Inclusive Citizenship: Realizing the Potential

RUTH LISTER
Loughborough University, Loughborough, UK

ABSTRACT Citizenship has been described as a “momentum concept”. One important development over the past decade has been the various ways in which scholars and activists have developed citizenship’s inclusionary potential. The first part of the article explores these developments in general terms with regard to the values underpinning inclusive citizenship; the implications of the notion of cultural citizenship; and the theorization of differentiated forms of citizenship, which nevertheless appeal to universalist principles. These principles provide the basis for the citizenship claims of people living in poverty, a group largely ignored in citizenship studies. Other lacunae have been disability and, until recently, childhood. The second part of the article discusses how citizenship studies has reworked the concept in a more inclusionary direction through the development of a multi-tiered analysis, which pays attention to the spaces and places in which lived citizenship is practised. It focuses in particular on the intimate and domestic sphere, with particular reference to debates around care and citizenship, and on the interconnections between the intimate/domestic and the global, using “global care chains” and ecological citizenship as examples.

There has been an avalanche of literature on citizenship over the past decade, as the field of citizenship studies has established itself. There are a number of explanations for this intense interest in citizenship, reflecting developments in both the political and academic arenas. One reason perhaps why the concept continues to fascinate scholars from diverse disciplines stems from the fact that it constitutes a “momentum concept”. Momentum concepts, John Hoffman explains, “‘unfold’ so that we must continuously rework them in a way that realizes more and more of their egalitarian and anti-hierarchical potential” (2004, p. 138). As such, they provide tools for marginalized groups struggling for social justice.

From the perspective of citizenship, this struggle can be articulated in terms of the tension between citizenship’s inclusionary and exclusionary sides—a tension which is inherent to the concept and which has led, for instance, Engin Isin to problematize “the idea of inclusion [which] relentlessly produces exclusion” (2005, p. 381). Nevertheless, the struggle for social inclusion has been an important theme in citizenship studies and activism and is the subject of the first part of this article. It also informs the second part, which reflects on some of the implications of the development of a multi-tiered, spatially...
grounded analysis of citizenship, with particular reference to the practice of citizenship within the intimate/domestic sphere and its interconnections with the global.

The Dynamics of Inclusion/Exclusion

Much of the contemporary citizenship literature is marked by the challenge it poses to citizenship’s exclusionary tendencies and by its attempt to make real citizenship’s inclusionary promise. This work can be analytical or normative or sometimes a mixture of the two. Theoretical analysis has interrogated citizenship’s universalistic claims from the particular perspectives of a range of marginalized groups and of nation-state “outsiders” and has developed new differentiated forms of citizenship (discussed further below). A more normative stance is consistent with T. H. Marshall’s notion of “an image of an ideal citizenship against which achievements can be measured and towards which aspirations can be directed” (1950, p. 29).

Values of Inclusive Citizenship

An inspiring attempt at articulating such “an image of an ideal citizenship”, framed in terms of the values underpinning “inclusive citizenship” and the meanings of citizenship expressed “from below”, derives from a series of case studies, mainly in the global South. This work reflects the ways in which, in recent years, the discourse of citizenship has been taken up by those active in and writing about international development and points to its salience (interpreted according to local context) for social and political mobilization in the South. In bringing together the case studies, Naila Kabeer suggests that they “help to shed light on what inclusive citizenship might mean when it is viewed from the standpoint of the excluded” (2005, p. 1, emphasis in original). Despite the very different contexts within which these excluded groups’ understandings of citizenship are forged and struggles for full citizenship are waged, she argues that:

their testimonies and actions suggest there are certain values that people associate with the idea of citizenship which cut across the various boundaries that divide them. These values may not be universal but they are widespread enough to suggest that they constitute a significant aspect of the organization of collective life and of the way in which people connect with each other. And because they are being articulated by groups who have experienced exclusion in some form or other, these values also articulate their vision of what a more inclusive society might imply. (Kabeer, 2005, p. 3)

The four values of inclusive citizenship that emerged from these accounts “from below” are:

- **justice**, articulated in terms of “when it is fair for people to be treated the same and when it is fair that they should be treated differently” (Kabeer, 2005, p. 3);
- **recognition** “of the intrinsic worth of all human beings, but also recognition of and respect for their differences” (p. 4);
- **self-determination** or “people’s ability to exercise some degree of control over their lives” (p. 5). This value also emerges particularly strongly in disability theorists’ accounts of citizenship, which detail the very specific barriers to self-determination and also participation faced by disabled people (Morris, 2005); and
• **solidarity**, that is, “the capacity to identify with others and to act in unity with them in their claims for justice and recognition” (Kabeer, 2005, p. 7). This value could be said to reflect a horizontal view of citizenship (developed most strongly in Nordic accounts in the North) which accords as much significance to the relations between citizens as to the vertical relationship between the state and the individual.

**Recognition as well as Rights: Cultural Citizenship**

These values, which are not necessarily exhaustive, chime with many accounts of inclusive citizenship in the North also and overlap with the principle of “participatory parity” enunciated by Nancy Fraser: the ability of “all (adult) members of society to interact with one another as peers” (2003, p. 36, emphasis added). According to Fraser, participatory parity requires a distribution of material resources “such as to ensure … independence and ‘voice’ and institutionalized patterns of cultural value [which] express equal respect for all participants and ensure equality opportunity for achieving social esteem” (p. 36).

A prominent narrative in the theory and practice of citizenship over the past decade has thus been that inclusive citizenship is as much about recognition as about access to formal rights. This is one aspect of the development of what Isin and Turner, in their *Handbook of Citizenship Studies*, identify as “a sociologically informed definition of citizenship in which the emphasis is less on legal rules and more on norms, practices, meanings, and identities” (2002, p. 4). In similar vein, Werbner and Yuval Davis contrast earlier liberal and political science definitions, derived from “the relationship between an individual and the state”, with the approach taken in their edited collection, which “defines citizenship as a more total relationship, inflected by identity, social positioning, cultural assumptions, institutional practices and a sense of belonging” (1999, p. 4). Both these collections are indicative of how contemporary writing on citizenship is interrogating the meaning of membership in ways which the earlier literature did not, paying particular attention to aspects such as identity (see, for instance, Isin & Wood, 1999).

Identity and recognition figure prominently in the theorization of cultural citizenship: a strand of citizenship studies that has emerged to prominence over the past decade, reflecting the centrality of cultural identity to contemporary citizenship struggles (Turner, 1997). In the first issue of *Citizenship Studies* Jan Pakulski defined cultural citizenship in terms of:

> the right to be “different”, to re-value stigmatised identities, to embrace openly and legitimately hitherto marginalised lifestyles and to propagate them without hindrance. The national community, in other words, is defined not only in formal legal, political, and socioeconomic dimensions, but also increasingly in a sociocultural one. Full citizenship involves a right to full cultural participation and undistorted representation. (1997, p. 83)

More recently, Nick Stevenson paints a broad canvas for cultural citizenship as being “concerned with questions of imagination, identity, recognition and belonging” and as seeking “to rework images, assumptions and representations that are seen to be exclusive as well as marginalizing” (2003, pp. 36, 18). Struggles for inclusive cultural citizenship
are about “the demand for cultural respect” and are “as much a matter of symbolism as of formal rights” (pp. 23, 46). In normative terms, for Stevenson “the very essence of cultural citizenship” lies in “a genuinely cosmopolitan dialogue . . . underpinned by both the acceptance of universal principles and the recognition of difference”, which he locates within the “shift from identity politics to a [more inclusive] politics of difference” (pp. 25, 26).

A Politics of Difference: The Feminist Contribution

The centrality that Stevenson accords to the politics of difference chimes with more general developments in citizenship theory, inspired in particular by feminism. Feminist accounts of citizenship have been pivotal in much of the momentum achieved by this “momentum concept” over the past decade. The starting point was to expose how, despite its claims to universalism, citizenship was drawn according to a quintessentially male template so that women’s exclusion (and the chequered nature of their inclusion) was integral to both the theory and practice of citizenship. The wider challenge to the public–private dichotomy framed feminist re-interpretations of citizenship, particularly with regard to the status accorded unpaid care work in relation to the rights and responsibilities of citizenship and, related to that, the gendered division of domestic labour and time (discussed further below).

The critique of course represented only a first step and laid the ground work for feminist reworkings of citizenship. Partly in order to avoid the danger of casting the excluded as passive victims of structural forces and other people’s agency, a number of feminist citizenship theorists have underlined the importance of political agency. This provides the link between conceptions of citizenship as an active participatory practice and as a set of rights, which are the object of struggle (see, for instance, Lister, 1997/2003; Siim, 2000). Feminist reworkings have re-gendered citizenship in differing ways, embodied in the normative images of the ostensibly “gender neutral”, the explicitly “gender-differentiated” and the radically “gender pluralist” citizen (Lister, 2002). This last model, exemplified in different ways in the work of Chantal Mouffe (1992) and Iris Young (1990, 2000), reflects “an ethos of pluralization [which] makes possible a radically plural rather than dual way of thinking about citizenship and identity” (Isin & Wood, 1999, p. 23).

Various attempts have been made by feminists in recent years to articulate a citizenship politics of difference within such an “ethos of pluralization” in order to avoid getting mired within identity politics. For instance, Jodie Dean’s “reflective solidarity” is infused with “an ideal of a universalism of difference” (1996, p. 10); Nira Yuval-Davis adopted the concept of transversalism to express the idea of “universality in diversity” (1997, p. 125; 1999); and the notion of a “politics of solidarity in difference” is rooted in the idea of a “differentiated universalism in which the achievement of the universal is contingent upon attention to difference” (Lister, 1997/2003, p. 91). These formulations attempt to express the idea of “a politics that, in a spirit of solidarity in the face of oppression, traverses the web of group differences, but without suppressing them” (Hobson & Lister, 2002, p. 39). In each case, the theoretical challenge has been to work with “an ethos of pluralization” without sacrificing citizenship’s universalist emancipatory promise as expressed in the ideals of inclusion, participation and equal moral worth.
The Universalist Promise

Poverty activists are a group whose citizenship claims appeal to these universalist principles. The last thing people living in poverty want is to be seen and treated as different or “other”, as they are in dominant discourses of poverty, reinforced by media representations. Poverty politics increasingly is framed within a discourse of human rights and of citizenship. As such it can be represented as a politics of “recognition&respect” and not just a politics of redistribution, as it is more conventionally understood (Lister, 2004).

At the first European meeting of Citizens Living in Poverty, the European Anti-Poverty Network reports that “participants stressed that they were first and foremost ‘citizens’ before being ‘people experiencing poverty’. Citizenship is something to which we all stake a claim and means ‘being part of the mainstream of society’” (EAPN, 2003, p. 4, emphasis in original). Inspired by human rights conceptualizations of poverty, developed by the UN among others, these citizenship claims refer in particular to dignity and respect, equal rights, and voice.

In a study of citizenship in deprived communities in Rio de Janeiro, participants “made it clear that meaningful citizenship cannot exist without dignity” in everyday interactions. One woman summed it up: “Dignity is everything for a citizen—and we have no dignity. We are treated like cattle in the clinics, on the buses and in the shops” (Wheeler, 2005, p. 109). This is resonant of Uma Narayan’s articulation of the citizenship ideal of “a society that is responsive to the social dignity and worth of all who are members” (1997, p. 54).

A key element in a human rights conceptualization of poverty, which translates into concrete citizenship claims, is the idea that rights are indivisible or interdependent so that socio-economic and cultural rights are not separate from civil and political rights. Moreover, some formulations incorporate “an actor-oriented perspective . . . based on the recognition that rights are shaped through actual struggles informed by people’s own understandings of what they are justly entitled to” (Nyamu-Musembi, 2005, p. 31). In doing so they reinforce the importance accorded by the human rights approach to the participation of “the poor” in the development of poverty reduction strategies. Calls for the voices of marginalized groups to be heard in policy-making and campaigning are becoming more vocal. They represent a demand for recognition of and respect for the expertise borne of experience alongside those forms of knowledge and expertise that have traditionally been privileged. As Anne Phillips has noted, recognition struggles are “very much struggles for political voice” (2003, p. 265).

Filling Some Lacunae in Citizenship Studies

Despite the value of understanding poverty politics within a citizenship framework it is an area which remains relatively unexplored in citizenship studies as such. The same is true of disability politics. While a number of disability theorists have framed their analysis using the concept of citizenship, it is rare for citizenship theorists to incorporate disability in their work. In a paper for the UK Disability Rights Commission, Jenny Morris complains that disabled people’s perspective has been singularly absent from contemporary debates about citizenship, not just in Britain but also in other Western democracies. The very language of the debate often excludes people who have physical and/or sensory impairment, mental health problems or learning disabilities. Even feminist challenges to the dominant concepts of citizenship have, in inserting the private
world of the family and women’s caring role, still treated disabled people as absent. (2005, pp. 5–6; see also Meekosha & Dowse, 1997; Beckett, 2005)

Such analyses as exist of disabled people’s citizenship generally underline the inter-relationship between socio-economic and cultural forms of injustice. In a collection on cultural citizenship, for instance, Deborah Marks “focuses on the ways disabled people are currently denied recognition or respect in ablist culture. However ... disabled people are denied not just full cultural citizenship, but also the formal rights and responsibilities which form the socio-political context for cultural association. Representation cannot be separated from structural issues” (2001, p. 168).

Disabled activists simultaneously struggle for full, equal and accessible citizenship and for the right to be different citizens. As Morris concludes, if disabled people are really to have “equal opportunities to participate and contribute as equal citizens”, this will mean a society in which “difference does not mean you cannot ‘belong’, but where instead our common humanity is recognised and valued” (2005, p. 40). Disability thus represents an important terrain for the theoretical challenge of addressing the tension between citizenship’s universalist promise and the recognition of difference.

Children are another group who, until recently at least, have been largely invisible in citizenship studies, where citizenship has implicitly been equated with adulthood. Children, at best, have figured as citizens of the future; indeed in hegemonic political discourse in a number of welfare states they are portrayed as citizen-workers of the future who represent units of investment (Lister, 2003). Children’s citizenship is a theoretical lacuna that is beginning to be filled, notably in three articles that have appeared in Citizenship Studies in the past five years. Together they point the way to a theorization of children’s citizenship, which treats them as more than “citizens in the making” (Marshall, 1950, p. 25), but which also explores the ways in which children’s citizenship is different from that of adults.

Elizabeth F. Cohen’s analysis provides a good starting point. She argues that “understanding children’s semi-citizenship requires rejecting approaches that conflate one element of citizenship for the whole” (2005, p. 223). This then makes it possible to unpack the different elements of citizenship in order to clarify the ways in which children “are citizens by certain standards and not by others” (p. 234). Cohen draws an analogy between the way in which children are “folded into the legal identity of their parents” and women’s earlier lesser citizenship under coverture (p. 229). Mehmoona Moosa-Mitha’s account draws much more explicitly on feminist citizenship theory and on “difference-centred models of citizenship” to develop “a difference-centred theory of children’s citizenship rights” (2005, pp. 372, 369). She argues that children should be treated as “‘differently equal’ members of the public culture in which they are full participants” (p. 369).

Children’s participation is at the heart of Daiva Stasiulis’ exploration of children’s citizenship practice, which conjures up the “imaginary of the active child citizen”. She contrasts “the relative failure of adult decision-makers to implement the participation rights of children” with the view advanced by “the contemporary children’s movement ... of children as empowered, knowledgeable, compassionate and global citizens, who are nonetheless, like other marginalized groups, in need of special, group-differentiated protections” (2002, p. 507). Children’s citizenship practices in different spheres could be said to constitute them as de facto citizens even if they do not enjoy all the rights of full de jure citizens (Lister, 2007a).
Spaces and Places: Connecting the Intimate/Domestic and the Global

In the first part of this article I have traced a number of ways in which theorists and activists have attempted to shift the dynamics of inclusion/exclusion in favour of a number of marginalized groups. Another way in which citizenship studies has reworked the “momentum concept” of citizenship in a more inclusionary direction is through the development of a multi-tiered analysis, which has problematized the traditional association of citizenship with the nation-state.

Although the contemporary nature of this association is disputed in the face of globalizing forces, in practice nation-states continue to play a pivotal role in regulating access to territory and to citizenship rights for migrants and asylum-seekers. Indeed, what is striking is the disjuncture between the inclusionary philosophy underpinning critical citizenship theory and the increasingly exclusionary stance adopted by many nation-states towards “outsiders”, as we witness “an anti-(im)migrant backlash reinforced by ... the securitization of migration” (Dobrowolsky & Tastsoglou, 2006, p. 3; Desforges et al., 2005; McNevin, 2006).

Thus the nation-state continues to represent a significant domain in the “ensemble of different forms of belonging” (Isin & Wood, 1999, p. 21) that constitute citizenship. What the multi-tiered analysis does is to expand the terrain of citizenship to embrace also the intimate and domestic, the local, the urban, the regional and the global. Here I will focus on the intimate and the domestic and some of the ways in which they interconnect with the global. A number of strands of multidisciplinary analysis come together, including notions of “intimate”, “lived”, “global” and “ecological” citizenship, together with “new geographies of citizenship”, which frame the study of citizenship in terms of “scale”, “space” and “place” (Desforges et al., 2005).

These analyses illuminate how the kind of citizenship struggles discussed in the first part of this article “play out at multiple, interrelated spatial scales” (Grundy & Smith, 2005, p. 390; see also Isin & Wood, 1999). They also have the potential to combat the somewhat abstract nature of much theorizing on citizenship by rooting analysis in “the actual spaces in which citizenship is expressed” (Jones & Gaventa, 2002, p. 19). Taken together with feminist insistence on “an embodied, rather than an abstract, view of citizenship” (Kabeer, 2005, p. 11), what is emerging is a more grounded understanding of citizenship as a practice.5

It is also a more contextualized understanding (Siim, 2000). It is increasingly appreciated that citizenship is understood and experienced within specific national and local social and political contexts, reflecting historical traditions and institutional and cultural complexes (Bellamy et al., 2004; Lister et al., 2007). In particular, citizenship as a lived experience cannot be divorced from its context, including its spatial context (Desforges et al., 2005). There is growing interest in everyday life “lived citizenship”: how people understand and negotiate rights and responsibilities, belonging and participation and “the meaning that citizenship actually has in people’s lives and the ways in which people’s social and cultural backgrounds and material circumstances affect their lives as citizens” (Hall & Williamson, 1999, p. 2; see also Lewis, 2004).

The Intimate and the Domestic

A key tenet of feminist citizenship theory is that understanding lived citizenship involves a challenge to the public–private dichotomy that underpinned the traditional association of citizenship with the public sphere. This has opened up a number of new paths including the
theorization of intimate and sexual citizenship and debates around the relationship of care to citizenship.

Ken Plummer defines intimate citizenship as “a cluster of emerging concerns over the rights to choose what we do with our bodies, our feelings, our identities, our relationships, our genders, our eroticisms and our representations” (1995, p. 7). Broader than but encompassing sexual and gendered citizenship, intimate citizenship serves “as a sensitising concept which sets about analysing a plurality of public discourses and stories about how to live the personal life” (Plummer, 2001, p. 238). Acknowledging that some might dismiss the term as oxymoronic, Plummer conceptualizes intimate citizenship as “public discourse on the personal life” and offers it as a “potential bridge between the personal and the political”, which “sensitizes us” to the imbrication of public and private spheres (2003, pp. 68, 15, 68).

Such sensitization has been important also to the development of the concept of sexual citizenship (Richardson, 1998, 2000; Weeks, 1998; Lister, 2002). The theorization of sexual citizenship has embraced, with differing emphases, sexuality as a determining factor in the allocation of the rights (and to a lesser extent the obligations) associated with citizenship and as a terrain for citizenship practices. The salience of the spatial dimension is again underlined by Isin & Wood (1999) with reference to lesbians and gays’ relationship to the public sphere, drawing on the work of Michael Brown. Brown has, more recently, argued for greater attention to the question of political obligation within the conceptualization of sexual citizenship and for grounding the exercise of citizenship responsibilities with regard to safe sexual practices “in an ethic of care and connection” (2006, p. 20).

Brown is here drawing on a strand of feminist citizenship theorizing, in particular Selma Sevenhuijsen’s Citizenship and the Ethic of Care (1998). Leaving aside those who ignore or reject care as pertaining to citizenship, the exact nature of care’s relationship to citizenship is debated in the literature in at least two ways. First, care is sometimes identified on the one hand as an obstacle to women’s citizenship because of the gendered domestic division of labour and time and on the other as a resource for citizenship and an expression of citizenship responsibility. In practice, this emerges more as a source of tension and ambivalence within the writings of individual scholars than as a dispute between them and typically accommodation is sought through calls for the redistribution of caring labour and time (Lister, 1997/2003; Herd & Harrington Meyer, 2002; Kershaw, 2005).

More difficult to resolve, at least theoretically, are some of the different positions taken on the question of how care constitutes citizenship. A currently dominant strand in the feminist literature contends that care should be acknowledged as an expression of social citizenship responsibilities and should be accorded equal value with paid work obligations, which are currently privileged in modern, “active” welfare states. This idea has been developed in a slightly different direction by Herd and Harrington Meyer who apply it to debates about civic engagement in order to argue that care work represents “an active form of participatory citizenship with far-reaching civic benefits” (2002, p. 666; see also Prokhovnik, 1998). More controversial is the argument that care constitutes a form of political citizenship, which goes further than the orthodox feminist position that the political pertains to the private as well as the public sphere.

The argument is developed by Paul Kershaw who conflates the social and the political in the notion of the “socio-political” in making the case for care-giving as a form of active citizenship. Drawing in particular on the care practices of African American women and the work of Patricia Hill Collins, he argues that
domestic care has the potential to function as a form of resistance to oppression that stretches well beyond the particular homes in which the work is performed because it contributes to a broader project of community development. Qua cultural workers, mothers contribute significantly to the project of “group survival” by transmitting an ethnocentric worldview to the next generation. (Kershaw, 2005, p. 116)

The issue here is where the boundaries around what constitutes citizenship are to be drawn and on what criteria. While I would argue that the act of caring is not in itself an act of political citizenship (even if it constitutes a resource for it), Kershaw’s arguments are nevertheless persuasive in suggesting how, in certain circumstances, the practice of caring might indeed represent political citizenship. This suggests therefore that it is not valid to assume a priori that political citizenship cannot be practiced within domestic spaces. Perhaps one conclusion to be drawn is that, the importance of spaces and places of citizenship notwithstanding, the key determinant of whether or not an action constitutes citizenship should be what a person does and with what public consequences, rather than where they do it.7

Connecting the Intimate/Domestic and the Global

Care represents one of the links between the intimate/domestic and the global tiers of citizenship—what Plummer refers to as “globalizing intimate citizenship” (2003, Chapter 8). Within the context of “wrenching global inequality”, the intimate and the global are interwoven through “global care chains” in which migrant women leave their children in the care of others so as to provide care within the homes of more affluent families in the West (Ehrenreich & Hochschild, 2003, p. 2). “A complex web of wage-earning and care is spun by migrant women stretching from the intimate private sphere of their citizen employers to their countries of origin, with implications for the citizenship of all those connected through the global care chain” (Lister et al., 2007).

The chain creates a link between two spaces of “domestic” citizenship: the intimate/domestic sphere of the household and “the domestic” as “site of the national” highlighting the racialized and gendered character of each (Lewis, 2006, p. 100). A forthcoming study, reported in a volume on gendering citizenship in Western Europe, illustrates also the artificiality of fixed notions of the public–private divide, challenged by feminist citizenship theory. For migrant domestic workers, the workplace—typically part of the public sphere—is here the private sphere of their employers, while they themselves are unable to live in their own private sphere (Lister et al., 2007).

Another example of how the domestic and global spaces of citizenship intersect is in the practices of ecological citizenship. On the one hand ecological citizenship can be understood as one element of the broader concepts of global and cosmopolitan citizenship (Linklater, 2002). Andrew Dobson observes that, given that environmental problems cannot be contained within national borders, “if ecological citizenship is to make any sense, then, it has to do so outside the realm of activity most normally associated with contemporary citizenship: the nation-state” (2003, p. 97). Dobson himself transcends the global in his articulation of a “post-cosmopolitan citizenship” in which the political space of ecological citizenship is that created by “the ecological footprint”. Ecological citizens who “(may) inhabit the territory created by my ecological footprint . . . are strangers not only to each other, but to each other’s place, and even time. The obligations of the
ecological citizen extend through time as well as space, towards generations yet to be born” (p. 106).

These obligations stem from “systematic ecological injustice” (Dobson, 2003, p. 132). As well as extending through time and space they are generated and exercised in the home. Thus ecological citizenship is also “all about everyday living” (p. 138, emphasis in the original). Dobson spells out the implications for the domestic sphere of citizenship:

the private realm is important to ecological citizenship because it is a site of citizenship activity, and because the kinds of obligations it generates, and the virtues necessary to meeting those obligations, are analogously and actually present in the types of relationship we normally designate as “private”. (Dobson, 2003, p. 138)

Bullen and Whitehead draw, critically, on Dobson in their exposition of the idea of “sustainable citizenship”, which differs from that of ecological citizenship in its inclusion of the non-human world. Sustainable citizenship, they explain is “a brand of citizenship which stretches the spatial, temporal and material bounds of citizenship. In stretching the conventional bounds of citizenship, a sustainable citizenry is one which does not recognize the historical divide erected between the public and private spheres” (2005, p. 512). It represents a “hybrid form of citizenship, which connects different spaces, times and facets of substance” (p. 507).

These two examples of the intersections of the domestic and the global—care and ecological/sustainable citizenship—illustrate a more general feature of a multi-tiered conceptualization of citizenship or of citizenship as “a multiscalar social practice”: that the multiple scales of citizenship are not hierarchical but overlapping (Grundy & Smith, 2005, p. 389).

Concluding Remarks

This article has been painted on a wide canvas, mirroring the breadth and vibrancy of the multidisciplinary field of citizenship studies. It has reflected on some of the myriad ways in which theorists and activists have, over the past decade, attempted to challenge citizenship’s exclusionary tendencies in search of more genuinely inclusive forms of citizenship, understood as a multi-tiered concept and practice. The breadth of the field represents one of its strengths, for it offers an exciting terrain for scholars from a range of disciplines to engage with this “momentum concept”. However, there are times when perhaps the notion of citizenship is stretched too far so as to lose its distinctive meaning(s) or when it is sprinkled indiscriminately simply to add conceptual spice.

Finally, we need to take stock of the (im)balance between theoretical and empirical work in the field. Well over a decade ago, Conover et al. observed that much of the theoretical debate about the meaning of citizenship is “conducted in what is virtually an empirical void” (1991, p. 801; see also Lister et al., 2003). That void is gradually being filled but there remains an imbalance between theoretical and empirical advances in our understanding of citizenship. The field would be enriched by more empirical studies of the “the everyday world of citizenship” (Desforges et al., 2005); of the cultural, social and political practices that constitute lived citizenship for different groups of citizens in different national and spatial contexts (Lister et al., 2007); and of how citizenship’s inclusionary/exclusionary dynamics are experienced by both citizens and non-citizens.
Notes

1 This article is dedicated to the memory of Iris Marion Young (1949–2006) whose work did so much to challenge exclusionary expressions of citizenship and to contribute to more differentiated, inclusive forms.

2 The case studies in the South (in Bangladesh, Brazil, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru and South Africa) were part of an international research partnership—the Development Research Centre on Citizenship, Participation and Accountability—based at the Institute of Development Studies in the UK (www.drc.citizenship.org).

3 Angharade E. Beckett, however, notes that not all disabled people want to be seen as different and that analysis of the UK disability movement raises the possibility that some “individuals may be inaccurately labelled as ‘different’ not only by dominant ‘outsiders’ but also by dominant voices internal to the group” (2005, p. 417, emphasis in original).

4 An edited collection on Children and Citizenship, edited by Clutton, Invernizzi and Williams, is also due to be published by Sage in 2007 or 2008.

5 An embodied understanding also emerges from the work of disability theorists.

6 With regard to adults, some disabled feminists have also challenged the very language of care as undermining disabled people’s autonomy and hence their citizenship (see, for instance, Morris, 2005).

7 This issue is explored in more depth in Lister (2007b).

References


Inclusive Citizenship 61


