Few city regions in the world have been more dramatically transformed by recent immigration than Toronto. And few institutions have a more direct impact on immigrant settlement and integration than municipal governments. This paper explores the extent to which new patterns of urban citizenship are emerging from global migration to Toronto.

The starting point is a dynamic, contested understanding of the term citizenship. We conceive of citizenship broadly—not only as a set of legal obligations and entitlements which individuals possess by virtue of their membership in a state, but also as the practices through which individuals and groups formulate and claim new rights or struggle to expand or maintain existing rights. Analyzing citizenship, therefore, requires investigating not only formal rights conferred by states, but also the autonomous actions, claims and struggles of diverse groups
within the same state. Furthermore, it also requires taking into account various polities in which such rights are exercised and enacted. The rise of the city as a new space of politics and of re-enactment of citizenship at the end of the twentieth century constitutes perhaps one of the most significant areas of social and political research (Magnusson 1996; Sassen 1996). Thus, the recent convergence in Toronto of dramatic ethnocultural diversity, and sweeping restructuring of municipal governance provides an opportune occasion to explore emerging patterns of citizenship in Canada’s largest, most multicultural metropolitan centre. Accordingly, this paper has two primary objectives:

- identifying the new geo-politics of immigration ethnicity, race and class across the Toronto city region; and
- exploring both formal and informal domains of immigrant citizenship in Toronto.

The portrait of immigrant urban citizenship that emerges reveals both barriers and incentives to mobilization. There are compelling reasons to focus on the city when seeking answers to questions of immigration, ethnicity, race, politics and power. Foremost is the reality that both globally and domestically, immigrant settlement is overwhelmingly an urban phenomenon (Castles and Miller 1993; Clark 1996; King 1996; Richmond 1994; Sassen 1994; Statistics Canada 1997a). In 1996, 85% of all immigrants in Canada lived in 25 census metropolitan areas. And recent immigrants have overwhelmingly settled in our largest urban centres: nearly three-quarters of all newcomers since 1991 reside in Toronto, Vancouver or Montreal (Statistics Canada 1997a). Cities are now therefore the prime venue for assessing how well societies are responding to the challenge which Castles and Miller identify as central to the present age of migration: “the problems of living together in one society for ethnic groups with diverse cultures and social conditions” (Castles and Miller 1993: 2).

The policies and programs of local government, moreover, have a direct impact on immigrant and diverse communities. Much of this stems from municipal government’s responsibilities for the services of everyday life such as schooling, safety, social services, land use, recreation, public health and transportation. As James Lightbody has observed somewhat quaintly, “[c]ity government is the one most directly relevant to a person’s pursuit of a satisfactory life” (Lightbody 1995: 24). Forces of globalization are further enhancing the strategic significance of cities. Consistent with the post-Fordist paradigm, intermediary institutions of national and provincial government are losing leverage to transnational alliances above and city regions below. Toronto’s celebrated ex-mayor David Crombie, recently articulated this sentiment of resurgent urbanism in describing city regions as “the human habitat of choice...heralding new values, overwhelming traditional local jurisdictions, pushing aside old boundaries and borders and even insisting on international influence and status” (Crombie 1998: A27).

Yet as several scholars have noted, the urban sphere has been an understudied dimension of immigration research. Roger Waldinger has recently emphasized the need “to bring the ‘urban’ back into immigration research,” paying
special attention to how particular immigrant cities shape immigrant destinies (Waldinger 1996: 1078). In the Canadian context, Yasmeen Abu-Laban has echoed Waldinger in pointing out that there has been “systematic neglect” of this research agenda (Abu-Laban 1997: 77). This essay explores patterns of immigrant settlement and urban citizenship across the Toronto city region.

**Immigration and Diversity in Toronto Immigration and Diversity in Toronto**

Within a single generation, the Toronto city region has become a remarkably diverse ethnocultural, linguistic and religious community. The transformation is nicely captured by Globe and Mail columnist John Barber’s reflection on the Torontos he has known: “I grew up in a tidy, prosperous, narrow-minded town where Catholicism was considered exotic; my children are growing up in the most cosmopolitan city on Earth. The same place” (Barber 1998: A8).

Attempting to portray Toronto’s demographic diversity first poses the inevitable dilemma of nomenclature. Synonymous with urban sprawl, multiple incarnations of Toronto presently exist. All are captured in Figure 1. Toronto as a municipal government now refers to the recently amalgamated City, providing a single mayor and council for the six previously federated municipalities of Etobicoke, North York, Scarborough, York, East York and Toronto. This new City of Toronto has a population of some 2.4 million people. The Greater Toronto Area (GTA), represents the Toronto city region as designated by the Province of Ontario, taking in the 25 municipalities from Burlington and Milton in the west to Scugog and Clarington in the east up to the northern-most Georgina and Brock. The GTA is marked by the bolded borderlines of Figure 1, and presently contains a population of some 4.6 million. Lastly, there is the Toronto Census Metropolitan Area (CMA), which is largely, but not wholly overlapping with the GTA. Excluded from Toronto’s CMA are Burlington to the west and five municipalities to the east, most notably Whitby and Oshawa. The Toronto CMA’s population is 4.2 million.

Toronto’s immigrant population and ethnocultural diversity are extraordinary—among the highest to be found in any urban centres in the world. In 1996 immigrants represented 17.4% of Canada’s population. Across the Toronto CMA, immigrants comprised 42% of the population, while in the amalgamated City of Toronto 47.6% were foreign-born. Elsewhere in Canada by comparison, the Vancouver and Montreal CMAs were 35% and 18% foreign-born respectively (Statistics Canada 1997a; Carey 1998b). For the United States, the highest immigrant concentrations across census metropolitan areas in 1990 were: Miami (33.6%), Los Angeles (27.1%), San Francisco (20%), and New York (19.7%), with only the City of Miami barely surpassing the amalgamated City of Toronto’s proportion of foreign-born in a direct city to city comparison (Macionis and Parrillo 1998; Nijman 1997). The extent to which Toronto continues to be recon-
stituted via global migration patterns is evident from the findings that 10% of its CMA’s population in 1996 had immigrated over the past 5 years; 21% had arrived over the prior 15 years; and 42% of all immigrants to Canada since 1991
have settled in the Toronto CMA (Statistics Canada 1997a).

Yet statistics alone fail to convey the demographic impact of immigration on Toronto. As Daiva Stasiulis has observed, Canadian immigration policy until the 1960s was designed to develop the country as a “white settler” society (Stasiulis 1995). Until then Britain, the United States and Europe were Canada’s prime—virtually sole—sources of immigration. Asian-born arrivals, for instance, accounted for only 3% of immigrants prior to 1961 (Statistics Canada 1997a). Accordingly in 1961, 95.9% of all Canadians claimed European ethnic origin (Turner 1995). Since then immigrants from Asia, the Caribbean, Africa, Central and South America have predominated. Until 1961, 9 of every 10 immigrants to Toronto came from the United Kingdom and Europe; since the 1960s, fewer than 2 in 10 have followed the same route (Statistics Canada 1997a). While visible minorities comprised 11.2% of Canada’s population in 1996, they represented almost a third (31.6%) of the Toronto CMA’s population. More than 4 of every 10 visible minority members in Canada reside in the Toronto CMA. Three groups predominate: 25% of CMA Toronto’s visible minority population are Chinese, 24.7% are South Asian, and 20.5% are Black (Statistics Canada 1998). Taking stock of this demographic transformation, the amalgamated City of Toronto projects that by the year 2000, visible minorities will make up 54% of the City’s population, up from 30% in 1991 and just 3% in 1961 (Carey 1998b). As a result, Toronto is not only a home to a high proportion of immigrants but also these immigrants come from increasingly diverse ethnocultural and class backgrounds and accordingly create diverse spaces in the city. Immigrant settlement patterns across the Toronto CMA have been particularly striking and significant in framing relations with local governments. City regions inevitably contain a distinct variety of urban forms: typically including core cities, suburbs, once autonomous older towns now drawn into the metropolitan orbit, and even rural municipalities. Scholarly judgement to date is divided in explaining the prevailing pattern of immigrant and ethnocultural community settlement in city regions. Saskia Sassen contends that the dominant trend in American cities continues to point “toward concentration of immigrants and ethnic populations in the center,” as third world immigrants occupy the core cities vacated by white flight to the suburbs (Sassen 1994: 103). By contrast, Peter Muller contends that “foreign-settler communities are on the rise in metropolitan rings from Los Angeles to New York to Miami” (Muller 1997: 57). Toronto’s experience is characterized by substantial immigrant settlement in both the urban core and periphery.

Figure 1 identifies the diverse urban forms to be found within Toronto’s city region—the Greater Toronto Area. Six distinct types may be identified. (To allow greater precision in portraying immigrant and ethnocultural settlement patterns, we continue to show the 6 previous municipalities now amalgamated into the new City of Toronto). The old City of Toronto constitutes the original core city. York and East York are early 20th-century industrial suburbs. Etobicoke, North York and Scarborough are post-World War II suburbs. These 6 comprise the newly amalgamated City of Toronto, which represents just over half the 4.5 million

An actual process of Diversification in the sense of becoming more Diverse
population of the entire Greater Toronto Area. It has now become fashionable to
distinguish these two parts of the GTA by reference to their distinct telephone
area codes: 416 for the amalgamated City, and 905 for the rest of the GTA.

The 24 municipalities in the 905 area also may be classified in 3 categories. There are edge cities such as Mississauga, Brampton, Vaughan, Richmond Hill
and Markham which have experienced explosive growth in recent years. Beyond
these are a string of older, medium-sized cities possessing sufficient geographic
distance and/or economic autonomy to resist full metropolitan integration with
the core city. Burlington, Oakville, Newmarket, Whitby and Oshawa are exam-

ples of these cities. Finally, the GTA is ringed by close to a dozen primarily rural
municipalities from Milton in the west to Georgina and Brock in the north and
Clarington to the east.

An important aspect of urban citizenship in the GTA is the fact that the
highest concentrations of immigrants are not located in the traditional immigrant
settlement area of the former City of Toronto, but in the post-World War II
suburbs and edge cities of the city region. Tables 1 and 2, drawn from the most
comprehensive presently-available data of the 1991 census, provide a profile of
immigrant and ethnocultural settlement across the GTA. The tables present
individual municipalities within the two-tier, regional municipal governments to
which they belonged in 1991: Metro Toronto, Peel Region, York Region, Halton
Region and Durham Region. (The Metro data may be read as the amalgamated
City of Toronto’s 1991 profile, while the four other regions presently retain their
1991 structure).

As shown in Table 1, under the column “PIMPOP”, the top 10 municipalities
in order of immigrants as a (rounded) percentage of all residents in 1991 were:
City of York (46%), North York (46%), Scarborough (44%), Vaughan (41%),
Markham (40%), Toronto (39%), Mississauga (39%), Etobicoke (38%), East
York (36%) and Richmond Hill (34%). Recently available 1996 census data
reveals two significant trends:

• a marked increase in immigrant proportions of residents across all these
areas, consistent with the large numbers of immigrants drawn to the Toronto
CMA during the 1990s, and

• the decline in the former core City of Toronto’s relative ranking as recent
immigrants increasingly settle in suburban settings.

The top 10 immigrant concentrations of total residents in 1996 were: North
York (52%), Scarborough (51%), York (50%), Markham (48%), Etobicoke
(43%), Mississauga (43%), Vaughan (42%), Richmond Hill (42%), Toronto
(under 42%) and East York (41%). Predictably the lowest immigrant concentra-
tions are in rural municipalities, with percentages for 1996 typically hovering in
the low teens. And relatively minimal proportions of immigrants have been
drawn to those more autonomous, long-established municipalities such as
Oshawa (16% foreign-born), Newmarket (18%), Burlington (21%), and Oakville
(28%) (Toronto 1998: 2.5; Toronto, Urban Planning and Development Services:
Personal Communication).
Several comments flow from these figures and rankings. Beginning in a
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In comparative vein, the Toronto city region’s status as one of the world’s major immigrant concentration places is reflected in the fact that the top 10 immigrant settlement municipalities in its CMA all had higher proportions of foreign-born residents than New York City — the classic symbol of the immigrant city, with its 35% foreign-born population in 1995. Toronto’s Big Sprawl, its suburbs and edge cities, have higher proportions of immigrants than the Big Apple. Within the Toronto city region it is striking that the core, former City of Toronto (pre-amalgamation) — for generations the primary site of immigrant neighbourhoods — ranked 9th in immigrant concentration in 1996 behind 4 edge cities, 3 post-World War II suburbs and 1 early 20th century industrial city. This leads to the final and most significant conclusion from this data. A powerful expression of urban citizenship among immigrants to Toronto over the past two decades is their determination to select their residential location of choice rather than be confined to traditional zones of immigrant settlement. This has seen newcomers from Hong Kong settle directly in Scarborough, Markham and Richmond Hill subdivisions; immigrants from India locating in Brampton; and upwardly mobile Italian immigrants pulling up inner city stakes for homes in Vaughan. To be sure as well, the concentrated settlement of less affluent immigrants in high-rise apartment buildings in Etobicoke, North York, Scarborough and Mississauga is less a reflection of pure locational preference than of their limited financial resources and options.

In geo-political terms, the differences and tensions between the 416 and 905 sections of the Toronto city region have often been emphasized. The amalgamated City’s 416 area is more densely settled, transit oriented and home to a disproportionately large share of the city region’s poor, homeless, elderly and social assistance recipients. Conversely the 905 area beyond the megacity embodies a more uniformly middle-class, single family dwelling, suburban, car oriented form of urbanization. Inevitably, perhaps, the 416 and 905 areas have clashed over issues of metropolitan governance, municipal services and tax sharing. Yet in the long run the future social and environmental sustainability of the GTA will surely depend upon the coordination of services and planning on a regional scale. The GTA’s post-war suburbs and edge cities are more complex and dynamic environments because of immigrant settlement. Indeed, by one account they may already have achieved at least one pre-requisite of urban “greatness”. As Robert Harney has written: “[N]o great North American city can be understood without being studied as a city of immigrants, of newcomers and their children, as a destination of myriad group and individual migration projects” (Harney 1990: 229). There is much work to be done pursuing Harney’s injunction across Toronto’s many spaces of transnational migration.

Table 2 identifies urban residents by ethnic origin drawing on the most recent data presently available — the 1991 census. Across the Toronto CMA, the leading ethnic origins were British (26.2%), British & Other (12.4%), Italian (8.1%), Canadian (6.9%), Chinese (6%), South Asian (5%), and Black (3.3%) (Turner 1995). A comparison of the column headed “PETBRIT” in Table 2 with
the adjacent Ethnic columns reveals that people of British origin comprised the
## Table 2: Select Ethnicity Data for the Greater Toronto Area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MUNICIPALITY</th>
<th>ETS</th>
<th>PET</th>
<th>ETM</th>
<th>PET</th>
<th>ETBR</th>
<th>ETHNIC #1</th>
<th>ETHNIC #2</th>
<th>ETHNIC #3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GTA</td>
<td>3,139,674</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>1,057,478</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>861,867</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>405,430</td>
<td>10.0</td>
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<td>Peel</td>
<td>543,845</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>185,695</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>151,570</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>49,785</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mississauga</td>
<td>554,350</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>198,155</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>153,410</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>42,335</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brampton</td>
<td>365,925</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>128,915</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>95,700</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>73,425</td>
<td>13.0</td>
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<td>Oakville</td>
<td>73,975</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>39,885</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>31,395</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>4,700</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burlington</td>
<td>82,160</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>40,860</td>
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<td>36,000</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>4,670</td>
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<tr>
<td>Newmarket</td>
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<td>26.3</td>
<td>19,930</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>13,300</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>2,200</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pickering</td>
<td>13,930</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>6,090</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>3,235</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ajax</td>
<td>29,630</td>
<td>64.9</td>
<td>10,490</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>8,480</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>2,960</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgina</td>
<td>19,030</td>
<td>63.6</td>
<td>10,545</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>10,675</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>685</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Halton</td>
<td>199,305</td>
<td>63.6</td>
<td>111,355</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>96,275</td>
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<tr>
<td>Caledon</td>
<td>10,945</td>
<td>61.4</td>
<td>6,730</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>6,360</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>725</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>35.1</td>
<td>8,480</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>2,960</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note:  
ETS = Single ethnic origin responses,  
PETS = The proportion of single ethnic origin responses to the total population,  
ETM = Multiple ethnic origin responses,  
PETM = The proportion of multiple ethnic origin responses to the total population,  
ETBR = The proportion of British ethnic origin responses to the total population,  
ETHNIC#1 = Excluding British, Cdn., English, Irish and Scottish, the largest ethnic origin population (the proportion in parenthesis),  
ETHNIC#2 = Excluding British, Cdn., English, Irish and Scottish.
Cdn., English, Irish and Scottish, the second largest ethnic origin population (proportion in parenthesis),
ETHNIC#3=Excluding British, Cdn., English, Irish and Scottish, the third largest ethnic origin population (proportion in parenthesis)
single largest ethnic group in 28 of the 30 local municipalities then in existence in the GTA. In both exceptions, Italians constituted the largest single ethnic group: by less than a single percentage point in the City of York, and by more than a 35% spread over British origin residents in the demographically remarkable edge city of Vaughan. There is likely not another Canadian city outside Quebec where residents of British origin represent less than 6% of the total population! Yet too much should not even be read into the plurality which people of British origin held in the 28 other GTA municipalities; British origin residents in 1991 accounted for fewer than one in five residents of most of the region’s larger municipalities.

In 1991, Italians constituted the largest non-British group in 6 of the top 10 GTA immigrant municipalities (Vaughan, York, North York, Richmond Hill, Etobicoke and Mississauga); Chinese led in 2 (Markham and Scarborough); with the Portuguese and Greek communities each standing out in 1 (Toronto and East York respectively). The Toronto city region, then, is distinctive not only for its great number of immigrants, but for the diverse ethnocultural mosaic of communities dispersed across its metropolitan area.

To date, there has been little spatial analysis of the socio-economic dimensions of immigration and diversity in Toronto. In her recent study of ethnic relations in Toronto, Sheila Croucher bemoans the fact that despite assiduous research efforts she was unable to locate “a single table that breaks down ethnicity by income, employment or occupation...I still had no detailed data on income or employment by race and ethnicity for the Toronto CMA” (Croucher 1997: 343). Drawing on the new National Occupational Classification (NOC), we have begun to map the new geography of immigration, ethnicity, race and class in Toronto. In 1991, Statistics Canada started collecting this occupational data based on sophisticated criteria of skill level, type and responsibility which broadly reflect changes in sociological and political literature in defining new class alignments in Western societies (Bradley 1996; Clement and Miles 1994; Lee and Turner 1996; Wright 1997). NOC data permits occupations to be classified in one of five classifications: management, professional, technical, clerical and labour (Statistics Canada 1993). Our primary interest is the convergence of occupational classification with immigration, as captured in Figures 2 through 7. These maps were produced by using proportions: immigrants as a proportion of the total population in census tracts for Figure 2; and then the proportion of the employable population in each occupational category in census tracts for the remaining Figures.

Figure 2 depicts the immigrant settlement trends we discussed earlier in Tables 1 and 2. Now we can spatially visualize Toronto’s predominant immigrant settlement areas:

- up the west-central corridor of the amalgamated City spanning the former cities of Toronto, York and North York, and north onto Vaughan;
- across the northern top of the amalgamated City spanning the former cities of North York and Scarborough, and north into Markham and Richmond
Hill; and

- in Mississauga (whose immigrant concentration appears magnified due to the massive size of the census tract occupied by Pearson International Airport).
When we compare Figure 2 with Figures 3 and 4, which depict the settlement patterns of residents holding managerial and professional occupations respectively, there is little overlap. This suggests that immigrants are under-
represented in these high-paying, high-status positions which are concentrated in the east-central areas of the megacity spanning neighbourhoods of the former cities of Toronto, North York and Scarborough, which have relatively low proportions of immigrants. Figure 5 shows a concentration of technical (often computer based) occupations in edge cities, with more craft-based skills reflected in rural areas. The edge city clusters are compatible with American research showing high tech industries and their technician workforce gravitating to the
Figure 6 reveals a concentration of clerical workers in high immigrant census tracts of Mississauga, and sections of the former cities of Toronto, York, North York, and Scarborough as well as several lower immigration municipalities east of the megacity. Finally, Figure 7 starkly illustrates the concentration of manual labour occupations in the west-central corridor primarily comprising Portuguese and Italians in the former Toronto; Portuguese, Italians and Blacks in York; Italians and Blacks in North York; and Italians in Vaughan. Conversely, British origin residents predominated in the previously identified managerial and professional census tracts.

Interpreting the interplay of occupation and immigration has allowed us to develop a number of preliminary findings which emphasize the socio-economic and geographic differentiation among immigrants in the Toronto city region. First, lower-income immigrants are concentrated in the amalgamated City of Toronto as well as the City of Hamilton, while concentrations of high-income immigrants are to be found in Mississauga, Markham, Vaughan, Richmond Hill, Oakville, King, Burlington and Brampton. Interestingly, this socio-geographic divide is experienced within many immigrant and ethnocultural groups. Thus for instance lower-income Chinese, Vietnamese, Portuguese and Italian enclaves are to be found in the 416 area of the GTA, while more affluent enclaves of each community are located in the 905 periphery.

As we shall argue, an appreciation of the diversity of immigrant Toronto along ethnic, race, class and spatial dimensions establishes the context, and frames the relationship between municipal governments and immigrant groups. Accordingly, we now turn to an analysis of three domains of urban citizenship in Toronto.

**Claiming Citizenship: Mobilizing Against the Megacity**

Diversity challenges citizenship. As Sharon Zukin has observed, the task confronting ethnoculturally diverse societies is “whether [they] can create an inclusive political culture” (Zukin 1995: 44). And as Daiva Stasiulis has observed, global migration patterns “pose a fundamental challenge to develop morally defensible, inclusive forms of citizenship” (Stasiulis 1997a: 197). Our research explores three domains of immigrant and ethnocultural citizenship in Toronto. We examine the participation and mobilization of diverse groups in the urban movement which arose in 1997 to oppose the Province of Ontario’s intention to create an amalgamated megacity of Toronto. Next we examine results of the 1997 municipal elections in the Greater Toronto Area. And finally we explore claims on public space as reflected in street and civic square parades, rallies and celebrations. Taken together, these three domains of civic participation permit a multi-dimensional assessment of immigrant and ethnocultural citizenship in Toronto.

During 1997 Toronto’s largest citizens’ movement in history rallied to resist
the provincially-imposed amalgamation of the six federated Metro municipalities of Toronto, York, East York, Etobicoke, North York and Scarborough. The prospect of accessible local governments giving way to a remote megacity burdened with a massive downloading of additional service costs, galvanized a mass movement into opposition. Journalist Joe Chidley captured the city’s ensuing passion-play well. “The city is in the grip of Mega-Madness,” he wrote in March 1997, “and a riveting drama is being played out on the civic stage” (Chidley 1997: 46). As we shall see, immigrants and diverse ethnocultural communities were completely missing from this movement but eventually would launch their own, autonomous intervention into megacity politics in Toronto.

First a quick overview of the scale of citizen mobilization is helpful. The megacity protest was organized around a non-partisan organization called Citizens For Local Democracy, typically revered or reviled under its acronym C4LD. The group held weekly meetings that routinely attracted between 800-1200 citizens. The group’s largest rally was a full-house of 2600 at the venerable concert venue, Massey Hall. February 1997 conveniently brought the 160th anniversary of the Rebellion of Upper Canada, and a crowd variously estimated at between 10 and 15 thousand people re-enacted the march down Yonge Street of an earlier generation of dissidents. Then came provincial hearings into the megacity legislation, which drew over 600 deputants — most speaking passionately against the proposed legislation. And finally, a referendum campaign in March across the 6 Metro Toronto municipalities resulted in considerably higher voter-turnout than typically marks a municipal election. And 76% of the voters rejected the Megacity.

With remarkably few exceptions, the anti-megacity movement represented a mobilization of white, British-stock Toronto. This is a point self-critically acknowledged by the leaders of C4LD. Kathleen Wynne is a member of C4LD’s steering committee, and she chaired the group’s mass weekly meetings. Reviewing the movement’s campaign, she acknowledges that “we have not reached out, we have not succeeded in bringing in people from other ethnic communities. We are an Anglo group, white Anglo. It was mostly an Anglo WASP or WASC, (there were Catholics too!), community that rose up against the megacity” (Wynne 1997).

Why was that? A variety of factors account for the movement’s ethnocultural homogeneity in this remarkably diverse city. First, an explanation of why white, Anglo Toronto did rise up. Kathleen Wynne identifies most C4LD participants as preponderantly downtowners, elderly, well educated and literate; as she observed, “people who when you said John Ralston Saul was coming got on their feet and cheered” (Wynne 1997). And they cheered in a large downtown church, where the movement’s weekly meetings were held. This was generally affluent, white Torontonians meeting in a nearby church. Virtually all of the 2300 people on C4LD’s mailing list lived in the former central city of Toronto, and fully 60% lived south of Bloor Street in the downtown area. The movement was galvanized by an assortment of both principled and pragmatic concerns: the elimination of
local governments which these residents felt some ownership of; the prospect of higher property taxes; and the feared erosion of a host of local services across the city’s social and physical infrastructure. As Kathleen Wynne says, this was “a constituency that felt comfortable coming into the halls of power and then felt entitled to organize this citizen’s movement ... Nobody had the authority to stop them” (Wynne 1997). Overwhelmingly, then, this civic protest movement was rooted in the downtown Anglo-Canadian professional and managerial classes, whose spatial concentration in the core city of Toronto we identified above (Figures 2, 3 and 4).

The anti-megacity movement proved inaccessible and scarcely relevant to the large immigrant and ethnocultural communities across the 6 municipalities targeted for amalgamation. Ever scrambling to respond to a bulldozing and blustering provincial government, C4LD did little to mobilize the city’s diverse communities. Except for a short-lived initial attempt, materials were not translated into other languages. The downtown location — in a church at that — was a mismatch for many communities. No effort was made to identify amalgamation’s threat to issues of concern to immigrant and minority communities such as service access, employment equity and policing.

As a result the anti-megacity movement never spoke to the area’s diverse composition and communities. Some believe this stemmed from Toronto’s own experience of two solitudes. The coordinator of the Mayor’s Committee on Community and Race Relations in the former city of Toronto, Augusto Mathias observes that “C4LD was very mainstream, Canadian-born, white European. We’ve (visible minorities) always been in isolation from the mainstream” (Mathias 1997). Another leader from the South Asian community feels immigrant absence from the struggle reflected their political marginalization. Lawyer Viresh Fernando, who would subsequently be instrumental in mobilizing a distinctive immigrant and visible minority presence in the debate over Toronto’s political future, says immigrants didn’t participate in C4LD “because they feel powerless ... They feel that it’s all decided elsewhere” (Fernando 1997).

More generally, several additional factors likely came into play. First, it is undoubtedly true that immigrants and visible minorities had no reason to feel the attachment to the targeted local governments that older, white Torontonians did. City Hall had not been as accessible or reflective of their communities. The ethnocultural profile of municipal politicians elected in the former city of Toronto is suggestive. Fully 16 (64%) of the 25 councillors sitting on the city of Toronto council or representing its residents on the regional Metro council were of British ethnic origin. Only 1 was a visible minority. The former city of Toronto’s British origin professional and managerial classes discussed earlier, simply dominated the political life of the city and C4LD perpetuated this pattern. Second, and this is significant in terms of urban identities and citizenship, immigrants are far more likely to regard themselves as Torontonians, whether they reside in York, East York, Etobicoke, North York or Scarborough. Their urban geo-political reference point is more likely to be metropolitan, rather than municipally
sensitive, self-identifying as migrants from their homeland to Toronto in Canada. And finally class may also account for some of C4LD’s one-dimensional appeal. Higher formal political participation has tended to correlate with greater occupational status and income. The major immigrant communities in C4LD’s base of the former city of Toronto were Chinese, Italian and Portuguese each disproportionately characterized by large numbers engaged in manual labour, and by low income households. To this point then the struggle against the megacity may be seen as the old Toronto — remnants of its “white settler” urban society — rising to defend its familiar and trusted system of municipal government, while newer Torontonians stood on the sidelines.

But political participation and citizenship are not static phenomena. As the debate over Toronto’s restructuring reached its provincially-imposed conclusion, immigrant and visible minority groups mobilized on two fronts: first, through the formation of a new coalition called New Voices For The New City; and second, through an assertive campaign to promote the continued commitment to access, equity and anti-racism work in the new megacity.

New Voices For The New City originated from the provincial hearings into the megacity legislation. One of the few visible minority presentations was by Viresh Fernando, on behalf of the Council of Agencies Serving South Asians (CASSA). Preparing the submission, it became clear to Fernando and CASSA that immigrant communities could be particularly vulnerable in a new megacity. Their brief identified a variety of risks: downloading would lead to cuts in services and funding for community agencies; increased resort to user fees for municipal services was likely, and would have an adverse impact on immigrants and minorities; ethnocultural groups were better off dealing with seven local governments, more attuned to neighborhood needs than with a more remote centralized institution; a single large council would be harder to lobby and interest in community concerns; municipal sector job losses caused by amalgamation would hit designated equity groups hardest; and the megacity might not follow equity principles in making appointments to its assorted agencies, boards and commissions.

CASSA’s deputation did not deter the provincial government’s plan to amalgamate, but it did convince CASSA of the need to mobilize marginalized, minority voices in megacity politics. By the summer of 1997, CASSA had pulled together an impressive coalition of 63 diverse community organizations under the banner of New Voices For The New City. Affiliated groups included the Canadian Arab Association, the Chinese Canadian National Council, the Ethiopian Association of Toronto, the Jamaican Canadian Association, the Canadian Sri Lankan Association, the Somali Canadian Association, and the Vietnamese Association of Toronto, as well as a number of women’s organizations and unions. Recent immigrant groups predominated, and most were spatially concentrated not in the former central city of Toronto but in the 3 post-war suburbs of North York, Scarborough or Etobicoke. A civic alliance on this scale was unprecedented as New Voices co-chair Viresh Fernando noted,
“most of the 63 groups had never come together voluntarily on any issue” (Fernando 1997). Its founding document served notice that New Voices was intended to promote more engaged and effective forms of urban citizenship among traditionally marginalized communities: “Increasing the participation of First Nations, visible minorities, immigrant groups, socially disadvantaged persons in the political process is the main aim of this project... The purpose of this project is to strengthen civic society by ensuring that these voices are heard and that the future Mayor and Council of the Megacity will respond to these concerns” (New Voices of the New City 1997a: 1).

Specifically, and perhaps too minimally, New Voices of the New City committed itself to organizing a megacity mayoralty debate on issues of access, equity and anti-racism. Their objective was to raise these issues in the election campaign; press the candidates to take a stand; and thereby raise community participation and voter turn-out in the election. New Voices may have set a record for the longest title attached to a political forum. Its mayoralty debate was billed as “Defining the Spaces and Roles, of First Nations, Immigrants, People of Colour, Disadvantaged Women and Other Marginalized Groups in the Mega-city”. The two mayoralty front-runners as well as an African-Canadian candidate from a field of 17 “also-rans” were invited to participate. Several hundred people were in attendance, media coverage was strong, and Viresh Fernando of New Voices deemed the event a great success, saying: “We brought them [the candidates] face to face with diversity, and the politics of diversity” (Fernando 1997).

Paradoxically, then, the creation of the megacity of Toronto — condemned for undermining local democracy — stimulated unprecedented civic mobilization among immigrant and visible minority communities. It also generated an important rallying of forces within the municipal bureaucracy pressing the new amalgamated City to preserve and strengthen existing municipal commitments to access, equity, anti-racism and human rights. All seven municipalities being amalgamated, (including the regional Metro government), had established council committees and/or staff positions devoted to these initiatives. How important would this agenda be for the new City? Initially, the answer depended on recommendations of a provincially-appointed Transition Team empowered to design the new City’s political and administrative structures. Six of the seven soon-to-be merged municipalities collaborated in presenting a joint brief to the Task Force. Leading the initiative were a cadre of dynamic municipal staff, many of whom were themselves immigrants or visible minorities who joined the municipal bureaucracy from earlier positions as community activists and advocates. Their joint brief declared, “The new City of Toronto will need to ensure that it is a sensitive, accessible and accountable entity... To do this, the City of Toronto will have to commit itself to ensuring that its political and bureaucratic structures are actively involved in anti-racism, access and equity work, that it will work with and enable communities to participate effectively in the city’s services and decision-making processes and further, that it has the
resources to effectively facilitate this” (Service Equity Team 1997: 10). This message was echoed in 19 submissions from municipal staff to public hearings of the Transition Team.

So another important vehicle that emerged during the amalgamation process to articulate civic claims on behalf of immigrant and ethnocultural communities was the accumulated infrastructure of staff devoted to these issues. Their initial efforts met with disappointment. The Transition Team’s Interim Report rhetorically invoked values of inclusivity and equity, but committed neither institutions nor staff to their achievement. As Bev Salmon, a veteran municipal politician and immigrant advocate observed, “The marginalization of these issues in the Report may lead to reinforcing the marginalization of equity-seeking groups in our civic society” (Salmon 1997: 1). Continued lobbying by staff, politicians and communities themselves nudged the Transition Team to strengthen the profile and resources of the new City’s access and equity mission by positioning its staff in the Chief Administrative Officer’s Department, as proposed by community advocates. And through the megacity’s first year of operation, pressure continues to be mobilized on the new council to advance an access and equity agenda responsive to the concerns of communities traditionally remote from the corridors of municipal influence including immigrant, refugee and ethnocultural-racial communities, women, gays lesbians and the disabled. A Task Force on Access and Equity comprised of both municipal councillors and community representatives will recommend a course of municipal action based on wide public consultations to be held across the megacity. In the politics of amalgamation in Toronto, therefore, immigrant communities were less concerned with preserving a jurisdictional status quo than attempting to assure that an enlarged city government was responsive to their distinct concerns.

**Measuring Citizenship: Municipal Elections 1997**

Elections are an important, if inherently ambiguous, terrain of citizenship. Voting, running for office, and winning are all markers of a community’s engagement in politics and its access to decision-making positions. Thus two leading Canadian specialists in the subject have written that analyzing the ethnocultural composition of elected legislators “may index the equality of access the system provides into the corridors of power”, and is further suggestive of the political system’s responsiveness to the policy preoccupations of diverse groups (Black and Lakhani 1997: 2). Meanwhile in a recent literature review of the subject, Daiva Stasiulis issued a useful reminder of the “complex relationships that exist between statistical or numerical representation and substantive representation” (Original emphasis. Stasiulis 1997b: 6). Accordingly our election analysis addresses both the numbers and their sometimes uncertain significance, drawing on election results across the Greater Toronto Area for the 1994 and 1997 municipal elections, and the 1997 federal vote.
Few municipal elections in Canadian history have garnered the media and public attention of Toronto’s 1997 vote. Interest ran high for several reasons. This was the inaugural election for the new City of Toronto council, a megacity council of 57 members for the megacity. A close mayoralty race between two sharply contrasted front-runners — North York’s brash, business-booster mayor Mel Lastman and Toronto’s consensual, neighbourhood-friendly mayor Barbara Hall — dominated the headlines. Across 28 wards, (electing 2 councillors each), the election was more competitive than ever as incumbents from the 106 seats in Metro Toronto’s previous two tier system desperately fought it out for the 56 remaining council seats — with a number of prominent ex-school board trustees added for good measure. Intuitively one might expect that the greater the number of municipal councillors to be elected, and the smaller the wards, the more reflective and representative municipal councils would be in a diverse urban setting. And conversely the fewer the elected politicians and the larger the wards, the less ethnoculturally representative. As we shall see the results of the first megacity election proved counter-intuitive in some respects.

Voter turn-out in November 1997 was substantially higher than any time in recent decades. Traditional turn-out in the 30% range soared to 45%. The conventional wisdom has argued that voter turn-out among immigrant and minority ethnocultural communities is low. A variety of factors have historically impeded this expression of citizenship including: the confusing structure of local government; a paucity of election information in languages other than English; unfamiliarity with candidates; few candidates drawn from diverse communities; and of course in many cases, ineligibility to vote pending naturalization.

In the most hotly contested race of all in 1997, Toronto’s mayoralty contest, it was striking how much emphasis the two front-runners placed on winning the immigrant and ethnic minority vote. It is particularly instructive that in the final days of the campaign, which pollsters were calling a virtual dead heat, both Lastman and Hall concentrated their personal appearances and campaign effort on immigrant and minority communities. Mel Lastman’s final weekend days on the campaign trail included speeches and appearances before a Sikh community, a Black community, and visits to a Hindu Temple, a synagogue and two churches. Barbara Hall visited the Italian, Tamil and Chinese communities, attended a Caribbean-immigrant church, a Hindu Temple and had volunteers from the Vietnamese community on a mission to phone all their compatriots before election day. Never before has Toronto’s ethnocultural diversity been so aggressively courted by candidates for civic government’s highest office. Reinforcing the blandishments of the leading mayoralty hopefuls was an advertising campaign spear-headed by staff in the former City of Toronto to run ads in the 10 leading non-English linguistic community ethnic newspapers providing basic information regarding municipal voter eligibility and polling locations. In the end, it was Mel Lastman’s commanding lead in the multicultural neighborhoods of North York and Scarborough which assured him of victory as Toronto’s first Mega-Mayor. (see Figure 2).
We have drawn on a combination of name identification and biographical information to develop ethnocultural profiles of elected politicians across the GTA. The ethnocultural composition of the City of Toronto’s new council is striking for both its concentrations and absences. The 57 member council is comprised of 27 members of British origin (47%), 11 Italians (19.3%), 7 visible minorities (12.3%) consisting of 4 Chinese members, 3 Blacks, 6 Jewish members and 6 of assorted other European heritage (10.5% each). The first statistical observation to draw from these figures is historical. The megacity election results produced an interesting pattern of ethnocultural winners and losers. In some respects the megacity’s council is marginally better reflective of Toronto’s diversity than were the 7 pre-existing councils (including Metro Toronto’s). Based on the 1994 municipal elections, British origin councillors accounted for 52.8% of the total 106 council seats, Italians 16%, visible minorities 7.5% and Jews 6.6%. So British origin dominance declined somewhat as Italian, visible minority and Jewish incumbents overwhelmingly held their seats. The biggest losers were the Greek and Portuguese communities. In 1994 there were 3 councillors of Greek origin in East York, now there are none; in 1994 the former city of Toronto’s Portuguese community had 3 voices on council, now there is 1.

In the transition to the megacity then, fewer available municipal seats has spelled marginally better statistical representation for some minorities, and major losses for others. Overall, some groups are now significantly over-represented on the new Toronto council compared to their presence in the population, and some significantly under-represented. Substantially over-represented are British, Italian and Jewish municipal politicians. Dramatically under-represented from their 31% share of the population are visible minorities, with a number of large communities such as the Korean, Vietnamese, Filipino and several from the Indian sub-continent having no members elected at all.

In 1997 Torontonians went to the polls both municipally and federally. A comparison of results reveals a more equitable ethnocultural pattern of representation municipally. The area of the megacity contains 22 federal ridings. Elected were 12 MPs of British origin, 6 Italians, 3 other Europeans, 1 visible minority and no Jews. Proportionally then, Italians fared significantly better federally (taking 27% of the seats) than their already-strong municipal showing; British and Europeans rank marginally higher; visible minorities considerably worse (dropping from over 12% to 4.5%); and Jews are federally absent compared with their 10.5% municipal presence. Several factors account for the more reflective pattern of representation municipally than federally: there are more elected positions available; smaller constituencies reinforce the likelihood of geographically concentrated groups electing one of their own; members of some groups, such as Jews with distinct dietary, prayer and communal practices may be reluctant to pursue political careers based in Ottawa; and political parties may not be doing enough to attract diverse ethnocultural candidates.

Finally, comparing the 1997 megacity (area 416) results with the
surrounding regions (area 905) of the GTA reveals some stark contrasts. This involves at its fullest measure, the 212 council seats in the assorted municipalities of Halton, Peel, York and Durham regions. Only 3 of the 212 elected were visible minority candidates, 2 Councillors of Chinese origin in Markham and a Black Councillor in Mississauga. The vast majority of seats went to councillors of British origin. Results were somewhat more representative if one takes only the 4 non-megacity municipalities which rounded out the GTA’s top 10 immigration list from the 1991 and 1996 census — namely Vaughan, Markham, Mississauga and Richmond Hill. Of a total 41 councillors elected across these 4 municipalities in 1997, 22 (54%) were of British origin, 11 (27%) were Italian; 3 aforementioned visible minority members (7%), 3 Jewish (7%), and 2 other European (5%). These edge cities are closer to the electoral representation profile of the megacity, than they are to the homogeneity of the rest of the GTA’s 905 area. Perhaps most significantly, the 3 visible minority councillors elected in 1997 represent a 200% increase over the previous 1994 vote when only one visible minority had been elected. Particularly noteworthy was the mobilization of the Chinese Canadian National Council — York Region to raise Chinese voter turn-out and electoral representation in Markham in the aftermath of several conflicts between the community and municipal council over issues of zoning and commercial signage. Their efforts paid off with the election of a second Chinese origin member of council.

Statistically, then, several important patterns stand out from all these numbers. First, local council seats in the Toronto city region are overwhelmingly held by politicians of British origin. They constitute an absolute majority of elected politicians on all but a handful of the GTA’s 29 municipal councils, even though in the 1991 census barely 20% of the GTA’s population declared exclusively British ethnic origins.

Second, the Italian community’s electoral record is particularly distinctive. Consistently at both the local and federal levels, the Italian community has been Toronto’s most successful non-British ethnic community. Based on the 1991 Census, Italians represented 7.7% of the megacity’s population, and 7.5 of the total GTA population. As we’ve seen, the 11 megacity councillors of Italian heritage make up almost 20% of its council; and their 11 Italian counterparts in Vaughan, Markham, Mississauga and Richmond Hill comprise 26.8% of those 905/GTA seats. Toronto’s Italian community is geographically highly concentrated, and demonstrates a strong pattern of collective group preference in elections.

The experience in the city of Vaughan is especially striking. In 1991, the latest year of available data to date, 43% of that edge city’s population of 110,000 were Italian. Vaughan consistently has had the highest municipal voter turn-out across the GTA. In 1994 it had a 45% voter turn-out, compared with 25% in Mississauga and 31% in North York. According to one senior administrative official in Vaughan, turn-out in some Italian areas of Vaughan often runs as high as 70% to offset very low turn-outs in other areas of the municipality.
The 1997 municipal election, like the previous, saw Italian candidates win 6 of the 8 seats on Vaughan council. Vaughan is the only municipal council in the entire GTA on which politicians of British origin are outnumbered by another ethnic group. The remarkably high pattern of voter participation in Vaughan reminds us of the hazards of excessive generalization about a particular group’s political participation. The lowest voter turn-out in the megacity is found in heavily Italian inner-city wards close to downtown, with high levels of unemployment, tenancy and transience of population. Class and generation matter, as evidenced by the wealthier first and second generation Italian concentration in Vaughan. It would be interesting to know whether there is another large Canadian municipality where a non-Anglo or non-Francophone ethnic group is so active and successful electorally. In Vaughan Italians represent the statistical and political dominant culture, with British origin residents too few to assert their political hegemony as in every other GTA municipality.

Third we have seen that visible minorities are substantially under-represented on municipal councils in the Greater Toronto Area. During the 1997 election campaign Munyonzwe Hamalangwa, a megacity mayoral candidate, sought to enhance visible minority electoral participation through a Charter challenge before the courts. He called on the courts to extend the municipal franchise to landed immigrants, which would be of particular value to the great majority of recent immigrants from Asia, the Caribbean, Central and South America. (As we have seen, the great majority of the GTA’s non-citizen immigrants reside within the new City). Hamalangwa’s challenge did not get far — it was dismissed, but nonetheless represents an important attempt to redefine urban citizenship for newcomers to Canada.

And what finally is the substantive meaning of these election results? Do ethnic politicians render particular benefits to their ethnic compatriots? Is a group’s statistical over-representation synonymous with political dominance? Is under-representation symptomatic of political marginalization? The tangible significance of identity and representation are far more ambiguous than their statistical expression suggests. Consider some examples of the complexities involved.

Viresh Fernando of New Voices dismisses two of the megacity’s visible minority councillors as inauthentic on the grounds that they do not advance minority community claims and were elected in the same predominantly white, affluent ward (Fernando 1997). It did not help that one of them was responsible for the most bigoted outburst against the arrival of Roma immigrants to Toronto in the fall of 1997. For some minority advocates then, policy commitments and community roots are necessary conditions for minority group political representatives. Nor is it uncommon for minority heritage politicians to disavow any transnational, distinct or even hyphenated identity in favour of an unabashed assertion of Canadianism. Thus staff of one minority member of megacity council declared that the councillor was born in Trinidad, regards himself simply as
Canadian, and does not take kindly to being lobbied as a member from an identifiable immigrant community (Anonymous 1998).

Additionally there are occasions when members of an ethnic group may regard a candidate of another heritage as an appropriate advocate for their group. One Greek voter in Scarborough explained to a student reporter why he supported Norm Kelly over fellow Greek candidates Mike Tzekas and George Pornaras. Explained the voter, “The Greek community was supporting Tzekas and Pornaras but I told them Norm is more Greek than those guys. Where were those guys when Norm helped build St. John’s?” (Neresian 1997). Norm Kelly’s previous support for construction of a Greek Orthodox church was enough to earn him the vote — and honorary Greek status! — from this resident. On election night Kelly topped the polls in the ward. It is also the case that some of the leading municipal advocates on human rights, anti-racism, access and equity in Toronto have been white male councillors of British or European origin.

It is also instructive to situate politicians into the familiar municipal camps of progressives versus establishment, community orientation versus business orientation, left versus right. Pertinent criteria become voting behaviour and views on issues such as social services, policing, user fees and development. Interestingly in the recent megacity election the Metro Network For Social Justice — a Toronto umbrella group of advocacy, labour, immigrant and community groups — endorsed only 1 of the 7 visible minority candidates who were elected. It also supported 4 non-incumbent visible minority candidates who failed to get elected. It appears that conservative voices from these communities stand far better election chances than dissidents.

Nor is it automatically evident what tangible “return” an ethnocultural community secures by electing one of its own. Beyond a symbolic validation of their place in the urban landscape, it is unclear for instance what benefits Toronto’s Italian community has derived from electing fellow Italians onto municipal council. Many of the megacity (and forerunner municipality) Italian origin councillors represent wards with disproportionately large numbers of unemployed and lower income residents who often endure inferior quality municipal services such as transit, libraries, community centres and planning. These are not the typical spoils of political success.

In sum identity, electoral representation and citizenship belie one-dimensional interpretation. But nor can they be ignored as reflections of political influence and institutional access. Indeed minority communities themselves typically identify their own electoral under-representation as a prime source of community weakness in urban affairs. Thus the President of the Jamaican Canadian Association, Herman Stewart, attributes his organization’s recent protracted battle to secure a rezoning for a community centre in North York, (an experience he wearily confides “I wouldn’t wish it on my worst enemy”), to the absence of any Black member on the pre-amalgamation North York council. Stewart believes strongly that a marginalized and stereotyped community like his requires its own electoral representation: “the solution to it is to have more Black
people and more immigrants on council and if we had one of our own on council then that lack of understanding wouldn’t be there because we had somebody there who knows exactly what we are about and would be able to talk to their colleagues and say hey, they are not there to create problems, they are there to make that community a better place” (Stewart 1998). In the end, Stewart believes, it was more direct community mobilization that finally won over the politicians of North York Council. He noticed a dramatic change in council support after more than 200 members of the Jamaican community packed a council committee meeting discussing the issue. Beyond its symbolic value, then, electoral representation has been regarded by immigrant communities as a necessary precondition of equitable urban citizenship.

Expressing Citizenship: Claims On Public Space

So far we have been measuring political participation in very formal, institutional ways such as participation in political protest movements and elections. These are important indicators of citizen engagement but they don’t tell the whole story. Governments and elections can be detached from the direct imperatives and identities of everyday life. There is a growing recognition that claims on public space represent an important expression of collective citizenship, especially for immigrant and minority groups who are asserting their presence in a new urban environment. Dolores Hayden for instance emphasizes the importance of public space in nurturing an inclusive sense of identity, when she defines “[t]he power of place — the power of ordinary urban landscapes to nurture citizens’ public memory, to encompass shared time in the form of shared territory ...” (Hayden 1996: 9).

Our research has therefore explored immigrant and minority community claims on public space — particularly streets for parades, marches and religious processions; civic squares; and parks for picnics and recreational events. Who uses and occupies the public realm is an important indicator of community and citizenship. Initial findings suggest a disproportionately high use of public space by immigrant and ethnocultural minority communities. Applications for parade permits in Toronto are instructive. This involves registering and gaining police approval for a street parade. In 1996 there were 165 recorded requests to the Metro Toronto police (spanning the territory now covered by the megacity) for parade permits. Remarkably, all but 10 were from ethnic, racial or religious organizations and groups. So overwhelmingly the streets of Toronto are marched and paraded by immigrants, ethnic and visible minority groups. By far the single largest type of event was observance of a Christian holiday or ritual. There were 93 parades in this category — almost all involving the Italian, Portuguese and Greek communities. Of these 93, 56 reflected non-religious mobilization of immigrant, ethnic and visible minority groups, which included political protest marches, cultural festivals, national day observances, and fund-raising events. Of
these 56, 31 were organized by 14 different visible minority groups such as the Vietnamese, Tamil, Chinese, Filipino, and Indian communities; 25 were organized by 10 different groups of British or European heritage (Metropolitan Toronto Police 1996).

Use of Toronto’s celebrated civic square — Nathan Phillips Square — outside Toronto City Hall is another prime indication of claiming public space. The Square opened in 1965 — perfectly timed to greet the waves of immigrants from around the world who would call the city home, and use the square to assert their collective presence. In 1996, 36 of 140 event bookings at the Square were by identifiable ethnocultural, visible minority or religious groups. These ranged from demonstrations to cultural celebrations and flag raisings (City of Toronto 1996). Finally the spectacle of soccer’s World Cup ‘98 once again brought thousands of Torontonians from diverse immigrant and ethnocultural communities onto the streets to collectively celebrate their team’s triumph. The area’s Italian, Portuguese, Brazilian, Jamaican and Croatian communities led the way with the city’s Italian and Portuguese thoroughfares typically being closed to cars, buses and streetcars as throngs of soccer revelers took possession of the streets on foot or by motor car cavalcades bedecked with flags. So widespread were the celebrations that the Globe and Mail editorialized that these spontaneous street rallies afforded proof “that freedom-of-assembly rights are alive and vibrant in this country ... Toronto’s street life was evidence that Canadians can still be seized by a healthy impulse to gather in the open” (Globe and Mail 1998: A18).

Interestingly however this right of citizenship virtually had to be ‘seized’ by minority communities as Toronto’s police declared at the outset that motorists waving flags from vehicles would be subject to fines for traffic violations. As a Toronto Star headline proclaimed, Torontonians’ massive “Wave of defiance” put an end to any such plans, and Toronto’s diverse communities had struck another blow for urban citizenship (Toronto Star 1998: A1).

Conclusion

This analysis suggests that global migration is nurturing new expressions of urban citizenship among immigrant communities in Toronto. Fundamentally these emerging patterns of ‘urban belonging’ among diverse communities are rooted in immigrant demographics, identities, spatial settlements and adversities.

Toronto’s immigrant communities are scarcely homogenous. Rather, they are differentiated — both within and between themselves — along a host of dimensions including ethnic, racial, religious, spatial, occupational and income. Yet the following patterns emerge from our demographic analysis and mapping of immigrant Toronto:

- The Toronto city region ranks among the world’s most heavily concentrated immigrant metropolises;
- over the past 30 years migration to Toronto has been globalized, bringing the
largest numbers of newcomers from Asia and the Caribbean;
- immigrant enclaves are now to be found across both the core and periphery of the Toronto city region;
- the greatest concentrations of immigrant settlement are now to be found in post-war suburbs followed by edge cities, earlier industrial suburbs, and then the original core city;
- the original core city of Toronto is dominated by Anglo-Canadian professional and managerial classes;
- most immigrants are employed in clerical and labour occupations; and
- those immigrants employed in management, professional or technical occupations tend to settle in edge cities rather than the core city or its post-war suburbs.

These patterns shape both the expression and exercise of civic engagement among Toronto’s immigrant communities. There is no doubt that transnational migration has generated new claims to urban citizenship in Toronto. Immigrants and diverse ethnocultural groups no longer feel constrained to reside in traditional immigrant or minority settlement areas; through their dispersed residential settlement — and the attendant development of community centres, places of worship and commercial services — they have transformed the GTA’s suburbs and edge cities into remarkably cosmopolitan settings; they have established their own organizations to influence the direction of local government and policy; they are actively pursuing electoral office and the extension of voting rights for non-naturalized immigrants; and they are busily laying claim to public space, the streets and civic squares of their new urban home. Immigrant and diverse ethnocultural groups are staking out new rights to the city in Toronto.

Indeed the triumph of Mel Lastman over Barbara Hall as the first mayor of the megacity’s 2.4 million residents symbolically represents the ascendancy of immigrant Toronto over the city’s British origin dominant culture. North York’s mayor defeated the mayor of the former core city of Toronto; Lastman embodied ethnic bravado to Hall’s apparent Anglo reserve; and Lastman swept to victory based on his commanding lead in North York and Scarborough — the city region’s two areas of greatest immigrant concentration — while Barbara Hall’s strongest base was the former city of Toronto.

Yet immigrants also face numerous obstacles to exercise their citizenship. First, there is resistance to consider them as genuine citizens by recognizing their distinct place in the polity. As we demonstrated even a progressive, activist movement such as Citizens For Local Democracy proved unable to reach out to Toronto’s diverse communities. Arguably the city’s largest urban movement ever, C4LD failed to build linguistic, cultural or policy bridges to immigrant Toronto. And elsewhere in the GTA immigrant communities have had their claim to civic belonging challenged more frontally, as when the city of Markham’s Deputy Mayor Carole Bell condemned Chinese signage in retail malls for adversely altering the city’s character and alienating long-time residents. In both cases immigrant communities responded by mobilizing autonomously to advance their
rights in the city.

Immigrant communities will need to draw on this resilience and activism against a number of prevailing adversities. While wealthier immigrants settle in the GTA’s 905 area and claim rights to citizenship on the basis of their access to resources, those edge cities lack traditions of accommodating diversity. Their urban form also provides few public spaces in which communities can express collective identity, solidarity and citizenship. So ironically immigrants from across the GTA continue to celebrate their national holidays, religious festivals or soccer triumphs on the streets or civic square of the old core city of Toronto. Moreover recent immigrant communities are badly under-represented, if not totally absent, on edge city municipal councils. Advances in immigrant urban citizenship in the GTA’s 905 area will signify that edge cities are indeed complex and not uni-dimensional suburbs.

Within the megacity of Toronto, another set of challenges loom large for immigrant communities. As we have seen the 416 area is home to less affluent immigrants. The new city of Toronto faces massive provincial downloading and funding cuts which will translate into a wave of user fees, staff reductions and service cuts. All will hit immigrant and minority communities particularly hard. Assuring access and equity to municipal services and resources will test both immigrant Toronto and the city’s new political institutions.

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