Citizenship, reproduction and the state: international marriage
and human rights

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The relationship between citizenship, marriage and family has often been overlooked in the social and political theory of citizenship. Intimate domestic life is associated with the private sphere, partly because reproduction itself is thought to depend on the private choices of individuals. While feminist theory has challenged this division between private and public – ‘the personal is political’ – the absence of any systematic thinking about familial relations, reproduction and citizenship is puzzling. Citizenship is a juridical status that confers political rights such as the right to carry a passport or to vote in elections. However, from a sociological point of view, we need to understand the social foundations and consequences of citizenship – however narrowly defined in legal and political terms. This article starts by noting the obvious point that the majority of us inherit citizenship at birth and in a sense we do not choose to be ‘Vietnamese’ or ‘Malaysian’ or ‘Japanese’ citizens. Although naturalisation is an important aspect of international migration and settlement, the majority of us are, as it were, born into citizenship. Therefore, the family is an important but often implicit facet of political identity and membership. In sociological language, citizenship looks like an ascribed rather than achieved status, and as a result becomes confused and infused with ethnicity. This inheritance of citizenship is odd given the fact that, at least in the West, there is a presumption, following the pronouncements of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, to think of citizenship in universal terms that are ethnically ‘blind’, but it is in fact closely connected with familial or private status. These complex relations within the nation-state are further complicated by the contemporary growth of transnational marriages and this article considers the problems of marriage, reproduction and citizenship in the context of global patterns of migration.

Keywords: Citizenship; reproductive rights; state; family

Introduction: the nature of modern citizenship

My argument attempts to capture the central paradox of marriage in relation to the public sphere which is that, leaving aside the issue of arranged marriages, the decision to marry and to reproduce is typically seen to be the result of private, romantic decisions of couples, but the state has a very clear public interest in these private decisions, because the future of the population and the society depends on them. International marriages complicate this picture because the offspring of these unions need to be allocated citizenship status, but, if citizenship has a strong ethnic definition, then the offspring of parents of different ethnicities may have an ambiguous status in the public sphere. When the ethnicity of the
parents is compounded by the different religious backgrounds of the parents, there can be vexatious struggles to categorically define the child.

In broad terms it is common to distinguish between two criteria for the acquisition of citizenship – birth and residence. In Germany the idea of *ius sanguinis* has been the dominant tradition, giving citizenship rights only to those of German race and their descendants. French citizenship employed both *ius sanguinis* and *ius soli* thereby recognising those born on French soil of foreign forebears as French citizens. The Israeli Law of Return gave Israeli citizenship to those who can demonstrate that they have a Jewish mother. This law was amended in 1970 to state ‘[t]he rights of a Jew under this Law and the rights of an *oleh* (immigrant) under the Nationality Law ... are also vested in a child and a grandchild of a Jew, the spouse of a Jew, the spouse of a child of a Jew and the spouse of a grandchild of a Jew’. Citizenship by naturalisation is often difficult and prolonged, and the majority of people have citizenship as a consequence of birth and residence in a particular country. In short, citizenship is inherited from our parents rather like the inheritance of property. It is just this sense of rights entitlement, which captures the notion of the social capital or the ‘wealth’ of one’s birthright to citizenship that is expressed in the *ius soli* and *ius sanguinis* distinction as an aspect of ascriptive membership. Citizenship defines access to resources (such as welfare benefits), but it is itself a form of property right defining our social entitlements. In all of these political processes, the family is a distinctive and defining conduit of rights.

The family plays a central part in the distribution of citizenship entitlements that are effective claims on the state. Effective claims on social resources depend on contributions to society through work, war (or public service) and reproduction (or parenting). For example, entitlements are acquired by young couples through the creation of households and families that become the social vehicles for the reproduction of society through the birth and socialisation of children. These services to the state through the family and household provide entitlements to both men and women as parents, namely, as reproducers of the nation. Given the fact that the majority of Asian societies – especially Japan, South Korea, Singapore and Thailand – have very low fertility rates, Asian governments recognise that they must increase fertility by a variety of material and ideological inducements or increase the rate of immigration, or both.

Contemporary government policies on new reproductive technologies implicitly demonstrate the general importance of eugenics for the modern state. Because Asian societies, apart from the Philippines and East Timor, now enjoy only modest rates of successful reproduction in demographic terms, the state promotes the desirability of fertility as a foundation of social participation. These issues are obviously not confined to Asia. Recent debates about the decline of the birth rate in post-communist societies are instructive about the state’s relationship to population stagnation in a society in crisis. For example, the Russian total fertility rate has fallen from 1.89 in 1990 to 1.17 children per woman in 2000, and it is anticipated that the population of the Russian Federation will decline from 147 to 123 million by 2015. Alcoholism and drug abuse have had a dramatic impact on the reproductive health of young men, while poverty and the collapse of public health institutions are associated with the rise in tuberculosis and AIDS. Abortions in Russia are four times higher than the United States or one for every 35 people in the country. In 2003 legal changes restricted the grounds for abortion which is now permissible if the woman’s health is at risk or in cases of rape. President Vladimir Putin has suggested that this situation could be reversed by the repatriation of ethnic Russians, but ultra-nationalists like Vladimir Zhirinovsky have proposed that the family code be amended to legitimise polygamy. Although the Russian dilemma (an increasing death rate
and a declining birth rate) is unusual in a technologically advanced society, it serves only to underline the relationship between the state, regulation and demography.

Governments of the developed world are consequently concerned by what might be regarded as the ‘failure’ of heterosexual households to achieve adequate national reproduction. The privileged position given to heterosexuality in official discourse is a function of how public policies seek to normalise reproduction as the desired outcome of marriage. The liberal regime of modern citizenship regards parenthood in ‘normal’ families, rather than heterosexuality, as the defining characteristic of the responsible citizen and as the basis of social entitlement. Because governments are faced with the dilemma of ageing populations and low fertility, they must intervene in the private sphere of family life, becoming thereby increasingly involved in the management of marriage and reproduction. This is true of Muslim and non-Muslim societies (Jones and Karim 2005).

The clear division between the private and the public upon which the liberal view of citizenship was historically grounded has become confused and contested, especially with the growth of international marriages. National citizenship often appears to be an inflexible and anachronistic framework for addressing globalisation, including the status of asylum seekers and refugees, but less dramatically it does not appear to be a legal framework that is fashioned to deal with international marriage and the offspring of such unions. As a result, recent studies of citizenship have emphasised the changing nature of ‘flexible citizenship’ in which immigrants, for example, can often achieve partial rights as guest workers without in fact becoming full citizens (Ong 1999).

**Sexuality, reproduction and citizenship**

Although the intimate sexual activity of adults in marriage is regarded in law as a private matter, the state and church have historically taken a decisive interest in the moral conditions for lawful union and for the reproductive consequences of lawful and unlawful sexual activity. Sustaining and legitimating heterosexual reproduction has been a major objective of the regulatory activity of the modern state, because the values and norms of a household constituted by a married heterosexual couple provide the dominant ideal of social life in modern society, despite the fact that in most developed societies (especially those societies with no established religion) many children are born outside wedlock and many households have no children. Despite the long decline of ‘the nuclear family’, the moral force of the idea of marriage and domesticity is so compulsive that many states are now beginning to permit gay couples to form civil unions, thereby giving them the rights and benefits currently available in law to married heterosexual couples. Many western societies have recognised homosexual unions as a legal unit within the household and South Africa is the first African society to legitimise gay marriage.

Citizen rights can be defined as ‘contributory rights’ (Turner 2006). They are based on the principle of lifelong contributions to collective resources; they assume a close if imprecise relationship between entitlement and duty, that is, between reward and effort. People can in principle choose to increase their contributions in the anticipation of higher rewards in the future, and these investments allow people to draw retrospectively on their past contributions. It is assumed therefore that there is some long-term correlation between lifelong contributions and long-term benefits, and hence there is some degree of fairness between effort and reward.

Because reproduction is regarded by the law as an activity that takes place privately in the domestic sphere, the contributions of women to civil society and the reproduction of the nation have often been ignored, insofar as women are ascribed to the private sphere.
By contrast, because reproduction is crucial to the survival of the nation and hence the state, women’s reproductive choices are typically controlled by men through the regulatory institutions of the state and religion. Where overpopulation has been seen to be a threat, women’s reproduction may be limited by the state (as in the Chinese one-child policy) and where depopulation is seen to be a problem women will be encouraged to have more children (as in contemporary Russia, Japan and Singapore). It is for these reasons that feminist social theory has sought to expose the implicit gender assumptions of citizenship, nationalism and the modern state (Mayer 2000).

Rather than define citizenship within a static framework of rights and obligations, it is important to conceptualise citizenship as a set of processes. It is both a process of inclusion involving some reallocation of resources and an exclusionary process involving the building of identities on the basis of a common or imagined solidarity. Citizenship entitlements provide criteria for the allocation of scarce resources in society and at the same time create strong identities that are not simply juridical, but typically involve assumptions about ethnicity, religion and sexuality (Isin and Wood 1999). Nineteenth-century national citizenship was typically constituted around ethnic divisions, excluding outsiders from access to scarce resources on the basis of a typically imaginary ethnic or national identity. Because citizenship involves the distribution of entitlements, obligations and immunities within a state, these entitlements are themselves based on principles that both describe and evaluate the specific contributions individuals have made to society, for example, through war service, or reproduction, or work.

In historical terms, social citizenship has been closely associated with the involvement of individuals (typically men) in the formal labour market. Gainful employment was fundamental to the conception of citizenship in the welfare state in post-war reconstruction in Europe. Individuals could achieve effective entitlements through the production of goods and services, that is, through work as the basis for the provision of pensions and superannuation. These entitlements typically included work care, insurance cover, retirement benefits and health care. Second, service to the state through warfare generated a range of entitlements for the soldier-citizen. War-time service created special pension rights, health provisions, housing and education for returning service men and their families. Such war service has been important in the development of the evolution of social security entitlements. Third, people achieve entitlements through the establishment of households and families that become the social mechanisms for the reproduction of society through the birth, maintenance and socialisation of offspring. These reproductive services to the state through the family provided entitlements to both men and women as parents, that is, as reproducers of the nation. These reproductive entitlements become the basis of family security systems, various forms of support for mothers, and health and educational provision for children. These conditions of effective entitlement also established a pattern of active participation in society, contributing in turn to civil society through the creation of ‘social capital’. Active citizenship was associated with work-related associations (such as working men’s clubs, trade unions, professions and guilds, and political organisations such as left-wing labour parties).

Recent writing in the field of citizenship studies (Berkovitch 1999) has underlined the neglect of gender in the analysis of the national development of citizen entitlements and obligations in the nation-state. We need to extend the discussion of citizenship, nationalism and gender by examining the relationship between parenthood and entitlement. However, reproducing the next generation of citizens through marriage and household formation is a central means of acquiring comprehensive entitlements of citizenship and fulfilling its related obligations. Contemporary government policies on new
reproductive technologies demonstrate the general importance of eugenics for the modern state. Because the majority of East Asian societies in demographic terms enjoy only modest rates of successful reproduction, the state promotes the desirability of fertility and reproductivity as a foundation of social participation. The privileged position that was historically given to heterosexuality is a function of the manner in which public policies seek to normalise reproduction as the desired outcome of marriage.

**Nation-building**

The idea that state-building, nationalism and reproductive citizenship define a set of necessary social connections is supported by traditional theories of patriarchy and by the history of the modern state. In the traditional terminology of political science, citizenship building also involves nation-building. The creation of a community as the basis of national citizenship typically involved the conjunction of the dominance of both ethnic and national identities. The centrality of ‘national manhood’ in the making of American citizenship is a classical illustration of the role of an ‘imagined fraternity’ alongside an ‘imagined community’ (Nelson 1998). The creation of institutions of citizenship in legal, political and social terms was an important stage in the construction of a national framework of membership within the modern state – a process that, for example, dominated domestic politics in Europe and North America through the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The production of an institutional framework of national citizenship required the creation of national identities. Citizenship identities during the rise of the European cities had been local and urban, but with the rise of nationalism they became increasingly connected with strong nationalistic cultures that sought greater domestic coherence and simultaneously organised negative images of outsiders. These national mythologies cement individual biographies and collective biographies of generations within the history of a nation-state and its people. In modern Asia, state formation is still the main political project of societies that are inherently ethnically complex, but similar processes of citizenship building can be observed with similar constructions of nationalist ideology and identity.

Women were clearly not excluded from these processes of nation-building. They are crucial for family formation and sexual reproduction, because these ‘domestic arrangements’ in turn reproduce political society (Yuval-Davis 1998). However, women’s voices in the grand narratives of nationhood tend to be muted or marginalised by a more dominant warrior ethos. Epic poetry, tragic romances and national mythologies combine collective emotions and sentiments with the stories of nation-building. Modern masculine identities were forged and sustained by nationalism and anti-colonial struggles, and national identity has been built around and sustained by the institutions of citizenship which are national institutions of exclusionary entitlement. These macro-social processes that have traditionally sustained national citizenship converge on reproduction within the family as the principal institution that functions as the conduit of individual entitlements.

The nation-state presupposed a continuing pattern of patriarchy and patriotism as the dual legacy of monarchy and state-building. The modern matrix of nation, citizenship and masculinity has been changed by the global challenge to national sovereignty, by the transformations of work and warfare in modern societies, and by the transformation of sexuality and parenthood associated with the development of reproductive technologies. Despite these fundamental social and political transformations, the foundations of national citizenship and the basis of individual entitlement remain legally and socially connected with reproduction and hence with the family and heterosexuality. A familial ideology
of procreation has been a major legitimating support of the contemporary ensemble of entitlements that constitute the social rights of modern citizenship.

Residence, birth and citizenship
The majority of contemporary citizens have acquired their citizenship by virtue of the peculiarities of their birthplace. Securing membership in a specific state or society is, even in the current age of increased globalisation, a crucial factor in the determination of life chances. The vagaries of birth in a specific national context determine access to particular levels of economic wealth, political stability, and the rule of law. These entitlements of birth therefore determine the allocation of political membership in a particular state. Economic wealth and political entitlements are in these circumstances significant resources representing the principal transfer of goods between generations. The determination of citizenship by birth and residence has significant implications for these lifelong social opportunities that determine the well being of individuals through the entire life course.

Citizenship offers opportunities of social closure to exclude outsiders from resources. If membership of different states conditions different trajectories and life chances of individuals, then the connection between birth and citizenship rewards the interests of those individuals who already happen to enjoy wealth, resulting from an accident of birth. There is a clear parallel between birthright and the legal conditions that determine the circumstances under which political membership (or naturalisation) can be achieved. Creating citizenship necessarily creates aliens (Sassen 1999).

There has been much discussion of the possibility of global citizenship and global governance. With the globalisation of many institutions of law and government through United Nations agencies, sociologists have contemplated the possibility of transnational citizenship. Anthropologists have also explored the issue of identity in modern societies with the growth of transnational communities and diasporic cultures (Ong 2006, Kivisto and Faist 2007). Consequently T.H. Marshall’s famous typology of citizenship has been criticised because it cannot encompass these changes that result from globalisation (Marshall 1950). These conventional theories of citizenship were developed before the current phase of the globalisation of the labour market and the consequent increase in the mobility of modern populations. The increasing number of international marriages is simply one aspect of these more general economic and social transformations. This view of modern societies is associated with the work of John Urry (2000) who has criticised mainstream sociology for its alleged focus on nation-states. Urry has advocated ‘mobile sociology’. He is clearly correct to draw our attention to the importance of global flows and networks as key features of the modern world. However, as the economy becomes increasingly global, especially in terms of the flow of finance and commodities, the polity in many respects becomes more rigid in attempting to defend the principle of sovereignty and to control migration. There is a profound contradiction between the economic requirements of flexibility and fluidity in the labour market and the state’s goal of defending its territorial sovereignty. In particular with the growth of a global war on terror, states rather than becoming more porous have defended their borders with increasing determination. From a historical perspective, the flow of people has arguably become more rather than less restrictive. The actual invention of the passport as a method of surveillance and regulation is itself a product of the twentieth-century state (Torpey 2000). While there may be an increasing global flow of goods and people, there is also emerging what we might call a parallel ‘immobility regime’ exercising surveillance and control over citizens and aliens (Shamir 2005). In this context, the growth of international
marriages has significant implications for citizenship and political identity, especially for the children of such unions, and hence the state needs to intervene in such forms of partnership and cohabitation to achieve some surveillance and regulation over these ‘private’ romantic acts.

There is therefore a central paradox of labour migration. The labour markets of global economies depend on high levels of migration, because they have ageing populations and low fertility. In addition, their own labour force is not sufficiently mobile and is reluctant to take on unskilled or low-paid work. Markets need migrant labour, but democratic governments responding in part to electoral pressures and media campaigns cannot be seen to be too lenient towards high levels of migration. In modern politics after 9/11, there is an implicit conflation of three categories of persons: migrants, refugees and asylum seekers. Conservative or right-wing parties have successfully mobilised electorates against liberal policies towards labour mobility and porous frontiers. While migrants contribute significantly to economic growth, they are often thought to be parasitic on the host society. They do not fit easily into a national welfare model of contributory rights. Governments have been reluctant to give citizenship status to migrants without stringent criteria of membership and naturalisation is often a slow, arduous and complex process. Issuing work permits confronts governments and their bureaucracies therefore with fewer problems than granting outright citizenship. Furthermore, dual citizenship continues to be regarded in many societies as an anomaly, and there is an increasing level of social criticism against quasi-citizenship, dual citizenship and flexible arrangements, because these forms of citizenship are thought to undermine the hegemonic model of traditional political membership.

If we conceive of the polity as a ‘club’, then full citizenship in a democratic but exclusive state offers substantial benefits to members. It offers even for members of an underclass some basic security as a basic right of membership, plus the psychological benefit of a secure identity. It is hardly surprising that citizenship is highly prized as a set of entitlements, especially in a world of international insecurity. It is in the interests of members of the club, both rich and poor, to regulate access and to limit the flow of newcomers. The private decision to form an international marriage opens up the prospect that the offspring of these marriages would have automatic membership of the club. Legislation to regulate such marriages is at least in part an attempt to protect the (limited) assets of the club from too rapid dilution.

**Intimate citizenship**

Romantically falling in love and creating permanent sexual relations are characteristically regarded as supremely private, free and individual acts of interpersonal intimacy. This private sphere is one which is often fiercely protected against state intervention (Cohen 2002). While this has long been true of heterosexual unions, gay and lesbian movements have claimed that sexual liberation, especially the right of individuals to decide on their own sexual orientation and sexual pleasures, is an important component of any civilised and egalitarian society (Bell and Binnie 2002). These political arguments promote the idea of sexual rights as an obvious extension of the liberal model of social citizenship as a set of civil, political and social rights. The growth of such rights has been described as the early formation of intimate citizenship (Plummer 2001). In sociological terms, these changes in social attitudes can be regarded as a larger aspect of the ‘transformation of intimacy’ (Giddens 1992). However, these accounts of sexual citizenship run into fundamental problems relating to individual rights.

There has consequently been a growing concern to expand the concept of citizenship to embrace such rights of sexual citizenship. In addition, there is the notion of intimate
citizenship to express the rights to intimate relations with people of one’s own choice, including people of one’s own sex. These rights might be contrasted with also the notion of ‘reproductive rights’. It is important to define these rights accurately. A reproductive right is the right to choose one’s sexual partner without undue restraint with the intention of reproducing, and having a child whose own chances of survival are not compromised. Reproductive rights are associated with the notion that reproduction is an aspect of healthy living, and that involuntary infertility is damaging to the mental health of the partners. A sexual right may be initially defined as the right to select one’s sexual partner without external (that is, state) interference. A sexual right need not entail any desire to reproduce, because the issue is more concerned with freedom to select partners than to have children. These rights are designed to protect gay and lesbian partnerships in which there is no necessary intention to form a family. Further still, one might identify a right to sexual pleasure or ‘intimate citizenship’ in which it is claimed that there is a right to sexual activity (in private) that should not necessarily be the concern of the state.

Reproductive rights are enshrined in Article 16 of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which recognises that ‘[m]en and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have a right to marry and to found a family’ and that ‘Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses’ (Gearon 2003). This reproductive right is associated with Article 3 (‘everyone has the right to life’) which we might extend to the idea that everyone has a right to make life. These human rights clearly indicate that forced marriage is an infringement of personal liberties and that in certain circumstances arranged marriage might be incompatible with the spirit of Article 16. These rights within the Declaration have nothing to say about duties, but one might reasonably assume that the duty that corresponds to a right to reproduce is a duty to protect one’s offspring and to ensure that their health is not compromised by the life style of the parents. Reproductive rights are however primarily about the exercise of free choice in the selection of partners and about personal autonomy in the conditions under which reproduction takes place. One can see obvious tensions here between a universal right to marry and reproduce (‘to found a family’) and the state’s involvement in regulating with whom one might marry and enjoy reproductive rights. There is therefore a tension between these universal rights to marry and local state laws that prescribe and proscribe legal and illegal forms of marriage, thereby also regulating the status of the resulting children. The legal contradictions of international marriage arise because of the friction that exists between universal human rights and the rights of national citizens under the law of states.

Reproductive rights are important to human health and can be understood as an aspect of the capabilities model (Nussbaum 2000). Nussbaum’s understanding of ‘central human functional capabilities’ includes ‘bodily health’ and ‘being able to have good health, including reproductive health’. Economic development cannot take place without the development of social and political rights, and social development cannot take place without the equality of women, especially through the provision of education. Women’s social rights are very closely connected with their reproductive rights. For example, Article 12 of the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (1997) says that states should ‘take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the field of health care in order to ensure, on a basis of equality between men and women, access to health care services, including those relating to family planning’. The 1994 International Conference on Population and Development recognised the importance of a satisfying and safe sexual life as the basis of the capability to reproduce and the freedom to choose to reproduce when and how. Reproductive citizenship can also be said to include a right not to reproduce.
Reproductive rights (such as the right to reproduce under conditions of one’s own choosing) involve primarily the rights and duties of parenting, and not necessarily the rights of an unborn child. Legislation relating to reproductive citizenship attempts to provide a legal answer to the question: with whom may one reproduce and under what social and legal conditions? By contrast, sexual citizenship concerns the rights of sexual consumption: with whom may one enjoy sexual intimacy, what forms of intimacy are legitimate and under what conditions can one find sexual fulfilment? Is there a natural right to reproduce? These issues bring out an essential aspect of reproductive, unlike sexual, rights, that they necessarily entail the rights of others, especially offspring, and it is one reason why states intervene in the private sphere. These rights illustrate the crucial matter of obligation in any discussion of rights. If we grant full and effective reproductive rights to women (more generally to parents), do children have comparable rights? Children are dependent on advocacy if they are to realise their rights effectively, and the obvious problem is that generally children cannot exercise their rights without the full backing and assistance of their parents, but parental rights (to selection, contraception, abortion, and divorce) may not always coincide with children’s rights. Children have been missing from liberal theories of the family based on the idea of a sexual contract between the adult partners (O’Neill 1994).

Conclusion

The state’s interest in sexuality and sexual identity is secondary and subordinate to its primary demographic objective of securing and enforcing the historic connection between reproduction and citizenship. Reproductive citizenship as a concept is therefore sociologically and legally more adequate than the idea of sexual citizenship. It recognises the state’s interest in population within the framework of governmentality. State-building, nationalism, and reproductive citizenship are necessary connections of reproduction, supported by traditional ideologies of patriarchy. The nation-state presupposes a continuing pattern of patriarchy and patriotism as the dual legacy of monarchy and state-building. The modern system of nation, citizenship, and masculinity has been changed by the global challenge to national sovereignty, by the transformations of work and warfare in modern societies, and by the transformation of sexuality and parenthood associated with the development of reproductive technology. Despite these fundamental social and political changes, the foundation of national citizenship and the basis of individual entitlement remains legally and socially connected with heterosexual reproduction and hence with the nuclear family. A familial ideology of procreation has been a major legitimating support of the contemporary ensemble of entitlements that constitute the social rights of citizenship. One might say that the state’s eugenic commandment is biblical: go forth and multiply. These arguments and illustrations only serve to reinforce the well known political arguments that while sexual relations may appear to be private affairs (of the bedroom), they are in reality critical matters of the public domain, linking reproduction to citizenship, nationalism and state functions.

This historical pattern between state, citizenship and family is breaking down for a variety of causes: the globalisation of the economy, the world-wide increase in labour migration, the emergence of international marriages and geographically dispersed families, low fertility and ageing populations, and changing definitions of citizenship and legal entitlement. From a sociological and anthropological perspective, international marriages can be regarded as a site where these contradictions between state and market are condensed.
References


