Chapter 2

Crisis Region Western Africa: The Cradle of African Migration to Europe

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Introduction

Africa’s economic history is a history of large population movements driven by a variety of reasons: notably, slave-trade and colonialism, violent conflicts, poverty, ecological degradation, population pressure and a certain cultural propensity of some ethnic groups for outward orientation. Even today, most of the 680 million Africans live under conditions of extreme poverty and insecurity. Although the incidence of trans-national migration has remained about the same on a global scale since the 19th century, its structure and direction has changed significantly. Whereas Europe was known as a source of waves of large scale out-migration until the early 20th century, trends were reversed after the Second World War. The rate of immigration in highly industrialized Western European countries has accelerated significantly in the past decades. It is mostly undocumented Africans who constitute a growing proportion of these immigrants. There are well founded reasons to believe that this tendency will accelerate, as Sub-Saharan Africa probably has a higher potential for immigration into the EU than any other region in the World.

All of the 20 least developed countries (LDCs) are African, and more than half of them belong to crisis-torn Western Africa, which in the 1990s gained the reputation of degenerating into the Pandora’s box of the continent, while being situated relatively close to West European borders. Some experts even believe that population movements from Africa could evolve into the single biggest migration wave in world history in the medium and long run. Therefore, politicians of all sides are well advised to take this development more seriously than in the past. However, experts and politicians alike are deeply divided over the best concepts for analysing and solving the problem. Even in scholarly literature, several myths about

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1 GIGA – Institute of African Affairs, German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Hamburg. An abridged German version has been published as GIGA-Focus Afrika, No. 12. 2006.
international migration, remittances and developments still persist. The following is meant to provide more facts and to clarify some of the controversies of the current debate.

Incidence of West African Migration to Europe

Migration from Africa is a reflection of its socio-economic dynamics over time. Over the past few decades, the number of refugees from conflict regions in Africa has increased dramatically. Between 1993 and 2002, 27 out of 53 African states suffered from violent conflicts. At the end of 2005, some 18% of all African migrants were refugees. This proportion is far above the global average, and African refugees constitute about one third of the global refugee population. This may explain, why nearly half (47%) of the 16.7 million cross-border migrants in Africa in 2005 were women and children. The above figures explicitly disregard some 13 million additional internally displaced people, as well as a considerable number of seasonal migrants, who would have accentuated the problem even more. Most of the trans-national migrants, however, remain in neighbouring African countries, overwhelmingly (42%) in Western Africa. Apart from push factors, like violent conflicts, gross human rights violations, population pressure, degradation of natural resources and poverty, the major part of current migration is due to external pull factors.

Young people, threatened by unemployment and lack of perspectives in their home countries, are eager to try their luck in what may appear to them at first sight as their El Dorado, i.e. Western Europe. Many of them struggle to reach it, in utter disregard of the involved risks, by any means, mostly illegally. But let there be no misunderstanding, the extreme African poor do not even have of this alternative, as migration to overseas destinations involves considerable costs, which can be covered in many cases only with contributions by the extended family (e.g. €800 to €1200 per person for the passage from the Senegalese coast to the Canary Islands), good health, a minimum amount of risk tolerance, and embeddedness in viable trans-national social networks.

Most African migrants with overseas destinations go in Europe. According to 2005 estimates of the International Organization on Migration (IOM), there are about 4.6 million recorded Africans living in the EU, compared with 900,000 in the USA. The major reasons for this unequal distribution are the comparative advantages in relation to transfer cost and the established cultural and socio-economic links of African diasporas to the former colonial powers such as England, France, Portugal, Spain, Germany and Italy. According to IOM-census figures, about two-thirds of Africans in Europe are from Northern Africa (Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia). A smaller, but steadily increasing part has arrived from Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). The latter overwhelmingly stay in France (274,538) and England (249,720), and, on a smaller scale, in Germany (154,564) and Italy (137,780). However, these figures are probably grossly underestimated, as they do not take account of the majority of unauthorized Africans living in the EU.

According to estimates of the Migration Policy Institute, there are between seven and eight million irregular African immigrants living in the EU, mostly in its Southern parts. Current figures fluctuate in accordance with the regularization programmes of member states, notably of France, and more recently of Italy and Spain. However, many of the officially recognized migrants fall back into illegality when their limited visas expire or if they fail to meet other conditions for recognizing their legal status.

West Africans constitute by far the largest share of SSA-migrants in Europe. They mostly come from Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal. In general, Francophone Africans are more likely to migrate to France because of its special socio-cultural post-colonial relations with its former colonies and due to the language, whereas Anglophone Africans, notably Ghanaians and Nigerians, show more flexibility in selecting their destinations. Figure 1 shows the major SSA diasporas in the EU.

However, the attraction of the EU for SSA migrants increases from year to year. According to IOM estimates, between 65,000 and 80,000 migrants crossed the Sahara annually in their strive for unrecorded entry into the EU in the past five years. One of their major transit countries was Morocco, which recorded a tenfold increase of SSA migrants between 2000 and 2005. Subsequently, the authorities in Rabat, assisted by the EU, have reinforced their borders surrounding the Spanish enclaves of Melilla and Ceuta, as well as along the Atlantic coast, which contributed to the recent reorientation of the flow of migration.

Ambiguous Impact of Migration on African Economies

Migration is not necessarily a zero-sum game, where one side loses to the benefit of others; this holds for Africa too. In the ideal case, if migration were to be properly managed in the overall interest, all parties involved could gain: the migrants, their extended families at home, the countries of origin and the receiving countries. Unfortunately, the selfish interests of major players involved in this game, both on an individual and state level, have hitherto prevented such an optimal solution. Deterrence and zero-migration policies on the part of fortress Europe, for example, encourage irregular immigration, smuggling, marginalization and exploitation of migrants on different levels and stages of their journey to Europe.

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8 Cf. IOM (2005, p. 33).
11 Cf. Figure 1.
12 Cf. UN (2006, p. 6).
15 Cf. below.
17 Cf. below.
As usual, the better educated have most to gain, and because of their resource endowment, they are more prone than others to benefit from the pull factors, such as better living and economic conditions in their host countries. This is one of the reasons for a considerable 'brain drain' over the past 30 years, which has resulted in the loss of about one third of the African academic workforce to highly industrialized countries. Between 33% and 55% of Africans with higher education left Angola, Burundi, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Uganda and Tanzania in search of a better life and employment in OECD countries. For example, about 20,000 Nigerian and 12,000 South-African doctors migrated overseas, whereas only 33,000 remained in South Africa, according to recent WHO statistics. Even the 926 Ghanaian doctors practising nowadays in OECD countries would be urgently needed at home, where they would represent 29% of all doctors employed.18 Again, Western Africa has been the most important source of this brain drain, due to the economic and/or political crisis in Ghana, Gambia, Nigeria, Liberia and Sierra Leone since the 1980s (see Table 2.1).19

The drain of human capital is mostly reflected in the employment sector for highly qualified personnel.20 Island economies, such as Cape Verde (69%), the Seychelles (59%), Mauritius (48%), Madagascar (36%), but also countries suffering from civil war, such as Somalia (59%), Sierra Leone (41%) or Liberia (37%), have been affected21. Another remarkable trend is the 'feminization' of the brain drain, as women are more likely than men to study abroad and migrate later. In addition, the migration of highly qualified personnel is a considerable financial burden to the state budget of the countries concerned. According to UNCTAD estimates, the loss of one qualified academic costs on average US$184,000. Last, but not least, the brain drain delays the growth of an African middle class and the development of sustainable structures of the civil society, which may exert a negative impact on the political and economic stability of the countries of origin.

However, there are also positive — although often neglected — socio-structural effects of the brain drain, beyond the question of remittances (which will be discussed further below). This counteracting 'brain gain' relates to the transfer of knowledge, of innovations and the consolidation or extension of foreign trade relations. New value systems, political and spiritual orientations, acquired by migrants in Europe, are more prone than others to benefit from the pull factors, such as better living and economic conditions in their host countries. This is one of the reasons for a considerable 'brain drain' over the past 30 years, which has resulted in the loss of about one third of the African academic workforce to highly industrialized countries. Between 33% and 55% of Africans with higher education left Angola, Burundi, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Uganda and Tanzania in search of a better life and employment in OECD countries. For example, about 20,000 Nigerian and 12,000 South-African doctors migrated overseas, whereas only 33,000 remained in South Africa, according to recent WHO statistics. Even the 926 Ghanaian doctors practising nowadays in OECD countries would be urgently needed at home, where they would represent 29% of all doctors employed.18 Again, Western Africa has been the most important source of this brain drain, due to the economic and/or political crisis in Ghana, Gambia, Nigeria, Liberia and Sierra Leone since the 1980s (see Table 2.1).19

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In addition, remittances of African migrants can contribute considerably not just to the wellbeing of their families at home, but to poverty reduction and development at the regional and even at the national levels in general.24 Case studies from Burkina Faso, for example, have revealed that remittances of migrants reduced the rate of households living below the poverty line by 7.2%.25 Although average individual remittances from Africans are relatively low (US$200–300), compared with the global average, its overall annual total almost doubled from US$4.9 billion to US$8.1 billion between 2000 and 2005, according to estimates of the World Bank and ECA. All officially recorded money transfers from Africa amounted to US$14 billion in 2004. Depending on the respective country, this translated into shares of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of 3% (Nigeria, Kenya), 7% (Ethiopia, Senegal, Sudan), 11% (Ghana), 23% (Cape Verde), and of up to 40% in Lesotho.26 Remittances via official channels accounted for over 200 billion CFA (€300 million) for Senegal only.27 However, these official figures only reflect an incomplete image of the reality. Many Africans prefer informal channels for remittances transactions in view of the lack of performance of the African banking system, notably if they are unauthorized guests in their receiving country. These informal transfers double and sometimes triple the share of officially recorded remittances, according to estimates of the IOM. In some LLDCs they surpass even private foreign direct investments (FDI) or development aid.28 Therefore, it has been recognized that remittances (mostly from Europe) constitute the second largest source of external private finance in African developing countries, besides FDI. Up to now they are an underutilized and badly managed source of national development in the countries of origin.29 However, the EU member countries bear their share of responsibility too: high entry barriers and the criminalization of irregular immigrants result in social seclusion and the formation of ghettos of migrants in European capitals, which discourage remittances because the concerned prefer to care for their own immediate needs in a hostile social and political environment (see Figure 2.2).30

Migration Routes from Africa to Europe

In the last two decades Northern Africa has developed into a transit region for Sub-Saharan migrants. The new migration pattern, its policy response by the Maghreb-
and European states, as well as its negative ‘side effects’ on the migrants concerned, have been analysed in detail by Baldwin-Edwards (2006) and others. The actual number of Sub-Saharan migrants living ‘in transit’ in Northern Africa is difficult to estimate. Most of them are irregulars, ‘without papers’, mostly living as outcasts under miserable conditions in an Arabic xenophobic social environment. A case study of irregular African migrants living in Algeria has revealed that about two thirds of the interviewed migrants consider themselves treated as ‘slaves’, ‘poor wretches’, or subhuman beings. According to well-informed estimates, there are at least 100,000 living in Algeria and Mauritania, more than a million in Libya, and some 10,000 in Morocco. They are certainly not welcomed by the local population and the authorities. Between January 2000 and March 2006 about 35,000 unauthorised Sub-Saharan migrants were forcibly expelled by Algerian authorities.

Because of the more rigid migration controls of EU member states, the sealing of the EU’s southern borders along with the coastal line between Morocco and Mauritania against the increasing influx of irregular migrants, migration routes have increasingly shifted to sea-born alternatives, notably from Senegal, Gambia and Guinea to the Spanish Canary Islands (see Figure 3). The latter registered over 31,000 African refugees in 2006, a sixfold increase compared with 2005, and almost four times as many in the previous four years combined. An additional 5000 were intercepted by the islands’ coastguards, and 6000 migrants died or went missing under appalling conditions on the perilous 1000 km sea journey, according to estimates of Spanish border authorities in Tenerife. Another 16,000 African migrants arrived on the tiny Italian island of Lampedusa (south of Malta) from the Libyan coast in the same year.

As for the Atlantic sea routes, migrants pay the smugglers the equivalent of US$800 to US$1250 for a one-way passage from Senegal to the Canary Islands in small wooden fishing boats, called lothios, or ‘pirogues of death’ in the local dialect. Because of the rapid growing demand, boat-builders and carpenters in Gambia started to construct bigger pirogues, designated especially for the transport of 60 to 100 migrants, which cost about 100,000 dalasi (US$3539). They are equipped with two outboard engines, GPS, and a minimum of petrol and other supplies for the 8 to 12 day journey, depending on the sea conditions. The transfer in the crowded boats under the open sun is life threatening. Local agents openly admit that the chances the boat will be detected by border patrols before arrival is 50:50, otherwise the people on the boat simply perish. No wonder then that experienced pilots of these pirogues are in high demand. One renowned ‘pirogier’ was the ‘Baron’ from Saint-Louis, who

escaped prosecution in Senegal in September 2006 by fleeing to Mauritania. He was said to have successfully transported over 1000 migrants to Tenerife. Concerning the risk evaluation of such journeys, the long distance over the open Atlantic is not the only problem. Senegalese fishermen had already been forced to travel along the West African coast up to the Gulf of Guinea in search of valuable catches, because their local fishing grounds had been depleted by foreign (mostly EU) fishing armadas. The new GPS technique facilitates orientation. Besides irresponsible neglect of basic security precautions on the side of the smugglers, the major cause for imminent danger lies in the special framework conditions for these transports, i.e. clandestine refugee-transfers in overcrowded boats on the high sea, enforced by the close surveillance of the multinational Frontex sea- and air-born forces, patrolling along the Western African coast, and organized by the EU and concerned African states. This was demonstrated by the sad fate of a tiny rickety yacht which started in late December 2005 with 37 Senegalese migrants on board, towed by a bigger smuggling vessel with a destination of the Canaries. On the way, the smugglers severed the towing line, possibly because they feared detection by the coastguard planes, and the yacht drifted into the open Atlantic. On 30 April 2006, fishermen from Barbados, rescued the boat, which had been driven by the trade winds over the Atlantic, but nobody had survived the ordeal; they found on board only 11 mumified corpses and some evidence of their origin and fate.

Notwithstanding these imminent hazards, the desperate migrants see no alternative. Apparently, even Asian smugglers have joined the lucrative business. They transport migrants from Pakistan, India or Bangladesh by air to West African harbours where they are loaded on board of unseaworthy ships meant to reach the Canaries. In September 2006, a rusty fishing trawler with 160 Pakistani and Indians on board was intercepted by the Spanish coastguard before the Canaries. In February 2007 a fishing trawler, overloaded with some 400 migrants from Kashmir and different African origins, set sail from Guinea to the Canary Islands and broke down in international waters off the Mauritanian coast. It was towed – after one week of wrangling over the responsibility for the rescue mission – to the Mauritian port of Nouadhibou for the repatriation of the migrants. Most of the irregular migrants whose nationality could be identified were repatriated to their home countries. Thus,

31 Cf. Boubakri (2004, Fall); Haas (2006b); Hamood (2006); Futo & Jandl (2004); Marfaing (2004).
33 Cf. Parkes (2006); Figure 3.
35 Cf. below in more detail.
36 Cyapus, in Spanish.
38 Cf. Belleret: Chronique des clandestins (12) – On n’arrêta pas la mer avec les bras (Le Monde, 22 October 2006).
39 Cf. below.
40 Belleret: Chronique des clandestins (10) – L’irrésistible appel du large. (Le Monde, 20 October 2006).
42 Cf. Nation News, Barbados, 7 May 2006. Connotations with the deplorable conditions of the Atlantic slave trade are not too far fetched.
Unfair EU Foreign Trade Policy Reinforces Migration Pressure in Africa

The enduring desolate economic situation and bleak perspectives of most households in African LLDCs account for one of the major reasons for African trans-national migration. This has also been recognized by the member states of the EU. At the joint EU–AU migration summit in Tripoli (22 to 23 November 2006) they promised to stem the growing flow of migrants by a significant increase in development aid to the most affected West- and North African countries, specifically targeted on potential migrant populations. In total, the EU promised to allocate some €40 million to boost job creation in Africa. Nevertheless, aid and development do not necessarily lead to a reduction of migration. On the contrary, different studies suggest that at least the kind of economic growth promoted by the highly industrialized Western countries and by the WTO, based on a neo-liberal approach of trade liberalization, would stimulate migration from Sub-Saharan Africa in the medium and long run. This applies the more if the donor countries obstruct sustainable growth of African LDCs by non-tariff barriers to trade, unfair subsidies and dumping prices, which undercut the comparative advantages of these countries for labour intensive agricultural products on the world market. Thus, studies published by the World Bank, international NGOs, and others have repeatedly blamed the EU in this respect, proving that the EU foreign trade policy contributes to a significant extent to reduce the income-earning possibilities of West African producers, in pursuit of the commercial interest of the EU member states, and to the detriment of development in Sub-Saharan Africa. In addition, this selfish foreign trade policy of the EU and its member states counteracted its own pro-poor foreign trade policy concerning the ACP member countries in 2002; but to date it has not put corresponding measures into practice. Even high ranking representatives of EU member states, like the German minister for Economic Development Cooperation, Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul, and the German President Horst Köhler, criticised the double talk and the lack of coherence of EU trade and development policies during the WTO conference in Cancun (Mexico, 2003) and the Africa Forum summit in Accra (Ghana, January 2007), but again, apparently without great success.

Contested EU Measures to Prevent Irregular African Migration to Europe

The prevailing perspective of the EU concerning African immigration is still focused mainly on security and prevention, neglecting the chances for development linked to it for all sides concerned. During the joint Migration and Development Conference at Rabat (Morocco, 10 to 11 July 2006), attended by ministers of over 30 African and European states, the African partners accepted in principle the demand of their European colleagues for a more active involvement in the close supervision and prevention of irregular migration ('Action Plan of Rabat'). However, it was agreed upon that stepping up border controls both at land and at sea would not suffice. New ways to open up legal ways of temporary or ‘circular’ migration and development of employment opportunities in the transit countries and countries of origin were considered to be a necessary supplement. At the Tripoli summit in November 2006 the EU vice president Franco Frattini recommended once more a quota system of legal immigration, adapted to the specific needs of each EU member country. But whether more draconic proposals to seal off ‘fortress Europe’ had been discarded all together was not certain. This concerns the construction of concentration or ‘reception’ camps for ‘boat people’ and other irregular migrants and refugees outside the EU borders in Northern Africa, proposed among others by the then British Premier Tony Blair in 2003 and the German and Italian ministers of the interior Otto Schily and Giuseppe Pisanu in 2004, but fiercely contested by other governments of EU member states and by human rights groups. In 2004, the EU proposed to set up five ‘reception centres’ in Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia at a later date. On 5 November 2004, the leaders of the 25 EU governments agreed on the approval of common asylum rules for the EU until 2010, whereby it should be examined if there is a possibility to process asylum claims outside the territory of the EU. At least one camp was built in Libya with the assistance of the Berlusconi government in 2004. Another camp was constructed with Spanish assistance in Nouadhibou, Mauritania, where up to 4000 undocumented migrants were interned in 2006, mostly from Senegal and Mali.  

on the base of a bilateral agreement between the Spanish and Senegalese immigration authorities 4400 migrants interned in refugee camps on the Canary Islands were repatriated by plane to Saint Louis (Northern Senegal) between 9 September and 26 October 2006.

45 Haas (2006a); Martin & Taylor (1996).
47 CF. Anderson et al. (2005); Baffes (2005); Borrmann et al. (2005); Hinkle & Schiff (2004); Oxiam (2006).
49 CF. Gillson et al. (2004).
In the meantime, the implementation of other more subtle proposals of the European Commission’s ‘Global Approach on Migration’ was accelerated, like the creation of job-recruiting centres for temporary African migrants in their home countries, co-financed by the EU and interested member states. In February 2007, an EU-pilot project in Mali was under construction, and similar centres were planned for Senegal, Ghana and Mauritania. Their aim was to match the European demand for cheap labour, notably in Spain, Italy and France, in sectors such as agriculture, building or cleaning, to the corresponding offer of suitable African job seekers. Initially the job centres will be restricted to the capital, but regional offices in outlying towns or villages, where most migrants start their journey, are also envisaged. However, these plans were strongly opposed by right-wing EU politicians, notably in Poland and other East-European member states, such as Slovakia and Lithuania – as well as Romania and Bulgaria, which recently joined the EU. They argued that it would be difficult to understand for millions of their voters – who would be happy to have low-skilled jobs in agriculture and other sectors within the EU – why they could not work freely in all EU member states, whereas millions of euros would be spend on African immigrants.

As similar populist views opposed to African immigration are increasingly fashionable all over Europe, policy makers were at pains to propagate ‘modern’ concepts of ‘circular migration’. On the basis of recent research findings, they underlined the positive aspects of migration if managed properly, like the development potential of remittances or the tapping of other African diaspora resources for development. Although the new concepts are certainly more than a simple re-vitalization of old models of temporary migration, as employed by the German ‘Gastarbeiter’ system in the 1960s and 1970s, they share some common shortcomings, notably with respect to negative social effects in sending and receiving countries.

The social costs in the receiving countries are related to the highly asymmetric distribution of cost and benefit of immigration. Whereas certain sectors of the economy, as well as the middle and upper class, who employ the labour or services of immigrants, can gain considerable profits, notably if employed under precarious black market conditions, the lower strata of the society, especially unqualified labour, will be exposed to cut-throat competition both on the labour market and in the social services. Increasingly violent social conflicts between disillusioned migrants and their neighbourhoods, as the former are insufficiently integrated into the society and often living as outcasts in suburban ghettos, as in Cachan (Paris) and other French cities in 2005, are foreseeable in other European countries, probably reinforced by related ultra-right-wing excesses. The envisaged immigration quota systems for temporary migration, already practised in the veiled form of periodical ‘regularization’ of hundreds of thousands unauthorized immigrants in Spain, Italy and France in the past ten years, might solve short-term problems on national labour markets. But in the medium and long run they are likely to increase the social and political tensions caused by badly managed immigration policies. An adequate and sustainable integration concept for immigrants would be viable only if it comprised a significant improvement of the labour market conditions for domestic citizens living under precarious economic and social conditions. And last, but not least, the unfair EU foreign trade policy mentioned above should be replaced as soon as possible by Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) between the EU and ACP countries on equal footing, supplemented by sustainable reintegration and development programmes.

**Conclusion**

African migration is a reflection of its socio-economic dynamics since the times of the slave trade. In the last few decades the number of refugees from conflict regions in Africa has increased dramatically. The conflict ridden and poverty stricken region of Western Africa became the cradle of migration from Sub-Saharan Africa to Europe, where most African migrants with overseas destinations live. They flee from their desolate economic situation, violent conflicts or political persecution. The drain of human capital from Africa is most pronounced in the employment sector for highly qualified personnel. Another remarkable trend is the ‘feminization’ of the brain drain in recent years, caused by the growing number of highly skilled African women looking for employment abroad. However, migration is not necessarily a zero-sum game, where one side loses to the benefit of others. There are also positive – although often neglected – economic and socio-cultural effects of the brain drain. Remittances of African migrants contribute considerably not just to the wellbeing of their extended families at home, but to poverty reduction and development on a national scale in general. They constitute the second largest source of external private finance, apart from foreign direct investment. In addition, a counteracting ‘brain gain’, i.e. new value systems, political and spiritual orientations, acquired by migrants in Europe, results in a transfer of knowledge and of innovations.

The European Union and its member states share a heavy dual responsibility for the continuing migration pressure: first, because they fostered over decades corrupt and autocratic regimes like that of Eyadéma’s Togo, or successive Nigerian military dictatorships, with dire disregard to principles of ‘good governance’. The aftermath of these regimes is still to be felt today, and constitutes one of the underlying factors for politically motivated migration. Second, the EU contributed to Africa’s growing economic misery, due to the damaging effects of selfish European external trade policy. Nevertheless, the prevailing perspective of the EU concerning African immigration remains to be focused on security, the foreclosure of its external borders and prevention. Even current EU programmes to combat African migration

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53 Cf. BBC-news: 9 February 2007: ‘European Union development commissioner, Louis Michel, is in Mali for talks to set up the EU’s first job centre for African migrants’.
55 Cf. above.
‘at the roots’ with increased development aid to West African countries concerned may be based on illusions. The available evidence and literature points to the fact that this policy of ‘development instead of migration’ is bound to fail because of the peculiar overall structure of economic growth in West Africa, promoted by the highly industrialized Western countries and the WTO. Their neo-liberal approach to development, based on global trade liberalization, will rather stimulate migration from Sub-Saharan Africa in the medium and long run.

The European–African migration summits in Rabat and Tripoli in July and November 2006 even strengthened the policy of exclusion. But even Germany and France meanwhile hesitantly accept the fact that they are immigration countries. The EU commission endorses a limited and temporarily restricted immigration of Africans. However, two fundamental problems remain unsolved. The cost and benefit of immigration are distributed asymmetrically between EU member countries and between social classes within the EU. Both will aggravate the imminent danger of violent conflicts and of right-wing extremism in the immigration regions. The revitalization of old concepts of ‘selective’, ‘temporary’ migration under the heading of the modern approach of ‘circular migration’ is unlikely to solve the problem either. Yet well-adapted immigration regulations could serve the interest of all parties involved. Last, but not least, it could contribute to protect the over-aged population of European member states in the long run against threatening economic decline.

References


Figure 2.2 Financial inflows of ODA, FDI, and official remittances (average of the years 1980 to 1999; source: IOM 2003: 228, World Bank data of 2001)

Table 2.1 Immigration rate and level of skill of Africans in OECD-countries (25+ years; in percentage of local work force)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>1990 Level of skill</th>
<th>2000 Level of skill</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Africa</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Eastern Africa</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Africa</td>
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<td>1.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Northern Africa</td>
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<td>1.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Southern Africa</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
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Low skilled = primary education 0-8 years of schooling  
Medium skilled = secondary education 9-12 years of schooling  
High skilled = tertiary education 13+ years of schooling  

Figure 2.3 Migration-routes from Africa to Europe  
Source: © UN (2006, p. 12)