Migration and development: reconciling opposite views

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Abstract

In this essay, I review opposite positions on the relationship between migration and the socio-economic development of sending countries and regions, and the theoretical schools that underlie each of them. In order to adjudicate between these competing perspectives, it is necessary to distinguish between the human capital composition of different migrant flows, their duration, and their structural significance and change potential. This theoretical discussion culminates in a typology that seeks to clarify under which conditions migration can have developmental effects and under which it will be contrary to the advancement of home communities and countries. Policy implications of this analysis, in particular the role of governments in sending and receiving nations, are examined.

Keywords: Transnationalism; circular migration; brain drain; remittances; national development.

Debates and research on consequences of contemporary South–North migration have been overwhelmingly focused on the impact migration has on the nations and localities at the receiving end. Much less attention has been paid to the effects of such movements on the countries left behind. The general view among analysts and the public is that out-migration should be good for sending countries because of the safety valve to poverty and unemployment that it provides and, above all, because of the river of remittances sent by expatriates which contributes significantly to the survival of families and the financial stability of sending nations (Diaz-Briquets and Weintraub 1991; Massey et al. 1998; Guarnizo 2003).

Arrayed against these optimistic views are a number of global South scholars who have become fierce critics of out-migration and its consequences for their nations. From their point of view, migration is
not only a symptom of underdevelopment, but a cause of it, as it depopulates entire regions, turns sending families from producers into rentiers, and allows governments to escape their responsibilities by relying on migrant remittances. Such views have been summarized in a number of public documents, of which perhaps the best known is the 2005 ‘Declaration of Cuernavaca’:

The development model adopted in the immense majority of labor-exporting American countries has not generated opportunities for growth nor economic or social development. On the contrary, it has meant the emergence of regressive dynamics; unemployment and job precarization; loss of qualified workers; productive disarticulation and stagnation; inflation and greater economic dependency. As a consequence, we experience a convergence between depopulation and the abandonment of productive activities in areas of high emigration.

(Delgado-Wise and Covarrubias 2006)

How can we reconcile these opposing views? On the one hand, we have governments of sending nations pleading with the United States and Western European countries to let their nationals in and not to deport them, so that they can continue sending remittances. On the other hand, development experts from the same countries denounce the very same outflows as inimical to the national interest. Adjudicating between these opposite views requires us to make several practical and conceptual distinctions in order to separate disparate phenomena obscured under blanket statements:

1. Between the **structural importance** of migration flows and their **change potential**; the latter being a subset of the former.
2. Between high human capital flows and those composed primarily of manual workers.
3. Between cyclical or temporary flows and permanent or quasi-permanent migrations.

The first distinction calls attention to the possibility that out-migration acquires structural importance for sending nations not by developing them, but precisely by consolidating entrenched elites inimical to their development. The ‘safety valve’ function of large outflows and the role of remittances in buttressing public finances play a role in this process: they do not change the institutional underpinnings of economic stagnation and social inequality, but can actually perpetuate them. This is, in part, the reason why, as critics of migration argue, there are no documented instances in which such movements have actually lifted sending countries out of poverty and a
subordinate position in the global system (Reichert 1981; Castles 2004; Delgado-Wise 2004).

In turn, the change potential of migration does not always yield effects conducive or congruent with developmental goals. Migration-induced social change is not always for the better. To see these differences more clearly, it is best to organize the discussion on the basis of the second distinction, namely that between manual and high human capital flows. The two movements possess different dynamics, although, as we shall see, their potential contribution to sending countries’ economic and social development hinges largely on the same set of factors.

Manual labour international migration

The mass migration of peasants and workers out of the global South and into wealthy nations is what critics of these flows commonly have in mind. Despite sustained criticism by nativists in host nations, these movements can play a significant positive role in their economies by, among other effects, compensating for a declining and ageing population and meeting demand in labour-intensive sectors such as agriculture, construction, and low-tech industries (Bean and Stevens 2003; Portes and Rumbaut 2006, ch. 3). Two economic schools have generally favoured the onset and continuation of these flows. The first is the orthodox economic position, associated with the classic studies of Brinley Thomas (1973) and W. Arthur Lewis (1959). It sees these movements as natural equilibrating mechanisms between labour-surplus regions, where the marginal productivity of labour is near zero, and those where it can be put to productive use. Migration helps both regions by allowing productive investments in receiving areas, while helping raise wages in sending ones (Todaro 1976).

The second school is the ‘New Economics of Migration’, which also takes a positive stance toward such flows, but for different reasons. They are seen as a functional alternative to imperfect credit and futures markets in sending rural areas and as insurance against unforeseen economic downturns. The migrant worker functions, in a sense, as his family’s social security and credit card all rolled into one (Stark 1984, 1991). For this school, migrants’ remittances always have positive effects in sending economies because they stimulate demand which is met by domestic production. Massey et al. (1987, 1998), for example, argue that every ‘migradollar’ sent by Mexicans in the United States generates a $2.90 contribution to Mexico’s gross national product (GNP). Supporters of these theories also tend to stress the role of social networks in maintaining the continuity of cross-border labour flows: knowledge of others who have previously undertaken the
journey represents the prospective migrant’s ‘social capital’, as it lowers the costs and the uncertainty of the enterprise.

Yet, authors of this school tend to neglect another and less positive consequence of social networks, namely that the cumulative processes of out-migration that they facilitate may end up emptying sending areas of their able-bodied population and weakening their productive structures. In the end, there would be few people to send remittances to and nowhere to make productive investments. Places of out-migration can thus become ‘ghost towns’ or ‘tinsel towns’, decorated once a year for the patron saints’ festivities, but otherwise populated only by the old and the infirm. Already, close to 50 per cent of Mexico’s municipalities report having lost population during the last intercensal period (Delgado-Wise and Covarrubias 2006).

Whether social networks structure migrant flows in ways conducive or contrary to local and national development depends ultimately on the timing of these movements. Cyclical flows, where migrant workers spend a certain time abroad but eventually return to their towns and families, tend to produce the positive developmental outcomes described by the ‘New Economics’ school: families stay put, their consumption generates positive spinoff effects, and migrants’ accumulated savings can be put to use productively in local economies. Permanent out-migrations tend to have the opposite effects. These are the movements that can depopulate townships and entire regions. Migrant workers who settle abroad take their families with them, thus weakening the incentive to continue sending remittances or making investments at home. The economic focus shifts in the direction of surviving and moving ahead in the host society (Cornelius 1998a; Lopez and Stanton-Salazar 2001). Not incidentally, children raised abroad by poor migrant families experience all the disadvantages of a strange culture and language plus poor schooling, without many countervailing resources. The result is a process of ‘segmented assimilation’ in which many second generation youths end up assimilating into the lowest rungs of the host society, associated with gangs, violence, and the pervasive presence of the drug trade. Such youths are lost not only to their country of origin, but to their families and to themselves (Vigil 2002; Portes, Fernandez-Kelly and Haller 2005; Telles and Ortiz 2008).

**Transnational communities**

The sole silver lining in the consolidation of permanent expatriate settlements is the rise and growth of transnational organizations linking these settlements with areas of out-migration. It is a fact supported by hundreds of studies that migrants do not simply ‘leave’; instead they maintain intense ties both with their families and with
their communities left behind. The concept of ‘transnationalism’ has been coined to refer to this intense traffic of communication, information, and resources across places of origin and destination (Vertovec 2004). The research literature has also established that the immigrants most likely to take part in these organizations and activities are not the most recent arrivals, but those better established and with a more solid economic position in the host countries (Portes, Haller and Guarnizo 2002; Guarnizo, Portes and Haller 2003; Portes, Escobar and Walton Radford 2007).

Established first generation immigrants create organizations of the most varied kind – from hometown committees to civic associations and branches of home country political parties. Tables 1 and 2 reproduce findings from a recent national survey of organizations created by Colombian, Dominican and Mexican expatriates in the United States. The first table is an inventory of all such organizations by type which documents their notable diversity. The second table presents data on the membership of these organizations which again

Table 1. Latin immigrant organizations in the United States by type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National origin</th>
<th>Colombian %</th>
<th>Dominican %</th>
<th>Mexican %</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic/cultural organizations</td>
<td>47.30</td>
<td>30.00</td>
<td>6.82</td>
<td>16.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other cultural organizations</td>
<td>10.16</td>
<td>15.29</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>3.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic organizations</td>
<td>4.44</td>
<td>2.35</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>1.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hometown associations</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>3.53</td>
<td>63.80</td>
<td>47.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federations of hometown associations</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>4.26</td>
<td>3.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State-of-origin associations</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>8.68</td>
<td>6.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International philanthropic organizations (Lions, Rotaries, Kiwanis)</td>
<td>6.98</td>
<td>3.53</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home country philanthropies</td>
<td>3.17</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political committees</td>
<td>7.93</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>2.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional associations</td>
<td>8.89</td>
<td>14.12</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>3.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious groups</td>
<td>1.59</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social service agencies</td>
<td>2.86</td>
<td>17.06</td>
<td>3.26</td>
<td>4.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports groups</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>1.76</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>7.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student organizations</td>
<td>3.81</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>1.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N</strong></td>
<td>315</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>1,290</td>
<td>1,775</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Comparative Immigrant Organization Project (CIOP). For a detailed description of this survey, see Portes, Escobar and Arana (2008).
demonstrate that they are composed primarily of older, better established, and more educated migrants.

Transnational organizations engage in a variety of philanthropic and civic activities in their home localities and regions which, to a certain extent, ameliorate the negative effects of permanent out-migration. They have been referred to as a form of ‘globalization from below’ through which poor people seek to mitigate the growing inequalities and lack of opportunity foisted on them by capitalist-driven ‘globalization from above’ (Portes and DeWind 2004). Remittances to families, philanthropic contributions to towns, and public works planned and funded by transnational organizations are all forms in which ‘globalization from below’ takes place (Itzigsohn et al. 1999; Landolt 2001; Smith 2005).

Table 2. Characteristics of members of Latin immigrant organizations in the United States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Colombian</th>
<th>Dominican</th>
<th>Mexican</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 years or less, %</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 years or more, %</td>
<td>53.2</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>48.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than high school, %</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>20.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College degree or more, %</td>
<td>52.3</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>45.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual laborer, %</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>40.1</td>
<td>26.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional/business owner, %</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>50.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge of English:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very little, %</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Well or very well, %</td>
<td>64.2</td>
<td>49.7</td>
<td>60.9</td>
<td>58.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal status:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does not have entry visa, %</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US citizen, %</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>49.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of US residence:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 5 years, %</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 years or more, %</td>
<td>68.9</td>
<td>66.8</td>
<td>69.5</td>
<td>69.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average trips to home country for organizational matters:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never or rarely, %</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At least three trips a year, %</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Transnationalism, however, is not a panacea and does not completely neutralize the negative effects of permanent out-migration. This is so for three reasons. First, as depopulation of sending regions advances, there are less kin to send remittances to and less economic infrastructure to build on. For migrant resources to be invested productively, there must be ‘something’ that they can return to. Otherwise, no investments can be made or they would be of the purely symbolic kind, building the ‘tinsel towns’ for the annual festivities, but without any effective developmental potential (Fitzgerald 2000; Portes, Escobar and Walton Radford 2007).

Second, regardless of migrants’ good intentions, the resources that they can commit to developmental projects are modest. Recall that labour migrants are former peasants and workers and that their wages in the host labour market are low (Cornelius 1998b). While some may become successful entrepreneurs, the mass of their pooled contributions can have significant positive effects in their hometowns, but very limited effects at the regional and, especially, national levels (Landolt, Autler and Baires 1999; Portes, Haller and Guarnizo 2002). This is another form of saying that expatriate communities cannot be counted on to develop sending nations, either through their remittances or through their philanthropic activities.

Third, active transnational activism is, by and large, a one-generation phenomenon. While, as shown by the research literature, it strengthens with the consolidation of migrants’ economic and legal position in the host society, their offspring cannot be counted on to continue these activities or, at least, carry them on with the same level of fervour (Haller and Landolt 2005). The power of assimilative forces generally leads to a reorientation of the second generation toward their lives and prospects in what is now their country, to the detriment of the transnational concerns and goals of their parents (Fernandez-Kelly and Konczal 2005). The level of commitment to transnational activism may thus be portrayed as a bell curve moving along with the passage of time: low at arrival; increasing with the consolidation of the first generation; and declining with the passage of that generation from the scene and the arrival of the second. Figure 1 graphically portrays the process.

For these reasons, transnationalism can be regarded as, at best, a palliative for the deleterious effects of permanent population loss in sending nations. While cyclical flows might be counted upon to make a significant contribution to development, the demographic and economic consequences of permanent departures lead, on balance, in the opposite direction. Although it is true that mass out-migration can have structural significance in helping consolidate the power of dominant classes in sending nations, this result is not conducive, for reasons already given, to developmental transformation. Despite the
rise of transnational organizations and activism, the overall change potential of permanent settlement abroad is not positive either, since these contributions cannot match, in the long term, the hollowing out effect of such movement.

**The migration of professionals**

Manual labour migrations are not the only type of economically-driven population movements in the global economy. The same wealthy societies that generate demand at the bottom of their labour markets also do so at the top. These increasingly information-driven societies require foreign-trained talent to supplement their domestic professional and technical labour pools. The information technology revolution in the United States, centred in California’s Silicon Valley,
generated a vast demand for engineers, computer scientists, and programmers, which American universities by themselves could not supply (Saxenian 2006). The deficit has been covered by importing talent.

Recognizing this need, the US Congress created in 1990 the H1B visa programme under which highly skilled professionals can be hired for temporary work in the United States. The visa and work permits are issued for a maximum of three years, renewable for another three. In practice, many ‘H1B workers’ eventually manage to shift their status to permanent residents. In 1990, the authorized ceiling for this programme was 65,000. Successive congressional acts increased the figure, which reached 195,000 in 2002. In 2003, 360,498 H1B permits were issued to professional foreign workers and their families, and by 2006 the figure had increased to 431,853. Principal specialty areas represented among these temporary immigrants include computer science, engineering, and information technologies. Emerging Third World countries such as India and China are the principal sources of this inflow, followed by large Latin American countries such as Colombia and Mexico, and by countries of the Commonwealth, mainly Canada (Office of Immigration Statistics 2004; 2008).

Dubbed ‘brain drain’ in sending countries, professional outflows can be examined through the same theoretical lens used for the analysis of labour migrations. Neoclassical economists view these movements as natural equilibrium-restoring mechanisms between low-wage and high-wage countries, the latter being able to better reward workers according to their productivity (Borjas 1989, 1990). The neoclassical approach is contradicted by the fact that professional out-migrations do not generally originate in the poorest countries, where salary differentials are at a maximum, but in emerging mid-income and even developed countries where such differentials are much lower. In addition, the theory is unable to explain why most professionals in sending countries do not migrate, despite being exposed to the same wage differentials (Oteiza 1971; Portes and Rumbaut 2006, ch. 2).

While the ‘New Economics of Migration’ school has not explicitly addressed the topic of professional outflows, its key concept of ‘relative deprivation’ can be readily applied to correct the shortcomings of the neoclassical analysis: professionals at risk of moving abroad are those subject to high levels of relative deprivation. This situation can come about in two ways: first, if their incomes are not high enough to allow them a middle-class life, according to local standards – in these cases, it is not the invidious comparison with higher incomes abroad, but with those earned by other professionals at home which can create a powerful incentive to move abroad (Oteiza 1971; Portes and Ross 1976); and second, if their training is so superior to local employment opportunities that they see their chances for
professional development as seriously compromised. In these cases, the point of reference is professionals in First World countries, not because of their incomes, but because of their much better working conditions (Alarcon 1999).

A third theoretical perspective, world-system analysis, can be invoked to provide a broader context to the relative deprivation hypothesis. The operative concept in this case is ‘structural imbalancing’ (Portes and Walton 1981, ch. 2; Sassen 1988), which denotes how the cultural and technological penetration by advanced nations into less developed ones ends up compromising the chances of the latter to create and retain pools of domestic talent. Schematically, the process runs as follows: professional standards and training practices are disseminated from the core nations to the rest of the world and are readily copied by emerging countries aiming to ‘catch up’ with the West. Young professionals trained according to these ‘First World’ standards look for occupational opportunities that allow them to put their advanced skills to use and to develop them further. Unfortunately, such opportunities are scarce in the local economy, with the result that many experience rising relative deprivation. In the interim, high-tech firms and universities in the advanced world experience scarcities of domestic talent and seek to supplement it by recruiting abroad. Naturally, the first place to look is among well trained labour pools created by imported professional standards in less developed nations.

The fit between the goals of young professionals experiencing relative deprivation at home and the demand for high human capital abroad sets the stage for the ‘brain drain’. In this manner, poorer countries end up subsidizing the high-tech labour needs of rich ones. Structural imbalancing ensures that the effort of emerging Third World nations to imitate advanced ones is compromised, at every step, by the better fit between talent trained according to the most modern standards and the labour needs of the countries from which these standards emanated in the first place. Figure 2 graphically summarizes the process.

Up until recently, theorizing about determinants and consequences of the brain drain pretty much ended here. However, two developments have added complexity to the picture and, in the process, significantly altered its sombre conclusions. First, temporary professional migration promoted by such legislation as the H1B programme creates strong incentives to return in a relatively short period. While, as noted above, many H1B workers manage to extend their stays, the expectation and reality of the programme are that the majority return, thus creating a cyclical flow. Cyclical professional migration contributes to development in sending nations for the same reasons that cyclical manual labour movements do: returnees bring their new skills
and savings which can be invested productively at home. The extent to which the return flow of professionals pays off depends largely on the existing infrastructure: sending countries that possess a modicum of universities, research centres, and firms able to absorb scientific and technological innovations will obviously be better placed to make use of their professional returnees than those that lack such institutions.

Second, the advent of the transnational perspective to migration studies has modified the lens through which permanent professional
out-migration was previously seen. From a ‘brain drain’ outlook, such flows amounted to a permanent loss for sending countries whose sole recourse was to try to attract their migrants back (Oteiza 1971). However, the discovery that immigrant transnationalism increases with length of residence in host countries and with levels of education leads to the expectation that professional expatriates will be at the forefront of these activities (Guarnizo, Portes and Haller 2003; Portes, Escobar and Walton Radford 2007). Data from recent studies of transnational organizations, including those presented in Table 2, lead to the same conclusion.

Unlike manual labour migrants whose transnational philanthropy leads, at best, to public works and services in their hometowns, a community of professional expatriates can make a significant contribution to the scientific and technological development of their home country. Reasons for doing so are straightforward. In addition to national loyalties and the weight of nostalgia, migrant professionals often have a sense of obligation to the institutions that educated them. When, on the basis of that education, they achieve wealth, security, and status abroad, it is only natural that they seek to repay the debt. Some do so through philanthropic activities; others through transferring information and technology; still others through sponsoring the training of younger colleagues. Professionals who have become successful entrepreneurs abroad may go further and endow their Alma Maters or even found institutions of higher learning and research at home (Saxenian 1999, 2002; Vertovec 2004).

Professional transnationalism has another important facet: unlike manual labour immigrants whose return home is often made difficult by their legal status and modest resources, professionals with a well established position abroad have the option of making their journey cyclical. They can do so because they face no legal difficulties to travel and because they command the necessary resources. Hence, they are able to continue living and working abroad while making investments at home or involving themselves in philanthropic and educational activities there.

The recent research literature on economic transnationalism strongly supports this line of argument. First, surveys show that transnational entrepreneurs are recruited among the better educated and better established members of their respective immigrant communities and, moreover, that they represent the bulk of these communities’ business class (Portes, Haller and Guarnizo 2002; Guarnizo 2003). Second, as the cases of China, India and Israel show, the growth of sizeable expatriate populations of scientists and engineers does not necessarily mean the hollowing out of these countries’ scientific and research institutions, but may energize them through a dense traffic of personnel, resources and ideas. Saxenian (2002; 2006) who studied
these cases in detail attributes the growth of dynamic information technology poles in cities like Bangalore in India, Shanghai in China, and Tel Aviv in Israel to the entrepreneurial initiatives of their professionals abroad.

A word of caution is necessary at this point. The positive developmental potential of settled professional communities abroad depends, as in the case of cyclical migration, on the existence of an infrastructure capable of absorbing technological innovations and investments. For this potential to materialize, sending country governments must be proactive in creating suitable conditions for returnees. These range from reliable property regimes to support of scientific and technological research facilities that can dialogue with professionals abroad and understand the import of what they have to offer. A laissez-faire approach that merely waits for the market to work its ‘magic’ through spontaneous remittances and knowledge transfers will not work. Governments must meet their half of the bargain because, in the absence of suitable conditions that only they can create, the best-intentioned transnational projects cannot succeed. Again, for professional migrants to effectively transform the technical and industrial structures of their home nations, there must be ‘something’ that they can return to.

Figure 3 summarizes the analysis presented so far with a typology of international migration. Its aim is to reconcile opposite positions concerning the role of migration in development, by showing when and under what conditions such flows can make a positive contribution to sending countries and when they will have the opposite effects. The very complexity of these movements ensures that the overall picture will be mixed: some countries have benefited and will continue to benefit greatly from their expatriates, making use of their transfers to transform their productive structures and export capacity; others have used their departure and their remittances merely to perpetuate the existing socio-political order and the rule of dysfunctional elites; in others, the overall balance is still uncertain. Not surprisingly, this opaque picture has given rise to opposite pronouncements. The role of the present typology is to help extract from this complexity the elements that can lead to alternative developmental paths.

**Conclusion**

In conclusion, I would like to return to the first point of the introduction, namely that international migration flows receive far more attention for their real or imagined effects in receiving societies than for their effects in places of origin. Governments of host nations generally follow suit, enacting policies designed to stem or channel the flow according to purely domestic interests with nary a thought about
the implications of these policies for migrant-sending nations. Governments of the latter have not proven much more enlightened, as their interests in migration seldom extend beyond the size and growth of remittances sent by their expatriate communities (Castles 2004). In this context, it has fallen to immigrants themselves to correct the situation by implementing a myriad of transnational activities that seek to connect and reconcile the needs and interests of people living here and there.

As previously noted, this form of globalization from below is by itself insufficient to neutralize the negative developmental consequences of permanent out-migration, but it does point in the right direction. Instead of a zero-sum game, international migration could

![Figure 3. International migration: its types and developmental effects](image-url)
be transformed into a ‘win–win’ process if sending and receiving governments would take active steps in organizing it as a managed labour-transfer programme. Based on the preceding discussion, such managed programmes can be constructed on the basis of five general principles:

1. Cyclical labour flows, both of professionals and of manual workers, are generally preferable to permanent out-migration.
2. The cyclical character of migration should be grounded on a schedule of real incentives in both receiving and sending nations, so that return is voluntary and not coerced.
3. Governments of advanced nations should seek to cooperate with their sending country counterparts in creating the necessary infrastructure of health, education, and investment opportunities for families of migrant workers to remain at home and for migrants to be motivated to return.
4. Similar support should be provided in the construction of scientific and technological facilities which can receive returned migrant professionals and benefit from their knowledge transfers.
5. For migrants who settle permanently abroad, facilities should be created so that they can transform their journey into a cyclical one through transnational investments and philanthropic activities at home.

The best available research evidence shows that there is no contradiction between active transnationalism and successful social and political incorporation of permanent immigrants in host nations. Rather than pay attention to the misguided chorus of nativists and xenophobes, host nation governments could follow science by working along the paths already charted by the self-propelled initiatives of migrant communities themselves. Similarly, instead of worrying exclusively about their balance of payments and flow of remittances, sending country governments should also pursue the same lines of action, guided by the long-term developmental potential of migration rather than its short-term economic consequences. Only in such a fashion will the sorry outcomes witnessed today and poignantly denounced by Third World scholars in documents like the Cuernavaca Declaration give way to a world in which international migration and national development can be mutually supportive.

Note

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