: “primordialism,” which underlined that ethnic membership was acquired through birth and thus represented a “given” characteristic of the social world, was pitted against “instrumentalism,” which maintained that individuals choose between various identities according to self-interest. “Essentialism” was opposed to “situationalism,” the former privileging the transcontextual stability provided by ethnic cultures while the latter showed how individuals identify with different ethnic categories depending on the logic of the situation. “Modernists” attributed the salience of ethnicity to the rise of the modern nation-state, while “perennialists” insisted that ethnicity represented one of the most stable principles of social organization in human history. Scholars who insisted on the subjectively felt reality and deeply rooted character of ethnic “identity” argued against those for whom ethnic distinctions were primarily driven by the changing “interests” of individual or collective actors.

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3 These binary oppositions appeared in various constellations and combinations. In the eyes of some, they aligned along a grand battle line separating constructivist-instrumentalist-circumstantialist-interest approaches from the essentialist-primordial-
This article attempts to transcend these debates. I argue that the empirical and analytical questions that they raise cannot be solved by definitional ontology—by trying to find out what ethnicity “really is.” The past decades have produced an impressive variety of case studies in which we find examples that fit—and contradict—any of the positions summarized above, as will be shown in the following section. The definitional debates may have diverted our efforts away from understanding why ethnicity appears in such variable forms. While there is a substantial body of work illustrating the contrasting properties of ethnic, national, or racial boundaries across usually two or three examples, little has been done to explain the entire range of empirically documented variation through comparative theory building and research. This article is certainly not a successful execution of this task; rather, it is intended as a substantial beginning and as an invitation to other scholars to further advance this agenda.

The article makes a twofold contribution to this project. First, it offers a systematic description of the wide variety of ethnic constellations that empirical research has brought to light and shows that none of the existing comparative hypotheses suffices to make sense of these differences. Four principal dimensions of variation are identified: different degrees of political salience of ethnic boundaries, of social closure and exclusion along ethnic lines, of cultural differentiation between groups, and of stability over time.

Second, I outline an analytically more sophisticated and empirically more promising theory designed to explain why the process of ethnic group formation produces such different outcomes. The model leads from the macrostructural level to the agency of individuals and aggregates their actions back to the macrostructural level. It thus represents a dynamic

4 During the 1980s, various attempts were made at reconciling these positions and arriving at a theoretical synthesis (McKay 1982; Bentley 1987; Keyes 1981; G. Scott 1990; Nagata 1981). The mainstream debate, however, continued to oscillate between the various pairs of oppositions. By the end of the 1990s, constructivism had gained the upper hand over essentialism, instrumentalism over primordialism, and circumstantialism over perennialism. Contrary positions are still expressed today and with much more sophistication than in decades before (see Roosens 1994; Hirschfeld 1996; Gil-White 1999, 2001) but seem to be no longer in control of mainstream discourse. Routine references to the “constructed,” “changing,” and “power-driven” character of ethnicity that one finds in today’s literature illustrate the contemporary hegemony of constructivism. Primordialism, essentialism, and perennialism have, however, survived in unacknowledged form in some ethnic studies departments and in migration studies (Wimmer, 2007) as well as in conflict research (Brubaker 2004).
process theory focused on how social forms are generated and transformed over time. In a nutshell, the model explains the varying features of ethnic boundaries as the result of the negotiations between actors whose strategies are shaped by the characteristics of the social field. It proceeds through four steps, each corresponding to a separate section.

In a preliminary step, I provide an inventory of possible strategies of ethnic boundary making that individual and collective actors might pursue. In a second step, I discuss three characteristics of social fields that explain which actors will pursue which strategies (the macrostructural level): (1) the institutional framework determines which types of boundaries—ethnic, social class, gender, villages, or others—can be drawn in a meaningful and acceptable way in a particular social field; (2) the position in a hierarchy of power defines the interests according to which actors choose between different possible levels of ethnic differentiation; (3) who exactly will be included in the actor’s own ethnic category depends on the structure of her political alliances. In the third step, I explain how the ensuing classificatory and political struggles between actors advocating different ethnic categories may lead to a more or less encompassing consensus over the topography, character, and rightful consequences of boundaries (the agency level). Finally, it is shown that the nature of this consensus explains the characteristics of ethnic boundaries: their varying degrees of political salience, social closure, cultural differentiation, and historical stability (leading back to the structural level).

This multilevel process model of ethnic boundary making represents, to the best of my knowledge, the first attempt at systematically explaining the varying character and consequences of ethnic boundaries. It thus goes beyond the dominant approaches in comparative ethnicity that either try to get at the nature of the ethnic phenomenon “as such,” develop static typologies of different ethnic configurations, or outline in broad strokes the world historical forces that have given ethnic, racial, or national divisions their current significance.

Defining the Field

Following the tradition established by Max Weber ([1922] 1985, p. 237), I define ethnicity as a subjectively felt sense of belonging based on the belief in shared culture and common ancestry. This belief refers to cultural practices perceived as “typical” for the community, to myths of a common historical origin, or to phenotypical similarities (see Weber 1978, pp. 385–98; Schermerhorn 1970; Erikson 1993; Jenkins 1997; Cornell and Hartman 1998). In this broad understanding of ethnicity, “race” is treated
as a subtype of ethnicity; as is nationhood: if phenotypical features are used as indicators of group membership, we speak of ethnosomatic groups; if members of an ethnic community have developed nationalist aspirations and demand (or control) a state of their own, we describe such categories and groups as nations (Jenkins 1997, chap. 6; Weber 1978, pp. 921–26; Smith 1986). Further subtypes of ethnicity can be distinguished depending on the type of markers that are used to substantiate the belief in shared culture and ancestry, most importantly ethnoreligious, ethnoregional, and ethnolinguistic categories and groups.

Subsuming “race” under “ethnicity” runs against the folk use of these terms in the United States. “Race” is associated with African-Americans, while “ethnicity” commonly refers to the less consequential distinctions among the dominant “white” group based on different European countries of origin. From W. Lloyd Warner’s “Yankee City” studies onward (Sollors 1986, pp. 21–23), mainstream American sociology treated “race” and “ethnicity” as phenomena of a different order (see van den Berghe 1991; Feagin and Feagin 1993; Omi and Winant 1994; Bonilla-Silva 1999; Cornell and Hartman 1998), reflecting the dramatically different fate that the descendants of African slaves and European immigrants experienced over the past two centuries. While using a terminology that contradicts domestic common sense is inconvenient, adopting this common sense for comparative purposes would be even more problematic (see Loveman 1997; Kivisto 2003).

First, treating race as fundamentally different from ethnicity overlooks the fact that one and the same group of individuals might be treated as a race at one point in history and as another type of ethnic category at another: in the 16th and 17th centuries, African slaves in the United States were primarily defined as pagans, and their English masters as Christians. Only after about 1680 was this ethnoreligious distinction gradually replaced by the ethnosomatic differentiation between “white” and “Negro” (Jordan 1968). Second, phenotypical differences are often evoked as one among other markers of ethnic distinction, as the racialization of ethnicity in Rwanda and Burundi and many other contexts with a history of ethnic violence shows. Third, distinguishing between race as fixed, imposed, and exclusionary, on the one hand, and ethnicity as fluid, self-ascribed, and voluntary, on the other hand, would not do justice to constellations (such as among Serbs in Kosovo, Albanians in Serbia) where ethnic groups experience degrees of forced segregation, exclusion, and domination usually associated with race. Thus, there is no clear-cut line between eth-

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1 The list of authors who define race as a special case of ethnicity includes Gordon (1964); Wallman (1986, p. 229); Sollors (1991, chap. 1); Anthias (1992); Loveman (1997); Patterson (1997, p. 173); Nagel (2003, chap. 2); and Banton (2003).
nosomatic and other types of ethnicity that would justify establishing entirely separate objects of analysis to be addressed with different analytical tools.

Perhaps it is useful to briefly address the political worries that seem to motivate opponents of an encompassing definition in the United States. They argue that subsuming race as a particular form of ethnicity is part of a sinister neoconservative agenda (Omi and Winant 1994, chap. 1) meant to negate the role that racist ideologies have played in the colonization of the world and to deny that racial exclusion might be relevant in contemporary U.S. society and beyond (Bonilla-Silva 1999, p. 899; Winant 2000, p. 179). However, an encompassing definition does not imply that race no longer matters in the United States. Quite to the contrary, it allows one to see *how much* it matters by situating the U.S. case in a comparative horizon. Within that horizon, we will find societies with phenotypical variation among the population but without racialized groups (Sanjek 1996, p. 5–6; Horowitz 1971), societies without phenotypical variation but racially defined groups in stark opposition to each other,6 and nonracialized systems of ethnic differentiation that are as exclusionary as race is in the United States. An encompassing definition not only allows us to situate the U.S. experience better but also prevents us from misinterpreting the specific ethnosomatic order of this particular society as a universal form of social organization and then projecting this form onto other societies across the globe (see the *philippica* of Bourdieu and Wacquant [1999]; Bonnett 2006).

Having defended my definition of ethnicity, I will elaborate briefly on the notion of boundary used in this article. A *boundary displays both a categorical and a social or behavioral dimension*. The former refers to acts of social classification and collective representation; the latter to everyday networks of relationships that result from individual acts of connecting and distancing. On the individual level, the categorical and the behavioral aspects appear as two cognitive schemes. One divides the social world into social groups—into “us” and “them”—and the other offers scripts of action—how to relate to individuals classified as “us” and “them” under given circumstances. Only when the two schemes coincide, when *ways of seeing the world correspond to ways of acting in the world, shall I speak of a social boundary*.7

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6 See the distinction between “red humans” and “white humans” among the Rendille described by Schlee (2006, p. 82).

7 The best discussion of the relationship between the two dimensions of ethnicity is still Mitchell (1974); with regard to the boundary concept in general, see Lamont (1992, chap. 1). An example of a categorical distinction with few behavioral consequences is the sharp moral boundary most contemporary Americans draw against atheists (Edgell, Gertels, and Hartman 2006).
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A further clarification might be necessary in order to avoid a potential misunderstanding. The concept of boundary does not necessarily imply that the world is composed of sharply bounded groups. As I will show below, ethnic distinctions may be fuzzy and boundaries soft, with unclear demarcations and few social consequences, allowing individuals to maintain membership in several categories or switch identities situationally. The concept of boundary does not imply closure and clarity, which vary in degree from one society, social situation, or institutional context to another. It represents one of the foremost tasks of the comparative study of ethnicity to account for such varying degrees of boundedness.

FOUR DIMENSIONS OF VARIATION
The past decades of research have produced hundreds of ethnographic studies, contrasting case comparisons, and historiographies of ethnic groups and boundaries. Seen together, they offer a breathtaking panorama on a variety of ethnic forms. Here, I review and organize this literature by outlining four dimensions of variation along which an individual case could be situated. Each will bring to light different empirical and analytical challenges that the comparative study of ethnicity has so far failed to address in a systematic way.

The Political Salience of Boundaries
The first challenge is to understand why some ethnic boundaries are politically salient while others are not. When boundaries are salient, political alliances are more likely to be formed between coethnics than between individuals on opposite sides of a boundary. In Switzerland, for example, not a single political party, trade union, or major civil society organization is organized on the basis of language (Wimmer 2002, chap. 8). In Northern Ireland, by contrast, politics is conceived as a matter of ethnoreligious power relations, and political loyalties rarely cross the ethnoreligious divide. How are we to explain comparatively such varying degrees of political salience?

This question is relevant not only from a comparative perspective but also from a case study point of view because many systems of ethnic classification are of a multilevel character: they comprise several nested segments of differentiation—in contrast, for example, to gender classifi-

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8 For other attempts at laying out the dimensions of variability in ethnic forms, see Horowitz (1971); Cohen (1981); Shibutani and Kwan (1965, pp. 48–51). Arthur Stinchcombe (2006) recently described general forms of variation in the features of social boundaries.
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cations or ranked social estates—all of which might become the main focus of political loyalty. The following example illustrates this widespread feature of ethnicity. A Southern Californian may identify as Blue Hmong as opposed to White Hmong, as Hmong in opposition to other persons of Vietnamese origin, as Vietnamese in contrast to other Asian nationalities, as Asian-American in opposition to African-Americans and Euro-Americans, or as American from a global perspective. Which of these potential lines of cleavage will be politically relevant, and which ones will not?

Several attempts have been made to address the salience question. The “situationalist” approach, developed by anthropologists working in complex, “plural” societies (Okamura 1981, but see also Galaty 1982), offers a straightforward answer: the salience of the various levels of differentiation depends on the logic of the situation and the characteristics of the persons interacting. Thus, in the example above, a political activist will emphasize his Blue Hmong identity when struggling with White Hmongs over which group’s cultural heritage will be recognized by the Californian government. When traveling in Europe, he will be treated as and identify with “being” American and will have to defend the foreign policy of “his” government.

However, there are social forces beyond those emerging from specific social contexts that make certain levels of categorical distinction more important than others for a person’s overall life chances. Whatever the situational relevance of a Blue-White Hmong boundary, a person’s assignment to the racialized category of “Asian” will be more important for college officers when they decide whom to admit to their programs or for political entrepreneurs who design electoral strategies—even if his personal identity may situationally be defined in other terms (Kibria 2002, chap. 3). Following Despres (1975) and others in the pluralist school, we may thus want to identify those categorical cleavages that are the most consequential and salient for the overall structuring of political relations in a society. The framework outlined in later sections will identify these social forces— institutions, power, and networks—that are most likely to produce such effects of “structuration,” to borrow Anthony Gidden’s term.

A second approach derives the salience of ethnic categories from the dynamics of economic competition. Ethnic boundaries that correspond to groups in competition on the labor market will be politically more relevant.

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9 For a discussion of this aspect of ethnicity, see Moerman (1965); Keyes (1976); Okamura (1981); Galaty (1982); Jenkins (1997); Brubaker (2004, chap. 2); Waters (1990, pp. 52–58).

10 Compare also the “contextualist” arguments in Cornell and Hartman (1998, chap. 6); Jenkins (1997, pp. 63–70).
than those that cut across lines of economic interest. This solution to the salience problem is at the core of the only genuinely comparative tradition in the field of ethnic studies, stretching from Abner Cohen’s work in the 1970s to Amy Chua’s recent best-seller (see Cohen 1974; Patterson 1975; Banton 1983; Bonacich 1974; O’Sullivan 1986; Olzak and Nagel 1986; Chua 2004; Chai 1996, 2005). Competition theory indeed helps to understand the situation of trading minorities for which ethnic networks represent a considerable advantage in the provision of cheap credit and labor (see Landa 1981; Ward and Jenkins 1984; Boissevain et al. 1990; Wintrobe 1995). The broader claims, however, proved to be problematic. The economic structures of labor markets are poor predictors of where the most salient fault lines in the ethnic landscape come to lie, as the following two examples illustrate.

Olzak (1993) studied U.S. cities during the high tide of immigration before World War I, to confirm the competition argument. However, increasing job segregation and reduced competition between African-American immigrants from the South and the established labor force did not decrease the salience of the black-white boundary. Quite to the contrary, most of the violence was directed against black migrants rather than those from Europe (Lieberson 1980), even though it was the latter who increasingly competed for the same jobs as local Euro-Americans. A recent study by Dina Okamoto (2003) also finds results that directly contradict the predictions of competition theory: higher degrees of occupational segregation between Asian-Americans and others increases the likelihood of pan-Asian mobilization, while more competition decreases such mobilization.

It seems that economic competition theory does not help to understand who is seen as a legitimate competitor and who is not. The dynamic of ethnic boundary formation follows a political logic that cannot be derived in any straightforward way from economic incentive structures. More often than not, the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate competitors in the economic field maps onto that between national majority and minority—a thesis to which I will return.

A third answer to the problem of salience is provided by scholars who believe that the visibility of ethnic markers determines which cleavage will be the most relevant for social interactions and political life. Various authors (Hale 2004; van den Berghe 1997) have maintained that differ-

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11 For more extensive empirical critiques of the competition argument, see Horowitz (1985, pp. 105–35) regarding the trading minority model and Bélanger and Pinard (1991) and Wimmer (2000) regarding labor market competition theory.

12 This point has been made by Bélanger and Pinard (1991) and by Espiritu (1992, chap. 1).
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ences in physical appearance are more likely to be used to draw boundaries because they are easy to recognize and thus cognitively economical. According to another group of authors, racialized boundaries originated in colonial conquest, slavery, and postemancipation segregation and thus will be more politically salient than the less exclusionary boundaries between ethnic groups (Isaac 1967; Omi and Winant 1994; Bonilla-Silva 1996; Cornell and Hartman 1998). This is certainly a reasonable assessment of the contemporary situation in the United States—but it proves to be difficult to generalize once we enlarge the horizon both historically and cross-nationally.13

In the history of American ethnic and race relations, groups such as Jews (Saks 1994), Irish (Ignatiev 1995), and Italians (Guglielmo 2003) that were once considered to be phenotypically ambivalent and probably even belonging to other “races” are now considered “white” ethnics. The perception of racial difference and associated practices of racial discrimination seem to shift over time and do not depend on “objective” phenotypical appearance alone. In other plantation societies of the New World that do not know the American “one drop rule,” the location of boundaries on the somatic continuum varies even more. In Puerto Rico, the definition of “white” expanded considerably over time to include individuals of “mixed” background previously considered “colored” (Loveman and Muniz 2006). In Brazil, the classification of similar-looking individuals into ethnosophistic types varies according to a number of contextual factors (Sansone 2003, chap. 1). In Colombia, people with the same somatic features might be “black” in one region of the country (Wade 1995) but not in another (Streicker 1995). The difficulties of deriving the salience of boundaries from “racial” differences appear even more clearly if we compare across societies. As Hoetink noticed some time ago, “one and the same person may be considered white in the Dominican Republic or Puerto Rico, . . . ‘coloured’ in Jamaica, Martinique or Curacão . . . [and] may be called a ‘Negro’ in Georgia” (Hoetink 1967, p. xii).

Social Closure and “Groupness”

A second challenge is to understand which ethnic boundaries are relevant for the structures of social networks and the access to resources that they enable. Some ethnic groups have firmly closed themselves off against outsiders. In other cases, relationships flow easily across ethnic boundaries. Sometimes, ethnic boundaries are associated with high levels of discrimination and exclusion; sometimes they do not matter for hiring and firing, marrying and divorcing, befriending and feuding. What is the best way

Richard Jenkins (1994) proposes to distinguish between an ethnic category, which may be entirely imposed by powerful outsiders and is associated with high degrees of discrimination and exclusion, and an “ethnic group” based on self-identification and a shared sense of belonging.°

However, the distinction between group and category is not one of principle, as Jenkins notices, because imposed categories may over time be accepted as a category of self-identification and thus transformed into a group. The black-white divide in U.S. society, to give an example, has been reproduced despite immigration from countries where other modes of classification prevail. Second-generation immigrants from Cape Verde (Ito Adler), Haiti (Woldemikael 1989), and working-class children of West Indian immigrants living in innercity neighborhoods (Waters 1999) come to identify with the imposed category of “black”—while their parents still vehemently emphasized their national identity in order to counter the stigma of “blackness.”

If ethnicity can be both a category—imposed by outsiders—and a group—embraced by its members—a dichotomous distinction obviously looses its value. We might want to replace it with a continuous variable. A good starting point is Max Weber’s discussion of ethnic group formation as a process of social closure (cf. Loveman 1997). High degrees of closure imply that a boundary cannot be easily crossed and that it is consequential for everyday life because it denies access to the resources that have been monopolized by the dominant group.° Social closure does not occur exclusively in such hierarchical relationships, however, but may be of a more symmetric nature, as when Indian peasant villages in Mexico each control their own piece of communal land and deny access to outsiders (Wolf 1957). To be sure, social closure is not a universal feature of ethnic

On the distinction between group and category (i.e., individuals sharing an ethnic trait), see also McKay and Lewis (1978). A Nepalese example nicely illustrates what Jenkins means by ethnic category: “The majority of Rajopadhyaya Brahmans of the Katmandu valley,” Gellner writes, “do not today see themselves as Newars, do not call themselves Newars, do not speak Newar to their children, and to not support Newar ethnic activism. Yet they are seen as Newars by many others, an identification . . . which they themselves reject” (Gellner 2001, p. 6).

The mechanisms that lead to the “internalization” of imposed boundaries are well known from social psychology. Several studies have shown that low-status group members are more likely to identify with their own category when the boundaries are perceived as impermeable (Mummendey et al. 1999); another line of work demonstrates that high prejudice leads to more identification with one’s group as a first step of establishing a positive self-concept (Branscombe, Schmitt, and Hervey 1999).

In such contexts, the theory of “identity choice,” as developed by Patterson (1975), Lustick (2000), or Laitin (1995a), is of little help, because the choices by individuals placed in subordinate categories are much less consequential for their own lives than the ones made by more powerful actors.
group boundaries. The literature offers a range of ethnographic examples where no such closure has occurred and where permeable boundaries are of little consequence for access to resources.17 We are thus well advised to distinguish between different degrees of closure and to try to understand under which conditions these emerge.

Another dimension of variation follows from this. Depending on the degree of closure, ethnic boundaries may or may not separate “groups” in the sociological sense of the term, implying widely shared agreement on who belongs to which category, as well as some minimal degree of social cohesion and capacity for collective action. Ignoring this variability, many authors have fallen back into a “groupist” default language, to use Rogers Brubaker’s term (Brubaker 2004). These authors assume, rather than demonstrate, that an ethnic category represents an actor with a single purpose and shared outlook.18 Such ontological collectivism overlooks, however, that ethnic categories may shift contextually and that there might be substantial disagreement among individuals over which ones are the most appropriate and relevant ethnic labels.19 The list of well-documented examples is quite long.20 In such contexts, we may well speak of “ethnicity without groups” (Brubaker 2004) or ethnicity without boundaries. Moerman’s description of the fluid, fuzzy, and overlapping modes

17 On the identity choice among white Americans, see Waters (1990); for the back and forth switching between Tatar and Bashktiar categories in Tatarstan, see Gorenburg (1999); for the change of self-identification in Latin America, see Lancester (1991) and Wade (1995).

18 See also the critique by Chai (1996).

19 For a recent example of “groupist” analysis, see Ross (2001).

20 Gorenburg (2000) reports that the identification with Tartar nationalism varies across occupational groups; Sanjek (1981) describes how individuals group tribal-ethnic categories in different ways in urban Ghana; according to Starr (1978), who did research in prewar Beirut, the classification of an individual depends on the context of interaction and the ethnic characteristics of the classifying person; Levine (1987) reports how different systems of ethnic and caste classifications in Nepal may be used in different contexts; Berreman (1972) arrived at similar findings regarding ethnic and caste classification in North India; Labelle (1987) shows that the use of ethnoracial labels in Haiti varied, among other things, by social class; in Nicaragua, it depends on how formal the situation of interaction is (Lancester 1991); Harris’s (1980, chap. 5) research in Brazil found widespread disagreement in the use of ethnoracial categories for the same persons and even different classifications for siblings; research by Landale and Oropesa (2002) highlights the varied strategies of self-identification of Puerto Ricans in the United States. To make things even more complex, some ethnographic studies have shown that even the self-classification by individuals may be context dependent and variable (e.g., Jiménez [2004] on contemporary Californians of Mexican and “white” parentage; Campbell, Lee, and Elliott [2002] on northeastern China under the Qings; Nagata [1974] on urban Malaysia; Mayer [1962] on rural migrants in urban South Africa; Waters [1990, pp. 36–38] on suburban white ethnics in the United States; Russell [1997] on the Yahka of East Nepal).
of ethnic classification in northern Thailand represents the locus classicus for this assertion (Moerman 1965).

I would like to note, again, that these examples represent one end of a continuum only. An equally diverse sample could be cited as support for the opposite proposition: that ethnic boundaries are drawn unambiguously, are relevant for many different domains of everyday life, are agreed upon by a vast majority of individuals, and form the basis for collective action and resource mobilization. In Gil-White’s example from Mongolia, there is little disagreement among his interviewees that a Mongol is a Mongol even if born from a Kazah mother and brought up among Kazahs (Gil-White 1999).21 Northern Ireland could be cited as another society where variation in the use of ethnoreligious categories is rather limited, the consequence of a long history of segregation, endogamy, and conflict (Ruane and Todd 1996).22 Various scholars have observed that classificatory variability and ambiguity are greatly reduced through violence and war (most explicitly, Smith [1981] and Appadurai [1998]). “Who are the Albanians?” to paraphrase the title of Moerman’s article, is maybe too easy a question to deserve an answer in present day Kosovo. Given this wide spectrum of variation, it is certainly useful to distinguish between various degrees of “groupness,” as Jenkins (1997, p. 50) put it, and to attempt to explain these comparatively.23

Cultural Differentiation

Contrary to Barth’s famed dictum that it is the boundary that matters in ethnic relations and not the “cultural stuff” they enclose (Barth 1969b, p. 15), a number of authors, including Barth (1994) himself some 30 years later, have noted that this stuff may indeed make a difference. In the landscape of cultural variation, to use a metaphor coined by Tim Ingold

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21 A similar argument centering around the notion of “participant’s primordialism” is offered by Roosens (1994). His example are first-generation Spanish immigrants in the Netherlands.

22 This does not preclude, obviously, a great deal of dissent over the meaning and political implications of those boundaries, as the Northern Ireland example illustrates. Ethnographic research shows that there is space for local negotiations over the implications of the religious divide in daily interactions (Harris 1972; Burton 1978). Individuals may blur one categorical dimension of the boundary (e.g., by associating with Catholics in a sports club), as long as they are straight on other dimensions (e.g., not dealing with anybody with open sympathies for the IRA).

23 Allowing for the existence of ethnic groups does not imply ontological collectivism: they might be thought of as aggregate consequences of individual-level processes and mechanisms (see the discussion in Wimmer [2007]; for a useful distinction between ontological and methodological collectivism/individualism, see Hedström [2005, pp. 70–74]).
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(1993), we may observe discontinuities and ruptures: a graben between tectonic plates, or an abrupt change in soil composition and vegetation, to push the geological metaphor. Ceteris paribus, we expect that ethnic boundaries will follow some of these more dramatic cultural ruptures, such as those brought about by long-distance migration or conquest.24 We would indeed be surprised if first-generation Chinese merchants in Jamaica would not see themselves and be perceived by Afro-Caribbeans as ethnically different—at least among the first generation of immigrants.25

If cultural difference and ethnic boundaries do coincide in this way, they can reinforce each other in a two-way process. Cultural differentiation may make a boundary appear quasi natural and self-evident, while social closure along ethnic lines may reinforce such differences through the invention of new cultural diacritics,26 such as when Chinese traders in Jamaica converted to Catholicism to set themselves apart from the rest of the population and stabilize the boundary (Patterson 1975).

However, this again only represents one end of a continuum. In other constellations, ethnic boundaries do not divide a population along obvious cultural lines but unite individuals who follow quite heterogeneous cultural practices. Examples include multilingual, multireligious national communities such as the Swiss who managed, to the bewilderment of observers such as Tocqueville, John Stuart Mill, Ernest Renan, Max Weber, and Karl Deutsch, to develop a strong sense of belonging and to draw sharp boundaries toward immigrants from neighboring countries (Wimmer 2002, chap. 8). Another example is the Maconde, who are perceived and perceive themselves as a distinct ethnic group despite vast cultural differences between migrants from Mozambique and town dwellers in Tanzania and despite the fact that they are divided into endogamous

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24 Max Weber saw migration and conquest as prime forces of ethnic group formation (Weber 1978, pp. 385–98; see also Keyes 1981). Schermerhorn (1970) adds the emergence of pariah groups and “indigenous isolates” in settler societies to the list of ethnicity generating dynamics.

25 See the novel on a Chinese trader in Jamaica by Powell (1998); on the Chinese in Mississippi, see Loewen (1971).

26 This argument has been made by different authors and in different analytical language. Bentley has used Bourdieu’s habitus theory to explain why cultural differences easily—yet not automatically—translate into perceptions of ethnic difference (Bentley 1987; cf. also Wimmer 1994). Cornell argues that if an ethnic group’s identity is primarily built around shared values, as opposed to shared interests, this culture may act as a “filter” for the perception of interests and thus influence the strategies of boundary maintenance (Cornell 1996; cf. Barth [1994]: the filter argument can also be found in Keyes [1981]). Hale takes a cognitive perspective and argues, in a neo-Deutschean mode, that communication barriers such as those represented by language differences will make it more likely that individuals find the boundary meaningful and will use the corresponding linguistic markers as clues to make cognitive sense of the social world and reduce uncertainty (Hale 2004).
castes (Saetersdal 1999). Finally, where ethnic boundaries originally did coincide with cultural difference, the boundary may nevertheless be blurred subsequently and eventually break down completely—such as among the Chinese in Guyana (Patterson 1975) or Cuba (Corbitt 1971) and countless other cases of assimilation.

Stability

A final challenge for the comparative understanding of ethnicity is that some groups and boundaries are tenacious and change only slowly, over the course of many generations, while in other contexts, substantial shifts in the ethnic landscape may occur during the lifespan of an individual. It seems that ethnic boundaries cannot always be redefined or changed ad libitum, as radically constructivist interpretations of Barth’s writings suggested. Following Katherine Verdery, we would be well advised to “situate the situationalims” of radical constructivism (Verdery 1994).

It seems that the degree of stability is linked to various modes of transmitting ethnic membership. The most stable boundaries are found among peoples who identify individuals through multigenerational, unilineal descent lines, such as among Mongols, Pathans, Jews (Gil-White 1999), and Germans. More unstable boundaries, one could argue, are those defined by behavioral, rather than genealogical, membership criteria. Among the Vezo of Madagascar, for example, one is considered “being Vezo” if one behaves like “a typical Vezo” and lives the lifestyle of “a Vezo,” independent of the ethnic background of one’s parents (Astuti 1995).

Whatever the correlates are of more or less stable boundaries, the con-

27 Other examples would include the Tat in Dagestan, which include Christian, Jewish, and Muslim sections; the Karen of Thailand and Burma, which comprise adherents of Protestantism, Catholicism, animist religions, Buddhism, and several syncretist religions (Keyes 1979); Kachin groups in northern Burma that speak Jinghpaw or Lisu (cf. Leach 1954), or the Hadiyya in Ethiopia which comprise Muslim, Protestant, and Catholic sections (Braukämper 2005).

29 This echoes the discussion of open vs. closed citizenship regimes, which allow for more or less easy naturalization of immigrants and thus more or less stable boundaries between nationals and foreigners. Access to citizenship is easier, it has been argued, when the nation is defined in terms of political behavior; national boundaries are more stable and impermeable, on the other hand, where membership is defined by ancestry (Brubaker 1992; Alba 2005).
The contrast between ethnic categories that perdured over thousands of years—the Jewish community being the most prominent example—and those that have been invented, adopted, and forgotten within a generation, such as the “Ciskeian nation” of the apartheid era (Anonymous 1989), is striking enough to ask for a comparative explanation.

Intellectual Genealogies

So far, I have shown that explaining different degrees of political salience, social closure, cultural differentiation, and historical stability represents a major challenge for the comparative sociology of ethnic group formation. I have also demonstrated that the existing literature offers little help in addressing this task. In what follows, I outline a theoretical framework that might represent a first step toward an analytically more sophisticated theory that allows one to explain the wide range of ethnic forms that the comparative literature has brought to light. The model draws inspiration from three research traditions.

1. The first goes back to Max Weber, who conceived ethnicity as a mode of drawing boundaries between individuals and thus creating social groups. This focus on group making stands in opposition to studies of “collective identity” in social psychology (cf. Le Vine and Campbell 1972, pt. 3; Scheff 1994) and of “group relations” in both sociology (Pettigrew 1980; Banton 1983) and social psychology (Dovidio, Glick, and Rudman 2005), which all take for granted that—rather than explain why—a society is divided along ethnic lines. The genealogy of this boundary and group-making approach leads from Weber to Fredrik Barth (1969a), Michele Lamont (2000), Mara Loveman (1997), Richard Alba (2005), Charles Tilly (2006), and other contemporary writers.

2. The second tradition is the study of ethnicity as the outcome of a political and symbolic struggle over the categorical divisions of society. This line of research was initiated by political anthropologists of the Manchester school such as Boissevain, Turner, and others, and later canonized and popularized by Pierre Bourdieu (1991). Today, it includes Bentley (1987), Loïc Wacquant (1997), Rogers Brubaker (2004), Wimmer (1994, 2004), and many others who rely on Bourdieu’s framework. Some anthropologists and historians work along similar lines but have adopted Antonio Gramsci’s concept of hegemony (Mallon 1995; Comaroff and Comaroff 1992; Omi and Winant 1994), to be discussed later on in this essay. Both the Bourdiesian and the Gramscian strands developed largely as a response to, and in opposition to, a range of other theories that continued the Herderian line of thinking in conceiving ethnicity as an identity based on the shared culture and values of a group.

3. The third intellectual source for this project is the emerging insti-
tionalist tradition in the study of ethnic politics. Institutions provide incentives for actors to draw certain types of boundaries—ethnic rather than class or gender, for example—and to emphasize certain levels of ethnic differentiation rather than others. While some have emphasized macropolitical institutional transformations, such as the shift from indirect to direct rule (Hechter 2004) or the spread of the nation-state form (Brubaker 1996; Meyer et al. 1997; Wimmer and Min 2006), others have looked at mesolevel and microlevel institutional mechanisms that lead actors to emphasize certain ethnic boundaries over others (Posner 2005; Koopmans et al. 2005). This institutionalist approach contrasts with various microsociological traditions that see ethnic boundaries as “emerging” from the minutiae of cognition, action, or interaction, variously conceived as conversational encounters (as in the ethnomethodologist tradition pursued by Day [1998]), performative enactments (Sharp and Boonzaier 1994), rational choices (e.g., Kuran 1998) or the cognitive processing of information (Fryer and Jackson 2003).

ELEMENTARY STRATEGIES OF ETHNIC BOUNDARY MAKING

This article draws these three traditions of research together and integrates them into a unified theoretical framework. It derives the topography and character of ethnic boundaries from the institutional structures, the network of alliances, the distribution of power, and the dynamics of representational politics that they shape. The model is presented in several steps. The first one, to be undertaken in this section, consists of taking stock of the various possible strategies of ethnic boundary making that may be pursued by different actors in different social contexts. Summarizing a diverse empirical literature, I distinguish between five types of such strategies:30 those that seek to establish a new boundary by expanding the range of people included; those that aim at reducing the range of the included by contracting boundaries; those that seek to change the meaning of an existing boundary by challenging the hierarchical ordering of ethnic categories; those that attempt crossing a boundary by changing one’s own categorical membership; those that aim to overcome ethnic boundaries by emphasizing other, crosscutting social cleavages through what I call

30 The typology has been inspired by Lamont and Bail’s work on destigmatization strategies (Lamont and Bail 2005); Zolberg and Woon’s (1999) distinction between boundary crossing, blurring, and shifting; and Donald Horowitz’s (1975) discussion of amalgamation, incorporation, division, and proliferation as strategies of categorical fusion and fission. In the sociopsychological literature on attitude change, a similar distinction between “de-categorization,” “common ingroup identity,” and “intergroup differentiation” is being made (Gonzalez and Brown 2003).
Ethnic Boundaries

strategies of boundary blurring. In the following paragraphs, I present
the bare bones of this typology, referring the reader to another article on
the subject for more details (Wimmer 2007).

Shifting Boundaries through Expansion

Actors may create a more encompassing boundary by grouping existing
categories into a new, expanded category. Examples from across the world
at different levels of aggregation and from various historical periods can
be found in the literature. Many modernizing empires have created, from
the 18th century onward, larger ethnic minorities out of smaller groups
in order to tighten and centralize the system of indirect rule over their
subjects. Similarly, colonial authorities grouped various previously in-
dependent tribes and other local communities into larger ethnic entities,
often by appointing chiefs or other representatives, as numerous works
in colonial historiography have shown. Not all such strategies of minority
making, it should be noted, have been successful in creating durable and
salient boundaries.

Other examples of ethnogenesis come from newly nationalizing states
after independence. Several of the ethnic categories that imperial admin-
istrations had created were further grouped into ethnoregional blocks by
politicians who attempted, with varying success, to establish a larger
political base in order to compete more successfully in the new national
political arena, as a whole tradition of research in political anthropology
has shown. Similarly, nationalizing states in the West have grouped var-
ious minorities into larger entities for the purpose of administration and—
some would say—hegemonic control.

Perhaps the most consequential form of boundary expansion in the
modern world is nation building: “making French” out of peasants, Prov-
ençales, and Normands; Brazilians out of whites, blacks, and browns;
Jamaican Creoles out of Afro-Caribbeans, Europeans, and Chinese; and
so forth. Not all such strategies, it should again be noted, have been
successful.

Shifting Boundaries through Contraction

The opposite strategy is to promote narrower boundaries than those al-
ready established in the social landscape. Ethnic localism may be an
especially attractive strategy for individuals and groups that do not have
access to the centers of communication and whose radius of action remains
confined to narrower geographic spaces. The indigenous groups of Mexico
provide a good example. Their social world was once defined by imperial
polities that had established wide areas of cultural commonality. After
conquest and the dismantlement of these empires and kingdoms, indigenous peasants started to draw an ethnic boundary separating their municipality, the new center of their political, social, and spiritual universe, from the rest of the world—a formidable symbolic weapon against the claims to exclusivity and cultural superiority that the Spanish-speaking elites made when distinguishing themselves as “gentes de razón” (people of reason) from the indigenous majority as “gentes naturales” (Wimmer 1995).

Another example of boundary contraction is the insistence, among middle-class, second-generation Chinese and Koreans in Los Angeles, that they should be referred to and treated as Chinese-Americans and Korean-Americans rather than lumped together under the term “Asian” (Kibria 2002)—similar to immigrants from the West Indies who fight for recognition as “Jamaicans” and “Trinidadians” in order to avoid being categorized as “black” (Waters 1999).

Inversion
In contrast to expansion and contraction, the strategy of normative inversion does not target the location of the boundary but the hierarchical ordering of ethnic groups. The category of the excluded and despised comes to designate a chosen people who are morally, physically, and culturally superior to the dominant group—the “Umwertung der Werte” (transvaluation) that Nietzsche so profoundly detested. Examples of normative inversion abound. The most widely known in the Western world is probably the cultural nationalism among African-Americans in the United States and the African nationalism in South Africa. To be sure, not all attempts at inversion were successful, and not all despised and dominated groups have developed such powerful political movements.

Repositioning
Repositioning describes a strategy in which the principles of hierarchy are not contested (as they are in normative inversion) nor are boundaries expanded or contracted. Rather, an actor seeks to change her own position within an existing hierarchical boundary system. Status change may be pursued individually or, much less often, by repositioning one’s entire ethnic category within a multitiered hierarchy. Assimilation and passing are the main strategies for individuals to “shift sides” and escape a minority stigma. Both can be found in an enormous variety of social contexts, including among contemporary immigrant minorities, Jewish converts in 19th-century Europe, Dalit groups embracing Islam in prewar India, Mexican Indians after the revolution, and Polish workers in prewar Germany.
The best example of collective repositioning is perhaps what anthropologists have called “caste climbing.” By adopting the lifestyle of the upper castes and strategically demanding certain jajmani services from members of other castes (a central feature of local caste systems), a group may slowly acquire a higher standing in the ritual hierarchy (Bailey 1969). Other examples are the Chinese of Mississippi who managed, although originally classified as nonwhite, to cross the caste boundary onto the other side (Loewen 1971).

Blurring Boundaries

Boundary blurring aims to overcome ethnicity as a principle of categorization and social organization altogether. Other, nonethnic principles are promoted in order to undermine the legitimacy of ethnic, national, or racial boundaries. Examples include such explicitly antinationalist organizations as the Communist International, radical Islamic movements that dream of the restoration of a supranational caliphate, some forms of transnational and transethnic feminism, as well as less organized, less politically salient forms of boundary blurring. Transethnic localism represents a good example for the latter, such as in Sophiatown in the 1950s, a township outside Johannesburg (Hannerz 1994). Africans, Jews, and immigrants had formed what they perceived as a cosmopolitan culture inspired by American Jazz, British fashion, and continental literary styles. They saw this urban lifestyle, at least in part, as a counterculture that would stand against the racial classification and segregation imposed by an emerging apartheid regime.

Emphasizing civilizational commonalities is another way to blur ethnic boundaries. Perhaps the most politically salient example is to underline membership in one of the world religions, especially Islam, Buddhism, or Christianity. Out of many possible cases, I may cite a recent study on British Pakistanis whose Muslim identity is more salient in daily life than the “Pakistani” category officially assigned to them by the state (Jacobson 1997). Similarly, Maghrebian immigrants in France emphasize their membership in the umma, rather than their national origin or immigrant status (Lamont, Morning, and Mooney 2002).

Even more encompassing boundaries are drawn when individuals pursue what Lamont has called “universalizing” strategies. Universal moral qualities and membership in “the human family” are often evoked, so it seems, by the most excluded and stigmatized groups, such as working-class African-Americans (Lamont 2000) or African immigrants in France (Lamont, Morning, and Mooney, 2002), or Muslim caste groups in Hyderabad (Ali 2002).
INSTITUTIONS, POWER, AND NETWORKS

Actors are obviously not free to choose whatever strategy they like best—whether to “invert” the normative hierarchy or simply cross the boundary into the dominant group. In this section, I discuss three types of constraints that all derive from the structures of the social field within which actors are situated. They are constrained, first, by the institutional environment that makes it appear more plausible and attractive to draw certain types of boundaries—ethnic, class, regional, gender, tribal, or others. Second, the distribution of power defines an individual’s interests and thus which level of ethnic differentiation will be considered most meaningful. Third, the network of political alliances will influence whom the boundaries will include and who will not be counted as “one of us.”

Institutions

Institutional frameworks specify the historical context within which the dynamics of ethnic boundary making unfolds. Much has been written about world historical trends that have shaped these contexts: the colonization of the non-Western world, the racialization of its populations (Balibar 1988), and at the same time its division into ethnic domains (Mamdani 1996); the role of forced labor and slavery in the making of the Americas and the various ethnosomatic constellations that it produced (Patterson 2005); and the spread of the nation-state in the postcolonial era and the ways in which this has transformed the dynamics of ethnic politics (Wimmer and Min 2006). The model to be outlined here treats these world historical developments as exogenous. It focuses on how particular types of political institutions—whatever the macrohistorical processes that led to their emergence and global spread—shape the strategies of ethnic boundary making that actors pursue.

More specifically, I focus on the peculiarities of the institution of the nation-state, which dominates contemporary politics across the globe. An analysis of the incentives that it provides for ethnic politics offers a crucial starting point to understand why much of contemporary politics is about drawing, maintaining, and shifting the boundaries of ethnicity, race, or nationhood. This argument draws upon a growing tradition of research that looks at the interplay between nation building and the making of ethnic minorities (Young 1976; Williams 1989; Verdery 1994; Wimmer 2002; Mann 2005).

While it would be exaggerating to maintain that empires or premodern territorial states were not at all interested in shaping and policing ethnic boundaries, the change from empire to nation-state provided new incentives for state elites to pursue strategies of ethnic—as opposed to other
types of—boundary making. On the one hand, the principle of ethnonational representativity of government—that like should rule over likes—became de rigueur for any legitimate state. It provided the main institutional incentives for state elites to systematically homogenize their subjects in cultural and ethnic terms, usually by expanding the boundaries of their own group and declaring their own ethnic background, culture, and language as forming the national pot into which everyone else should aspire to melt. On the other hand, the nation-state also needs to define its territorial boundaries in ethnic terms. The transethnic, universal principles of imperial rule—in the name of Allah, the spread of civilization, revolutionary progress—meant that the boundaries of a polity were never defined in ethnonational terms. In modern nation-states, however, only territories populated by the nation should be integrated into the polity. Defining the ethnic boundaries of the nation therefore is of central political importance, and state elites are encouraged to pursue the strategies of nation building and minority making outlined above.

The nation-state also provides institutional incentives for nonelites, especially political entrepreneurs among “ethnic minorities,” to emphasize ethnic rather than other social divisions. The principle of ethnonational representativity can be “turned on its head” by applying it to the minorities themselves. Minorities can thus be transformed, through a strategy of normative inversion, into “nations” (Wimmer 1993). Evoking the logic of ethnonational representativity, they can demand an independent state for their own group or at least fair representation within an existing state—to have the minority culture respected and honored in national museums, to have its language recognized as an official idiom to be taught in schools and universities, and so forth.

For the population at large, the nation-states also provides incentives to pursue ethnic boundary-making strategies: majority members might discriminate against minorities in the day-to-day interactions on the job, marriage, and housing markets and feel justified, if not encouraged, to do so because they have become dignified as representing “the people” of a particular state and thus entitled to a privileged seat in the social theater. They might enforce the boundary toward minorities or encourage boundary expansion by assimilating minority members into the national family. Minorities are encouraged to cross the boundary into the national majority and pursue strategies of passing and assimilation that will overcome the consequences of the new structure of exclusion and discrimination or, to the contrary, to divert the stigma associated with their minority status.

I explore the relation between the nation-state and politicization of ethnicity in greater detail in Nationalist Exclusion and Ethnic Conflicts (Wimmer 2002).
through boundary blurring, emphasizing the village, the continent, or humanity as the main focus of identity and source of human dignity.

The ethnic logic of the nation-state thus shapes the boundary-making strategies of many actors and comes to permeate many different social fields. The precise way in which the boundary between the nation and its various “others” are drawn varies substantially from society to society, as a large body of comparative research has shown (most recently Bail [in press]). The nature of this boundary then determines the kind of the claims that ethnic minorities make in the public domain. In Britain, the racialized boundaries of the nation are reflected in the ethnosomatic modes of self-identification by migrant organizations, while none of the migrant organizations in France portray their constituency as a “racial minority” but instead emphasize their status as politically and legally excluded. In the Netherlands, Germany, and Switzerland, national identities are more prevalent while “race” as an identifying marker is almost absent from the discursive repertoire of minority politics—conforming to the way the national majority defines its boundaries toward immigrant others (Koopmans et al. 2005, chap. 4).32 The task remains to explain how these varying definitions of the national boundary came into being—a topic to be addressed in the remainder of this section.

Before we proceed, however, two qualifications are in order. The above does not imply that the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion are drawn along ethnic or national lines in all institutional fields and in all situations (cf. Bommes 2004; Brubaker et al. 2007). In the emergency rooms of hospitals in the contemporary United States, to give an example, distinctions based on ethnicity, nationality, or race are considered inappropriate, while distinguishing between bodies with life-threatening and non-life-threatening injuries is part of the institutional routine. Outside emergency rooms, however, when it comes to the treatment of diseases that pose no threat to immediate survival, some hospitals may inquire about the legal status of Spanish-speaking immigrants (see, e.g., Preston 2006) or may give black patients less care than Anglo-American patients with similar health problems (Thomson 1997). It is a matter of empirical analysis to determine how far the ethnonational master scheme of modern society has penetrated these institutional domains in a particular case.

Second, other institutions also influence the dynamics of ethnic boundary making once modern nation-states have been established, producing further variation across cases. Democratization politicizes and deepens the boundary between national majority and ethnic minorities, as it provides additional incentives for politicians to appeal to the shared interest

32 For other research that shows how ethnic claims making depends on institutionalized opportunity structures, see Ireland (1994) and Okamoto (2006).
of “the people” and unravel the machinations of its ethnic enemies (for evidence, see Mansfield and Snyder [2005]). The shift from one-party regimes to democratic multiparty governments may also entail incentives to emphasize other levels of ethnic differentiation hitherto of little political significance (Posner 2005). Similar effects can be observed when the institution of federalism is introduced (see the Ethiopian case study by Braukämper [2005]).

Power

Thus, the institution of the nation-state provides strong incentives for elites and nonelites alike to emphasize ethnic rather than other types of boundaries, using the various strategies outlined above. But there are many different ways of drawing ethnic boundaries, because systems of ethnic classifications often entail various, segmentally nested levels of differentiation, as noted above. Which level of ethnic differentiation an individual will emphasize depends on her position in the hierarchies of power that the institutional order establishes. The effects of power are twofold.34

First, an actor will prefer that level of ethnic differentiation that is perceived to further her interests, given her endowment with economic, political, and symbolic resources. The best model to understand this process is the theory of frame selection offered by Hartmut Esser (Esser 2002; Kroneberg 2005). It describes how actors first choose a cognitive scheme appropriate to the institutional environment and conducive to their perceived interest and then the script of action most suitable to attain the goals defined by the scheme. Depending on information costs and the logic of the situation, both choices are made either in a fully conscious, reflexive mode of reasoning or in a semiautomated, spontaneous way. It should be underlined that in this model the perception of interests is not independent of the institutional environment and the cognitive frames that have already been routinized. I will discuss such path dependency effects later on in this article, focusing on the types of boundaries that are more likely to produce them.

33 Supranational institutions provide other and sometimes contradicting sets of incentives. On the effects of European Union conditionality on minority politics in Eastern European candidate countries, see the literature cited in Kymlicka (2007, p. 41 n. 26). On the political opportunities offered by the supranational indigenous rights regime, see Passy (1999).

34 I define “power” by referring to the three Weberian/Bourdieuian dimensions of social stratification: economic assets and income, the possibility to influence other actor’s choices even against their will (political power), and the “Kapital der Ehre,” the honor and prestige associated with one’s social standing.
But even where a particular ethnic boundary has already been established and routinized in everyday cognition and action, individuals have a choice between different interpretations and instantiations of the ethnic scheme. They will choose that particular version that allows them to claim an advantageous position vis-à-vis other individuals of the same ethnic category, as the following example illustrates. Michèle Lamont and her collaborators have accomplished a series of ethnographic studies on how African-Americans draw social boundaries in order to counter stigmatization and exclusion. Marketing specialists pursue a strategy of inversion by emphasizing the power of consumption and the “hipness” of black culture. They thus draw a line between insiders and outsiders that places themselves—as experts in the production and consumption of things fancy and as members of the black community—at the very top of the symbolic hierarchy (Lamont and Molnár 2001). The highly educated and successful upper-middle class, by contrast, stresses professional competence, intelligence, and achievement as criteria to identify the morally and socially superior—thus relying on the classic scheme of meritocracy to establish equality between “black” and “white” (Lamont and Fleming 2005). Finally, working-class African-Americans draw on religious universalism and underline the value of caring personalities to emphasize that they belong to the right side of the moral divide. Each of these groups thus interprets the black-white categories in such a way as to give legitimacy to their own claims to moral worth and social standing and to place themselves at the top of the prestige pyramid.

Second, the endowment with power resources not only determines which strategy of ethnic boundary making an individual will pursue but also how consequential this will be for others. Obviously enough, only those in control of the state apparatus can use the census and the law to enforce a certain boundary. Only those in control of the means of violence will be able to force their ethnic scheme of interpretation onto reality by killing “Catholics,” “Shiites,” or “Furs,” or resettling “Tatars” and “Germans” à la Stalin, thus making Catholics, Shiites, Furs, Tatars, and Germans. Discrimination by those who control decisions over whom to hire, where to build roads, and to whom to give credit is much more consequential than the discriminatory practices of subordinate individuals and groups.

Other examples could be cited to underline the point. Contrast the game of ethnic identity choice that white, middle-class suburbanites in the United States are playing (Waters 1990) with the rather anxious insistence on the relevance of the black racial divide among their working-class peers (Lamont 2000). Many studies have shown that educational background (or class status) explains most of the variance that we find in how sharply majority members draw a boundary toward minorities/immigrants (e.g., Betz 1994; Mugny et al. 1991; Semyonov et al. 2006).
Ethnic Boundaries

However, we should not overstate the hegemonic power of dominant modes of ethnic boundary making. While powerful actors can make their vision of the social world publicly known and consequential for the lives of all, subordinates may develop counterdiscourses and other modes of dividing the social world into groups than those propagated by the dominant actors (cf. the notion of “hidden transcripts” by J. Scott [1990]). Sometimes an imposed category is countered by a strategy of boundary contraction: insisting on “being” Jamaican rather than black (Waters 1999), a Zinacanteco rather than Indio (Wasserstrom 1983). Sometimes boundary expansion is the answer: being Muslim rather than a Pakistani (Jacobson 1997) or a “child of God” rather than a black person (Lamont 2000). In still other contexts, boundary blurring is the counterhegemonic strategy of choice: checking the “other race” box on the U.S. census (Almaguer and Jung 1999).

To recognize the possibility and existence of such counterdiscourses—or of “resistance” in more romantic terms—is of crucial importance for the model that is being proposed here. It helps to avoid equating strategies of classification by powerful actors with the formation of groups in everyday life and thus allows a crucial question to be asked: under which conditions do subordinate actors pursue counterstrategies, and under which do they embrace the categorical distinction imposed upon them, thus transforming the category into a group and the classificatory distinction into a social boundary? I return to this question below.

Networks

Institutional frameworks and power differentials explain if and what strategies of ethnic boundary making actors will choose. They will adopt ethnic classifications—rather than distinguishing between classes, genders, religions, villages, tribes—if there are strong institutional incentives to do so, and they will choose that level of ethnic differentiation and that interpretation of an existing boundary that ensures that the individual is a full member of the category of worthy, righteous, and dignified. But where exactly will the boundaries between “us” and “others” be drawn? Which individuals will be classified to which ethnic groups? Here, networks of political alliances come into play, the third characteristic of social fields in the framework that I propose here. 36

I hypothesize that the reach of political networks will determine where...
the boundaries between ethnic "us" and "them" will be drawn. This can be illustrated with examples of nation building. The political alliances of state elites in the early periods of nation-state formation are most consequential for the location of the boundary between nation and minority, as the comparative literature shows. Anthony Marx (1999) explains how different constellations of conflict and alliance led to the inclusion of large sections of the population of African descent into Brazil’s nation-building project and to their exclusion in the United States and South Africa. Modifying Marx’s point slightly, we may argue as follows: when slavery was abolished and restricted forms of democracy introduced, Brazil’s elite relied on an extensive network of clientelist ties stretching far into the intermediate class of mixed racial origin that had emerged in previous centuries. In the United States, however, this intermediate class was composed of Anglo-American peasants and tradesmen (Harris 1980, chap. 5), and no transracial political ties had previously developed. Accordingly, Brazil’s new political elites aimed at integrating and mixing peoples of different racial origin, while in the United States the nation was imagined as white and mixing conceived and treated as a horribilium to be avoided at all costs (Ringer 1983; Hollinger 2003). The lack of well-established transracial political networks helps explain why nation building in America was set off against the “black” population as its inner other, rather than against the nation of competing neighboring states as in much of Europe.

Similar lessons can be drawn from a least similar case comparison involving Switzerland, Iraq, and Mexico (Wimmer 2002). It shows that the reach of elite political networks in the early days of nation-state formation determine which groups will be considered part of a national project. In Switzerland, the new political elite relied on already established civil society networks that stretched across French, German, and Italian-

A related hypothesis plays an important role in social movement research. It has been shown that movements are mobilized along existing networks and that the relevant boundaries become salient also on the level of identity and categorization (Bearman 1993; Zelizer and Tilly, in press). That the boundaries of networks and ethnic categories coincide is one of the most important mechanisms explaining ethnic solidarity, as research in experimental economics has shown (Habyarimana et al. 2006).

Similarly, such “transracial” political ties were formed during the wars of independence in Cuba (Helg 1995) and explain why the nation was imagined in a comparatively inclusive way.

The Populist Party or the Readjuster coalition in Virginia that attempted to build a transracial political network from scratch failed to break the “white” transclass alliance established during the war and institutionalized within the Democratic Party. On the rise and fall of the Readjuster movement, see Dailey (2000); on the defeat of the Populist Party and the control of Democrats over the black vote, see Goodwyn (1978, pp. 187–200); Hicks ([1931] 1961, pp. 251–54).
Ethnic Boundaries

speaking cantons when they mobilized a following to compete in the arena of electoral politics. This explains Switzerland’s exceptional history of multiethnic nation building. Those networks were limited to a Creole-mestizo elite in newly independent Mexico, and the vast majority of the indigenous populations remained excluded from the nation-building project up until the Mexican Revolution. The segregation of political networks along ethnoreligious lines in preindependent Iraq prevented the rise of a popular Iraqi nationalism once the country was released from the colonial leash. No independent civil-society organizations were allowed under the Baath’s ethnocratic dictatorship, and tranethnic alliances like those that had formed from the 1940s onward within the Communist Party were destroyed. Once the American invasion led the Iraqi state to collapse, political alliances rarely crossed the ethnoreligious divides, and politics quickly became a matter of the balance of power between ethnoreligious blocks (Wimmer 2003).

STRUGGLING OVER BOUNDARIES: CONFLICT AND CONSENSUS

It follows from the previous analysis that different actors will pursue different strategies of boundary making, depending on their position in the hierarchies of power and the structure of their political networks. If they want their preferred ethnic classification to be accepted by others and the associated boundaries of inclusion and exclusion generally enforced and socially respected, they have to convince others of their view of society. They thus have to enter a negotiation process with other actors that may prefer other types of boundaries. We are now ready to consider this interactional dynamics and analyze under which conditions they may lead to a shared understanding of the location and meaning of ethnic boundaries. But how is such consensus possible between actors who pursue different strategies and are motivated by diverging interests?

The perhaps most prominent answer to this question is the one provided by scholars working in the (neo-)Gramscian tradition. They assume that subordinates consent to the cultural models developed by elites, including categories of ethnic or national belonging, thus stabilizing the underlying system of political and economic domination. The precise ways in which this consent is conceptualized diverge widely, however, not least because of the many ambiguities in Gramsci’s own writings (Anderson 1976). Some scholars emphasize the overwhelming definitional power of dominant actors. Subordinates passively receive and internalize hegemonic discourses, do networks not change??

40 The Marxist tradition of conceiving such agreements as a sign of “false consciousness” (cf. Kasfir 1979) has now been abandoned. For attempts at transposing Bourdieu’s habitus theory into the domain of ethnicity, see Bentley (1987) and Wimmer (1994).
thus leaving no room for autonomous agency. This interpretation of hegemony makes it impossible to understand why subordinates sometimes pursue counterhegemonic strategies such as boundary blurring, inversion, or crossing. More promising are other followers of Gramsci, notably Roseberry (1994), Grandin (2000), and Mallon (1995), who underline the informed, partial, and strategic nature of consent by subordinates and show that elites are bound by the hegemonic accord as well, even if this may at times go against their immediate self-interest. In this interpretation, hegemony denotes a partial consensus between groups and individuals, which reflects a particular constellation of power and alliance.

This variant of neo-Gramscianism comes close to the theory of cultural compromise that I have developed elsewhere (Wimmer 2002, chap. 2; 2005). According to this theory, a consensus between individuals and groups endowed with different resources is more likely to emerge if their interests at least partially overlap and strategies of classification can therefore concur on a shared view. It is then possible to agree that a particular ethnic boundary indeed represents the most important division of the social world. Interest overlap does not necessarily imply that interests are identical, however. Quite to the contrary, a consensus may result from the “exchange” of different economic, political, and symbolic resources between individuals occupying different social positions. A partial overlap of interests therefore reflects a particular structure of inequality and political alliances in a social field.

Let me illustrate the usefulness of this concept of cultural compromise with some examples. Perhaps the most interesting is the spread of the idea of the national community. What compromise does underlie this consensus? The elite of a newly established nation-state promotes the

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41 For such a Foucauldian interpretation of Gramsci, see Comaroff and Comaroff (1991); Omi and Winant (1994, p. 66). For critiques, see Donham (2001); Merry (2003).
42 For experimental support for this assumption, see the sociopsychological research tradition established by Thibaut (1968). For a similar approach in political philosophy, see John Rawls’s (1987) notion of an “overlapping consensus.”
43 I prefer this theory of cultural consensus over the neo-Gramscian framework for three closely related reasons. First, it does not imply a dichotomous view according to which a society is necessarily composed of two classes with opposite interests—the Marxist legacy in the Gramscian framework. Second, the language of cultural consensus leaves no doubt that subordinate actors are capable of developing their own classificatory practices. It thus avoids the implication that individuals act and think against their “true” interests that is part of the conceptual baggage of “hegemony,” at least in the dominant interpretation of Gramscian writings (cf. Gramsci 2001, p. 145). Finally, the concept of hegemony was coined as an argument to support certain political strategies among Russian revolutionaries, within the Comintern and later the Italian Communist Party (Anderson 1976) and the New Left. The concept bears the marks of this political history and does not travel particularly well to other constellations outside of the orbit of these ideological preoccupations in the West.
expansion of the boundary of the nation in order to give legitimacy to increased state centralization and administrative control that the shift from indirect to direct rule has brought about (Hechter 2000). On the other hand, individuals of varying ethnic backgrounds may accept the offer of assimilation and cross the boundary “into the nation” because this allows them to claim equal treatment before the law, while access to justice previously depended on one’s social status and wealth. Assimilation into the nation also increases the chance that their voice will be heard now that the government claims to rule in the name of “the people,” while beforehand political participation was limited by birth to certain clans, families, or ethnosocial strata (Wimmer 2002). Thus, the nation-building strategy pursued by state elites may be mirrored by subordinate strategies of boundary crossing through individual assimilation or collective repositioning. The exact nature of the nation-building process therefore depends on the constellation of power and political alliances that sustain it, as the previous discussion of the United States, Brazil, Mexico, Switzerland, and Iraq has already suggested (cf. also Mallon [1995]).

Cultural consensus is also negotiated at lower levels of social organization, however, including in environments characterized by face-to-face interactions and dense social networks. In a previous work on indigenous communities of Mexico and Guatemala, I have shown how the ongoing negotiation between local elites and peasant farmers may result in agreements on different types of ethnic boundaries, depending on the configuration of power between actors and the exchange equilibrium it induces. One example is the exchange of the political loyalty of peasant farmers for collective goods provided by the local elite, most importantly the defense of the community’s land holdings against the encroachment of agricultural entrepreneurs or other peasant communities. For both sets of actors, the idea of the local ethnic community as the prime locus of political solidarity and as the spiritual center of the universe makes sense and subsequently becomes institutionalized and routinized in many fields of social life, including religion (Wimmer 1995). Similarly, Mallon (1995) and Grandin (2000) have described the local and regional “hegemonies” that bind together members of ethnic communities in the Sierra Norte de Puebla and in Quetzaltenango, despite sharp differences in economic and political power.

Such local consensus is not limited to village communities but may also

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44 For a theory of ethnic identity that emphasizes this interactional, situational level of the negotiation process, see Eder et al. (2002). A good empirical example of the negotiation dynamics at the individual level is provided by Bailey’s analysis of how an adolescent of Dominican origin situationally emphasizes his black, Hispanic, or American identities (Bailey 2000).
emerge in modern urban environments, as research on the boundary struggles in immigrant neighborhoods in Switzerland shows. Here, the consensus is much thinner than in the previous examples but still has powerful consequences for the dynamics of ethnic boundary making. Despite disagreement on who legitimately belongs to the morally, socially, and culturally acceptable circle of persons, and what the appropriate standards of judgment may be, men and women, old and young, established immigrants and autochthons agree that recently arrived refugees from the former Yugoslavia bring trouble, indecency, and violence (Wimmer 2004). This consensus on the categorical boundaries of belonging is reflected in the structures of social closure. Network data show that there are almost no personal relationships between immigrants from former Yugoslavia and established residents. Those excluded from the realms of the morally decent and socially acceptable, however, do not share this view of the social world. They pursue a strategy of blurring by emphasizing universal moral qualities that make the division of the world into ethnonational groups appear wrong and unjustifiable (Karrer 2002, chap. 12).

As this last example illustrates, a consensus over boundaries may not include the entire population. In the Swiss case, the boundary is one-sided; that is, only the long-established neighborhood residents agree on its relevance and legitimacy. We may refer to this as an asymmetrical consensus. In other cases the consensus is partial. Most people would agree on the topography of boundaries—who belongs on which side—but individuals on either side disagree strongly on the nature and the political meaning of the ethnic divide. In Northern Ireland, there is little dissent as to who is a Catholic and who is a Protestant, even if on the local level there is room for negotiation and occasional boundary blurring (Harris 1972; Burton 1978). Yet views on the significance and political implications of the religious divide diverge sharply. In the United States, the “one drop rule” draws a sharp line between “black” and “white” and is largely accepted by individuals on both sides, with only a small minority advocacy its blurring by adding a “mixed race” category. But disagreement about the meaning and political implications of the boundary, as over the legitimacy of affirmative action, are perhaps as pronounced today as ever (Hochschild 2003). In such cases, Sandra Wallman wrote, the boundary “is not a conceptual fence over which neighbors may gossip or quarrel. It becomes instead a Siegfried line across which any but the crudest communications is impossible” (Wallman 1978, p. 212).

Such struggle and contestation are characteristic of all cultural compromises, even when no open disagreements appear. According to the theory of cultural consensus, every group and every individual constantly tries to interpret the cultural compromise in ways that seem to justify their own demands, to validate their own actions, and to represent their
own private vices as public benefits. The notion of cultural compromise therefore does not lead back to a functionalist view of society where conflicts and change vanish from sight. A cultural compromise merely limits the horizon of possibilities within which individuals can argue in their search for power and recognition. A cultural compromise may thus be more or less encompassing. It may be limited to elites and counterelites, or it may be shared by larger segments of the population. It may be more or less stable, more or less reversible, more or less detailed and elaborated. All these variations are, according to the analytical framework offered here, dependent on the constellation of interests produced by institutional patterns, hierarchies of power, and structures of political alliances.

BOUNDARY FEATURES

So far, I have offered a series of hypotheses to explain under which conditions a widely shared consensus over ethnic boundaries will arise. We are left with the task of explaining the varying nature of these boundaries, or, more specifically, their political salience, cultural significance, social closure, and historical stability. I will argue that these characteristics vary according to the degree of power inequality as well as the reach of the consensus—whether it is partial or encompassing, asymmetric or symmetric. Institutions and networks—the other main variables in the model—influence whether ethnic boundaries matter at all, and if they do, whom they encompass and whom they exclude. They are less important for understanding the properties of the boundary. In the following, I suggest some preliminary hypotheses of how the degree of inequality and the reach of consensus shape boundary features.

Closure, Salience, Differentiation

The more encompassing a compromise—that is, the more symmetric and complete it is—the less politically salient a boundary will be. When the location, meaning, and implications of a boundary are widely accepted, it will be taken for granted on an everyday basis and impossible to challenge in the political arena. An encompassing consensus also allows cultural differentiation to proceed smoothly since adding new cultural diacritics appears as a natural process when everyone agrees that the social world is composed of ethnic groups with different cultures. On the other hand, where there is no agreement on either the social location of ethnic boundaries, let alone their consequences for the allocation of resources, we expect ethnicity to be politically more salient. Thus, the question of where boundaries lie and what the legitimate consequences of being an
X rather than a Y should be may move to center stage in the political drama.

Let us now consider how degrees of inequality affect the nature of ethnic boundaries. Where power differentials between individuals of different ethnic backgrounds are high, degrees of social closure are also high, as Cornell and Hartman have postulated (Cornell and Hartman 1998, chap. 6). Those who have successfully set themselves apart from the rest of the population as “ethnic others” and managed to monopolize economic, political, or symbolic resources will try to police the ethnic boundary and make assimilation and other strategies of boundary crossing difficult. The more the maintenance of privilege depends on collective group membership, such as in the “Herrenvolk” democracy of the post–Civil War American South, the more fiercely strategies of closure will be pursued. Conversely, where market forces—such as a “meritocratic” system of elite recruitment through expensive private schools and universities—ensure status reproduction, tendencies of closure may weaken. Social closure and high degrees of “groupness” in turn will lead, as we have learned from Max Weber (1978, pp. 341–48) and Pierre Bourdieu (1982), to cultural differentiation because those who set themselves apart reinforce the boundary by adding new cultural diacritics in order to show how culturally different and inferior the subordinated groups are. This reinforces the taken for grantedness of the boundary, which leads to further and ongoing cultural differentiation, and so forth.

At the other end of the continuum, low degrees of inequality may make strategies of boundary enforcement and policing less likely and in any case less successful because the power to contest boundaries through inversion, shifting, or blurring is more equally distributed across a population. The results are low degrees of social closure and less cultural differentiation. In many cases, the boundary will be contested, fuzzy, varied, and soft enough to let observers agree, even those most inclined to “groupist” thinking, that there is no clearly identifiable “ethnic group” of which a traditional anthropologist could write an ethnography.

Stability and Path Dependency

The relative stability of a boundary—the last of the four dimensions of variation to be addressed—derives from the three other characteristics discussed above. Where boundaries are not politically salient, where degrees of closure and hierarchization are low, when cultural differentiation has not produced an empirical landscape with clearly demarcated territories of cultural similarity, classificatory ambiguity and complexity will be high and allow for more individual choice. Accordingly, boundaries will change more easily. On the other end of the continuum, powerful
effects of path dependency develop (cf. Mahoney 2000). If ethnic boundaries correspond to cultural difference, they represent a plausible empirical landscape against which any new classificatory discourse will have to argue; if high degrees of social closure characterize an ethnic hierarchy, a crosscutting, newly defined ethnic boundary needs to be advocated by actors possessing considerable political power and legitimacy; if political networks are aligned along an ethnic boundary, it will be difficult to establish crosscutting alliances.

Such effects of path dependency are reinforced through the sociopsychological process of identification. When members of an ethnic category self-identify and are identified by others as “belonging” to a “group” with little ambiguity, when they share easy-to-identify cultural repertoires of thinking and acting, and when they are tied together by strong alliances in day-to-day politics, we expect strong emotional attachment to such ethnic categories to emerge (Brubaker 2004, pp. 46–47.). Ethnic identity will be “thicker” than in other contexts, and group members will be prepared to incur high costs to defend the culture and honor of their community and the authenticity of its culture, thus stabilizing a boundary even in situations of profound social change.

To put it differently, “thick” identities reduce the range of strategic options that actors dispose of—they will thus be more likely to choose the scheme of interpretation and the script of action that corresponds to the ethnic category in question, they will be more likely to define their interests in terms of those of the entire ethnic community, and they will be more likely to respond to group pressure from their ethnic peers (cf. Cornell 1996). Under these circumstances, “identity” may indeed assume primacy over “interests,” as some authors in the “identity” school have observed and unfortunately assumed to be a universal characteristic of ethnicity per se.

Figure 1 summarizes the hypothesis regarding boundary features into a three dimensional graph. It shows how the three boundary features (with values plotted on the z-axis) are expected to vary depending on the degree of power inequality (on the y-axis) as well as the reach of a consensus (the x-axis). These hypotheses could be tested using various research strategies, including comparative historical methods, multisite fieldwork, or cross-national studies. The data problems to be overcome for a statistical test are quite formidable, however. So far ethnic boundaries have rarely been treated as an outcome to be explained (but see Chai 2005) but rather as an independent variable that influences explananda such as economic growth or the propensity of civil wars. While there are several indices that measure ethnic diversity either in demographic (Fearon 2003) or political terms (Cederman, Girardin, and Wimmer 2006) or that indicate the level of political mobilization of ethnic groups (Gurr
1993), no data set exists that describes the nature of ethnic boundaries, their degrees of closure, salience, or stability.

DYNAMICS OF CHANGE

In the preceding section, I outlined the major mechanisms that stabilize a boundary by reducing the range of strategic options from which actors choose. Certain ethnic boundaries therefore will be more resistant to strategic reinterpretation or blurring than others. Path dependency, however, is not a deterministic concept. Under certain historical circumstances, a path may be abandoned, and change becomes possible. Following the central tenets of the model outlined so far, three mechanisms of change can now be discussed: first, the field characteristics (institutional frameworks, power distributions, or political alliances) may change because

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Fig. 1.—Boundary features as a function of the nature of consensus

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44 See the mechanisms of “unlocking” described by Castaldi and Dosi (2006) and Kathy Thelen’s work on slow, cumulative change over longer periods of time (Thelen 2004).
new institutions, resources, or actors are introduced (exogenous shift). Second, these field characteristics may change endogenously as the intended and unintended consequences of the strategies pursued by various actors (endogenous shift). Third, new strategies diffuse into a social field and are adopted by certain actors (exogenous drift). These three sources of change will be discussed subsequently.

1. **Exogenous shift.**—Major political events such as imperial conquest or nation-state formation transform the institutional structure, which in turn provides incentives to pursue new strategies of boundary making while letting go of old ones. Similar patterns of transformation can be triggered by comparatively less dramatic institutional shifts. Dan Posner shows how the democratization of Zambia resulted in a process of boundary expansion (Posner 2005). In the post–civil rights era in the United States, the shift to an ethnically based system for distributing state resources has provided incentives for political actors and individuals to organize social movements on the basis of ethnic claims.46

The structure of power relations and political alliances can change exogenously through various processes. New actors may enter a field, such as when international organizations become actively involved in the ethnic politics of a country. The interventions of the European Union in the candidate countries of Eastern Europe (Kymlicka 2007, chap. 6) or the engagement of the UN and other international organizations for the “protection of indigenous rights” in various Latin American countries are examples here (see Conklin and Graham 1995; Warren 1998). International migration may also change the constellation of actors quite dramatically. These new actors also offer new opportunities for forming alliances and thus provide an impetus to redraw ethnic boundaries.

Exogenous processes may also shift the power base of actors, as the following example illustrates. The resources that Latin American state elites controlled dwindled when they were forced by financial markets and the International Monetary Fund to shift toward a policy of lean government. Clientelist, corporatist forms of political incorporation broke down and reduced the attractiveness of the nationalist, encompassing classification. Political networks no longer extended from the centers of power to the indigenous hinterland. Both factors together led to the rise of ethnonationalist movements (Yashar 2005).

2. **Endogenous shift.**—Boundaries may also change endogenously due to the cumulative consequences of the strategies pursued by actors. If all members of a particular ethnic category pursue a strategy of boundary crossing into another group, and if members of this second group pursue a strategy of boundary expansion and allow such assimilation, the first

46 See Glazer and Moynihan 1975; a case study is provided by Padilla (1986).
Third, if such movements are successful, they may not only manage to shift the consensus over the location and meaning of boundaries in their direction but also destabilize and denaturalize existing hierarchies of power, institutional structures, and political alliances. These shifts in the distribution of power, institutional order, and networks of alliance in turn lead actors to pursue new strategies of boundary making and transform their bargaining power in the process of negotiation and contestation, leading to a further transformation of the system of ethnic boundaries until a new “equilibrium” is reached.

The Mexican Revolution provides an apt illustration for this “feedback” mechanism of endogenous change. The revolutionary wars mobilized large sections of the indigenous population and provided the basis for their integration into a new, pervasive network of clientelist relationships managed and controlled by the emerging one-party regime. These political networks supported, as I have shown elsewhere (Wimmer 1995, chap. 3; cf. also Mallon 1995), a new concept of the Mexican nation. While “Mexicans” were imagined in the prerevolutionary period as consisting of criollo elites who felt called to keep the racially inferior Indios in check, the revolutionaries now conceived of the Mexican people as an amalgam of Indian and Spanish cultures and peoples. As the model described in this article predicts, the expansion of political networks was mirrored in an expanded concept of the nation, resulting in a massive process of boundary crossing by those indigenous villages most closely involved in the revolutionary struggles and thus most integrated into the emerging clientelist power apparatus. Accordingly, they quickly ceased to think of themselves as anything other than “Mexican” (cf. the case study of Friedrich [1970]).

3. Exogenous drift.—The system of ethnic boundaries may also change because actors adopt new strategies that were not part of existing rep-

47 For other “tipping” models, see Laitin (1995b); for a descriptive approach, see Nagel (1995).
Ethnic Boundaries

Innovative actors, who recombine separate schemes of thinking and acting, may invent these new strategies or they may, more often than not, be adopted from the outside. Examples are the global diffusion of the strategy of normative inversion pursued by the U.S. American civil rights movement, which has inspired not only “red power” (Nagel 1995) and other ethnic minority movements (Takezawa 1995) in the United States itself but also the political mobilization of Quebecois in Canada, Catholics in Northern Ireland, postcolonial immigrants in the United Kingdom, “blacks” in Brazil (Telles 2004), and so forth. Another strategy of inversion is the discourse of “indigenousness” that has been adopted by many ethnic minorities in Latin America and beyond (cf. Niezen 2003): by Crimean Tatars, Roma, Afro-Latin Americans, Kurds, Palestinians, Abkhas, Chechens, Tibetans, and Dalits (Kymlicka 2007, p. 285). Even more important in world historical terms has been the global spread of nationalism—the principle that ethnic and political boundaries should coincide—and corresponding strategies of ethnic boundary making from the middle of the 19th century onward. This diffusion process has profoundly changed the political outlook of the globe and transformed it from a world of empires to one of nation-states (Wimmer and Min 2006)—thus globalizing an institution that provides strong incentives for the further ethnicization of social and political life.

SYNOPSIS AND OUTLOOK

I have now discussed all the different elements of a multilevel process theory of ethnic boundary making that promise to address the empirical and analytical challenges faced by the field of comparative ethnicity today. The first part of the model consists of three basic features of a social field that together determine which actors will pursue which strategy of ethnic boundary making (see fig. 2). First, the institutional order provides incentives to draw boundaries of a certain type. More specifically, I have discussed how the modern nation-state entices elites and subordinates alike to distinguish, both in the political arena and in their private lives, between ethnic “us” and “them,” rather than between man and women, rich or poor, carpenters and college professors, and the like.

However, such institutional frameworks do not determine which level of ethnic differentiation will be emphasized—whether the Blue Hmong, Hmong, Vietnamese, Asian, or American identities, to come back to an example introduced earlier. The choice depends on the position in the hierarchy of power. Actors will choose that level of ethnic distinction that will best support their claims to prestige, moral worth, and political power. Networks of political alliances, finally, will determine the precise location
of the boundary, that is, who will be included in the group of the culturally authentic, morally dignified, and politically entitled. These three field characteristics thus determine, in a probabilistic way to be sure, which actors will pursue which strategies of ethnic boundary making.

In the next step, I looked at how these actors pursuing different strategies of boundary making interact with each other. Consensus over the social topography and meaning of ethnic boundaries may or may not evolve from these ongoing negotiations. I have maintained that consensus will emerge where institutional structures, power differences, and networks of alliance create a zone of mutually beneficial exchange between actors, a sphere of overlapping interests around which strategies of boundary making can converge. My primary example for such consensus was nation building, where the boundary expansion strategies of state elites and the assimilation strategies of minority individuals converge. Other, more local level examples referred to indigenous peasant communities in Mexico and immigrant neighborhoods in Switzerland.

In the last step, I discussed how the nature of consensus shapes the characteristics of boundaries: whether they remain largely categorical or actually have consequences for the everyday web of social relationships (degree of closure and groupness), how significant the cultural differences between individuals on opposite sides of the boundary will be (cultural differentiation), and how far a boundary will be relevant for the forging of political alliances (political salience). The model predicts, in a nutshell, that the higher the degree of ethnic inequality and the more encompassing the consensus between actors, the more closure and cultural differentiation we expect to observe. The more inequality and the less consensus, on the other hand, the more politically salient boundaries will be.

Finally, I identified four mechanisms that either stabilize or change a system of ethnic boundaries. Highly salient, socially closed and culturally marked ethnic groups will produce high degrees of identification among its members and thus stabilize a boundary through path dependency effects. Shifts in the structure of a social field—and thus in the strategies pursued by individuals and the nature of the consensus they might reach—can be brought about by new institutions (such as through conquest, revolution, or democratization), new actors (as through migration or the emergence of new transnational actors), or new power resources. These are treated as exogenous to the model, as is the invention and diffusion of new strategies of ethnic boundary making, such as the global spread of nationalism. The intended and unintended consequences of action represent an endogenous mechanism of change: successful ethnopolitical movements intentionally transform field structures through concerted political action while unintended consequences may cascade into shifts in the location and meaning of ethnic boundaries.
Fig. 2.—A processual model of the making and unmaking of ethnic boundaries

The theoretical framework introduced here departs from other approaches in several important ways. First, it does not follow the static logic of standard typologies in comparative ethnicity. These distinguish societies in which ethnicity coincides with social class from those where it crosscuts class divisions (Horowitz 1971), or societies with high from those with low degrees of ethnic institutional pluralism (van den Berghe 1967; Smith 1969), or societies where ethnic groups are segregated from more integrated ones (Hunt and Walker 1979), or postnationalist Western societies from the primordially ethnic rest (Heisler 1991), and so forth. **While these typologies confine themselves to outlining different forms and functions of ethnicity, the model presented here explains these as the outcome of a cycle of reproduction and transformation composed of various stabilizing and transformative feedbacks.**

Second, a multilevel process theory does not offer a simple formula relating “dependent” to “independent” variables as in mainstream social science, for example, by predicting the degree of political salience of eth-
nicity from levels of gross domestic product, democratization, or ethno-
linguistic heterogeneity (see the attempt by Chai [2005]). Rather, it is a
generative model where variables are “dependent” or “independent” de-
pending upon which phase in the cycle of reproduction and transformation
we focus. The model thus concurs with a series of recent approaches in
sociology (Abbott 1998; Emirbayer 1997), political science (Greif and Lai-
tin 2004; Thelen 2003), and economics (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson
2004), which emphasize that in order to understand the logic of social life
we should focus on the processes that generate and transform its varying
forms (Cederman 2005).

Like other such models and similar to evolutionary models in biology
(cf. Lieberson and Lynn 2002), it is empirically “void.” That is, it needs
to be tailored to the relevant social and historical context in order to arrive
at a concrete prediction of which ethnic boundary we expect to result
from the dynamics of negotiation and contestation. The model thus does
not represent a lawlike universal operator but an analytical framework
for generating context-specific, local predictions. More specifically, one
needs to first “fill in” the historically grown character of existing bound-
aries (their salience, closure, cultural differentiation, etc.) before specifying
the institutional constraints, the distribution of power, and the structure
of alliances that prevail in a social field at a particular point in history
to then understand the dynamics of negotiation and contestation that will
make a specific path of transformation more likely than others.

Finally, the model is more complex than others because it integrates
existing insights from both the macro and micro sociological traditions,
rather than pursuing only one avenue of research, such as rational choice
theories or, on the other end of the spectrum, the various world-system
approaches. It therefore covers several levels of analysis—from the coun-
try level down to the micro processes of boundary contestation in everyday
life. It specifies the mechanisms that link these levels by showing how
macro social phenomena, such as institutional structures, the distribution
of power, and political alliances, influence micro behavior—such as the
choice of particular strategies of boundary making. It also analyses how
the interplay of various strategies (the dynamics of consensus and conflict)
in turn reflects back on macro structures, that is, the nature of ethnic
boundaries that characterize a social field. The model therefore offers a
“full circle” explanation, as specified by Coleman (1990), Bunge (1997),
and Hedström (2005), leading from macro to micro and back to the macro
level again.

That the model is of a processual nature, empirically unspecified and
of a multilevel nature, does not mean that it cannot be tested empirically.
It contains a range of comparative hypotheses that are meant to explain
in which societies and contexts ethnicity will be relevant, which actor will
pursue which type of ethnic boundary-making strategy, under which conditions a more or less encompassing consensus over the location and meaning of such boundaries will emerge, why such boundaries are more or less politically salient, whether they imply more or less social closure, how correlated they are with cultural differences, and so forth. Some of these hypotheses have already been robustly tested. The idea that the institution of the nation-state gives ethnic boundaries a new meaning, for example, has been solidly confirmed by quantitative cross-national, comparative historical, and ethnographic research. Other hypotheses, most importantly those concerning the boundary properties themselves, have to wait for serious empirical testing in the future.

The aim of my model, then, is to situate these more specific empirical propositions within an encompassing theoretical framework. Obviously enough, this framework itself cannot be subjected to an empirical test and thus cannot be “falsified.” Its ambition is situated on a different level: first, to foster the conversation between the disjointed and segregated fields of macro sociological, comparative historical approaches to ethnicity, race, and nationalism, on the one hand, and the micro sociological and ethnographic traditions, on the other hand. The goal is not integration on a mere rhetorical level, but to identify as precisely as possible the mechanisms that link the various levels and domains on which these school of research have traditionally focused. Second, the paradigmatic framework offered here is meant to move the debate forward by showing that the most prominent theories of ethnicity—from primordialism to constructivism, from instrumentalism to identity theory—are best seen as descriptions of particular ethnic constellations, rather than as general theories of ethnicity. The major challenge ahead that this paper has identified and tried to address is to comparatively explain the emergence, stabilization, and transformation of these various forms of ethnicity.

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