Reconsidering Witchcraft: Postcolonial Africa and Analytic (Un)Certainties

ABSTRACT  African notions of witchcraft are neither archaic nor static but are highly flexible and deeply attuned to the conundrums of our contemporary world. Many anthropologists have recently argued that notions of the African witch provide commentaries on the meaning and merit of modernity as experienced in different historical and cultural settings. By exploring one particular type of witchcraft—that involving rain—amongst the Ihanzu of Tanzania, this article suggests instead that some forms of witchcraft may be more pertinent to understanding local notions of “tradition” than “modernity.” It is argued that the process of identifying rain witches provides Ihanzu men and women with a way to circumscribe, contemplate, and, ultimately, reassert the veracity and significance of a conceptual category they call “tradition.” The article concludes by critiquing the homogenizing effects of terms like the African witch and African witchcraft, compelling us to think in terms of pluralities rather than singulars. [Keywords: witchcraft, modernity, tradition, rain-making, anthropological theory]

“BUT YOU’RE THE VOICE OF TRADITION!” an exasperated man bellowed at the defiant diviner. “You understand these things,” he continued, “and then you go and ruin them!” Disconcerted and defeated the diviner sat, staring vacantly into the hostile crowd.

It was another unseasonably and unreasonably hot and dry February day in Ihanzu, Tanzania. The rains, it is true, were long overdue. And this most unfortunate diviner—I shall call him Kingu—had been publicly accused of ruining them through witchcraft. Kingu was no stranger to such accusations. Since 1989 he has suffered through at least ten heated trials for allegedly bewitching the rain. On this occasion, like others, Kingu was eventually released with a stern warning: If he did not allow the rain to fall, and soon, he would be expelled from the village. Fortuitously for Kingu, it rained the following week. He was allowed to remain, if precariously, in the village.

This rain witchcraft case, together with many others I encountered during my time in Ihanzu, prompted me to reflect on how many contemporary scholars view African witchcraft today. For there is a striking degree of scholarly consensus that African witchcraft—situated, as it is, soundly within the project(s) of modernity—is and indeed must be about modernity. Witches and peoples’ beliefs about them are thought to provide moralizing metacommentaries on the project of modernity or, perhaps more accurately, modernities in the plural. Yet, somewhat unexpectedly, as Kingu’s case alludes, Ihanzu rain witchcraft has very little to do with local notions of modernity (maendeleo). On the contrary, this case and others like it seem to concern themselves more with local concepts of tradition (jadi). The aim of this article, most generally stated, is to suggest that African witchcraft may well be part of modernity, but by no means needs to be about modernity. Notions of African witchcraft have proved surprisingly flexible and thus survive—indeed thrive—in novel postcolonial contexts (Comaroff and Comaroff 1993b; Geschiere 1997; Shaw 2002). This conceptual flexibility implies that while the African witch may be about modernity, it may also be about other things, too. In some cases African witchcraft allows men and women to circumscribe, contemplate, and reassert the veracity of a conceptual category they find meaningful, a category they call “tradition.” Put differently, if the African witch “permits argument about the causes and consequences, costs and benefits of particular forms of modernity” (Comaroff 1994: 11), then it similarly provides men and women with a means to envisage and engage creatively with particular forms of tradition. “Tradition,” of course, is itself modernity’s shadowy companion. One category has little meaning...
without the other. Even so, by speaking to “tradition,” Ihanzu rain witchcraft speaks to “modernity” only obliquely. It demarcates modernity’s conceptual boundaries but does not fill them.

AFRICAN WITCHCRAFT AT THE MILLENNIUM

Witchcraft has long been central to the anthropological enterprise, especially to British social anthropologists working in Africa. It was in this context that E. E. Evans-Pritchard produced his landmark study on Azande witchcraft (Evans-Pritchard 1937), focusing on the sociology of knowledge, and where later Manchester School anthropologists explored the social dynamics of witchcraft suspicions and accusations (Marwick 1965; Middleton 1960, 1963; Mitchell 1956; Turner 1957).

The explanations contemporary scholars offer of African witchcraft differ in important ways from those of their predecessors. Most notably, many today have been enthusiastic to demonstrate the modernity of witchcraft (Geschiere 1997). No longer, we are told, can we view African witchcraft and similar ideologies as “archaic or exotic phenomenon, somehow isolated or disjointed [from] historical processes of global political and economic transformation” (Auslander 1993:168; Geschiere 1998a). Rather, African witchcraft beliefs and practices are alive and aware of the basic rhythms of our world and engage in creative ways with novel postcolonial realities (Bastian 1993; Comaroff and Comaroff 1993b; Fisiy and Geschiere 2001; Geschiere 1997; Parish 2000; Shaw 1997, 2001). This is why, predications of modernization and globalization theorists notwithstanding, African witchcraft, sorcery, and other “occult economies” (Comaroff and Comaroff 1999) are reportedly on the rise, not decline, across the continent (Bastian 1993:156; Colson 2000:341; Rowlands and Warner 1988).

Whether in state politics, legal institutions, the economy, or simply as everyday “public secrets” (Ashforth 1996: 1194) that permeate all these arenas, witchcraft is all-pervasive in Africa today. By contextualizing witchcraft beliefs and practices, both spatially and historically, this new wave of studies has endeavored to show the myriad of ways that witchcraft forms an integral part of the African postcolonial experience (see Moore and Sanders 2001).

To this end, a number of contemporary Africanist scholars have implied—and some have insisted—that witchcraft discourses and practices provide moralizing metanarratives on the meaning of modernity as experienced in different localities. In this sense African witchcraft has been seen not only as part of modernity but also as a locally inflected critique of it; as a local lexicon, in other words, that points up and engages with modernity’s latent and blatant immoralities.

It would be extremely difficult to overstate the popularity of this position. African witches and witchcraft, anthropologists have suggested, have “become a symptom of the ways in which the values attributed to capitalist accumulation and the possession of material goods generate friction in the local moral economy” (Parish 2000:488); “express people’s worries about globalization’s threatening encroachment on intimate spheres of life” (Geschiere 1998a:813, n. 5); and thus suggest that “people do not easily surrender control over the material and symbolic production and reproduction of their lives” (Auslander 1993:189). Furthermore, African witches, witchcraft, and the discourses about them have been seen as “a critique of the capitalist economy which makes people exchange essential values of fertility, health and long life for material gains” (Meyer 1992:118, 1995); “a critical commentary on inequality and on the violence that underlay power” (Smith 2001:807); potentially provoking “a self-critique of the capitalist West” (Austen 1993:105); “modernity’s prototypical malcontents” (Comaroff and Comaroff 1993: xxviii–xxix); a local discourse that “has allowed those who participate in its reproduction to see the goods and technologies of modernity as both desirable and disruptive” (West 1997:693); and “a metacommentary on the deeply ambivalent project of modernity” (Sanders 1999b:128). In short, in whatever guises or disguises, the African witch today provides Africans and Africanists alike with fertile conceptual terrain for constructing, considering, and contesting the multiple manifestations of modernity that positively flourish at the crossroads of local and global worlds.

There are a number of reasons this African-witch-as-master-trope approach, albeit in varied forms, has gained such overwhelming favor amongst anthropologists. One is the poststructuralist desire to reject uncompromising teleologies of progress, those stories, to paraphrase and partially pervert Clifford Geertz (1973:448), that the West tells itself about itself (see Ferguson 1999:13ff). These are the metanarratives of modernity (Englund and Leach 2000) that deftly encompass and naturalize many Western notions commonly conceptualized with capital letters: the relentless search for Truth; the inevitable triumph of Reason over superstition; the rise of the Modern and the demise of Tradition. Yet no longer can we correctly suppose—indeed we never could—that “the primitive” is one step behind “the modern.” Nor, in spite of claims to the contrary, can we rightly assume that “modernity destroys tradition” (Giddens 1994:91). Recent studies instead insist that we find ourselves—all of us—in perfectly modern settings, faced with perfectly modern conundrums. Following anthropology’s broader intellectual mandate, then, these critiques aim to deotherize “the Other.”

Simultaneously, writings in this genre play on a popular liberal critique by celebrating the morality of “the Other” while simultaneously showing up the inherent immorality and invasiveness of the new world (dis)order. Among anthropologists and other social scientists, this has long proved a popular political and rhetorical strategy, one that appeals to our liberal sensibilities as well as fulfills our manifest moral obligations to those “Others” with whom we work. Peoples in faraway places thus offer unique insights into, and caustic critiques of, the workings
of our contemporary world (West and Sanders in press). Such critiques remind us that our own master narratives are deeply cultural, not natural products; that "our pretended rationalist discourse is pronounced in a particular cultural dialect—that 'we are one of the others' " (Sahlins 1993:12; see also Comaroff and Comaroff 1993a, 1999, 2000). Here, anthropologists aim to unsettle and problematize Western commonplaces.

Recent anthropological concerns with African witchcraft also draw attention to local agency and creative potentialities. People are not simply overrun by global structural inevitabilities: They resist, creatively accommodate, and selectively appropriate new styles, symbols, and structures of meaning. Global-local interstices become highly creative sites where "people 'make' themselves modern, as opposed to being 'made' modern by alien and impersonal forces" (Gaonkar 1999:16).

In spite of these resonances—or, perhaps more accurately, because of them—it is worthwhile pondering whether, in aiming to see anthropology's theoretical forest, we have not lost sight of her empirical trees. In this case, even though discourses about witches and witchcraft have wide social currency in contemporary Africa and in certain economies of the academe, this does not necessarily mean that such discourses have something of interest to say about the (un)desirability of African modernities. They may. Or they may not. For being within modernity and being about modernity are not, after all, logically equivalent (Englund 1996:259). It would, therefore, be unwise to assume, as the collective weight of the current literature seems to do, that all African witchcraft must today be "about" modernity; that all Africans' fears and fantasies, trials and tribulations concerning witches must necessarily "personify the conflicts of modernity, the ways in which foreign forces invade local worlds, turning ordinary people into monsters, and endangering established life-ways" (Comaroff 1994:9).

In some cases, of course, they do (Sanders 2001a, in press). But given witchcraft's palpable dynamism, we should also expect witchcraft discourses to be polysemic, capable of making claims about many things. One of those things is a category people ponder and proffer as "tradition" (cf. Green 1997; Sanders 1999b).

To speak, once again, of tradition is not a disingenuous return to the notion that "non-Western" peoples live in an archaic, static world. Nor is it to defend defective social evolutionary paradigms. Modernity's master narratives—at least among anthropologists—have lost all theoretical plausibility, to say nothing of social respectability. While it may be true that the term tradition is becoming banal and meaningless, as Achille Mbembe complains (Guyer 1996:4), it is also true that it remains with us (Guyer 1996:4). The suggestion that we reconsider tradition is thus a plea to recognize that tradition, like modernity, today features prominently in the African popular imagination (Kratz 1993). As a locally meaningful category of thought and action, it demands our analytic attention.

Most scholars would today agree that tradition is dynamic, and highly attuned to the ebb and flow of day-to-day life (Bernal 1997; Errington and Gewertz 1996; Guyer 1996; Schrauwers 1999). For years now, social scientists have known that tradition is "plucked, created, and shaped to present needs and aspirations in a given historical situation" (Gusfield 1967:358). Sometimes traditions are outright invented (Ranger 1983). In others, long-standing traditions are abolished by the very people who practice them. The Manjaco of Guinea-Bissau, for instance, hold periodic "congresses" in the form of initiation ceremonies during which they actively argue over and rewrite "tradition" by eliminating specific customs they find outmoded (Gable 1995, also 2000).

While the negotiation of "tradition" is sometimes a discursive matter, as amongst the Manjaco, it need not be. The process of deciding what is or is not "tradition" may equally be one of practical engagement, a process whereby the category of "things traditional" is actively negotiated through doing rather than saying. As we shall see, the Ihanzu of Tanzania use rain witchcraft accusations in precisely this way: to circumscribe, contemplate, and occasionally renegotiate the category of "tradition" as locally envisaged. In so doing, they confidently reassert what tradition is, and what it ought to be. At the same time, this process evokes and demarcates the boundaries of a parallel conceptual category—modernity—but leaves its conceptual terrain mostly uncharted. The fact that Ihanzu rain witchcraft is implicated more in tradition than in modernity is related to how people link rainmaking and ethnic identity.

IHANZU RAINMAKING, "RAIN BREAKING," AND ETHNIC IDENTITY

The Ihanzu live in north-central Tanzania and currently number around thirty thousand. They are farmers, their principle crops being sorghum, millet, and maize. Even so, farming has never proved easy in this remote, semiarid region. Soils are generally poor, and the rains fail about one year in five. The rain falls—when it does fall—between November and April or May. The months between June and October typically see no rain at all. Even in good years, rainfall peaks at a meager 30 inches. This is often erratic and unevenly distributed: one village (sometimes even one plot) may receive sufficient rain while one adjacent to it dries up. There are no year-round rivers and few operational water pumps that might ease the situation. For these reasons, farming in Ihanzu is and always has been a precarious enterprise. It is small wonder, really, that rain is of the utmost practical and symbolic importance to all Ihanzu.

Most Ihanzu believe that their two royal leaders (akola ihit) bring the rain each year, a feat they purportedly accomplish with the help of the ancestors, medicines, and certain rituals. Even though people sometimes say these leaders make rain (anonia imbula), no one means by this
that they create (külompwa) it from thin air. Only God (Itunda) can do this. Rather, royals are said to "suck," "pull," "entice," or "attract" (küluta) God's rainclouds—and, with that, God's rain—from distant locations to Ihanzu. Such sucking is only made possible by gaining the approval of the ancestors (alîngù), and all rain rites are directed toward this end.9

Of the royal rainmakers,9 one is male, the other female. Both are members of the royal rainmaking matrilineage (Anyampanda wa Kirumi); succession to their positions follows rules of primogeniture within the matrilineage. It is these two reigning royals who are thought jointly to hold the ultimate secrets of rainmaking. Other royals and members of the Anyampanda clan are sometimes suspected of possessing some esoteric knowledge of rainmaking. Under no circumstances are they able legitimately to use this knowledge to influence the weather.

Ritual leaders gain their sanction and legitimacy directly from what people consider “traditional” sources, namely, the ancestral spirits. Part of this sanction they embody within their person, since they are themselves direct matrilineal descendants of previous Ihanzu rainmakers. The other part requires they observe certain practices. Royal leaders must reside in what is today the subvillage of Kirumi, the sacred center of Ihanzu. Kirumi is also where rainmaking royals must be buried. Additionally, ritual leaders are responsible for performing or overseeing an array of rain rites each year in Kirumi—all of which people insist are traditional (jadi or mila)—immediately prior to and during the wet season. Attempting ritually to bring rain at any other time of the year would, people say, be as futile as it would be foolish. God’s rain would then be unavailable to attract: The spirits would not listen.

Just before the onset of the rains, usually in October, the year’s first rain rite, “cutting the night sod” (Kükumpya lutinde), is held in Kirumi. This annual initiatory rite is carried out privately, marks the beginning of each new season, and is followed by several public rites at the Kirumi rainshrine (mpilimo). Annual rain rites have been carried out in Ihanzu since at least the late 1800s (Adam 1963).10 Today it is primarily the male leader who conducts these rites, aided by several male rainmaking assistants.

There are currently 19 rainmaking assistants (ataata; sing. miitaata) who reside in and represent ten of the 18 villages in Ihanzu. Each season these men collect token amounts of grain from each household in their respective villages and bring it to Kirumi for the annual rain rites (see Sanders 1998). Following the night cutting of the sod, these assistants prepare rain medicines inside the rainshrine, under the direction of the male leader. Although the female leader never enters the shrine, it is widely assumed that the two leaders consult each other to determine which medicinal mixtures are most effective. Throughout the season rainmaking assistants visit the rainshrine to monitor and, if necessary, remix the rain medicines.

When these preliminary rain rites bring rain, no other rain rites are necessary during the year. Regrettably, however, the rain does not always fall immediately, or at the right time or place. Certain remedial measures are then taken to avert drought. These remedial rites include royal rain offerings (mapolyo ka mbula),11 which are large gatherings, involving many more than just royals and rainmaking assistants. Royal rain offerings only take place when they are deemed necessary through divination (Sanders 2002). A second remedial measure is a women’s rain dance (isimplya) that shares broad similarities with women’s rain rites found widely across Africa (see Moore et al. 1999). In these rites, women are granted extreme license and are expected to behave outrageously—they dance naked down the paths, make lewd gestures, and sing obscene songs (Sanders 2000).

All these rain rites and those who perform them are of decided importance to the Ihanzu today, and have been for well over a century. In precolonial times, Ihanzu villages were largely autonomous, each responsible for its own internal political, legal, and economic affairs. There was little cooperation between villages and occasional fighting (Reche 1914:85). People did, however, share a common purpose in ritual matters and warfare. In such instances all looked to the Kirumi rainmakers for leadership. As in other precolonial African societies (Feierman 1990; Packard 1981), these royal leaders, their medicines, and the rituals they conducted were essential to the flow of daily life: the farming cycle, protection, hunting, and circumcission. Ihanzu of different villages were united by their common allegiance to the rainmaking specialists at Kirumi (Adam 1963:17).12 More than this, rainmaking has provided the Ihanzu with an enduring focal point for collective identity.

Of late, scholars have shown how “identity,” like “tradition,” forms part of the social imagination. Far from being fixed, identity is actively molded in particular social, cultural and historical settings (Greene 1996; Hodgson 2001; Sorenson 1993; Spear and Waller 1993). For the men and women of Ihanzu, rainmaking has long featured centrally in this constructive project of self-making and still does today. Since my first visit to Ihanzu in the early 1990s, countless men and women have told me that, if I am to write a book about them, then it must surely be a book on “Ihanzu traditions” of rainmaking. In Ihanzu eyes, their rainmaking beliefs and practices mark out both an identifiable terrain of “tradition,” as well as provide a certain collective sense of “Ihanzuness.” One way Ihanzu ideas about the linkages between rainmaking and ethnic identity are made manifest is through rainmaking rites. Another is through their origin myth.

I have only heard one Ihanzu origin myth, the one all Ihanzu know, the one many have told over the years to non-Ihanzu with evident zeal (Adam 1963:14–15; Kohl-Larsen 1943:194–195).13 Variations aside, all versions tell of an ancient migration from Ukerewe Island in Lake Victoria. As the story goes, many different clans made this journey, driven by famine and drought. Varied clans rested at different locations, which are today remembered...
by name, and some of the sites within Ihanzu are used for rainmaking rites. Moreover, each clan supposedly came with particular things. Some came with seeds, while others came with cattle. Not everyone knows all the clans, or what they brought with them. However people never fail to mention that the first Ihanzu rainmakers also came from Ukerewe, together with their rainmaking knowledge and ritual paraphernalia. And, for many, this seems to be the point of telling the story in the first place—to say, in so many words, “We came from Ukerewe with our rain-makers and rain medicines.” Everyone I asked about what makes an Ihanzu an Ihanzu explicitly noted as much, often pointing proudly in the northerly direction of Ukerewe for added emphasis.

Thus, if the Nuer see themselves as “people of cattle,” it would not be inaccurate to say that the Ihanzu imagine themselves a “rainmaking people.” Ihanzu men and women express this through ritual, myth, and in their everyday explanations of who they imagine themselves to be. By providing the Ihanzu with a sense of historical continuity with bygone generations, ancestral spirits, and the lands on which they live, rainmaking rites and beliefs provide them with a symbolic resource with which to generate a meaningful collective identity in the present. That rainmaking features centrally in the Ihanzu popular imagination—and is a defining feature of what it means to be “Ihanzu” today—is hardly surprising in a locale where climate is, quite literally, a matter of life or death. The conceptual centrality of rainmaking institutions and beliefs also helps explain the attitudes Ihanzu men and women hold about rain witchcraft.

Witchcraft (ulogi) in Ihanzu is an all-pervasive, if somewhat mundane, part of people’s day-to-day lives. It can be inherited or learnt, but there is little concern over which type of witchcraft any particular witch might use. This is because those thought to have inherited witchcraft need not practice it; and anyone can purportedly purchase witchcraft medicines. Ihanzu witchcraft of any sort is considered evil (abi tai) and destructive. Sometimes witches are said to gain from their diabolical deeds. Other times they apparently gain nothing.

Ihanzu witchcraft comes in many forms, and people stress that different witches (alogi; sing. milogi) excel at different types of destruction. Some, for instance, allegedly specialize at killing people—frequently one's own clanmates but also government officials, shopkeepers, businesspeople, and others. Others reputedly excel at the wanton destruction of buses, radios, and other “modern” wares (Sanders 1999b). Of the varied Ihanzu witches, none is more menacing than the rain witch: To attack the rain is to attack all Ihanzu—willfully, shamelessly, and without remorse.

If rainmakers attract rain clouds and rains to Ihanzu from elsewhere, rain witches (alogi a mbula) do precisely the opposite by summoning winds to destroy them. How they do this, few can detail. People’s understandings of the ritual mechanism of rain witchcraft rely heavily on the testimony of accused rain witches who, under duress, fire the collective imagination. I have heard of witches stopping the rain by tossing red medicine to the four cardinal points (a symbolic color inversion of other rain offerings); forcing a young, naked boy to pack down medicines around the village with his buttocks (an inversion of the naked, fertile women from other rain rites); and a man wandering about, without pants, with a feather protruding conspicuously from his posterior (no immediate explanation). Although I have never witnessed any of these things myself, a number of reliable informants assure me that they have.

Why would anyone bewitch the rain? What's the point? Rain witches, local theory has it, are able to entice the rain clouds from other villagers’ plots to their own. This allows them, in theory, to reap a large harvest and consume inordinate amounts of grain while fellow villagers suffer. Here I stress “in theory” since this is the rationale people often produce when asked, in general terms, about rain witchcraft. In practice things are different.

When considering specific cases of rain witchcraft, it is far from obvious that those accused have in any way benefited from their alleged nefarious activities. Some have lots of grain; many others do not. Villagers recognize this and explain away this discrepancy in varied ways but commonly suggest that rain witches’ desires for mass destruction override their common sense. They destroy all rain—including rain they might steal—and, thus, ironically, destroy themselves in the bargain. “Rain witches are just stupid!,” snapped one woman. Thus, while in theory rain witches have much to gain, in practice people imply these witches are wholly incompetent. Rain witches are simply reckless. And not too bright.

To bewitch the rain, or the royal leaders who bring it, is to destroy the source of all villagers’ livelihood. Furthermore, because rainmaking institutions and ritual officiants feature so conspicuously in Ihanzu identity, to attack them through witchcraft is to strike at the very foundation of Ihanzu’s sense of being in the world. To attack the rain is to attack “tradition.” Rain witchcraft—like no other witchcraft—thus threatens to undo all that is done, to turn people’s conceptual and practical life-worlds upside down. For this reason, if the men and women of Ihanzu possess a “standardized nightmare” (Wilson 1970:285), then rain witchcraft is surely it. Before turning to that nightmare’s specifics, we must unpack Ihanzu notions of “tradition” and “modernity.”

**Ihanzu Images of Tradition and Modernity**

The Ihanzu today distinguish between two conceptual categories: “modernity” (maendeleo) and “tradition” (jadi or mila). As elsewhere on the continent, these categories and their contents are not of their own making (Mudimbe 1991; Pels 1996). Jadi, mila, and maendeleo are all Swahili terms. They come from elsewhere. This “elsewhere” has taken varied forms through time.
Colonials—first the Germans, then the British—were likely the first to introduce, reify, and give meaning to these categories. Colonial administrators continually considered the Ihanzu “primitive,” “backward,” and “traditional,” all terms that feature repeatedly in colonial writings on Ihanzu. Although this colonial imagining of the Ihanzu was multifaceted, archetypal of it was Ihanzu rainmaking, a seemingly dogged vestige of tradition and the tradition-bound tribesman. Such thinking made good (social evolutionary) sense in its day, especially when contrasted, as it was, with European images of home and with “modern” (or “modernizing”) African cities.

“Traditional” though it may have been, British administrators never demonized or prohibited rainmaking. They were quick to realize that “the question of rainmaking in this area is one which must be approached with the greatest caution.” This is because, in the Ihanzu popular imagination, rainmaking and reign making had long been linked. Locally understood, for colonial chiefs to reign legitimately, they had to bring rain. By turning Ihanzu rainmakers into colonial chiefs, then, the administration implied that tradition, or at least certain traditions, could be positive. Missionaries were less accommodating.

The Augustana Lutheran mission first opened its doors in Ihanzu in 1931. Early and later missionaries, like colonial administrators, saw the Ihanzu and their rainmaking beliefs and institutions as “traditional.” Unlike colonial administrators, however, these “Messengers of Love” (Ward 1999) positively loathed such things and aimed explicitly at “breaking down of their primitive tribal religion before the advance of civilization” (Johnson 1934:23). From this pious perspective, not only was rainmaking seen as “superstitious,” “primitive,” and “traditional,” but it was also seen as irrevocably evil, something that had to be eradicated at all cost. Today’s Tanzanian postcolonial landscape bears the impress of these earlier understandings of tradition and modernity.

Ihanzu Lutheran church views have changed little from earlier times. The local reverend, himself an Ihanzu man, continues to preach on the perils of tradition and the salvation Jesus offers in the form of moral and material betterment. Today, some seventy years after missionaries’ arrival, this missionary message falls mostly on deaf ears: 80 percent of Ihanzu men and women classify themselves as pagans (wapagani) and do so unabashedly. Few, it seems, have any enthusiasm for hearing The Word of a distant demigod if this means the wholesale abandonment of rainmaking rites, beliefs, and leaders.

The postcolonial church’s and state’s views, at least in Ihanzu, today coincide more than ever. Representatives of the postcolonial Tanzanian state contrast “tradition” and “modernity” as colonial administrations did before them. However, in my experience, today many place a premium on modernity and its attainment while painting tradition as modernity’s stark antithesis. There is little, if any, space for creative accommodation. For the Ihanzu, this was made distressingly clear when, immediately following independence, the postcolonial Tanzanian state abolished chiefships across the land. In an instant, Tanzania legislated itself “modern.” Thus tradition, while actively imagined, is perhaps imagined more negatively and less creatively by the state today than in the past.

Like the Tanzanian postcolonial church and state, the Ihanzu continue to find “tradition” and “modernity” good to think with. But, contrary to both, most Ihanzu still maintain that “tradition” is a good thing, something they actually want. But why is this? What is at stake?

Claims about “tradition,” “culture,” and “identity,” anthropologists have frequently shown, can serve particular class or clan, generation, or gender interests. This is commonly the case, as in the example of Mount Kilimanjaro, where struggling for resources such as land, livestock, and labor is worthwhile (Moore 1986). In such places, what counts as “tradition” is crucially linked to managing one’s livelihood successfully. This is much less the case in Ihanzu, where such terms are not implicated in identity politics in the same way, or to the same extent: Being more “traditional” or more “Ihanzu” than one’s neighbor provides no obvious material benefits, no privileged access to scarce resources. Indeed, in Ihanzu there are no “traditional” resources for which it is worth struggling: matrilineal lands are largely exhausted; there are no “traditional” corporate herd holdings into which people might tap. Nor does anyone benefit materially from asserting a sense of Ihanzuneness to the government, which ignores such “tribal” markers and suggests they are counterproductive to the aspirations of the Tanzanian nation-state. Rather, what is principally at stake regarding Ihanzu desires to link rainmaking, “tradition,” and Ihanzu-ness is the forging of a solid conceptual mooring in an ever changing world. Rainmaking provides Ihanzu men and women with a means to assert meaningful historical continuities with their past, as well as a way to say who they are as a people in the present vis-à-vis the state and church. “Rainmaking,” Ihanzu frequently told me, “is our tradition” (jadi yetu).

When discussing tradition, Ihanzu men and women often imply it is about particular ways of doing things, normally those passed from older to younger generations. People are explicit about what counts as “tradition”—all rainmaking activities including rain witchcraft, divination, building mud and stick houses, cultivating sorghum and millet, hunting with bows and arrows, and herding, among other things. Following from this, certain things are routinely implicated in the category of tradition: royal rain stones and rainmaking medicines, diviners’ medicines, grain crops, livestock, and mud and stick homes.

Certain people and social groupings, too, are explicitly associated with tradition. The two royal leaders and the lineage from which they come stand out as the living embodiments of tradition. By extension, people also claim other members of the royal Anyampanda lineage are “traditional.” It was, according to many, the first group to enter Ihanzu following their long trek from their original (perhaps mythical) homeland on Ukerewe Island. For this
reason, members of the Anyampanda clan are considered more traditional than, say, members of clans that have more recent origins in neighboring Iramba. Rainmaking assistants are associated with tradition, as are members of the local vigilante group (Nkili), and diviners.

Common to all things and persons traditional is their connection to the powers of the ancestral spirits. "Traditional" people carry out their jobs successfully by drawing on the spirits' powers, while the very act of carrying out their jobs convinces the spirits to continue to make such otherworldly powers available to them. Furthermore, given the presumed historical longevity of ancestral powers, locals often present tradition as if it had a certain atemporality to it, harking back, some would say, to the very beginnings of time. Here, ironically, the Ihanzu continue to want tradition—as people the world over do—in precisely those ways anthropologists insist they cannot have it: as a reified, essentialized, atemporal category. "Tradition is what we have always done," people frequently remark. As we shall see, practices sometimes belie this position.

In Ihanzu eyes, modernity is opposed to tradition. Ihanzu see modern things, whether institutions, material artifacts, or types of persons, as relatively recent arrivals. On these grounds, both Christianity and the government are classified as "modern." So, too, are the people implicated in these institutions—preachers, government employees, Europeans, and anthropologists—and, likewise, the "modern" goods and goodies they bring with them.

In discussions about modernity and tradition, men and women stress the mutually exclusive nature of these categories, and the need to keep them separate. In practice, however, this dichotomy between the traditional and the modern is not as unproblematic as Ihanzu women and men routinely imply.

During a 1986 battle over cattle, the agricultural people of Ihanzu, Iramba, and Sukumaland used, to great effect, a certain Sukuma vigilante organization known as Sungusungu against the invading pastoralist Barabaig and Maasai. Immediately after the war, the Ihanzu adopted their own version of this organization, which they call "Nkili." The local government soon recognized Nkili as an appropriate way for villagers to deal with cattle theft. Since its advent, Nkili has expanded its purview considerably, and is now involved in almost anything considered "traditional," that rain witches are identified.

Ordinary villagers, rainmaking assistants, ritual leaders, and the local vigilante group (Nkili) may call such meetings. Government administrators cannot; they may and do organize their own village meetings (shalo ka hathara) for other reasons like discussing tax collection, education, and sanitation. Because rainmaking, rain meetings, and rain witchcraft are seen as "traditional" matters, they have no part in "modern" governmental affairs.

Rain meetings are public, well organized, well attended, and always raise considerable excitement and heated discussion. Villagers who do not attend are often discussed, and sometimes fined, for disregarding such consequential communal matters. During these meetings, anyone who feels he has something to say may stand, in turn, and speak. Others listen silently until the speaker has finished and reseated himself. This process sometimes lasts days, weeks, or even years. During droughts, the same issue may be raised repeatedly throughout the season. While rain meetings ostensibly aim "to discuss the reasons for drought," they nearly always lead to accusations of rain witchcraft.

Some alleged rain witches, it transpires, have been previously vaguely identified through divination. "An Anyampanda clan member from the east is responsible for the drought," went one such oracular pronouncement. Others are accused of engaging in questionable activities. Someone may stand and note, for example, that some person was seen wandering through people's fields at night. Such observances will strike some as odd, plausible, or implausible, and might or might not merit further comment.
The goal is to reach consensus on who is responsible for the drought and how they will be handled so the rain will return. It is rarely obvious beforehand who might be accused of rain witchcraft. Moreover, in my experience, rain meetings do not so much polarize communities but, in true Durkheimian fashion, consolidate them. This is not so surprising when one considers what is at stake: returning the rain, expunging evil, and, with that, regenerating the Ihanzu moral community.

The format of rain meetings—usually lengthy, always heated—ensures accusations are guided more by public concerns than personal animosities. Accusations result not from structural or underlying interpersonal tensions, but, rather, from a generalized fear; a fear that, faced with no rain, there is an all-pervasive evil at work within Ihanzu society. Naturally, some accusations in these meetings are motivated by personal disputes, but people generally recognize this and act accordingly. As cases drag on in the public eye week after week, month after month, or even year after year, accusations come to follow more neatly expected stereotypes of who might conceivably bewitch the rain. Accusations that do not fit the mold are eventually dismissed. As with witch-cleansing rites reported elsewhere, “stereotypes are more likely to inform actual behavior when a community, rather than an individual, feels threatened” (Abrahams 1994:21). Under such circumstances, men and women have ample opportunity to reflect on who is capable of bewitching the rain, and to consider their possible motives. As we shall now see, accusations of rain witchcraft that hold sway are those in which the accused are heavily implicated in “tradition” and its trappings.

**Case 1**

This case involves a middle-aged woman by the name of Mwajuma, a member of the royal Anyampanda lineage. She is the reigning female rainmaker’s sister’s daughter and is next in line of succession to this royal office. As such, she reputedly possesses some of the ritual knowledge of rainmaking. Under no circumstances can she currently use this knowledge, not legitimately anyway.

Mwajuma grew up in Kirumi. She moved to her husband’s village on marrying. When, in the 1980s, she divorced, Mwajuma, now with two young children, returned to Kirumi to live and farm with her mother. In 1992 her mother died. Mwajuma remained in Kirumi. She is relatively poor, though not any worse off than scores of other villagers; she has no livestock and, in the years I knew her, a virtually empty grain store. There is nothing particularly unusual in Ihanzu about poor, female-headed households like hers; many women find themselves in this situation.

Mwajuma is well liked. However, she is rumored to be lazy: People say her farming skills, in particular, leave much to be desired. It thus surprised few when, in early January 1994, she was mentioned at a village rain meeting as a potential rain witch. An elderly man claimed that rather than farming, Mwajuma had been wandering the village telling people secretly that should she be given beer and grain, because she could bring rain. Others stood and publicly confirmed the allegations. She reputedly bewitched the rain by pretending she had the powers to bring it. Making patently false claims about one’s abilities to control the weather, people say, angers the royal spirits who may subsequently stop the rain.

Mwajuma, who was present, remained silent. The reigning female rainmaker spoke privately with Mwajuma for nearly an hour. Mwajuma later told me she had promised no longer to claim she could bring the rain. But the story does not end there.

The following season Mwajuma did not farm at all—a fact that escaped no one’s attention. Villagers worried. Mwajuma, the rumors began, would be jealous of others’ harvests, or their potential harvests. She might thus bewitch the rain, people said. Villagers scheduled another rain meeting. Two days before the meeting, Mwajuma hastily moved with her children to neighboring Mbulu District, only returning to Ihanzu the following year.

It is important to note that while Mwajuma’s accusations were brought about by her lack of enthusiasm for farming, this fact alone does not explain the accusations. The same season, in the same village, a not-so-well-off elderly man of the Anyisungu clan—a clan of “less-traditional” Iramba origin—similarly failed to farm his small parcel of land. Everyone remarked on this. But no one much cared. He was never accused as a potential rain witch. People felt that this man, jealous or not, posed no threat to the weather.

Mwajuma’s case shows that members of the royal lineage are accused of rain witchcraft. This is as true for reigning royalties as it is for those like Mwajuma, who stand in the required genealogical position eventually to take ritual office. It is also true for other members of the royal lineage who are guilty, at least potentially, by association. As the next case shows, the net is cast wider still, as certain nonroyals are also regularly accused.

**Case 2**

In late January and early February 1995, several rain meetings took place in Kirumi to deal with an alleged rain witch named Luketo. An elderly, married man of the Anyambilu clan, Luketo is of average wealth. Prior to his accusation, he owned five cows, some goats, and farmed two small plots. He generally gets on well with people. Crucially, having been a rainmaking assistant for over 25 years, he is one of the three most senior rainmaking assistants in Ihanzu. People therefore expect he knows a great deal about rainmaking.

Luketo’s problems began when other rainmaking assistants thought that some rain stones had gone missing from the rain shrine. Because Luketo was the last to leave the shrine the day before, he became the obvious suspect.
Before going public, a diviner was consulted, who confirmed that Luketo was allegedly trying to sabotage the rain by pilfering rain stones from the rain shrine. A rain meeting was called in Kirumi for the following day. Luketo was summoned.

Because ordinary villagers cannot enter the rain shrine, the rain stone theft proved impossible to verify. Even the rainmaking assistants disagreed about the exact number of stones in the shrine. But, whatever the case, the chicken oracle had already confirmed Luketo’s guilt.

Villagers demanded that Luketo return the missing rain stone(s)—and fast. Luketo, who sat alone, head hung low, in the middle of the hostile crowd, said this would be quite impossible, since he had not taken them. His denials fuelled tempers: “We’re very late farming this year!” yelled one middle-aged man. “Just return the rain stones,” snapped another.

For three excruciating days this continued. On the third day, showing signs of severe duress, Luketo admitted he had bewitched the rain by stealing stones. He agreed to pay a fine to appease the spirits. A recount of the rain-stones supposedly upped the number by one, further proof, I was told, of Luketo’s guilt: By mundane or magical means, he had obviously returned the stone during the night. Luketo, all agreed, should keep his job but be more closely supervised. He was fined three cows and three goats for his offence.

As this example shows, one need not be a member of the royal clan to be accused of rain witchcraft. Those who have privileged access to the ultimate source of traditional powers are also in danger of being accused. Three other rainmaking assistants similarly fell victim to rain-witchcraft accusations during my time in Ihanzu.

Case 3
In 1994, the Nyaha village commander of the Nkili vigilante group was accused of rain witchcraft. The commander is from a nonroyal clan, and is, by all counts, wealthy, both in livestock and money.

During a rain meeting in Nyaha, a chicken oracle told the commander that he had caused the rain to stop. This was allegedly because of an outstanding two-cow debt the commander had to a powerful Sukuma diviner who, in turn, was angered and, thus, used his powers to stop the rain. The commander was absent during these revelations but was summoned to another rain meeting later that week. He agreed that, months earlier, he had visited a Sukuma diviner. But, he said in his defense, he had already paid all outstanding debts.

Villagers persisted. Threats about what might happen to the commander should he continue to lie were only thinly veiled. The commander, a shrewd man, eventually agreed to (re)pay the diviner. And to pay a fine. In total, he paid four cows and Sh10,000 (about US$30), a small fraction of his total worth. I will have more to say about this case below. First, let us consider a final case, the long-running saga of Kingu the diviner that opened this article.

Case 4
Kingu is an elderly man of the Anyambeu clan, who has, for many years, resided in eastern Ihanzu. As a diviner (muganga), he is one of the best. His expertise is widely acknowledged, though for some years now villagers have been dubious about the precise nature of his work.

Kingu’s difficulties began in 1989 when he fell ill. Because diviners are thought incapable of diagnosing themselves, Kingu visited another diviner, as is common. The diviner told Kingu he would need to carry out an ancestral offering at a certain tree on Kingu’s plot, and to do so annually to appease the spirits. Although highly unusual, Kingu’s ancestral spirits, said the diviner, resided in the tree. Kingu immediately carried out the offering, tying the sacrificial sheepskin around the tree as instructed. He fully recovered. The rains, too, were plentiful that year.

By 1991, Kingu had abandoned his annual offerings. Very little rain fell in his village that year. Kingu was called to a series of rain meetings to explain. Villagers demanded that Kingu make an offering to appease the possibly angry spirits. Kingu refused. He said that he had no sheep (which was true) and that villagers treated him poorly (a point people contested). Why should he do anything for them?

When drought again visited that village in 1992 and 1993, villagers began asking further questions about the real nature of Kingu’s offering. Could it be rain witchcraft? Some villagers organized one night to chop down Kingu’s tree. They failed, for fear of his medicine/witchcraft and the probable wrath of the spirits. Only Kingu, they said, could remove his own witchcraft.

In 1994 villagers demanded that Kingu fell his tree. Obstinate as ever, Kingu refused. They accused him of bewitching the rain. Kingu did nothing to refute the allegation. At a few points, in fact, he even insinuated that he had stopped the rain on purpose because, as he said, people mistreated him. Once again villagers mobilized to chop down his tree but again decided against it. At another meeting, Kingu was told to leave the village. He refused. When last I visited Ihanzu in 2001, Kingu was still residing in his village. His tree still stood, the rotting sheepskin from his original 1989 offering defiantly dangling from it.

DISCUSSION
These rain witchcraft cases are emblematic of the 21 I sat through while in Ihanzu, and of dozens more I recorded from years past. They also, I believe, exemplify Ihanzu thinking on rain witchcraft. Collectively they raise several issues. First, personal wealth plays little or no role in rain witchcraft accusations. People of poor, average, and wealthy standing may be, and are, regularly accused of ruining the rain through witchcraft. Nor is gender a decisive
factor. I know of many women, not just Mwajuma (Case 1), suspected of bewitching the rain. What the accused do have in common is their varied but well-known associations with "tradition."

The accused fall into three broad categories. First are ritual leaders, those whose job it is to bring rain. Those with the knowledge of bringing rain are equally capable of withholding it. As is common elsewhere on the continent, intimate knowledge of traditional power may be used for good or ill (Feieiman 1990; Gottlieb 1989:254ff; Hauenstein 1967; Kiterenze 1980:43; Schapera 1971:99). By extension, since they may share some rainmaking secrets, all members of the royal lineage or clan may be plausibly accused of rain witchcraft. Most of the rain witchcraft cases in Ihanzu that have come to my attention, like Case 1, involve royal Anyampanda clan members. The second discernible category of people includes those with legitimate (or sometimes illegitimate) access to esoteric rainmaking knowledge, but who are not necessarily royal clan members themselves. Here we find rainmaking assistants. These men possess some knowledge about bringing rain and are therefore well positioned to ruin it. Third are those with privileged access to ancestral powers and so-called traditional institutions only peripherally related to rainmaking. These include office-holding members of the local vigilante group, Nkili (Case 3), as well as diviners like Kingu (Case 4). It is these people's access to, and control over, traditional ancestral powers that allows for their plausible accusations. Diviners and senior Nkili members allegedly know far more about matters medicinal and other-worldly powers of tradition than average villagers.

The point worth stressing is that all those accused of rain witchcraft are, in Ihanzu eyes, deeply implicated in "tradition." All have privileged access to and control over the powers of the ancestral otherworld. The fact that these people, and not others, are regularly accused suggests villagers are practically evoking and reflecting on a conceptual package they envisage as tradition. Hence, the process of identifying rain witches in Ihanzu leads not only to imposing fines on people and their occasional expulsion but also provides men and women with a public forum—an imaginative, generative space of sorts—in which they actively mark out and negotiate tradition's conceptual terrain. And "negotiate" is key: Recall that the local vigilante group, Nkili, was only recently added to the repertoire of things traditional. Prior to 1986, a rain witchcraft accusation against the now-commander (Case 3) would have been most unlikely. The commander's unfortunate fate implies that villagers now agree, at least for the moment, with what many told me: that Nkili is "traditional." All told, Ihanzu rain witchcraft trials are highly creative sites in which collective imaginings of tradition are regenerated and reconfirmed through public accusations.

Before going further, we must revisit a crucial point about Ihanzu imaginings of tradition—that they simultaneously evoke modernity. This is because the Ihanzu frame tradition and modernity as conceptual opposites. For this reason, it is instructive to note that those not generally accused of rain witchcraft—government servants, shopkeepers, police, and the like—are those most closely associated with modernity as locally conceived. To be sure, such people are frequently suspected of practicing other sorts of witchcraft, like that used to gain and maintain material wealth and political advantage, as well as to destroy them (Sanders 1999b, in press). This witchcraft (also called "ulogi") operates in the "modern" sector and people claim it is distinct from "traditional" rain witchcraft. Different witchcrafts for different things. So-called modern people are differently situated concerning traditional power structures and struggles. To assert one's connection to tradition and traditional powers is to open up the possibility of that power's abuse. To deny such connections quickly renders the possibility, at the very least, extremely unlikely.

In discussing rain witchcraft, there is another way modernity comes into play: because the tradition-modernity dichotomy, though today pervasive, is itself the product of the colonial imagination. Recall that it was colonials and Christians, not Ihanzu, who gave form and value to these categories. The very category of "tradition," as many scholars have noted, is itself the ideological product of modernity. Thus, insofar as Ihanzu rain witchcraft conjures tradition, and tradition conjures modernity, Ihanzu rain witchcraft is categorically part of modernity. Thinking about one requires thinking about the other. But does seeing rain witchcraft and ethnic identity as facets of tradition therefore not simply attest to the pervasiveness and persuasiveness of modernity's ideological claims? Simply stated, by speaking to tradition, is Ihanzu rain witchcraft not really speaking to modernity after all?

Not exactly. For adopting a dominant discourse is not the same as critiquing it. Speaking in terms of "tradition" and "modernity" says nothing of the moral evaluation of either category. Ihanzu rain witchcraft is patently part of modernity. It is not about modernity. By commenting primarily on tradition, rain witchcraft comments on modernity only by saying what it is not. The process of defining tradition provides necessary but not sufficient conditions for making sense of local forms of modernity. Much less does it offer any sustained critique of modernity.

In many contexts, in fact, Ihanzu today actively covet rather than criticize modernity. Like peoples everywhere, they want "the indigenization of modernity, their own cultural space in the global scheme of things" (Sahlins 1999:410). This is not to say that the Ihanzu find modernity entirely unproblematic, for they do not. What's more, sometimes they even express their discontent through witchcraft—just not rain witchcraft (see Sanders 1999b, 2001a, in press). My point is simply that the Ihanzu are seeking a meaningful modernity, a modernity on their own terms. For them, as for many, this implies the ongoing negotiation of modernity and tradition (Sahlins 1993:20). As I hope to have demonstrated, Ihanzu rain witchcraft
plays a pivotal role—albeit a one-sided role—in these negotiations.

The foregoing discussion raises several broader issues. Most immediately, it suggests that the topic of "tradition" is worthy of analytic attention in Africa and beyond (Bernal 1994; Errington and Gewertz 1996; Gable 2000; Guyer 1996; Kahn 1993; Kratz 1993). This is not because it represents a bygone era—it does not—but because it appears, with globalization, to become more salient and more uniform in its structure. "Tradition" is today being commodified in similar ways the world over, often linked to both the conceptualization and politics of difference. It is in this sense that "tradition" is becoming different in uniform ways: vastly different in contents, but isomorphically similar in its conceptualization as "local," "authentic," "unchanging," and so on. As such, "tradition" cannot be ignored, practically or analytically.

Secondly, scholars need not shy away from linking "tradition" to "witchcraft," even if broader disciplinary concerns—concerns with de-Otherizing the Other; with critiquing the West; with valorizing and portraying Others as active subjects—hint that we might be wise to do so. Naturally, linking witchcraft and tradition does require careful attention to the issue of representation, to avoid reinscribing the very notions of "primitiveness," "irrationality," et cetera, that we seek to dismantle. But this is no reason to give up the game altogether.

Above all else, in making sense of African witchcraft, we cannot succumb to theoretical somnambulism. While in many places and many cases, the witchcraft-critiques-modernity thesis gives us additional theoretical purchase over the postcolonial African worlds we seek to describe, we must guard against pregiven answers for what "African witchcraft" must mean. These are empirical not theoretical questions, and remain to be demonstrated rather than assumed. Underscoring this point is all the more crucial just now, at a time when scholars working in, say, East Java, are just beginning to argue that witchcraft and witchcraft attacks "can be understood as an expression of the tensions and contradictions of globalisation and social transformation" (Campbell and Conner 2000:88). Bearing in mind anthropology's longstanding interest in witchcraft, and the varied ways we have made sense of it over the years, we would do well to remind ourselves that the answers we provide today are, as ever, partial and provisional.

This article has argued that Ihanzu rain witchcraft speaks more to tradition than to modernity. In passing, I have mentioned other types of Ihanzu witchcraft that speak more directly to modernity. Yet the real world, as anthropologists are fond of saying, is far more complicated. There are still other Ihanzu witchcrafts (like "love magic," to name one) that by local reckoning have little or nothing to do with "tradition" or "modernity." The Ihanzu have many witchcrafts that speak to many things. My hunch is that they are hardly alone here.

For some time now, anthropologists have been keen on turning singulars into plurals. Culture long ago become culture-s. Similarly, modernity has recently become modern-ities (Comaroff and Comaroff 1993a; Eisenstadt 2000); capitalism, capitalism-s (Blim 1996; Gibson-Graham 1996); socialism, socialism-s (Hann 1993); and now globalism, globalism-s (Tsing 2000). It is not just for fun, of course, that anthropologists do such things. Nor are we simply being mischiefous. Instead, the intention is, and always has been, to nuance further those ever elusive "social facts" we study. Unitary visions, it appears, sit uneasily in our contemporary world where fragmentation, heterogeneity, and a decided distaste for master narratives are all the rage—as well they should be. It is here, at this particular analytic juncture, that we anthropologists might seriously consider working our disciplinary magic on "African witchcraft" and "the African witch," and turn singulars into plurals. No longer, I submit, can we allow one to stand in for many.

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**NOTES**

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1. Fieldwork was carried out from August 1993–May 1995, July–September 1999, and July–August 2001.

2. These studies rarely conceive of "modernity" in singular, monocultural terms. Rather, modernity is multifaceted and varies in different geographic and historical settings, following no single trajectory. See the special issues of *Daedalus* (2000, vol. 129, no. 1) and *Public Culture* (1999, vol. 11, no. 1).


4. Documenting witchcraft's historical trajectories is no simple feat. While some authors report an actual rise in witchcraft accusations and beliefs (Colson 2000:341), others focus instead on local experiences of an increase (Comaroff and Comaroff 1999, 2000:316, in press; Geschiere 2000:19; Moore and Sanders 2001). The idea that witchcraft increases with novel political and economic arrangements is not new (e.g., Richards 1935:458–460), though it is sometimes presented as though it were.

on consumption and the economy, see Apter 1993; Geschiere 1992; Geschiere and Koning 1993; Masquelier 1999, 2000, 2002; Parish 2001; Sanders 1999b, 2001a, 2001b; Shaw 1997; on sport, see Rower 2002; and on the popular press and cinema, see Bastian 1993, 2001; Meyer 1999.

6. While some have argued for the modernity of witchcraft, others have demonstrated the witchcraft of modernity by exploring witchcraft-by-any-other-name phenomena found in the West: moral panics and satanic child abuse in Europe and the United States (Comaroff 1997; La Fontaine 1998), the role of spin doctors in U.S. politics (Geschiere 1998b), and conspiracy theories in the United States and elsewhere (Harding and Stewart in press; Sanders and West in press).

7. "Ihanzu" is what locals call the land on which they live, while the term used to describe themselves—Anyithanzu—means simply the "people of Ihanzu."

8. The male ritual leader was also a government chief until 1962 when the office was abolished. The female ritual leader was never officially recognized, though she has nonetheless played an important ritual role for as far back as oral histories and written records take us (Adam 1963; Kohl-Larsen 1943:290).

9. By "rainmaker" I mean those people thought capable of controlling the weather legitimately and to positive ends.


11. These rain offerings are virtually identical to those conducted for personal illness (ipolyo la ndwala). For examples of the latter, see Obst 1912:115–117, Adam 1963:21–23, and Sanders 1999a.


14. The Ihanzu do not differentiate linguistically between witchcraft and sorcery; both are called "ulogi.

15. While rain witches allegedly benefit by producing grain for home consumption, I have never heard of them benefitting by selling grain on the market, which in any case would be impossible in this region, given the lack of markets and infrastructure.


17. This figure is based on a random survey I conducted in 1994 in households in four villages (23 subvillages) in October 1994.

18. This profoundly rocked Ihanzu, not because anyone cared much about the chiefship, but because people feared the new government would prohibit the "chief" from making rain (Adam 1963:15). The new government turned a blind eye to rainmaking.

19. For more on Sukuma Sungusungu vigilante groups see Abrahams 1987 and Feisher 2000.

20. Infamous rain witches are generally remembered, and I have recorded the details of numerous such cases, some dating to the early 1930s. Between 1993 and 1995, I attended 21 such cases. Although the Africanist literature is replete with references to rain witchcraft, there are few sustained analyses on the topic.

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