NEW COMPLEXITIES OF COHESION IN BRITAIN

SUPER-DIVERSITY, TRANSNATIONALISM AND CIVIL-INTEGRATION
NEW COMPLEXITIES OF COHESION IN BRITAIN:
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This piece of work was commissioned by the Commission on Integration and Cohesion, a fixed-term advisory body set up by the Communities Secretary in September 2006. It is being published alongside the Commission's final report as a piece of independent thinking. The findings and recommendations are those of the authors, and do not represent the views of Ministers, or of officials within the Department of Communities and Local Government.
Executive Summary

As the Commission on Integration and Cohesion (CIC) observes, British society is becoming evermore diverse. Although largely conditioned by immigration dynamics, it is short-sighted to view this diversity solely or predominantly in terms of ethnicity or country of origin. There are many other variables interacting to affect integration and cohesion. Through a review of social scientific research and theory, this commissioned thinkpiece explores additional dimensions of immigration-related diversity and socio-cultural complexity existing in the UK today.

The paper initially recapitulates some of the data and argument of a forthcoming academic publication concerning the emergence of a condition of ‘super-diversity’ in Britain (Vertovec 2007). It goes further to discuss the linkages between processes and practices of transnationalism and integration, as well as several issues surrounding everyday social relations and practices of civility in ‘super-diverse’ contexts.

The paper’s three core concepts are:

**super-diversity** - a term intended to underline a level and kind of complexity surpassing anything the country has previously experienced. ‘Super-diversity’ is distinguished by a dynamic interplay of variables, including: **country of origin** (comprising a variety of possible subset traits such as ethnicity, language[s], religious tradition, regional and local identities, cultural values and practices), **migration channel** (often related to highly gendered flows, specific social networks and particular labour market niches), and **legal status** (including myriad categories determining a hierarchy of entitlements and restrictions). These variables co-condition integration outcomes along with factors surrounding **migrants’ human capital** (particularly educational background), **access to employment** (which may or may not be in immigrants’ hands), **locality** (related especially to material conditions, but also to other immigrant and ethnic minority presence), and the usually chequered **responses by local authorities, services providers and local residents** (which often tend to function by way of assumptions based on previous experiences with migrants and ethnic minorities).

**transnationalism** - a key social scientific concept referring to how migrants’ lives are lived with significant reference to places and people located both abroad (in homelands or elsewhere in the diaspora) and in their place of settlement. Evidence from numerous published studies, plus findings from a recent COMPAS/JRF project, show that the maintenance of transnational ties does not impede immigrant integration (however defined); indeed, although causal mechanisms have to be ascertained, several analyses suggest that persistent transnational attachments are often correlated with enhanced patterns of integration.
‘civil-integration’ – a notion coined to describe the acquisition and routinization of everyday practices for getting-on with others in the inherently fleeting encounters that comprise city life. These include simple forms of acknowledgement, acts of restricted helpfulness, types of personal consideration, courtesies, and ‘indifference to diversity’. Recognizing these modes of integration may help the wider public and policy-makers to better realize that (a) lack of ‘deep, meaningful, sustained’ relations is not necessarily an indicator of the lack of social cohesion, and (b) by way of these civil practices, immigrants may be better integrated than often thought. Such kinds of civility can be learned and promoted alongside the calls for more meaningful and sustained inter-group relations.

Some key points

- While pointing to important indicators of diversity, country of origin data may mask significant forms of differentiation. Within any particular population from a given country, there will be important distinctions with reference to ethnicity, religious affiliation and practice, regional and local identities in places of origin, class and social status, kinship, clan or tribal affiliation, political parties and movements, and other criteria of collective belonging.

- Immigrants’ channels of migration and the myriad legal statuses which arise from them are often just as, or even more, crucial than shared ethnicity or country of origin with reference to: how people group themselves and where people live, how long they can stay, how much autonomy they have (versus control by an employer, for instance), whether their families can join them, what kind of livelihood they can undertake and maintain, and to what extent they can make use of public services and resources (including schools, health, training, benefits and other ‘recourse to public funds’). Immigration status is not just a crucial factor in determining an individual’s relation to the state, its resources and legal system, the labour market and other structures; it is an important catalyst in the formation of social capital and a potential barrier to the formation of cross-cutting socio-economic and ethnic ties.

- There may be widely differing legal statuses within groups of the same ethnic or national origin. For example, among Somalis in the UK – and in any single locality – we will find British citizens, refugees, asylum-seekers, persons granted exceptional leave to remain, undocumented migrants, and people granted refugee status in another European country but who subsequently moved to Britain. This fact underscores the point that simple ethnicity-focused approaches to understanding and engaging various minority ‘communities’ in Britain, as taken in many models and policies within conventional multiculturalism, are inadequate and often inappropriate for dealing with individual immigrants’ needs or understanding their dynamics of inclusion or exclusion.
Not all migrants maintain the same level or kinds of transnational engagement, socially, culturally, economically or politically. Much of this will be largely conditioned by a range of factors including migration channel and legal status (e.g. refugees or undocumented persons may find it harder to maintain certain ties abroad), migration and settlement history, community structure and gendered patterns of contact, political circumstances in the homeland, economic means and more. Hence, transnational practices among immigrants in Britain are highly diverse between and within groups (whether defined by country of origin, ethnicity, immigration category or any other criteria).

Belonging, loyalty and sense of attachment are not parts of a zero–sum game based on a single nation-state or society. That is, the ‘more transnational’ a person is does not automatically mean the ‘less integrated’ they are, and the ‘less integrated’ does not necessarily prompt or strengthen the ‘more transnational’ patterns of association. While migrants continue to feel powerfully bound to homelands and communities elsewhere, they are now more able to maintain and enhance these feelings while at the same time are quite capable of developing a new life, livelihood, social ties and political interests in their places of settlement.

It is often clear in various studies that group inter-relations are closely dependent on the existence or absence of competition for local resources and services (whether of state, voluntary or public sector). Lack of conflict between ethnic groups is often due to a separation of communities by way of economic niches, and or differential demands on public resources.

In order to be successful as a strategy for breaking down prejudices and encouraging interaction, individuals should be made aware of each others’ multiple category memberships under conditions that promote inclusiveness.

Given the overwhelming fact that most new migrants move into places populated by previous cohorts of immigrants or ethnic minorities, a wide variety of interactions and integration processes occur among these groups – not just with regard to longstanding White communities. Indeed, many immigrants often only meet, live in the same building with, socialize or work with other immigrants or British ethnic minorities. These kinds of encounters and processes have hardly been addressed in social scientific research or policy development.
Desirable as they might be towards promoting better relations, ‘sustained encounters’ and ‘deep and meaningful interactions’ are simply not going to occur among most people in British cities today, whether ethnic majority, minority or new immigrant. Apart from a few contexts such as work or school, **most urban encounters are fleeting or momentary**, although importantly they might be regular (such as greeting or acknowledging neighbours). Incidental interactions among strangers actually do draw upon and constitute shared meanings, common values and cooperation for collective purposes. People accomplish this by learning, negotiating and reproducing ‘overarching principles for stranger interaction’ and basic, albeit unspoken, modes of civility (especially the exercise of common norms of courtesy and consideration).

Societies need common principles within in the population, and those principles comprise the foundation for a shared **civil culture**. Yet civil culture need not just refer to knowledge of workings of civil society; it includes competence in everyday conventions and norms of civility.
New complexities of cohesion in Britain: Super-diversity, transnationalism and civil-integration

Over the past ten years, the nature of immigration to Britain has brought with it a transformative ‘diversification of diversity’ (cf. Hollinger 1995). This has been not just in terms of bringing more ethnicities and countries of origin, but also with respect to a multiplication of significant variables that affect where, how and with whom people live.

In the last decade the proliferation and mutually conditioning effects of additional variables shows that it is not enough to see diversity only in terms of ethnicity, as is regularly the case both in social science and the wider public sphere. In Britain much public discourse and service provision is still based on a limited set of Census categories: White, Black Caribbean, Black African, Black Other, Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Chinese and Any Other Ethnic. These categories do not begin to convey the extent and modes of diversity existing within the population today. The Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) has observed that new immigration flows have significantly altered the nature of diversity in Britain (CRE 2007). However, the CRE nevertheless seems to remain focused on conventional categories of race, equality and racism.

In order to understand and more fully address the complex nature of contemporary, migration-driven diversity, additional variables need to be better recognized by social scientists, policy-makers, practitioners and the public. These include differential immigration statuses and their concomitant entitlements and restrictions of rights, divergent labour market experiences, discrete gender and age profiles, patterns of spatial distribution, and mixed local area responses by service providers and residents. The interplay of these factors is what is meant in the first part of this paper, in summary fashion, by the notion of ‘super-diversity’.

Further, it is now widely recognized among academics and policy-makers alike that transnationalism, or the cross-border and homeland links maintained by migrants, are an inescapable fact of migration under contemporary conditions of globalization. Cheap transport and advances in telecommunications have allowed migrants to maintain, as never before, extensive social, economic and political ties with places of origin or fellow members of global diasporas. To provide a better picture of the complex social worlds in which migrants live, these connections need to be considered with regard to changing dynamics of integration, as well. These are outlined in the second part of the paper.
Finally, in addition to all the conventional measures accounting for immigrant integration processes (such as participation in the labour force, access to housing, educational attainment, political participation), social scientific theory and public policy development should consider everyday kinds of constructive social interaction in a variety of spaces. In the third part of this thinkpiece, different kinds of ‘contact’ and their outcomes are addressed, as well as processes of ‘civil-integration’, or the acquisition of common, albeit unspoken, behaviours for getting-on with others.
SECTION 1
The emergence of ‘super-diversity’

By invoking ‘super-diversity’ I wish, firstly, to underscore the fact that in addition to more people now migrating from more places, significant new conjunctions and interactions of variables have arisen through patterns of immigration to the UK over the past decade; their outcomes surpass the ways – in public discourse, policy debates and academic literature – that we usually understand diversity in Britain.

Over the past ten to fifteen years, immigration – and consequently the nature of diversity – in the UK has changed dramatically. Since the early 1990s there has been a marked rise in net immigration and a diversification of countries of origin. This shift has coincided with no less than six Parliamentary measures: the Asylum and Immigration Acts of 1993, 1996, 1999, the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, the Asylum and Immigration Act 2004 and the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Bill 2005. Throughout this time there has been a proliferation of migration channels and immigrant legal statuses. In addition, this decade was a time when numerous conflicts were taking place around the world leading to a significant expansion in the numbers of those seeking asylum. The various flows and channels have been characterised as ‘the new migration’ and the people involved as ‘the new immigrants’ (see Robinson and Reeve 2005, Berkeley et al. 2005, Kyambi 2005). Multiple dimensions of differentiation characterize the emergent social patterns and conditions.

COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN

One of the most noteworthy features of ‘the new migration’ is the multiplicity of immigrants’ countries of origin. Moreover, most of this new and diverse range of origins relates to places which have no specific historical – particularly, colonial – links with Britain.

In the 1950s and 1960s almost all immigrants came from colonies or Commonwealth countries (again, mostly in the Caribbean and South Asia). By the early 1970s most newcomers were arriving as dependants of the newly settled migrants. The decades since then have seen fairly dramatic change. Alongside relatively constant inflows of returning British people, in 1971 people from ‘Old’ and ‘New’ Commonwealth countries accounted for 30% and 32% of inflow; by 2002 these proportions were 17% and 20% respectively. EU citizens represented 10% of newcomers in 1971, rising to 17% in 2002; however, those in a broad ‘Middle East and Other’ category have gone from 16% in 1971 to 40% in 2002 (National Statistics Online). Since the beginning of the 1990s alone, the diversity of immigrants’ places of origin has been growing considerably (see Figure 1).
Britain is now home – temporary, permanent or one among many – to people from practically every country in the world. As Table 1 suggests, various waves of immigrants from rich, middle income and poor countries have accumulated. All the groups, as well as many individuals within these, have diverse migration experiences in the UK – some over the last decade, others over generations, still others over more than a century. With regard to this dimension of super-diversity, we should consider how the assorted origins and experiences of migrants condition social relations with non-migrant Britons and with each other.
In London alone there are people from some 179 countries. Many represent just a handful of people, but there are populations numbering over 10,000 respectively from each of no less than 42 countries; there are populations of over 5,000 from a further 12 countries (Greater London Authorities (GLA) 2005a). Reflecting trends in Britain as a whole, 23 per cent of foreign-born people came to London before 1970, 32 per cent between 1970-1990 and 45 per cent since 1990. Foreign-origin populations in London are widespread and unevenly distributed (see Kyambi 2005). Within a number of areas, the diversity of origins is staggering, as depicted by way of example in Figure 2 with reference to Newham.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Number in UK</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>368000</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>171000</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>133000</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>121000</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>96000</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>95000</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>92000</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>86000</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>83000</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>80000</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>73000</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>69000</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>60000</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Former Yugoslavia</td>
<td>54000</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>52000</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>51000</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>48000</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>48000</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>45000</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Former USSR</td>
<td>44000</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>43000</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>40000</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>37000</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>37000</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>36000</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All foreign nationals 2,857,000 100
Of the British local authorities with the highest percentage of population who are non-UK born, the top twenty-two are all London boroughs, from the first, Brent with 46.5% of its 263,463 population, to the twenty-second, Redbridge with 24.2% of its 238,634 population. However, high proportions of foreign-born are found throughout the UK (see especially Kyambi 2005). By way of example, Figure 3 indicates such differential patterns of distribution in four cities of Britain.
While pointing to important indicators of diversity, country of origin data itself, however, may mask more significant forms of differentiation than it reveals. Within any particular population from a given country, there will be important distinctions with reference to ethnicity, religious affiliation and practice, regional and local identities in places of origin, kinship, clan or tribal affiliation, political parties and movements, and other criteria of collective belonging.

**LANGUAGES**

The growth of multilingualism in the UK has been recognized and engaged in various ways by both social scientists and policymakers, although the latter have often arguably failed to respond in positive or adequate ways (Rampton et al. 1997). Still, it is now often proclaimed with pride (for instance in the city’s successful 2012 Olympic bid) that 300 languages are spoken in London. This figure is based on a survey of no less than 896,743 London schoolchildren concerning which language(s) they speak at home (Baker and Mohieldeen 2000). Despite some methodological flaws, this remarkable data source provides an important look into a much under-studied field of diversity in the UK. The study does not take account of languages among groups with few children in schools (for instance because of a high number of young, single migrants in a particular group), which would represent ones like Polish, Czech,
Hungarian and other east European languages. Nevertheless, findings like those in Table 3 indicate sometimes surprisingly sizeable numbers speaking particular languages within a divergent range.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Language name</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>5636500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Panjabi</td>
<td>155700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Gujarati</td>
<td>149600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Hindi/Urdu</td>
<td>136500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Bengali &amp; Sylheti</td>
<td>136300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>73900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>53900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>English Creole</td>
<td>50700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Cantonese</td>
<td>47900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Yoruba</td>
<td>47600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>31100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Portuguese</td>
<td>29400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>French</td>
<td>27600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Akan (Twi &amp; Fante)</td>
<td>27500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Spanish</td>
<td>26700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Somali</td>
<td>22343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Tamil</td>
<td>19200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Vietnamese</td>
<td>16800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Farsi</td>
<td>16200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Italian</td>
<td>12300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Tower Hamlets, where British Bangladeshis are highly concentrated, ‘the demand for Eastern European language services collectively now exceedsthat for Sylheti translation’ (Keith 2005: 177). School districts, health services and local authorities are among those institutions which have to meet the challenges of growing linguistic complexity. Many new initiatives have arisen for this purpose. For example, the Language Shop provides a comprehensive translation and interpretation service in more than 100 languages to Newham Council and its partners, such as community groups and neighbouring councils, while Language Line provides telephone or in-person translations in 150 languages to health authorities and other public sector clients. Language Line data, based on telephone interpreting demand from UK Police forces, show the top requested languages between 2003 and 2006 are Polish, Kurdish, Russian, Portuguese, French, Turkish, Punjabi, Farsi, Lithuanian and Arabic (Audit Commission 2007: 17). Across the country there are numerous local initiatives for offering translation and interpretation (Ibid.: 30-32).

**RELIGIONS**

The religious diversity that migrants have brought to Britain is well documented and is not possible to detail here (see for instance Parsons 1994, Peach 2005 as well as National Statistics Online). On the whole we can say that among immigrants to Britain, Christianity is the main religion for people born in all continents except Asia; Asia-born people in the UK are more likely to be Muslim than any other religion, although of course Indians include a majority of Hindus and a significant number of
Sikhs. For many, religions tend to be broadly equitable with countries of origin – Irish and Jamaicans are mostly Christian, Bangladeshis mostly Muslim and so forth – but even so these categories often miss important variations in devotional traditions within each of the world religions.

Taking Islam as example, it is often pointed out that there are several traditions within the faith as practiced by South Asians in the UK (Deobandi, Tablighi, Barelvi, Sufi orders and more; see Lewis 2002). Such variations are multiplied many times when we consider the breadth of origins among Muslims from around the world who now live in Britain (such as Nigerians, Somalis, Bosnians, Afghans, Iraqis and Malaysians). In London Muslims are the most heterogeneous body of believers in terms of ethnicity and country of origin, with the largest group (Bangladeshis) making up only 23.5%. ‘London’s Muslim population of 607,083 people is probably the most diverse anywhere in the world, besides Mecca’ (The Guardian 21 January 2005).

**MIGRATION CHANNELS AND IMMIGRATION STATUSES**

Socio-cultural axes of differentiation such as country of origin, ethnicity, language and religion are of course significant in conditioning immigrants’ identities, patterns of interaction and – often through social networks determined by such axes – their access to jobs, housing, services and more. However, immigrants’ channels of migration and the myriad legal statuses which arise from them are often just as, or even more, crucial to: how people group themselves and where people live, how long they can stay, how much autonomy they have (versus control by an employer, for instance), whether their families can join them, what kind of livelihood they can undertake and maintain, and to what extent they can make use of public services and resources (including schools, health, training, benefits and other ‘recourse to public funds’). Therefore such channels and statuses, along with the rights and restrictions attached to them (Morris 2002), comprise an additional – indeed, fundamental – dimension of today’s patterns and dynamics of super-diversity.

Coinciding with the increasing influx of immigrants to the UK in the 1990s, there has been an expansion in the number and kind of migration channels and immigration statuses. Each carries quite specific and legally enforceable entitlements, controls, conditions and limitations (see JCWI 2004). Most prominent are the following channels and statuses:

- **Workers.** Between 1993 and 2003 the number of foreign workers in the UK rose no less than 62% to 1,396,000 (Sriskandarajah et al. 2004). This large-scale increase in workers includes people who have come under numerous categories and quota systems (see Clarke and Salt 2003, Salt 2004, Kofman et al. 2005). For example, in 2005 – to date the year that ‘saw the largest ever entry to the UK of foreign workers’ (Salt and Millar 2006: 353), that is, over 400,000 – almost half of immigrants came under the Worker Registration Scheme primarily for new EU accession state nationals (194,953), followed by work permits (86,191), EU and EFTA workers (35,200), working holidaymakers (20,135), highly skilled migrants (17,631), Seasonal Agricultural Workers (15,455), domestic servants (10,100),
those with UK ancestry (8,260), Sector Based Scheme workers (7,401), au pairs (2,360), science and engineering graduates (2,699) and ministers of religion (530) 

- **Students.** The number of foreign students entering the UK recently peaked at 369,000 in 2002 before reducing to 319,000 in 2003. Non-EU students accounted for some 38% of all full-time higher degree students in 2003 (Kofman et al. 2005: 20); they numbered over 210,000 in 2004. In this year 47,700 Chinese students came to Britain, marking a seventeen-fold increase from the 2,800 Chinese students in the UK in 1998. The number of Indian students has grown from under 3,000 in 1998 to nearly 15,000 in 2004. The third largest sender is the USA with over 13,000 students in 2004.

- **Spouses and family members.** The number of migrating spouses and family members coming to the UK more than doubled between 1993-2003. Furthermore this is a particularly feminised channel of migration compared with others; for instance, of the 95,000 grants of settlement to spouses and dependents in 2004, 20.6% were made for husbands, 40% for wives and 28.8% children. Their geographical provenance varied significantly, however: the Indian sub-continent was origin to 36% of husbands, 28% of wives and 15% of children; the rest of Asia brought 8% of husbands, 21% of wives and 18% of children, while from Africa there came 24% of husbands, 17% of wives and 42% of children (Salt 2004). Not all have come under the same conditions: within the spouses and family migrant category Kofman (2004) distinguishes a number of types, including family reunification migration (bringing members of immediate family), family formation migration (bringing marriage partners from country of origin), marriage migration (bringing partners met while abroad) and family migration (when all members migrate simultaneously).

- **Asylum-seekers and Refugees.** Throughout the 1990s the number of asylum applications rose considerably in the UK and indeed throughout Europe. Applications (including dependents) in Britain rose from 28,000 in 1993 to a peak of 103,100 in 2002. This too is a highly gendered channel of migration: in 2003 some 69% were male. The provenance of asylum-seekers represents a broad range: again in 2003 applications were received from persons spanning over 50 nationalities, including 10% Somali, 8% Iraqi, 7% Chinese, 7% Zimbabwean, and 6% Iranian. However, numbers of asylum-seekers from various countries have fluctuated much over the years.

- **Irregular, illegal or undocumented migrants.** This category, variously termed, pertains to people whose presence is marked by clandestine entry, entry by deceit, overstaying or breaking the terms of a visa. It is not a black-and-white classification, however: Anderson and Ruhs (2005) discuss grey areas of ‘semi-compliance’ under which only some, sometimes minor, conditions are violated. As Pinkerton et al. (2004) describe, it is very difficult to reliably estimate numbers within this category. In 2005 the Home Office offered a ‘best guess’ number between 310,000 and 570,000 irregular migrants in the UK.
• New citizens. A great many migrants become full citizens. During the 1990s around 40,000 people became citizens each year. This number has risen dramatically since 2000, with 2004 seeing a record number of 140,795 granted British citizenship (The Guardian 18 May 2005). According to Home Office estimates, 59% of the foreign-born population who have been in the UK more than five years – the minimal stay to become eligible – have indeed become citizens.

In attempting to understand the nature and dynamics of diversity in Britain, close attention must be paid to the stratified system of rights, opportunities, constraints and partial-to-full memberships that coincide with these and other immigrant categories (Morris 2002). And as pointed out by Lisa Arai (2006: 10),

There is a complex range of different entitlements, even within one migrant status category (e.g. overseas students), and a lack of coherence or rationale to a system developed ad hoc over many years, and which reflects competing pressures, such as whether to provide access to a service because the individual needs it, or because it is good for society (e.g. public health). Or whether to deny a service in order to protect public funds, ensure that access does not prove an attraction for unwanted migrants or to appease public opinion. This means that neither service providers, advice-givers nor migrants themselves are clear as to what services they might be entitled.

Moreover – and denoting a key feature of super-diversity – there may be widely differing statuses within groups of the same ethnic or national origin. For example, among Somalis in the UK – and in any single locality – we will find British citizens, refugees, asylum-seekers, persons granted exceptional leave to remain, undocumented migrants, and people granted refugee status in another European country but who subsequently moved to Britain. This fact underscores the point that simple ethnicity-focused approaches to understanding and engaging various minority ‘communities’ in Britain, as taken in many models and policies within conventional multiculturalism, is inadequate and often inappropriate for dealing with individual immigrants’ needs or understanding their dynamics of inclusion or exclusion.

Immigration status is not just a crucial factor in determining an individual’s relation to the state, its resources and legal system, the labour market and other structures. It is an important catalyst in the formation of social capital and a potential barrier to the formation of cross-cutting socio-economic and ethnic ties.

Many immigration statuses set specific time limits on people’s stay in Britain. Most integration policies and programmes, in turn, do not apply to people with temporary status. Temporary workers, undocumented migrants and asylum-seekers often only spend short periods of time in given locations, either due to the search for work or relocation by employers or authorities such as the National Asylum Support Service. Short periods of duration may pose difficulties not just for them, but for local institutions, such as schools (Ofsted 2003), to provide services. Yet most integration policies and strategies take undue account of temporary sojourners. Certainly they have integration needs as well as longer-term immigrants.
In order to understand the nature and complexity of contemporary super-diversity, we must examine how such a system of stratified rights and conditions created by immigration channels and legal statuses cross-cuts socio-cultural and socio-economic dimensions.

GENDER

Over the past thirty years, more females than males migrated to the UK; since about 1998, males have come to predominate in new flows. The reason for this, Kyambi (2005) suggests, may be due to a general shift away from more female oriented family migration to more male dominated work-based migration schemes since 1995. It is likely also related to the inflow of asylum-seekers, most of whom have been male.

There is considerable variation of gender profiles of different immigrant populations, and this mostly relates to channels of migration and the evolution of migration systems from particular countries of origin. For instance, 80% of Slovakians, 72% of Czechs, 71% of Filipinos, 70% of Slovenes, 68% of Thais and 67% of Madagascars are women (GLA 2005a: 89). They are mostly to be found in domestic or health services. Meanwhile, 71% of Algerians, 63% of Nepalese, 61% of Kosovars, 61% of Afghans, 60% of Yemenis and 60% of Albanians are males, almost all of whom are asylum-seekers (Ibid.: 90).

AGE

The new immigrant population has a higher concentration of 25-44 year olds and a lower proportion of under-16s than a decade ago, also perhaps reflecting a shift away from family migration (Kyambi 2005). Variance in age structure among various ethnic groups reflects different patterns of fertility and mortality as well as migration (GLA 2005a: 6). The mean age of new immigrants is 28 – averaging eleven years younger than the mean age of 39 for the British Isles born population.

The ‘new immigration’ and its outcomes in Britain have entailed the arrival and interplay of multifaceted characteristics and conditions among migrants. This has resulted in a contemporary situation of ‘super-diversity’. Compared to the large-scale immigration of the 1950s-early 1970s, the 1990s-early 2000s have seen more migrants from more places entailing more socio-cultural differences going through more migration channels leading to more, as well as more significantly stratified, legal categories (which themselves have acted to internally diversify various groups). Significantly, the complex characteristics, identifications and trajectories of today’s super-diverse migrants are also fundamentally affected by their patterns of transnationalism, or the array of links with places of origin and diasporas elsewhere.
SECTION 2
Transnationalism and integration

What are the implications of sustained transnational connections for migrants’ integration? There are various answers to this question, various modes of transnationalism and integration that can be examined, and various studies that have attempted to measure or interrogate related processes and phenomena.

Perhaps throughout history, and certainly over the last hundred years or more, immigrants have stayed in contact with families, organizations and communities in their places of origin and elsewhere in the diaspora (Foner 1997, Morawska 1999, Vertovec and Cohen 1999). In recent years, the extent and degree of transnational engagement has intensified among immigrants, due in large part to changing technologies and reduced telecommunication and travel costs. Enhanced transnationalism is substantially transforming several social, political and economic structures and practices among migrant communities worldwide (Vertovec 2004a).

The ‘new immigrants’ who have come to live in Britain over the past ten years have done so during a period of increasingly normative transnationalism (cf. Portes et al. 1999): that is, in many parts of the world it has become the norm for family members to travel abroad and maintain numerous forms of contact with kin and communities of origin (especially through the sending of remittances). Today in Britain, cross-border or indeed global patterns of sustained communication, institutional linkage and exchange of resources among migrants, homelands and wider diasporas are commonplace (see the findings of the ESRC Research Programme on Transnational Communities, www.transcomm.ox.ac.uk; also, for example, Anderson 2001, Al-Ali et al. 2001, Spellman 2004). This can be observed in the increasing value of remittances sent from Britain (now estimated at some £3.5 billion per year; Blackwell and Seddon 2004), the growing volume of international phone calls between the UK and various places of migrant origin (Vertovec 2004b), the frequency of transnational marriage practices (Charsley and Shaw 2006) and the extent of engagement by various UK-based diasporas in the development of their respective homelands (Van Hear et al. 2004).

The degrees to and ways in which today’s migrants maintain identities, activities and connections linking them with communities outside Britain are unprecedented. Of course, not all migrants maintain the same level or kinds of transnational engagement, socially, culturally, economically or politically. Much of this will be largely conditioned by a range of factors including migration channel and legal status (e.g. refugees or undocumented persons may find it harder to maintain certain ties abroad), migration and settlement history, community structure and gendered patterns of contact, political circumstances in the homeland, economic means and more. That is, transnational practices among immigrants in Britain are highly diverse.
between and within groups (whether defined by country of origin, ethnicity, immigration category or any other criteria), adding yet another significant layer of super-diversity to all those outlined above.

Many migrants develop and maintain strong modes of community cohesion – but not necessarily with others in their locality. The strongest senses of cohesion or belonging may remain with others in a homeland or elsewhere outside Britain. However, this needn’t mean they are not becoming integrated in the UK. Belonging, loyalty and sense of attachment are not parts of a zero–sum game based on a single place. That is, the ‘more transnational’ a person is does not automatically mean the ‘less integrated’ he or she is, and the ‘less integrated’ one is does not necessarily prompt or strengthen ‘more transnational’ patterns of association.

Some early discussions of transnationalism tended to suggest that continuing links with homelands represented an alternative to integration (cf. Appadurai 1990, Basch et al. 1993; cf. Faist 2000). Increasingly, however, with regard to transnationalism and integration – or assimilation, in American parlance – numerous works have come to underline their ‘concurrent and intertwined’ nature (Itzigsohn and Giorguli-Saucedo 2005), ‘interconnectedness’ along with ‘their both/and rather than either/or character’ (Kivisto 2005: 311), ‘simultaneity’ and the emergence of ‘complex amalgam structures and dispositions that combine elements of assimilation and transnationalism’ (Morawska and Joppke 2003: 3). Indeed, Ewa Morawska (2003) suggests more than forty factors that shape different forms and combinations of transnationalism and assimilation.

Moreover, the insight that transnationalism does not hinder integration also pertains with reference to the concept of segmented assimilation. This key notion in the American literature recognizes that migrants might follow differing trajectories and outcomes reflecting the dynamics of race/ethnicity and class (and to some degree, geography). Segmented assimilation theory sees at least three possible paths for migrants’ socio-economic mobility: upwards into White, middle class society, downwards into the broadly excluded or low-income working class, or into an ethnic or racialized community characterized by its own economic and cultural patterns (Portes and Zhou 1993, Zhou 1997, Portes and Rumbaut 2001; cf. Waldinger and Feliciano 2004). This important approach emphasizes that a linear process based on White, middle class norms is not the only measuring stick for integration; indeed, the segmented assimilation thesis argues that processes of incorporation may mean greater – rather than lesser – social distance between immigrants and White Americans (Itzigsohn and Giorguli-Saucedo 2005). What’s more, ‘Each of these different trajectories of integration into the host society can coincide with the maintenance of different forms of identificational and participatory transnationalism’ (Joppke and Morawska 2003: 25; also see Morawska 2004).

Empirical research has demonstrated the complex relationships between modes of transnationalism and integration. For instance, the Comparative Immigrant Entrepreneurship Project (CIEP) provided robust data on Colombians, Dominicans and Salvadorans in five major U.S. cities between 1996-98. Its findings, analyzed and
published by a variety of academics, demonstrate that across a range of variables and correlations, modes of transnational participation have compound interplays with processes of integration. Economic transnational practices are positively associated, ‘accelerating rather than retarding the long-term integration of contemporary immigrants’ (Portes et al. 2002: 294). With CIEP data Alejandro Portes (2003) shows that many forms of transnational participation increase with levels of human capital including years of education, occupational status and extent of experience in the U.S. In another study based on the same dataset (Guarnizo et al. 2003), the authors find a similar correlation with regard to political transnationalism; that is, education level, amount of time in the U.S. and citizenship do not reduce interest in homeland politics – indeed, they may facilitate it since ‘A U.S. passport enables former migrants to travel back and forth without restrictions; greater time in the United States is usually associated with economic stability and more resources to invest in favoured political causes [in the homeland]’ (Ibid.: 1229). Mariano Sana’s (2005) CIEP analysis shows a different picture: that the prominent transnational practice of remitting money is highly correlated with renting a home, the lack of citizenship and lack of language fluency – which are all evidence of limited migrant integration or incorporation. Another CIEP study by Itzigsohn and Giorguli-Saucedo (2005) concludes that:

The same factors that promote incorporation – i.e., exposure to American life, increased socioeconomic status – also promote transnational participation. On the other hand, factors that hinder the process of incorporation, namely the encounter with the American racial systems, also push immigrants toward transnational participation. (Ibid.: 916)

In addition to realizing that the relationship between transnationalism and integration is not a zero-sum game, it is important to understand that neither concept is of a piece; that is, various modes or components can be selectively combined by migrants. Here, Peggy Levitt (2003: 194) has importantly highlighted such a selective nature of participation (whether in ‘host country’ or transnational/‘home’ spheres) by relating the experience of one of her informants, Pratik, a Gujarati engineer living in Boston:

Pratik, then, successfully combines selective assimilation and transnational involvements to advance in both settings. He is not interested in participating in Indian or US politics. He has assimilated into mainstream economic life in the US but rejects membership in its cultural and religious institutions. And at the same time, he is active in the economic and religious life of his sending community. He purposefully picks and chooses where and what he will be involved in, so far achieving mobility in both contests.

In a study of 300 immigrants in the Netherlands from six Western and non-Western countries of origin. Erik Snel and his colleagues (2006) also examined multiple kinds and extents of transnational involvement alongside measures of integration. They also included an attitudinal dimension, marked by the degree of identification with both sending and ‘host’ contexts as well as with others in diaspora. Their analysis found considerable variation between all these factors among the groups in question.
Transnational activities occur both among migrants with good and with marginalized social positions (in terms of educational level and labour market participation) in the host society, it was observed (Ibid.: 300). Their intriguing results show that the ‘least structurally integrated’ respondents (Moroccans and Antilleans) identify strongly with their countries of origin but do not develop notable transnational activities.

Transnational activities are not confined to particular migrant groups or to a particular type of migrant. …transnational identifications weaken the longer the migrants live in the Netherlands. However, involvement in transnational activities hardly diminishes with increase length of stay, which suggests that these occur in part for reasons other than transnational identification (for example, because of familial obligations). (Ibid.: 303, emphasis in original)

The Dutch study further underlines the point that transnational involvement itself does not impede integration, nor is there a direct correlation between social position and transnational activities.

In a recent COMPAS study on new migrants and community cohesion, led by Hiranthi Jayaweera and funded by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation (see www.compas.ox.ac.uk), informants were asked about the various local spaces in which they did or did not regularly meet and talk with people from different ethnic and/or religious backgrounds (homes, workplaces, streets, markets, schoolgates, associations, places of worship, GP surgeries, etc.). It is hypothesized that the higher the number of such engagement-spaces (up to twenty-two in this survey), the greater the capacity for social integration. Among 199 new immigrants – that is, people with less than five years’ residence in the UK – those with more sustained transnational links (measured through indicators such as political or associational participation in country of origin, remittances, owning property in country of origin, media consumption, regular visits, etc.) tended to meet people of other ethnicities and religions in more engagement-spaces than those without such sustained transnational links.

The reasons for such patterns are not clear, but one might be a matter of confidence in relation to overall engagement activity: when immigrants feel well plugged into a field of interactions whether in the UK or spanning a place of origin, this may well provide a sense of confidence to engage yet other people and spaces. If, on the contrary, exclusion from interaction – in the UK or place of origin – is felt, this may work to mitigate propensities to engage further.

The incontestable fact is that with regard to either processes of transnationalism or integration, migrants adapt. Sustained and intensive patterns of transnational communication, affiliation and exchanges can profoundly affect manners of migrant adaptation – including practices associated with positive or limited integration – through the maintenance of a particularly strong sense of connection or orientation to the people, places and senses of belonging associated with the place of origin. Such increasing incidence among contemporary migrants (afforded especially by cheap telephone calls and transportation) arguably contributes to a more widespread process of transformation affecting many Western societies, namely the public.
recognition of multiple identities. As in earlier eras, migrants feel powerfully bound to homelands and communities elsewhere – and now they can variously express and enhance this attachment (transnationalism ‘has come out of the closet’, as Ewa Morawska [1999] puts it). At the same time, new immigrants clearly are getting on with developing a new life, livelihood, social ties and political interests in their places of settlement. What kinds of interactions are they developing, and what are their effects?
SECTION 3
Understanding ‘contact’, everyday interaction and civility

The Cantle Report into the 2001 riots in Oldham painted a now infamous picture of groups living ‘parallel lives’ that do not touch or overlap by way of meaningful interchanges (Home Office 2001; also see Home Office 2004). But social scientists – to say nothing of civil servants – have few accounts of what meaningful interchanges look like, how they are formed, maintained or broken, and how the state or other agencies might promote them. Further, what about ‘less-than-meaningful’ interchanges? Might these have some productive impacts on cohesion as well?

‘There are plenty of neighbourhoods,’ writes Ash Amin (2002: 960), ‘in which multiethnicty has not resulted in social breakdown, so ethnic mixture itself does not offer a compelling explanation for failure.’ In order to foster a better understanding of multiethnic dynamics, Amin (ibid.) calls for greater attention to the ‘local micropolitics of everyday interaction,’ akin to what Leonie Sandercock (2003: 89) sees as ‘daily habits of perhaps quite banal intercultural interaction’ and what Paul Gilroy (2004) describes as ‘conviviality’, cohabitation and multi-ethnic interaction in ordinary life. Such interactions, moreover, should be looked at in terms of the multiple variables of super-diversity mentioned above, not just in basic ethnic or racial categories.

While less prevalent than studies of specific ethnic communities, there have been some important studies which valuably contribute to such an approach toward understanding everyday experiences in multi-ethnic, multi-status contexts. For example, the contributions to Structuring Diversity (Lamphere 1992a) comprise case studies exploring interactions between and among established residents in U.S. cities and groups of new immigrants (such as Hmong, Assyrians and Mexicans). Interactions were observed within defined institutional settings including workplaces, schools and housing complexes. The everyday experiences described in these studies showed a range from distance and separation, to intermittent tension and conflict, to inclusive bonds and emergent patterns of friendship.

Roger Sanjek’s (1998) The Future of Us All provides an ethnographic account of local civic and political organizations in one of New York City’s most ethnically diverse neighbourhoods – Elmhurst-Corona, in Queens. Sanjek portrays how a shared ‘politics of place’, or set of common quality of life issues, serves to forge multi-ethnic coalitions and alliances among whites, longstanding ethnic minorities and new immigrants (such common causes are advocated by social psychologists, among others, as the key to better relations; see below).
And in one of the most methodologically and theoretically important works in this field, Gerd Baumann’s (1996) *Contesting Culture* moves squarely away from simplistic approaches to ethnic group definitions by looking at Southall, west London as a single social field or unit of analysis. Baumann considered discourses of ethnicity, culture and community as they are manifest among a variety of Southall residents and at various levels and sites, revealing ‘communities within communities, as well as cultures across communities’ (Ibid.: 10). Further, through his examination of cross-cutting ties, Baumann paints a detailed ethnographic picture of lived multiculturality.

What do these kinds of ethnographic studies contribute to our understanding of inter-ethnic and immigrant-“host” relations? They provide detailed accounts of how people together shape their interactions and forms of exchange and reciprocity (of goods, services, and information), attitudes, experiences and impressions, often through very commonplace forms of sociality – such as greetings, courtesy and acknowledgement of the presence of others. Yet these studies also point to the ways in which discourses of ‘us’ and ‘them’ are often strategically invoked, how stereotypes are easily conjured and how they may trigger tension or outright conflict despite long experiences of positive relations. What’s more, as Louise Lamphere (1992b: 2) points out, ‘interrelations are not just a matter of race, ethnicity, or immigrant status but can be influenced by the organisation of a workplace, apartment complex, or school.’ Such modes of organisation inherently and often unconsciously shape and constrain interrelations.

Although interaction between new immigrants and established residents may often take place in more fluid, informal settings – in neighbourhoods, on the street, in parks, on subways, or at publicly sponsored festivals – most such interaction takes place in formal settings where relationships are defined and circumscribed through well-defined roles such as management-worker, owner-tenant, teacher-student and elected official-voter. (Ibid.: 4)

That is, even everyday relationships are inscribed with and conditioned by power of one kind or another. Such power can be used to build either bridges or fences between individuals and communities.

Additionally, it is clear in such studies that inter-relations are closely dependent on the existence or absence of competition for local resources and services (whether of state, voluntary or public sector; cf. Dench et al. 2006). Lack of conflict between ethnic groups is often due to a separation of communities by way of economic niches, and or differential demands on public resources. Such conditions correlate to the findings of the Communities and Local Government Citizenship Survey, namely that ‘as deprivation increases, there is a fall in the number of people who agree that people from different backgrounds get on well together, and a fall in the number who agree that residents respect ethnic differences between people’ (CIC 2007: 16). Inter-ethnic or immigrant-‘host’ relations may be underpinned by anxiety or a sense of threat if there is perceived competition for resources, including jobs, education, housing, welfare benefits and other forms of public largesse (Ibid: 17).
One, often-suggested way of fostering better relations is for public and voluntary bodies to play role in bringing people together (see Cooke and Spencer 2006). These include women’s groups, sports clubs, mixed schools, faith-based institutions, community festivals, trade unions and business associations. But just what kind of relations should be fostered? At what point does behaviour get attributed to ethnicity or country of origin, to religion, to locality or socio-economic position, to gender, age, or legal status? How do people decide who is like ‘us’ or ‘them’?

**IN-GROUPS, OUT-GROUPS, ‘CONTACT’**

Social psychologists have devoted considerable efforts to addressing these kinds of questions. Their approach is often based around notions of in-groups and out-groups, and oriented to how these are conceived, predicted and acted upon (Hewstone et al. 2002). Broadly speaking, in-group attribution is related to mutual identification, the extension of trust, positive regard, cooperation and empathy; people regarded as members of an out-group, conversely, are subject to various forms of discrimination, avoidance, exclusion or hostility. Here it is important to note that in-groups need not coincide with ethnicity or country of origin, but may be associated with language, locality, socio-economic position, immigration status or other variables of super-diversity.

Contemporary calls for new arenas of inter-ethnic or immigrant-‘host’ interaction, such as made by the CRE and CIC, are (knowingly or not) broadly based on a ‘contact hypothesis’ in social psychology. This hypothesis posits that under the right conditions, forms of social contact between members of different groups can reduce prejudice or hostility and promote more positive attitudes. Stemming from the 1950s, the premise in social psychology was that ‘contact under cooperative interactive conditions provides opportunity for positive experiences with outgroup members that disconfirm or undermine previous negative attitudes and ultimately change attitudes toward and beliefs about the group as a whole’ (Brewer and Gaertner 2001: 455). More recently, however, many social psychologists have pressed for greater attention to processes, conditions and qualifiers that determine the nature of contact.

At least three processes might obtain in situations of inter-group contact (Brewer and Gaertner 2001). The first is ‘decategorization’ or personalization, in which the salience of in-/out-group categories are diminished and members of groups get to know each other as individuals. The ideal here is to break down any monolithic perceptions of an outgroup as a homogeneous unit, and to reduce the importance of categories overall. The second possible process is ‘recategorization’ in which members of two or more groups acknowledge membership in a common, higher order or more inclusive category (transforming representations of ‘us’ and ‘them’ to ‘we’). A third contact process has been called ‘mutual differentiation’ by way of which cooperation or interdependence is stressed while maintaining and recognizing distinct group boundaries and membership. When promoting forms of interaction, public and voluntary bodies could enhance their effectiveness by clearly considering which process they are attempting to simulate.
However, each of these processes – which are not exclusive – may not produce satisfactory outcomes in terms of stimulating more positive attitudes and interactions. Almost regardless of context, ‘contact’ without acknowledgement of difference risks reinforcing perceptions of groups in ways that exacerbate anxieties and bias. Research has shown the importance of clearly maintaining group boundaries and differences, instead of just trying to supersede them, in order to achieve successful interaction (Hewstone 1996).

Building on these insights, it appears that much success in building positive relations can arise with the recognition that individuals each belong to multiple group identities at different levels of inclusiveness – that individuals are both members of discrete groups and members of superordinate, cross-cutting or overlapping social formations (cf. Bauman 1996). This can be acknowledged, for instance, in tenant’s associations, parent-teacher associations, theatre groups and sports teams. Hewstone et al. (2002: 592) point to the importance of such categories,

Where ‘others’ can be simultaneously classified as in-group or out-group members on multiple dimensions. Shared or overlapping category memberships reduce bias because they: (1) make social categorization more complex; (2) decrease the importance of any one in-group/out-group distinction; (3) make perceivers aware that the out-group consists of different subgroups; (4) increase classification of others in terms of multiple dimensions; and (5) increase the degree of interpersonal interaction and trust across category boundaries.

In order to be successful as a strategy for breaking down prejudices and encouraging interaction, individuals should be made aware of their multiple category memberships under conditions that promote inclusiveness. Further, as previously noted, competition and power-differences can seriously impede interactions. As one major American study showed, ‘In circumstances where groups have relatively equal power, even if the level is minimal, social distance can reflect harmonious relations’ (Bach 1993: 38). Therefore, multi-category interactions should also be based as far as possible on considerations of equal status. ‘Contact’ should not place anyone in a subordinate status.

Here it is important to underline the fact that these processes and interactions are not just matters of White majority meeting non-White immigrants or ethnic minorities. Given the overwhelming fact that most new migrants move into places populated by previous cohorts of other immigrants or ethnic minorities, a wide variety of interactions and integration processes occur among these groups – not just with regard to longstanding White communities. Indeed, many immigrants often only meet, live in the same building with, socialize or work with other immigrants or British ethnic minorities. These kinds of encounters and processes have hardly been addressed in social scientific research or policy development.

Mixed communities and multiple forms of contact were the subject of the Ford Foundation’s ‘Changing Relations’ project (Bach 1993). This large-scale, multidisciplinary study examined everyday interactions and relations among and between new immigrants and established residents in six diverse U.S. communities.
To ensure the research would not just be about the immigrants and their adjustments, the project team members focussed on what they called accommodation: ‘a process by which all sides in a multifaceted situation, including established residents and groups at different stages of settlement, find ways of adjusting to and supporting one another’ (Ibid.: 4). Their conclusions recall many features of the ‘contact hypothesis’:

Active engagement in common tasks most frequently brings about accommodation. When groups come together to participate in a shared task, the inspiration is usually a desire to improve specific community conditions – to secure better social services or housing, or to battle neighbourhood crime and deterioration. The groups are not searching consciously for cross-cultural means to improve an abstract sense of ‘quality of life.’ Rather, in these situations, they are struggling together over a loss of control in the face of dramatic changes in their standard of living. Shared activities reduce tension and competition and build bonds of trust among groups. (Ibid.: 6)

A key message to emerge in the Ford project was that ‘participation works’ (Ibid.: 48). Participation in shared tasks were proven to form social connections and bonds of trust. ‘Beyond interpersonal encounters, one shared interest persistently emerges as a rallying point for newcomers and established residents – controlling the character of community change’ (Ibid.: 49). Moreover, community change was particularly perceived in terms of crime/security and the decline of public services. Joint activities to address these issues created ‘a mobilizing point for the rediscovery of commitment to community‘ (Ibid.). The project also found that through day-to-day interactions, ‘community brokers’ – often women – forge ties and ease tension between groups, however defined.

EVERYDAY INTERACTIONS

Beyond collective endeavours to address community concerns, what sort of social interactions should bridge groups best? The Commission for Racial Equality (CRE 2007:25) believes that ‘deep and meaningful interaction between people who come from different backgrounds is key to fostering a sense of belonging.’ The Commission on Integration and Cohesion (CIC 2007: 23) similarly says that

We cannot just encourage any random mixing – if we throw people together, then we risk a negative interaction. But the best interactions were identified as those that: are in depth and sustained, are positive, acknowledgment of differences as part of the interaction, are around shared activities and common issues, take place in everyday, safe contexts – school, work & neighbourhood.

Moreover, CIC (Ibid: 24) suggests ‘it is worrying that more sustained encounters are not being developed.’

But, desirable as these might be toward promoting better relations, ‘sustained encounters’ and ‘deep and meaningful interactions’ are simply not going to occur among most people in British cities today, whether ethnic majority, minority or new
immigrant. Apart from a few contexts such as work or school, most urban encounters are fleeting or momentary, although importantly they might be regular (such as greeting or acknowledging neighbours, and purchasing goods). Ephemeral interactions comprise the bulk of social relations in libraries, parks and playgrounds, apartment buildings and housing estates, street markets, shops and shopping centres, hospitals and health clinics, hair salons and other commonplace sites. While surely promoting 'sustained encounters' and 'deep and meaningful interactions' in certain spaces controlled by public or voluntary agencies (while bearing in mind the conditioning nature of power relations in such contexts, mentioned earlier), we would do well to think about how to conceive, appreciate and foster positive relations – if not common senses of belonging – amid the fleeting and superficial kinds of contact that are the daily stuff of urban existence.

Important steps toward recognizing the nature of everyday interactions include examining how and where social norms are created, negotiated and modified, challenged and reproduced. In specific spaces, what do people (differentially or commonly) think is expected, or acceptable, behaviour and what is considered beyond tolerable conventions? If conventions are broken, how is tension or conflict mediated?

A few studies have looked at everyday interactions in these kinds of terms. For example, there is Soheila Shashahani’s (2002) work regarding a mixed (Shiite, Kurd, Afghan) neighbourhood in Tehran. This demonstrates that where, how and when people encounter one another – by way of their daily travel itineraries, shopping habits, schooling, courteous salutations and other aspect of social life – are very closely defined by the intersection of a range of variables including ethnicity, income, gender, age and locality. Amanda Wise's (2006) research on ‘quotidian transversality’ in suburban Australia traces everyday modes of sociality across super-diverse boundaries including forms of gift exchange and reciprocity, ways of talking and gossip networks.

In thinking about commonplace interactions, it is important to acknowledge that different kinds of interaction or contact take place in the successive, multiple spaces people inhabit through the course of their day. The CIC has already raised a similar point, in that with regard to integration and cohesion, social segregation is more important that residential segregation. This is so because:

It does not matter where people live, but it’s about whether they feel comfortable in meeting and mixing on a day-to-day basis in the following settings: education, work, healthcare and other public services, the neighbourhood and public spaces, by getting involved in making local decision and democracy, places of worship, youth groups such as Scouts/guides, voluntary groups, shopping, food and leisure activities, public transport. (Ibid: 21)

Furthermore, in the previously mentioned COMPAS/Joseph Rowntree Foundation project on migrants and community cohesion, findings indicate the existence of a kind of hierarchy of spaces in which, 320 respondents (new immigrants, settled migrants and non-migrants) reported, they meet and talk with people from other
ethnic and religious backgrounds. Most reported meeting such others in work and
evening classes, followed by shopping places, places of entertainment/leisure, public
service institutions and family or children-oriented spaces; fewest met others at
religious institutions, homes and voluntary associations. Rather than condemning
‘segregation’ in toto, perhaps in some spheres it is acceptable – or perhaps for some
desirable, as long as there is exposure and participation in other spheres.

**TOWARDS ‘CIVIL-INTEGRATION’**

The CRE (2007:40) has noted the importance of creating or sustaining some sort of
ground rules for inter-ethnic interaction, ‘an unwritten handbook for getting on with
each other.’ But what should such ground rules consist of?

Lyn Lofland (1973:177-8) has described how, in the evolution of cities and their
endemic condition as ‘a world of strangers’, there emerged a type of social being we
can recognize as the city cosmopolitan ‘who was able, as his tribal ancestors were
not, to relate to others in the new ways that city living made not only possible but
necessary.’ The combination of experiences, attributes and attitudes created by city
life meant that ‘the cosmopolitan did not lose the capacity for the deep, long-lasting,
multifaceted relationship. But he gained the capacity for the surface, fleeting,
restricted relationship’ (Ibid.).

In a later work, Lofland (1998) draws on a wide range of sociological and social
psychological research to demonstrate how in a variety of public spaces, everyday,
fleeting and incidental interactions among strangers actually do draw upon and
constitute shared meanings, common values and cooperation for collective purposes.
People accomplish this, she says, by learning, negotiating and reproducing
‘overarching principles for stranger interaction’. These include unspoken but mutually
understood ideals of: *cooperative motility* (how, in their physical movements
throughout public places, people choreograph themselves to mutually maintain
personal space and avoid collision or conflict), *civil inattention* (after Erving Goffman,
how people can be mutually present but ritually ignore each other out of politeness),
*restrained helpfulness* (how people enact clearly limited requests and offers for
mundane assistance – such as asking the time or directions) and – most importantly
for this paper – *civility towards diversity*. Lofland describes the latter as the ways how,

[I]n face-to-face exchanges, confronted with what may be personally offensive
visible variations in physical abilities, beauty, skin color and hair texture, dress
style, demeanor, income, sexual preference, and so forth, the urbanite will act in
a civil manner, that is, will act ‘decently’ vis-à-vis diversity.

[T]o be civil toward diversity is not necessarily to act in a manner that will be
defined as nice or pleasant. …The crux of this principle is evenhandedness and
universality of treatment, not demonstrations of friendliness or fellow-feeling.
Civility probably emerges more from indifference to diversity than from any
appreciation of it. (Ibid.: 32-3)
All of the above principles are contextually and historically variable, highly gendered and culturally contingent (indeed – as part of the current search for ‘British values’? – we can try to observe how there may be particularly ‘British’ ways of enacting these principles – for example, with habitual utterances of ‘sorry’). In any case such principles or groundrules help strangers define the situation they find themselves in from day-to-day and space-to-space, ‘and those definitions, in turn, help people to construct their actions, to guide their conduct’ (Ibid.: 34).

‘Civility’ is another notion by way of which some social scientists have addressed the basic principles for everyday, often inadvertent but positive interactions. Perhaps at its most basic, civility is most commonly understood as consideration, or at least the absence of ‘rudeness’, in our interactions with others (cf. Fyfe et al. 2006). Richard Boyd (2006: 864) draws on this connotation of civility to describe it as:

The manners, politeness, courtesies or other formalities of face-to-face interactions in everyday life. In this view, to be ‘civil’ is to speak or interact with others in ways that are mannerly, respectful or sociable. These trappings of civility range from polite forms of address – using correct titles, saying please and thank you, speaking in a sympathetic tone of voice, etc. to matters of etiquette….

The notion is particularly pertinent to questions of immigration, ethnic relations and cohesion because, as Boyd says, ‘pluralism and civility go hand-in-hand’. That is, while ‘The heterogeneity and even outright conflict between different populations suggests the futility of expecting deep moral agreement,’ (Ibid.: 870) cultural diversity requires some common norms of behaviour at the most basic levels of interchange. There is mainly a need for agreement on means of interaction, Boyd suggests, not on ends. It is basic norms of civility which provide such means of interaction.

As trivial as they may seem, then, casual signifiers of human respect such as ‘please’ or ‘thank you’, ‘excuse me’ or ‘how’s it going’, serve to awaken a sense of sympathy and to breed an easy spontaneity among urban-dwellers whose primary interactions with others are both fleeting and superficial. Despite their evanescence, however, they are not devoid of moral significance. Insofar as they communicate to others a basic and elemental respect, these ritualised practices and everyday formalities are the cement that makes modern society possible.

All of this pertains to civility’s value as a way of coping with social pluralism – with the plurality of different beliefs, cultures and identities found in the contemporary city. (Ibid.: 872)

However, Jennifer Lee’s (2002) Civility in the City, a study of ordinary and typically uneventful daily inter-ethnic practices in Philadelphia and New York, nevertheless shows that ‘civility does not come without effort’ (Ibid.: 183). Investments of will, energy and patience and are often needed to develop and maintain mutually beneficial day-to-day routines of civility.

The topic of language has sometimes been perceived to increase inter-group stress, to call for remedial effort and to put civility to the test. Certainly competence in English language has been shown to be of significance in integration processes, particularly
for finding and maintaining a job, sustaining workplace relations, and determining income levels (see e.g., Dustman 2001, EC 2003, CIC 2007). However, we need to question the degree to which a high level of linguistic competence is crucial for everyday interactions and modes of civility. (This is particularly a question we can ask regarding short-term sojourners: how much English does a temporary migrant actually need to carry out essential social or economic interactions in addition to performing a particular employment task?) Indeed, as Nick Fyfe and his colleagues (2006: 855) observe,

Civility often assumes a common language. Yet this may not always be the case, even within a single country. As society changes and becomes more diverse, there are sub-cultural groups and ethnic minority languages, as well as distinct forms of physical interaction and presentation, and this should be acknowledged. The latter becomes increasingly important in cities where the dominant mode of interaction is visual as opposed to verbal.

In other words, principles of civility entail practices without much verbal communication – our words and gestures aimed at others or used in the presence of others. This view coincides with many of the ‘overarching principles for stranger interaction’ suggested by Lofland.

Language is often purported to be a point of conflict surrounding immigrants. As the Ford project found,

If a single source of conflict among newcomers and established residents stand out, it is language…. Language is more than a means of communication. It binds individuals together and separates groups. It conveys tremendous complexity of purpose and meaning, and contains both the instrumental value of enabling communication and the symbolic value of personal and group identity. (Bach 1993: 36).

But it wasn’t immigrants’ level of competence that was shown to cause the main problem: ‘language differences alone rarely cause overt conflict. Conflict occurs when language use becomes a source of intergroup competition and rivalry’ (Ibid.: 37). So, in conditions where dual or multiple levels of linguistic competence exist, one lesson might be that positive interactions and routinized positive relations can still be built upon other, partially or non-verbal norms of civility and ‘stranger interaction’.

Conceiving of the nature and role of civility in this way helps us re-think the nature of immigrant integration. It is clear that societies need common principles within in the population (Vertovec 1999), and that those principles comprise the foundation for a shared ‘civil culture’. Yet civil culture need not just refer to knowledge of workings of civil society, as described in the Home Office’s (2004b) Life in the United Kingdom guide for prospective citizens. Beyond these – or, we might better say, prior to these knowledge-based groundrules – ‘civil culture’ includes competence in conventions and norms of civility (Schiffauer et al. 2004). These can be learned by immigrants formally, but they are probably best inculcated informally through daily practice (since
many of the principles described above become routinized into non-conscious acts). The acquisition of these commonplace practices of getting-on with others amounts to a process that we might call everyday ‘civil-integration’.

What does an appreciation of civil-integration bring to the understanding, and policy strategies, of and for integration and social cohesion? First, it helps us to accept that a lack of ‘deep and meaningful interaction’ between communities (defined by country of origin, ethnicity, legal status, etc.) does not necessarily mean poor social cohesion. Urban contexts are known to function through the lack of deep and meaningful interactions among city-dwellers; indeed, most people seem to be more than satisfied with maintaining cordial but distant relations with their neighbours and particularly with strangers. Second, integration and cohesion cannot be fostered merely by instilling knowledge (of rules, rights, customs, etc.); daily interaction is what civil-integration is about. And third, cohesion cannot be manufactured from the top down, or simply stimulated by putting people into the same places with scripted roles and behaviours. Norms of civility must be enacted in a wide variety of contexts and public spaces, automatically as it were, and this comes through wholly through experience and practice.

It may be true, as the Ford study suggests, that ‘ Civility, cordiality, and conviviality are often thin veils for underlying distrust ’ (Bach 1993: 47). But it is likely that even a veneer of civil-integration has positive impact on social cohesion. We cannot and should not expect everyone in a complex society to like each other or develop numerous wide-ranging friendships. But we can urge and expect degrees and modes of civility, based on the most ordinary actions. As described by Lofland (1998: 242),

> The public realm is, in fact, probably the locus for a significant portion of all noncommunal, nonintimate relationships that humans form with one another. When negotiating a crowded intersection, when managing civil inattention on a crowded tram or subway, when watching the human comedy play itself out on a plaza, when giving or receiving minor assistance, when purchasing a drink or a meal, in these and other myriad ways… persons can truly learn Sennett’s lesson that ‘one can act together [more accurately, one can interact] without the necessity to be the same’ (1970, 1977). To learn that lesson is to become not only a more mature political actor, but a more cosmopolitan one as well.

The commotion of contemporary urban life, compounded by the perceived social and cultural turbulence surrounding a steady stream of newcomers, often gives rise to popular yearnings to reduce the complexity and constrain the change. Lofland (1973: 180) has criticised such attempted ‘retreats’ into the ‘pseudotribalism’ of urban villages or ‘into dreams of somehow “re-creating” in the “community” the binding brotherhood and sisterhood of “communion.”’ Elsewhere I (Vertovec 1999) have pointed to popular desires and nostalgia – for conditions which usually never existed – that are inherent in many notions of ‘social cohesion’. Many contemporary ideas and debates around cohesion in Britain could be interpreted as fanciful retreats from complexity and change. The Commission on Integration and Cohesion will hopefully avoid this kind of retreat in its recommendations for better cohesion.
Through a review of wide-ranging academic studies and theories, this thinkpiece has drawn attention to three key topics which, it is suggested, the Commission on Integration and Cohesion can benefit by considering in its review of the nature of, and responses to, increasing diversity in Britain. In sum, the paper has called for an increased attention to: (1) dimensions of the new super-diversity, including multiple identifications or axes of differentiation, only some of which concern ethnicity or country of origin; (2) enhanced transnationalism among today’s immigrants, underscoring the fact that ‘migrant communities, just as the settled population, can “cohere” to different social worlds and communities simultaneously’ (Zetter et al. 2005, pp. 14, 19); and processes of civil-integration, whereby immigrants, ethnic minorities and members of the ‘host’ or White majority mutually come to practice everyday principles of interaction and civility.
References


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