THE ENCLAVE, THE CITADEL, AND THE GHETTO
What Has Changed in the Post-Fordist U.S. City

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The author defines *classic ghetto* as the result of the involuntary spatial segregation of a group that stands in a subordinate political and social relationship to its surrounding society, the *enclave* as a voluntarily developed spatial concentration of a group for purposes of promoting the welfare of its members, and the *citadel* as created by a dominant group to protect or enhance its superior position. The author describes a new phenomenon, connected to global economic changes: the *outcast ghetto*, inhabited by those excluded from the mainstream economy by the forces of macroeconomic developments. The distinction among these differing forms of spatial separation is crucial for a number of public policies.

The following four major points constitute the basis of this article:

1. The black ghetto of today is a substantially different ghetto from the *classic ghetto*: It is an *outcast ghetto*, and those within it are subject to exclusion from the mainstream of the economic, social, and political life of the city;
2. The immigrant and cultural enclaves of many cities differ fundamentally from the ghetto in its classic form and in its outcast form;
3. *Citadels* established by higher-income, higher status groups, in turn, differ from such enclaves; and
4. The distinctions between these different forms of ethnically and class-defined spatial concentrations of population are crucial for public policy.

Space and race play a new role in the dynamics of urban poverty in the United States today. The outcast ghetto, the ghetto of the excluded, is one of its chief new characteristics. It reflects a new process of exclusion of a portion of the population from the mainstream of society. It is part of a broader

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pattern that makes up the post-Fordist city, a term I use here as shorthand to describe at least the major cities of technologically developed countries since the late 1960s or early 1970s, the cities variously characterized as postindustrial, post-Keynesian, in the global era, postwelfare, dual, and quartered. Such cities are influenced by four linked processes in new forms and directions today: technological change, internationalization, concentration of ownership, and privatization of the public sphere. Space and race determine how these processes will affect their victims. Here, I look at the consequences, rather than the causes, of these processes.

The argument presented here is as follows: Space and race have been combined in the United States today to produce a new ghetto that is different from the ghettos of the past and from the immigrant enclaves of the past and present. The U.S. ghetto today is an outcast ghetto, differing in its definition and role from the historic black ghettos in that its inhabitants are the excluded and the castaway rather than the subordinated and restricted. It also differs dramatically from the enclave, which is a quite different spatial concentration that also has various forms: imperial enclaves, exclusionary enclaves, immigrant enclaves, and cultural enclaves. The role of the state in the contemporary process of spatial separation is also new; it reinforces and hardens the effect of market forces rather than, as has sometimes been the case under various pressures, trying to counter them. Thus the differentiation between a ghetto and an enclave is crucial for policy; the current discussion around Empowerment Zones is an example.

Two points need to be emphasized. First, no form of ghettoization or enclave formation is entirely new (see Marcuse 1993b). Ghettos and enclaves have existed, in various forms, since time immemorial. Some of the causes of the new outcast ghetto are indeed new, but other ingredients in its composition are old: Racism is not new, exploitation is not new, and differentiation by class and status are not new. Thus some of the remedies are likely not new as well—to be ones that were suggested earlier but not carried out. Policy responses cannot be only to what is new; they must also address longer duration and more deeply seated roots. Nevertheless, the focus here is on what is new, because problems cannot be dealt with in general but only in their specific and concrete settings. Those settings, together with the precise way those problems are manifest, must be understood for effective analysis. The chances are that a thorough remedy will involve some cures that are old and some that are new.

The second point needing emphasis is that no form of ghetto or enclave is entirely "pure": Each is a mix; the outcast ghetto will have characteristics of the classic ghetto, and its residents will not all be excluded from the life of the city's mainstream. Every ghetto will have some features of an enclave,
and every enclave will have some features of a ghetto. The minimum characteristic of the ghetto is that it is a spatially separate area. Yet that description lacks two other key components: what group or groups are involved and what the relations of the area, the space, is to the rest of the city.\(^5\) Without these components, the spatially separate area of movie stars in Beverly Hills or of the elderly in retirement communities could be described as a ghetto; those within Washington’s Beltway could be described as living in the ghetto in which the commander-in-chief lives, and the privates in Fort Dix could be considered ghettoized.

The term *hyperghetto* presents a different problem, in some usages. Wacquant (1993, 367) has suggested the term as the description of a “reconfigured,centred and spatially differentiated ghetto.” However, that description specifically excises the spatial component: If a ghetto can be decentered, it no longer refers to a place or set of places but, rather, to a set of persons.\(^6\) Yet precisely because of that switch, the description also makes an important positive contribution: Because it is not simply space that defines the ghetto, it must be some relationship of a set of persons—a group—to others and to the society at large that is the ghetto’s unifying characteristic. That relationship is one of subjection, of inferiority; the ghetto relationship is one imposed from the outside by those with more power upon those with less, the spatial segregation being a part of that pattern. (Other uses of the term hyperghetto are considered later.) Further, the inferiority of the group in the classic ghetto is not one based on ability, merit, natural weakness, or culture. The ghetto cannot be defined as the spatial location of those involved in a culture of poverty. Wilson (1985, 158) disposed of the culture-of-poverty arguments succinctly and eloquently:

Different ethnic behaviors and outcomes are largely due to different opportunities and external obstacles against advancement—which were determined by different historical and material circumstances. . . . [C]ultural values do not ultimately determine behavior or success. Rather, cultural values emerge from specific circumstances and life chances and reflect one’s position in the class structure. . . . [B]ehavior described as socially pathological and associated with lower-class minorities should be analyzed not as a cultural aberration but as a symptom of class inequality. . . . As Herbert Gans states: “Some behavioral norms are more persistent than others, but over the long run, all of the norms and aspirations by which people live are non-persistent: they rise and fall with changes in situations.”

The negative aspect of the culture of the ghetto is defined by external forces, not by either the choice or the voluntary actions of the ghetto’s residents.

Another characteristic of the classic ghetto, as that term has been historically understood, is that the group that is ghettoized is defined by some
characteristic defined by the outside world and not a matter of choice for those thus separated out. Race is the typical example, in all the vagueness of that term; national origin, color, facial features, embedded religious traditions, language, and ethnicity will also do. Members of the group are not free to change that characteristic, to opt to be out of the group. No individual action puts them within it, and no individual action can take them out. Thus a prison is, in a sense, the confined location of a group held to be inferior by the surrounding society, but prisoners are there, at least in legal theory, because of their individual acts, not their group characteristics. In this sense, there are no artists’ ghettos or white-collar ghettos comparable to black, Jewish, or “native” ghettos in colonial countries.

A full definition of ghetto, then, would necessarily include three elements: spatial separation, inferiority, and involuntary definition of identity, usually as racial. Thus a formal definition of a ghetto, as the term is used here, is as follows:

> A ghetto is a spatially concentrated area used to separate and to limit a particular involuntarily defined population group (usually by race) held to be, and treated as, inferior by the dominant society.

This definition leaves open a number of quantitative questions. Two variables are often considered: the percentage that a particular group forms of the total population of a given area and the percentage of that population group that resides in that or such areas. Thus the Department of Housing and Urban Development considers an area racially impacted (ghettoized) if a majority of its residents are of a particular group. Massey and Denton’s (1993, 18) definition, “a set of neighborhoods that are exclusively inhabited by members of one group, within which virtually all members of that group live,” requires high figures for both: “virtually all” members of a population group must live in areas “exclusively” occupied by members of that group. Both factors are clearly relevant; the precise figures chosen for each will depend on the context and the purpose of the use and will necessarily be largely arbitrary.

**THE OUTCAST GHETTO**

The black ghettos of major U.S. cities today add something new to the definition of the classic ghetto. An examination of the literature reveals that the attitudes toward the ghetto have changed within the last 50 years. Little of the recent writing on the subject has focused on the qualitative change that the ghetto in the United States has undergone in the transition from the Fordist
to the post-Fordist city. In two of the best recent books, the focus was more on the persistence and intensity of segregation and ghettoization than on changes in its character (Massey and Denton 1993).\textsuperscript{10} Although some scholars (e.g., Goldsmith and Blakely 1992) link the ghetto with the Latino barrio, most view the ghetto in the United States as strictly a phenomenon of black residence. Thus Massey and Denton (1993, 18-19) could say that “no ethnic or racial group in the history of the United States, except one, has ever experienced ghettoization, even briefly. For urban blacks, the ghetto has been the paradigmatic residential configuration for at least eighty years.”

That there have been recent changes within these spacial concentrations of racial/ethnic groups has been little explored. Adding “hyper” to ghetto, however, suggests that something new is happening; hypersegregation might be considered as referring to a new stage in the development of the United States ghetto. Yet that is not how the term has generally been used; rather, it has come into use to differentiate, in purely quantitative terms, areas of extreme differentiation on one or more scales from areas of lesser differentiation.\textsuperscript{11} The worsening patterns that Massey and Denton (1993) demonstrated and discussed do, however, lend credence to the belief that also comes through in their careful study, that something new is happening.

Wilson (1985, 1990) focused attention on changes in the character of the ghetto in the 1970s and, in a detailed but somewhat neglected portion of his major study, pointed to their deeper causes in the economic changes of the middle of the postwar period. The debates he generated, however, focused more on short-term issues. Wilson emphasized that the out-migration of middle-class blacks from older areas of racial concentration in the 1970s as a result of the fair housing successes of the civil rights movement of the 1960s left behind a new form of ghetto that produced what he first called the underclass (Wilson 1985) and more recently called the ghetto poor (Wilson 1990). Thus, although Wilson began his explanatory account of the new ghetto with the major economic and social changes that are often characterized as the advent of post-Fordism, he also directed the explanation for changes in the role of the ghetto to narrower issues of demographics and population movement. And that more limited explanation has unleashed its own controversy; some have argued that the out-migration he referenced is largely a chimera and that middle-class blacks remain segregated within black ghettos as much as poor blacks (see, e.g., Fainstein 1993; Massey and Denton 1993). The debate is an important one, and I shall return to it.

I wish to argue here that the post-Fordist ghetto is new\textsuperscript{12} in that it has become what might be called an outcast ghetto, a ghetto of the excluded, rather than of the dominated and exploited or of those only marginally useful.\textsuperscript{13} The outcast ghetto adds a new dimension to the classic ghetto: a
specific relationship between the particular population group and the dominant society that is economically as well as spatially exclusionary.\textsuperscript{14}

A historical overview is perhaps the best way to make the point. In the past, ghetto residents have been segregated spatially but not excluded from playing a role in the economy in which they lived and worked. In Sennett’s (1994) fascinating account of the origins, in 1516, of the ghetto that added the word to the language\textsuperscript{15}—the ghetto of Venice—it is clear that Jews left the ghetto each morning to transact business in Venice, returning to the ghetto only in the evening, and were an essential part of the Venetian economy. Indeed, there was a significant number of non-Jews who came into the ghetto each day to work or on business; in 1638, according to Lestchinsky (1930-1935), 4,000 Christians worked in Jewish factories there. The Venice ghetto was not an outcast ghetto; indeed, it had precisely the two characteristics that distinguish the older ghetto from the new outcast ghetto: ties to the mainstream of economic life in the outside society and internal resources (partly as a consequence), permitting its residents to draw strength from their very ghettoization. Thus, as Sennett (1994, 12) wrote, the story of the Jews of Venice “is the story of a people who were segregated against their will, but who then made new forms of community from their separateness and who acquired an interest, as social actors, in being segregated.”

Those in the ghetto were separated, indeed, and were held inferior by the construction of the ghetto, but they remained a key part of the larger society and were not cast out of it. It was indeed characteristic of premodern societies that social separation and economic integration were not seen as inconsistent. Anderson (1991, 81) wrote about “common citizenship” as a component of the contemporary imagined communities, along with nation-states and republican institutions, as opposed to their conceptual opposites, “subjecthoods, serfdoms, and ghettos.” Subjects, serfs, and the ghettoized are not citizens, but they are essential components of the societies whose economies they serve. In the outcast ghetto, the pattern is reversed; those confined there are perhaps formally citizens, but they are not part of the mainstream economy. Their relation to the fringes of the informal economy is discussed later, in the comparison with the immigrant enclave.

In the earliest full discussion of the ghetto in the sociological literature in the United States, Wirth (1928, 85, 98 [also cited in King 1976, 4D]) described the ghetto in almost glowing terms:

The ghetto . . . indicates the ways in which cultural groups give expression to their own heritage when transplanted to a strange habitat; it evidences . . . the forces through which the community maintains its integrity and continuity. . . . [T]he spatially separated and socially isolated community seemed to offer the best opportunity for following their religious precepts, their established ritual
and diet, and the numerous functions which tied the individual to familial and communal institutions. . . . The ghetto . . . was a self-perpetuating group to such an extent that it may be properly called a closed community. . . . [It is . . . a cultural community] can be completely understood only if it is viewed as a sociopsychological, as well as an ecological phenomenon: for it is not merely a physical fact, but also a state of mind.

Wirth had in mind the immigrant concentrations of cities like Chicago and, in this sense, was referring more to what is here called an enclave than a ghetto. But that very fact is noteworthy. By the time he was writing, Harlem had already achieved international recognition as the center of black life, and the South Side of Chicago was clearly Negro. As Weaver (1948, 3) wrote, “By the outbreak of World War I, the larger centers of Negro population in the North had established segregated community facilities of various types. . . . Black Belts had appeared.” By 1925, densities of black areas in Chicago were twice the density of whites; in Philadelphia, almost four times; in Manhattan, one and a half times. Yet Wirth did not deem it necessary to pay attention to the differences between the classic immigrant enclaves he described and the black ghettos of these cities.

Interestingly enough, one might argue that in the United States, the ghetto did not arise until there was, in reality, a claim by the former slaves to full “common citizenship.” As Myrdal (1944, 621) pointed out in his landmark study, the patterns of segregation were quite different in the antebellum South than in the post-civil-war North: “Southern whites do not want Negroes to be completely isolated from them: they derive many advantages from their proximity. . . . [T]here is also segregation, but the segregation is based on what we may term ‘ceremonial’ distance rather than spatial distance.”

What Myrdal called the racial etiquette of the South, understood by both blacks and whites, was sufficient to maintain the relationships of subordination and domination. When that breaks down, as it did after Reconstruction—when the claim to equal treatment, equal access, and equal rights becomes prevalent among blacks—the necessity for ghettoization in its classic forms arises. Abrams (1955, 18ff [as summarized by Morrill 1965, 339-40]), for instance, argued,

During the nineteenth century the American Negro population, in this country from the beginning but accustomed to servitude, remained predominantly southern and rural, and those who did move lived in small spatial concentrations about the cities. The Negro ghetto did not exist. Even in southern cities the Negroes, largely in the service of whites, lived side by side with the white majority. Rather suddenly, with the social upheaval and employment opportunities of World War II, Negro discontent grew, and large-scale migration began from the rural south to the urban north.
This new and fuller sense of having a formal claim on full participation, of being artificially separated spatially from that of which they are a part economically and socially, can be seen in Weaver’s (1948, 7) definition, given what was perhaps the last moment that full integration of blacks into U.S. society seemed a practical goal, immediately after the end of World War II:

The modern American ghetto is . . . not, as the ghetto of old, an area which houses a people concerned with perpetuation of a peculiar (and different) culture. It is no longer composed of black people almost all of whom are too poor to afford decent shelter. The Negro ghetto of today is made up of people who are American to the core, who are a part of the national culture and who share a common language with the majority of Americans. . . . Its inhabitants are better prepared and more anxious than ever before to enter the main stream of American Life. Residential segregation, more than any other single institution, is an impediment to their realization of this American Dream.

Thus Weaver implicitly argued that two of the three reasons—poverty, ethnic attachment, and enforced segregation—that Myrdal (1944, 619) gave for the existence of black ghettos no longer existed: Its only reason for continued existence, after World War II, was enforced segregation. Positive aspects could indeed still be attributed to the ghetto, but as responses to an undesirable and hopefully dwindling reality: the racism of white society. Thus Drake and Cayton (1945 [cited in Boal 1976, 47]) presented the ghetto as a place where black people could “escape from the tensions of contact with white people,” a tension that was itself the subject of attack and was hoped would disappear. Even Clark (1965), in his later and much more pessimistic view of the ghetto, wrote that “there is considerable psychological safety in the ‘ghetto’: there one lives among one’s own and does not risk rejection among strangers.” That is not presented as any reason to preserve the ghetto, however; its dissolution remains the objective. The tradition is that presented in Park, Burgess, and McKenzie ([1925] 1984) in which all ethnic groups in U.S. cities were seen as passing through a series of stages from contact and competition to conflict to assimilation as the ultimate (and positively valued) end result, all as part of a natural and “organic” development process.

Clark’s (1965, 11) description of the ghetto 17 years after Weaver’s (1948) presented a more somber picture:

The dark ghetto’s invisible walls have been erected by the white society, by those who have power, both to confine those who have no power and to perpetuate their powerlessness. The dark ghettos are social, political, educational, and—above all—economic colonies. Their inhabitants are subject peoples, victims of the greed, cruelty, insensitivity, guilt, and fear of their masters.
Clark wrote of the ghetto presciently, just at the point when its character was beginning to change. Powerlessness was no part of the feeling of Weaver's ghetto—and certainly not of Harlem, the capital of black America in the 1920s. It became characteristic of pictures of the ghetto by the late 1960s but still in an integrationist context. Clark had, after all, given key support for the plaintiffs in the school desegregation cases that outlawed legal segregation of public schools in 1955. The colonies are linked to the colonizers; the masters have an interest in (profit from) the work of the subject peoples. That is what has changed in the post-Fordist city. Those in today's black ghettos are not productive for their masters; their masters get no benefit from their existence. As far as the dominant society is concerned, they are only a drain on public and private resources, they are a threat to social peace, and they fulfill no useful social role. They are outcasts; hence the term outcast ghetto. The appropriate historical analogy for the outcast ghetto is more the leper colony than the medieval Jewish ghetto.

Figures tell part of the story. In the area designated as an empowerment zone in Harlem and the Bronx in New York City, for instance, 42% of all residents lived below the poverty level, 18% were officially counted as unemployed, and a much higher percentage was discouraged and not even looking for jobs: only 51% were actually in the labor force. Of all households, 27% were headed by a single woman, and more than one-third of all households were receiving public assistance. The death rate was much higher than in the city as a whole; black men living in Harlem were less likely to reach the age of 65 than men in Bangladesh. New York City is hardly alone: a solid recent study of Philadelphia, for instance, shows that, in 1980, 47.5% of blacks living in the ghetto were on public assistance, 17% of men aged 25-44 years were unemployed, and 33.3% were not in the labor force (Jargowsky and Bane 1991, 248); 44.3% of black families had single parents (p. 246). Figures on rates of incarceration through the judicial system, on victimization by crime, on drug abuse, or limited education, could be cited endlessly in support.

Beyond the figures, however, the composition of the outcast ghetto differs from its predecessors and from the immigrant and ethnic enclaves discussed later, as well as in the crucial area of social organization. Wacquant (1993, 368) has described some of the key characteristics of the outcast ghetto elegantly; he wrote about “lack of social potency . . . low organization density . . . the massive inferiority of its resident institutions . . . de-solidarizing effects . . . an impossible community, perpetually divided against [itself].”

The distinction from the earlier descriptions of Harlem in, for example, the biographies of Adam Clayton Powell, is clear. In Chicago, according to Wood (1992, 3),
the black ghetto... was still a functioning community as late as 1966. Blacks still provided most of the community services, they still owned the small shops and businesses, and black professionals still provided help to black citizens. There was a vertical integration.

After that period, the Chicago ghetto became the example Wilson (1990, 3) used for the socially destructive ghetto.

A peculiar irony accompanies the evolution of the outcast ghetto. As its residents are more and more cast out, marginalized, unemployed, and unwanted by the dominant forces in society, their internal cohesion is weakened, but the importance of place to them may even be strengthened. As real economic bonds—bonds of a common and viable education, cultural life, work and community building—are eroded, the bonds a common residential area might provide increase. Thus, even if the formal internal organizational structure of Harlem appears weakened, its residents’ turf allegiance is strengthened—defensively, it is true, and as a last resort, perhaps, but nevertheless. Displacement from a neighborhood was not a concern in the early slum clearance projects of the 1930s; slums became fiercely contested terrain just as their internal coherence and strength weakened.21

A parallel ambiguity exists as to the economic life of the outcast ghetto. The ghetto, of course, has an economy; its residents would not survive without an extensive network of economic activity. It is sometimes characterized as part of the informal economy, but that description is misleading. Some parts of the ghetto are indeed involved at the margins of the primary economy—in very low-paying jobs, in part-time or occasional labor, and in illegal activities dependent on the mainstream market such as drug dealing. But the characteristic of the economy of the outcast ghetto is its separation from that of the mainstream. Merchants on 125th street in Harlem sell to residents of Harlem; livery cab services are used primarily north of 110th street, largely by law; and trade and services are directed at the black market. It is not an inconsequential market, but it is largely a separate one. Unlike in earlier times, Harlem is not a magnet for middle-class blacks who may live elsewhere; it is isolated. The painful aspect of this development appears in the discussions of economic development in the ghetto, which is taken up briefly in the conclusion to this article: The best hope for increased incomes for many in the ghetto may well appear to lie precisely in the development of those activities and enterprises that rely on separation from the mainstream to establish their markets.

Frequently, ethnicity is defined as running as a vertical division across the horizontal divisions of class; each cell may be defined as an ethclass (Glazer and Gordon 1964, 53). Then, as Boal (1976, 55) suggested, “each ethclass has the potential for residential segregation from other members of the same
social class on the basis of ethnic differences, and from other members of the same ethnic group on the basis of social class.” The outcast ghetto is an ethclass ghetto in a way in which neither the earlier black ghetto nor the classic immigrant ghetto was an ethclass ghetto. The outcast ghetto is new and unique in that it is differentiated horizontally and vertically, with each division being sharp—race perhaps as before but class in a new sense, connected with the exclusion that contemporary organization of the economic system has produced for a significant part of the population. Thus a formal definition of the outcast ghetto might be as follows:

An outcast ghetto is a ghetto in which ethnicity is combined with class in a spatially concentrated area with residents who are excluded from the mainstream of the economic life of the surrounding society, which does not profit significantly from its existence.

From abroad, Habermas (1970, 108-109) defined the situation accurately, drawing political conclusions:

Underprivileged groups are not social classes, nor do they ever even potentially represent the mass of the population. Their disfranchisement and pauperization no longer coincide with exploitation, because the system does not live off their labor. They can represent at most a past phase of exploitation. But they cannot through the withdrawal of cooperation attain the demands that they legitimately put forward. That is why these demands retain an appellative character. In the case of long-term nonconsideration of their legitimate demands underprivileged groups can in extreme situations react with desperate destruction and self-destruction. But as long as no coalitions are made with privileged groups, such a civil war lacks the chance of revolutionary success that class struggle possesses.

An important note bears repeating here. The concepts put forward are ideal types. No actual ghetto will have all the characteristics of either the classic or the outcast ghetto (or of the enclave or citadel, as hereafter discussed). There will always be a mix of characteristics. This is particularly true of the outcast ghetto. Even in the most extreme of the outcast ghettos that now exist (as in New York City, for example), there is much that is directly connected with the outside economy, with many middle-class and working-class individuals and families, with a substantial social network, and with many strong and stable institutions of social, economic, religious, and political life. The point is particularly important because of the danger of the use of the concept to discredit the residents of those ghettos approaching the outcast status and to argue that either paternalistic or custodial policies are required toward them. The analysis might thus be used to oppose democratic self-governance, full political participation, and measures toward self-empowerment. That
would be a false conclusion to draw. Also, as far as its spatial form is concerned, even those ghettos most nearly approaching outcast status house many individuals who are in no sense excluded and who are gainfully and productively employed in mainstream enterprises, public and private. The formation of the outcast ghetto is a tendency, and a dynamic one at that. Conceivably, that tendency might at some time reach the stage of the complete breakdown that Wilson (1990) or Wacquant (1993) described, but that is far from the situation today. The outcast ghetto remains a growing and dangerous tendency and is in danger of becoming overwhelming—but that is not yet the case.

THE ENCLAVE AND THE Ghetto

Not every contemporary space of racial or ethnic concentration is a ghetto as I use the term here, however, and the differences are crucial for historic understanding and for public policy. The issue of immigrant ghettos has become highly visible recently, in part through more detailed examinations of the complexities of Los Angeles and its riots and in part through work on specific immigrant enclaves such as Cubans in Miami. An understanding of the difference between the black ghettos and immigrant enclaves in the United States today is important both for analytic clarity and for policy, because the assumption that blacks should behave like immigrants and that black ghettos ought to be stepping stones toward self-organization and upward mobility, as immigrant enclaves are thought to be, plays a major role in attitudes toward blacks. Its ultimate expression is blaming the victim: "If Koreans can do it, why can’t blacks? It’s their own fault if they don’t." I use the term black here, instead of African-American in this article to emphasize the point; although African-American highlights a positive ethnic identity linked to a country or continent of origin and thus establishes a basis for identity and a claim for equality of treatment that has strong positive value, the issue here is, rather, the relationship with the dominant group(s). For that purpose, African-American suggests a similarity with Korean-American or Italian-American that is misleading. Blacks are not immigrants, and their position is markedly different from that of many other minority groups. The black ghetto is not likely to be similar to an immigrant enclave.

The spatial patterns reflect the difference. Figure 1 shows the distribution of the black population in New York City; its concentration is striking. Figure 2 shows the distribution of the Asian population; it also has areas of concentration but also shows much dispersion. The Asian pattern is more that of a set of enclaves; the black pattern reflects ghettoization in its harshest form.
Figure 1: New York City Residential Patterns: Black Population
NOTE: Figure excludes Staten Island (data are only for Brooklyn, Bronx, Manhattan, and Queens). Each dot represents .01% of the population shown.

Space is at the heart of the matter. If ethnic enclaves are not spatially defined at all but are really ethnic economies not spatially limited, segregation and ghettoization are not major issues. Nonspatially separated ethnic activi-
ties are by definition at least spatially connected to nonethnic economic activity—are at least economically integrated into the wider economy. Thus Sanders and Nee's (1987) definition, for statistical purposes, that all Chinese
living in San Francisco are members of a Chinese enclave begs the central question here: whether spatial separation within the city has a positive value. Likewise, Wacquant's (1993, 367) suggestion of the possible existence of a “reconfigured, decentered and spatially differentiated ghetto or ‘hyper-ghetto,’” is provocative and potentially useful at least as a metaphor, but it is beside the point if the specific question is the role of spatial separation.

The term enclave refers to those areas in which immigrants or other groups have congregated; enclaves are seen as having positive value, as compared to ghettos, which have a clearly pejorative connotation. Historically, ghetto can have a positive aspect; for example, Sennett (1992, 40) presented the ghetto as “a space at once a space of repression and a space of identification”—people have pride in Harlem at the same time as they condemn segregation. By the same token, enclave can have a negative aspect: Its original use, derived from the word enclosure, was to designate part of a city or country surrounded by foreign territory, typically an imperial enclave in a colonial country. It was thus both dominant and defensive; it suggested power but also fear and limitation.  

Thus, although enclave and ghetto are two-sided concepts, enclave is here used to describe those spaces with a primarily positive meaning for their residents, and ghetto is used to denote those with a predominantly negative meaning. A formal definition (some of the nuances are spelled out later) would be as follows:

An enclave is a spatially concentrated area in which members of a particular population group, self-defined by ethnicity or religion or otherwise, congregate as a means of enhancing their economic, social, political and/or cultural development.

It is important to recall again that all spaces of concentrated activity share some characteristics of a ghetto and some of an enclave. Pure types do not exist. Any given spatial concentration will have strengths and weaknesses for its residents. Examples are numerous: the Jewish ghetto of Warsaw as a site both of control and of insurrection, the similar role of Casbahs in Algeria (Taber 1970, 138), the divisions of Belfast, and so forth. Hobsbawm (1969) and Piven and Cloward (1974) made similar, if more controversial, arguments as to the black ghetto in the United States. Archer (1995, 26) described in some detail how the residents of Black Town in North Calcutta found it in their larger interest that Europeans be disinclined to venture into the “Black Town” too far or too often. . . . Not only would it help to sustain some economic advantage for Indian producers and traders by discouraging direct European involvement (better to leave negotiations to a dubash or banian). It also would
deter Europeans from having the knowledge of the urban fabric and its people necessary for effective intervention and control.

Steps in the Third Empire to break up those working-class districts in which cobblestones had been used as barricades in various revolutionary moments show awareness of the same potential to use space for resistance; Kostof (1992, 103) put it very simply: "[Baron] Haussmann's enemy was the quartier, the long-lived, independent-spirited neighborhood fabric of Old Paris." This is what underlies much of the drive for assimilation of outsider groups in history.

The usage of terms here—the ghetto/enclave distinction—is not consistent with some historical usage of the word ghetto. Many of what were always called Jewish ghettos were, oddly enough, as much enclaves as ghettos. The first known legal segregation of Jews was in Speyer, where, according to Lestschinsky (1930-1935, 649), the bishop, "in order to attract Jews to the city and thus 'add to its honor,' gave them the right to have a separate residential quarter where 'they might not be readily disturbed by the insolence of the populace.'"

Immigrants have historically first settled in separate communities defined by their national origin, forming enclaves providing mutual support and an orientation to the new land. Perhaps, because such communities have always been seen as voluntary and transitional, their characteristics are not normally considered in the context of ghettoization or segregation. It was assumed that workers employed in them earned less than they would have if they had been in the mainstream workforce and that they submitted to superexploitation because they saw it as a likely way out of the enclave and into the mainstream. In many cases, the immigrant networks supported the first entry of immigrants into contact with the mainstream, such as Korean grocery stores starting up in non-Korean neighborhoods and Chinese restaurants catering to non-Chinese clientele. Immigrant networks created protected niches in which entrepreneurs could get started and build a secure base before moving into the outside world (Hannerz 1974). One finds the same phenomenon in cities throughout the world. For example, Richardson (1995, 54) wrote about how in Vladivostock, before World War I, the Chinese population lived apart from the Russian:

The millionka district with its small shops, theaters, opium dens, brothels, and hideouts for smugglers and thieves symbolized to many Russians and other Europeans all that was fascinating and unsettling about the Chinese. The city's economy depended in great measure on the small-scale services of these merchants and businessmen who inhabited this mysterious community, yet at the same time many Russians resented their success. On various occasions various local Tsarist officials launched campaigns to expel the Chinese from the city or to limit their activities there, but the Chinese remained an integral
part of Vladivostok’s commercial life, while detached from its official and legal establishment. Speaking a different language, with different traditions and a different culture, and living in their own ghetto, the Chinese were a part, yet apart from the city in which they flourished. But they, like the Koreans and Japanese, helped make Vladivostok a city unique in the Russian Empire.

In discussions about the ethnic enclaves of today, scholars are exploring a different aspect; they are discussing the comparison between those of enclave ethnicity living inside and living outside the enclave. Ethnic enclaves currently under discussion seem to show that those living in the enclave undertook their economic activity within the enclave itself but earned more than their compatriots, who were otherwise similarly situated but living outside of the enclave and employed outside it. This was the finding of Wilson and Portes (1980), Portes and Bach (1985), and Portes, Stepick, and Fernandez-Kelly (1993), who studied the experience of the Cuban community in Miami. They speculated that there was a productive attenuation of class relationships within the enclave, in which ties of ethnic solidarity resulted in employers’ providing training, skills, and upward mobility in return for initially lower wages. Portes and Bach (1985, 343) wrote that

Ethnic ties suffuse an otherwise "bare" class relationship with a sense of collective purpose. . . . But the utilization of ethnic solidarity in lieu of enforced discipline also entails reciprocal obligations. If employers can profit from the willing self-exploitation of fellow immigrants, they are also obliged to reserve for them . . . supervisory positions . . . to train them . . . and to support their . . . move into self-employment.

One might quarrel with the theoretical formulation of collective purpose as a modification of class relationships, and there have certainly been arguments about the validity of the empirical findings (Waldinger 1993). In a recent study of New York City, for instance, Gilbertson (1995, 657) found that at least for Hispanic women, “enclave employment provides women with low wages, minimal benefits, and few opportunities for advancement. . . . [E]thnic ties do not confer advantages to women workers.” More to the point here, however, is the relationship between ethnic enclaves and the ghettoization of blacks.

The issue is whether the black ghetto should be seen as an enclave, differing from the immigrant enclave in degree but not in nature. The traditional answer has generally been an implicit yes, perhaps emphasizing that the difference in degree is vast, with residential segregation being the primary culprit (see Massey and Denton 1993, 2; Weaver 1948; Logan, Alba, and McNulty 1994, 12, 16-17). And that answer is true, in part: There is an identity derived from the ghetto, analogous to that claimed for immigrant
enclaves, as a localized space, a special cultural development, a support for political leadership, and a place in which economic gains from retailing and services meet local needs. But that the existence of separated spaces creates a net plus for blacks is more and more questionable. The economies of immigrant enclaves are closely linked to the economies of the cities in which they are located; thus Koreans open stores in non-Korean neighborhoods, and Chinese open restaurants well outside Chinatown, but black ventures at a comparable scale, proportionately, cannot be found. Sassen (1990, 484) flatly stated that the "recent development in immigrant communities . . . the expansion of an informal economy . . . contrasts sharply with the growth of an underclass in black neighborhoods." Today's black ghetto is a ghetto, not an enclave, even if those confined to it are sometimes able to marshal strength from that very confinement.

South Africa today presents the issue of ghetto versus enclave in particularly critical form. The enclave argument is strong: According to Scott (1992, 97),

As South Africa moves into the twenty-first century, it is apparent that an increasing component of the urban fabric will be informal in character. . . . Constructive efforts are required in both state and private sectors to create the legal machinery that allows for place-based informal communities to establish a sense of identity what could be harnessed as a constructive force in the creation of a democratic society in the post-apartheid era.

The logic of building for the middle class in black townships was already suggested in the White Paper of 1986. That produced a racially defined ghetto crossing class lines; its enclave character was enhanced. Refusing to invest further in black townships—at least beyond immediate improvements to bring conditions above some minimum threshold of sanitary services—stimulates integration of the black middle class into nonblack communities but produces U.S.-style ghettos in the townships in which race and class come together in space.

All enclaves are not alike, and one might distinguish two broad categories: the immigrant ethnic enclave and the cultural, or lifestyle, enclave. The old Jewish Lower East Side of New York City differs, for instance, from the gay areas of Greenwich Village, and the Korean sections of Queens differ from the Hasidic community of Williamsburg. The former were transitional; the latter are likely to be permanent. The former were seen as a way of moving toward integration and upward mobility in the society as a whole, in which moving out of the enclave was seen as a sign of success; in the latter, people congregate because they wish to be together and generally to preserve and strengthen the separate characteristics that underlie their sense of identity. One might call the first an immigrant enclave and the second, a cultural
enclave. It should be emphasized that just as each ghetto has some elements of an enclave in it and each enclave, some elements of a ghetto, so does each immigrant enclave have something of the cultural about it and each cultural enclave have something of the transitional feeling, even if undesired, of the immigrant.

THE CITADEL AND THE ENCLAVE

Enclave was not originally used to refer to immigrant areas of concentration but, rather, to any group of one ethnicity living in an area predominantly of another ethnicity.36 Its most frequent usage was as a description of the enclave established by an imperial country in its colony. Thus one spoke of the British enclaves throughout the empire, such as the one in Canton, a protected settlement on an island in the Pearl River, or the one in Delhi, which became New Delhi (King 1976, 1985). In this usage, it meant a place that was superior to its surroundings, a place that dominated them.

That description of an imperial enclave is quite inconsistent with the picture of an immigrant enclave as I have used it here. Those in an immigrant enclave are struggling to make their way, are entering into the structures of the surrounding society, not trying to dominate or refashion it. To use the word enclave to denote both the classic immigrant enclave and the imperial enclave is confusing; it describes a physical arrangement of an area of spatial concentration of a population group but not the relationships that exist between those inside and those outside. If one wants to find a term that analogizes certain spatial arrangements within a contemporary city to those within the colonial city, the term enclave is misleading.

Friedmann and Wolff (1982, 325) introduced the term citadel to mean precisely such an imperial arrangement. But they used the term narrowly: “The citadel serves the specific needs of the transnational elites and their immediate retinues who rule the city’s economic life.” Yet not only those at the very top of the international hierarchy have created special areas for themselves that are symbolically or actually fortified against intrusion by the poorer and lower status people outside. Both the sociological and the popular literature is replete with descriptions of the new gated communities, in which private security guards, high-tech surveillance systems, and warning signs are all aimed at controlling entry and keeping “undesirables” out.37 Generally, such fortified communities consist of one-family homes, and in some communities, specific higher-income neighborhoods are literally fenced off for the protection of their residents;38 but one finds the exact equivalent in luxury high-rise apartment buildings in New York City or Chicago or San Francisco:
Outer doors controlled by closed-circuit television cameras, doormen who double as security personnel, controlled egress from elevators, and combination locks on entry to underground garage space serve to protect residents.

An alternate term for citadel that has come to be widely used to describe such places is fortified. Goetz (1996) wrote about the “forting up” of the American urban landscape, Blakeley and Snyder (1995) titled their study *Fortress America*, and Judd (1995) titled his *The New Walled Cities*. Elsewhere, I have used the term stockade to describe walls—literal, social, and symbolic—erected around such areas and used the stockade’s relationship to the fortress to justify the metaphor (Marcuse 1997). The fortress, as so used, is identical to what is referred to here as citadel. The formal definition of a citadel, then, paralleling the definition of ghetto and enclave, would be as follows:

*A citadel is a spatially concentrated area in which members of a particular population group, defined by its position of superiority, in power, wealth, or status, in relation to its neighbors, congregate as a means of protecting or enhancing that position.*

Among the various types of citadels that can be found in the contemporary United States, some are indeed at the pinnacle of the economic, social, and political hierarchy: those areas Friedmann and Wolff (1982) designated as citadels. It may be useful to distinguish these from those citadels erected by those who are high enough in the hierarchy to be privileged in the society but not at the pinnacle, who are insecure enough to want protection from those below. In New York, Donald Trump’s high-rise luxury condominiums on Fifth Avenue can be distinguished from the upper-middle-class apartment buildings on the upper west side of Manhattan; in California, the heavily guarded private estates of the very wealthy in Pacific Palisades or San Clemente are not the same as the retirement walled communities or insular suburban developments of Brentwood and San Diego. The former serve to dominate and to protect bastions of power and influence, and the latter serve simply to protect groups feeling vulnerable, by excluding those different from themselves. One might call those at the peak imperial citadels and those below them exclusionary enclaves. The dividing line between the two is not a sharp one, but the ideal types are clearly different.

The mixed characteristics of most forms of spatial concentration only apply in limited form here. Ghettos and enclaves share some characteristics, but the differentiation between citadels and ghettos is stark: One is at the top of a hierarchy; the other, at the bottom. Further, citadels are not simply an extreme form of an immigrant or a cultural enclave. Such enclaves do not have an exclusionary purpose. Strangers—nonimmigrants or those of differ-
ent cultures—are not excluded, are not even unwelcome. There may be some element of discomfort for a stranger moving into such an enclave, but in fact, most enclaves harbor many who do not belong to the majority group. Immigrant enclaves often have members with widely different national origins in their midst, and cultural enclaves are generally interspersed, although concentrated, in areas in which the majority is often dissimilar. Citadels, by contrast, are by their nature exclusionary; whatever cultural homogeneity they may possess is more of class than of ethnicity or belief. Their relationship with those outside is one of superiority, not simply of difference.

GHETTO, ENCLAVE, AND CITADEL: TOWARD A TAXONOMY

In a systematic examination of the various historical forms of spatial separation within urban areas, one needs to consider a substantial number of factors. A taxonomy is not an explanation; it is an attempt to systematize classification in aid of explanation. Thus far, I have presented the simple tripartite division, ghetto/enclave/citadel, but clearly the matter is more complicated than that, as the discussion has already shown. In the hope of developing a clarity in the use of terms and as an aid to further discussion, then, I suggest the taxonomy shown in Table 1. Each of the five characteristics listed as column headings in the table require definition.

SPATIAL FORMATION

Of course, a characteristic of all enclaves and ghettos, by definition, is that they are spatially separated, but the physical form the separation takes, reflective of its economic and social characteristics, will vary widely. Here, insular is used to mean sharply separated by well-known, generally visible, boundaries that may be actual walls, as was the case with many medieval ghettos; or physical demarcations such as highways, rivers, steep slopes, blocks of buildings; or legal, such as group area boundaries in apartheid South Africa (Marcuse 1994a). Each of the spatial formations here listed is consistent with a variety of different overall spatial patterns for the cities or metropolitan areas in which they are located, which will be discussed later.

VOLUNTARY OR INVOLUNTARY

Voluntariness is a matter of degree. There may be some who obtain pleasure in living in a fortified enclave that gives them a commanding
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Example</th>
<th>Spatial Formation</th>
<th>Voluntary (Yes or No)</th>
<th>Economic Relationships</th>
<th>Social Relationships</th>
<th>Identifying Characteristic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ghettos</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Classic ghetto</td>
<td>Jewish ghettos;</td>
<td>Insular,</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Separated but linked; exploited</td>
<td>Discriminated</td>
<td>Race, color, religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Harlem, 1920</td>
<td>walled in</td>
<td></td>
<td>Excluded</td>
<td>against</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcast ghetto</td>
<td>South Bronx today</td>
<td>Insular,</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td>Discriminated</td>
<td>Race, color, class (bottom)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>walled in</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>against</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enclaves</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrant enclave</td>
<td>Chinatown;</td>
<td>Concentrated</td>
<td>Yes, seen</td>
<td>Separated but linked</td>
<td>Open</td>
<td>Nationality, ethnicity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cuban Miami</td>
<td>but mixed</td>
<td>as transitional</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Williamsburg;</td>
<td>Concentrated</td>
<td>Yes, seen</td>
<td>Various;</td>
<td>Not hierarchically</td>
<td>Culture, language,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Soho</td>
<td>but mixed</td>
<td>as permanent</td>
<td>generally integral</td>
<td>discriminating</td>
<td>religion, lifestyle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Insular,</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Integral;</td>
<td>Discriminating</td>
<td>Class (upper),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>physically</td>
<td></td>
<td>exploitative</td>
<td></td>
<td>economic status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>protected</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusionary enclave</td>
<td>Beverly Hills</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural enclave&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citadel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imperial Citadel</td>
<td>Canton;</td>
<td>Insular,</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Integral;</td>
<td>Descriminating</td>
<td>Class (upper),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trump</td>
<td>physically</td>
<td></td>
<td>exploitative</td>
<td></td>
<td>political, military power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tower</td>
<td>dominant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> Every enclave and every ghetto has aspects of cultural identity; what is meant here are those enclaves that are primarily cultural. The distinction is often neglected. See the text discussion of voluntariness and social characteristics.
position over their surroundings or who enjoy the status of a citadel, but there may be many more who would, given their first preferences, rather live more freely and less surrounded by walls. Likewise, some residents of a ghetto may find their inability to move out in fact a blessing, removing challenges and creating a inescapable solidarity. In most cases, voluntariness will be a matter of degree; enclaves, ghettos, and even citadels have some advantages and some disadvantages. At the extremes, however, the distinctions are clear.

ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS

A crude measure of the economic relations of those within the area and those without is in the location of employment: Are residents primarily or exclusively employed within the area or do they use their residence within the area to increase their opportunities without? The Venetian Jewish ghetto or Hasidic Williamsburg or Battery Park City are examples of outward-linked areas; Cuban Miami is largely inwardly oriented, and current Empowerment Zone legislation (Marcuse 1994b) clearly contemplates inward linkages.

SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS

The term social relationships is meant to cover the more or less hierarchical and more or less oppressive relationships between those within the area and those outside it. A wall may look the same surrounding an enclave of luxury garden apartments or a public housing project; the decisive difference is in the social (and economic and political) relationships between those on different sides of the wall.

Minority and majority might seem to be a first approximation to the central distinction here, but that is so only if the terms are not quantitatively but qualitatively defined. In general, those living in a ghetto will be members of a numerical minority, and those forming exclusionary enclaves may be members of a numerical majority. But the key question is relationship. If Yinger’s (1965 [cited in Boal 1976, 43]) definition is used, that “a minority is defined as a group which, regardless of where it is on the class ladder, faces barriers to the pursuit of life’s values that are greater than the barriers faced by persons otherwise equally qualified,” then the minority/majority distinction becomes directly useful here.42

Cultural differences, of course, do not have to be connected to hierarchical social differences—but it may be doubted if the two are ever really separable. Thus Wirth (1928, 19), in writing about the Jewish ghettos of the middle ages, stated that “the geographically separated and socially isolated community seemed to offer the best opportunity for following their religious precepts.”
It may be questioned whether such an opportunity was freely chosen or whether it instead represented an adaptation to an (undesired) hierarchical relationship with the non-Jewish surrounding power. On the other hand, many well-established and economically integrated groups use, according to Boal (1976, 49) "residential clustering as an aid to the conservation of ethnic characteristics"; the examples are too numerous to require repetition. The key question about social relationships is not whether they are between groups that are different but whether those differences reflect a hierarchical relationship.

IDENTIFYING CHARACTERISTIC

It should be obvious that there is no inherent systematic relationship between the identifying characteristics of a group and whether they are segregated. It may seem, in the United States, that race or color correlates completely with the excluded ghetto, but functionally, race and color are sociologically defined. There are religious ghettos and religious enclaves; Chinese people may live in separated areas with quite different relationships to the outside in Hanoi or Jakarta than they have in New York City or San Francisco. Indeed, to argue otherwise would be taking seriously physical definitions of race or ethnicity or origin—a racist form of blaming the victim. Poverty and power are socially created distinctions, and correlate directly with the form of separateness of a particular space occupied by those thus characterized.

THE POLICY CONTEXT

The dominant public ideology in the United States has long been integrationist—that is, it has assumed integration as a positive value and a desirable goal for public policy. Integration means something more than nonsegregation; it means a positive interaction, a mixing, an ongoing communication among groups. I use the terms integration, desegregation, segregation, and separation as mutually exclusive terms, in what I hope is an intuitively evident sense. Table 2 provides a formal statement of the terms' usage. Spatial concentration is used as the comprehensive term denoting, simply, an area of spatial concentration of a population group, whatever the pattern.

The arguments for integration have been many and various and will not be rehashed here. They range from the simple civil rights argument that without integration, minority group members will not have the freedom to live where they wish to the uplift argument that deprived ghetto residents
### TABLE 2: Patterns of Spatial Concentration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Determinant</th>
<th>Dissolved</th>
<th>Mixed</th>
<th>Isolated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary</td>
<td>Absorbed; cultural assimilation (melting pot)</td>
<td>Inegrated; multicultural; structural assimilation(^a)</td>
<td>Separated; monocultural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involuntary</td>
<td>Differences suppressed; eingeschaltet(^b)</td>
<td>Desegregated; formal; open occupancy</td>
<td>Segregated</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) From Boal (1976, 43).
\(^b\) The term comes from the Nazi policy toward potentially oppositional groups integrated into the apparatus of the Third Reich.

Need role models to stimulate self-improvement to the hotbed concern that crowding underprivileged people breeds resentment and crime. Integration may be the dominant ideology, but of course it is not the exclusive ideology. There are still a few majority group members who openly advocate segregation as a way of keeping minority group members under control and some minority group members who argue that separation is advantageous for minority group members and that integration’s virtues are far exaggerated.

A dominant ideology is not necessarily the dominant practice—in the case of integration, it certainly is not, as the history of governmental actions supporting discrimination has shown through the decades (Goering 1986). Many doubts have been raised, in increasing numbers again in the last several years, about the likelihood or even the feasibility of true integration—from Gans’s (1991) doubts about cross-class racial integration to Bell’s (1991) conviction about the deep-rootedness of racism in white society. And there is the central question about what divisions are to be integrated: divisions by race, by ethnic group, by religion, by gender, by sexual preference, by age, and/or by location? Despite all these questions and qualifications, however, integration as a value has always been held out as a necessary constituent part of U.S. democracy, whether the image used for it has been the melting pot, the mosaic, or the salad bowl. The arguments in favor of integration are almost second nature to U.S. citizens: learning from diversity, teaching tolerance, essential to democracy, and good examples influencing bad (Galtung 1992; Goering 1986).

A new counterargument has recently arisen, however, with a strong spatial component that may be phrased as seeing in the ghetto the virtues of the enclave, using the terms as I have defined them earlier. This is not the Gans (1991) or the Bell (1991) argument about the difficulties of integration; it is,
rather, an argument in which the existence of ghettos is considered a positive phenomenon. Most persons would agree that an enclave created voluntarily—at least to the extent that it is not exclusionary, which is a big qualification—is acceptable and can be consistent with a democratic society. The difficult question is whether officially created or reinforced separation and, certainly whether involuntary separation, segregation, can have positive values for those thus separated—whether, in other words, ghettos can be ultimately consistent with a free and democratic society.

The values claimed for the ghetto by analogizing it to an enclave are economic, political, and social. The economic advantages are largely deduced from the concept of community economic development, an idea in good currency at least since the 1960s. The push to have blacks patronize black-owned businesses and to have blacks take over businesses in black communities, an argument with validity in its own right, is thus extended to endorsement of continuation of patterns of spatial concentration that would encourage such mutual support activities. Likewise, in the underclass-ghetto poverty thesis that Wilson (1985, 1990) has elaborated, the argument is put forth that the departure of middle-class blacks from black ghettos helped to impoverish those ghettos—an argument debated on empirical grounds— from which the conclusion might logically be drawn that the black middle class should be encouraged to return to the ghetto. But that logic has not been incorporated into public policy until very recently. The current empowerment zone legislation reveals the same logic; in permitting tax benefits only for jobs created within the ghetto for residents of the ghetto, similar processes are presumed to take place in the ghetto as in the enclave, and this presumption reinforces spatial separation.

Arguments over values are, of course, hardly the decisive forces in shaping public policy. Behind policies promoting integration has historically been the sense, on the part of the leaders of government and business, that integration would promote social stability. That current is very strong and, frequently, explicit in policies adopted toward immigrants in the United States since at least the nineteenth century. Gans (1991) has traced the assimilationist objectives of integrationist policies toward various immigrant groups in some detail, and their linkage to the roots of city planning are clear (see Foglesong 1986; Scott 1992). Slum clearance, in England and in the United States, had as objectives not only the elimination of unhealthy physical conditions but also the elimination of the undesirable social consequences of the aggregations of poverty—and, presumably, crime and immorality. In these slums, densely built concentrations of residents in the heart of the city, the residents in the United States were more likely to be immigrant than nativeborn. Slum clearance thus incorporated an early version of the underclass hypothesis in
its cruelest form. Even in the story of Benjamin Rush's generally progressive Committee on Decongestion of the Population in the days of the early housing reform movement in New York City (see note 7), this undertone of moral improvement by dispersion is evident (Lubove 1962). Some accounts also relate the desire for dispersion to class relations; David Gordon (Alcay and Mermelstein 1977) argued, for instance, that putting workers in too close proximity to each other was feared to promote the inclination to strike and certainly to spread knowledge of worker resistance to employment conditions. On a more general level, the finding of the split between residential and workplace interests and loyalties (which builds on neighborhoods being class integrated in a way that factories are not) has been examined as one of the roots of the lack of radical militancy on the part of workers in the United States (Katznelson 1981). It has become part of the conventional wisdom that—as Kwok (1996, 9) commenting on Hong Kong's planning policies, wrote—a "decentralized spatial pattern for population distribution proves to be cogent in dissipating the grass-root coalition of the working class and political dissent."

At least as to the black population, I do not believe this argument that integration reduces social unrest holds sway any longer in the United States. Integration has indeed always encountered resistance; the history of racially discriminatory housing actions, both public and private, is well documented (see Massey and Denton 1993) But, at least since World War II, there has been a strong pro-integrationist trend, not only among blacks and middle-class liberals but also within the established power structure. Integration was thought to promise social peace, as it had in the slum-clearance movement; the President's Commission on Civil Disorders, established in the aftermath of the civil disturbances of the mid-1960s, warned against an "America that is two nations" (Kerner Commission 1968, 1). But although antidiscrimination legislation is still on the books today, integration as a goal of public policy is not. The Department of Justice now sues to enjoin a housing development from maintaining a benign quota to preserve integration; public housing authorities are increasingly forced to pursue policies that have already led to a public housing program in which black residents constitute 87% of the population in effectively segregated projects.

Empowerment zone legislation, the only urban policy of the current U.S. administration,49 is a classic example of the changed approach—and of its difficulties. Under the present empowerment zone legislation, six urban empowerment zones have been designated in the United States; Harlem is one.50 In each zone, $100,000,000 in social service funds is available from the federal government over 10 years, in addition to tax benefits for businesses within the zone that employs zone residents. According to repeated
statements of those most active in implementing the New York zone, a major focus is on making Harlem attractive for the black middle class, bringing them back into the community so that Harlem will once again be a viable, economically mixed, and culturally rich place in the mainstream of America.

Emblematic of the change in the dominant policy approaches to the ghetto are these two aspects of the empowerment zones: limiting tax credits to jobs located within Harlem and attempting to bring back to Harlem those of the black middle class who have left it. Central to both aspects is the question of the residential pattern of the black middle class. Through the end of the 1970s, it would be fair to say that the dominant formal public policy was open housing: expanding the opportunities for blacks to move out of the ghetto as their incomes rose, integrating the suburbs, and knocking down the barriers that kept blacks from jobs in the mainstream economy. Today’s policy is almost the reverse. The theoretical debate draws on Wilson’s (1990) emphasis on the flight of the black middle class as a major component of the underclass—he no longer uses the term—ghetto. Integration by race is not a significant objective; the objective is, rather, integration by class within assumed racial boundaries. Whereas Harry Belafonte was lauded for attempting to establish a black-oriented theater outside the bounds of the ghetto on 86th street in the 1960s, Magic Johnson Theaters now seeks a location in the heart of Harlem on 125th street as a contribution to the welfare of the same community.

In these new approaches, the ghetto is treated as a failed but permanent enclave. From the point of view of the residents of the areas within empowerment zones and those desiring to work with and strengthen them, the purpose of these new approaches is to build on the enclavelike characteristics of the ghetto: the mutual support and solidarity, the networking, the protected markets, the political strength, the cultural cohesion, and the common traditions and history. Their usage builds on the facts, as emphasized earlier, that no ghetto is completely an outcast ghetto, and that even in its most extreme existing form, there are many sources of strength, connections with the mainstream economy, and many vital institutions within it. Nevertheless, the black ghetto is not an enclave. It is created from the outside, and most of its residents are barred from participation in major mainstream areas in a way residents of historic immigrant enclaves never were. The isolation of the ghetto is seen as a benefit by much of the outside white society, quite contrary to the earlier view of the isolation of the immigrant ghetto, which was seen as a danger by social leaders.

What the policy response should be today, on the part of those concerned with social justice, is a complex question, and this is not the place for a detailed discussion. The past open-housing approach—assuming that the
ghetto is like an immigrant enclave and thus investing to encourage upward and outward mobility for its residents, letting cultural traditions take care of themselves—is not likely to work; the contemporary black ghetto is not a voluntary base of solidarity and upward mobility. But the approach of accepting the permanence of ghettoization, luring the middle class back in the hope that that will improve the lot of the poor confined there, is not likely to work either. Leaving aside the question of how far such a strategy can realistically be implemented, its benefits for the poor, as long as they remain segregated in a segregated society, are doubtful. The outcast ghetto, combining race and class in a new form of separation and exclusion, needs to build up its own strength and to break the bondage of that exclusion. That means both strengthening the community, bringing the middle class back and reinforcing cultural ties, and breaking down segregation, particularly for the poor, fighting for their integration into the mainstream of economic and political activity and power. More middle class in and more poor out: precisely the opposite of the classic enclave pattern.

Policy issues around the handling of more voluntary forms of separation, of clustering, also require reexamination. An enclave that is a source of strength to a group toward the bottom of the hierarchy working its way up to equality and integration merits support in such matters as resisting the processes of gentrification. But helpful measures may be as profitably addressed to its individual members as to its spatial structure, which is likely to be transitional. A nonexclusive cultural enclave may be a benefit to the community as a whole, as well as to its members. An exclusionary enclave—and certainly a citadel—runs counter to basic democratic conceptions of a just society; measures that strengthen it should be condemned by public policy.

Ghettos are not enclaves, and enclaves are not ghettos—even if each has some characteristics of the other—and neither are citadels, although citadels have some characteristics of the exclusive enclave. The understanding of the differences among these spatial forms is a critical issue of public policy for anyone concerned about the future direction of urban societies. That is the policy context that makes changes in the nature of the ghetto, and the distinctions among these three superficially similar forms of spatial clustering, such an important issue today.

NOTES

1. After I had chosen the phrase, I found that Wacquant (1993) had also used the term outcast in the title of his article, “Urban Outcasts: Stigma and Division.” I use the term with the same meaning as he does, and appreciate his detailed discussion in that article.
2. Advanced homelessness, the peculiar homelessness of technologically advanced societies, is another. I have discussed it in detail in other works (Marcuse 1993a, 1993b; Mingione 1996).

3. For a discussion of the term and its roots in regulation theory, see Aglietta (1979). The literature is by now extensive; a good overview of the current state of the discussion is Ash (1994). "Post-Fordist city" is a slightly misleading usage, because no city is just a post-Fordist city. One of the glorious facts of city life is that every city carries its past into its present. A city is always a combination of the built environment and the human traditions of the past and the present. Although the accurate phrase would be "the city in the post-Fordist era," I use the shortened version simply for convenience.

4. The literature on these processes is vast; I presented a summary of my understanding of them in an earlier work (Marcuse 1995).

5. Neighborhood remains undefined in the formulation quoted. The issue of space is important not only in terms of measurement—changing the scale of the unit, the neighborhood, changes the results of the index of dissimilarity substantially, for instance—but also in substantive terms. As van Kempen (1994) asked, how does one categorize the spacial situation in which Chinese make up only 10% of a given neighborhood but all Chinese in the city live in that neighborhood? That certainly appears to be an exclusion of Chinese from all other neighborhoods, and I would be surprised if redefining neighborhood to a smaller scale did not reveal an area in which Chinese were the large majority.

6. I have taken Wacquant's (1993, 367) suggestion, conveyed in a footnote, out of context to make my point. In the text, he was explicitly concerned with "the dilapidated racial enclaves [sic] of the metropolitan core" and viewed them as, among other things, clearly spatially defined.

7. It is not an entirely satisfactory definition for all purposes. Two specific forms that might be included under its terms but would not normally be considered ghettos are the concentration camp or prison and the company town—or more broadly, the conforming ghetto, which might include the company town for workers, the executive suburb for managers, the "acculturating" housing envisaged by early housing reformers such as Benjamin Rush, and the integrating kibbutz for new immigrants. But these are not of direct relevance here.

8. For example, an area in the Netherlands in which more than 25% of the residents are immigrants from the former Dutch colonies in Indonesia would qualify as a ghetto, but a similar area in the United States in which 25% of the residents are black and 75% are white would be considered an integrated area.

9. The wide variety of measures of segregation that have been developed over the last 30 years, largely built on the pathbreaking work by Taeuber and Taeuber (1965), reflects the concern to measure various aspects of ghettoization, each of which may best be examined with a different quantitative technique.

10. An exception is Vergara (1995), a graphic description that focuses on the contemporary ghetto, not the classic one of the past.


12. The formulation is hardly original; but my concern here is to specify more precisely what is new, and why. Vergara (1991) has used new American ghetto to denote a ghetto created by government, in part through the concentration of public actions locating specific groups, such as the homeless and drug-dependent populations, in concentrated areas that were seen as ghettos, yet became even more so as a result of those public actions. His point is valid and useful, but I use the term new in the broader sense of the outcast ghetto here.

13. Kesteloot (1994) suggested, in an interesting paper, that the growing importance of exclusion over marginalization is a key characteristic of the present phase.
14. "Institutionalized" is added to the definition by Van Amersfoort (quoted in van Kempen 1994, 3): a ghetto is an institutionalized residential area in which all the inhabitants belong to a single ethnically, racially or religiously defined group and all members of this group live in this area. . . . "[I]nstitutionalized" means that the inhabitants did not choose their dwelling or residential area themselves: they were to some degree coerced by society . . . by law or . . . by subtle discrimination.

It is thus apparently intended to be synonymous with involuntary, and is thus an important, if self-evident, addition to the definition. Were it to mean either "with its own institutions" or "created by formal institutions of the dominant society," it would raise other important questions.

15. Sennett's (1992, 11) etymology, in which the word ghetto comes from the Italian word for foundry (from gettare—to pour), because the location of the first Venice ghetto was on an island in the old foundary district of Venice, is different from the more tepid etymology in the Oxford English Dictionary, in which the word is possibly derived from borghetto, the Italian diminutive for borough (borgo).

16. For a discussion of the parallel impact of migration from the rural south to the urban north after World War II, see Piven and Cloward (1974).

17. See Johnson (1925) and Osofsky (1968, esp. last chapter, with its warning against romanticizing the picture).

18. All figures are from page 12 of the Empowerment Zone application filed with the Department of Housing and Urban Development in 1995.

19. Wacquant (1993, 372 n. 15) warned, properly, against converting this description to a normative one, arguing that the ghetto indeed has a "specific social order," but a "socio-fugal" one.

20. A parallel change, but of a quite different complexion, was occurring in many immigrant enclaves at the same time. Compare, for instance, Gold's (1937) picture of the Lower East Side with Abu-Lughod's (1993).

21. Of course, the absence of turf resistance to displacement in the 1930s had something to do with Depression conditions, and stable and strong communities in the 1950s also resisted Robert Moses's axlike intrusions on their turf vigorously, so the logic suggested in the text runs along more complicated lines. Desperation is not the only reason people oppose displacement (Fried 1963, 151-71).

22. For this argument spelled out in the South African context, see Marcuse (1995).

23. Wilson and Portes (1980) probably were the first to extend discussion using the term.

24. Following Gans's (1991, x) logic that "African-American . . . is a term that seems to me to emphasize an ethnic heritage, and thus to de-emphasize, if not intentionally, the racial issues inherent in the term black." Further, African-American often excludes other black people of African descent such as those from the Caribbean. The precise position of such non-native groups is complex. My judgment is that they are treated substantially like African-Americans in residential patterns but with significant differences in terms of jobs and economic progress, but the issue remains open.

25. There are indeed other uses of the word enclave that emphasize the positive or voluntary character to the exclusion of the negative. See, for instance, Vernoy's (1993, 4) definition: "[A]n enclave is an enclosed sector of the city, usually fairly small, that uses its separation from the rest of the city as a means to increase its potential land rent differential." It is a usage related, in real estate terms, to the broader and richer concept of the term citadel introduced by Friedmann and Wolff (1982) more than 10 years ago (discussed later).

26. Although of course an enclave, such as an enclave of an imperial power in its colony, will be evaluated positively by its residents but quite negatively by its neighbors.
27. And all voluntary actions are in part involuntary—that is, not chosen from an unlimited range of possibilities (see van Kempen, 1994, 3). In the context here, the ambiguity is often linguistic: Logan, Alba, and McNulty (1994), for instance, defined an enclave as bounded by race, ethnicity, or national origin, which may mean bounded from the inside or from the outside. Bailey and Waldinger were more explicit: They wrote of enclaves as engaged in “a process of boundary creation” (Logan, Alba, and McNulty 1994, 4, 5). But to speak of “whites as having an extensive enclave economy” (Logan, Alba, McNulty 1994, 7) is to lose the point of a definition. The economy of whites is not bounded.

28. As Castles and Miller (1993, 112) noted,

Residential segregation of migrants has a double character: on the one hand, it can mean poor housing and social amenities, as well as relative isolation from the majority population; on the other hand, it offers the opportunity for community formation and the development of ethnic infrastructure and institutions.

29. Hobshawn (1969), in arguing that the strategic location of the ghettos made the riots a real threat to dominant interests, was I believe, mistaken in his assessment of the U.S. case.

30. The literature is replete with descriptions of such enclaves: Dahya (1974) discussed Pakistanis in Bradford, England, and Suttles (1968) discussed Italians in Chicago, for example (see van Kempen 1994).

31. For a general discussion of enclaves in the context of community economic development, see Bates (1993). Bates provides a good discussion of the role of race and enclaves.

32. In fact, Gilbertson (1995, 668) concluded that “some of the success of immigrant small-business owners and workers in the ethnic enclave is due to the marginal position of immigrant women. . . . [E]nclave employment is most exploitative of women.” Simple comparisons among immigrant groups are dangerous, however, because the path of each group is dependent on the reasons for its members’ migration, their status prior to migration, the nature of the economy at the point of destination at the time of their arrival, whether they had established a base at their point of destination before their arrival, and other factors. I am indebted to Arturo Sanchez, who is in the Ph.D. Program at Columbia, for highlighting the complexity of such comparisons. However, this consideration only makes the use of the generalized concept of enclave economy that much more questionable.

33. Not all concentrations of those with a common ethnic background are enclaves, in the predominantly positive sense in which the word is used here. For instance, in a detailed analysis of the Los Angeles metropolitan area, Logan, Alba, and McNulty (1994) pointed out that Japanese, Chinese, and Korean enclaves are significantly different in their economic structure from areas of concentration of Mexicans or Filipinos.

34. Kostof (1992) uses the term cultural nucleation, and sees it, as I do, as ambiguous.

35. Deglar (1971) perhaps made this case most strongly, in arguing that race relations were better in the United States than in Latin America because of racial segregation, antimiscegenation laws and legal Jim Crow in the United States, which led to group solidarity and thus strengthened the civil rights movement. He argued that in Brazil, for instance, the Mulatto Escape Hatch siphoned off much of the potential black leadership by permitting those who would find themselves, voluntarily or otherwise, identified with the black community to have an intermediate identity outside of it. The argument is an unpleasant one.


37. For a combination of the best of both literatures, see Davis (1990).

38. See, for instance, the description of a Chicago suburb in Johnson (1995).
39. In fact, more factors than are discussed here should be considered, such as the question of scale (one building? a nation within a nation?) and the question of time (a refugee camp? a protest encampment?). For a formal definition, some outliers would have to be handled also: prisons, hospitals, army camps, and the like.

40. Boal (1976, 57) presents the only other formal taxonomy I have found. He suggests ‘‘colony’ for a transitional concentration; ‘enclave’ where the concentration results from internal cohesion; and ‘ghetto’ where the concentration is the result of external factors.’’ Yet whether a concentration is transitional or not can only be determined with hindsight; presumptively, many of what are here called ‘‘immigrant enclaves’’ would be transitional. Internal cohesion and external factors are not necessarily opposites; these criteria appear in my taxonomy under social and voluntariness.

Herbert and Thomas (1990, 235) listed five types of ghettos: early southern with blacks close to whites but in alley and back streets; classic southern ghetto housing on the other side of the tracks or other unwanted land; early northern tenements; northern housing after white flight high density, high poverty, and substandard class areas; and the new city ghetto, from inner city to rural-suburban fringe, with ethnoclasses’ social stratification within it.

41. At the conclusion of this article, in Table 2, I attempt to reduce this five-part division to its two key elements.

42. So, defined by position rather than numbers, blacks in South Africa are a minority. Anglo-Saxons are not. Minority, in this sense, means an oppressed group.

43. So, of course, are the meanings of race and ethnicity, but in a different sense from that which is relevant here. If race is interpreted as socially defined superiority or inferiority, then the comment in the text does not apply. I wish simply to say that no physical characteristic is, as such, a cause of any particular spatial treatment or choice.

44. I first tried to develop a consistent meaning for these terms, which are often confusing when used without definition, in Marcuse (1969). Table 2 does not show the differences within clusters, which may be internally homogeneous or heterogeneous (Heikkila and Griffin 1995).

45. The desire to integrate or assimilate a potentially troublesome group into a dominant system—to socialize them—is one that can be seen throughout history: Haussman, in Paris in the middle of the last century, wanted to destroy the power of the working-class quartiers, reformers were concerned to “Americanize” immigrants (Gans 1991), then came the Raffles Plan and contemporary policy in Singapore (Kostof 1992, 108), and so on. I am tempted to call this approach negative ghettoization: the deliberate prevention of enclave formation for fear of the strength it would give its residents and as the mirror image of the creation of ghettos to confine and render powerless their residents. The objective in both cases is the same; the tool, the diametric opposite.

46. When Marshall Berman, as a Jew and a sociologist who had studied changing communities in New York, suggested at a meeting of black students that Jewish ghettos had produced some great literature and music, suggesting a positive side of ghetto creation, his comments were roundly condemned by his audience.

47. See Fainstein’s (1993) critique, for instance, arguing that there was in fact no such large middle-class exodus from the ghetto.

48. For an eloquent discussion of the difference between assimilation and integration, see Powell (1996).


50. Actually, the zone includes areas of the South Bronx outside of Harlem, and does not include all of Harlem, because of the combination of local politics and federal eligibility requirements. The differences are not relevant for the point being made here, because for all but
formal purposes, the empowerment zone in Manhattan is being treated as if it were indeed simply Harlem.

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