Cultural citizenship in the 'cultural' society: A cosmopolitan approach

Nick Stevenson

* School of Sociology and Social Policy, University of Nottingham, University Park, Nottingham, UK

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This article seeks to develop a model of cultural citizenship suitable for a cosmopolitan age. A variety of themes and issues are raised: the continued importance of democratic notions of ‘civil’ society, questions of cultural exclusion, the impact of the development of the media of mass communication, globalisation and identity politics. In particular, the argument stresses the continued importance of Habermas and Foucault to ‘cultural’ understandings of citizenship. In the middle section, I discuss competing definitions of cultural citizenship offered by Will Kymlicka, Joke Hermes and Tony Bennett. These authors are discussed due to the emphasis they place on cultural questions and their relation to citizenship. However, while offering important contributions for debate, they are found to be limited in respect of cosmopolitan understandings of culture and society. Finally, I seek to link some of the themes suggested by Habermas and Foucault to a discussion of the forms of education that are appropriate for modern citizenship.

Manuel Castells (1997, p. 359) has recently written that ‘new power lies in the codes of information and in the images of representation around which societies organize their institutions, and people build their lives, and decide their behavior. The sites of this power are people’s minds’. This paper will argue that this ‘new power’ is both transforming conventional understandings of citizenship and pressing the case for more complex cultural understandings of its genuinely new dimensions. Definitions of citizenship need to link the struggle for rights and social justice with the quest for recognition and cultural respect. Further, that while citizenship studies has broadened its focus to include concepts such as sexual citizenship, ecological citizenship and multicultural citizenship it needs to pay greater attention to the rise of the ‘cultural’ society. The genuinely ‘cultural’ dimensions of citizenship can no longer be assumed to be peripheral within modern mediated, globalised and post-modernised societies. These features and others have transformed modern forms of citizenship. Citizenship should be seen as a social process ‘in which the emphasis is less on legal rules and more on norms, practices, meanings and identities’ (Isin and Tuner, 2002, p. 4).
Within these contours the role of the cosmopolitan imagination is likely to be crucial.

Many in the social sciences have neglected the idea of the imagination. Castoriadis (1997) has argued that all societies are dependent upon the creation of webs of meaning that are carried by societies institutions and individuals. Society is always a self-creation that depends upon norms, values and language that help give diverse societies a sense of unity. The ‘imaginary’ is a social and historical creation, and serves to remind us that society must always create symbolic forms beyond the purely functional.

By cosmopolitanism I mean a way of viewing the world that among other things dispenses with national exclusivity, dichotomous forms of gendered and racial thinking, and rigid separations between culture and nature, and popular and high culture. Such a sensibility would be open to the new spaces of political and ethical engagement that seek to appreciate the ways in which humanity is mixed into inter-cultural ways of life. Arguably cosmopolitan thinking is concerned with the transgression of boundaries and markers, and the development of a genuinely inclusive cultural democracy and citizenship suitable for an information age. Yet cosmopolitanism is not only concerned with intermixing and the ethical relations between the self and the other, but seeks an institutional and political grounding in the context of shared global problems. A concern for cosmopolitan dimensions will inevitably seek to develop an awareness of the discourses, codes and narratives that make such political understandings a possibility. As Lawrence Grossberg (1992, p. 64) has argued, ‘no democratic political struggle can be effectively organised without the power of the popular’.

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T.H. Marshall, as is well known, was concerned with the historical development of civil, political and social rights in the British national context. Marshall drew attention to the contradiction between the formations of capitalism and class, and the principle of equality enshrined within the granting of basic rights. Such a view of citizenship was hardly surprising given that Marshall was writing in an age where identity and social conflicts were dominated by class. The setting up of the welfare state, the possibility of full male employment, the nuclear family, the dominance of the nation-state and the separation between an elite literary culture and a popular mass culture all inform his dimensions of citizenship. Marshall perceived that the principle of civil and political rights had been granted in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, whereas the twentieth century had seen the acceptance of the idea of social rights. As many of Marshall’s critics have pointed out, questions of civil and political rights are far from settled, and social rights were threatened once the post-war compromise between capital and labour came under attack. Further, Turner (1994) argues that the post-modernisation of culture and the globalisation of politics have rendered much of the literature in respect of citizenship inadequate. The attack on traditional divisions between high and low culture poses serious questions in terms of the common or national cultures that might be transmitted by public institutions. The diversification and fragmentation of public tastes and lifestyles
have undermined a previously assumed ‘cultural’ consensus. Further, the development of transnational spheres of governance, instantaneous news and global networks amongst new social movements has questioned the assumed connection between citizenship and the nation-state. These processes undermine, or at least call into question, the correspondence that citizenship has traditionally drawn between belonging and the nation-state. Marshall’s analysis, while still influential, fails to locate the state within a complex web of international flows and relations, while assuming that the ‘political’ works within stable national cultures. The context of increasing cultural diversity and globalisation brings to the fore questions of cultural rights.

More recently, Jan Pakulski (1997) has argued that ‘cultural’ citizenship should be viewed in terms of satisfying demands for full inclusion into the social community. Such claims should be seen in the context of the waning of the welfare state and class identities, and the formation of new social and cultural movements that focus on the question of the rights of groups from children to the disabled. Cultural rights, in this sense, herald ‘a new breed of claims for unhindered representation, recognition without marginalisation, acceptance and integration without “normalising” distortion’ (Pakulski, 1997, p. 80). These rights go beyond rights for welfare protection, political representation or civil justice and focus on the right to propagate a cultural identity or lifestyle. These claims, however, are likely to be as problematic as the implementation of social rights. Pakulski suggests that there is already a perceived backlash against ‘politically correct’ programmes and unease about bureaucratic attempts to regulate the cultural sphere. These questions aside, Pakulski (1997) and Turner (1994) argue that any attempt to rethink models of citizenship would have to problematise questions of ‘culture’ in ways that are not evident in Marshall’s initial formulation of citizenship. We might push these arguments further by suggesting that ideas of ‘cultural’ citizenship need to be able to define new forms of ‘inclusive’ public space so that ‘minorities’ are able to make themselves and their social struggles visible and open the possibility of dialogic engagement, while offering the possibility of deconstructing normalising assumptions. Cultural citizenship then becomes the struggle for a communicative society.

A ‘cultural’ approach to cosmopolitan citizenship suggests a different although related approach to the ‘liberal cosmopolitanism’ offered by writers such as Held (1995) and Linklater (1998). Liberal cosmopolitanism offers the view that without a global civil society and cosmopolitan institutions, we will remain a world at the mercy of the interests of nation-states and economic markets. Democracy, in this view, has to become a transnational form of governance by breaking with the cultural hegemony of the state. A cosmopolitan political community would be based upon overlapping or multiple citizenships connecting the populace into local, national, regional and global forms of governance. The cosmopolitan polity, guided by the principle of autonomy, would seek to achieve new levels of interconnectedness to correspond with an increasingly global world. These dimensions remain vital, surpassing older divisions in the democratic tradition between direct and representative democracy by seeking to maximise the principle of autonomy across a range of different levels. Yet such a view stops short of demonstrating how cosmopolitan identities and sensibilities
might be fostered in terms of everyday cultures. That is, cosmopolitanism needs to be discursively, culturally and emotionally imagined. What would a cosmopolitan education strategy look like, or indeed how might we devise cosmopolitan cities and cultural policies? If cosmopolitanism is to be become more than a matter of institution building it will need to address questions such as the construction of public space, identity and difference.

Civil Society, Difference and Public Space

As we have seen, issues of inclusion and exclusion are at the heart of notions of cultural citizenship. In particular, how to achieve widespread participation in questions of genuinely communal concern is at the centre of our discussion. For Raymond Williams this was the possibility of achieving a genuinely participative and educative democracy. These questions are usually answered through the discussion of the need to develop an inclusive civil society. Cultural inclusion, taking our lead from Williams, should be concerned with both having access to certain rights and the opportunity to be heard, in the knowledge that you will have the ear of the community. As Cohen and Arato (1992) argue, democracy is maintained through formal institutions and procedures and the maintenance of civil society. Here rights of communication and dialogue have a necessary priority over all other social and economic rights. Whereas Marxism has criticised capitalist societies for instituting merely bourgeois rights, and liberalism has sought to remain agnostic in respect of the lifestyle choices of its citizens, a politics based upon a communicative civil society takes us in a different direction. Civil society should ‘institutionalise’ the everyday practice of democratic communication. Michael Walzer (1992, p. 89) has identified civil society as a ‘space of uncoerced human association and also the set of relational networks—formed for the sake of family, faith, interest and ideology’. Notably the revival of interest in civil society came from dissident Eastern European intellectuals who sought to construct domains of civic association and engagement not controlled by the state. The argument here was that a free and democratic society would necessarily be underpinned by a variety of associations that had gained at least relative forms of independence from the state. These concerns also found resonance within the West, given the growing concern that privatised lifestyles encouraged by neo-liberalism were undermining a wider culture of democratic engagement (Keane, 1989). While many have noted that ideas of civil society have long and complex histories, it is difficult to see how definitions of citizenship and democracy that wish to retain a participatory basis can ignore the concept (Kumar, 1993).

In terms of more contemporary thinkers, it has been Habermas (1989) who has taken these questions most seriously. If we are breaking with the idea that social totality will be transformed by an international movement of workers that will instigate a more just and democratic society, then how we choose to communicate with each other becomes ever more important. The idea that social problems cannot be swept away through whole scale transformations fostered by revolutionaries, technologies or indeed governments reintroduces the idea of morality and ethics. For Habermas (1990) the idea of discourse ethics is based upon the
notion that the rightness or the justness of the norms we uphold can only be secured by our ability to give good reasons. In turn, these norms are considered valid if they gain the consent of others within a shared community. The moral principles that we uphold must be more than the prejudices of the particular group to which we happen to belong. Such collectively held norms can only be considered valid if they are judged impartially. In this sense, our ethical claims can be said to be deontological in that their rightness cannot be secured by social conventions or appeals to tradition. The achievement of a universal ethical stance, therefore, requires that participants in practical discourse transcend their own egoistic position in order to negotiate with the horizons of other cultures and perspectives. A norm can only be considered valid if all those it would potentially affect would freely accept it. These remarks, as should be clear, represent a radical reworking of the universalistic thinking of Kant, and a forcible rejection of relativistic standpoints.

Habermas’s (1996) most recent writing on the public sphere has sought to more precisely define its dynamic and spatially complex nature. Habermas links the cognitive capacity of the self and the institutional mechanisms of society in the promotion of a critical pluralistic culture. The distinction between ethics (questions of what’s right for me) and morality (questions of what’s right for the community) means that the public sphere is continually involved in a process of determining what can reasonably be decided by the community and what can not. The decidability of such questions presupposes a participatory democratic culture that is able to couple the increasing individualism evident in ethical decisions and dilemmas with a need for a moral discourse at the level of the community. The primary task of the public sphere, therefore, is the detection and identification of public problems that need to be fed into the procedures of parliament and the state. The public sphere in the modern media age operates as a ‘signalling device’ highlighting matters of public importance that have to be decided upon by the structures of representative democracy. Public opinion, in this respect, is not so much the result of opinion polls (although these are a contributing factor) but proceeds a period of proper focused debate. Habermas argues that agreement can only emerge after a period of what he calls ‘exhaustive controversy’ (Habermas, 1996, p. 362). However, Habermas is clear that such widespread discussions only become converted into communicative power once they pass through the institutional matrix of democratic will formation. Proceeding this we can say that public opinion has been activated once the various interactive agencies of state and civil society have become focused on a particular problem.

The domain of civil society is much more than a well scripted public relations exercise, but crucially involves the direct intervention of ethical communities, feminist campaigners, green networks, religious denominations, trade unions, ethnic organisations and parent’s groups. A society-wide conversation is dependent upon the emergence of an ‘energetic civil society’ which is able to force issues and perspectives onto a public agenda. A robust civil society ensures that the communicative basis of the life-world never becomes completely colonised by agencies of money and power. Civil society then, under certain circumstances, is able to convert itself into communicative power through the channels
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of public communication and the activation of public normative sentiment. For the public sphere to be socially just it must both prevent the manipulation of the public by forces with vested interests in social control and pull together an otherwise fragmented public. A communicative civil society produces a cultural citizenship where the public is capable of learning from one another’s viewpoints.

The political and cultural question becomes how to promote genuinely cosmopolitan definitions, practices and understandings of public space. How might we enhance our capacity to learn from one another within globalised settings, and what are the educational and material implications of aiming to live in a genuinely democratic culture? These are all questions raised by Habermas’s reflections. Yet an institutional definition of civil society (usually made up of relatively independent organisations like churches, trade unions, schools, and the media) does not go far enough. Arguably Habermas’s analysis of civil society stops short of an investigation into the ways in which civil society has become historically and culturally constructed. While he correctly emphasises the normative importance of communicative rights for fostering civic solidarity he understates the cultural dimensions of what he calls a ‘cosmopolitan consciousness’ (Habermas, 2001, p. 112). For example, Jeffrey Alexander (1992) argues that civil society is not merely an institutional realm, but is constructed through symbolic codes of inclusion and exclusion. Notions of ‘civility’ depend upon definitions of incivility. All citizens make judgements between those who are deserving of exclusion from the public right to speak or indeed who is worth hearing. Who is deemed worth listening to, which parts of the city are coded as dangerous, and whose languages and perspectives are able to pass as ‘normal’ are all contentious questions (Bourdieu, 1996). Indeed it has been the strength of cultural studies and post-structuralism that they have been able to highlight the ways in which civil society becomes coded through multiple and often antagonistic discourses (Mouffe, 1993).

Chantal Mouffe (2000) has argued that theorists like Habermas who appeal to ‘reasonableness’ or ‘rationality’ try to hide the ways in which the ‘political’ or ‘civil society’ is constituted through powerful codes and discourses. The idea that participants within dialogue and civic exchange should seek a ‘rational consensus’ obscures the role played by passion and affect. Cultural understandings of citizenship are concerned not only with ‘formal’ processes such as who is entitled to vote and the maintenance of an active civil society, but with whose cultural practices are disrespected. Cultural versions of citizenship need to ask who is silenced, marginalised, stereotyped and rendered invisible. As Renato Rosaldo (1999, p. 260) argues cultural citizenship is concerned with ‘who needs to be visible, to be heard, and to belong’. What becomes defining here is the demand for cultural respect. Whereas liberalism commonly recognises that a political community can generate disrespect by forms of practical mistreatment (torture or rape) and by withholding formal rights (such as the right to vote), notions of cultural citizenship point to the importance of the symbolic dimension of community. Cultural citizenship is concerned with ‘the degree of self esteem accorded to his or her manner of self-realisation within a society’s inherited cultural horizon’ (Honneth, 1995, p. 134). These aspects might be linked to
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whose language is given public acceptance, whose history is taught in schools, which sexual activities are confined in the private, or who is permitted to move securely through public space. Cultural citizenship becomes defined through a site of struggle that is concerned with the marginalisation of certain social practices.

The discursive strategies of post-colonial and queer theory have criticised the ways in which dominant discourses have helped construct a number of binary oppositions that reinforce the presumed superiority of ‘Western’ or ‘heterosexual’ life styles. The aim here is to subvert the ways that ideas of citizenship have sought to mask and normalise cultural difference. Homosexuality, feminism and black politics are not ‘minority’ issues, but are dependent upon the construction and deconstruction of dominant codes and discourses. The attempt to fix the identities of homosexuals and heterosexuals, men and women, and white and back people is the effect of powerful ideological discourses. Such codes and ideologies seek to impose unitary identities and thereby impose a normalised social order. Here identity is not the product of social construction, but is largely experienced as natural social facts (Seidman, 1997). The argument here is to question both the simple binaries between self and other and also the supposed unity of ‘oppressed’ or ‘dominant’ groups in order to reveal the ways in which identities are constructed through language and culture.

There has been a shift from identity politics to a politics of difference. Whereas objectivist and interest based traditions within the social sciences sought to develop a politics based upon unitary identities these features are now being called into question. Instead, identities are increasingly represented as the site of contestation and struggle, and as multiple and fragmented rather than pre-given and natural (Calhoun, 1994). Judith Butler (1990) in this context has called for an anti-identity political strategy. By this she means that any attempt to base a politics upon an assumed unitary identity is necessarily exclusionary. This converts the categories of ‘woman’, ‘class’, ‘race’ or even ‘earth’ into ‘permanently moot’ points (Butler, 1990, p. 15). Claims to ‘identity’ are always caught up in the construction of an inside and an outside.

According to Isin (2002), all historical ages offer a dominant account of the virtues of citizenship which draws discursive distinctions between insiders and outsiders. More often what becomes celebrated are the glorious self-images of the victorious and the dominant. We might seek to map an alternative history of citizenship as to how dominant groups have defined themselves against others seeking to ‘naturalise’ their superiority. To write a history of citizenship from the point of view of alterity is to ask who is currently favoured and protected by its current constructions, and who is excluded. For Isin the twentieth century saw the rise and dominance of the professional classes who have come to articulate the shape of modern citizenship. Professional groups not only do the work of globalisation whether as lawyers, architects or bankers but also have come to constitute themselves as virtuous citizens. The emergence of ‘entrepreneurial professionalisation’ has normalised the market, individual responsibility, private as opposed to public goods and promoted privatisation. The subject is now constituted as an active, choice-driven and risk-reducing individual. Individuals are expected to be entrepreneurial and competitive rather than dependent upon

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paternal forms of collective welfare. Above all, the individual is expected to 'be flexible' about their working life, lifestyles, intimate commitments and the cities in which they roam. Its is these virtues that are 'threatened' or at least partially disrupted by the presence of the urban poor, refugees, immigrants and beggars. Similarly, Nikolas Rose (2001, p. 13) has argued 'The Third Way' strategy of new Labour seeks to make 'citizenship conditional on conduct'. The excluded are seen as social failures that can only be restored to communal forms of participation through social discipline. Those who refuse to be socially responsible and govern themselves ethically become the target of new forms of social discipline from zero tolerance to the removal of social benefits.

Questions of cultural citizenship inevitably work within a Foucauldian politics that disrupts the normal, legitimate and dominant, thereby radically questioning what is usually accepted as the politics of citizenship. Cultural citizenship then learns from a queer ethics and becomes about the right to be different (Seidman, 1997). The ability to be able to create new individual and personal possibilities while becoming free from the normalising rhetoric of consumer society, social movements or indeed the state goes beyond attempts to win new legal rights. A Foucauldian politics of the self is concerned with the possibility of lifestyle experimentation and new possibilities for selfhood. The concern here is to promote a politics of the self that does not fall into a prohibition against inventing difference, while seeking to deconstruct the dominant culture. Cultural citizenship should be cautious about becoming identified with 'politically correct' narratives, images and rhetoric that inevitably construct normalising hierarchies and passions. Yet the post-modern requirement that we deconstruct many of the hegemonic assumptions of dominant Western cultures needs to be able to distinguish between 'colonising discourses and convincing ones' (Habermas, 2001, p. 148). We need to be able to separate discourses that foster cosmopolitan solidarity and those that simply homogenise difference. What sort of dialogic ethics could include both a politics of conversation as well one of discursive interruption? The challenge remains how to reconcile a cultural politics with a politics of culture. Put differently, we need to be able to argue that cultural citizenship is simultaneously underpinned by universal norms while recognising the need to deconstruct dominant cultures of exclusion. The destabilisation of meaning needs to be connected to normative models of citizenship, and a politics of difference linked to the possibility of inter-cultural dialogue (Fraser, 1995; Touraine, 2000). For example, the Habermasian idea that democratic politics should aim at consensus is difficult to reconcile with a strict Foucauldian politics of anti-normativity. Habermas's position is that Foucault’s politics make it very difficult for us to choose between democratic and totalitarian regimes as both are dependent upon exclusion. However, we might alternatively seek to build upon Foucault’s (1984a, p. 343) caution that 'not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous'. This might serve to remind us that while democratic public spaces and civil societies are preferable to their absence they are not immune to a symbolic politics of exclusion. My argumentative strategy is that these concerns lead us into genuinely cosmopolitan and cultural concerns, but before moving in this direction I want to consider alternative definitions of cultural citizenship.

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The model of citizenship presented thus far has assumed an approach which combines the insights of Habermas and Foucault pointing us towards a cosmopolitan understanding of cultural citizenship. In this section, I want to briefly consider three other competing definitions of cultural citizenship while pointing to their respective shortcomings. Arguably, all three approaches ask important questions, and potentially have much to contribute to questions of cultural citizenship, but from my point of view remain limited.

Will Kymlicka has proposed that liberal societies need to become more welcoming than they currently are in respect of group rights. In particular Kymlicka is concerned about the rights of national minorities who since the 1970s have sought to have their ethnic particularity accepted by public institutions. These groups are distinctive from the cultural diversity that arises out of individual or familial immigration where people more typically seek to integrate themselves into the wider society. There are in fact three main ways in which we might think about group-differentiated rights. First, national societies could grant minority communities rights to self-government, which would involve devolved assemblies and parliaments. Second, the recognition of polyethnic rights would involve public recognition and tolerance of the cultural practices of minorities. This could involve the recognition of distinctive patterns of dress or the funding of ‘minority’ media and cultural festivals. Finally, there are also claims for special forms of representation that could be made, given that the polity tends to be dominated by white, middle-class and able-bodied men. Kymlicka argues that he is mostly supportive of the capacity of ‘minority’ cultures to make all three of these different claims. In this a genuinely multicultural community would seek to promote the recognition of national and ethnic difference. Kymlicka connects the term ‘culture’ to an intergenerational community that shares a distinctive language, connection to a certain homeland and history.

In making these claims Kymlicka recognises that many liberals are concerned that the granting of group rights is actually hostile to the recognition of the rights of the individual. In particular there is considerable fear in liberal circles that group rights could be used by minority communities to police dissent and cultural contestation. By way of defence, Kymlicka argues that group rights should be viewed as a form of external protection against majorities rather than the internal restriction of individual rights. For example, ethnic groups could demand the right to remove children from schools in order to reduce the impact of ‘majority’ cultures and reinforce ‘traditional’ cultural practices such as arranged marriages. That is, that the struggle for group rights is usually orientated towards the generation of group respect from mainstream society and that the protection of the rights of individuals would need to be open to the critical scrutiny of the courts. In short, a group-differentiated citizenship is desirable, as society founded upon the recognition of diversity is more likely to promote the conditions for social unity than a community which seeks to deny or hide group difference.

Jeremy Waldron (1999) argues from a cosmopolitan point of view that
Kymlicka’s idea of culture is deeply questionable. Kymlicka’s notion of culture implies that within modernity we are able to live as if we were the exclusive products of a single national or ethnic community. In other words, Kymlicka is working with a model of culture whereby separate national and ethnic communities impose homogenous cultures upon its members. According to this model, the integrity of a culture is maintained by its ability to silence external influences and maintain order within its ranks. This, as Waldron notes, leaves very little space for the intermixing of cultures, hybridity and inter-cultural communication. The cosmopolitan view of culture emphasises that no community is self-sustaining and that individuals do not live their lives in cultural enclaves. We may indeed want to grant ‘special’ rights to certain sections of the community, but should we do so we would need to dispense with the idea that cultures act as pre-constituted billiard balls that strike up against each other. As Homi Bhabha argues, questions of cultural difference are not the same as those of cultural diversity. Whereas diversity requires a pre-given cultural realm, questions of difference view culture as constituted through struggle and claims to homogeneity and superiority. Questions of cultural difference seek to deconstruct claims to cultural purity and demonstrate that the meanings and symbols of cultural identity require interpretation and enunciation. As Parekh (2000) comments, it is Kymlicka’s view of culture that leads him to dismiss the claims to special rights by immigrants. As immigrants have left their ‘natural’ cultural home then they should have no rights to culture and are required to integrate into the host culture. Whereas national ‘minorities’ have specific cultures that require recognition, the culture of immigrants should be denied public expression. Yet in a world of unprecedented cultural mobility in terms of peoples and symbols it makes little sense to argue that cultures are confined to national and ethnic boundaries. In this respect, Kymlicka’s proposals could well lead to a form of cultural apartheid, rather than the inter-cultural recognition of difference and the necessity of dialogue. Hence a genuinely cultural model of citizenship would need to monitor the extent to which it interrupted or reproduced the cultural power of dominant ethnic groups.

Joke Hermes (1997, 1998) has argued that the media has transformed citizenship by constructing us as members of overlapping communities (not necessarily national in focus) which have opened up new forms of subjectivity and identity through the domain of popular culture. A defence of public communication systems by commentators on the Left and Right has often been accompanied by a sharp disdain for popular culture. In this argument robust systems of public communication are required as a defence against the encroachment of a feminine ‘Other’. Hence the attempt to defend public culture against the logics of emotionalism, irrationality and passivity becomes the defence of a beleaguered masculine identity. The binary that constructs media cultures through access to substantive information versus the banalities of consumer culture operates through specifically gendered forms of thinking. A renewed definition of ‘cultural’ citizenship would need to be open to the different fantasies, hopes and utopias which are more often the traces of popular culture. Such a view would move our ideas about the construction of public knowledges beyond oppositions between reason and emotion, quality and trash, hard news
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and popular entertainment. This crucial move deconstructs the gendered oppositions that would neglect to analyse the role of popular dramas, soap operas and talk shows in the construction of the ‘public’.

Questions of citizenship for Hermes move beyond liberal distinctions between the individual and the state to explore the construction of the ways in which personal identities emerge through the interface of popular culture and politics. A non-gendered conception of cultural citizenship would need to investigate the ways that popular forms of media entertainment help construct the variable horizons of everyday life. John Fiske (1989) has gone furthest in this respect arguing that the art of everyday life is commonly involved in the ‘transformation’ of mediated products. All popular media then is the site of struggle where meanings are never controlled by the producers, but are actively and pleasurably produced by the consumers themselves. For Hermes and Fiske to understand the ‘cultural’ working of citizenship we might seek to understand the disdain for popular forms of culture, and the ways in which the ‘popular’ is assumed to be the domain of manipulation and irrationality. Yet the problem with such a view is that it can end up converting ‘serious’ and ‘educated’ forms of culture into the ‘Other’.

As Bourdieu and Darbel (1991) have argued a visit to a museum or art gallery presupposes access to limited forms of cultural capital. The best predictor of whether or not you are likely to attend a formal gallery or exhibition is family background and educational qualifications. Working-class people who lack the necessary cultural capital to make works of art meaningful are forced to make sense of them through more restricted repertoires of interpretation. Working-class visitors are ‘condemned to see works of art in their phenomenal state, in other words as simple objects’ (Bourdieu and Darbel, 1991, p. 45). Those without the appropriate cultural capital complained of feeling out of place, were in constant fear of revealing their lack of knowledge and displayed most interest in art (like furniture) that had an obvious social function. This lack of affinity with the world of art was compounded by educational institutions that only sought to transmit a limited understanding of artistic works. Familiarity with a wide range of artistic and aesthetic practices was more often transmitted by the bourgeois family. For Bourdieu a cultural democracy (or in our case cultural citizenship) can only be achieved by educational institutions seeking to make up for the lack of cultural capital available within the working-class family. Cultural equality for Bourdieu cannot be sought by either celebrating a working-class populism or by leaving artistic taste to the private discernment of individuals. Unless educational resources make some attempt to reverse the flow of cultural capital transmitted in the home then the end result will be enhanced forms of cultural inequality. Bourdieu and Darbel (1991) powerfully argue that the only way to short-circuit assumptions of working-class barbarism is to disrupt the idea that taste is naturally rather than socially reproduced. An inclusive cultural citizenship requires the intensification of the presence of the school within working-class people’s cultural lives. While Bourdieu famously underestimates the complexity of the ‘popular’ in ways that are revealed by others such as Hermes and Fiske his remarks necessarily remind us that a cultural citizenship that wished to promote equality and respect would have to tread a very fine line.
Complex understandings of cultural citizenship would need to press a dual strategy whereby the ‘popular’ is both transformed and respected. A cosmopolitan educational strategy would need to follow an inclusive cultural strategy that offered school children a range of cultural repertoires drawn from across the popular and high cultural divide. A genuinely cosmopolitan education might seek to revalue cultural practices and narratives that more traditional forms of education had branded as unworthy. Yet such an approach would need to stop short of populism should it fail to instil a critical appreciation of artistic practices from classical music to performance art.

Finally, the work of Tony Bennett (1992, 1998) has offered an understanding of cultural citizenship as cultural policy. Bennett’s main argument runs against both cultural Romanticism and culture as hegemony and symbolic struggle as the two traditions which have sought to detach cultural studies from policy studies. For the Romantics the aim has been to warn of the dangers suffered by culture once it becomes regulated by the forces of money and administration. The aim here has been to stress that ‘authentic’ culture always escapes utilitarian forms of calculation and that culture is valuable precisely because it is useless. Alternatively, much of contemporary cultural studies has sought to uncover complex patterns of transgression and resistance on the part of consumers of popular culture. Bennett’s aim is to shift from a Marxism which is overtly concerned with the colonisation of aesthetics or semiotic warfare to a social democratic analysis that seeks to make cultural studies both more practical and more relevant (Miller, 1998). This means that cultural studies should give up the practice of either looking at the ways artistic forms of culture are being eroded or the ways dominant cultures are resisted from below. In its place, Bennett proposes a view of cultural studies that offers a detailed knowledge of the workings of specific institutions, policies and practices. Here the intellectual becomes a technician who seeks to build up an in-depth understanding of particular cultural practices. Cultural studies is less about the promotion of an aristocratic demeanour or the celebration of populist resistance, but the devising of specific techniques and strategies in order to achieve certain ends. Bennett argues that if we are concerned that museums are insufficiently multicultural or that television advertising promotes gender stereotypes we need to work out specific strategies to pursue these ends. In short, we should view culture as a form of social regulation and governance.

At this point Bennett’s argument is indebted to Foucault’s late writing on the concept of governmentality. For Foucault (1991) the idea of governmentality is intended to critique mainstream liberal ideas of citizenship. Whereas liberalism is concerned with institutions, ideas of contract and rights Foucault investigates the ways in which the population becomes managed through a variety of techniques (Procacci, 2001). Traditional understandings of citizenship are too concerned with institutions and not enough with practices. For example, we may point to the ways in which the extension of social rights has increasingly brought the population under the normative gaze of the state. Foucault (1991) extends these reflections in his writing on governmentality by insisting that there is an art to the activity of governing. Within modernity, Foucault argues, the ultimate aim of government is the continuing and sustained welfare of the population.
Government intervention through a variety of health campaigns, the regulation of disorderly activity, the monitoring of viruses and other mechanisms which bypass traditional ideas of politics, helps constitute good government. In applying these ideas to cultural policy, Bennett argues that new programmes of cultural maintenance need to be devised to revise and reform existing industries. Our common culture needs to be minutely planned, administered and reformed if it is to serve the needs of a democratic and multicultural society.

Bennett’s arguments viewed generously suggest that cultural studies need to become more responsible. Intellectuals are urged to come out of their ivory towers and engage in practical forms of analysis that could have measurable effects. There is, as Bennett identifies, a need for this kind of detailed policy oriented work if cultural studies wishes to have direct effects on the shape of our television industries, museums, and local arts policies.

However, there remain deep dangers and considerable evasions in such a strategy. Bennett’s orientations in respect of cultural studies are overly critical of a number of different traditions that continue to ask relevant questions. Here I want to briefly focus upon what the study and practice of cultural policy might continue to recover from cultural Romanticism and the study of hegemony and resistance. First, Bennett is critical of those like Adorno who would embark upon an unashamedly elitist strategy where self-appointed cultural guardians utilise a policy framework to preserve high culture. Bennett (1998, p. 199) argues that despite the attentions of a few ‘retro-aesthetes’ and cultural conservatives we can now recognise that such dispositions represent ‘merely a market segment’. Cultural policy should not only unashamedly treat culture as an industry, but help construct a variety of frameworks where we can assess different policies in terms of the different publics they might serve. The less intellectuals seek special licence for their own disposition towards culture the better they are able to plan a coherent cultural policy. There is obviously much here objecting to the elitist positions taken by critics like Adorno who seek to preserve their tastes against those of others. Yet my concern is that this argument can be pushed too far.

If we return to Adorno’s (1991) original essay on the subject of administration and culture he voices a set of concerns about the relationship between the practice of administration and the dynamic complexity of culture that Bennett dismisses too easily. Adorno argues that under conditions of late capitalism ‘culture’ exists within an ambivalent relationship to questions of administration. The paradox is that ‘culture’ becomes damaged when we seek to plan and administer it, but that without institutional supports it quickly becomes marginalised. Adorno (1991, p. 101) famously identifies ‘culture’ as that which goes beyond questions of utility, that it is its ‘impractical nature’ that makes it so special. A culture that was completely administered and planned would have driven out the individual impulse, crushed creativity and become largely uncritical. What Adorno is seeking to preserve is an avant-garde disposition towards culture that protects artistic practice as a field of aesthetic creativity. Within this Adorno correctly perceives reactionary sentiments which would seek to restrict artistic freedom in the name of a crude populist democracy. Here I think we need to tread carefully. Bennett is of course correct that similar arguments have been
used by cultural conservatives to maintain the superiority of Western art traditions. This poorly appreciates the sheer diversity of aesthetic practices and traditions that can be perceived within modern multicultural contexts. However, Romantic claims like Adorno’s continue to have a point in arguing that the vitality of a culture depends largely upon the autonomy, creativity and difference of its cultural producers. The idea that we could ever totally administer a culture remains a bureaucratic fantasy which is unlikely to find many supporters outside the offices of chief administrators. To argue that the development of cultural policies require governance is one thing, but to suggest cultures can (or indeed should) ever be subordinate to such logics is quite another.

We might continue that what Bennett offers is an overly instrumental understanding of culture. Any full understanding of this most contested of terms would need to emphasise that as members of overlapping ‘cultures’ we are only ever conscious of a small part of its connecting elements. Given the different levels of interpretation, partly realised experiences and different semiotic networks we are some way short of a ‘full understanding’ of even the most impoverished cultural life. This remains poorly appreciated by Bennett’s technocratic language of ‘regulation’, ‘effects’, and ‘management’.

Second, we might also argue that neo-Gramscian writing on hegemony (such as that of Stuart Hall, 1988) usually relies upon a wider understanding of different sets of social relations than those offered by Bennett (Nixon, 2000). Bennett emphasises the managing and governing of culture, rather than the social and cultural context such processes inevitably work within. For example, Jim McGuigan (1996) has argued that for cultural policy to remain critical it needs to be informed by wider questions of political economy, democracy and class which will play a large role in determining the field of struggle within which cultural policy operates. The Foucauldian attempt to recapture the micro operation of knowledge and power sometimes obscures these necessary questions. Further, Bennett is unable to offer much help with regard to the normative values that ‘should’ guide the operation of cultural policy. Here Kenny and Stevenson (1998) argue that cultural policy frameworks have much to gain from a closer engagement with ideas of cultural citizenship. Rather than calling for cultural studies to implement strategic policies within the cultural arena it might be better served seeking to democratise the institutional practice of policy. The focus on citizenship and inclusion would indeed ask what sorts of policies might be adequate in a context of diasporic and multicultural citizenship. However, Kenny and Stevenson (1998) recognise the need to take these questions beyond the confines of the policy makers. This might include the holding of citizen’s juries on controversial cultural issues, the appointment of citizen’s representatives on the boards of galleries and theatres, and the attempt to represent the voices of marginalised communities within an international context.

Cosmopolitanism, Education and Cultural Citizenship

This paper has argued that cultural citizenship is an emergent area of interdisciplinary concern (Miller, 2002). My case has been that citizenship studies needs to be relocated within a range of cultural conflicts which include
multiculturalism and questions of difference, popular and educated culture, and
the need to formulate more inclusive and democratic cultural policies. As should
be evident, these 'cultural' questions need to be understood within a wider
context of globalised civil societies and the need to break with normalising
images of the 'responsible' and 'engaged' citizen. Yet it should also be evident
that unless a renewed emphasis is placed upon republican institutions, education
and enhanced citizen dialogue then many of the cosmopolitan challenges
currently facing global citizens are unlikely to be addressed. Cosmopolitan
understandings need to enter into the soil of culture. In cultural terms without
such an emphasis, citizens' horizons are likely to be dictated by a crude and
uneven mix of monoculturalism, populism and technocratic policy decisions.
Cultural citizenship above all is the attempt to foster dialogue, complexity and
communication in place of silence and homogeneity.

In particular, it could be argued that these formulations have particular
implications for educational institutions. Bhikhu Parekh (2000) has already
identified the need for a cosmopolitan educational strategy. What makes
Parekh's contribution distinctive is his argument that multicultural societies
should aim to create a common culture out of difference. Such a culture, he
reasons, could grow out of cross-cultural conversations and inter-cultural dia-
logue. The key resource in seeking to develop such sensibilities amongst its
citizens is the progressive development of a genuinely multicultural education.
In terms of European liberal societies this would involve the enhanced question-
ing of Eurocentrism and monoculturalism more generally, and the development
of an 'educated' curiosity in respect of other cultures. Simply to learn about the
'great and glorious' past of a particular ethnic or national society not only breeds
racism, but also stultifies the creative imagination.

Yet we need to be careful not to reduce the call for a cosmopolitan education
to changes in the curriculum as important as these might become. Isin and
Turner (2002) report that neo-liberalism has lead to a widespread erosion in the
value of learning across society as education becomes reduced to a passport for
employability. In such a context, calls for more cosmopolitan and citizen
influenced forms of education would have to do more than discipline young
people into the virtues of 'good' citizenship. Both citizenship and education
presupposes a subject that can learn from the Other. Rather than seeking to
'civilise' students into a cosmopolitan ethos Alain Touraine (2000) has recently
sought to argue for a form of education that seeks to realise the ideal of
inter-cultural education. Such an education system would emphasise the needs of
the individual over that of society or the economy. A cosmopolitan education
would not solely depend upon having the 'right' curriculum, but with the
capacity of the subject to be communicative with themselves and others. This is
distinct from the call often found within cultural studies for public forms of
education to provide spaces where the influence of corporate control might be
checked (Giroux, 1999). Both cosmopolitanism, education and citizenship
should be judged by the extent to which they enable citizens to learn from one
another and engage with the Other. It is this rather than the passing on of radical
certainties that is likely to enhance the necessary dialogic capacities suitable for
a global age. If the new power lies in dominant codes and images, the citizen’s
response will have to be through deeper forms of cultural communication that transgress the boundaries of the local and the global, the educated and the popular and the hierarchies of traditional educational relations.

Finally, returning to the problems raised by Foucault and Habermas, we can cautiously welcome the recent move to teach citizenship in British schools. The 1998 report into the teaching of citizenship, which begins in 2002, stresses the need to foster ‘active’ citizenship amongst school children (Qualifications and Curriculum Authority, 1998). Throughout the report there are examples of what is meant by this including the writing of letters to complain about a local park, the setting up of school councils, and the tackling of bullying. From a Foucauldian point of view such projects could be seen as the disciplining of students into ‘teacher friendly’ definitions of good citizenship. The report offers little scope to explore the power matrix of the school, and how ‘good’ citizenship has become encoded. Indeed the report repeatedly argues that one of the principle aims of the teaching of citizenship is to foster ‘responsible’ attitudes towards authority. However, I wish to argue that a genuinely ‘cultural’ cosmopolitan citizenship would depend upon the creative cultural productions of the subject and an ethics of dialogue. In terms of constructing a relevant ‘cultural’ citizenship adequate for schools this would concentrate upon enabling the pupils to produce themselves as subjects. By this I mean that subjects will need to be able to use a variety of cultural techniques from diary writing to poetry and from music making to video in order to produce new narratives of the self. Foucault towards the end of his life discovered a similar ethic through what he called the ‘care of the self’ (Foucault, 1984b). This was not the discovery of the true self, but an appreciation with the capacity of the self to be creative and inventive. How, Foucault is asking, might we create selves that resist the temptations of the doctrinaire and domestication? The care of the self seeks to explore ways in which we might choose a lifestyle that avoids the traps of empty consumerism or civic obedience. While not disallowed by Foucault, an ethics of dialogue is more firmly rooted in Habermas’s writing. This would necessitate both the development of personal capacities to engage with the Other, but also a critical understanding of the ways in which communication within our shared global world is systematically distorted by cultural power. In Habermasian terms the operation of money and power permanently seeks to distort our understanding of social, political and cultural questions. Such an approach would seek to politicise the ways that powerful institutions work to exclude the possibility of dialogic exchange. A cultural cosmopolitan approach in the context of educational institutions requires the reconnection of ‘self’ and ‘Other’ in a global context.

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