Boundaries and Belonging

States and Societies in the Struggle to Shape Identities and Local Practices

Edited by

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Mental Maps and Virtual Checkpoints

Struggles to Construct and Maintain State and Social Boundaries

Joel S. Migdal

In the period from the end of the Cold War, at the beginning of the 1990s, to the present, academics and laymen alike have moved away from a view of borders as fixed and hard features of international life. Today, borders are much more commonly understood as contingent, porous, and in flux. The Cold War, especially its last two decades, had managed to make the lines dividing countries on world maps seem to be permanent parts of the landscape, like rivers and mountains. Those years had eclipsed the memories of the dissolution of huge empires in World War I, the creation of new states and mandates after that war, and the occurrence of massive territorial changes during World War II. Indeed, once the old European empires finally faded away in Africa and Asia and decolonization drew to an end, mostly by the mid-1960s, remarkably few countries disappeared or even had significant border changes. One could cite a few cases – the transformation of East Pakistan into Bangladesh, the appearance and disappearance of Biafra, the cease-fire lines after the 1967 war in the Middle East – but they were the limited exceptions to a period of extraordinary state-border stability.

Not surprisingly, then, outside an interest in decolonization, few books and articles by political scientists and sociologists dealt with the question of borders in the postwar period and, especially, in the generation from the mid-1960s to the early 1990s. And consequently, I think, few works addressed larger political and cultural meaning attached to borders: questions of the essence of sovereignty and the degree to which borders served as frames for actual human communities. There was little interest in what kind of

meaning, or sense of belonging, borders created for people, as they tried to place themselves socially in the world.

In the 1990s, though, events brought the issues of territory and borders back into the popular and academic imagination. Old states vanished and new ones appeared. The Soviet Union splintered into fifteen new states; Yugoslavia, into five; Czechoslovakia and Ethiopia, into two each. Namibia (1990) and the Palestine Authority (1993) appeared. The European Union replaced the European Community, grew larger, moved toward a single currency, and appropriated functions from its member states. The flow of capital and communications across borders, which appeared increasingly porous, went off the charts. These changes and more created cottage industries in the social sciences and humanities examining the implications of border changes, including numerous studies of sovereignty, transnationalism, globalization, European integration, and territorialization. Some went so far...
as to reject “the nationally-constituted society as the appropriate object of discourse.”

All these subfields suggest that borders are impermanent features of social life, dependent on particular circumstances rather than being permanent fixtures of human society. The status of borders has been contingent on varying historical circumstances, rather than being immutably rock-like. Borders shift; they leak; and they hold varying sorts of meaning for different people. No one could simply assume that any person’s primary identity is necessarily rooted in the people within his or her state’s borders, whether that state is the Congo or even France.

Yet even in the new streams of social science, many studies, wittingly or unwittingly, continue to “remain fixed and thematized at the level of the spatial and the geopolitical” associated with the nation-state. This volume maintains the importance of a spatial understanding of society and history, but it suggests a way of conceiving of borders and space that goes beyond a school map of states. Its subject is the struggle among differing spatial logics, or mental maps. It is concerned with the meanings that state borders hold for people but recognizes that such meanings vary and are contested by other social formations. The authors here ask, To what degree do state borders encase the mechanisms that make the decisive rules governing people’s lives, and to what extent do they give way to other rule makers? To what extent do states circumscribe the communities to which people feel attached, and to what extent do they intersect with other communities of belonging? The chapters in this book home in on the struggles and conflicting demands on people, given that state borders are not automatically preeminent and that other spatial logics demand attention.

Boundaries

I use the term “boundaries” here to convey more than simple borders, lines dividing spaces as represented on maps; boundaries signify the point at which something becomes something else, at which the way things are done changes, at which “we” end and “they” begin, at which certain rules for behavior no longer obtain and others take hold. That is, boundaries include symbolic and social dimensions associated with the border divisions that appear on maps or, for that matter, other dividing lines that cannot be found


8 King, ed., *Culture, Globalization and the World System.*

9 Jameson and Miyoshi, eds., *Cultures of Globalization.*
on any map at all. Because boundaries connote the site at which things are
done differently or the limits to where things are done in one way, they are
social constructions. And as the site where different ways of doing things
meet, they are likely to be replete with tension and conflict. People thus cre-
ate barriers through accepting common manners of acting and rejecting –
even fighting off – other ways of acting. One may think of people’s acting
according to a set of laws on one side of a state boundary, for example, and
others acting on the basis of a different code on the other side of the bound-
ary. Boundaries are barriers that people establish, but by no means are they
airtight.

Deborah S. Bernstein demonstrates this point nicely for a boundary be-
tween not two states but two social groups: Jewish and Arab workers in
Palestine in the early stages of their century-long bitter conflict. In the critical
interwar years, she writes, the pattern that emerged in the town “of Haifa’s
labor market was the overall, pervasive separation and boundary construc-
tion between Jews and Arabs which was pushed through by organized Jewish
labor. The essence of the construction of boundaries in the economic sphere
was to close the Jewish economy to Arab labor so as to protect Jewish work-
ners from the competition of much cheaper Arab workers.” Nonetheless,
she argues, the two communities cannot be understood as “secured within
clear-cut, impenetrable and unrefuted boundaries…. Such a focus did not
lead to sufficient understanding of the formation of boundaries. It could
not shed light on the controversies and conflicts concerning boundary for-
mation, as the boundaries themselves were taken for granted…. They were
conveyed as part of the basic order rather than as a negotiated and dynamic
social construct.”

Boundaries, to my mind, incorporate two elements beyond serving as
simple separators: checkpoints and mental maps. Boundaries are constructed
through the practical monitoring devices that groups use at actual and vir-
tual checkpoints to divide one space from another. Checkpoints refer to the
sites and practices that groups use to differentiate members from others and
to enforce separation. Monitoring at actual checkpoints includes a variety
of surveillance techniques, from checking visas and passports to insidious
practices such as racial profiling. At virtual checkpoints, practices go from
scrutiny of modes of dress to detection of language and accent differences.
Dress and language, along with other daily practices, then, not only are
accepted ways of doing things among certain people; they also serve as sig-
nifiers at virtual checkpoints, as separators, marking who is included in a
group and who is not.

10 Deborah S. Bernstein, Constructing Boundaries: Jewish and Arab Workers in Mandatory
Palestine, ed. Russell Stone, SUNY Series in Israel Studies (Albany: State University of New
11 Ibid.
Mental Maps and Virtual Checkpoints

All sorts of practices, both obvious and subtle, act as boundary markers, which tip people off as to whether someone is a member of their group or not. Monitoring devices at checkpoints are among the numerous ways of scrutinizing and interrogating people so as to determine into which social space they fall or to which group they belong. They are also the ways of enforcing the categorizations of space by using various sanctions and rewards. Enforcement devices can include something as innocent as giving someone the cold shoulder as well as a practice as horrible as ethnic cleansing. As Adriana Kemp’s chapter notes, the construction of Israel’s new boundaries after the state was created in 1948 included not only the physical patrolling of the armistice lines but devices designating certain citizens, the Palestinian Arabs, as a dangerous population. What the actual monitoring devices should be and who the guardians of the checkpoints should be can be intensely contested questions. In Israel, as Patricia Woods notes in her chapter, even among the privileged Jewish population, secular and religious agencies and courts within the state itself have battled over boundary questions, including the all-important one of who is a Jew.

Besides monitoring practices at actual and virtual checkpoints, boundaries also are constructed and maintained by people’s mental maps, which divide home from alien territory, the included from the excluded, the familiar from the other. Mental maps incorporate elements of the meaning people attach to spatial configurations, the loyalties they hold, the emotions and passions that groupings evoke, and their cognitive ideas about how the world is constructed. All these act to establish and maintain the attachment of people to one another, but in so doing, they also mark the separation between groups.

If one indeed believes that boundaries have been built and maintained by what people do and think, both through the practices at virtual checkpoints and through mental maps, then one can imagine boundaries to be more than simply dividers of spaces occupied by states. Multiple sets of boundaries can exist, beyond those associated with state borders. Social groupings have their own boundaries, virtual checkpoints, and mental maps marking them off from other groupings. The boundaries of social groupings have their own spatial logic. That is, social groups, too, have territorial dimensions (usually physical, sometimes virtual), quite apart from state borders. A smuggling ring, to take an extreme example, may have all sorts of monitoring devices marking it off, such as code words, secret names, signals, established routes for travel, and sanctions for breaking the rules of the ring. And the mental map of its boundaries, including its territorial reach as well as who is in the group and who is outside, can be firmly embedded in its members’ imagination and in the minds of border guards, customers, competitors, and others.

The boundaries constructed by the smuggling ring’s monitoring devices and mental maps certainly do not appear on any school map and are very different from those of the state; indeed, they are meant to diminish – bypass,
erase, neutralize—those of the state. Other social groupings, such as an extended family with members on two or three continents, may have no such overt intentions, but they, too, have their own spatial logic and share a mental map of the limits of their clan and its ways of doing things—language and acts of familiarity, forms of material exchange, and more—that establish spatial boundaries different from those of the state. The space of a group, such as a multicontinental clan, might differ from that of a state in that it may be discontinuous (although, it should be noted, that a few states are discontinuous, too). Jews, as a people, for example, maintained clear social boundaries through history without having a continuous space. Daniel S. Milo put it this way: “The Jewish perception of space is marked by two unique characteristics: it comprises a notion of multiple spaces, rather than one of a single space; and between these spaces—a void. In other words, the Jewish spatial experience is differential and discontinuous.”

Space may also be deconcretized, as with a family in which concrete space is far less important than the boundaries created by the social relations themselves.

All people face multiple social groupings, including the state, in their daily lives that offer differing divisions of space, that is, differing mental maps of how their world is constructed and laid out and different monitoring devices marking the boundaries of that world. People thus encounter multiple sets of boundaries, which configure space differently and which have various sets of meaning as well as checkpoints with scrutinizing and enforcing devices attached to them. Individuals, in short, daily confront radically divergent mental maps of how the world is configured. Sometimes, perhaps most times, multiple social groupings and the maps they project coexist harmoniously, causing minimal dissonance. But at other times they clash, using sanctions and rewards to demand contradictory ways of doing things and loyalty from people.

One example of such conflict that received much publicity came out in the tense days immediately after the infamous 2000 presidential election in the United States, when neither George W. Bush nor Al Gore could claim victory. John Ellis had served as election day vote analyst for the Fox network, the first of the national news associations to call the election (prematurely) for Bush that night. All the networks understood the enormous significance of their casting Bush as the presumptive winner at a moment when the outcome was still very much in doubt. Most of them later undertook internal inquiries as to what had spurred them to jump the gun. Fox’s call for Bush pushed the others into following suit and was thus extremely important. Fox officials later found out that Ellis, a cousin of Bush, traded information with

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Bush throughout election night, actions that threatened the independence and integrity of Fox, possibly leading it to call the election before there was any real certainty over the actual outcome. As one Fox executive said after the election, the network hired him “because of his ability, not his bloodline.” Fox had one set of rules and demands that it made on its employees; the “bloodline,” another. Fox’s transnational boundaries suggested one mental map of where boundaries lay and which social grouping’s code should take precedence over others. It had checkpoints with monitoring devices, ranging from subtle ways of affecting professional reputation to censure, to enforce that representation. The Bush “bloodline” suggested quite another set of boundaries, with their own map and checkpoints (Bush jokingly suggested excluding members from the Thanksgiving dinner table who did not hold up their ends for the bloodline during the election).

Social groupings, such as news networks and extended families, or even states themselves, may seem to be inviolable social formations, with firm boundaries. They appear to enter the fray of conflicting boundaries as wholly formed institutions, with their checkpoints and monitoring devices to maintain their boundaries, such as professional censure, family ostracism, or imprisonment, in hand. In cases of severe conflict, the state itself, often through its judicial system, presents itself as the final arbiter of which rules of conduct should take precedence, but in so doing, courts rarely challenge the legitimacy of particular social institutions to exist; the “hardness” of social organizations and the permanence of their boundaries remain unquestioned.

The idea of the hardness of social groupings is frequently reinforced by the virtual checkpoints, boundary markers, and monitoring devices that their members employ in order to project the essentiality and primacy of the group’s own boundaries. The fact that people use an attribute, such as skin color, unthinkingly as the default indicator separating “us” from “them” makes the categories of black and white and the divider between them seem natural and permanent. Lauren Basson’s chapter notes how key social actors and state officials in the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century United States used a variety of means, including pseudoscience, to make racial categories and the dividers between them seem hard and fast in the country.

In short, people depend on those checkpoints and markers, such as skin color, to navigate daily life, and in accepting those signposts to guide them, people lend an additional feeling of hardness to the boundaries of existing social groupings. Marking off social groups in this way is tremendously important, especially where those social groups are large and impersonal. People encounter others every day whom they have never met or barely know as acquaintances. This is a terrifying prospect. What kind of confidence can

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they have that strangers and near-strangers will act civilly and not stab them in the back, figuratively or literally? Routine practices — those boundary checkpoints, markers, and monitoring devices — help to separate those with whom one feels safe, for whom one has clear expectations for how they will behave, from others. The monitoring of boundaries, then, alerts them to who falls within one’s group and who remains outside.

People’s feelings of security rest on a sense that checkpoints and markers separate the familiar — those who share language, dress, skin color, mannerisms, citizenship, or other identifiable attributes — from the unfamiliar. Sometimes the markers are quickly identifiable, as when African Americans greet each other as “brother,” even when they are not acquainted. At other times, the markers might be very subtle, as when Jews in Nazi-occupied Europe, fearing that any overt sign of their being Jews could doom them, murmured various words or phrases, including the word “amhaw” (“[I am one of] your people”), as codes to identify possible coreligionists. In short, the ability to identify boundaries of social groups is tremendously important for people simply to make out the lay of the land — where they believe that threats lurk and where security resides.

People draw their mental maps by configuring the world as familiar and unfamiliar spaces. They are thus constantly navigating, searching for those “manners of acting” that can delineate configurations of spaces where they feel that they are, or should be, relatively safe, places that somehow feel familiar and different from the chaotic sense of the totally unfamiliar. As much as high crime rates, the unfamiliarity with how things are done and how strangers behave is what makes a particular neighborhood feel “dangerous.” In contrast, the reassuring message people take with them on their forays into meetings with strangers in familiar places, such as a city bus, is that by knowing the markers and checkpoints they can minimize risk and know what to expect from others. They feel, within the parameters of mingling with strangers, who by definition represent the unknown, that they still can have a sense of what to expect and how to behave. This cognitive element, the mental map, helps construct and maintain boundaries, even if those boundaries are somewhat arbitrary and fluid.

Regular checkpoints and habitual monitoring devices serve to naturalize a state or social group, creating a reassuring mental image of it as permanent and unchanging and a mental map that sets it off from other social groups. The perception that the groups are rock-hard diminishes the terror of vulnerable people in their dealings with strangers. Any feeling of threat is mitigated by the unquestioned assumption that the person one is encountering is a “brother” or “amhaw.” And the perception acts, in turn, to validate

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the checkpoints for scrutinizing boundaries, even when the practices associated with those checkpoints are demanding and costly, such as having to purchase a passport and spend endless hours in line going through customs. The mental map and the checkpoints seem to be in a virtuous cycle feeding off one another to make the state’s or social grouping’s boundaries appear to be inviolable. It is easy to understand how laypeople and academics alike could slip into seeing states in the Cold War era as givens and the particular division of boundaries on maps as a depiction of the permanent configuration of the social and political landscape.

But the virtuous cycle of mental maps and checkpoints does not exist in a vacuum. Other forces intervene to change and challenge boundaries and highlight the impermanence of social groupings, as the 1990s made clear for some states. Perhaps this notion of the mutability of boundaries, their malleability in the face of human events, was portrayed most vividly in a statement attributed to Louis XIV. When his grandson became king of Spain, Louis is purported to have said, “There are no more Pyrenees.” For all the efforts to maintain hard racial boundaries in the United States of a century ago, Basson demonstrates how those classifications were confounded by the challenges of racially mixed people who did not fit into any of the categories, for whom the mental map of space made no sense and for whom the normal checkpoints raised more questions than they answered.

No matter how much people like to think of their mental maps as permanent, they must be very sensitive to changing and uncertain boundaries. Those on the lowest social rungs, especially, need to be prepared at a moment’s notice to remake their map of the social terrain. They must face the fact that today’s boundaries are not static. Different social groups make contradictory demands on them and, in so doing, complicate both the placement of the boundary and the question of which boundary should take precedence in a given social situation. Is security in a difficult situation to be found in citizenship, gender, religion, ethnicity, kinship, or perhaps some other social formation, such as gangs or social clubs? These are not idle questions nor do they have an invariable answer; indeed, being sensitive to necessary changes in the answer may determine a person’s very survival. Navigating the boundaries of these social formations, knowing which boundaries will provide maximum security, and patrolling those boundaries so as to ally with those who will be most helpful are important skills, particularly when exogenous factors undermine old mental maps and checkpoints.

For social scientists, it is probably preferable to think of the normal state of boundaries as in flux, rather than as permanent or semi-permanent, when trying to understand the configuration of human space. To be sure, the rate of flux will vary in different circumstances. The dynamics of social life come when competing boundaries, demanding different, even contradictory practices and mental images, bump up against one another. They put varying demands on people in terms of behavior, emotions, and cognition, causing
no small amount of distress and dissonance for people. After all, these conflicting boundaries are asking people to assign very different sorts of meaning to the world, events, and people that they encounter. And as boundaries do clash and people encapsulated by them make choices about which demands to follow and which to ignore, those boundaries change. That means that dividing lines, the scrutinizing practices that maintain them, loyalty, and the like change in an ongoing process. Mental maps and virtual checkpoints are constantly being contested and transformed.

All the chapters in this book focus on such processes. They all examine struggles over the construction of groups at moments when old boundaries, mental maps, and virtual checkpoints are being challenged: Which groups will succeed in demanding membership? Which will command people’s loyalties and personal identities? Which will make rules for behavior that will displace other rules or impulses? All the authors here ask about the construction and maintenance of boundaries between groups. What are the sites and practices that constitute people’s virtual checkpoints? What sorts of boundary markers are used to identify members (e.g., language, race, or personal presentation such as clothes or food)? How do boundaries include and exclude particular people? What kinds of monitoring devices are used to interrogate people about their membership?

Each of the social entities discussed in the following chapters is constructed and reconstructed in ongoing struggles and negotiations with other groups. Each has a spatial logic associated with it, and these logics, too, are often at odds. That means that people face tough choices about where to throw their lot, which boundaries to accept for determining how they act and to whom they are loyal. All the chapters stress that the configuration of social space is contested.

The assumed spatial logic in so much of the historical and social science literature, of course, has been the territory of the state (the school map, again), and the primary social group has been its associated nation. Of course, one cannot ignore the notion of the nation-state. But what the chapters that follow demonstrate is that these entities – state and nation – have been constantly defined and reconstructed by the other spatial logics put forth by the groups that they claim or with which they interact. School maps have been challenged by other mental maps. Those other groups may be fully contained within the boundaries of individual states; they may traverse the boundaries of two or more states; or they may subsume multiple states within their own boundaries. Not only have the boundaries of states been reconstructed continually, they also have varied in importance in people’s lives.

The contestation of state boundaries, at first glance, may seem to be a fairly obvious phenomenon: You will know it when you see it. One can immediately think of the disintegration of Yugoslavia’s boundaries in the early 1990s. It was perfectly clear that the old boundaries were dissolving and that this dissolution was unleashing the most vicious sort of contestation: the
Balkan Wars that consumed Croatia, Bosnia, and Serbia, including Kosovo, for the better part of the decade. But, in fact, the contestation of boundaries can be much more subtle and less immediately obvious. One way to think about these less obvious, but still insidious challenges to state boundaries is through a central institution of the state, the law. For states, probably nothing constitutes them more than law, the rules of conduct that prescribe proper behavior of its members and the control implied by the enforcement of the codes. Not only does law set out the ways of doing things, it also projects an essential part of the image of the state, as when it denotes the whole body of rules, institutions (such as courts) associated with them, and their affective component (as in “respect for the law”). People are classified by whether they stay within state laws (law-abiding) or step outside them (lawbreakers). State law, then, both prescribes behavior within the boundaries of the state and symbolically demarks those boundaries by signifying the realm and limits of the state’s law.

When others put forward an alternative code to state law – let’s say, that of a street gang – they contest not only the code itself but the realm and its limits suggested by the law. That challenge puts forward an alternative spatial logic to that offered by the state’s borders; in the case of a gang, perhaps a streetcorner or neighborhood. Lisa Conant’s chapter, in a case seemingly far from street gangs, suggests that the European Union, with its own spatial logic, has contested state laws that determine whether such people as long-term resident migrant workers from other member states or from third countries are entitled to certain social rights that local citizens have. And in response to clear and supposedly binding decisions by the European Court of Justice, member states have ignored, evaded, and flouted those judgments. “As the European Court of Justice attempts to blur national boundaries by creating transnational European rights and obligations,” Conant concludes, “member states actively maintain and reconstruct territorial and national borders through their law, policy, and practice.” This is every much a contestation over the binding codes associated with different boundaries as the battle between street gangs and local police. In another case of transnational boundaries, Yeşim Arat demonstrates how, from within the structures of the Turkish state, onetime prime minister Necmettin Erbakan and his Welfare Party similarly set out a transnational set of boundaries, in this case based on Islamic unity, as an alternative to the territorial construction of the state. Erbakan eventually was sentenced to a year in prison for his advocacy. No contending spatial logic today is more powerful than yet another transnational force, neoliberal capitalism, as discussed by Matthew Sparke in his chapter on the PACE lane intersecting the U.S.-Canadian border. He argues that the implications for state boundaries and the concept of citizenship are stark with “neoliberalism beginning to operate as a fundamentally unaccountable political rhetoric at the same time as it legally straitjackets democratic governance in practice.”
In the European context, Conant begins to make sense of a contest over which body properly has the final say on law, the member states or the European Union. In that case, there is a guiding set of precepts on how to resolve such questions, although Conant demonstrates that, even then, there is tremendous ambiguity and decisions made on the fly that complicate the process. For people such as migrant workers and state welfare bureaus, this ambiguity confounds attempts to figure out which are really the key boundaries. It raises the question of whether migrants from outside Europe can somehow work their way into social boundaries in Europe or will forever remain outside them. For Europeans generally, the struggle is over which law will trump and, ultimately, with which boundaries, national or pan-European, people will identify. The battle is over which mental map will take precedence in Europeans’ minds and which boundary checkpoints will prevail in determining who is an insider and who an outsider.17

In other cases of the contestation over law, the kinds of formal institutions and constitutional principles that putatively referee battles between member states and the European Court of Justice have not existed at all. Often, challenges to or flouting of law has been dismissed as plain old criminality or corruption. That is, collective lawbreaking has been seen as simple deviance from the established norm—state law—rather than the proffering of an alternative law. I think this is a mistake. Collective efforts of lawbreaking, in fact, have presented spatial logics different from the state’s, suggesting alternative mental maps and varying notions of which checkpoints are in effect; that is, the question for individuals becomes which groups with whom one is most closely allied should take precedence. In brief, behaving according to nonstate rules of conduct challenges the most fundamental claim of states, that they appropriately make or delegate the right to make the rules that guide even the minute details of people lives.

Belonging

The challenge goes beyond a calculated decision of with whom one allies, say, the members of a smuggling ring or the members of the state. Because people find the essential security that they need for their survival in social groupings—whether the state or some other group with a different spatial logic—they invest tremendous emotional capital in the group. That is one reason it is so important to have all sorts of virtual checkpoints and

Mental Maps and Virtual Checkpoints

markers delineating who is inside and who is outside. Their personal investments generate a transcendent process, transforming instrumental alliances into communities of belonging with deep affective ties. The emotional ties prompt people to acts of personal sacrifice that cannot simply be explained by their instrumental considerations. Belonging, then, has both a formal, instrumental sense attached to it – that is, one’s status – and an informal, affective component – that is, one’s sense of identity. Communities of belonging thus designate one’s external standing, one’s status, for others to see. But these communities of belonging gain succor from the affective elements associated with identity that bind people together in ways transcending their material and instrumental interests, inducing them to sacrifice for the group. For states, the status of individuals is that of citizen, and the identity is the sense of being part of the nation.

In short, the struggles over the construction of boundaries – which mental maps and checkpoints will prevail, which will take precedence – involve the most fundamental personal and social processes. These processes construct a personal sense of belonging and identity, and they provide cement to social groups by binding their members in communities of belonging, which hold together beyond people’s momentary considerations of their personal interests. Such struggles are complex affairs. No one has just one set of operative boundaries; people operate according to multiple social logics simultaneously, but they face difficult questions on the ordering of these logics and how to respond when they encounter contradictory demands. These sorts of questions cut to the heart of their status – who they are to others and where they stand in one group or another – and to their identity – whom they understand their essential selves to be, especially in terms of the others to whom they liken themselves. The chapters that follow cut into these struggles. While not at all assuming that the state simply triumphs, they do place the state in the midst of these struggles everywhere. These battles complicate the most fundamental categories of status and identity beyond kinship in today’s world: those of citizen and member of the nation.

French sociologist Dominique Schnapper, a staunch defender of the community of belonging created by state borders (i.e., the nation), captured the link between citizenship and status in the modern state: “Citizenship was not only a juridical and political attribute in the narrow sense of the term. It was certain means of acquiring social status, the necessary – even if not

always the sufficient condition – for the individual to be fully recognized as an actor in collective life.”

In a world of strangers, states represent an institutional complex aiming to provide a basis for personal safety and, by means of that sense of safety, the most meaningful social boundaries in people’s lives. “Citizenship laws,” writes Jeffrey Herbst, “… explicitly tie populations to unique, territorially defined polities.” Through citizenship, states provide a status packaged with common legal standing, rights, and responsibilities designed to insure one’s security and to maintain the state’s ability to continue providing a secure environment. Beyond this legal dimension and the instrumental contract-like relationship between state and subject that it implies, citizenship provides the basis for a stronger sense of belonging, conveying loyalty to the social group represented by the state and its particular boundaries, the nation. Rogers Brubaker put it this way: “Debates about citizenship, in the age of the nation-state, are debates about nationhood – about what it means, and what it ought to mean, to belong to a nation-state.” State borders thus are intended to mark both the limits of the state as an institutional complex and the limits of the primary community of belonging, the nation. In Sparke’s words in his chapter on the PACE lane, “Borders, then, are hybrid sites where the reciprocal ties between the social and cultural definition of belonging to a nation and the bureaucratic regulation of belonging to a state – ties that form the very basis of modern citizenship – are worked out and written out in space.”

Mazzini, the great Italian nationalist of the nineteenth century, sought to capture the connection between citizen (status) and nation (identity). “A nation,” he stated, “is the universality of citizens speaking the same tongue.” But that connection between citizenship and member of the nation, mediated by a common language, has never been easily achieved.

Mary Callahan’s chapter in this volume demonstrates the explosive relationship between language and citizenship in contemporary Burma. Imposition of a single language, Burmese, on a multilingual population lay at the center of the military regime’s ambitions to “create new boundaries that would define the terms under which the population throughout the country could belong, be left alone, or be heard. At the heart of the regime’s reconstruction process was

22 Herbst, States and Power in Africa.
24 Encarta Book of Quotations (Microsoft Corporation, 1999).