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Introduction: The Evolving Tradition of Citizenship
GERSON SHAHAR

Imagine that you have been invited to draw up, through intensive consultation with a group of strangers, the blueprints for a new society. Your task is to delineate the legal framework, institutions, and social relations around which the members of the new society would coalesce. That would probably require you and your co-founders to debate how virtuous ordinary people are and can be made. You and your co-founders would then need to ask how the members of the new society would learn to cooperate and settle their conflicts. Subsequently, you are likely to puzzle over the best way of emending these arrangements once the circumstances of the society change. Raising and answering such questions is part of the long tradition that addresses society as a partnership of free citizens.1

The theme of citizenship and the kinds of questions raised here-with have reemerged into the center of public debate in the past few years (together with the concept of civil society) as the focus of policies and studies regarding a number of major contemporary processes: democratization and its consolidation in Eastern Europe and parts of Africa and Latin America; the rise of sometimes vicious ethnic and national conflicts concomitantly with the unprecedented integration of Western Europe’s nation-states in the European Union; the debate over welfare entitlements; and global migration to developed industrial states. Effective democracy, nationalism, the reform of the
welfare state, and immigration all pose challenges to our understanding of individual rights, political and social conflicts, and the nation-state; they can be, and have been, addressed through the prism of citizenship discourses.

The appeal of the theme of citizenship is not surprising. Citizenship, as the legal and social framework for individual autonomy and political democracy, has been a central axis of Western political philosophy. This long tradition of citizenship is a bridge between antiquity and the modern era, linking the civic and political self-conception of the Greek polis and the Roman Empire with the French Revolution and Enlightenment emphasis on the equal moral worth of all individuals. Citizenship, then, is an intellectual and political tradition that has been repeatedly revisited and updated and, therefore, today consists of a string of citizenship discourses. The resilience of the study of citizenship is further demonstrated by the fact that it is becoming the new abode of some of the Marxian preoccupations with conflict, oppression, and resistance.

But it was a theoretical renewal—John Rawls’s systematic revision of the theory of liberal individualism—that helped give the issues we associate with citizenship pride of place in current intellectual and political debates. Rawls’s philosophical writings facilitated and catalyzed the resurgence of interest in citizenship as a central theme for comprehending social change at the end of the twentieth century and supplied some of the theoretical language for analyzing contemporary social processes. Rawls’s invigorated liberal theory continues to serve as a major impetus for a considerable portion of the new citizenship debates.

The cross between an age-old theme and current public concerns rendered the citizenship nexus into the node of five modern debates (which are presented in Parts III to VII). The first goal of this reader is to present the perspectives of those who are engaged in these polemics. As part of each debate, the demand to expand liberal individual citizenship, in order to provide new or sturdier rights to individuals or to fully incorporate the individual members of another group into society, is criticized from the perspective of yet another collectivist version of citizenship rights. Complex communitarian, social democratic, nationalist, feminist, and multiculturalist critiques of liberal citizenship extend into debates over the proper nature of citizenship.

The theme of citizenship is frequently treated in relative isolation within separate academic disciplines, and most theorists participate in debates that take place within a single citizenship discourse. Case studies, however, frequently demonstrate that in most societies alternative discourses of citizenship coexist with and constrain one another. I believe, therefore, that bringing together alternative citizenship frameworks and pitting them against each other would increase theoretical cross-fertilization among disciplines. The second goal of this reader is to juxtapose these debates in order to inquire how competing citizenship discourses affect one another and the society in question. And, given the conflicting views of these discourses, we need to conclude by asking what is left today of the universalist claims made on behalf of citizenship as full membership in society. In Part VIII, therefore, theoretical and empirical articles seek to examine the interaction of multiple citizenship frameworks within one society.

As we proceed from historical origins to contemporary debates, we will observe a growing emphasis on social pluralism and cultural diversity that typifies our modern society and correspondingly the analysis of citizenship. While some of the theorists argue that for the citizenship tradition to survive it needs to ignore or at least to bypass this potentially fragmenting diversity, others hold that diversity has to be, and can be, integrated into the framework of citizenship itself. It is here, on the cutting edge of the debates on contemporary citizenship, its limits and potential for extension, that the fiercest debates are joined and the character of our society in the future is contested.

**HISTORICAL ORIGINS AND ANTECEDENTS**

Already in the earliest formulation, as J. G. A. Pocock’s and Max Weber’s essays in Part I suggest, we can locate the most enduring themes associated with citizenship. The tradition of citizenship commences as a framework of political life. But it also doubles as a sociological perspective and becomes one with humanism itself. Organizing social life around the political goal of securing freedom for the citizen generates a general vision of humanity.

In the context of the Greek city-state, the polis, citizenship appeared as a double process of emancipation. First, it was the liberation of a portion of humanity from tribal loyalties and its fusion into a voluntary civic community. Citizenship is the legal foundation and social glue of the new communality. It is founded on the definition of the human being as “a creature formed by nature to live a political life” and, in Pocock’s words, this is “one of the great Western definitions of what it is to be human.” Second, it was the transcendence of the instrumental sphere of necessity, in which we toil to satisfy our material wants, into the sphere of freedom where the practice of freedom, in collective rational and moral deliberation over a common destiny, is its own reward. This contrast has been conceptualized in multiple forms—for example, as emancipation from the private sphere of the household (oikos) into the public sphere of political life (polis) or, as
Pocock chooses to designate it, from the world of things into the world of persons and actions. This definition of freedom as an aim sought after for its own sake shows, in his words, that "citizenship is not just a means to being free; it is the way of being free itself" and has remained an enduring view of freedom as a value in itself regardless of other conditions in which we find ourselves.

The Greek concept of citizenship enshrined freedom, but only for a portion of mankind. The elevation of the public domain of political life over the private sphere of the family and economic life signaled the emancipation of free male citizens at the expense of women and slaves, who remained excluded from citizenship. The purview of Greek citizenship was limited and never amounted to more than a participatory aristocracy. The legacy of Greek citizenship, consequently, remained contradictory. The civic notion of membership established a framework for the incorporation of new members or categories of members into the "realm of freedom." At the same time, the early identity of citizenship and privilege left us with the question of just how possible it is to accommodate the practice of citizenship with broader notions of inclusion, such as the reduction of the barrier between the private and public, without having to abandon the citizenship tradition altogether.

The historical record indicates that when social conditions change, some aspects of the theme of citizenship change with them. Consequently, multiple historical conceptions of citizenship are available. Two of these transformations, the Roman imperial and the medieval, and their citizenship discourses are examined by Pocock and by Weber respectively.

In the polis all citizens possessed the same privileges, but the heterogeneity of empires is reflected in multiple and diverse types of memberships. In the Roman Empire various gradations of citizenship were granted to individuals and groups with the aim of incorporating the upper strata into the imperial institutions as loyal supporters of the emperor. The nature of citizenship itself had also been drastically revised as the conception of freedom was altered in the transition from the small Greek self-governing city-state to the massive Roman Empire. Instead of enabling one to freely participate in political decision making, citizenship became a legal status that provided protection from the emperor and his representatives' arbitrary rule. In addition, Roman citizenship was defined, for example by the jurist Gaius, not by the freedom to deliberate with other people but by the right to be a proprietor. Roman law became the regulation over freedom to take and dispose of possessions, including slaves.

The comparison of the Roman and Greek experiences already suggests many of the issues we will encounter in contemporary citizenship debates. In many ways the Greek approach resembles the communitarian discourse of citizenship while the Roman approach is like the liberal version of our times; in fact, as we shall see in Parts II and III, the liberal-communitarian debate might be fruitfully seen as a modern reenactment of the imperial-polis division. The contrast between political freedom and legal freedom raises intriguing questions. Could it be that where legal protection of rights is available, civic-mindedness suffers? Does security, and security in our possessions in particular, override people's aspiration to be free? Is the aspiration for political freedom less compelling than Greek political theory makes it out to be?

Pocock and Weber concur that the political freedom associated with citizenship emerged at first in the Western world. The rest of their analyses diverge. In Weber’s comparison of citizenship in the city-states of antiquity and the Middle Ages, in contrast to Pocock’s analysis of the cultural significance of citizenship, we benefit from a sociological explanation of the unique conditions under which citizenship came into existence. While Pocock places great emphasis on the importance of transcending tribal loyalties, Weber draws a broader picture in which the elimination of all magically (or religiously) sanctioned social divisions is seen as crucial for allowing the free association and solidarity on which communities of citizens are founded.

Unlike Pocock, Weber locates the impetus toward the development of citizenship in the military dimension of the Greek polis. The city-state is based on the association of those who can afford to purchase their own weapons and military equipment first for the protection of the city and later for conquest and the acquisition of land and booty (a venture Weber terms political or military capitalism). Equal access to arms led to the demand for the granting of effective citizenship rights to the armed plebeians. The democratic character of the polis reflects the further desire to ensure that growing economic inequality will not undermine the ability of free men to participate in the military, that is, to ensure the survival of the partnership of soldiers (termed by Weber a soldiers’ guild). The identity of soldier and citizen was firmly established in the polis, and participation in the military became the foundation for ancient freedoms.

Medieval cities, like the polis, also legislated their own law, and their citizens, mostly guild members and therefore still only a fraction of the inhabitants, elected their own officials. But in important respects the two
institutions and their citizenship frameworks differed. The divergence of the *polis* and the medieval cities reflected the changing relationship of military and civilian occupations. Medieval military technologies privileged feudal knights and reduced the armies of medieval cities to defensive tasks, and, conversely, the weight of the artisans’ guilds and the role played by them in the city was enhanced. The medieval city was founded on the peaceful arts of the citizens, scorned in antiquity, and produced economic resources and mobile capital that were the key to urban ascendance and modern progress. Allied with the political power of the rising modern states, the bourgeoisie or the first national citizenry emerged out of the cities. The possibility of its expansion into a truly all-encompassing national citizenry and the consequent transformations of citizenship will be the focus of all subsequent chapters.

The Revisited Liberal Position

John Rawls’s *A Theory of Justice*, which was published in 1971, its 1993 sequel, *Political Liberalism*, and his many articles commenced a reassessment of our thinking about public life in modern democratic liberal society and inspired many subsequent studies — some sympathetic, others critical — that focused on the theme of citizenship. Rawls has revisited liberalism with the intention of replacing its self-interested justification by *utilitarian* philosophy with a public morality that focuses on the attainment of justice in liberal society. At the same time, Rawls’s philosophical approach, like other forms of liberalism, continues to accent personal liberty — that is, individuals as the bearers of rights — and the toleration of religious, cultural, and political diversity. The centrality of his work and its relative complexity warrant a detailed exposition of its central arguments.³

In contrast with most liberals who are content with deliberating over ways of ensuring rights for individuals, Rawls seeks to discuss the rights of free and equal individuals as part and parcel of a theory of social cooperation. He proposes to do so by identifying justice with the simple idea of *fairness*. When cooperation between individuals is fair — that is, based not only on individuals’ freedom to contract with one another but also on mutually benefiting from their cooperation (for example, by acquiring some of the *primary goods* they need to shape their lives in a way that is meaningful) — justice is ensured while justice itself becomes fairness. Rawls’s approach of *justice as fairness* permits a shift in the liberal perspective from private to public life while still retaining the traditional concern with individual rights that animates liberalism.

One of the main reasons for Rawls’s rejection of the foundation of liberalism on a utilitarian psychology and its goal of maximizing the psycho-logical well-being of “happiness” for all is his disagreement with the notion that all rational and well-informed individuals have an identical view of what is good. Presuming principled diversity, the question Rawls faces is how the cooperation of a multitude of individuals can be secured when, frequently, the efforts necessary for the attainment of their different goals lead to conflict among them. May diverse goods be attained through cooperation and still benefit all?

In seeking to lay out the *basic structure* of an ideal or well-ordered society — a modern constitutional democracy — Rawls recreates the classical thought experiment (in Rawls’s own terms, it is a “device of representation”) of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau. Like his illustrious predecessors, Rawls seeks a social contract type of agreement as the foundation of the social order. Rawls suggests that, in order to be fair, individuals in the *original position* of contracting have to be behind a “veil of ignorance” as to their social situation in the new society: they must not know whether they will be rich or poor, a member of the majority or a minority, and so on. Under such conditions of imaginary equality, he argues, individuals will evolve from their basic intuitive ideas of cooperation in a democratic society a framework of political justice. As reasonable moral individuals — with capacities for justice (to act from the public conception of justice) and a capacity for a conception of the good (to rationally pursue a view of what is valuable in human life) — they will construct a society of free and equal citizens. The ensuing conception of justice (or social contract, in the traditional language of political theory), he argues, would include the two principles according to which political and economic institutions of a fair modern liberal democracy may be set up: the possession, by individuals, of (1) “a fully adequate scheme of equal basic rights and liberties,” and (2) equal opportunity combined with the most clearly distinguishing feature of Rawls’s approach of justice as fairness, “the difference principle,” namely, that “social and economic inequalities” would be acceptable only insofar as they operate “to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society.” These two principles are listed in order of priority. In practical terms this means that of the alternative social orders that safeguard the individual’s basic liberties, we should select the one that provides the most equal access to those positions that provide unequal rewards and in which social and economic inequalities work to the advantage of society’s least advantaged members.¹ Once basic liberties, or what in this volume will repeatedly be called civil citizenship rights, are safeguarded, the rights of the least advantaged, or their social citizenship rights, should be our main consideration in contracting for a just society.
For Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness to work, he repeatedly admonishes us, it has to be viewed as a political theory for a democratic citizenry. The reason is that the political life of citizens in a liberal democracy is not dominated by a single comprehensive moral — whether religious, nationalist, or other — vision, in contrast to other areas, such as our private or communal lives, where monolithic views are permissible. According to Rawls, justice as fairness is not intended as a comprehensive moral doctrine but as a practical modus vivendi that allows the emergence of an overlapping consensus of moral principles between opposing comprehensive doctrines.

It is not possible to attain agreement in a pluralistic modern society on disputed moral and religious questions without resorting to the repression that exists in nondemocratic societies. The strength of liberal society is precisely its ability to tolerate diversity by creating a self-limited political realm of individual rights and by setting an institutional framework within which disputes are avoided by permitting the political expression of only those conceptions of the good that are not monolithic. Whereas in A Theory of Justice Rawls went as far as arguing that his theory gave priority to right over good, in his more recent Political Liberalism he holds that rights are not opposed to the good, but only very limited notions of the good, such as the practical attainment of an overlapping consensus, are compatible with rights.4

The embodiment of the moral person in the liberal democratic society is the citizen who is free, self-originating, and responsible in exercising rights and discharging duties. Rawls argues that the citizen was formed in this limited political arena and operates to uphold it. Since rights are attached to an individual’s public identity as a free and equal citizen and not to one of the features that determine her identity, such as religion or nationality, she is free to change her view of the good life (e.g., convert from one religion to another) without being deprived of these rights. Indeed, only in a democratic society do citizens have the right to make claims that are valid; in nondemocratic societies only the views of those in positions of leadership carry authority. Finally, citizens take into account the need for cooperation (political justice is based on notions of social cooperation) and are responsible for making demands that are not excessive. This last point allows Rawls to argue that though the focal point of his theory is individual rights, the very same individuals possess what we would call cooperative virtues, which allow the citizens to create not just a loose partnership of ad hoc associations between individuals but a type of society with fairly stable and strong bonds between the members. Social unity and the allegiance of the citizens to their common institutions evolves only when they all share the same political conception of justice. The acceptance of the moral principle of fairness through an overlapping consensus, and not just adherence to the formal aspects of the political and institutional framework, is the foundation of social unity.

Some of the new liberal theorists, like Stephen Macedo, argue that democratic liberal society is in fact less divided and more robust than Rawls’s surface-level approach, seeking no more than an overlapping consensus, makes it out to be. Rawls’s theory focuses on the original position, the stage in which a reasonable political consensus is constructed. There is, however, a second stage in which the established liberal social order comes up against competing comprehensive religious and political moral orders. It is then that liberalism as a regime — namely, its principles that shape our goals and lives and its institutions that embody those principles and help us reach them — leads its citizens to oppose comprehensive conceptions of the good because they are incompatible with liberalism itself. In Macedo’s view, then, Rawls has not avoided but only deferred conflict, since liberalism cannot remain only a means but will also install its practice of justifying and accepting conceptions of the good only when they are reasonable. Liberal citizenship, therefore, possesses its own virtues, and those who publicly advocate its standards in effect construct their own moral community around those reasoned political positions.5

Rawls’s approach is obviously normative — he constructs a well-ordered, or ideal, society, in part through a thought experiment. This question arises: how can one compare the kinds of empirical studies that are found in this volume with his and with other normative approaches, such as Walzer’s? Though it is normative, Rawls’s theory is also historically situated: he clearly and repeatedly states that he strove to work out a basic structure for a modern liberal citizenry from the intuitive ideas of a political culture that continues the Greek tradition of citizenship and was reconstituted in the early modern era out of the confluence of religious toleration following the Wars of Religion, the market economy, and the constitutional principles of government. There is, in short, enough communality between his theory and the other works to make comparison possible. At the same time, the empirical studies in this volume are also not devoid of normative dimensions and concerns: they frequently study and often critique existing legal frameworks and principles on which the allocation of rights depends. The gap, then, between the normative and the empirical studies in the area of citizenship is limited and many bridges lead across it.
The Communitarian Critique

Modern civic republicanism is driven by longing for the communal life that seems to have been lost in the transition to the modern world. The source of many of the ailments of liberal society, in the view of many of its critics, is found in the decline of solidarity between citizens and their limited involvement in governing themselves, which leads to the loss of the sense of a common destiny. True communal life is possible, according to the civic republican discourse, only if citizens are virtuous and society is organized in a fashion that will ensure that they are and remain so.

If the utilitarian version of liberalism, and in important respects even Rawls’s revisited liberalism, resemble in their individualistic accent and legalistic framework the Roman imperial conception of citizenship, many of their opponents derive their inspiration from, and seek to make relevant to modern life, the Greek polis’s citizenship ideal. Greek civic republicanism, which was given expression most coherently by Aristotle, has sustained a vibrant political tradition in the writings of Machiavelli, Rousseau, Tocqueville, and others all the way to American republican thought in the eighteenth century. Adrian Oldfield’s essay expresses the views of civic republicanism, or the communitarian approach.

The debate between the liberal and the communitarian schools is a debate between two normative conceptions of the citizen. The individual, in either the utilitarian or the contractual liberal view, is the sovereign author of her life who pursues her private rational advantage or conception of the good. The role of politics in this approach remains negative: only to aid and protect individuals from interference by governments in exercising the rights they inalienably possess and in return for which they have to undertake certain minimal political duties (pay taxes, vote periodically, obey the law, serve in the military). Consequently, citizenship, in the liberal view, is an accessory, not a value in itself.

Oldfield uncovers one major limitation of this perspective. Oldfield emphasizes that individuals are members of social units larger than themselves, and one of these larger units—and it is here that the character of the communitarian approach emerges most clearly—is the political community. Communitarians retain the Greek view of politics as the hub of human existence and as life’s supreme fulfillment. Politics is a communal affair, and it is enduring political attachment that provides the citizen with her identity—and thereby another important term that will recur in many of the essays in this volume is introduced. Citizens are who they are by virtue of participating in the life of their political community, and by identifying with its characteristics. Pursuing the common good is the core of the communal citizens’ civic virtue. If we amplify political life by demanding more from the citizen, as Oldfield’s emphasis on duties indicates, her existence will be richer and she will lead a more fulfilling and morally inspired life.

One of the highlights of the communitarian perspective is the considerable attention devoted to identifying the kinds of social bonds, commitment, and education, maybe even molding, necessary to create and maintain such a community. Oldfield concludes that the citizen’s autonomy has to be balanced with “concord” or friendship, and the citizenry’s shared life and common aims have to be secured through the ongoing exercise of collective political judgment. Citizenship, in sum, communitarians contend, should be an activity or a practice and not, as liberals hold, simply a status of membership. Precedence is to be given not to individual rights but to the pursuit of the common good.

Liberals and communitarians are famous for their polemics over the priority of right versus good. Rawls’s and Oldfield’s essays in this volume seek to find common ground between their respective versions of liberalism and communitarianism and are willing to accept goals that are more modest than those sought by other liberals or communitarians. Oldfield is at pains to point out that modern communities must allow for the pursuit of alternative forms of individual good life, that is, to stay consistent with the autonomy of individuals and their diversity, which is also a starting point of Rawls’s justice as fairness approach. Rawls, for his part, constructs a theory of social cooperation and believes that in a society based on political justice rights complement the good. Individuals’ attitude toward one another in such a society is not instrumental but is based on moral principles that also serve to provide social unity. But even Rawls’s approach, satisfied as it is with the search for an overlapping moral consensus, has been criticized for not paying sufficient attention to the communal aspects of social life.

The contention between the liberal and the communitarian views of citizenship is many-sided and raises many questions. Would the pursuit of a single conception of the good, which communitarians hunger after and of which Rawls remains fearful, inevitably bring on an authoritarian state or, as Oldfield believes, could it be obtained voluntarily? Can the balance between individual autonomy and social cohesion, as is drawn by Oldfield, be maintained over time? How fallible is collective political judgment, and how susceptible is the public to demagoguery? In general, what is the appropriate balance of freedom and control within both liberal societies and communities?

There are also many questions communitarians debate among themselves. One of the central ones is what kind of community of citizens com-
munitarians should wish for and under what circumstances it would rise and prevail. Oldfield mentions two such communities. First, historically, political communities of engaged citizens, as Oldfield notes, have frequently emerged in the context of revolutions or wars of liberation that perforce educated the citizenry to cooperate against their enemies and, in the process, endowed them with a new political identity. The French Revolution was the first of such experiences, and the Jacobin radical political clubs provided the model for generating sweeping commitment in the modern era. But such revolutionary origins are hardly a recipe for begetting continuously active and free citizens. How long would it be possible to avert the danger of the community’s members being forced to endorse a collective interest that they don’t necessarily view as their own? When would such community come to exist outside, and therefore above, the individuals who constitute it and come to resemble a closed, hierarchical, preindustrial society?

Oldfield recognizes that in the modern world it is well nigh impossible to construct a true community on the national level and, consequently, it is necessary to seek communal forms of life in smaller units. Relying on Platt’s view that in the modern world functional units should replace territorial communities, Oldfield offers a second model of modern communities, professional associations. It seems mildly naive, however, to suggest that professions have a “common identity, stable membership, shared values, a common language, and acknowledged authority.” Even if the members of a profession successfully maintain a common front toward outsiders, they may engage in bitter struggles over the legitimate authority and the criterion of authority that should govern them.

The same question can be raised, in more general form, in regard to the capacity of small, decentralized communities to accommodate diversity. Will not small communities’ desire to preserve their distinct identity lead their members to reject minorities that hold different conceptions of the good? What would be the status of immigrants? Will a communitarian approach lead to the enforcement of popular morality at the exclusion of alternative ways of life; will it lead to the tyranny of the majority? Will prejudice and ignorance replace moral argumentation over reasonableness? Conversely, will the admission of diversity into the community allow its members to reach consensus through collective political judgment? Since communal citizenship also takes precedence over larger, especially universal, identities, will there be an impetus toward the evolution of new, broad rights; or will small communities stagnate and remain inward-looking?

Beyond criticizing what they see as the willingness of liberalism to sacrifice social solidarity and the virtuous behavior of citizens to the protection of individual rights, even the best-known communitarians such as Sandel and McIntyre are hard-pressed to put forth “some substantial vision of a common political good.” In fact, they seem apt to reject many of the existing comprehensive conceptions of the good as detrimental to liberal citizenship rights. This lacuna of civic republicanism is filled by others. In Parts IV, V, VI, and VII, alternative versions of communities of modern citizens are put forth by social democrats, nationalists, feminists, and multiculturalists.

The Social Democratic Critique

In 1949, in a series of lectures entitled “Citizenship and Social Class,” the British sociologist T. H. Marshall opened a new debate over citizenship by producing a theory that owes little to antiquity and a great deal to modern industrial experience. The historical context of Marshall’s work was the post–Second World War era when the British Labour Party and its social-democratic program of a welfare state and universal provision of welfare services predominated.

The strength of Marshall’s and the social-democratic approach is that they go beyond the conventional idea that membership in a community is predominantly a political matter. Marshall’s theory is at once legal, political, and socioeconomic, and since it is also historical, it introduces into the study of citizenship the element of social change that was missing from the more one-dimensional and static normative approaches. Marshall surveys and analyzes the expansion of the rights of citizens as a process of incorporating new groups—in the case of England, the working classes—into society and the body politic. New rights make the possession and wielding of previous rights more effective, and the access to such rights removes fences between groups previously separated by legal barriers or social custom. Each time citizenship is expanded it becomes stronger and richer.

The expansion of citizenship is connected with the incorporation of new groups into the state, a concept that had been only touched upon so far but now has to be introduced into the center of the citizenship debates. In our historical survey this will be the third time the political and territorial unit in which citizenship is embedded has changed: in antiquity from the Greek polis to the Roman Empire, during the Middle Ages from the Roman Empire to towns, and, finally, in the modern era from towns to states. The modern state emerges around the time of the Renaissance, usually through a political process of centralization that replaces fragmented and overlapping feudal authority with uniform practices within its boundaries. With the growth of citizenship from a local into a statewide institution, the freedoms conferred on citizens in the medieval towns were radically expanded, and
freedom itself was converted from a privilege into a right. Simultaneously, argues Marshall, the expansion of rights is part and parcel of the process of democratization, of the attainment by the lower classes, specifically the working class, of the modern rights originally fashioned by the upper classes for themselves.

Marshall distinguishes between three sets, or what we might term three generations, of citizenship rights: civil, political, and social. Civil rights are the bundle of rights necessary for individual freedom that emerged in the eighteenth century. Political rights originated in the nineteenth century and guaranteed participation in the exercise of political power as voter or representative. Finally, in the twentieth century, social rights of citizenship—Marshall’s original conceptual contribution to the theory of citizenship—make possible the attainment of a modicum of economic welfare and security or, as gracefully expressed by Marshall: “the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in society.” Marshall’s emphasis on the common standard of civilization allows us to avoid the common mistake of conflating welfare rights with social citizenship: the former are means-based and single out vulnerable individuals as needing protection; the latter is universal and attained as a right by virtue of membership in the community.

Marshall’s work explores the relations that emerge from the expansion of rights that are at once cumulative and contradictory. He is especially concerned with the contradiction between civil rights, which are in harmony with class inequalities, and social rights, which established “a universal right to real income which is not proportionate to the market value of the claimant” and, therefore, modify “the whole pattern of social inequality.” Their operation is also antithetical: civil rights provide protection from the state; social rights establish claims for benefits guaranteed by the state. The question that drove Marshall’s theoretical quest was, To what extent can the reduction of class equality, through the expansion of citizenship rights, reconcile people to the remaining inequality? He concluded that social citizenship and capitalism are at war, and the exercise of citizenship rights will continue to generate social conflict. At the same time, Marshall argues that citizenship and social class are compatible in our society “so much so that citizenship has itself become . . . the architect of legitimate social inequality.” Marshall’s own ambiguity echoes the debate over citizenship between the radical followers of Marx and the more moderate social democrats.

Nancy Fraser and Linda Gordon examine the evolution of citizenship rights in the United States and note contrasts with Marshall’s evolu-

tionary framework. Fraser and Gordon show that a strongly rooted civil rights tradition, instead of leading to the attainment of social rights, as was the case in Britain, may in fact hinder the growth of social rights of citizenship. The emphasis on contract—the predominant social relationship—and on property rights—the model for other kinds of legitimate rights—relegates other relations to a less esteemed status and restricts the emergence of alternative public languages that could legitimate social citizenship rights. Fraser and Gordon’s study suggests that the relationship of social citizenship rights to civil and political rights has been complex and cannot be reduced to a single pattern.

There is now a rich body of empirical studies that criticize Marshall’s work for presenting the British case as a universal model and the expansion of citizenship as a linear and irreversible process, thus opening a debate over the relationship between the different types of rights and, correspondingly, over different types of modern societies. Michael Mann has shown that modernizing absolutist elites, for example, granted civil rights; provided, and sometimes even pioneered, limited social rights; but bestowed only sham political citizenship. In other cases social citizenship rights have served to constrain, or even were conceived of outright as substitutes for, civil citizenship. For example, fascism and communism provided no civil or political rights but went furthest toward social citizenship, fascist regimes hesitantly and communist ones aggressively. Even in Britain, it has been argued, highlighting internal regional variation and giving greater emphasis to the impact of political culture and the public sphere would alter the pattern of the evolution of citizenship rights that was painted by Marshall. And not only social democratic regimes such as those in Great Britain and Scandinavia but, pace Fraser and Gordon, also the New Deal in the United States “revolutionized” social rights and thus acquired the loyalty of masses of voters. We need to inquire how both in Britain and in the United States social citizenship rights and welfare rights that seemed secure for decades have been recently abrogated. The study of each country then has to examine the history of the struggle for rights, the conditions under which they were given, the type of regime or state that granted or conceded them, and the local configuration of citizenship rights. But scholars and policy makers will continue to test and inquire: How intense is the conflict between civil, political, and social rights? How deeply are social rights ingrained and how far have they expanded or contracted? And have additional types of citizenship rights been demanded or granted as part of the full social heritage and the life of a civilized being under contemporary circumstances? Finally, the history of modern citizenship is more extensive than the history of in-
The Nationalist Critique

Another crucial dimension of modern citizenship, as Weber had already indicated and Marshall clearly noted, is the coincident emergence of civil rights and the birth of "modern national consciousness," which awoke people for the first time to a "sense of community membership and common heritage." The extension of other citizenship rights also paralleled the growth of the institutions of the state for national justice and a common law to all, national markets and economy, national education, and finally national planning. The framework for modern citizenship rights is the state that is gradually transformed into a state for a nation, a nation-state.

The French revolutionaries were the first to introduce the term nation with its modern meanings into the political lexicon. The Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen spelled out within the Enlightenment's rational philosophical framework simultaneously the democratic sovereignty of the nation and the civil rights of its citizens. As Rogers Brubaker's essay in this volume notes, this overlap between the "national" of a country and its "citizen" was the result of the long existence of the old French regime and the active role it played in the homogenization of its population, a process that was continued with greater vigor by the state administration, schools, and army in the nineteenth century. The Enlightenment's civic framework of citizenship is another embodiment of the values of liberal individualism, in the form of liberal nationalism.

In contrast, in the fragmented German kingdoms and principalities, the void between political citizenship and the nation gave rise to the alternative tradition of the Romantic, or völkisch, nationalism. In place of the Enlightenment's view of the nation as a partnership of individual citizens who possess identical, universal civil rights, the ethnic Volk was posited as an organic body with a life of its own. Nations, in Romantic nationalism, are all radically different from one another because their members possess distinct cultural markers, such as language, religion, and history. Since in this view nations are inscribed into the identity of their members, individuals were regarded as beholden to their nation and were required to demonstrate an ever-growing loyalty to the nation-state at the price of an ever-growing denial of their individual rights. The most extreme denial of individualism was advocated by fascist nationalism, an exaggerated and distorted version of Romantic nationalism.

Clearly, civic or liberal and Romantic or ethnocultural nationalism have given rise to conflicting theories of nationhood and citizenship. The rights demanded for the individual members of the nation by the former were bestowed on the national collective by the latter; whereas in the former individuals are known through their rights, in the latter individuals are characterized more by their identities.

In Brubaker’s study we are shown how these conflicting versions of nationalism, mediated by alternative legal definitions of citizenship, lead to different approaches to the naturalization of immigrants in France and Germany. Whereas French civic nationalism is based on the French experience that political incorporation and assimilation into the national language and culture go hand in hand, German ethnic nationalism denies the possibility of cultural assimilation. Consequently, in France the nation was seen as a territorial community and the criterion of jus soli was used to grant citizenship to those born on its territory. Germany is an extreme case in that its citizenship is based exclusively on jus sanguinis — on descent or blood line. German law, consequently, makes no provisions for granting citizenship to second-generation immigrants because that would contradict its dominant nationalist conception. It has to be emphasized that though the French and German nationalists disagree as to how best to achieve their goal — politically or culturally — that goal is the same and it is shared by nationalists elsewhere: the creation and maintenance of a homogeneous nation.

In the past few years, however, a process of revision began in both countries. In France, the automatic right of second-generation immigrants to become French citizens upon maturity has been abolished, and those who wish to become citizens will be required to ask expressly. In Germany, a yet inconclusive debate is carried on over the tradition of restricting citizenship to "foreigners" who were born in the country or lived there most of their adult lives. These changes and debates seem to be instances of contrary tendencies for responding to the kind of diversity that nationalists oppose. The changes in French and debates over German naturalization practices raise the question of how fixed national traditions and conceptions of citizenship are. Are they likely to change and, if so, under what conditions? And if change is possible, can liberal individual citizenship replace the Romantic, völkisch citizenship, or vice versa, completely? Finally, placing these questions in broad terms, just how fixed are individuals' social and national
identities? Does and should citizenship represent the deepest layers of cultural identity or proclaim the surface layers of political life?

The Immigrant and Multiculturalist Critiques

The examination of national citizenship has demonstrated that traditions of national identity, though divided into opposing camps, are animated by the desire to homogenize the state’s population by producing a fundamental overlap between citizens and nationals. In the post–Second World War era, however, global factors frustrate this goal. Contemporary waves of migration pose a clear challenge to the European conception of the nation-state as the political framework of a culturally homogenous citizenry. The growing number of migrants and their descendants, having forsaken one nation-state but not yet merged into another, are legal and cultural anomalies according to any national conception. On top of the still ongoing debates within many countries between adherents of the Enlightenment’s liberal and Romanticism’s völkisch versions of nationhood and citizenship, the diversification of industrial nation-states’ populations produces new demands for the extension of the rights of citizens in yet new directions. Will Kymlicka’s and Yasemin Soysal’s essays outline two such directions that, nonetheless, are potentially opposed to each other. But there is also continuity between the nationalist and the postnationalist debates: the multiculturalist aspirations examined by Kymlicka share some, though not all, features of ethnic citizenship, whereas the global citizenship rights studied by Soysal seem to further expand the liberal framework of citizenship.

Kymlicka’s multiculturalist perspective on polyethnicity, simply stated, calls for reforming social institutions in a way that will allow the accommodation of the cultural distinctiveness of multiple ethnic groups in a single state. Such an approach requires that rights be bestowed not only on individuals, as is done in the liberal mold, but on groups as well, thus leading to differentiated citizenship. Kymlicka’s illustrations demonstrate that most democracies already confer rights on distinct groups when their members live in close proximity and, in fact, the claims of homogeneity made by nation-states had never been fully met and are in the process of rapid erosion. Multiculturalists would like to go further by instituting rights for groups that are not concentrated territorially; theirs is a new goal for a new era of diversity. Though multiculturalism in many ways signals a further extension of the religious tolerance that Rawls also cited as a basis of liberalism, it is also a step beyond, and in some views away from, the liberal tolerance of “pluralism.”

Kymlicka’s main purpose is to show that the apprehension that liberal society will be fragmented if group-based rights are granted is largely unfounded. The goal of ethnic groups, frequently composed of new immigrants, is not withdrawal from the mainstream, argues Kymlicka, but, on the contrary, the kind of inclusion that does not require the denial of their culture. Rawls already suggested that the creation of an overlapping consensus was the way to create cooperation in the face of pluralism. Kymlicka seeks a new, broader cultural consensus by extending Marshall’s scheme. This would be attained by awarding what we might characterize as a fourth citizenship right (or, in the corresponding legal lingo, a fourth-generation right): adding cultural citizenship rights to the congeries of civil, political, and social citizenship rights.

Though multiculturalism in Kymlicka’s view implies a willingness on the part of both immigrants and hosts to traverse part of the cultural gap between them, frequently multiculturalism is defined in a more sweeping and radical fashion. In such view, Western societies committed to multiculturalism must allow and facilitate each ethnic group’s right to develop its own culture and, in the process, accede to the reduction of its Western-centrism. This multiculturalist perspective seeks not simply diversification of the majority’s culture, so that it can include the contributions made by immigrants, but abandonment of the very notion of a majority culture. Radical multiculturalists hold that citizenship as identity takes precedence over citizenship as a legal status of membership.

The divergence of opinions among multiculturalists raises critical questions: Can citizenship itself be overextended to the point where it loses its integrative role, or is further democratization always the best solution to crises of democracy and alienation from the mainstream? Will increased participation by new groups compensate for the loss of the single status of citizenship for all? When religious and legal practices in the immigrants’ cultures—such as those that violate gender equality—are incompatible with the civil rights of the host societies, which should prevail? And, turning to Marshall’s scheme, will differentiated rights undermine the universal definition of citizenship rights on which the welfare system is based?

Kymlicka’s approach to group-based citizenship rights of national minorities leads him to embrace at least some aspects of the radical definition of multiculturalism. In the debate between the adherents of the malleability of national identities and those arguing their “givenness,” Kymlicka comes down on the side of the latter, seeing collective identities as generally very stable. Equally telling is his argument that a shared concep-
tion of justice and the rights based on it, as developed by Rawls, might not suffice for attaining social unity, whereas shared identity will unify the members of a society. Rights based on membership status in the political community seem to steadily recede, in his mind, before rights allocated on the basis of identity.

This preference becomes even clearer in Kymlicka’s discussion of national minorities. Multiculturalism for immigrants can be, and usually is, combined with a commitment to common political institutions that provide social unity; thus polyethnicity does not threaten the state’s political unity. In contrast, states with national minorities that, viewing themselves as a separate people, also seek some measure of self-government are under such threat. The coexistence of multiple political communities in one state may definitely lead to demands of ever-increasing autonomy, sovereignty, and, eventually, secession. Thus, paradoxically, the progression from common citizenship, typical to liberal societies, to differentiated citizenship, awarded to immigrant groups, to dual citizenship, granted to national minorities, as part of growing respect for cultural diversity, might lead from multicultural to unicentral states. Such development would defeat Kymlicka’s stated goal.

Sossal’s study of guest workers, many of whom became permanent residents of their host Western European societies, also shows that the character of the nation-state is challenged. Immigrants in Europe, even when they are not formally citizens, possess a modicum of civil and social rights (though not yet political ones) and, consequently, enjoy a measure of incorporation into their societies. They are a new category between citizens and immigrants, called by Hammar denizens. Sossal identifies the contemporary phenomenon of the decoupling of citizenship rights and identity as the key to their emergence.

Immigrants are the beneficiaries of the evolution of a new model of membership, seen in the transition from individual rights to universal personhood. Universal human rights replace national rights when universal personhood replaces nationhood as the defining site of citizenship. The incorporation of guest workers into their host societies, in contrast to Kymlicka’s approach, is not sought through the expansion of rights within the nation-state but as the latter’s transcendence in important respects. Nation-states decline in importance as states become increasingly interdependent, as illustrated by the rise of transnational political structures (like the United Nations and the European Union) and the spread of international and transnational market and security arrangements.

Sossal’s study leads her to point to yet another, the fourth, transition in the site of citizenship: so far it was embedded in the polis, empire, town, and nation-state; now its purview is transnational or global. Not only immigrants but also citizens of the member states of the European Union, as agreed to in the 1991 Maastricht treaty, will be able to carry with them their rights as they move from state to state within the union. This ongoing transition, Sossal warns us, is partial: nation-states are declining but not disappearing. No new structure has emerged to replace the nation-state. The sovereign nation-state still remains the sole institution that administers and enforces rights, even those conceived to be universally held. Sossal, therefore, cautiously calls hers a postnational model, one in which state sovereignty is contested but not yet replaced. The postnational and the national frameworks remain concurrent.

Sossal’s work raises new questions: Is the importance placed by multiculturalists on identity as the basis of citizenship exaggerated, and is there a return to the liberal emphasis on citizenship granted according to membership status? How far is the eclipse of nation-states likely to proceed? Will we ever possess a single world society, and what would the meaning of citizenship in such a world be? In general, which of the respective directions in which immigrants’ rights are expanding, as documented by Kymlicka and Sossal, is likely to prevail?

The Feminist Critique

The last direction from which the liberal conception and practice of citizenship comes under intense and rigorous criticism is feminism. Feminists concur that women remained second-class citizens even in Western democracies, and only a few of them see the continued extension of liberal citizenship rights as sufficient to foster women’s full integration into society in the future.

This skepticism is based on an identified male bias in the tradition of citizenship — found in the dichotomy between the private household (oikos) and the public sphere (polis) — that was central to the citizenship tradition from its inception in ancient Greece. The consequent portrayal of the public sphere as transcendent, rational, and ultimately masculine and of the private sphere as the feminine realm of emotions and the weak body has not disappeared. The association of citizenship with military service, as in the Greek polis, or with labor market participation, as in Marshall’s model, or the customarily narrow definition of politics and political participation as interaction with the state and its institutions prevents the full incorporation of women into the body politic. Fraser and Gordon point out that the independence gained by married men as male heads of nuclear families in the nineteenth century went hand in hand with and was predicated on making
their spouses into their dependents. And even when women gain citizenship rights, their ability to act in the public realm is curtailed and their rights remain ineffective or only partially effective. Though citizenship was finally proclaimed to be universal, its erstwhile character as privilege keeps resurfacing. But beyond this agreement, as Jones’s article asserts, alternative feminist schools emerge—communitarian, social democratic, multicultural, and neoliberal—and, consequently, the contending schools in the debate over the character of citizenship have been reproduced within the feminist discourse. All these schools probe the margins of liberalism.

Jones seeks to gather, as well as critique, the various perspectives and direct attention to the relevance of those empirical studies that highlight women’s citizenship status and rights. Essays by Fraser and Gordon and by Young also address issues found in the feminist literature.

Feminists working within the framework of Marshall’s approach probe the extent to which women’s social citizenship rights can alter gender stratification. Some argue that allegedly gender-neutral welfare policies in fact create a two-tiered system in which women lose the autonomy that typifies citizens and become dependent on the welfare state and, consequently, gender stratification is increased. Conversely, others point to the disbursement of non-income-tested services as empowering their recipients and, furthermore, leading to solidarity among them. Finally, some take Marshall’s argument further by suggesting that as social rights shield workers from the adverse effects of the labor market by commodifying them, so women need to be shielded from the failure of marriage—for example, by establishing secure income for women engaged in full-time domestic work or child rearing.14

The strongest opposition to the liberal perspective comes from “difference feminism,” whose adherents emphasize the unique aspects of women’s social world and of female culture and call for the transformation of the citizenship tradition itself in order to make these features into the tradition’s constituent parts. The liberal demand for equal rights, as Young notes, leads to the denial of differences and creates the paradoxical situation in which equal treatment is based on the repudiation of women essential’s needs—for example, for maternity leave from the workplace.

Alternatively, in the communitarian approach, the formation of a women’s community is proposed. This notion of community is based on voluntary, strong primary ties between women themselves. This approach expects to attenuate or replace the conflictual paradigm of politics with a model derived from the more intimate and particularistic bonds typical to kinship. Obligation to other women, in the latter view, may sometimes over-

ride the rights of the individual citizen. When the feminist community is international, the framework of the nation-state and its war-making focus are also challenged.

Since citizenship in antiquity, the Middle Ages, and the early modern era was identified with the masculine principle, many feminist works suggest that liberal and even revisited liberal attempts to extend citizenship as an abstract and disembodied practice, in disregard of concrete identities, are bound to fail. Feminist critiques of citizenship suggest that citizenship theories recognize the embodied self—its concrete identity, and the body itself—by reconstructing the public sphere to include the private or personal issues of concern to women. But the incorporation of private or embodied concerns, such as control over the body, alters the Greek, Roman, medieval, and early modern notions of citizenship, which essentially meant the replacement of particularistic identities with a public and universal identity. Would such extension of citizenship rights cover biological matters and concerns, in the past considered private but now politicized by feminists and other social movements, make the citizenship tradition even broader and richer, or would it negate it altogether? Can the sphere of politics remain true to general concerns by seeking to focus on issues of concern to only part of the citizenry? Can the citizenship tradition be extended by being made true to its purportedly universalist promise, or does the very conception of citizenship need radical overhauling in order to accommodate gender equality, and thus be changed beyond recognition?

**MULTIPLE CITIZENSHIPS**

The modern preoccupation with citizenship is an expression of a desire to create, and the capability to imagine, comprehensive membership frameworks that are capable of replacing the weakened communities of traditional society. But the aspiration to recover small and close-knit communities continues to coexist with the new citizenship frameworks, the most authoritative of which is the nation-state, while others are revisited and new ones are imagined. Global citizenship discourses are also typical of the modern era, and they live at times in accommodation and at other times in conflict with the nation-state. In most societies these multiple citizenship frameworks coexist uneasily and sometimes in outright conflict with each other. By “citizenship,” therefore, we need to understand not only a bundle of formal rights, but the entire mode of incorporation of a particular individual or group into society. By focusing on the multivalence of citizenship we will gain access to a major feature of modern society: a simultaneous and interconnected struggle for membership or identity or both with the in-
tention of ensuring access to rights that are disbursed by state (and, occasionally, local and transnational) institutions. As a result of the coexistence of multiple citizenship discourses, we will see the citizenship tradition not as necessarily leveling, universalizing, and dignifying for all but as a complex system of status gradations.

The final part of this volume will examine the relationship between alternative citizenship discourses that most often have been analyzed in isolation from one another. We have already observed how Kymlicka’s and Soysal’s approaches share the conviction that in multicultural or postnational states citizenship is no longer a single status but rather a multiplicity of memberships (even among immigrants some are more privileged than others). Kymlicka characterizes modern polyethnic and multinational societies as alternating between differentiated and dual citizenship; Soysal portrays the push and pull of global and national institutions that leads to a multilevel citizenship structure. Both versions depict modern societies as full of unresolved tensions. We will turn now to an examination of the coexistence and tensions inherent in the multiplicity of citizenship traditions based, alternately, on status, participation, and identity.

We will contrast two approaches: Iris Young’s, which calls for the institutionalization of multiple citizenships in order to enhance justice and fairness, with Michael Walzer’s insistence that in light of such diversity one type of citizenship—political—should be preserved as a common foundation without, however, using it to supplant other versions. Where Young is concerned with group rights, Walzer’s own survey of social pluralism concludes with a focus on the profound importance of public life: the common sphere of otherwise competing groups. Theirs are alternative notions of emancipation.

Young provides the most comprehensive and far-reaching criticism of the liberal promise of universal inclusion yet and of the very possibility of citizenship as equal rights for all. Citizenship even in its universal phase, she asserts, cannot but retain its character as privilege. Exclusion from citizenship does not result from an unwillingness to live up to the original pledge but, both in the liberal and in the republican tradition, was made in the name of universalism itself. The formation of a universal “public” presumes an ability and a willingness on the part of individuals to transcend their particular identities. In spite of “the near achievement of equal rights for all groups” nowadays, exclusion, Young asserts, will not disappear as long as there are, and unavoidably there always will remain, groups that have not assimilated to the requisite level of universality. Consequently, their members are faced with “the dilemma of difference”: they have to deny that they are different from others since citizenship rights are based on the equal moral worth of citizens, but they have to affirm their difference from other groups since formal equal treatment puts them at a disadvantage. Formal equality, ironically, creates substantive inequality.

In Young’s perspective, differences matter, and we cannot disregard them or successfully minimize their full impact as Rawls suggested. Instead, we should accept the unavoidability of social heterogeneity and the ensuing multiplicity of perspectives. Any concept of justice as fairness has to acknowledge that diversity by institutionalizing group-based representation enables groups to learn from each other and communicate to each other their multiple viewpoints and interests. True inclusion necessitates group representation, whereas equal treatment requires special group rights, leading Young to argue in favor of the differentiation of citizenship. Whereas Kymlicka bases the same demand for group representation on the grounds of cultural differences, Young seeks such rights for all oppressed groups in the United States, among which she lists women, Blacks, Native Americans, Chicanos, Puerto Ricans and other Spanish-speaking Americans, Asian Americans, gay men, lesbians, working-class people, poor people, old people, and mentally and physically disabled people.

An empirical study by Peled and Shafir examines the reality of several citizenships in the context of Israel and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and demonstrates both the dangers and the promises of multiplicity. The coexistence of citizenship discourses in Israel—republican, nationalist, and liberal—as well as lack of citizen rights in the Israel-controlled Occupied Territories allows both for the incorporation of various hierarchically stratified groups and for the complete exclusion of other groups. Differentiated citizenship is just as likely to be hierarchical as it is to be vertical or sectional. Such hierarchy of citizenships leads to struggle over the types of citizenship rights distinguished by Marshall, not all of which can be taken for granted by all and a few of which cannot be taken for granted by some of the groups. This analysis provides a possible model for studying citizenship dynamics as a framework for social research. It also raises the question of whether the multiplication of group rights or their collapse into a single liberal framework is most likely to ensure effective incorporation.

Young is aware of the danger that dividing political rights on the basis of group rights might lead to multiple criteria of inclusion and, consequently, to citizens with varying rights. She seeks to eliminate such a danger by transferring the site of the disadvantage from the group itself to society: instead of viewing oppressed groups as deviant cases in need of special treatment, she wishes to assert the heterogeneity of society and the
“plural circumstances” of its members as a natural condition of society itself. To remove the homogenizing tendency of universal citizenship, majority culture itself has to be replaced with a truly heterogenous culture.

Walzer compares and critiques four ideals of the “good life”—citizen, producer, consumer, and member of the nation—and examines their relationship to each other. The first is the realm of active engagement in the public life of society, whereas the other three have more detached and ambiguous relations to politics. Though Walzer associates citizenship, as in the Greek tradition, with politics as moral behavior and, therefore, as the highest form of humanity, in fact each of the four versions of the good life possesses its own citizenship discourse. The contention between these versions of the good life is, in fact, the citizenship debate.

And yet, political citizenship plays a crucial role in Walzer’s multidimensional framework. It is in this sphere of citizenship where individuals “think about a common good, beyond their own conceptions of the good life” and employ the state as a political tool for shaping their common life. “Hence” concludes Walzer, “citizenship has a certain practical preeminence among all our actual and possible memberships.” After all the alterations, transformations, and additions to citizenship theory, the Greek tradition lost its unique position but, as Walzer shows, it continues to provide the common core of social membership. Walzer returns us to the starting point of the tradition to confirm the enduring power of the Greek conception of citizenship as the principle of incorporation and social unity. But he rounds out the tradition of citizenship with the modern concept of civil society—“a setting of settings”—to provide another, less formalistic, version of the quest for toleration pursued by Rawls. Whereas citizenship is the basis of social unity, civil society, Walzer asserts, by allowing competing exclusive claims to accent another’s inherent limits, fulfills its classical task of generating civility. Citizenship, therefore, retains a privileged position among our multiple membership commitments.

In Walzer’s and Young’s respective essays, the contours of the contemporary debate are most sharply illuminated. Though Walzer and Young share the premise that citizenship discourses need to acknowledge the social pluralism and diversity that typify our modern society, they disagree about the proper way of doing so. Walzer views the political framework of citizenship as the arena in which a modicum of social unity is established since all individuals in society are its members and sometimes are active participants. Citizenship, however, cannot serve as the vehicle for the communitarian desire for the pursuit of a common good, not so much because of cultural or ethnic diversity but, as Rawls suggested, because there exist significantly different ideals of the good life and the common good. Within the voluntary civil society their plurality will be respected. The moderate goal of mutual respect is within reach within a modern civil society that is animated by the unifying authority of the citizenship tradition.

In contrast, citizenship for Young, even when its reach is well neigh universal, will always retain part of its character as privilege for those who fall within its implicit criterion of adhering to the elusive common good. Consequently, she argues, the allegedly universal character of citizenship, which as Kymlicka has shown is in many ways more illusion than reality even in modern industrial societies, should be replaced by differentiated citizenship. She suggests a changed focus: instead of being concerned with commonality and, consequently, ignoring or at least bypassing diversity, priority should be given to making the public sphere truly representative not only of individuals but of groups as well. Though Young opposes fundamental features of citizenship as we know it, she is, in fact, asserting that the citizenship tradition has not yet exhausted its potential to liberate oppressed groups. This can be accomplished by integrating diversity into the framework of citizenship itself. Walzer’s and Young’s perspectives represent the cutting edge of the debates on contemporary citizenship, its hopes and fears, its limits and potential for extension. Their essays are a fitting summary to the debates in which the character of our future society is contested.

NOTES


7. An exception is Robert D. Putnam’s Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), which seeks to alleviate one of the major problems of the communitarian
approach: its vagueness about the choice of the community that will fulfill the civic republican vision. Putnam's study of effective democracy in Italy leads him to locate the effective community at the regional level. Local civic tradition of participatory citizenship enhances regional democracy and conceivably can do so on a state level as well. But while his work is empirical and the studies of most communitarians remain abstract, Putnam shares one of their shortcomings: he did not include in his study an examination of the conception of the good pursued by the associations he surveyed, nor is he willing to endorse either a single conception of what is good in life or any and all that arise. Putnam is aware of, and warns against, the coalescence of solidarity and involvement generated by civic traditions around nondemocratic goals (such as the Ku Klux Klan or the Fascist Party), but this warning remains incidental to his theory.


PART I
HISTORICAL ORIGINS AND ANTECEDENTS
When we speak of the “ideal” of “citizenship” since “classical” times, the last term refers to times that are “classical” in a double sense. In the first place, these times are “classical” in the sense that they are supposed to have for us the kind of authority that comes of having expressed an “ideal” in durable and canonical form—though in practice the authority is always conveyed in more ways than by its simple preservation in that form. In the second place, by “classical” times, we always [mean] the ancient civilizations of the Mediterranean, in particular Athens in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. and Rome from the third century B.C. to the first A.D. It is Athenians and Romans who are supposed to have articulated the “ideal of citizenship” for us, and their having done so is part of what makes them “classical.” There is not merely a “classical” ideal of citizenship articulating what citizenship is; “citizenship” is itself a “classical ideal,” one of the fundamental values that we claim is inherent in our “civilization” and its “tradition.” I am putting these words in quotation marks not because I wish to discredit them, but because I wish to focus attention upon them; when this is done, however, they will turn out to be contestable and problematic.

The “citizen”—the Greek polites or Latin cīvis—is defined as a member of the Athenian polis or Roman res publica, a form of human association allegedly unique to these Mediterranean peoples and by them trans-
mitted to "Europe" and "the West." This claim to uniqueness can be criticized and relegated to the status of myth; even when this happens, however, the myth has a way of remaining unique as a determinant of "western" identity — no other civilization has a myth like this. Unlike the great coordinated societies that arose in the river valleys of Mesopotamia, Egypt, and China, the polis was a small society, rather exploitatively than intimately related to its productive environment, and perhaps originally not much more than a stronghold of barbarian raiders. It could therefore focus its attention less on its presumed place in a cosmic order of growth and recurrence, and more on the heroic individualism of the relations obtaining between its human members; the origins of humanism are to that extent in barbarism. Perhaps this is why the foundation myths of the polis do not describe its separation from the great cosmic orders of Egypt or Mesopotamia, but its substitution of its own values for those of an archaic tribal society of blood feuds and kinship obligations. Solon and Kleisthenes, the legislators of Athens, substitute for an assembly of clansmen speaking as clan members on clan concerns an assembly of citizens whose members may speak on any matter concerning the polis (in Latin, on any res publica, a term which is transferred to denote the assembly and the society themselves). In the Eumenides, the last play in Aeschylus's Oresteia, another fundamental expression of foundation myth, Orestes comes on the scene as blood-guilty tribesman and leaves it as a free citizen capable with his equals of judging and resolving his own guilt. It is, however, uncertain whether the blood-guilt has been altogether wiped out or remains concealed at the foundations of the city — there are Roman myths that express the same ambivalence — and the story is structured in such a way that women easily symbolize the primitive culture of blood, guilt, and kinship which the males, supposedly, are trying to surpass. But the men, as heroes, continue to act out the primitive values (and to blame the women for it).

This is a point that must be made strongly, and made all the time, but it does not remove the fact that, stated as an ideal, the community of citizens is one in which speech takes the place of blood, and acts of decision take the place of acts of vengeance. The "classical" account of citizenship as an Athenian "ideal" is to be found in Aristotle's Politics, a text written late enough in polis history — after the advent of the Platonic academy and the Macedonian empire — to qualify as one of the meditations of the Owl of Minerva. In this great work we are told that the citizen is one who both rules and is ruled. As intelligent and purposive beings we desire to direct that which can be directed toward some purpose; to do so is not just an operational good, but an expression of that which is best in us, namely, the capacity to pursue operational goods. Therefore it is good to rule. But ruling becomes better in proportion as that which is ruled is itself better, namely, endowed with some capacity of its own for the intelligent pursuit of good. It is better to rule animals than things, slaves than animals, women than slaves, one's fellow citizens than the women, slaves, animals, and things contained in one's household. But what makes the citizen the highest order of being is his capacity to rule, and it follows that rule over one's equal is possible only where one's equal rules over one. Therefore the citizen rules and is ruled; citizens join each other in making decisions where each decider respects the authority of the others, and all join in obeying the decisions (now known as "laws") they have made.

This account of human equality excludes the greater part of the human species from access to it. Equality, it says, is something of which only a very few are capable, and we in our time know, at least, that equality has prerequisites and is not always easy to achieve. For Aristotle the prerequisites are not ours; the citizen must be a male of known genealogy, a patriarch, a warrior, and the master of the labor of others (normally slaves), and these prerequisites in fact outlasted the ideal of citizenship, as he expressed it, and persisted in Western culture for more than two millennia. Today we all attack them, but we haven't quite got rid of them yet, and this raises the uncomfortable question of whether they are accidental or in some way essential to the ideal of citizenship itself. Is it possible to eliminate race, class, and gender as prerequisites to the condition of ruling and being ruled, to participate as equals in the taking of public decisions, and leave the classical description of that condition in other respects unmodified? Feminist theorists have had a great deal to say on this question, and I should like to defer to them — and leave it to them to speak about it. At an early point in the exposition of the problem, one can see that they face a choice between citizenship as a condition to which women should have access, and subverting or deconstructing the ideal itself as a device constructed in order to exclude them. To some extent this is a rhetorical or tactical choice, and therefore philosophically vulgar, but there are real conceptual difficulties behind it.

Aristotle's formulation depends upon a rigorous separation of public from private, of polis from oikos, of persons and actions from things. To qualify as a citizen, the individual must be the patriarch of a household or oikos, in which the labor of slaves and women satisfied his needs and left him free to engage in political relationships with his equals. But to engage in those relationships, the citizen must leave his household altogether behind, maintained by the labor of his slaves and women, but playing no further part in his concerns. The citizens would never dream of discussing their
household affairs with one another, and only if things had gone very wrong indeed would it be necessary for them to take decisions in the assembly designed to ensure patriarchal control of the households. In the parafeminist satries of Aristophanes they have to do this, but they haven’t the faintest idea how to set about it; there is no available discourse, because the situation is unthinkable. What they discuss and decide in the assembly of affairs of the polis and not the oikos: affairs of war and commerce between the city and other cities, affairs of preeminence and emulation, authority and virtue, between the citizens themselves. To Aristotle and many others, politics (alias the activity of ruling and being ruled) is a good in itself, not the prerequisite of the public good, but the public good in res publica correctly defined. What matters is the freedom to partake in public decisions, not the content of the decisions taken. This nonoperational or noninstrumental definition of politics has remained part of our definition of freedom ever since and explains the role of citizenship in it. Citizenship is not just a means to being free; it is the way of being free itself. Aristotle based his definition of citizenship on a very rigorous distinction between ends and means, which makes it an ideal in the strict sense that it entailed an escape for the oikos, the material infrastructure in which one was forever managing the instruments of action, into the polis, the ideal superstructure in which one took actions that were not means to ends but ends in themselves. Slaves would never escape from the material because they were destined to remain instruments, things managed by others; women would never escape from the oikos because they were destined to remain managers of the slaves and other things. Here is the central dilemma of emancipation: does one concentrate on making the escape or on denying that the escape needs to be made? Either way, one must reckon with those who affirm that it needs to be made by others, but that they have never needed to make it. The citizen and the freedman find it difficult to become equals.

If one wants to make citizenship available to those to whom it has been denied on the grounds that they are too much involved in the world of things — in material, productive, domestic, or reproductive relationships — one has to choose between emancipating them from these relationships and denying that these relationships are negative components in the definition of citizenship. If one chooses the latter course, one is in search of a new definition of citizenship, differing radically from the Greek definition articulated by Aristotle, a definition in which public and private are not rigorously separated and the barriers between them have become permeable or have disappeared altogether. In the latter case, one will have to decide whether the concept of the “public” has survived at all, whether it has merely become contingent and incidental, or has actually been denied any distinctive meaning. And if that is what has happened, the concept of citizenship may have disappeared as well. That is the predicament with which the “classical ideal of citizenship” confronts those who set out to criticize or modify it, and they have not always avoided the traps the predicament puts before them. In the next part of this essay, I shall consider how some alternative definitions of citizenship have become historically available, but before I do so, I want to emphasize that the classical ideal was and is a definition of the human person as a cognitive, active, moral, social, intellectual, and political being. To Aristotle, it did not seem that the human — being cognitive, active, and purposive — could be fully human unless he ruled himself. It appeared that he could not do this unless he ruled things and others in the household, and joined with his equals to rule and be ruled in the city. While making it quite clear that this fully developed humanity was accessible only to a very few adult males, Aristotle made it no less clear that this was the only full development of humanity there was (subject only to the Platonic suggestion that the life of pure thought might be higher still than the life of pure action). He therefore declared that the human was kata phusin zoon politikon, a creature formed by nature to live a political life, and this, one of the great Western definitions of what it is to be human, is a formulation we are still strongly disposed to accept. We do instinctively, or by some inherited programming, believe that the individual denied decision in shaping her or his life is being denied treatment as a human, and that citizenship — meaning membership in some public and political frame of action — is necessary if we are to be granted decision and empowered to be human. Aristotle arrived at this point — and took us there with him — by supposing a scheme of values in which political action was a good in itself and not merely instrumental to goods beyond it. In taking part in such action the citizen attained value as a human being; he knew himself to be who and what he was; no other mode of action could permit him to be that and know that he was. Therefore his personality depended on his emancipation from the world of things and his entry into the world of politics, and when this emancipation was denied to others, they must decide whether to seek it for themselves or to deny its status as a prerequisite of humanity. If they took the latter course, they must produce an alternative definition of humanity or face the consequences of having none. Kata phusin zoon politikon set the stakes of discourse very high indeed.

I want to turn now to a second great Western definition of the political universe. This one is not aimed at definition of the citizen, and therefore, in Aristotle’s sense, it is not political at all. But it so profoundly af-
fects our understanding of the citizen that it has to be considered part of the concept’s history. This is the formula, ascribed to the Roman jurist Gaius, according to which the universe as defined by jurisprudence is divisible into “persons, actions, and things [res].” (Gaius lived about five centuries after the time of Aristotle, and the formula was probably well known when he made use of it.) Here we move from the ideal to the real, even though many of the res defined by the jurist are far more ideal than material, and we move from the citizen as a political being to the citizen as a legal being, existing in a world of persons, actions, and things regulated by law. The intrusive concept here is that of “things.” Aristotle’s citizens were persons acting on one another, so that their active life was a life immediately and heroically moral. It would not be true to say that they were unconcerned with things, since the polis possessed and administered such things as walls, lands, trade, and so forth, and there were practical decisions to be taken about them. But the citizens did not act upon each other through the medium of things, and did not in the first instance define one another as the possessors and administrators of things. We saw that things had been left behind in the oikos, and that, though one must possess them in order to leave them behind, the polis was a kind of ongoing potlatch in which citizens emancipated themselves from their possessions in order to meet face to face in a political life that was an end in itself. But for the Roman jurist it was altogether different; persons acted upon things, and most of their actions were directed at taking or maintaining possession; it was through these actions, and through the things or possessions which were the subjects of the actions, that they encountered one another and entered into relationships which might require regulation. The world of things, or res, claimed the status of “reality”; it was the medium in which human beings lived and through which they formed, regulated, and articulated their relations with each other. The person was defined and represented through his actions upon things; in the course of time, the term property came to mean, first, the defining characteristic of a human or other being; second, the relation which a person had with a thing; and third, the thing defined as the possession of some person. From being kata phusin zoon politikon, the human individual came to be by nature a proprietor or possessor of things; it is in jurisprudence, long before the rise and supremacy of the market, that we should locate the origins of possessive individualism.

The individual thus became a citizen — and the word citizen diverged increasingly from its Aristotelian significance — through the possession of things and the practice of jurisprudence. His actions were in the first instance directed at things and at other persons through the medium of things; in the second instance, they were actions he took, or others took in respect of him, at law — acts of authorization, appropriation, conveyance, acts of litigation, prosecution, justification. His relation to things was regulated by law, and his actions were performed in respect either of things or of the law regulating actions. A “citizen” came to mean someone free to act by law, free to ask and expect the law’s protection, a citizen of such and such a legal community, of such and such a legal standing in that community. A famous narrative case is that of Saint Paul announcing himself a Roman citizen. Paul not only asserts that as a citizen he is immune from arbitrary punishment, he goes on to remind the officer threatening the punishment that he is a citizen by birth and the officer only by purchase and therefore of lower prestige and authority. Citizenship has become a legal status, carrying with it rights to certain things — perhaps possessions, perhaps immunities, perhaps expectations — available in many kinds and degrees, available or unavailable to many kinds of person for many kinds of reason. There is still much about it that is ideal, but it has become part of the domain of contingent reality, a category of status in the world of persons, actions, and things. One can say in the world of Saint Paul that citizenship is a right to certain things, and say far more than by saying the same in the world according to Aristotle.

We now ask: in what sense does citizen remain a political term after it has become a legal or juristic concept? An Aristotelian citizen, ruling and being ruled, took part in the making or determining of the laws by which he was governed. There had been a time when civis Romanus had similarly denoted one who participated in the self-governing assemblies of republican Rome. But Paul — who is not a Roman, has never seen Rome, and will find no assembly of the citizens if he ever gets there — means something quite different. By claiming to be a Roman citizen, he means that of the various patterns of legally defined rights and immunities available to subjects of a complex empire made up of many communities, he enjoys access to the most uniform and highly privileged there is. Had he been only a citizen of Tarsus, the officer might have ordered him to be flogged, especially as they were not in Tarsus at the time. But he is a Roman citizen and can claim rights and immunities outside the officer’s jurisdiction. The ideal of citizenship has come to denote a legal status, which is not quite the same thing as a political status and which will, in due course, modify the meaning of the term political itself. Over many centuries, the legalis homo will come to denote one who can sue and be sued in certain courts, and it will
have to be decided whether this is or is not the same as ruling and being ruled in an Aristotelian _polis._

The status of “citizen” now denoted membership in a community of shared or common law, which may or may not be identical with a territorial community. In Paul’s case it is not; the status of “Roman citizen” is one of several extended by Roman imperial authority to privileged groups throughout the empire (who enjoy it, wherever they may be, while living and moving—empires can be highly mobile societies—alongside others who enjoy only local and municipal privileges in communities more localized and territorial in terms of the laws that define them). In much later centuries, these municipal communities become known by the medieval French term _bourg,_ and one’s right of membership in them, one’s right of appeal to the privilege and protection of municipal law, comes to be known as one’s _bourgeoisie._ In virtue of one of those rhetorical devices that extend meaning from the part to the whole, the universal community of legal privilege to which Saint Paul laid claim, and his right of membership within it, came to be described as his _bourgeoisie Romaine,_ the municipal authority of that city having become imperial. But _bourgeoisie_ and _bourgeoisie_ came to denote membership in a municipal—rather than an imperial or political—community. While the bourgeois might sue and be sued, it was not clear that he ruled and was ruled, even when his _bourg_ might claim to be free and sovereign. In consequence, although many cities and _civitates_ had been reduced to the municipal status of _bourgs_ within empires and states, and the words _bourgeois_ and _citizen_ were used interchangeably as a result, there was always room for doubt whether they conveyed the same meanings—whether the _bourgeois_ really enjoyed, should enjoy, or wanted to enjoy the absolute liberty to rule and be ruled asserted by the ideal of citizenship in its classical or Aristotelian sense.

It was the notion of law that profoundly altered the meaning of the political. As Paul and Gaius both knew, law denoted something imperial, universal, and multiform; there were many kinds of law, some of which applied everywhere and some of which did not. As soon, therefore, as one employed the term _citizen_ to denote the member of a community defined by law, there might be as many definitions of _citizen_ as there were kinds of law. There was a community of Roman citizens like Paul, who might claim the same status wherever they went in the empire; there were numerous communities of those whose citizenship was only municipal and did not apply where municipal authority could not be appealed to; there was half the population according to gender and about half according to the distinction between slave and free who were not citizens at all and could not take the initiative in claiming the protection of the law even if it was offered them. And there was the notion—a new “classical ideal”—of a universal community to which all humans belonged as subject to the law of nature. But whether one was a “citizen” of the community defined by the law of nature was a question that strained the resources even of metaphor. Certainly one did not “rule” in it, if by “rule” was meant determining what the law of the community should be; there was no assembly of all mankind, and the very notion of a universal law meant that one could be a citizen only municipally, determining what the local, particular, and municipal application of the law of nature should be. There had by this time appeared the figure, or ideal type, of the philosopher, who, as the word was used as a classical idea, claimed that the cognition of natural law was an intellectual activity, and that by a separation between contemplation and action, theory and practice, the philosopher had acquired in his ideal world the absolute freedom of determination once sought by the citizen in his _polis._ There are those who think the history of political thought has no meaning outside the history of this claim by the philosopher, but my commission is to peruse the history of the concept of the citizen.

The advent of jurisprudence moved the concept of the “citizen” from the _zoon politikon_ toward the _legalis homo,_ and from the _civis_ or _polites_ toward the bourgeois or burger. It further brought about some equation of the “citizen” with the “subject,” for in defining him as the member of a community of law, it emphasized that he was, in more senses than one, the subject of those laws that defined his community and of the rulers and magistrates empowered to enforce them. It would do little violence to our use of language to suppose that Saint Paul claimed to be a Roman “subject” since by doing so he could claim protection and privilege as well as offering allegiance and obedience. This is why the last action he performs as _civis Romanus_ is to exercise his right of appealing to Caesar, after which the local magistrates are obliged to send him to Rome to be judged by Caesar, and we don’t know exactly what Caesar did with him when he got there; Caesar’s jurisdiction certainly extended to judgment of life or death. All this would be in the minds of Lord Palmerston and his parliamentary hearers when he proclaimed that any British subject might say with Paul “civis Romanus sum.” In terms of protection and allegiance, right and authority, _subject_ and _citizen_ might be interchangeable terms, and when my passport declares me to be a United Kingdom “citizen” as well as a British “subject,” I know that it is offering me rights and protections within the United Kingdom
which may be denied to other “British subjects,” and I am not altogether reassured, even though I am being privileged, by the implied separation between “subject” and “citizen,” which once meant the same thing.

What is the difference between a classical “citizen” and an imperial or modern “subject”? The former ruled and was ruled, which meant among other things that he was a participant in determining the laws by which he was to be bound. The latter could appeal to Caesar; that is, he could go into court and invoke a law that granted him rights, immunities, privileges, and even authority, and that could not ordinarily be denied him once he had established his right to invoke it. But he might have no hand whatever in making that law or in determining what it was to be. It can be replied that this is too formal a way of putting it; the law functions in such a way that it is determined in the process of adjudication, and litigants, witnesses, compurgators, pleaders, and so forth play a variety of parts in the process of determining it. The legalis homo is not necessarily a subject in the rigorously passive sense. But the growth of jurisprudence decentralized and may marginalize the assembly of citizens by the enormous diversity of answers it brings to the questions of where and by whom law is made, and how far it is made—how far determined and how far discovered. It may be found in the order of nature, the revealed will of God, the pleasure of the prince, the judgment of the magistrate, the decree of the assembly, or the customs and usages formed in the processes of social living themselves; and in this majestic hierarchy of lawgivers, the assembly of citizens, meeting face to face in the utter freedom to determine what and who they shall be, can only be one and may sink into entire insignificance. Legalis homo is perpetually in search of the authority that may underlie determinations of the law; the need to close off this search within the human world may induce him to locate sovereignty whenever it seems to have come to rest, in prince or people, and there are circumstances in which sovereignty may be lodged in the assembly of the citizens, so that the individual as citizen comes again to be what he was in the classical ideal, a coauthor of the law to which he is subject. But there are so many other possible locations of sovereignty, and so many ways of determining and discovering law other than by the sovereign’s decree, that even when the subject is a member of the sovereign, he is unlikely to forget Charles I’s dictum that “a subject and a sovereign are clean different things” and may ask whether he is the same person when ruling that he was when being ruled. This is the question repeatedly asked by Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the last great philosopher of early modern politics, and it reminds us that even from the world of Paul and Gaius—let alone from
The concept of citizenship (Bürgertum), as it is used in social history, carries three distinct meanings: [economic, political, and cultural]. First, citizenship may include certain social categories or classes which have a specific communal or economic interest. As thus defined, class citizenship is stratified; there are greater citizens and lesser citizens; entrepreneurs and manual laborers. Second, in the political sense, citizenship signifies membership in the state, with its connotation as the holder of certain political rights. Finally, by citizens...we understand those strata which are drawn together, in contrast with the bureaucracy or the proletariat and others outside their circle, as "persons of property and culture," entrepreneurs, recipients of funded incomes, and in general all persons of academic culture, a certain class standard of living, and a certain social prestige.

The first of these meanings is economic in character and is peculiar to Western civilization. There are and have been everywhere manual laborers and entrepreneurs, but never and nowhere were they included in a unitary social class. The [second meaning], the notion of the citizen of the state, has its forerunners in antiquity and in the medieval city. Here there were citizens as holders of political rights, while outside of the West only traces of this relation are met with... The farther east we go the fewer are these traces; the notion of citizens of the state is unknown to the world of
Islam, and to India and China. Finally, [the third meaning], the social signification of citizen as the man of property and culture, [as a "man with class,"] or of one or the other, in contrast with the nobility, on the one hand, and the proletariat, on the other, is likewise a specifically modern and Western concept, similar to that of the bourgeoisie. At the same time, in antiquity and in the Middle Ages, citizen was also an [economic] class concept; membership in specific class groups made the person a citizen.

... The citizen in the quality of membership in a class is always a citizen of a particular city, and the city in this sense has existed only in the Western world, or elsewhere, as in the early period in Mesopotamia, only in an incipient stage... Outside the West there have not been cities in the sense of a unitary community. In the Middle Ages, the city's distinguishing characteristic was the possession of its own law and court and an autonomous administration of whatever extent. The citizen of the Middle Ages was a citizen because and insofar as he came under this law and participated in the choice of administrative officials. That cities have not existed outside the West in the sense of a political community is a fact calling for explanation. That the reason was economic in character is very doubtful... For the fact that this development took place only in the West there are two reasons. The first is the peculiar character of the organization for defense. The Western city is in its beginnings first of all a defense group, an organization of those economically competent to bear arms, to equip and train themselves.

[In general], whether the military organization is based on the principle of self-equipment or on that of equipment by a military overlord who furnishes horses, arms, and provisions is a distinction quite as fundamental for social history as is the question whether the means of economic production are the property of the worker or of a capitalist entrepreneur. Everywhere outside the West the development of the city was prevented by the fact that the army of the prince is older than the city. The earliest Chinese epics do not, like the Homeric, speak of the hero who fares forth to battle in his own chariot, but only of the officer as a leader of the men. Likewise in India an army led by officers marched out against Alexander the Great. In the West, the army equipped by the warlord, and the separation of soldier from the paraphernalia of war in a way analogous to the separation of the worker from the means of production, arises only in the modern era, while in Asia it stands at the apex of the historical development. There was no Egyptian or Babylonian-Assyrian army which would have presented a picture similar to that of the Homeric mass army, the feudal army of the West, the city army of the ancient polis, or the medieval guild army.

The difference is based on the fact that the question of irrigation was crucial in the cultural evolution of Egypt, western Asia, India, and China. The water question led to the rise of the bureaucracy, the compulsory service of the dependent classes, and the dependence of the subject classes upon the functioning of the bureaucracy of the king. That the king also expressed his power in the form of a military monopoly is the basis of the distinction between the military organization of Asia and that of the West. In the first case the royal official and army officer is from the beginning the central figure of the process, while in the West both were originally absent. Consequently, the forms of religious brotherhood and self-equipment for war made possible the origin and existence of the city. It is true that the beginnings of an analogous development are found in the East. In India we meet with relations which verge upon the establishment of a city in the Western sense, namely, the combination of self-equipment and legal citizenship; one who could furnish an elephant for the army is in the free city of Vaići in a full citizen. In ancient Mesopotamia, too, the knights carried on war with each other and established cities with autonomous administration. But in the one case and in the other these beginnings later disappear as the great kingdom arises on the basis of water regulation. Hence only in the West did the development come to complete maturity.

The second obstacle which prevented the development of the city in the East was formed by ideas and institutions connected with magic. In India the castes were not in a position to form ritualistic communities and hence a city, because they were ceremonially alien to one another. The same facts explain the peculiar position of the Jews in the Middle Ages. The cathedral and the Eucharist were the symbols of the city's unity, but the Jews were not permitted to pray in the cathedral or take part in the Communion and hence were doomed to form diaspora communities. The condition which enabled cities to develop in the West in antiquity was the extensive freedom of the priesthood, the absence of any monopoly in the hands of the priests over communion with the gods, such as obtained in Asia. In Western antiquity the officials of the city performed the rites, and the resultant proprietorship of the polis over the things belonging to the gods and the priestly treasures was carried to the point of filling the priestly offices by auction, since no magical limitations stood in the way as in India. For the later period in the West three great facts were crucial. The first was prophecy among the Jews, which destroyed magic within the confines of Judaism; magical procedure remained real but was devilish instead of divine. The second was the Pentecostal miracle, the ceremonial adoption into the spirit of Christ which was a decisive factor in the extraordinary spread of
the early Christian enthusiasm. The final factor was the day in Antioch when Paul, in opposition to Peter, espoused fellowship with the uncircumcised. The magical barriers between clans, tribes, and peoples, which were still known in the ancient polis to a considerable degree, were thus set aside and the establishment of the Western city was made possible.

Although the city in the strict sense is specifically a Western institution, there are fundamental distinctions among the cities of antiquity and the Middle Ages. During the early years of the ancient and medieval cities the similarity between them was very great. In both, it is those of knightly birth, the families leading an aristocratic existence, who are the active members in the group, while all the remaining population is merely bound to obedience.

Medieval development and antiquity part ways with the establishment of democracy, though even here at first there is a great deal of similarity. The basis of democratization is everywhere purely military in character; it lies in the rise of disciplined infantry, the hoplites of antiquity, the guild army in the Middle Ages. The decisive fact was that military discipline proved its superiority over the battle between heroes. Military discipline meant the triumph of democracy because the community wished and was compelled to secure the cooperation of the nonaristocratic masses and hence put arms and, along with arms, political power, into their hands.

[On their part], the popolani know that they have fought and win the great wars of the city along with the nobility; they are armed, and hence feel themselves discriminated against and are no longer content with the subordinate class position that they have previously accepted. Similarities exist also, finally, in securing the right of intervention in legal processes for plebeians' representatives, as part of their opposition to the aristocrats.

Alongside the points of agreement there are categorical differences. At the outset there is an ultimate distinction as regards the divisions into which the city falls. In the Middle Ages these consist of the guilds, while in antiquity they never possessed the guild character.

Under the domination of the guilds, the medieval city pursued a special type of policy, called town-economy. Its objective was in the first place to maintain the traditional access to occupation and livelihood, and, in the second place, to make the surrounding country subservient to the town interest to the utmost extent through banalités and compulsory use of the town market. It sought further to restrict competition and prevent the development toward large-scale industry. In spite of all, an opposition developed between trading capital and craft work organized in guilds, with a growth of domestic industry and of a permanent journeyman class as a forerunner of the modern proletariat. Nothing of all this is to be found in antiquity under the rule of democracy. Thus in antiquity the guild, as the ruling power in the town, is absent, and with it guild policy, and also the opposition between labor and capital which is present even at the close of the Middle Ages.

In place of this conflict we find in antiquity the opposition between the land owner and the landless. The proletarian is not, as Mommsen aver, a man who can only serve the state by providing children, but rather the dispossessed descendant of a land owner and full citizen. The entire policy of antiquity was directed toward the prevention of such proletarians; to this end servitude for debt was restricted and debtor law alleviated. The ordinary contrast in antiquity was that between urban creditor and peasant debtor. In the city dwelt the money-lending patriciate; in the country, the small people to whom it lent its money; and under the ancient law of debt such a condition led readily to the loss of the land and proletarization.

For all these reasons, the ancient city had no subsistence policy like that of the Middle Ages, but only a policy directed to maintaining the fundus, on which a man could live and fully equip himself as a soldier. The aim was to guard against weakening the military power of the community. Hence the great reforms of the Gracchi must absolutely not be understood in the modern sense as measures pertaining to a class struggle; their objective is purely military; they represent the last attempt to maintain the citizen army and avoid the substitution of mercenaries. The opponents of the aristocracy in the Middle Ages were, on the one hand, the entrepreneurs and, on the other, the craft workers, while in antiquity they were always the peasantry.

In addition to these distinctions between the ancient and the medieval development, there is a further distinction in class relations. The typical citizen of the medieval guild city is a merchant or craftsman; he is a full citizen if he is also a householder. In antiquity, on the contrary, the full citizen is the landholder. In the guild city, accordingly, class inequality always obtains.

In his personal relations, however, the citizen of the medieval city is free. The principle "town air makes free" asserted that after a year and a day the feudal lord no longer had a right to recover his runaway serf. Although the principle was not everywhere recognized and was subjected to limitations... the equalization of classes and removal of unfreedom became a dominant tendency in the development of the medieval city.

Antiquity in the early period emphasized class distinctions similar to those of the Middle Ages; it recognized the distinction between the pa-
trician and the client, who followed the knightly warrior as a squire; it rec-
ognized relations of dependency and slavery as well. But with the growth
of the power of the ancient city and its development toward democracy, the
sharpness of class distinctions increases; slaves are purchased or shipped
in in large numbers and form a lower stratum constantly growing in numbers,
while to them are added the freedmen. Hence the city of antiquity, in con-
trast with that of the Middle Ages, shows increasing class inequality. . . .

Taken in its entirety, the foregoing argument leads to the conclu-
sion that the city democracy of antiquity is a political guild. It is true that it
had distinctive industrial interests and also that these were monopolized;
but they were subordinate to military interests. Tribute, booty, the payments
of confederate cities, were distributed among the citizens. Thus like the craft
guild of the closing period of the Middle Ages, the democratic citizens’ guild
of antiquity was also interested in not admitting too many participants. The
resulting limitation on the number of citizens was one of the causes of the
downfall of the Greek city-states. The monopoly of the political guild in-
cluded cleruchy, the distributing of conquered land among the citizens, and
the distribution of the spoils of war; and, in addition, the city paid out of
the proceeds of its political activity theater admissions, allotments of grain,
and payments for jury service and for participation in religious rites.

Chronic war was therefore the normal condition of the Greek full
citizen, and a demagogue like Cleon was conscious of his reasons for inciting
to war; war made the city rich, while a long period of peace meant ruin
for the citizenship. Those who engaged in the pursuit of profit by peaceful
means were excluded from these opportunities. These included the freed-
men and metics; among them we first find something similar to the modern
bourgeoisie, excluded from the ownership of land but still well-to-do.

Military reasons explain the fact that the city-state of antiquity, so
long as it maintained its characteristic form, developed no craft guilds and
nothing similar to them, that instead it erected a political-military monop-
oly for citizens and evolved into a soldiers’ guild. The ancient city repre-
sented the highest development of military technique in its time; no equiva-
 lent force could be sent against a hoplite army or a Roman legion. This
explains the form and direction of industry in antiquity with relation to profit
through war, and other advantages to be attained by purely political means.
Over against the citizen stands the “low-bred”; anyone is low-bred who
follows the peaceable quest of profit in the sense of today.

In contrast with this, the center of gravity of military technique in
the early Middle Ages lay outside the cities, in the knighthood. Nothing
else was equal to an armed feudal host. The result was that the guild army
of burghers . . . never ventured offensive operations but was only defensively
employed. The burgher army of the Middle Ages could therefore never ful-
fill the acquisitive guild function of the ancient hoplite or legion army.

In antiquity the freedom of the cities was swept away by a bureau-
cratically organized world empire. . . . The provision for the economic needs
of the state was taken care of through compulsory contributions and com-
pulsory labor of servile persons. . . . A conscript army takes the place of the
mercenaries. . . .

Quite different was the fate of the city in the modern era. Here again
its autonomy was progressively taken away. The English city of the seven-
ten and eighteenth centuries had ceased to be anything but a clique of
guilds which could lay claim only to financial and social class significance.
The German cities of the same period, with the exception of the imperial
cities, were merely geographical entities in which everything was ordered
from above. In the French cities this development appeared even earlier,
while the Spanish cities were deprived of their power by Charles V. . . . The
Italian cities found themselves in the power of the “signory,” and those of
Russia never arrived at freedom in the Western sense. Everywhere the mili-
tary, judicial, and industrial authority was taken away from the cities.

In form the old rights were as a rule unchanged, but in fact the
modern city was deprived of its freedom as effectively as had happened in
antiquity with the establishment of the Roman Empire. In contrast with an-
tiquity, however, it came under the power of competing nation-states in a
condition of perpetual struggle for power in peace or war. This competitive
struggle created the largest opportunities for modern Western capitalism.
The separate states had to compete for mobile capital, which dictated to
them the conditions under which it would assist them to power. Out of this
alliance of the state with capital, dictated by necessity, arose the national
citizen class, the bourgeoisie in the modern sense of the word. Hence it is
the closed nation-state which afforded to capitalism its chance for develop-
ment—and, as long as the nation-state does not give place to a world em-
pire, capitalism also will endure.