Lines of (F)light: The Visual Apparatus in Foucault and Deleuze
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This paper explores the relationship between cinema and society by taking the point of view that cinema is an example of a Foucauldian social apparatus (dispositif). To assess the extent to which the cinema constitutes a social apparatus, it is important to consider what components are necessary to take into account in their analysis. I argue that social apparatuses comprise more than simply regimes of enunciation. They comprise both discursive and non-discursive dimensions (Shields 1991: 43, Patton 1994: 158). As Deleuze claims, they are ‘machines which make one see and speak’ (1992a: 160). All social apparatuses, from sovereignty to discipline and beyond, feature regimes of light, regimes of enunciation, as well as lines of force that cross between the visible and the utterable and constitute their power dimension (Deleuze 1992a). Each dispositif therefore comprises, firstly, an optical machine. An optical machine consists of lines or planes (plans) of light which structure fields of visibility and invisibility, illuminating some objects and causing others to disappear. Secondly, each apparatus includes a sonorous machine, comprising lines of enunciation, or that which can be enunciated in discourse or uttered in a system of signs. These ‘modes of symbolic expression’ (Patton 1994: 163) function to authenticate or authorize presences and absences in the visual field. Each social apparatus is an audio-visual machine whose specificity lies in its particular regime of light, its style or form of enunciation (that is to say discursive regularities) and finally, in the lines of force which forge links between the seeing and the saying (between situations and responses).

The social apparatus of sovereignty included as its visual apparatus, the scaffold: a raised platform designed to be seen while maintaining the integrity of the ‘staged spectacle’ by keeping spectators at a safe distance (a mechanism to divide and differentiate seeing and scene and to limit participation). At its extreme point of application, the power of the sovereign theatre of force lies in its capacity to segment and distribute the body it targets (Foucault 1977: 227). This act ultimately ends in death. On one hand, sovereignty has a jurisdiction1 which limits it to the power over life and
1. See Shields (1991:44) for more on the judicial, jurisdictional and strategic aspects of the social apparatus.

2. For example, turning criminals into heroes erased the dividing lines which limited popular participation and travestied the established, hierarchical order of bodies and things (See Bakhtin’s [1984] discussion of popular-festive forms).

death: ‘a body destroyed piece by piece by the infinite power of the sovereign constituted not only the ideal, but the real limit of punishment’ (Foucault 1977: 50). On the other hand, sovereign power has to be seen to be effective. It also has a strategic function: ‘an execution that was known to be taking place, but which did so in secret, would scarcely have any meaning’ (Foucault 1977: 57-8). It is by way of the spectacular, public marking of the body that sovereignty displays its capacity to unite sonorous and visible elements. By the act of directly inscribing on the body’s surface sovereignty not only affirmed a dissymmetrical and irreversible power relation, it also produced meaning — indelibly linking signifier and signified. For while sovereignty acts directly on bodies, as an apparatus of power/knowledge it indirectly targets the undifferentiated mass of witnesses to its display. Sovereign power is therefore also indiscriminate in its application, targeting as it does the social body as a whole. In this aspect, its power is limited to containing the meaning of the event, and in preventing the staged-order from flooding its boundaries and becoming ambiguous. Subsequent resistance to sovereignty by carnivalesque plays of meaning reversed the festival of violence (Foucault 1977: 63). The inability to maintain the staged boundaries and contain the meaning of the spectacle was also a crisis which hastened the demise of sovereignty.

Disciplinary dispositives also have optical machines. The school has an optical machine for creating systems of presence and absence, the prison, a dissymmetrical ‘seeing machine’ (Foucault 1977: 207).

The panopticon is a machine for dissociating the see/being seen dyad; in the peripheric ring, one is totally seen, without ever seeing ... It is an important mechanism, for it automatizes and disindividualizes power. Power has its principle not so much in a person as in a certain concerted distribution of bodies, surfaces, lights, gazes ... Any individual, taken almost at random, can operate the machine (Foucault 1977: 201-2).

The prison is the exemplary disciplinary apparatus. Its optical machinery reverses the principles of the dungeon: to enclose, deprive of light and hide (Foucault 1977: 200), as well as the principles of the palace (designed to be seen) and the fortress (designed to survey an exterior). Discipline is a strategy of enclosure, programmed to
constitute, illuminate, interrogate and police the smallest movements in the interior space it frames. Discipline works by division, and by breaking up wholes (for example ‘dangerous mixtures,’ ‘contagions,’ ‘mysterious associations,’ and ‘intermingling bodies’). It ‘dissipates the compact grouping of individuals’ into discrete and elementary singularities and terminates any mixture that is ‘not supervised by authority or arranged according to [the dissymmetries] of hierarchy’ (Foucault 1977: 202 n3, 219, 239). Unlike the indiscriminate application of sovereign power, the discriminatory apparatus of the prison tailors punishments to the singularities constituted and framed in its spaces. Also different from sovereign power, the point of application of the disciplinary power is the ‘image of delinquency’ rather than the body of the criminal. Discipline punishes lifestyles rather than crimes (Foucault 1977: 252-255).

The optical machinery of discipline is micro/telescopic. It divides up space and movement, into smaller and smaller fragments, subjecting each to intense and extensive scrutiny. It makes things that were not visible before, observable and measurable, by dividing constellations and assemblages into innumerable points of illumination. These actions specify surveillance and make it functional (Foucault 1977: 174).

More than just a building or institution, discipline is a strategy of ‘traces’ (Foucault, 1977:131). Traces are the visible marks, or the succession of marks, inscriptions or imprints left by the passage of a body. They are records of its style of operating or habits of moving and its possible directions — traces are after-images of a body’s ‘way.’ Since every body has its own unique modus operandi, ambulatory style and sense of direction, its traces are its signature — the inscriptions which identify its individuality (Deleuze 1992b: 5). Different from the sovereign line of force, where marks are directly emblazoned on the body’s surface, discipline’s ‘soft touch’ establishes a body-image, rather than a body-sign connection. It does this by inscribing (or at least potentially inscribing) an image of a body’s motion on a receptive surface. If every action or decisive movement is potentially inscribed and stored somewhere as a signature (objectified trace or memory), and therefore potentially

3. In other words, to the long exposure of the disciplinary gaze.
punishable at some point, then it is the possible objective consequences, or the projections of these in the imagination, which will influence decisions to act in the present. No spectacular display of force has to reach the body. Discipline is a form of power that goes beyond the polarities of meaning and violence, a form of power that does not act directly on the body but acts on its actions.

Disciplinary power is predicated on what bodies can do (not what they are or what they mean), that is, on the expectation and anticipation of what another is capable of doing. If the other were predetermined in such a way as to be incapable of action or reaction, that is to say inhabiting a closed system lacking a field of possibilities from which to actualize one or several possible reactions, then the conditions favourable to this power-relation would not be present. Power is exercised only over individuals or collective subjects faced with possibilities. In other words, 'there is no relationship of power without the means of escape or possible flight' (Foucault 1983: 225).

By simply recording these signature-traces, the disciplinary apparatus affirms the assignment of motion to these figures. It holds them accountable for their movements, both past and future, and evaluates their ability to hold these movements, that is, to display appropriate postures, to hold a pose or maintain their composure. For under discipline, figures are distinguished in terms of their form or composition, that is, comparatively, as a system of rank-ordered deviations from a pure form or an ideal state (that is to say, a model or template4), either of body-type (as in early criminological theories) or bodily postures and attitudes which illustrate either good or bad form (good or bad copies of the model). Good copies are rewarded by changes in rank. Bad copies (simulacra), or those which deviate from the model, are sent back to begin a process of training over again. Discontinuous by the very nature of its exercise, each disciplinary internment has its own plan, habits to be acquired and forms of knowledge. From one system of internment to the next, from one apparatus to the next (from family, to school, to factory, barracks or prison), from one rank in the internal hierarchy to the next, one begins again, from a zero-point, and ends with an examination designed to evaluate a body’s disposition (for example

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4. See also Deleuze’s (1986: 22-25) discussion of the ‘disciplining’ or ‘appropriation’ of the Templar’s stone-cutting craft by imposition of a ‘static model of forms’ (stone-cutting by means of a template). This resolved the problem of the ‘point of contact’ (the tactile ‘encounter of cone and plane’) in a different way, by developing a model for reproduction.

Flow
its ‘taste for work;’ see Foucault 1977: 234).

So, not only are these spaces of internment ‘closed sets,’ each frame is potentially divisible into an infinite number of smaller subsets (a function of micro/telescopically ‘zooming in’) of a larger whole. But the whole is not a closed system. Disciplinary enclosures, as with all closed systems, are only ever ‘relatively enclosed’ (Foucault 1977: 276). As Foucault argues, it was the dungeon that was premised on a simple schema of enclosure, with thick heavy walls designed to prevent entering or leaving, as well as to hide and conceal. In contrast, Bentham’s original design for backlit cells shows conversely that disciplinary enclosures are full of ‘calculated openings’ (1977: 172). These relative openings allow light to pass to the interior and to converge on a central point. It is an illusion to suppose that the disciplinary gaze emanates from a subject within the enclosure. The disciplinary gaze is, rather, a centre where lines of light converge, where the motor-tendencies or signature-traces of a body’s motion are recorded. This receptive apparatus stands as the central repository of virtual perceptions, observations and information that any body can occupy. It is virtual because it is screened off from investigation: one should not know whether one is being seen (or recorded) at any given moment. The disciplinary gaze is anonymous. It has to be in order to function as it does. For discipline to work it has to see without being seen and hear without being heard.

The disciplinary dream of continuous control or seamless visibility remains elusive. At best, discipline produces a carceral archipelago, a discontinuous series of structured enclosures. And any series of enclosures, no matter how close together, will never be continuous: they will have gaps, intervals, marginal sites, places of lateral and asymmetrical mixtures, in short, places beyond, between or outside the horizon of visibility. Between and beyond the ‘spaces of places’ of disciplinary enclosures, there are ‘spaces of flow’ (to borrow Arrighi’s [1994: 23] dichotomy) that cannot, however, be reduced to inter-apparatus (or inter-state) relations or their ‘foreign policies.’

Flow constitutes the forth (analytic) dimension of the spacing of the social apparatus. Flow is a dimension of movement that passes...
between interior and exterior spaces, sometimes following the normal pathways and
migration routes, sometimes going beyond the norm and the convention. Disciplinary
apparatuses, as relative enclosures, are full of holes which allow lines of light from the
exterior to pass, and at the same time to strategically fall on certain objects, to illuminate
some and hide others. These lines of light are also potential "lines of flight," a means of
escaping the enclosure — the conditions which make the disciplinary exercise of power
possible. Its calculated openings are designed to structure the flow and distribution of
bodies and light, and its panoptic centre serves as an apparatus for potentially capturing
and recording these flows. This double strategy of calculated openings and techniques of
capture ensured that the movements of bodies, light and information (or
communication) were directed and channelled, one-way flows.

In many ways, the functioning of the disciplinary apparatus parallels the
functioning of the early cinématographe machines. Edison's first machines were bulky,
immobile and confined to the studio. Consequently, early cinematography, like
contemporary systems of surveillance, comprised fixed, single-point-of-view, spatial
shots, which allowed movements to remain the property of the figures in its frame (a
central feature of the disciplinary strategy). In single-point-of-view cinema, characters
and bodies change and exchange their relative positions, while cameras simply recorded
their spatial displacement.

It was the Lumière brothers' invention, unveiled one hundred years ago, on 22
March 1895, that was to change the functioning of the cine-apparatus. Unlike Edison's
stationary camera, the Lumière's cinématographe machine was lightweight and mobile.
It liberated them from the studio. It allowed them to take to the open space of the
Parisian streets and to follow, rather than capture, its mundane movements and flows.
By this movement of deterritorialization, that is, by following a flow or a line of flight,
the entire panoptic mechanism was broken and transformed into something else (Patton
1994: 158). Fixed, spatial shots were soon replaced: first, by setting the camera in
motion, then by panning, zooming and altering the depth of field; second, by stealing
motion from other bodies, by mounting cameras on vehicles or other ambulatory
apparatus; and third, and more significantly, by montage, that is, by selecting and
assembling separate shots, most of which could remain fixed and spatial (thus with very
little camera movement). These motor-mechanisms served to displace motion from the
bodies and figures in the frame, and to make motion a property of the apparatus itself.
The cinema apparatus does not simply capture images-of-motion which are exterior to
it, it produces movement-images.
While disciplinary strategies are concerned with the *mise-en-scène* (movement in the set or what goes on inside the frame) and with exercising power over that which can be interiorized, internalized or appropriated locally (Deleuze 1986: 15), cinema strategies are concerned with *montage*, or controlling what comes next, that is, the osmotic relation between the frame, the shot and what is beyond it (its outside), or what takes place between successive framings and shots (in-between in the interval or gap). The analysis of montage begins outside the frames and settings in the ‘any-space’ between structured enclosures, since this is where movement-images occur. Even if one were to stop the apparatus, and analyse the *still* thus isolated, one would invariably come across certain remarkable instances to contemplate, for example, ‘when the horse has one hoof on the ground, then three, two, one’ (Deleuze 1991: 5). But these remarkable singularities are not forms actualizing or embodying an eternal standard, prototype, model or template, nor do they await a narrative to order their arrangement or distribution (cf. Metz 1974). The singularities of the cinema have nothing in common with the order of long-exposure photos in the space of confinement. They are singular points which belong to movement and are immanent in it. For no matter how remarkable, unique, interesting or ordinary from the point of view of the immobilized section, each instant is simply an any-instant-whatever whose only distinguishing feature is that it is equidistant from all the other instants which comprise the mobile section of the shot. And every shot therefore comprises a multiplicity of singularities (any-instants-whatever). When approached as a mobile section, each frame is transformed from an enclosure that holds motion, into a threshold that allows movements and flows of all kinds to pass. Every enclosure communicates with an outside, just as every closed set refers to an out-of-field, or larger, unseen (virtual) set which encompasses or modifies it. This is also why ‘content’ analysis can never reach completion, nor contain the meaning of the event, as it can never completely close off lines of flight. Under a bounded system such as discipline, parts vary in relation to a ready-made set of fixed coordinates with a fixed centre of determination. This provides a clear cut mechanism for determining the placement, position or location of each part in relation to the whole (as in the numerical array or matrix and the ‘count’ which proceeds by a

7. For example, sound in the out-of-field can extend the scene beyond the visible frame. The sound of traffic or sirens emanating from beyond the frame can invoke the feeling of a larger urban setting, effectively displacing, qualifying and reterritorializing the scene. The out-of-field has transformative powers over the visual field. Consider how the haunting musical score in *Jaws* changes the intensity of what would otherwise be banal scenes.
One could include 'desire' among the categories of absence, since desire is typically defined as 'lack,' by a lack of being or a lack of presence which implies distance.

In the cinema apparatus, as an example of an 'open system' (Virilio 1995: 125), the whole is never fixed, neither given nor giveable, but is itself variable. This means that a part can belong to various relative sets simultaneously. And by refusing to settle in any one place (set, setting, or situation) such nomadic singularities always transform places into milieu, into in-between or threshold spaces (Grossberg 1996: 180). By subjecting each place or locale to a relentless process of opening or deterritorialization, space no longer functions as a fixed system of coordinates to define, position or delimit movements. Instead, space itself becomes a variable of movement: 'boundaries are only produced and set in the process of passage' (Massumi in Grosz 1995: 131).

The old dualities of space, or inside/outside, close/distant, present/absence, and the related categories of past and future (that is, 'categories of absence'; see Shields 1992: 187) are all derived from the relative safety of the enclosure, the point of view of confinement, and the 'voice of command' (Bhabha 1994: 116). Mobility changes all that. As Virilio argues, mobility has the effect of changing old notions of proximity and distance rather than simply restoring the idea that proximity is identical with being face-to-face (1995: 106). For Baudrillard (1987: 42-43), this change is seen as a function of the elimination of the stage and its corollary 'staged distance,' which has brought everything 'close-up' in an immediate proximity. Yet this notion of the absence of distance (a double negation) defines a field of pornographic visibility where everything appears to be given all at once. This logic always leads back to enclosure and the analysis of the phenomena that inhabit it, that is, fetishized partial objects.

Far from being simply an apparatus for staging the visible, the cinema apparatus keeps open the possibility of deterritorializing and reterritorializing the seen. It is montage that operates these potential movements which threaten to leave the territorial principle behind. The cinema is, after all, a moving scene/seen, not just a surveillance

Flow
apparatus for capturing movements in a pre-defined scene or ready-made whole.

The optical machinery of the cinema functions differently from both sovereignty and discipline. Sovereignty defined a spectacular regime of power that had to be seen to be effective. Discipline structured light to fall on an interior and illuminate its details, like a searchlight, or an intensional, nonsubjective (Foucault 1980: 94) consciousness, summoning objects out of their essential darkness (Boundas 1993: 35). It constituted a system of hierarchical (non-reciprocal) one-way gazes which see without being seen. The cinema, by way of contrast, operates by *introducing signs of the unseen to the seen*. Without reducing scene to seen, it makes us grasp what we do not see but what is perceptible to another (Deleuze in Boundas 1993: 36). The other, in this sense, is not simply an empirical other populating our field of visibility, as is the case in the face to face encounter of gazes doing reciprocal perspectives (interactionism) or engaging in a subject/object dialectic (existentialism). This Other is not necessarily actualized or materialized in one’s perceptual field, nor does it have to be in order to make its affects felt. The disciplinary apparatus already established the fact that the other was most powerful when it was not seen. Moreover, the empirical other must be ‘foreclosed’ (Boundas 1993) or displaced for this Otherness to make its affects felt. This Other does more than reflect back a self (cf. Denzin 1995: 112). It is a structure (of alterity) constituting the margin or horizon of visibility beyond the frame, like a spectre haunting the seen. So the question is not what this Other *is*, but what it *can do*. Nor is the problem one of trying to contain or locate its source, but, rather one of assessing its *affects*.

Put simply, in a world were the structure of alterity ceased to function, that is, in a world of isolation *without* others, we would be constantly bumping into the unseen and the unknown, which would strike us with the force of projectiles. ‘The absence of the other is felt when we bang against things, and when the stupefying swiftness of our actions is revealed to us’ (Deleuze 1990: 306). The entire structure of anticipation and expectation of what comes next, what is beyond, what we do not see and do not know (the horizon of possibilities) is a function of this structure.

The part of the object that I do not see I posit as visible to Others, so that when I will have walked around the object to reach this hidden part, I will have joined the Others [already there] behind the object, and will have totalized it in the way that I already anticipated. As for objects behind my back, I sense them coming together and forming a world, precisely because they are visible to, and are seen by, Others (Deleuze 1990: 305).
Similarly, the depth of our perception is a possible width for Others, thus enabling us to relativize proximities, to distinguish foreground and background and to know when objects are hidden behind others. This Other illuminates the margins of the world that we do not see, warning of assaults from behind or the side, smoothing transitions from one perception to another, and filling the world with benevolent murmuring (see Deleuze 1990: 305). For as Deleuze argues, ‘[w]hen one complains about the meanness of Others, one forgets this other and even more frightening meanness — namely, the meanness of things were there no Other’ (1990: 307).

Contemporaneous with all that is seen there is a ‘virtual’ unseen set, a beyond or out-of-field, that wards off (en)closure, prevents the set from closing in on itself, and precludes the identification of the scene with the seen. Like a line of (f)light, this virtual otherness passes through the porous membranes of the seen, and at the same time is that which allows the seen to pass into the beyond or what comes next. Interpretation, typically undertaken from a fixed standpoint (that is to say from point of view of confinement or the ‘standpoint of civil society’), is made all the more difficult when its subject-matter is porous (Grosz 1995: 131) and actively resists capture by constantly changing its shape or form, or refusing to settle or be pinned down. Perhaps nowhere is the difference between the regimes of enclosure and the open system more apparent than in the place the face occupies therein.

The face can be individuating (Deleuze 1991: 99). It can serve as a means of distinguishing or characterizing a person. Synonymous with the signature, ‘mug shot’ (photo de pose) or fingerprint, the face serves as of means of identifying individuals. The face can be socializing, in the sense that it manifests a social role or a social location. Taken as a reflection of the settings in which people normally act and perceive, the face becomes habitus (Bourdieu 1993) where looks become indices, distinguishing the place one belongs or the group one belongs to. The face can also be communicating, not only between characters or between roles, but also as an expression of the internal consistency (auto-communication between a character and its role or when one looks the part), or its lack (as in the automaton or the face that fails to

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9. In Peirce, indices possess three characteristics: (1) they have no significant resemblance to their object; (2) they refer to individuals, single units, single collections of units, or single continua, and; (3) they direct the attention to their objects by blind compulsion (1955: 108).
The face is verbose. It emits and receives, releases and captures, gathers and expresses many signifying signs. As Deleuze and Guattari argue, signifiers always reterritorialize on the surface of the face such that signifiers are always facified (1987: 115). Signatures (a means of individual identification), habitus/indices (a means of group identification) and signs of communication (identification or the failure to identify with an individual or a group) are examples of the face inscribed by a particular regime of enunciation. It is made to bear these ‘traces’ and inscriptions though no actual physical force ever touches or ‘marks’ its surface. These signs should be understood in terms of the particular disciplinary apparatuses, the regimes of enunciation and the lines of force which make it signify or ‘induce it to speak’ (so to speak). In the cinema apparatus the face takes on a different complexion. As Bergman (in Deleuze 1991: 99) defines it, ‘the possibility of drawing near to the human face is the primary originality and the distinctive quality of the cinema.’

It is typically the face which populates the cinematic close-up. Eisenstein (1942) goes further. By arguing that ‘the close-up is the face,’ he suggests that any close-up calls forth either a face or a facial equivalent. Therefore, in close-up virtually any thing can be facified. To illustrate such a ‘facified object’, we can turn to the example of a clock striking midnight (Eisenstein in Deleuze 1991: 87). The clock, shown in several close-ups which gradually draw near to its face, is on one hand, a receptive surface which merely reflects light back. On the other, and because its hands form a series of micro-movements (even virtual, imperceptible ones), it marks an accent toward a critical instant, to the point where midnight becomes a ‘fateful hour.’ The face/close-up is typically employed to stake out such critical instants, turning points or to prefigure paroxysms (Deleuze 1991: 89). It is preparatory, either of the progress toward a limit or of crossing a threshold. Moreover, it gathers and expresses these imperceptible qualities without ever actualizing them in a perceptual field.

While the close-up may appear as an act of enclosure par excellence, it is not a matter of cramming and arranging so many elements inside pre-existing boundaries (for example, the staged production), but is a special case of ‘cutting out’ or extracting a composition unit from the set (Aumont 1987: 36-7). Similarly in Eisenstein, framing is a matter of ‘hewing out a piece of actuality with the ax of the lens’ (1949: 41). Because the close-up involves a cut, or the cutting out of an image from the materiality of its set, some argue that they have discovered a cinematic equivalent of a psychoanalytic structure of the unconscious (for example, a castration complex; see Kaite 1991: 176), and, as in Baudrillard, associate this with the fetishization of the partial-objects, which in turn correspond with poses of the commodity (in other words, when it is immobilized).
(see also Kroker and Levin [1991] and Debord's [1994: 12, 43] discussion of the partial-object/image). Others, Barthes (1977: 66-67) for example, understand the cinematic fragment (still) as an 'act of quotation' forming the basis of cinematic parody (an analysis which is extended into Fiske's [1989: 95] treatment of the media as 'semiotic democracy').

While one certainly grants the fact that the close-up involves a change of dimension vis-à-vis the set, it does not follow that the image is therefore immobilized. In fact this change of dimension can be understood in two ways. On one hand, this change could be relative, consisting in the microscopic/telescopic magnification of the smallest detail — a form of cutting which produces partial or fetish objects. On the other, this change of dimension could be absolute — a form of cutting which opens up another dimension, and which produces an image of the whole as an interval or threshold of qualitative transformation or 'act of change.' It is my contention that, instead of (or in addition to) simply magnifying the 'small details' of the ready-made set, or enlarging the seen (pornographically), the close-up is an act of 'deframing' par excellence, since it cuts the image out of its moorings in a system of spatiotemporal coordinates and displays micro-movements of its own.

In a world of complete enclosure (dungeons or 'total institutions') where walls are without doorways or windows, the only way out is over the wall, an act akin to Barthes (1974) notion of transgression. But in a world of relative enclosures, there are all kinds of openings (calculated or not) and marginal sites through which movements and flows of all kinds pass. Very much unlike the surface of the mirror, the photo de pose, or the passive gaze of the other which simply reflects back or records movements that are external to it, the face (close up) is a mobile surface of micro-movements (as is the translucent film surface mobilized by the Lumiére's claws). It interrupts the flow of reflection and therefore the light which would otherwise reflect back or pass in one direction. The face is a reflective interval, an opening between that which is reflected and its reflection. In close-up it constitutes an interval-space, or the space in-between where suspense and expectation are both inscribed and suspended. As Bhabha (1994: 4) argues:

'Beyond' signifies spatial distance, marks progress, promises the future; but our intimations of exceeding the barrier or boundary — the very act of going beyond — are unknowable, unrepresentable, without a return to the 'present' which, in the process of repetition, becomes disjunct and displaced. The imaginary of spatial distance — to live somehow beyond the border of our time — throws into relief the temporal, social differences that interrupt our collusive sense of cultural contemporaneity.
It is only by dissolving (deframing) its spatiotemporal coordinates that the 'identity' functions of the face disappear. Thus, the facial close-up is also its individualizing, socializing and communicating effacement, for it aims at nothing beyond its own proliferation and expansion (cf. Grosz 1994: 195 on desire). In normal (or normalized) perception people are assumed to have individual characters or social roles, and objects have real uses, which stand in real connections to people, who stand in real relations with one another in a whole actual state of affairs. But there is also an 'expressed' state of affairs. Standing on a precipice, for example, may be the cause of vertigo, but it does not explain the expression it produces on a face. Vertiginousness is only one qualitative expression, or 'way of living the scene' of the precipice. Even though its expression might anticipate an action or event to take place in, or modify, an actual state of things (for example, actually falling over the edge) it is nonetheless a pure potentiality which gathers and expresses a virtual relation with the actual state of things, lacking the necessary correspondence rules required to embody a situation of truth or logos. This image does not live in the rule or role bound enclosure of the scene, but in the 'virtual world:' either a past or future which is beyond the reach of normal communication or judgement, and therefore beyond the laws or codes of normal interaction. What emerges in the close-up is a deterritorialized image occupying a virtual any-space-whatever grasped as the pure locus of the possible (Deleuze 1991: 96, 109).

This close-up/face effaces all other functions of the face which either belong to, are derived from, or indicate its place in a relative enclosure. Like a nomadic singularity that refuses to settle (or be captured) its significance cannot be secured in advance. As Balázs (in Deleuze 1989: 96) states: '... the expression of a face and the signification of this expression have no relation or connection to space. Our sensation of space is abolished. A dimension of another order is open to us.' By occupying the openings or margins, rather than inhabiting the enclosure, the signs which scribe its surface do not simply characterize or secure its identity (an individual representation). Nor are they just clicheé or stereotypical responses (good habits) that would identify the place, location or group that it belongs to (a group representation). The displaced face sheds all its 10. As in Hitchcock’s (1958) film of the same name.
11. Hitchcock’s Vertigo is exemplary in its use of the close-up, or affective deframing. In this film there are two worlds, one of affection and dizzying desire, the other, an actual world bound by rules and roles. Repeated inserts (close-ups) show the difference between the actual world and how characters live it.
12. The truth-value of any statement (any virtual propositional relation) rests on the premise that it indicates a state of affairs that makes it true (see Wittgenstein, 1958: 33). Statements of truth require a structural homologue (common code) to insure that the representative sign-order (propositional relation) and the order of the world share a syntactical form in common.
13. Like the close-up, flashbacks are attempts to concentrate the power of the virtual in the scene. However, the conventional flashback-insert usually carries with it signs which warn us of the difference between the actual perception.
and the virtual image it has called forth. Therefore, the flashback is typically marked by a dissolve-link, by clouding the horizons of the frame, changing from colour to black-and-white, prefiguring the change with an insert (close-up) of a face in REM sleep (as in Weir's 1993 Fearless), or by superimposing the virtual and the actual image. Wilder's Seven Year Itch (1955) is exemplary in the latter use of the flashback. In this case the flashback returns from beyond the frame to reterritorialize the displacing effect of the iconic figure played by Monroe. This flashback is either the voice of normality (from out-of-field) or a figure of normality, which, while on holiday, returns occasionally to reframe the situation and restore its normal habitus.

14. While Bourdieu (1993) counters the tendency to homogenize culture with a conception of the habitus as a means of entrenching cultural distinctions between different groups in society, these varieties of 'taste' and 'manner' really only 'traces.' It is no longer a functionary, deputy or subject of the enclosure. Instead it has become a seer of that which we do not see, and the visible presence or embodiment of the power of the out-of-field. Like a subservient, averted gaze, it turns towards-turning away (tournement-détournement, see Deleuze 1991: 104) to illuminate the horizon of invisibility. Without this face, there would be no transitions, no intervals, no warnings, only the shock of successive enclosures.

The face or its equivalent expresses something which does not exist independently of that active sensuous materiality which expresses it, yet is at the same time distinct from that expression. This something is the structure of the possible. The signs this face produces are iconic, since, according to Peirce (1955), an icon is a kind of sign which refers to an object by virtue of a quality which it possesses, and which it possesses independent of whether any such object actually exists or not. Similarly, qualities cannot act as signs unless they are embodied: such 'quali-signs' are necessarily iconic (Peirce 1955: 115).

The face/close-up is a type of movement-image and a form of signifying substance that does not simply allow external movements and flows to pass, nor does it simply deflect, reflect or turn them back. As an interval of reflection the face distorts lines of (f)light by turning them into affects and expressions. Movements never leave or enter the scene without passing through this affective interval. The close-up (both 'cut out' and 'inserted') controls the flow by carrying out 'virtual conjunctions' in the gaps, intervals or openings between the scenes, prior to any actualization. By structuring expectations, the close-up smooths the transitions from scene to scene, and constitutes a continuity that discipline lacked. Rather than simply making the gaps and intervals of the system of montage 'invisible' so that events flow (cf. Trinh 1991: 164-65), signs of the invisible or the unseen are inserted in these gaps to direct and channel the powers out-of-field and to make events flow.

The face in closeup, the sound-out-of-field and the flashback are surface structures inserted into the flow of the movement-image to qualify the scene and motivate responses to it, that is, to variously link situations and the actions which modify them. These affective-
inserts smooth transitions and lateral connections that would otherwise remain a discontinuous series of presents. The power to virtualize an actual image, to surround or encompass what is in the scene with affections, anticipations, qualities and memory, is to introduce elements which belong to the past or future into present perceptions and so potentialize its movement, change and transformation. For the present would not pass if it were a closed system and did not already contain an immanent potential for becoming-other. What montage does is to release the potentials of the image so that they do move (pass on) and at the same time authorize their passage by structuring the virtual openings through which they pass.

Conclusion

Since every bounded system is only ever relatively closed, it is under constant threat of spillage across its boundaries. This is true both of the staged spectacles of sovereignty and the hier-architecture of the disciplinary enclosure. The power of these apparatuses is both defined and limited by the way they structure the field of visibility, the kinds of surfaces caught in this regime of light, and the kinds of inscriptions left on these surfaces which make them signify particular regimes of enunciation. Power, understood as a relation, always inhabits the space between signs and things (images). To go beyond the enclosure, to control events outside the boundaries of the factory, prison, school, or barracks, or to control events in the interval between successive enclosures, a different dispositif is required. Montage, by constituting an interval-space, and by relating all movements to this interval, produces a form of ‘moving’ image that sees into the beyond, either the past or the future, to the side or elsewhere, and structures the expectation or anticipation of events to come. The face close-up, or its equivalent (the sound-out-of-field or the flashback), does not structure the seen, nor delimit its meaning, but rather suggests ways one should live the scene. It structures the possible. This is the face of the otherwise other, a benevolent face with a distinctive ‘cinema gaze’ (in other words, distinct from the more objective ‘eye of the camera’). Inscribed by signs which are iconic, it tells tales which have not happened, which could happen, or which have happened in the past and could happen again. It does serve as metaphors for objective social arrangements including social class — that is to say that ‘habits’ are simply ‘codes’ which serve to ‘naturalize’ ready-made hierarchical differences. The habitus is always positively situated in a given space (see Maffesoli 1993: 10). Belonging can therefore be assessed in terms of whether or not one has acquired the appropriate ‘know how,’ that is, whether or not one displays the appropriate badges, labels or other visual cues.

15. As Debord defines it, détournment ‘occurs within a type of communication aware of its inability to enshrine any inherent and definitive certainty’ (1994: 146).

16. Similar to the Lacanian objet petit a, which as Žižek (1989: 34) argues is always by definition, perceived in a distorted way, because, outside this distortion, “in itself,” it does not exist, hence, because it is nothing but the embodiment, the materialization of this distortion ... an object that does not exist for the “objective” look.'
not speak for the visible, nor is it a deputy of the seen. It circulates rumours, fabricates legends and makes 'small-talk' (Simmel 1950: 45). Like the language of myth, its mode of presence is memorial yet has pretensions to become actual (Barthes 1973: 122, 133-4). It is this structure of alterity that controls flows in the open.

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