Outline of a Theory of Citizenship
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OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF CITIZENSHIP

BRYAN S. TURNER

Abstract The problem of citizenship has re-emerged as an issue which is central, not only to practical political questions concerning access to health-care systems, education institutions and the welfare state, but also to traditional theoretical debates in sociology over the conditions of social integration and social solidarity. Citizenship as an institution is thus constitutive of the societal community. These sociological debates typically start with an analysis of the conceptual framework of citizenship in the work of T.H. Marshall. This article reviews the standard objections to Marshall’s concept of citizenship and the hyphenated society, and develops a critique of the unitary character of the concept of citizenship in the Marshallian tradition. There are in fact, as the etymological development of the concept itself demonstrates, several distinct forms of citizenship. In reply to a recent contribution by Michael Mann to the theory of citizenship, the article contrasts the history of citizenship in Germany, France, Holland, England and the United States; on the basis of this overview, we can identify two crucial variables. The first concerns the passive or active nature of citizenship, depending on whether citizenship is developed from above (via the state) or from below (in terms of more local participatory institutions, such as trade unions). The second dimension is the relationship between the public and the private arenas within civil society. A conservative view of citizenship (as passive and private) contrasts with a more revolutionary idea of active and public citizenship. By combining these two dimensions, it is possible to produce a historically dynamic theory of four types of democratic polities as societal contexts for the realization of citizenship rights.

Citizenship as Participation

With the development of a world economic recession and the emergence of monetaristic politics, the threat to the welfare state has become a central topic of social science debate in the 1980s (Lee and Raban 1988). This attack on the principles of public welfare is directly associated with the emergence of the New Right and the dominance of Thatcherism in British politics (Green 1987; Kavanagh 1987; Marquand 1988), but the parameters of this issue are in fact global. From a sociological perspective, these changes in political orientation and the creation of monetarist perspectives in social policy may, however, be treated as symptoms of a fundamental change in the politics of industrial societies, namely the break-up of corporatism and the collapse of the reformist consensus which dominated the post-war period of social reconstruction. The break-up of the corporatist consensus may be furthermore linked to radical reorganisations in global capitalism which some authors now regard as an
entirely new stage in the development of world capitalism, leading to the disorganisation of capitalism (Offe 1985) or to the end of organised capitalism (Lash and Urry 1987).

These structural reorganisations in world capitalism and the demise of government commitment to welfare expansion have had profound implications for social science research and teaching, producing a greater emphasis on interdisciplinarity and applied research as a defence of the welfare state (Bean, Ferris and Whynes 1985). While radical sociologists in the 1960s were often influenced by the critical work of Louis Althusser (1971), for whom the provision of welfare and the existence of health-care institutions were merely facets of the ideological state apparatus, in the crisis of the 1980s, critical theorists have returned to the questions of distributive justice, individual rights and notions of equality as the basis for social reconstruction and social reform (Turner 1986a). While the notion of abstract Human Rights (possibly in association with some commitment to Natural Law) no longer commands widespread intellectual support, it is clear that the institution of definite ‘rights’ is an essential feature in the protection of public space as an arena of legitimate debate. The secular institution of rights cannot, therefore, be separated from the question of democracy; and the infrastructure of democracy is a fundamental, if limited, restraint on the employment of coercive force. It is ‘the democratic apparatus, which prevents the agencies of power, law and knowledge from fusing into a single leading organ’ (Lefort 1988: 29).

In this outline of a theory of citizenship, it is argued that the current attempt to defend the principles of welfare in fact requires a far deeper sociological, historical and philosophical enquiry into the character of social membership and political participation, namely an enquiry into the extent and characteristics of modern social citizenship (King and Waldron 1988; Turner 1986b). This enquiry should have the theoretical goal of attempting to achieve a synthesis in the levels of analysis between the individual citizen, the organisation of social rights and the institutional context of democracy. This renewed interest in the issue of social participation and citizenship rights has, in turn, resulted, at the theoretical level, in a revival of interest in the work of T.H. Marshall (1963, 1965, 1981) which provides an important point of departure for any debate about the contemporary complexities of the relationship between citizenship entitlements and the economic structure of capitalist society.

Marshall’s Account of Citizenship

In the United States Marshall was particularly influential on the work of T. Parsons (1971), R. Bendix (1964) and S.M. Lipset (1960), but his sociology of citizenship is perhaps only now being adequately recognised and discussed in Britain (Halsey 1984; Roche 1987). In America Marshall’s work was developed as a framework for the analysis of ethnic problems and race relations (Parsons
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and Clark 1966), whereas in Britain Marshall's work originally developed and flourished in the context of post-war social reconstruction and as a social justification for an extension of state provision in the area of national welfare (Titmuss 1963).

While Marshall's analysis of citizenship is well known, it will be valuable here to outline briefly the three dimensions of citizenship which he considered in his original work. Marshall, whose intellectual roots were in the liberal tradition of James Mill and J.S. Mill, elaborated a specifically social version of the individualistic ideas of English liberalism. One theoretical and moral weakness of the liberal tradition was its failure to address directly the problem of social inequality in relationship to individual freedoms (Laski 1962). At the heart of Marshall's account of citizenship lies the contradiction between the formal political equality of the franchise and the persistence of extensive social and economic inequality, ultimately rooted in the character of the capitalist market place and the existence of private property. Marshall proposed the extension of citizenship as the principal political means for resolving, or at least containing, those contradictions.

The initial idea for his theory of citizenship was developed in 'Citizenship and social class' in 1949 (Marshall 1963). It was further developed in Social Policy (Marshall 1965), where he addressed the question of the evolution of welfare policies in Britain between approximately 1890 and 1945 as a specific example of the growth of social rights. However, his famous contribution to the analysis of social policy contained no explicit statement of his theory of social citizenship. Finally, he proposed a theory of capitalist society as a 'hyphenated society' in The Right to Welfare and Other Essays (Marshall 1981) in which there are inevitable tensions between a capitalist economy, a welfare state and the requirements of the modern state. Marshall was thus primarily concerned with the social-welfare history of Britain between the eighteenth and twentieth centuries in terms of the growth of citizenship as expressed in three dimensions namely, the civil, the political and the social.

Marshall argued that in the eighteenth century there had been a significant development of civil rights which were mainly targeted at the legal status and civil rights of individuals; and these rights were to be defended through a system of formal law courts. Civil rights were concerned with such basic issues as the freedom of speech, rights to a fair trial and equal access to the legal system. Secondly, Marshall noted an important growth in political rights in the nineteenth century as an outcome of working-class struggle for political equality in terms of greater access to the parliamentary process. In this area, political citizenship required the development of electoral rights and wider access to political institutions for the articulation of interests. In the British case, this involved the emergence of political rights which were associated with the secret ballot box, the creation of new political parties and the expansion of the franchise. Finally, he drew attention in the twentieth century to the expansion of social rights which were the basis of claims to welfare and which
established entitlements to social security in periods of unemployment, sickness and distress. Thus, corresponding to the three basic arenas of social rights (the civil, political and the social), we find three central institutions of contemporary society (the law courts, parliament and the welfare system). Marshall’s final theorisation of this issue conceptualised capitalism as a dynamic system in which the constant clash between citizenship and social class determined the character of political and social life. These tensions were summarized in his notion of the hyphenated society, that is a social system in which there were perpetual tensions between the need for economic profitability, the taxation requirements of the modern state and the rights of citizens to welfare provision.

While Marshall’s theory proved influential in the development of American social theory in the area of race relations and in the development of British sociology in the analysis of the welfare system, Marshall has been continuously criticised for certain (alleged) problems in his theoretical analysis of rights. For example, Anthony Giddens (1982) has criticised Marshall for developing an evolutionary perspective on the historical emergence of citizenship in which social rights appear to be the effect of a broad and imminent development within society. Marshall was also criticised for failing to consider the wider social context within which welfare policy developed in Britain, particularly in war-time and post-war reconstruction. Giddens also noted that citizenship rights are not a unified, homogeneous set of social arrangements. The liberal rights, which were the outcome of bourgeois struggles, cannot be compared with the claims to welfare which were developed by socialism and other forms of working-class action. Whereas liberal rights to the parliamentary process tend to confirm and reaffirm the social and political dominance of private property over labour, welfare rights are, at least in principle, a potential challenge to the very functioning of capitalism as an economic system. Therefore, there is no necessary similarity between liberal bourgeois rights in the nineteenth century and socialist demands for equality in the twentieth century. There is furthermore no necessary parallel or even development of different rights. For example, while civil rights may be developed in capitalism, political citizenship may often be denied (Jessop 1978).

Marshall was also criticised for perceiving the historical emergence of citizenship as an irreversible process within contemporary society, whereas the experience of the last fifteen years, following the oil crisis of 1973, shows that welfare-state rights are clearly reversible and not to be taken for granted. On these grounds Marshall has also been criticised by writers who regard Marshall’s underlying value system as essentially complacent and conservative (Roche 1987). Marshall was also challenged for failing to perceive that additional social rights might be developed in the area of culture, where citizenship could be regarded as a claim upon a national cultural system, and these cultural claims might be further associated with the educational revolution of the twentieth century with the emergence of mass education and the university system of the post-war period. While the argument that the university system
expressed the cultural expansion of citizenship has become associated with Talcott Parsons (Parsons and Platt 1973), in fact the link between democracy and higher education was also fundamental to the American pragmatist tradition which was grounded in Dewey's view of mind (Mills 1966).

Although there are clearly problems in Marshall's theory, I suggest that Marshall has often been criticised on the wrong grounds, and at least some criticisms of Marshall are based upon a misunderstanding of the original texts. Marshall was, for example, clearly aware of the broad social and military context within which welfare rights have developed, because he saw war-time conditions in Britain as providing favourable circumstances for the successful claim for welfare rights and provisions. Furthermore, it is not clear that Marshall's theory in fact requires an evolutionary perspective, assuming the irreversibility of claims against the state; Marshall saw the contingent importance of war-time circumstances on the development of social policy. It is clear however that political rights are of a very different order from economic rights, since in many respects the development of citizenship in capitalist societies stopped, as it were, at the factory gates. Democracy did not develop fully into economic democracy, although experiences between societies (in terms of workers' participation and control) are clearly variable (Lash and Urry 1987). Giddens is clearly wrong to suggest that Marshall treated civil and social rights as equivalent, or as having the same integrative functions. Marshall specifically argued that, whereas individualistic civil rights directly corresponded to 'the individualistic phase of capitalism', the social rights of trade unionism were 'even more anomalous, because they did not seek or obtain incorporation' (Marshall 1963:103). There was, however, an unresolved issue at the centre of Marshall's theory, namely that it is not clear whether social rights are in a relation of tension, opposition or contradiction to the economic basis of capitalist societies (Goldthorpe 1978; Halsey 1984; Lockwood 1974).

Although these criticisms are important, I would like to identify some rather different criticisms of Marshall in order to suggest a more elaborate version of his original scheme. Any theory of citizenship must also produce a theory of the state, and this aspect of Marshall's work was the most under-developed (Barbalet 1988:109). In Marshall's scheme it is implicitly the state which provides the principal element in the maintenance and development of social rights, being the political instrument through which various political movements seek some redress of their circumstances through the legitimisation of their claims against society. Furthermore, Marshall failed to develop an economic sociology which would provide some explanation of how the resources which are necessary for welfare are to be generated and subsequently re-distributed by the state to claimants in terms of health provision and general welfare institutions. In considering these aspects of Marshall's theory, it is important to put a particular emphasis on the notion of social struggles as the central motor of the drive for citizenship. Marshall failed to emphasize the idea that historically the growth of social citizenship has been typically the outcome
of violence or threats of violence, bringing the state into the social arena as a stabiliser of the social system. Although a number of writers on citizenship have drawn attention to the function of mass wars in promoting successful claims to democratic participation (Gallie 1983), it is necessary to have a broader notion of 'struggle' as a critical aspect of the historic growth of citizenship. This emphasis provides the context within which we can begin to see the real importance of new social movements for social change (Klandermans 1986; Melucci 1981). However, Barbalet (1988:103) has correctly pointed out that the institutionalisation of social rights also requires new political, legal and administrative practices which may have been only indirectly related to these social movements.

We can further elaborate the Marshall scheme by adopting a notion from Parsons (1966), namely that the development of citizenship involves a transition from societies based upon ascriptive criteria to societies based upon achievement criteria, a transition which also involves a shift from particularistic to universalistic values. Thus the emergence of the modern citizen requires the constitution of an abstract political subject no longer formally confined by the particularities of birth, ethnicity or gender. Parsons, following Max Weber's work on the city (1966), thought that Christianity had made possible the separation of the political and social, while also developing a notion of social relations which were independent of ethnicity and which treated faith, or abstract consciousness, as the ultimate source of community in modern societies (Parsons 1963). It is possible to regard the differentiation of the political and the social as the Parsonian version of the classical separation of the state from civil society (Berger 1986:75).

We can suggest therefore that the historical development of citizenship requires certain universalistic notions of the subject, the erosion of particularistic kinship systems in favour of an urban environment which can probably only flourish in the context, initially, of the autonomous city. Citizenship is, as it were, pushed along by the development of social conflicts and social struggles within such a political and cultural arena, as social groups compete with each other over access to resources. Such a theory of citizenship also requires a notion of the state as that institution which is caught in the contradictions between property rights and political freedoms. Finally, the possibilities of citizenship in contemporary societies are, or have been, enhanced by the problems of war-time conditions in which subordinate groups can make more effective claims against the state. This emphasis on the importance of mass war as a primary factor in social change is an important criticism of the conventional 'society-centred' perspective of both classical sociology and Marxism (Giddens 1985; Marwick 1974).

Although the welfare system was clearly expanded in Britain in the post-war period of reformism and reconstruction, there has been both a political attack on the welfare state and considerable institutional demolition of welfare institutions with the rise of Thatcherism and the spread of global recession.
since 1973. The causes of these changes are yet to be fully analysed, but the decline of the welfare system may be associated with the historical decline of the organised working class and class-based communities (Offe 1987). The spatial reorganisation of working-class communities under conditions of disorganised capitalism also makes the articulation of interests far more problematic, and these changes are also associated with the erosion of neo-corporatism and the class de-alignment of traditional political alliances with the restructuring of capitalism and the emergence of new social movements (Lash and Urry 1987). With the growth of global capitalism, the state is no longer able to mediate between private property owners and the working class, because its economic autonomy is constrained by international agreements and institutions such that 'local' political decisions by the state may have very adverse consequences for the value of its currency within the international money markets. The problem with Marshall's theory therefore is that it is no longer relevant to a period of disorganised capitalism. The British state, in fact, has very little scope for manoeuvre: while capital operates on a global scale, labour tends to operate within a local national market, articulating its interests in terms of a national interest group. Marshall's theory assumed some form of nation-state autonomy in which governments were relatively immune from pressures within the world-system of capitalist nations (Giddens 1985).

Marshall's theory was initially focussed on the British case, but a general theory of citizenship, as the crucial feature of modern political life, has to take a comparative and historical perspective on the question of citizenship rights, because the character of citizenship varies systematically between different societies. The emergence of citizenship is a feature of the very different and specific histories of democratic politics in western societies, but a genuinely historical analysis of citizenship would be concerned with, not only the Greek and Roman legacy, but with problematic comparisons between western and non-western traditions.

Ruling Class Strategies?

A particularly important and systematic criticism of Marshall's theory of citizenship has been developed by Michael Mann (1987), who attacks the ethnocentric specificity and evolutionism of the Marshallian perspective. The problem is that, while Marshall's scheme may fit the English example, it is historically and comparatively inappropriate for other societies. It may be the case that England is the exception rather than the rule. Mann (1987:340) notes that Marshall's argument is entirely about Great Britain. There is not a single mention of any other country. Did Marshall regard Britain as typical of the capitalist West as a whole? In fact, it would be more accurate to say that the Marshallian version of the theory of citizenship is entirely about England, since he takes for granted the socio-political unity of Great Britain (Turner 1986b:
46). The question of citizenship within the British state cannot be analysed historically without reference to the erosion of the cultural and political autonomy of the Celtic fringe (Hechter 1975; Turner 1984). As Anthony Smith (1986) argues, the creation of citizenship within the gesellschaft-like political space of the modern state may well require the subordination, or even eradication, of gemeinschaft-like membership within an ethnic primary group (or ethnien).

However, Mann’s comment on the Anglophile character of Marshall’s theory is merely the pretext for a more important exercise, namely the development of a comparative framework for the historical elaboration of five strategies of citizenship (liberal, reformist, authoritarian monarchist, fascist, and authoritarian socialist). Having divided the regimes of pre-industrial Europe into two ideal-types (absolute monarchies and constitutional regimes), Mann proceeds to inquire into how the traditional regimes developed strategies to cope politically first with the bourgeoisie and secondly with the urban working class during the period of industrial capitalist development.

Britain provides the principal example of a liberal strategy. The state retained a liberal character and the working class was successfully incorporated through the welfare state which ‘meshes into, rather than replaces, private market and insurance schemes’ (Mann 1987:343). Under the impact of trade-union struggle and class conflict in the nineteenth century, Britain eventually moved from a liberal to a reformist solution. The United States and Switzerland are also examples of a liberal strategy, but social citizenship remained under-developed in both. However, their buoyant economies have permitted their citizens to insure themselves against personal hardship. By contrast, in France, Spain, Italy and Scandinavia, the development of citizenship was bitterly disputed by monarchical and clerical reactionaries, and the absolutist legacy remained (with the exception of France) largely unchallenged, until the modern period.

Germany, Austria, Russia and Japan provide examples of an authoritarian monarchist strategy. While these absolutist regimes initially resisted the citizenship claims of both bourgeoisie and proletariat, they were eventually forced to modernise their polities. Wilhelmine Germany enjoyed the most successful strategy of political and economic development, which resulted in the bourgeoisie, and to some extent the proletariat, being ‘negatively incorporated’ (Roth 1963) into the system via a superficial development of political citizenship. The Soviet Union and Nazi Germany provide Mann with two illustrations of authoritarian socialist and fascist strategies. Although neither system provided comprehensive civil and political rights, there was a significant development of social citizenship. In Germany, policies of full employment and public works programmes were combined with another objective: rearmament. In the Soviet Union, a programme of social citizenship for all existed alongside substantial social inequalities in the shadow economy and the black market. Both systems, while proclaiming powerful legitimating
ideologies, had to depend on an extensive apparatus of violence and repression. However, while German fascism was very unstable, the Soviet system was more successful in domesticating its labour force by converting the trade unions into ‘a-political welfare state organizations’ (Mann 1987:350).

Mann’s treatment of citizenship represents, not only a major theoretical advance over the Marshallian paradigm, but also an important contribution to our understanding of the historical processes of citizenship formation. However, Mann’s theory appears to be weak on three crucial issues, and this debate with Mann’s ruling-strategy thesis then provides the context in which I wish further to elaborate an alternative to, or at least a modification of, Mann’s theory.

The first criticism is that, because Mann perceives the origin of citizenship as a strategy of class relationships in which the state has a major role to play in creating social stability, he fails to consider the questions of aboriginality, ethnicity and nationalism in the formation of modern citizenship. As I have already noted following Smith (1986), the creation of citizenship within the political boundaries of the modern nation-state has typically involved or required the subordination or incorporation of ethnic minorities and/or aboriginals. This incorporation may be achieved by the relatively painless process of the cultural melting pot (Glazer and Moynihan 1970), or it may be brought about by more violent means. Citizenship in societies like Canada, New Zealand and Australia has, as its dark underside, the ‘modernisation’ of aboriginal communities. The debate about citizenship in the United States cannot take place without an analysis of the historical impact of the black South on American civil society, and yet Mann curiously ignores the issue of racial orders. Any further development of Mann’s account of citizenship would have to examine social stratification in terms which are not class-reductionist, and his laudable attempt to provide a historical treatment of different types of ruling class strategies should be extended to include an analysis of the white-settler societies (Denoon 1983).

My second critical observation is that, while Mann (1987:340) warns us that ‘tradition matters’, he completely neglects the impact of organised Christianity and Christian culture on the structuring of private/public spaces, and how the typically negative evaluation of the political in mainstream Christian theology continues to place an individualistic brake on the expansion of active political citizenship. I have argued elsewhere (Turner 1986b:16) that both Christianity and Islam contributed to the development of citizenship by providing a universalistic discourse of political space (the city of god and the Household of Islam) which challenged ethnicity and kinship as the primordial ties of the societal community (Parsons 1971). However, Christianity also produced an important limitation on the emergence of an active view of the citizen as a carrier of rights. Christianity has emerged in the modern period as a radical threat to authoritarian or reactionary regimes (Poland, Soviet Union, South Africa or some Latin American states) in only exceptional circumstances, and
specifically where alternative means of legitimate protest have been destroyed. In these circumstances, Christian theology often requires considerable revision and redirection (Robertson 1986).

The Protestant Reformation provided an ideology of rebellion against Catholic hegemony and papal authority, and, partly through the development of vernacular versions of the Bible, established a cultural basis for the eruption of the nation-state. However, once in power, the Protestant churches were forced to turn to the local nation-state or to regional authorities for secular (that is, military) support of the faith. In theory, of course, the reformed churches regarded the state as a necessary evil, but in practice they came, not only to depend on secular political support, but also provided an ideology of 'godly rule'. The churches required, however reluctantly, state power for the sub-ordination of antinomianism, and in return they offered a theory of passive, obedient citizenship. In his Institution de la Religion chrétienne, Calvin was at pains to emphasise the Christian obligation to obey the laws of the land and to respect government, since the aim of the state was to create peace and stability during our miserable, but happily brief, sojourn on earth (Calvin 1939:197ff). The effect of Protestant doctrine was to create a private sphere (of devotional religious practice, the subjectivity of the individual conscience, the privatised confessional and familial practices) in which the moral education of the individual was to be achieved, and a public world of the state and the market place, which was the realm of necessity. While religion through the institutionalised means of grace monitored the interior subjectivity of the individual, the state through the institutionalised means of violence regulated public space. This division did not provide an environment which was congenial to the full development of a view of the citizen as an active and responsible member of the public arena. Mann's revision of the Marshallian version of liberal citizenship does not have a perspective on these religio-cultural variations in the constitution of political space.

Of course, the churches were not merely the vehicles for Christian cultural beliefs towards the political: they materially influenced the ways in which public space was shared. For example, Colin Crouch (1986) has provided an important comparative framework for understanding the interaction between state and religion in the formation of European states. He distinguishes between: (1) secular liberalism versus Catholic corporatism (in the French Republic); (2) hegemonic Catholic corporatism (Portugal and Spain in which as a result the liberal tradition was very marginal); (3) Protestant neutrality (Denmark, Norway, Sweden); (4) consociationism (The Netherlands, Switzerland and Belgium) in which the public affairs of civil society are organised separately for and by the different communities. Crouch argues that these traditional patterns for 'sharing public space' had long-term implications for modern politics. Thus,

It is important to distinguish this organic, Catholic fascism from the secular Nazism of Germany. This was made dramatically clear by Austrian history following the
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Anschluss, when the whole edifice of Austrofaschismus and its corporatism was abolished and replaced by the Nazi system, based on the Führerprinzip rather than corporatism. But the abiding, specifically Austrian tradition remained corporatist and space-sharing (Crouch 1986:186).

Again any understanding the issue of citizenship in a society like Israel would have to depend on an historical account of the settlement between religion and politics during the period of state formation.

My final (and possible most important) criticism of Mann concerns the notion of a 'ruling class strategy'. Mann can only conceive of citizenship being handed down from above (for example by the state) such that rights are passive. Thus, citizenship is a strategy which brings about some degree of amelioration of social conflict and which is therefore a major contribution to social integration. Such a view of citizenship from above precludes, or restricts, any analysis of citizenship from below as a consequence of social struggles over resources. Because Mann concentrates on strategies from above, he cannot adequately appreciate the revolutionary implications of the oppositional character of rights. Is it possible that Mann regards the demands of millenarian Fifth Monarchy Men, incendiary peasants, revolutionary republicans of the French Revolution, or radical Chartists as always capable of being successfully assimilated into the system by the calming oils of citizenship? I find Engels's view in Anti-Dühring more historically plausible:

in the same way bourgeois demands for equality were accompanied by proletarian demands for equality. From the moment when the bourgeois demand for the abolition of class privileges was put forward alongside it appeared the proletarian demand for the abolition of classes themselves – at first in religious form, leaning towards primitive Christianity, and later drawing support from the bourgeois equalitarian theories themselves (Engels 1959:146–7).

There is an important distinction here. In ideal–typical terms, and as a heuristic device for the development of theory, we can either regard rights as privileges handed down from above in return for pragmatic cooperation (Mann's thesis), or we can regard rights as the outcome of radical struggle by subordinate groups for benefits (Engels's thesis). There are in fact two related difficulties. The first is Mann's negation of rights from below, and the second is that, because the only important categories in Mann's theory are ultimately the Marxist categories of class, capitalism as a mode of production, the state and geo–politics, he cannot deal theoretically with the peace movement, feminism, Solidarity, the Green Movement, animal liberation or struggles for children's rights as genuine or important contributions to historical change – at least such movements do not figure in his account. While the co-optation of these movements rather than the satisfaction of their demands may be a common outcome (Piven and Cloward 1971), this is not always, or inevitably, the outcome (Schram and Turbett 1983). Furthermore, failure to satisfy demands within the welfare state creates conditions for new social movements which

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then become dependent on the state for the satisfaction of needs (de Geest 1984). Mann’s analytical framework appears to preclude any such consideration of the impact of new social movements on the expansion of citizenship from below.

By combining these two aspects of citizenship (the private/public division, and the above/below distinction), we can develop a heuristic typology of four political contexts for the institutionalisation or creation of citizenship rights:

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Revolutionary citizenship combines demands from below with an emphasis on the public arena, regarding the private world of the individual with suspicion. However revolutionary struggles for democratic rights often end in forms of public terror. Where revolutionary citizenship collapses into totalitarianism, l’imaginaire sociale (the social imaginary) results in the idea of ‘People-as-One, the idea of society as such, bearing the knowledge of itself, transparent and homogeneous’ (Lefort 1986:305). In liberal pluralism, while interest group formation typically leads to movements for rights from below, the revolutionary thrust of social protest may be contained by a continuing emphasis on the rights of the individual for privatised dissent. The classical liberal view of politics insisted on diversity and freedom of private opinion against the threat of uniformity of belief. Hence, J.S. Mill in his essay ‘On Liberty’ in 1859 expressed the fear that the spread of mass opinion would mean that Europe was ‘decidedly advancing towards the Chinese ideal of making all people alike’ (Mill 1962:130).

These forms of democratic citizenship may be contrasted with citizenship rights from above in which the citizen is a mere subject rather than an active bearer of effective claims against society via the state. Passive democracy recognises the legitimate function of representative institutions, the courts and a welfare state system, but there is no established tradition of struggles for citizenship rights. For the reasons which are outlined in Mann’s argument, citizenship remains a strategy for the regulation and institutionalisation of class conflicts by public or governmental agencies rather than a set of practices which articulate popular demands for participation. Finally, we can identify an authoritarian form of democracy from above in which the state manages public space, inviting the citizens periodically to select a leader, who is then no longer
responsible on a daily basis to the electorate. Private life emerges as a sanctuary from state regulation and, in the Germany described by Max Weber and Carl Schmitt, the private offered one possible, if fragile, shelter from the *obrigkeitliche Willkur* (arbitrariness of the authorities). This politico-cultural complex was the historical case of leader-democracy (*Führerdemokratie*).

This typology is regarded here as a mechanism for transcending the limitations of Marshall’s theory of citizenship. Although Marshall distinguished between various types of citizenship rights (civil, political and social), he did not develop any view of active or passive citizenship. While agreeing with Mann’s argument that we need a comparative perspective on citizenship in different historical contexts, Mann’s thesis is limited by the (largely implicit) Marxist paradigm in which citizenship is merely a strategy of dominant towards subordinate classes. Hence Mann does not consider social movements, which are not necessarily or directly tied to class, as social forces, which contribute to the expansion of social rights. In order to elaborate this alternative typology, I shall proceed by an examination of the etymological and cultural roots of the concept of citizenship in order to emphasise the argument that citizenship does not have a unitary character.

From Denizens to Citizens

Historically the concept of citizenship is bound up with the development of the city-state in the classical world of Rome and Greece. In the ancient world, the city-state was a public arena for rational, free men which functioned as a collective insurance against external threats, and internal dispute. In classical Greek and Roman societies, the dominant classes depended extensively upon slave labour for both direct production and domestic services. Thus, the dominant class was an urban population of free, legally constituted, citizens who nevertheless depended on the exploitation of large agrarian estates by slave labour. Since these slaves were often acquired by military conquest, every free-born citizen was threatened by the possibility of servitude and loss of status (Gouldner 1965). Because the full rights of citizenship were conferred upon members of the polis who had a right to speak and to govern, there was an ideological need to explain and to legitimise the subordinate status of women, adult slaves and children; the homosexual subordination of young men was therefore an acute legal and philosophical problem (Foucault 1987). The problems of justifying on rational grounds the existence of slavery came to dominate much of the central issues of classical philosophy (Finlay 1960).

Of course, the class structure of the ancient world was far more complex than a simple division between slave and non-slave (Turner 1988). In early republican Rome, the major social division was between the patricians and the plebians; the patrician class was constituted by large landowners who had the rights to function politically and to hold office, playing a major role in the
formation and direction of the army. The plebian class was composed primarily of landless tenants, who were forced to work patrician property and were excluded from entry into political life (Darnsey 1970). Through the operation of credit relations, a plebian debtor would often be forced into the status of a debt-slave. As the Roman Empire developed, these divisions in society became more precisely determined and defined, creating an enduring division between the lower classes (the humiliores) and the privileged class (the honestiores) (Hopkins 1974). Within this social context, the notion of citizenship rights had very circumscribed significance, being the status of (rational) property owners who had certain public duties and responsibilities within the city-state.

It would be wrong of course to imagine that the notion of citizenship remained historically static. There was, for example, a definite decline in the moral weight and importance of political commitment to the polis after its initial Socratic formulation. The Cynics and the Epicureans tended to give greater importance to the idea of individual autonomy and moral development rather than to the more collective virtues of Aristotelian philosophy. It was the Stoics who reformulated a notion of civic obligation. Thus Marcus Aurelius (121–80 AD) argued that our membership of (and therefore our citizenship in) a common political community was a necessary outcome of the fact that human beings qua humans have a common rational faculty, but his idea of political involvement represented a ‘weary loyalty’ (Sabine 1963:174) towards his status in society. Eventually the Stoical values of discipline, frugality and industry reflected the changing political reality of the Roman Empire, whose size, social differentiation and bureaucratic complexity no longer corresponded to the moral idea of the polis as an ethical association. While Cicero (106–43 BC) had attempted to translate the ancient Greek conceptions of civic virtue and public obligation to the polis into a new rhetoric which would be adequate to the changing conditions of Roman society, in the world of later Roman absolutism, philosophers like Seneca (4 BC–65 AD) could at best offer comfort to the citizen and in his De Clementia beg rulers like Nero to rule with mercy. The citizen–legion which had been the basis, not only of Roman military power, but an essential basis of social solidarity had broken down (Anderson 1974: 53–103; Mann 1986:283–298). Thus,

in place of the value of citizenship there is a common equality shared by all sorts and conditions of men; and in place of the state as a positive agency of human perfection there is a coercive power that struggles ineffectually to make an earthly life tolerable (Sabine 1963:179–80).

The problem in late Roman antiquity was how to combine an abstract notion of universal citizenship with strong political commitment, that is how to overcome political disengagement by citizenship (Wolin 1961:77–78). These tensions in the classical world between the heavenly city of rational beings and the earthly city of self-interested men, and between the moral development of the individual and the need for political duty in the public sphere became in
large measure also part of the Christian legacy within which political life was ethnically dubious.

The term for citizen was derived in classical times from *civitas*, giving rise in Roman times to the notion of a *civitatus*. This etymological origin provided eventually the French term *citoyen* from *cité*, namely an ensemble of citizens enjoying limited rights within a city context. Thus in French we find in the twelfth century the notion of *citeaine* and eventually in the thirteenth century the notion of *comcitien* (Dauzat 1949). A *citoyen* was the ‘habitant d’une cité, d’une ville, d’un pays libre; qui aime son pays’ (Nodier 1866:145). A citizen was ‘brave, honnête’. It is interesting to note that in the *Social Contract* of 1762, J.J. Rousseau complained that it was a common mistake to confuse ‘townsman’ with ‘citizen’. He asserted that ‘houses make a town, but citizens make a city’ (Rousseau 1973:175). In English, the notion of a citizen can be detected in the medieval concept of *citizen*, but at least in the sixteenth century this term was interchangeable with the notion denizen (deinsein). This limited notion of the citizen as simply the inhabitant of a city was both extensive and continuous. Bailey’s *Dictionary* says tersely that a citizen is ‘a Freeman of a City’ (1757). Brown’s *Dictionary of the Holy Bible* gives us more fully ‘one that has the freedom of trade and other privileges belonging to a city’ (1851:241). It was thus common to regard the inhabitants of a city as citizens, while outsiders beyond the city walls were ‘subjects’ (Downing 1988:9).

The notion of the city and the historical evolution of autonomous cities played a critical role in the development of philosophical thought about freedom, individuality and civility. Weber thought this constellation was unique to the West:

> only in the Occident is found the concept of citizen (*civis Romanus, citoyen, bourgeois*) because only in the Occident again are there cities in the specific sense (Weber 1966: 233).

The issue of citizenship was consequently an important issue in his view of the unique character of Western rationalism. These terms were also closely related to ideas about civility and civilization. To leave the countryside in order to enter the city was typically connected with the process of civilization; to become urban was to ‘citizenise’ the person. The city emerged as a topic in social philosophy with very contradictory meanings. Whereas Voltaire thought that the city was the core of individual freedoms which challenged the false hierarchies of traditional rural society, by the beginning of the nineteenth century the city came to be more frequently seen as the great centre of social corruption and moral decadence. In German social thought, there emerged in the nineteenth century a strong nostalgia for country life and rural practices. This romantic nostalgia crystallised around the concepts of *gemeinschaft* and *gesellschaft* in the work of Ferdinand Tönnies (1887), although Tönnies himself did not share necessarily this conservative commitment to the ‘organic’ community (Mitzman 1971). However the whole problem of the melancholy return
to Nature and the development of bourgeois inwardness (*innerlichkeit*) and loneliness (*einsamkeit*) has to be located much earlier in eighteenth-century romanticism (Lepenies 1972:96). In Germany the radical humanists generated an ideal vision of the Greek city-state as a major alternative to the urban society which was developing alongside capitalism. Thus Schiller, Fichte and Holderlin merged the features of the Greek polis with those of the medieval town to create an image of burgher culture as an alternative to the emerging industrial cities of Germany (Barasch 1968). We can therefore identify a rather significant distinction between the emerging concept of citizenship in Germany and the more revolutionary idea of citizenship which had developed in France out of the French Revolution.

In the German philosophical tradition, the notion of social rights and citizenship was closely connected with the development of the idea of civil society (*die bürgliche Gesellschaft*). Within the German conception of civil society, a citizen was any individual who had left the family context in order to enter the public arena which was dominated by economic competition and was contrasted with the state as that institution which was the historical embodiment of reason. In this German tradition the idea of the citizen was therefore necessarily tied to the idea of the burger, and civil society was in a sense merely burgerdom. In German this concept of burgerdom goes back to the fifteenth and sixteenth century, when the notion of burgersh ip embraced the inhabitants of a burgh who enjoyed certain privileges and immunities. The *Bürgertum* (bourgeoisie) was a product of the city who, through training and education, achieved a civilized mastery of emotions; the result was a new status group, the *Bildungsbürgertum* (Martin 1969:138–145).

In the Dutch language, there is the parallel notion of citizenship as a status enjoyed by any person who is a member of bourgeois society (*burgermaatschappij*) but there are other variations such as *stadtburschapp* and *staatsburgerschap*. This concept of the *staatsburger* also carries the idea of a moral body of citizens (*zedelijk lichaam van al de staatsburgers*) (Kruytskamp 1961:355). We can identify many of the principal components of the Dutch framework of citizenship in the religious conflicts of the Golden Age. Thus in the seventeenth century, the United Provinces played an important part in the development of the New Science; for example, Leyden, along with Padua and Edinburgh, was a great university centre of learning, but it was also crucial in the development of experimental science, especially in medical sciences. We can detect the impact of the principles of the New Science on the political philosophy of Spinoza (1632–77), whose *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* (1670) made an important contribution to the defence of individual liberty. However, it was in the political works of Simon Stevin van Brugge (1548–1620) that we find a specific attempt to define the character of citizenship through an analysis of the life of a Dutch burgher. Stevin’s *Vita Politica* (*Het Burgsherlick Leven*) of 1590 was a handbook for the conduct of a citizen. It was written in the context of great social and political disruption during the governor-generalship of
Robert Leicester (1585–8) and, possibly as a result, Stevin’s concept of citizenship allows for no right of disobedience against authority after an individual has rationally chosen the community within which he wants to live. The limited nature of citizenship is evident in Stevin’s general rule of civic life that ‘everyone must always consider as his rightful authority those who at present are actually governing the place where he chooses his dwelling’ (Stevin 1955:493). A law-abiding burgher is a citizen who finds his natural moral sphere within the private domain, and hence Stevin wrote extensively on the architectural principles which must govern the intimate physical relations between the private and public areas of a house in his Materiae Politicae (Dijksterhuis 1955).

While the revolt of the Netherlands (1565–1589) gave rise to a nationalistic, urban, patrician culture, which continued to flourish into the eighteenth century, the democratic elements of this patrician regime were eventually limited by the commercial character of Dutch capitalism, by the rapid decline of Dutch economic dominance in the eighteenth century, and the social ossification of the regents (Boxer 1965). Although Amsterdam and Rotterdam retained their open, cosmopolitan character, industrialisation was late to develop in the Netherlands as a whole. The Dutch Revolt was probably also limited in its political horizons by a strong Protestant commitment to authority and hierarchy (Parker 1977; Schama 1987). Thus in contemporary Dutch the notion of burgerschap (citizenship) still carries the connotation, not only of civic duties but also of a narrow-minded, middle-class world-view.

In social German philosophy, Hegel’s concept of civil society was adopted from the Scottish Enlightenment in which writers like Adam Ferguson in An Essay on the History of Civil Society (1767) and John Millar in Observations Concerning the Distinction of Ranks in Society (1771) had attempted to provide a systematic view of the social development of human societies towards more complex systems. Both Ferguson and Millar were concerned to understand the development of a sharp contrast between the ‘rude’ society of the Highlands and the civilised and sophisticated world of the urban civilization of Edinburgh and Glasgow (Lehmann 1960). For Ferguson, it was the ownership of private property which produced the crucial division between savagery and barbarism, but he feared that the egoism of commercial civilization could destroy the bonds of civil society. In the work of Hegel, civil society was that terrain lying between the family and the political relations of the state, where the state resolved the struggles and contradictions of conflicting interests providing a higher and more universal expression of the particularities of society. Against Hegel, Marx and Engels (1965) in The German Ideology of 1845 came to see civil society as the real ‘theatre of all history’ such that the state became merely an epi-phenomenon of more basic social processes. For Marx the citizen of bourgeois theory was merely an abstract subject which disguised the real conflicts lying in the basic structures of society. Therefore, Marx in the debate on the ‘Jewish question’ saw the political emancipation of the Jewish community as a rather
superficial and partial historical development in the absence of a genuine reorganisation of the socio-economic structure of society as such.

While Marx was highly critical of the abstract notion of bourgeois rights and civil society, the notion of civil society survived in critical theory through the writing of Antonio Gramsci (1971) who formulated the interconnections between the state, society and economy in terms of a set of contrasts between consent and coercion, private and public life. For Gramsci, civil society was not simply the domain of individual wills but a system of institutions and organisation which had the potential for developing freedom in a system of consent; Gramsci came to believe that the state could play an important part in developing this self-regulation of civil society.

In Germany the absence of a successful radical bourgeois revolution and the development of capitalism from above, via Bismarckian legislation, created a social context in which the conditions for the development of a full and dynamic notion of citizenship were limited, giving rise therefore to the rather restricted conceptions of burghership as the main carrier of rights. The absence of a successful bourgeois-liberal revolution and the continuing political dominance of the Junker class created an underdeveloped civil or public realm. This political structure was reinforced and legitimised by Lutheranism, which sanctified the state as both the representative of the Volksgemeinschaft and as the guardian of the privatised individual. The private realm of the individual and the family assumed enormous ethical and educational significance over and against the public.

As the state emerged as the moral guardian of the people, it is easy to see how the state acquired extensive social prestige and powers over civil society. Because Lutheranism failed to offer a normative basis for dissent, the bourgeoisie were, by the end of the nineteenth century, committed to an ideology which supported the state in a context where parliamentary authority was clearly lacking. Sovereignty rested in the law and the state, not in elected assemblies. The result was that ‘Nineteenth-century German Liberalism implicitly accepted the subordination of the individual to the moral expectations of the Volk, while Gustav Schmoller, for example, was lavish in praise of the unification and rationalisation of control by bureaucratisation’ (Lee 1988:34). In the political life of twentieth-century Germany, the impact of the First World War, military defeat and the weakness of the Weimar Republic created an environment in which totalitarian solutions were canvassed. Carl Schmitt’s view that it was not the responsibility of the state to enter into consensual agreements with an electorate, but to take bold and firm actions against its enemies was a natural consequence of these developments. To be free, from the point of view of the individual citizen, was to serve the state (Krieger 1957).

A Typology of Citizenship

These comparisons between different histories of citizenship in Europe suggest a model of citizenship development in terms of two dimensions. The
first dimension is the passive-active contrast depending on whether citizenship grew from above or below. In the German tradition, citizenship stands in a passive relationship to the state because it is primarily an effect of state action. It is important to note that this distinction is in fact fundamental to the western tradition and can be located in medieval political philosophy, where there were two opposed views of citizenship. In the descending view, the king is all powerful and the subject is the recipient of privileges. In the ascending view, a free man was a citizen, an active bearer of rights. In the northern city-states of Italy, the Roman law facilitated the adoption of a populist notion of citizenship; the result was that the populo came to be regarded as an aggregate of citizens who possessed some degree of autonomous sovereignty (Ullmann 1975). The second dimension is the tension between a private realm of the individual and the family in relationship to the public arena of political action. In the German case, an emphasis on the private (the family, religion, and individual ethical development) was combined with a view of the state as the only source of public authority. This typology allows us to contrast Germany with other historical trajectories.

The contrast between the English and the German traditions of political participation would appear to be very considerable. It was Weber of course who drew attention to the historically important contrast between constitutional law in the Roman continental system and the English judge-made law within the common law tradition. Weber argued that continental constitutionalism provided better safeguards for the individual, but he underestimated the importance of the common-law tradition in providing precisely a common basis for rights. The struggle against the absolutist state in England had lead to the execution of the king, an expansion of parliamentary authority, the defence of the English common-law tradition and the assertion of individual religious rights. Of course, it has long been held that the English tradition of individual rights in fact supported an unequal and rigid class structure. Effective social rights resided in individual rights to property, thereby excluding the majority of the population from real social and political participation (Macpherson 1962). The absence of a land army and the state’s dependence on a navy, the early de-militarisation of the English aristocracy and the incorporation of the urban merchants into the elite contributed to English gradualism (Anderson 1974). After the demobilisation of the new model army, two royal guard units were retained for primarily ceremonial duties. The British army was not modernised until the late nineteenth century. The monarch could no longer intimidate parliament (Downing 1988:28). A more important point is that the constitutional settlement of 1688 created the British citizen as the British subject, that is a legal personality whose indelible social rights are constituted by a monarch sitting in parliament. The notion of citizen-as-subject indicates clearly the relatively extensive notion of social rights but also the passive character of British civil institutions. The defeat of absolutism in the settlement of 1688 left behind a core of institutions (the Crown, the Church, the House of
Lords and traditional attitudes about the family and private life) which continued to dominate British life until the destructive force of the First and Second World Wars brought British culture eventually and reluctantly into the modern world.

By contrast with both the English and German cases, the French conception of citizenship was the consequence of a long historical struggle to break the legal and political monopoly of a court society within a social system which was rigidly divided in terms of estates. The very violence of this social transformation resulted in a highly articulate conception of active citizenship in the revolutionary struggles of the eighteenth century. The old myth that the king represented, combined and integrated the multiplicity of orders, groups and estates had become transparent during the political conflicts of the eighteenth century. Revolutionary political theories, acting against the absolutist conception of sovereignty, followed Rousseau in conceptualising society as a collection of individuals whose existence would be represented through the general will in popular parliamentary institutions. What bound Frenchmen together into a common nation was again the concept of citizenship (Baker 1987). Frenchmen had ceased to be merely subjects of the sovereign and had become instead common citizens of a national entity. There are therefore two parallel movements whereby a state is transformed into a nation at the same time that subjects are transformed into citizens (Lindsay 1943). The differences between the French and English revolutionary traditions may be summarised in two contrasted views of citizenship by Rousseau and Burke (Nisbet 1986). For Rousseau in The Social Contract the viability of citizenship required the destruction of all particular intervening institutions which separated the citizen from the state. By contrast, Burke in Reflections on the Revolution in France in 1790 argued that the essence of citizenship was the continuity of local groups, particular institutions and regional associations between the sovereign power of the general will and the individual. For Burke an organised civil society must have hierarchy, order, regulation and constraint; its hierarchical character precluded the very possibility of 'the rights of man' (Macpherson 1980).

Finally, the American case represents another variation on the history of western citizenship. The American example shared with the French a strong rejection of centralised power, adopting also the discourse of the rights of man and privileges of independent citizens. The Boston Tea Party was a symbolically significant expression of the idea 'no taxation without representation'. The radical nature of the 'democratic revolution' in America struck observers like Alexis de Tocqueville with great force; he came to regard America as the first macro-experiment in democracy in modern history. For de Tocqueville, the democratic foundation of the nation was explained by the absence of aristocracy, the frontier, and the exclusion of an established church. Although there was a radical tradition of citizenship expressed in the idea of an independent militia, American democracy nevertheless continued to exist alongside a divisive racist and exploitative South. In addition America's welfare state was late
to develop and provided very inadequate forms of social citizenship and participation for the majority of the population. This weak tradition of citizenship in welfare terms has been explained by the very strength of American individualism, and by the checks and balances of the federal system; American citizenship was expressed in terms of localism versus centralism, thereby limiting the development of a genuinely national programme of welfare rights. To some extent the dominance of individualism and the value of personal success have meant that the ‘public arena’ is typically understood in terms of individual involvement in local voluntary associations. Americans 'have difficulty relating this ideal image to the large-scale forces and institutions shaping their lives' (Bellah et al. 1985:199). The political is seen as morally suspect. This cultural analysis of American individualism would not therefore contradict Mann's analysis. On the contrary, they may be regarded as complementary. In America, the articulation of sectional interests through democratic institutions constrains the emergence of class-based politics.

The point of this historical sketch has been partly to provide a critique of the monolithic and unified conception of citizenship in Marshall and partly to offer a sociological model of citizenship along two axes, namely public and private definitions of moral activity in terms of the creation of a public space of political activity, and active and passive forms of citizenship in terms of whether the citizen is conceptualised as merely a subject of an absolute authority or as an active political agent.

We can now indicate how this ideal--typical construction might now be applied to specific cases:

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In France, a revolutionary conception of active citizenship was combined with an attack on the private space of the family, religion and privacy. In a passive democracy, citizenship is handed down from above and the citizen appears as a mere subject (the English case under the seventeenth century settlement). In a liberal democratic solution, positive democracy emphasises participation, but this is often contained by a continuing emphasis on privacy and the sacredness of individual opinion. In plebiscitary democracy, the individual citizen is submerged in the sacredness of the state which permits minimal participation in terms of the election of leaders, while again family life is given priority in the arena of personal ethical development (Maier 1988).
While revolutionary democracy may collapse into totalitarianism, plebiscitary democracy degenerates into fascism (Lefort 1988). In totalitarian democracy, the 'state, in pushing egalitarianism to the extreme, closes off the private sphere from influencing the course of political affairs' (Prager 1985:187)

The Geo-Politics of Citizenship

Following the work of Barrington Moore (1966), the different routes towards modern polities have distinctive consequences for the character of citizenship. Historically the presence of a successful bourgeois revolution in the development of politically modern systems was a significant ingredient in establishing parliamentary democracy and its associated civil rights. The revolutionary conflicts against aristocratic privilege in the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and the French Revolution of 1789 have been important in the establishment of the notions of sovereignty and citizenship, representation and social contract, and in the development of the concept of public opinion as significant in the shaping of political life (Baker 1987). If a successful revolutionary conflict against aristocratic powers is at least one aspect of the historical emergence of democratic citizenship, then the failure of a liberal bourgeois struggle (as in Germany in 1848) provides one aspect of the peculiarly bureaucratic, authoritarian character of political life in Germany under the aristocratic dominance of the Junkers (Dahrendorf 1967).

While Moore's primary orientation to the issue of the origins of democracy involved the historical relationship between lords and peasants in the development of modern societies, recent approaches to democracy (and by implication citizenship) have been more concerned with the implications of geo-politics for long-term constitutional change. Thus contemporary democratic politics owes a great deal to the military victories of the 'Anglo-Saxon' powers, but in the future, because of nuclear armaments, 'the war-assisted pattern of change' (Mann 1987:352) will not be an option. However, if we examine a much longer period of western history, then we can also see that in early modern Europe the pattern of constitutionalism (parliamentary assemblies, city-state immunities, village councils and so forth) represented an important foundation for later democratic movements. However, societies which were threatened by massive international military assaults were often converted from constitutionalism to military-bureaucratic absolutism. Brian Downing (1988) has shown how the different military histories of Brandenburg-Prussia, England, Sweden, and The Netherlands were important in the survival or destruction of early forms of constitutionalism.

Thus, Downing is able to criticize Moore on two grounds, namely his failure to acknowledge early developments in democratic participation and the role of warfare in creating conditions of authoritarian rule. Downing's thesis does however confirm the importance of gradualism in English democratic history.
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(in combination with the role of common law, demilitarisation, and island isolation) as the basis for (passive) citizenship. These historical accounts of the geo-politics of citizenship are compatible with the typology which has been developed in this argument, because the notion of democracy from above or from below is simply one version of Moore’s perspective on the rise of modern democracies. In addition, mass warfare has, in the modern period, created conditions whereby there can be political mobilisation to claim rights or to seek the satisfaction of rights through state mediation (Turner 1986b:67–78).

The principal addition to these comparative studies of the history of citizenship in this article is the argument that the ways in which public space is culturally organised (in relation to notions of individualism, privatism and the ethical status of the domestic) also has important implications for whether the private is seen as an area of deprivation or an arena of moral fulfillment. In classical societies, the private was definitely a space of necessity and privation, whereas in modern societies with an emphasis on achievement orientation in public competition for material success, the private is seen as the space of personal leisure and enhancement. If we regard the historical emergence of the public as in fact the emergence of the political, then the structural relationship between the private and the public, and their cultural meanings, is an essential component in any understanding of the relationships between totalitarianism and democracy (Arendt 1962; Lefort 1986; Prager 1985). The transfer of sovereignty from the body of the king to the body politic of citizens is thus a major turning point in the history of western democracies, because it indicates a major expansion of political space, indeed the creation of political spaces.

The revolutionary conflicts of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries gave rise to an expanded notion of political participation and membership. The development of the concept of the political citizen was an important adjunct to the historical development of the nation-state as the principal political unit of contemporary political life. The failure of absolutism and the survival of constitutionalism created a niche for the gradual development of parliamentary rights and political participation. Marshall’s work was important therefore in providing a theoretical perspective on a broader and deeper conception of social membership as expressed through the idea of a welfare state being itself the embodiment of certain social rights and claims. Citizenship became a form of entitlement (Bell 1976).

Conclusion: the globalization of citizenship

While the notion of citizenship continues to provide a normative basis for the defence of the welfare state, certain crucial changes in the organisation of global systems have rendered some aspects of the notion of citizenship redundant and obsolete. The contemporary world is structured by two contradictory social processes. On the one hand, there are powerful pressures towards regional...
autonomy and localism, on the other, there is a stronger notion of globalism and global political responsibilities. The concept of citizenship is therefore still in a process of change and development. We do not possess the conceptual apparatus to express the idea of global membership, and in this context a specifically national identity appears anachronistic. Indeed the uncertainty of the global context may produce strong political reactions asserting the normative authority of the local and the national over the global and international (Robertson and Lechner 1985; Robertson 1987).

The analysis of citizenship has in recent years become a pressing theoretical issue, given the problems which face the welfare state in a period of economic recession. However, the problem of citizenship is in fact not confined merely to a question of the normative basis of welfare provision; its province is global. It includes, on the one hand, the international consequences of perestroika and glasnost in the Soviet Union, and, on the other, the implications of medical technology for the definition of what will count as a human subject/citizen. While Marshall's aim in formulating a theory of citizenship was by contrast rather modest in its focus (to understand the tensions in Britain between capitalism and social rights), his statement of the issues has proved to be extremely fruitful in sociology and political science.

The limitations of Marshall's approach, however, are equally obvious. His framework is now widely regarded as evolutionary, analytically vague and ethnocentric. Mann's treatment of citizenship in a comparative and historical context as a 'ruling class strategy' indicates a number of important directions by which the Marshallian framework might be expanded, elaborated and finally transcended. My commentary in this article on different types of citizenship could be regarded as compatible, therefore, with the spirit of Mann's critique in the sense that only a historical sociology of citizenship can take us out of the Anglophile orbit of the Marshallian view. It has also been argued that Mann's thesis fails to deal with revolutionary conceptions of citizenship, with cultural variations in the definition of public space, and with the problem of status as opposed to class in the formation of citizenship. For example, Mann appears to regard gender, age and race as variables which are irrelevant in the historical emergence of citizenship. Since Mann (1986:222) has declared status to be 'that most vacuous of sociological terms', this absence is hardly surprising, and yet it can be argued that status is an essential concept for the analysis of modern problems of citizenship (Turner 1988).

In this article I have been concerned with two dimensions which I believe are missing in Mann's attempt to go beyond Marshall, namely the private/public division in western cultures, and the issue of passive and active versions of citizenship. However, any further development of the theory of citizenship will have to deal more fundamentally with societies in which the struggle over citizenship necessarily involves problems of national identity and state formation in a context of multiculturalism and ethnic pluralism. The societies on which this article has largely concentrated – France, Germany, England, the
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Netherlands and colonial America – were relatively homogeneous in ethnic terms during their period of national formation. With the exception of North America, these societies had no internal problem of aboriginality. The question of citizenship was less complicated therefore by questions of ethnic minorities, ethnic pluralism and cultural melting pots; it is partly for this reason that Mann's neglect of ethnicity is not an issue in the societies which he has chosen for debate, but ethnic migration has been critical (indeed crucial) in other contexts such as in South Africa, the Middle East, Australia and New Zealand (Turner 1986b:64-84). We may in conclusion indicate two possible lines of theoretical development of the (western) notion of citizenship. The first would be the conditions under which citizenship can be formed in societies which are, as it were, constituted by the problems of ethnic complexity (such as Brazil), and the second would be an analysis of the problems which face the development of global citizenship as the political counter-part of the world economy.

Notes

1. A version of this article was first given as a public lecture to the West European Studies Program, University of Pittsburgh in 1989. I am grateful to the participants for their commentary. I would also like to thank the anonymous reviewers of this article for Sociology for their recommendations. My original interest in the whole issue of citizenship was fostered by Dr. Karen Lane's unpublished thesis Broadcasting Democracy and Localism University of Adelaide 1988. This research was originally undertaken while I was an Alexander von Humboldt Fellow at Bielefeld University, West Germany 1987–1988.

2. The active and passive notion of citizenship can be identified in medieval legal and political philosophy (Ullmann 1975) where it was the product of two contrasted views of sovereign power, namely whether the king was seen as primus inter pares or whether the king was regarded as the separate and exclusive source of legitimate power. These two views therefore pinpointed an essential and permanent conflict within a feudal system between centralised and decentralised power, which involved a struggle over the monopolisation of the means of violence (Giddens 1985:53–60). In this article, however, the idea of citizenship from above through the state or from below via more localised, participatory, civil institutions is derived from Lash and Urry (1987:4–16). Within this framework, just as one can speak about the historical organisation of capitalism as a socio-economic system as a whole from above (for example Germany) or from below (such as Britain), so one might analyse the historical structuring of politics (through the formation of citizenship) within the same paradigm. This particular perspective on citizenship is also dependent on Claus Offe's analysis of capitalism in terms of the tensions between economic and political functions (Offe 1985), but this article, at least by implication, is also an attempt to translate the historical sociology of Barrington Moore (1966) into a political sociology of citizenship. Finally, my treatment of the private/public dimension has been influenced by Charles Maier's Changing Boundaries of the Political (1988).

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