FECAL ANIMALS: AN EXAMPLE OF
COMPLEMENTARY TOTEMISM

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The complementary and opposing relationship of person to his double: person/animal, womb/anus, inside/outside, postulated by the Kujamaat Diola (Sénégal, West Africa) permits two analogic extensions. One, that is based on interaction, provides a model of the major categories of the Kujamaat social system, and the other, that elaborates sameness/difference, draws out, as a projection from the original person/animal metonymy, the system's implicit duality. In turn, this paper describes the metonymy, the metonymy's two analogic extensions and finally concludes by showing how this kind of totemic 'thinking with animals' gets used by the Kujamaat to talk about specific social relations. The shift from beliefs as a system to beliefs as applied to actual situations necessitates a parallel shift in theoretical emphasis from the structuralism of Lévi-Strauss's 'totemic principle' to the notion of strategic 'entitlement' as argued by Kenneth Burke.

It may happen that sometime in his life an Ajamaat Diola will defecate a live animal. At its 'birth' the animal will run off into the bush to search out a place where it can expect to be safe. From birth on, the animal and its correspondent are united so that whatever happens to one will in some way affect the other.

My present task is to explore this particular and somewhat esoteric representation which I shall call a 'totemic double'. A double because, as we shall see, it is a discontinuous objectification of some essential part of the self. A totem also, because, following Lévi-Strauss (1962), it is a natural object (an animal) associated with a social category (an individual) that is subject to analogic extension where animal

I

The Kujamaat and their doubles

The Kujamaat (sg. Ajamaat) Diola who occupy an area they call the Kajamutay number over 80,000 and make up the northernmost sub-group of the Diola, a

Man (N.S.) 12, 1-27.
congeries of linguistically and ethnically related groups living in the Lower Casamance region of southern Sénégal. Although the Diola language is related to other languages spoken in Sénégal, such as Wolof and Serer, the Diola find their closest links, both in language and culture, to the Manjaku and Balant of Guinea Bissau. The three groups speak languages that together make up the Bak sub-group of West Atlantic (Sapir 1971). Like all the Diola, and the Manjaku and Balant as well, the Kujamaat are patrilocal sedentary rice cultivators.

The fecal animal, the totemic double, is called an ewsúǎm (pl. siwsúǎm) which has the literal meaning of ‘result of transformation’, where the root -wú is commonly used as a verb to mean ‘reincarnate’ and the derivative suffix -úm is the resultive marker.1 Ewsúǎm refers only to the animal double, and never has the sense of ‘someone who reincarnates’, which would be awúǎ (-a, ‘agentive’).

Where the animal goes to be safe is important to keep in mind, for much depends on it. If it is a man’s or an unmarried girl’s double it will usually find its way to the area of his (or, her) mother’s agnatic residence, or if not there then to some other residence, other than agnatic, where the correspondent ‘touches’ (gòr), which would be any place to which he or she has some kind of uterine link, FM’s, MM’s, etc. A married woman’s double will usually live at or near her own agnatic home, but may if necessary go, like a man’s, to some other place where she ‘touches’.

Common consciousness links a person to his double. Informants are vague on this point, but they will always affirm that a man and his double are in communication, each fully aware of what the other is doing at all times. What informants are never vague about is that whatever happens to the double will have a direct effect on its correspondent. If the animal hurts some part of its body, its correspondent will suffer at the same point. And if the animal is killed its correspondent will become very sick and if appropriate measures are not taken will die. The reverse, however, is not true. If the correspondent dies, the double simply becomes an ordinary animal of the bush. One informant told me that it was as if a cord were running between man and animal with the cord attached on one end to the man’s heart, and on the other, to the animal’s foot. If the cord gets broken it wounds the man’s heart, hence the danger for the man; but for the animal it means little more than a sore foot.

A double will always be of the same sex as its correspondent and will always be some kind of common wild animal, an antelope, leopard, monkey, snake, lizard and rarely a hyena or a crocodile. The only bird ever mentioned as being an ewsúǎm is said to be a vulture, and the only fish reported is the egonyong, a small biting fish that inhabits the inundated rice fields. Men generally have leopards, antelopes and monkeys, and women generally have antelopes, lizards and snakes. At no time will a woman have a leopard nor a man a lizard or snake. The reason given is that a woman’s ewsúǎm normally lives in the residential compound, while a man’s occupies the surrounding bush.

Beyond the rough and imprecise correlation between larger far-ranging animals for men and smaller short-ranging animals for women the Kujamaat see no likeness, physical or behavioural, between person and his double. In fact, throughout the course of his life a person can have a succession of different animals, first a monkey for instance and then an antelope.

Siwsúǎm are considered quite as natural as any ordinary animal. Anyone can see
them for they are ‘of the day’ (wati fulay) and are in no way connected with the supernatural power of muyal which is associated with the night (wati kalim) and which is available only to people with ‘open vision’ (mauwing), such as witches, curers, and talented elders. The siwuúm, along with wild and domestic animals, contrast with were-animals and animal familiars which are both the product of muyal.

Three criteria distinguish siwuúm from other wild animals. Habitat, they live close to or in human residences; looks, they have stubbed tails and tend to be somewhat bigger than normal animals; and behaviour, they act in peculiar ways. Thus if a person confronts an ewuúm it will hold its ground, not be afraid and will look right at him.

In a sense siwuúm conceptually occupy a position intermediate between wild and domestic animals. Hence a continuum linking man to nature: man; domestic animals, that live with men but are animals, though biologically distinct from wild animals; siwuúm, that live near or with men, but do not normally enter directly into man’s daily affairs and that are biologically like wild animals; and finally, wild animals. Siwuúm mediate between wild and domestic animals in that they are said to protect the latter from the former. And at one point, as we shall directly see, domestic animals mediate between siwuúm and man. Were-animals and animal familiars, being supernatural, are outside the continuum.

II

Man and double, a metonymy

Person and ewuúm together describe the two halves of a metonymy based on common blood and hence common ‘soul’, yut (opposed to enil, ‘body’), which is located in the blood. A ritual, called kajupen, that replaces a destroyed or hurt double demonstrates the common substance. The ritual makes use of either a goat, a goat and a chicken in serious cases, or just a chicken when the double has only been hurt. The domestic animal is the same sex as the invalid and is necessarily red, ‘for this is a matter of blood’, as informants always put it. The idea is to transfer the animal’s blood-soul to the invalid, and the ritual was likened by one informant to a Western blood transfusion. There are at least two regional variants. In one, the invalid, legs apart, embraces the animal, belly to belly, with the head of the animal on his shoulder. In the other, contact is made from mouth to mouth. In either case the officiant, a native curer (alaaka) using his powers of muyal, effects the transfer. He terminates the ritual by tapping the back of the animal, ‘to see if the blood-soul has passed over to the invalid.’ After the ritual the animal is killed and eaten by the curer and spectators. ‘Since it no longer has a soul, it would have died anyway.’ With his new ‘half’ to his soul, the invalid recovers and is now in a position to produce a new double.

By sharing common blood, the relationship between individual and double becomes the end point in a personal ontology that solves the conundrum of biological origins so often encountered in mythic thought. The Kujaamat believe that a child is conceived when its mother and father mix their respective blood during sexual intercourse (Sapir 1970: 1336–7). The contribution of each parent is said to be equal and of the same nature. Thus the problem: how can a single individual, of
one body and one blood, be the product of two people, of separate body and separate blood? The double solves this problem by mediating the original and final state. It gives two bodies (person and double) with a single blood.

From conception on a child is ‘pregnant’ with a duality—his double origin—which remains latent until he produces a double, at which point it becomes irreversibly manifest. If the double is destroyed, so is the self, unless the self can be re-impregnated with the lost half of its duality. I use here, and perhaps loosely, the terms ‘pregnant’ and ‘impregnate’, but this seems to be what the Kujamaat have in mind. At least this is the case with the variant of the kajupen ritual that is an obvious transformation of the act of sexual intercourse: legs apart, belly to belly, goat’s head on invalid’s shoulder. Instead of the original act that produced both the child and the child’s potential to have a double, we have a ritual that produces only the potential to have a double. A goat, as mediator between man and double, becomes a stand-in for a sexual partner. Instead of copulating with someone of the same species and of the opposite sex, the invalid ‘copulates’ with someone of a different species (a goat) and of the same sex.

Where the double goes develops the idea of personal duality by giving it a social reference. Recall that a double in finding a safe place to live will usually locate itself in the proximity of uterine linked kin when its correspondent is male or an unmarried girl, and, when the correspondent is a married female, with her own agnates. Thus for a man and an unmarried girl the person evvium split replicates the original parental source of the individual: his person remains with his agnates and hence with his father; while his double locates itself with a uterine linked residence group and hence with the categorical, if not always actual, mother’s point of origin. A married woman and her double reverse the allocation. Her person goes to live with the husband, while her double returns home to be with her father and brothers.

At this level, therefore, the two/one puzzle is solved as follows: To have a double in a very real sense, is to deny the physical fact that an individual can be only one self and at only one place, and to assert instead the social and psychological fact that an individual is always two selves at two places.

But the relationship between individual and double is asymmetrical and unequal. A double is your lesser half. Consider three oppositions. 1) The individual is a human being, his double is an animal; and like most of us the Kujamaat put a higher value on people than on animals. 2) Although both originate, as an elder put it, ‘in the belly (faar)’, one is delivered of the womb, the other evacuated from the anus. 3) Both child and double are born outside the residential compound. However the child is brought in by its parent, while the double is left to fend for itself. Traditionally a woman gave birth close to, but definitely outside the compound in a special area called uujj, ‘potsherds’, in reference to the debris of broken pots used for washing the newborn baby. Nowadays mothers universally avail themselves of maternity facilities provided by the government which are likewise ‘outside’. The Kujamaat always leave the compound, even in the dead of night, to defecate in the surrounding bush. To defecate in any part of the living area itself is considered very bad form, being permissible only to the very young or the very sick. In defining the noun bullapat, ‘serious fault, misdemeanour’, informants time and again offered the ostensive definition: ‘as when someone
defecates in the compound’, which brings to mind the formulaic insult, *nasan di fank, nataken kunyiil,* ‘he shits in the courtyard then blames the children.’

Thus we have: human $v.$ animal, womb $v.$ anus, comes inside $v.$ stays outside. And even where the double goes ‘to be safe’, it always remains on the penumbra of its residence: in the surrounding bush, or if inside, then tucked away in the corners, up in the rafters, or in the infrequented parts of the backyard.

An *ewúùm* is a form of excrement, something disposed of. But unlike feces it is not disposed of entirely. It is displaced, set into the background and is never eliminated.

The asymmetry between individual and *ewúùm* makes us qualify the social duality of the self: the reference point associated with the *ewúùm* is defined, in contrast to that associated with the individual person, as somehow secondary and less important. We can put it this way: given that the self has two social foci, he must, in order to have a viable social persona, put to the side, displace, renounce, in a word shit out, one focus in favour of the other. The symbolism of these fecal animals provides the vehicle for conceptualising, or ‘thinking about’ this social fact.

### III

**Siwúùm as analogy**

So much for the internal relationship that links a person to his double. This is the metonymy of totemism. But what of the overall analogy? What happens when we consider not just one person and his double, but instead a group of people each with his or her own double?

Two analogic models emerge. The first and more complex is about interaction and develops from the permutation of three oppositions: ego/alter, person/double, male/female. The second and more abstract continues our discussion of duality and develops a common feature of totemic systems, difference where there is sameness.

*Interaction.* A comment by Pierre Smith will make a good point of departure: ‘A model of the self is always, in one way or another, a corollary to a model of inter-personal relations. The axes that transect a person have a good chance of being perpendicular to those that link persons together’ (1973: 467). To apply this geometric image to our present case: The complementary division of the self into person and double is projected onto the field of inter-personal relations such that ‘one-half’ (person or double) of one self interacts with ‘one-half’ of another self. Thus when an Ajamaat is talking about doubles and their correspondents a remark like ‘A spoke to B’ can mean not only that a person A spoke to B, but also that A’s double spoke to B, the reverse, and that one double spoke to the other. That is, whenever doubles are taken into account there are four types of interaction: person to person, person to double, double to person, double to double. These four in turn become sixteen when the sex of ego and alter is added to the paradigm. Now an examination of the set of permutations leads to a quite startling conclusion. Taken together they produce a native model that defines the major features of Kujamaat social organisation. This model sets out four qualitatively distinct types of relationship which are mapped onto sixteen mutually exclusive and more or less exhaustive social dyads. From this perspective the *siwúùm* become an idiom
that permits the Kujamaat to conceptualise important aspects of their social life by defining how categories of people relate to each other. It is this model, as we shall see, that serves as the ground plan for talk about specific incidents involving particular doubles.

Since a man’s double goes to live at a uterine linked residence while the individual himself remains with his agnates, it follows that the *sivâüm* idiom defines for any male, vis-à-vis other males, four roles: as an agnate, a ‘nephew’, an ‘uncle’ and as a matrilateral parallel cousin. Thus, when ego’s person interacts with alter’s person, then both ego and alter interact as agnates. When ego’s double interacts with a person, he is then acting as a ‘nephew’; when it is the reverse he is ‘uncle’; and when both ego and alter are doubles, the two are matrilateral parallel cousins. Since a married woman’s double returns home to her agnates and not to her own uterine kin, an equivalence is made, as far as doubles are concerned, between mother and son. The roles paralleling her son’s are then: as an in-married woman—person to person; as an out-married woman—double to person; as brother’s wife—person to double; as sister to other out-married women—double to double. Table 1 shows these permutations and adds to them the remaining eight that have to do with cross sex interaction.

**Table 1.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ego (male)</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>a</th>
<th>a</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alter (male)</td>
<td>B agnates (F, B, S)</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>Zch, FZch</td>
<td>B MB, MF, MBS (etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(female) in-married women (BW, W, FW)</td>
<td>Z, FZ</td>
<td>MBW, MFW, MBSW (etc.)</td>
<td>M, MZ, MFZ (etc.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ego (female)</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>a</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alter (male)</td>
<td>B H, HB, HF</td>
<td>b HZch, HFZch</td>
<td>B F, B, BS</td>
<td>b ch, Zch, FZch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(female) in-married women (own peers)</td>
<td>HZ, HFZ</td>
<td>FW, BW, BSW</td>
<td>Z, FZ</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key: A = Ego-person  
a = Ego-double  
B = Alter-person  
b = Alter-double

Let me elaborate each of these basic types of relationship and then consider a negative relationship that is outside the system entirely.

1. Person to person.

Agnates. Kujamaat social structure is based on what we can call local patri-groups. At the lowest level will be a very shallow patrilineage, going back to at most three generations from the oldest living member. Several of these lineages group together to form a named compound. Links between lineages living within one compound are defined in terms of common residence, but may also be rationalised with vague genealogical references, such as ‘our forefathers were brothers’.
Several houses group together to form a ward whose members usually share a common exogamous and non-localised patronym. A village will be comprised of four or more wards with one of the patronyms dominating the village. The relationship of agnatic co-residence emphasises the jural rights and duties of a corporate group and have the potential for internal competition over land and other property.

In-married woman (asek). Since marriage is virilocal, a woman by marrying moves her social frame of reference from one patri-group to another. Comparing a man with a woman we can say that in terms of residence, actual time spent at this residence, and participation and potential competition in a localised corporate group, a married woman’s relationship to her husband’s local group is equivalent to a man’s relationship to his own agnates. That is, very simply, a woman as a person (not as a double) is equivalent to her husband and not at all to her brother. Or, put more specifically, a woman relates to other in-married women as a man relates to his brothers. This parallel comes out in the pattern of witchcraft. Although the Kujamaat do not go in much for overt witchcraft accusation, those cases that do surface most frequently involve either an in-married woman against her peers, or a man against his brothers.

All this has to do with the world of persons and not doubles or doubles interacting with persons. For agnates and in-married women, therefore, the siwūm idiom applies only indirectly or by way of contrast.

2. Double to person.

‘Nephew’ (asumpūl). Beyond his extended patri-group an individual has kinship ties with the patri-groups of any ascendant female, most particularly his mother’s and his father’s mother’s patri-groups, but potentially with his MM’s, MMM’s, FMM’s, FFM’s (etc.) as well. All these groups are terminologically merged with the phrase tanasumpūle, ‘where he is sister’s child (asumpūl)’, and contrast with the phrase tanakine, ‘where he originates’. Marriage into any of these groups is forbidden.

The relationship that ego maintains with one of his uterine linked groups, especially his MB’s, is significantly different from those he has with his own, with the former fitting the classic MB/ZS pattern typical of many African societies that have a strong patri-bias and that do not permit cross-cousin marriage. Briefly, it is non-competitive, is very much person to person, and is based on mutual interest and concern. It is also asymmetrical. MB offers help, protection, advice, guidance to his nephew, while the latter, always within limits, has the licence to do, take, and say what he pleases. As the Kujamaat put it, ‘it is where I have the right to take away chickens’. ZS is in fact sacred amongst his uncles, for if any uterine kin draws his blood while he is on their premises, one of the spirits associated with the compound will afflict its residents in perpetuity. This is a unique form of spiritual protection and would never apply to fights between agnates. Such is ZS’s liberty to speak, that he is often called upon to adjudicate disputes. He has the right to rebuke and otherwise admonish key elders in the local group, something junior agnates would never dare to do.

Out-married woman (arimen). A married woman’s own agnatic group is equiva-
lent to a man's MB's and other uterine linked groups. At marriage a woman's original and primary place of reference becomes secondary and what was secondary loses much of its importance being more or less combined with her former primary group. Although after marriage a woman maintains contact with her own uterine kin, she visits them infrequently. Time spent away from the new residence will be spent almost exclusively with her own agnates back at her old home where she has taken on the term of arimen, 'married sister', or more correctly, 'out-married female agnate'.

An arimen, like an asumpúl (i.e. her own, her Z's or her FZ's son), has a well-defined and distinctive role having to do with the welfare of her agnic local group. Among other things, she and her fellow married sisters (collectively called the furimen) have the responsibility to oversee the behaviour of in-married women, their brothers' wives. They also play an important part at funerals and are expected to diffuse any cases of witchcraft that might arise between their male agnates.

A rough equivalent to an asumpúl's sacred status and his right to do and say as he pleases is an institution called the ebun which is a spirit (enati) with a local shrine that is under the exclusive control of the furimen. At approximately five to ten-year intervals the shrine is celebrated when the furimen return home to their agnates for a period of several months. During this time they have the right to demand favours from unrelated men that run from small sums of money to demands for sexual access.

The dyad of double to person, and its converse, is obviously the heart of the siwúam idiom. It is the direct social projection of the individual's person-double metonymy and as such marks a sharp contrast with the face to face, person to person, relations that obtain between male agnates and their wives. In terms of a particular local group it allows the Kujamaat to include, yet hold apart, the dispersed furimen and their children, the kusumpúl. Moreover, it differentiates the furimen from the kusumpúl when we recall that women's doubles (lizards and snakes) generally live in the compounds, while men's (leopards and monkeys) always live in the nearby bush. In spatial terms this represents the fact that women, as agnates, were born in and had spent the first part of their lives in the compound, while men, whose doubles are present because of their mothers (or some other maternal link) were not.

The major point, however, is not to separate the furimen from the kusumpúl, but to appreciate the imaginative parallel the Kujamaat make between these kin and their animal markers. Thus, just as the vulnerable siwúám look for a safe place where they are sure to be 'taken care of', given water to drink and protected from hunters, so the kusumpúl at their MB's and the furimen at their brother's find a ready haven from home life where existence is very much à huis clos and is so often characterised by jostling and competition over property, rancid arguments, jealousy and witchcraft. And then, just as the siwúám as residual—fecal—material live on the penumbra of the residence, in the surrounding bush or hidden in secure and out of the way corners of the compound, so, sociologically speaking, do the furimen and kusumpúl also live on the social penumbra of the patri-group overseeing its welfare and exercising residual aspects of rights which because of marriage or birth they have had to renounce. The men have their residual rights to take chickens and to speak as they please, and the women, when they celebrate the ebun spirit, regain for a turn
the rights they had renounced at marriage; residence at their place of birth and
access, sexual and otherwise, to men other than their husbands.

3. Person to double.

‘Uncle’. Since a man is simultaneously ‘uncle’ to some and ‘nephew’ to others,
the relationship of double to person always has for ego its reciprocal, person to
double. Terminologically MB is called ampay which is usually glossed as ‘father’,
since it covers all +1 generation male consanguines (F, FB, MB). All male uterine
kin are, however, distinguished from +1 male agnates with the cover term sipay
in contrast to kumpay, the plural of ampay. And F and MB are also distinguished in
direct address where F is called papa and MB by his given name. Following the
Omaha pattern, MBS and even MBSS are merged with MB, although neither, if
they are the same age as or younger than ego, would be referred to as ampaom,
‘my father’, only collectively as akila sipayom ‘he (is one of) my male uterine kin’.

Brother’s wife. From a married woman’s point of view brother’s wife is the
female reciprocal to arimen. By marrying, a woman assumes the obligation to
respect her husband’s married sisters and to help him take care of his nephews.
These latter refer to her as inyam, or inyayom, ‘my mother’ which is extended,
collectively at least (sinyayom), to include MBD, MBSW, etc.

4. Double to double.

Matrilateral parallel cousin. The MB/ZS relationships imply another. This will
be between those dispersed consanguines who have -sumpül (ZS) rights at the same
place. Included are all matrilateral parallel cousins in the broadest sense of the word,
your MZ’s children, at your MB’s residence; your FMZchch at your FMBS’s
place, etc. Relationships between these dispersed cousins are sporadic, person to
person, and non-competitive. They become focused when, as a group, the cousins
oversee important events such as funerals, initiation rituals and when they adjudic-
ate disputes at their common uterine residence.

Sisters. Like a man to his matrilateral parallel cousins, a married woman’s rela-
tionship to her fellow furimen (her married sisters and FZ) is person to person and
equal, receiving collective focus only with regard to their common agnatic group.

For these equal and sporadic relationships the siwium idiom presents the image
of a group of animals of a variety of different species living in proximity to each
other. Although occasionally the siwium are said to act in concert, as when they
collectively express disapproval of one of their numbers, they, for the most part,
have very little to do with one another. Each goes about its own business, and when
interaction takes place it is between animal and person, only very rarely between
animals.

5. Neither person, nor animal.

Absent from the totemic calculus are a married woman’s own uterine kin and a
man’s in-laws (kulol), which include both his W’s and his ZH’s kin. Actually the
former, as I have already mentioned, tend to be collapsed with her agnates and at
certain times a married woman’s double may reside at the home of one of her
uncles (cf. case 5). This can be expected, for beyond living in or living out of the
compound there is no clear separation between furimen and asumpül. Both are
animals. As far as the idiom is concerned the major contrast for a married woman in her interpersonal relations is between her marital residence (person to person) on the one side and her consanguines, either as an arímen or as an asumpul on the other (animal to person).

But a man's affines are something very different, and I was told on several occasions that under no circumstances would a man have his double living near to his in-laws. 'It would surely get killed.' To have his double living there would be about as safe, perhaps less safe, than having it run wild in the bush or living next to complete strangers. In all such places it would be nothing but 'fair game'.

The presence of a male eewitness implies that its correspondent has the rights of an asumpul, and such rights scarcely apply to an in-law. Relations with both sets of in-laws (ZH, WB) are distant, polite and potentially hostile. And, following the common pattern, they tend to be asymmetrical in that wife-takers are expected to show deference to wife-givers. Your ZH is said to have 'shame' (-punyor) in your presence. This distinct type of relationship provides the major reason for an absolute aversion to cross-cousin marriage. It would seriously compromise the asumpul relationship. As we just saw MB has the obligation to look out for the welfare of his nephew and to accept his admonishments and advice, not to mention his freedom with MB's chickens. WB has no such obligations. He expects ZH to show him at least minimal deference and respect, to do him favours (hardly the reverse), and he has no need of ZH's uninvited counsels. In fact it would be considered grossly out of place for ZH to offer any at all.

* * * * *

Together and with their negative counterpart these four dyads can be summarised like this:

Person to person Closed corporate group, competition, witchcraft.
Double to person Particularistic, asymmetrical. Uncle gives, nephew takes; BW respects, HZ oversees. Doubles protected by persons, doubles protect domestic animals from predators.
Person to double Particularistic, equal, sporadic. Doubles only rarely interact.
Double to double Strangers and a man's in-laws. Distant, polite and potentially hostile.
Neither person nor double

With this sketch it should now be apparent that the social deduction from the person/eewitness metonymy, that has been made in terms of interacting dyads, gives a good overview of the major categories of interpersonal relations. The deduction is especially satisfying because it accounts for and fits with what the ethnographer, with other less imaginative means and without recourse to cosmology, might reasonably consider the social structure to be like, as 'it really is'. The opposing categories that have been defined by the permutation of ego/alter, male/female, person/double, especially the contrasts between agnates and uterine linked kin and between in and out married women, are all basic to Kujamaat life and no account
of their social structure can ignore their importance. Here then is a native model that is something more than 'just one view among others'.

There remains one further contrast in the *sivúum* idiom and that has to do with cross-sex equivalents. It is this aspect of the *sivúum* that is developed by our second model.

*Sameness, difference and matriliality.* When totemic systems are developed analogically they always show difference where one would otherwise find similarity. And the Kujamaat's *sivúum* are no exception. Such differentiation has been implicit in much of what I have said so far, but since my attention has been on a model for interaction it has tended to slip by unnoticed. I have been concerned with the relation of one-half (person or double) of one self with the half of some other self. Consider now the analogies of the whole self, both person and double together. What emerges is a distinct form of totemism. Because of the complementary, rather than homologous, relation of person to double, the system produces a set of mirror images. These images in turn point to the most general and pervasive correlation between the 'model of the self' (to return to Smith's remark) and the 'model of interpersonal relations'.

1) A group of male agnates live together and are differentiated by their respective doubles, which are dispersed. The range of places a man's double may go conceptualises his uniqueness among agnates as being defined by who his 'mothers' (*sinyay*) are. Doubles differentiate people from each other.

2) A group of matrilateral parallel cousins, as doubles, live together and are differentiated by their respective persons, who are dispersed. As the converse of 1), people differentiate doubles from each other and uniqueness within the group is determined by who your fathers are.

Taking into account that all parallel cousins are called sibling, we might, from the point of view of ego, put it this way: The Kujamaat have 'male' brothers, agnates living together inside a compound or ward. At the same time they have animal, fecal, or 'female' brothers, matrilateral parallel cousins living together outside some common uterine linked residence. Only ego's full brother would be both 'male' and 'female'.

With respect to agnation a woman's situation is the reverse, or mirror image, of a man's. 3) A group of agnatic sisters live together as doubles and are differentiated by their respective dispersed persons. 4) A group of in-married women, who are unrelated, are together as people and separated by their dispersed doubles. Only when sisters marry at the same place would two women and their doubles be simultaneously together.

Table 2 sets out the contrasts.

This play of mirrors highlights two cross-sex equivalents that we have already mentioned in passing, and gets us to the ultimate duality of the whole system. Foregrounded as human is the equivalence of husband (agnate) and wife (in-married woman). Backgrounded as a fecal residue is the equivalence of a mother (*as arímen*) with her son (*as asumpúl*). What the latter equivalence does is to give a matrilineal reflection to an otherwise patrilineal social organisation. As a person, a man lives together with his father, his father's brothers and their children. But as a double, he lives instead with his mother, her sisters, and their children. This tells us that implicit in a man's statement about agnation is necessarily a complementary state-
Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>People</th>
<th>Doubles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>male agnates</td>
<td>+ together</td>
<td>dispersed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- dispersed</td>
<td>together</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>female agnates</td>
<td>+ dispersed</td>
<td>together</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- together</td>
<td>dispersed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Where: (−) male agnates = matrilateral parallel cousins
      (−) female agnates = in-married women

NB. Table 1 is derived from the four categories here marked as ‘together’.

ment about matrification. Or, in the language of alliance theory (which the siwiúm model approximates rather well), a man is the product of a transaction between wife-givers and wife-takers.

What started as a consideration of opposing bodily functions: birth and defecation, now finally becomes a proposition about the dualistic nature of Kujamaat social organisation. The progress of opposition is as follows:

**SELF**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>self</th>
<th>opposition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>womb</td>
<td>anus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>birth</td>
<td>defecation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>human</td>
<td>animal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>inside</td>
<td>outside</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**GROUPS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>group</th>
<th>opposition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>agnatic residence</td>
<td>avuncular residence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(virolocal)</td>
<td>(agnatic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>male agnates</td>
<td>matrilateral parallel cousins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(in-married peers)</td>
<td>(out-married sisters)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>husband-wife</td>
<td>mother-son</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wife-takers</td>
<td>wife-givers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>patrilinal</td>
<td>matrifilial</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(….) applies to women

**IV**

*Talking about siwiúm*

When Arufu of Jipalom moved me and my baggage to more permanent quarters, a new cement plastered cube with a corrugated roof and no ceiling, I remember, on entering, looking up to see a snake slide along the ledge between the centre beam and the roof. Loudly, I expressed my surprise, but was assured that the snake was nothing, that ‘it was harmless’. My attention was diverted to something else so that by the time I looked up again the snake had disappeared behind the end rafter. Further questions about the snake … was it really harmless, did it live up
there? ... brought no response at all. No one, Arufu, his sons, my assistant, none of them seemed interested in talking about that snake. Surely, snakes were animals these Kujamaat took very much in their stride. But not so much in stride as it turned out when, a month or so later, a grey mamba that had come onto the veranda of the main house was chopped to bits amidst a terrific commotion. Why a fuss about one snake, and none about another? Was it that one was poisonous and the other not? Such was my pragmatic conclusion at the time and since my mind was then on Kujamatay grammar and phonology, and not symbolism, I let the matter rest at that.

Looking back now, from the vantage point of the inquiries that have informed the present discussion, I can say with assurance, if not certitude, that the snake in the rafters was ignored not because it was just harmless, but because it was an arimen. Four reasons permit the inference. It was a harmless snake; a common double for a woman. It was up in the rafters of the house; one of the compound’s byways frequented by female doubles. That the snake appeared at the precise moment it did. Just when a stranger, of startling provenience, had settled in for a long stay. By showing herself the arimen was not only looking me over, but was also providing a sign to mark my arrival as an event that was, auspiciously or not, in some way notable. But the main reason for calling the snake an arimen was precisely the conspicuous lack of any response from Arufu.

Although the Kujamaat will freely speak of the general principles that govern siwúum and give typical examples without specific reference (case 1), they are usually reluctant to talk about particular siwúum that directly affect their lives of the moment. In front of outsiders ... other Kujamaat as well as ethnographers ... one says nothing about any siwúum that might be living around. They are vulnerable and secrets about them are not to be entrusted to strangers, especially if the strangers live in the vicinity.

Not that particulars are never forthcoming. With persuasion, persistence and upon fuller acquaintance informants will give cases, though always within certain bounds. First of all, no one ever admits to anybody of having a double himself. Only responsible kin should know who has a double, and they, since they know already, never have to be told. Secondly, the cases that are given refer always to past incidents that do not apply, or only partially apply to the present. And finally, informants are more willing to talk in detail about particular doubles when they are sure that their questioner, who is prying into their personal affairs, knows little about the parties concerned. That is to say, my best examples were from informants who, though I knew them well, came from villages about which I knew next to nothing.

These limitations certainly preclude any fine grained dramaturgical case analyses of the social why’s and wherefore’s of particular doubles. Nevertheless the data I obtained permit reasonable interpretations of at least some of the recorded incidents. But what is much more important, the data without question demonstrate how the Kujamaat put the siwúum idiom to use.

To begin with all siwúum incidents involve inter-personal relations. Further the interaction they describe always follow the pattern set out in our model (table 1).

At all times the incidents focus, either directly or indirectly, positively or negatively, on the social relations of the furimen and kusumpúl. By direct focus I mean
those incidents where something is said about the furimen or kusumpül themselves, either in relationship to each other (animal to animal, rarely occurring) or between them and the agnicore of male agnates and their in-married wives (animal to person, as in most cases). Indirect focus would be incidents where primary reference is to the agnicore (person to person). They appear under the general frame: someone’s treatment of the siwúurum defines the relationship between agnates or between spouses. Examples would be case 2, where a husband praises his deceased wife and case 4, where a man takes revenge on his brother.

Positive incidents mark the furimen or kusumpül relationship as operating in an exemplary manner. Case 2 is a fine example, and so is case 6, even though it is associated with a death. But the majority of cases are negative. They indicate a malfunctioning of the relationships and offer a commentary on the consequences of the dysfunction. All these cases have to do with illness or death and each draws a parallel (so often encountered in African cosmologies) between body and social pathology.

The following cases are all typical with the exception of the penultimate (5) which is unique and decidedly untypical. I include this case to illustrate the conceptual boundary that separates beliefs about doubles from beliefs about were-animals and witches. For each example I have added a number of interpretative remarks.

* * * * *

1) A young man hunted in the forest near his residence and over a period of the time managed to kill a number of antelopes. After a while his asumpül (probably FZS) complained telling him to stop, ‘I (i.e. my double, which is a leopard) must eat’. If the ‘uncle’ refused to stop, then the asumpül threatened to ‘come to the house’, as a leopard, and start taking the goats and cattle.

Remarks. This incident, which was recounted to me as typical and without reference to particular people, is an imaginative play on the rights of kusumpül. As a person, an asumpül has the right to take chickens, but has no rights to other domestic animals, cattle and goats, which belong exclusively to his ‘uncles’. As a double, especially when the double is a leopard, an asumpül has the right to hunt wild antelopes, but has no right to hunt domestic animals which he is supposed to protect. Thus the metaphorical equivalence: chickens = antelopes, with goats and cattle having the same position in both domains. Now if an ‘uncle’ encroaches on a double’s rights to wild antelopes, then the double will encroach on the ‘uncle’s’ rights to the domestic animals. In strictly human terms, and without using the siwúurum idiom, we can paraphrase the incident as something like: ‘If you deny my rights as as asumpül, to take chickens (and to do other things besides), then I will exaggerate these rights and demand more than I otherwise would.’

2) Howa, an arimen of the Boyas ward of Jialom, had a night adder (?) (yew) as a double. The snake had been found by Jalaj, Howa’s brother’s wife, who put out food for it to eat. When Jalaj died the snake disappeared. Jalaj’s husband, Abdu, was Howa’s brother by the same father. Their mothers were sisters. (Recounted by Abdu.)

Remarks. One of the few cases where I knew all of the parties concerned. Abdu related it to me in 1970, eight years after his wife’s death. He had been extremely close to her and created a minor scandal by refusing to remarry for well over five years after her death, despite Jalaj having left him with three children, and despite his having assumed the responsibility of four other children as well. It was only after considerable pressure from his agnates that he reluctantly consented to remarry. Beyond sentiment Abdu had good reason to mourn his wife’s death, for by Kujamaa standards she was as close to being an ideal wife as one could hope. Among other things she had had the reputation of being particularly respectful of the furimen and perhaps more than anything else this was the real test of being a ‘good wife’. Thus by recounting the incident Abdu was entitling a theme that ran through many of our
conversations: that his late wife had been a most remarkable woman. Leaving out food for Abdū’s sister (her double) was surely an indication that she knew how to take care of (ṣaf) her female in-laws.

3) Arufu of Boyas (Howa’s and Abdū’s father) was a rich elder who, as is occasionally the case with outstanding men, possessed two doubles, a monkey and an antelope. They both lived next to the adjacent ward of Buben (at about 1 km. to the west of Boyas). Although his mother and his mother’s mother were from Jirego, a village 61 km. to the east of Jipalom, it was said in this account that his MMM was from Buben. One day Jambolang, a well-known cattle thief from Jijak, a village about 8 km. to the southeast, approached Arufu’s classificatory brother Luntul and reported that he (i.e. his double) had seen Arufu’s antelope get shot. The replacement ritual was performed. But just before the ritual and on the third day after the accident Arufu’s monkey presented itself in the open saying ‘he has killed me’ (i.e. he has killed my companion). But Ajambon, an unmarried woman at Buben told the monkey that she had recognised him as Arufu. She then said to the monkey that the youth who had killed him (his companion) was young and had not known who the antelope was. It was a mistake. Finally, she told the monkey to go away. Ajambon has seen it from time to time. It is now (1963) very old. (Recounted to O. F. Linares by Ajambon.)

Remarks. Ajambon volunteered this story as proof that Arufu had uterine links to Buben specifically via his MMM. Apparently however, Arufu himself was not of this opinion, for according to his genealogy all his matrilineal descendants came from Jirego. Unfortunately I was never able to straighten the discrepancy out, though I would guess that it was Arufu who was correct, mainly because if both his mother and his MM came from Jirego (which no one doubted) then, given the marriage patterns in the area, it was highly probable that his MMM came from the same general locality. But if probability supported Arufu, general opinion supported Ajambon. Not only did the people of Buben insist that Arufu was one of their asumppl, but also Arufu’s own children all identified Buben as the home of their FM MMM. The major reason prompting Buben to make the claim was that it permitted them to bridge the social segmentation of the village. Such a link was to their advantage, for Arufu, in his prime, had been the unquestioned ‘big man’ of the village (‘a giant silk-cotton among lesser trees’, according to one informant). Reciprocally, by having -sumppl rights in a neighbouring household Arufu’s children (especially when young) could make demands, close to home, for hospitality that would not have otherwise been their due.

In a context that asserted a strong -sumppl relationship, but that rests at best on a remote genealogical connexion, an appeal to the siwūam idiom is a very useful device. It places beyond dispute the existence of the relationship. Regardless of what Arufu himself might believe, a well attested case involving his doubles living at Buben was prima facie grounds for saying with assurance that he was a Buben asumpul. As an Ajamaat would put it, ‘Why else would his doubles be living there?’

4) An elder by the name of Jaan and of the village of Jirem had the habit of setting out water for the siwūam of his house. His brother Landing would sometimes hide and shoot the animals as they came to drink. In this way he was responsible for the death of three kusumpul. Jaan reprimanded Landing saying that he had done bad to hide and kill the siwūam. Landing replied that siwūam did not exist and that the animals were ordinary. To this Jaan retorted that he was not so crazy as to set out water for wild animals.

At Jaan’s funeral the kusumpul collectively cursed (enum) Landing to a death by fire. Shortly thereafter, when some upland fields were being burned over, Landing got severely burned and subsequently died. (Recounted by Anyara Jeme, one of Jaan’s asumpul.)

Remarks. We can interpret this incident as a posthumous settling of accounts. On his death bed Jaan recounted the story of his kusumpul by way explaining why several of them had died in recent years. Accepting Jaan’s explanation, the kusumpul had little other choice but to curse Landing, even though they had always considered him to be a good man. Not to have cursed him would have put them in jeopardy, for without Jaan’s protection they (i.e. their doubles) would become an even easier prey to Landing’s hunting excursions. What motivated the dispute between the brothers is unknown, though such fraternal animosities are not infrequent, indeed they are common. What is uncommon here, however, is that Jaan forced a reversal of the jural role customarily assigned to the kusumpul, which is normally to
settle disputes between agnates, not to avenge one at the expense of another. And further, and of particular interest to our discussion, is that the reversal was entailed by way of the siwãidâm idiom. Jaan did not accuse Landing of being an evil man who wished either overtly or as a witch ill of his kušumplû, but rather he accused Landing of being ignorant in his obstinate refusal to admit to the verity of Kujamaat cosmology, to the brute fact that siwãidâm exist. The animosity between the brothers was framed therefore in the contrast between Jaan’s traditional beliefs and Landing’s modern debunking of these very beliefs.\(^5\)

5) A dangerous ewiûâm. A very pretty girl, ‘red like a Fula’, had a kalib snake for a double. This snake is small, rare, and very colourful and pretty. It is also considered extremely poisonous, so poisonous that it need only enter a compound or just look into it, and someone will die in the near future. I was never able to identify what kind of snake a kalib is and I should not be surprised if it is entirely imaginary.\(^6\) The girl, who was married, was told by her father to get the snake away from her agnic residence. At the same time her mother told her to keep the snake away from her residence, that is, away from the girl’s mother’s brother’s home, the logical second choice for a married woman’s double. So she removed her snake to the residence of some remote uterine linked kin where there were many doubles. But these distant relatives were just as unhappy as her father and mother about the double and, after consultation with appropriate diviners, decided the only solution was to poison the snake, which they did. To save the girl, they then performed the replacement ritual. The girl, who never produced another double, terminated the entire affair by moving permanently to Dakar. (Recounted by a fellow villager who was unrelated to the girl.)

Remarks. A contrasting incident was reported by Anyara Jeme for his house at Jilsuk:

6) A python came out into the courtyard and the people standing by closed in on it, but it went away. Anyara’s brother, Abúlak, said that it was something special and not a bush snake. Shortly after that Abúlak died. The snake was Anyara’s FZ.

Anyara further commented that ‘the courtyard had not been clean. There was something bad that had come inside . . . An ewiûâm will know of badness in the compound and will show itself as a sign to the responsible household members.’

The two cases differ in that for 5) the girl’s double was taken to be the cause of the affliction, while in 6) the double provided a sign of an impending affliction. In the latter case the woman was identified, by way of the idiom, as fulfilling her role as an arîmen. That someone died was not to be blamed on her. She had forewarned the death, and to have prevented it was the responsibility of others. In contrast, 5) has the girl and her kalib snake reversing this protective role assigned to the jariñen.

But there is more, for in terms of the idiom this incident is unique. Normally siwãidâm, even leopards, are benign. They may commit some aggressive act, but only when provoked. Here, however, the very existence of the kalib snake was a threat to the safety of those near to where it was living. It was dangerous by nature. The incident represents a limiting case marking a transition from the idiom of siwãidâm: benign, usually vulnerable, animals needing protection; to that of were-animals: witches who transform themselves into animals for the sole purpose of doing some kind of harm. It is unique in another way as well. The woman and her double shared a specific quality in common: they were both very pretty. (Recall that outside the rough and overlapping categories separating men’s from women’s siwãidâm, the type of double a person might have is usually thought to be entirely arbitrary.) Beauty also implies another shared characteristic: poisonous. Given their extreme egalitarian frame of mind, the Kujamaat are suspicious of any person who is openly outstanding in any way. A rich man has assuredly stolen from others, a consistently successful fighter uses supernatural power (muylû), and a a person’s beauty, if it is exceptional, has been bought with muylû by his mother from some kind of bush spirit. Thus, a girl of physical perfection, whose perfection is of dubious origin, is here represented in the siwãidâm idiom by a beautiful and poisonous snake. This leads to the association: ‘(beauty) of dubious origin’ equal to ‘poisonous’, which in turn permits characterising the girl as being socially imperfect. She reverses (if unwittingly) her role as an arîmen. She afflicts rather than protects her agnates. The exceptional use of the idiom is, finally, a single instance of a common theme in Kujamaat thought where individual physical perfection is associated with social imperfection.\(^7\)
The question to answer now is why do the Kujamaat make use of the *siwúüm* idiom at all? Why talk about someone’s animal double when one can talk about the person himself? Of the various possible answers most are too narrow in scope. For example those interpretations that would consider the *siwúüm* idiom as a means for explaining illness or as a form of indirect accusation tend to be strictly utilitarian and unable to account for all cases. They also ignore the complexity of the idiom itself. A fuller interpretation would insist both on this complexity and on the interdependency of idiom with its specific application. At the same time it would raise the more general problem of metaphoric statement where, in I. A. Richards’s terms (1936), a vehicle, in this case animals, conceptually interacts with a tenor, the general notion of being *furímen* or *kusumpúl*, and together produce a metaphor which is the *siwúüm* idiom.8 From this angle, from the angle of metaphor, the idiom becomes a device for making succinct and precise statements.

Actual relations between a particular MB and his nephew (or between B and his out-married Z) are complex and diffuse involving a unique history and extending beyond the limits of any kinship category. However, the *siwúüm* idiom refers to those aspects of the relationship that are defined solely by the kinship category of being an *asumpúl* or an *arímen*. Therefore to apply the idiom to any particular situation allows the Kujamaat to define, or as Kenneth Burke would say, ‘to entitle’, this situation as falling directly and exclusively under the *kusumpúl* or *furímen* categories. To say that this is ‘a matter of *siwúüm*’ is to say that this is a matter of being *kusumpúl* and of being *furímen* in the fullest sense of the word. The very entitlement brings into play all that we have said about *siwúüm* in general, about the duality of the self and of Kujamaat society and about the particularistic and asymmetrical relationship between person and animal; between uncle and nephew, and between brother and sister.

There remains the interdependency of the idiom and its application. In a particularly suggestive paper Kenneth Burke (1966) argues that the semiotic canon, ‘words are the signs for things’ can be reversed to say ‘things are the signs for words’. Now this certainly works for the *siwúüm* idiom where not only does the idiom, a cosmological word, entitle ... is a sign for ... a particular situation, an experiential ‘thing’, but also that any *euvúim* incident is a sign for, an evocation of, the idiom itself. That is, each time the Kujamaat associate an instance of illness or some other situation with a particular *euvúim* incident they reinforce the truth of the idiom. Altogether this makes us consider the relationship of idiom to its application as being a tautology of mutual reinforcement. Situations, especially when they involve illness, ‘need’ to be defined or entitled by cosmology; cosmology ‘needs’ incidents so that it may entitle and thereby persist as valid.

V

Conclusions

By shifting the grounds of totemic inquiry from ‘thoughts about food’ to ‘food for thought’, where animals are not ‘good to eat’ but ‘good to think’, Lévi-Strauss has provided anthropology with an intellectualist programme that has, for better and for worse, greatly influenced the course of symbolic studies over the past decade. The challenging aspect of this programme has been the contention
that animals... and by extension all other external and concrete referents... are 'thought with' by way of the analogics of difference, opposition and correlation, and that these very analogics represent the basis of all imaginative thought.

My present concern has not been to argue for or against the universality, the sufficiency, nor even the necessity of this programme. Nor has it been to provide a test case on which the entire enterprise might stand or fall... an impossibility anyway given the combined abstractness of the programme and the utter complexity of human experience. Instead my problem has been purely ethnographic. It has been to attempt a full account of the Kujamaat proposition set out in the opening lines of this article: that an Ajamaat Diola might at some point in his life defecate a live animal... For this end Lévi-Strauss's shibboleth and its attendant analogics have been, in this case at least, most productive. It led me first to consider the metonymic relationship of person to double which turned out to be one of dualism and complementarity, rather than the more common relationship of homology. In turn, the dualistic metonymy permitted me to deduce two analogic models. Model I had to do with interaction and it was justified first because it accurately predicted the major categories of Kujamaat social relations and secondly because it provided the ground plan for all recorded *siwúum* incidents. If Model I was justified, so too was Model 2, for one was nothing more than a rewrite of the other. But beyond this, Model 2 set in relief the initial duality by extending it to include the cross sex equivalence of son=mother in contrast to husband=wife.

Normally a structuralist analysis would stop here and turn to comparative materials from neighbouring tribes and from other Diola sub-groups so as to find and describe any transformations that might (and surely do) exist in the idiom. However, my commitment has been to Kujamaat ethnography and not to structuralism and in order to approximate a complete ethnographic statement it was necessary for me to consider how the Kujamaat themselves talk about the *siwúum*. I made the jump from system to application with the help of the symbolic action perspective of Kenneth Burke, where the idiom serves to entitle situations which in turn, once entitled, validate the idiom. My remarks on the specific cases adhered more-or-less to this perspective. The cases however also raised or at least implied other questions which led away from the notion of *siwúum* itself. But such is the untidy nature of ethnography. One problem once raised, grasped, organised and solved only raises other problems to be solved from other angles and with the incorporation of other overlapping data. That is to say, in good ethnography one thing always leads to another, and the final word is never set down.

But to grasp at a closing if not final word let me end by mentioning a fact about the *siwúum* idiom that until now I have chosen to ignore. Not every Ajamaat has a double. In truth, most people do not. Moreover, my informants assured me that there are fewer doubles around now than in the past. This does not vitiate the idiom. Just as a few strategic marriages will maintain the structure of a restricted marriage system, so a limited number of *siwúum* will maintain the validity of the idiom. But the attenuation is nevertheless problematical, for it is certainly an indication of some form of decadence. There seem to be three reasons for the diminishing quantity of *siwúum*. Culturally, the Kujamaat by accepting Islam have turned away from the complexities of their traditional cosmology. Socially, the limits of Kujamaat life extend today way beyond the restricted field defined by the idiom...
and traditionally in operation. No longer is an Ajamaat confined to his agnates and uterine linked kin, but instead he operates in an open system that includes other Kujamaat and other ethnic groups as well. No longer is he tied down to a small patch of ground, but instead travels from one end of Sénégal to the other. But there is another reason that is equally important. It was suggested to me by an informant when he gave his answer to this question about fewer siwúüm. ‘Because’, he said, ‘there are fewer animals and fewer places for animals to hide.’ The greatly increased quantity of efficient guns (as opposed to the old muzzle loaders) has allowed the Kujamaat to deplete to the point of extinction what was once a plentiful reserve of game animals. And a greater reliance on peanuts as a cash crop has led the Kujamaat to turn into fields and bush huge tracts of forest lands. This raises an extremely interesting, if simple, point so often belittled by semiotists (though not at all by Lévi-Strauss). The concrete referent is a vital part of a metaphoric construct, especially when the referent is an animal or some other discrete object of nature. Without some personal experience with the animal vehicles out of which the siwúüm are developed, the idiom loses its aptness and risks becoming in time but a passing cliché. I would say then, with the help of my informant, that the Kujamaat have fewer siwúüm for precisely the same reason our barnyard metaphors (called ‘dead metaphors’) serve as little more than colourful ornaments. To call someone the ‘cock of the walk’ is to substitute a synonym for something like ‘he is sexually vain’. The substitute amuses, but it hardly ‘brings new knowledge’ as, according to Aristotle, all good metaphors must. But if we, urban dwellers that we are, knew something about cocks and hens (other than that they are good to eat and that a cock is somehow vaguely associated with the masculine organ), would not the metaphor say something infinitely more precise about the man than to say only that ‘he is sexually vain’? So let my closing words serve both as a pitch for animal conservation and as an empirical caveat. ‘Animals are good to think’, true, but only when there are animals about with which to think.

NOTES

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² Cf. Sapir 1965. For the sake of simplicity I have altered my original orthography for Kujamutay (the language of the Kujamaat, and heretofore called by me, Diola-Fogny). In this article I mark the tense vowels with an acute accent in contrast to the lax vowels which are left unmarked. Vowel harmony is not marked and thus, for example, a word spelt here arímen is pronounced arímén (or ařímen). (Cf. Sapir 1975 for a discussion of variation in Kujamutay vowel harmony.)

² In the village where I did the bulk of my field work the men used the expression ekús ejameney, ‘disembowel the goat’, as an euphemism for esak, ‘to copulate’.
Pierre Smith (1973), in a very interesting paper on dual concepts of the self in the Western Sudan, takes the idea of renunciation to be the key feature to all notions about doubles. However, this would narrow the concept too much for there are in fact three conditions at play when one talks about doubles: 1, that the person and double are discontinuous (this is the only necessary condition); 2, that person and double share a common destiny or consciousness; and 3, that person and double are complementary to each other, such that one is foregrounded at the expense of the other which is renounced, or simply left in the background. The Kujamaat system fulfills all three conditions; the Sudanic cross-cousin as double, mentioned by Smith, fulfills only 1 and 3; and the homologous system of siwulím found among other Diola sub-groups fulfills only 1 and 2 as do the animal souls of the Mayan Chamula as described by Gary Gossen (1975).

Freud’s (1953) concept of bi-sexuality and the process of unisexual identification would offer an interesting interpretation to those notions about doubles that fulfill the condition of renunciation. Thus in our case, the displacement into the world of siwulím of the secondary social focus would be reinforced, on the psychological level, by the renunciation of the opposite sex identification. On this level a man, by producing a double, defecates his feminality, though since the double is the same sex as its correspondent we have a transformation (already noted) of non-same sex (i.e. female for a male) > non-human (i.e. wild animal).

In contrast, Otto Rank’s (1971) theory about doubles per se is of little help. His interpretation considers doubles as a form of projection having to do with narcissism, love and death . . . (i.e., just about everything). Although this position applies with insight to examples from nineteenth-century Western literature (Oscar Wilde’s Dorian Gray, Poe’s Mr Wilson, etc.), it sheds no light whatsoever on the problem of siwulím, or, for that matter, on other similar representations found in the Western Sudan, if not beyond. The crucial difference, which separates the examples in Western literature from those at hand, is that with the former, but not with the latter, a great deal is made out of the direct interaction of person with his own double. And it is this interaction that serves as Rank’s major point of departure for his theory.

When necessary the remote ‘nephews’ can be distinguished from ZS and FZS by the term asalínken, which glosses as ‘repeat asumpil’. Thus tanaasumpillum which is unmarked, contrasts with the marked tanasaalíndrenum.

We might note also that, by their names, Landung was a Muslim while Jaan was not. Thus perhaps Jaan was striking out not just at Landung’s denial of the siwulím’s existence, but at his new religion as well.

This incident was recounted after my informant had seen in the Petit Larousse a picture of the American coral snake which he identified as looking like the kalib.

Cf. Sapis (1977b) for a discussion of this theme as it appears in a Kujamaat folk tale.

From the point of view of the whole self the relation of person to evoilím is, as we have been saying, one of metonymy. Each represents a separate part of the same whole. From a more analytical perspective, however, the relationship of animal, qua evoilím, to being an arimen or an asumpil is metaphor of the genus for genus rather than the analogic variety, with the common ground shared by evoilím and the social categories being the marginal position of each vis-à-vis the residential core. (Cf. Aristotle’s Poetics, ch. 21; also, Sapis 1977a.) An interesting reversal of the relationship where the tenor becomes vehicle and vehicle tenor, is when the Kujamaat use a person, an arimen, to designate an animal: barimen, ‘red finch’, a small bird that flocks in groups of ten to twenty and that is seen most frequently hopping about the edges of the cooking area, especially near the mortars used for pounding rice. Here we have similarity (kankan nen furimen, ‘is like the furimen’ (literally: ‘makes as the furimen’) and not identity, an equivalence reserved for an arimen’s double (yo oni arimen ache, ‘it is a particular arimen’ (literally: ‘it, that is an arimen, a certain one’)). Thus, just as the furimen supervise from a distance the behaviour of the in-married women, so the barimen, from the edges of the cooking area, supervise these same women as they discharge one of their basic duties, the preparation of food.

A paper comparing the Kujamaat’s with other Diola’s notions about the siwulím is in preparation.

REFERENCES