CHAPTER I
Case studies of conflict and territorial organization in divided cities
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1. The essence of division and partition

The purpose of this paper is threefold: to describe, analyze and compare first, processes which led to the division and partition of cities and second, to examine the appropriateness of one model of partition and division in relation to partitioned and divided cities. Thirdly, as partition and division in cities create barriers of various kinds in those cities, their impact on the functioning of partitioned/divided cities and their planning and management as one entity will be examined in depth. Thus, this paper deals mainly with two of the traditional categories of concepts of mainstream political geography: structure and process.

Structural–functional analysis attempts to provide a scientific theory of the system under study. As the name postulates, its attributes, structural–functional explanations, stress the functional character of elements such as borders and boundaries, capital cities or geopolitical and geostrategic regions (Kasperson and Minghi, 1969: 69). In the study presented here, structure relates to the functioning and components of partition/division in cities. This study particularly focuses on the permeability or impermeability of these divisions/partitions and their effect on cooperation and coordination of the partitioned/divided entities in matters concerning the whole urban entity, such as planning, watershed management, sewage treatment, air pollution abatement and similar area-wide functions.

Partitioned/divided cities constitute a culmination form of social, economic and political segregation of cities. Social ethnic and racial segregation still remain important features of contemporary cities (Smith, 1989). According to mainstream urban geography, this is basically a problem which results from hierarchy of power and wealth in which those in political and economic control decide and others are decided for. As long as such a hierarchy exists, segregation will prevail (Marcuse, 1993). This study will attempt to analyze partition/division as a form,
perhaps an extreme one, of social, economic, and, more importantly, political segregation in cities.

Processes which embrace the more dynamic components of political geographical research: This refers to political processes such as the rise and fall of states, political integration and disintegration of states and behaviour of political units in matters such as election, war and peace, struggle for power, selection of leadership, etc. Partition/division of states is the process under study in this research and, as previously stated, one particular model will be ‘tested’ for its suitability for partitioned/divided cities.

General theories and conceptual frameworks for the study of structure and process of partition/division are affiliated to two general categories: (a) theories and concepts which deal with the nature and functioning of borders and frontiers (we assume that partition/division in cities function as borders) and (b) theories and concepts which suggest explanations for the process of partition/division.

The Discussion of our study will start by fundamental definitions of partition and division (Introduction) and will point to some case studies of partition/division. After that introduction, the study will proceed to part I, in which the process of partition/division will be presented and to part II, in which the structure of partition/division will be analyzed. Each part will refer to the relevant structures and processes in the three case studies: Berlin, Jerusalem and Nicosia.

Jerusalem was partitioned in the 1948 War of Independence of Israel. The war between the Arab states and the newborn state of Israel resulted in a de facto partition of Palestine, Israel and Jerusalem. The Old City of Jerusalem and the surrounding areas were annexed to Jordan, while Western Jerusalem became a frontier town in Israel. Jerusalem was occupied and reunified in 1967 in the ‘Six Days War’. Berlin and Germany were divided at the end of the Second World War. Part of Germany and West Berlin were occupied by the victorious allies and became in the 1950s part of West (Federal) Germany. Eastern Berlin became the capital city of Social-Democratic (Communist) East Germany. Berlin and the two parts of Germany were reunified at the end of the 1980s. Finally, Cyprus and Nicosia became partitioned as a result of the Turkish army invasion and occupation of the northern part of the island in 1974. Nicosia and Cyprus are still partitioned. Other cities which were or are still partitioned/divided are Beirut, Belfast and Mogadishu. However, as the Introduction will show, the partition/division of cities is one type of the urban segregation process which takes place in various degrees in every city in the world.

2. Introduction: basic definitions and theories about partition/division

Partition is defined as “to divide (as a country) into two or three more territorial units having separate political status” (Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary, 1977). It is a term commonly used in the context of sovereign states in which an existing political geographic entity is divided into two or more separate entities (Waterman, 1984: 98). Territorially, as a social construct, it is “the
attempt by an individual or group to affect, influence or control people, phenomena and relationship by delimiting and asserting control over geographical area” (Sack, 1986: 19). Exclusion and segregation, namely the unequal access to specific territories within cities, regions or national territories, is typical of all societies, on various scales and at different periods. Spatial segregation and separation among social groups is founded on ethnic, religious and linguistic differences, and/or on some social and economic criteria. Societies are differentiated within, as to how they classify people: in some, segregation among individuals and groups is voluntary and relatively low; in others segregation is involuntary and comparatively high. Thus, each neighbourhood, city region or state could be classified along an imaginary axis of integration–segregation–separation.

The inevitable outcome of exclusive command over territory is conflict, especially in a world with finite natural and man-made resources (Smith, 1990: 1). Such conflict can range from trivial incursions by others into our own space, be it home or neighbourhood, but which may eventually lead to warfare within and between states. Division and partition, the processes investigated in this paper represent an outcome of contest and conflict on control of territory and resources within the context of segregation. An intriguing question to raise is whether segregated residential areas such as the black ghettos in North America and the apartheid segregated areas in South Africa present similar features to those of partitioned/divided cities. Ethnic enclaves and black ghettos in the USA and South Africa have an important common denominator with partitioned/divided cities: the principle of exclusion guides segregation between the various ethnic communities. Also common to the two is the theoretical concept of cultural pluralism and ethnic irredentism. The characteristics of urban segregation are displayed below.

2.1. Urban segregation in South Africa, North America as compared to partitioned/divided cities

Whereas urban segregation in South Africa and North America is fundamentally residential segregation, partitioned/divided cities often represent an ultimate form of segregation in which all the forms of urban livelihood are segregated. To begin with, the historical setting which brought up segregation of the black ghettos in North America, the black segregated areas in South Africa and the partition/division of cities is completely different.

The literature dealing with urban segregation in North America does not fully concur in respect to the determinants that have led to the segregated American city. Rose (1971) and Peach (1995), claim on the one hand, that the black ghetto in North American cities has evolved primarily as the result of the prevailing housing market mechanism in the 1960s. According to them, economic means and social needs played only a marginal role. On the other hand, other researchers, such as Goldberg (1993), suggested that urban segregation in the American cities has been rather a planned policy, emulating the South African Group Areas Act.
Regardless of what were actually the most crucial determinants, it seems that ghettoization of the black community in North America was a combined result of a housing allocation policy, urban renewal policies and suburban zoning regulations. Thus, urban segregation has been motivated primarily by a political decision (Saltman, 1991).

An urbanization process involving the out-migration of blacks from rural areas in the South to the lights of the big cities, extended enclaves of black populations to North and Western USA. Thus, by 1970, 28 major black ghetto centres existed in the US (Rose, 1971). The reasons for the out-migration of blacks from the Southern states are mainly economic. The decline of Southern agriculture and the loss of jobs served as major catalyst factors in pushing blacks to immigrate (Hamilton, 1964; Persky and Kain, 1970).

2.2. South Africa

South African urban segregation has been based primarily on race differences. The segregation policy, namely the apartheid, has existed since the late 19th century (Parnell and Mabin, 1995). The Gold Law of 1885, the Durban system and early location regulations officially set the conditions and regulations of urban life along lines of colour (Davenport, 1969). The various forms are all unquestionably types of segregation. Apartheid, which in 1949 was one of the main policies in the Malan regime, was created “to perpetuate the separateness of the population groups”; separate development and multinational development”. The National Party at that time envisaged moving all Coloureds and Indians into their own areas and also removing those black townships that were considered to be in close proximity to the expanding white areas. Thus, under NP rule, a city structure based on rigid racial segregation emerged (DeWitt, 1992; Mabin, 1992; Turok, 1994; Saff, 1995). The South African government imposed and maintained urban segregation through four different mechanisms. First, they legally divided the population based on skin colour and in a hierarchical order of colour. Second, by creating a spatial segregation based on well-defined land allocation policy and by using physical features such as rivers, roads and railways to demarcate the segregated territories. Third, by ensuring that major mineral resources remain within the white designated areas. Fourth, by enforcing differential political rights to non-whites and white groups. Thus, non-whites could not pursue any political activity that could change the on-going sociopolitical and economic segregation (DeCrespiny, 1980; Lemon, 1991).

Segregation in the South African context took place at two geographical levels, namely urban and regional segregation. While the urban segregation involved forcing non-white communities into secluded urban fringe areas (called townships), the regional segregation involved the creation of ‘homelands’—specific regions in the country designated for various non-white groups (DeWitt, 1992).

Partitioned/divided cities were formed in quite different historical and political settings. Partitioned/divided cities are almost always the consequence of the division of nations and partition of countries. Divided nations are countries with...
marked ethnic homogeneity, a common historical tradition and experience of successful political unity. They are split along ideological lines (Vietnam, Germany, Korea, China, Cambodia, Laos) (Henderson and Lebow, 1974: 434). The division is artificial in the sense that it has been artificially imposed from external sources, usually by great powers at the end of a war, or as a result of their involvement in a war. In contrast, partition is a result of internal schism which tears societies apart. Internal diversity based on divisions along ethnic, religious or linguistic lines may lead to a conflict between the various groups, and eventually to their complete partition. Partition is often associated with the dissolution of colonial empires (Austria–Hungary—8 states; British Raj—5; French-Indochina—4; Palestine Mandate—2) (Henderson and Lebow, 1974: 434). Cyprus, which is a de facto partitioned state along ethnic lines also belongs in this category, and Northern Ireland and Lebanon are also included in this group of countries, as a condition of ‘quasi-partition’ prevailed in parts of these states during certain periods of their existence. Partition is perceived as a way of solving a destructive diversity within a country (Taylor, 1989: 155). The conceptual framework for partition often lies within ethnic pluralism and irredenta. However, irredenta is also tied to divided nations (Kurds, Basques, Catalanians, Armenians) who are striving for unity while their citizens are scattered among different countries. These groups are not included in this study.

Bangladesh should also be added to the partitioned states. It was partitioned from Pakistan in 1971. Pakistan did not succeed in developing one unifying national identity for East and West Pakistan (Jahan, 1974: 323). In that respect it is similar to Malaysia, which broke up because it failed to integrate its various parts. Although partition is a ‘last resort’ or ‘best/worst’ solution, preferable to all-out civil war, this particular political surgery has not proved very successful (Waterman, 1987: 157; Henderson and Lebow, 1974: 442).

The partitioned/divided cities discussed in this study are an outcome of division (Berlin) or partition (Jerusalem and Nicosia) and it is the intention of this study to investigate if this type of city constitutes a category of its own, namely a category of cities in which urban segregation has been brought to its most extreme form.

3. Part I: The process of partition/division of cities

The paradigmatic model1 for division or partition follows six stages:

1. Pre-Partition/Division Stage, which includes all the times in which the analyzed cities functioned as one urban entity.
2. The Actual Division or Partitioning, which in all the cities examined was a

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1 Based on a modified version of Henderson and Lebow’s (1974) model and the model of Minghi (1976).
stage in which inter-communal conflicts and/or total war occurred, in which
superpowers or other states were involved, created and maintained the division/
partition.

3. Initial Division or Partition is marked by mutual non-recognition and intense
ideological or national-ethnic antagonism between the two partitioned/divided
sides of the city. The border is fortified and sealed, at least by one unit, and
this stage is also characterized by military incidents. The divided/partitioned
entities are occupied in claiming for themselves sole successor status, in
subverting the opponent’s legitimacy both by propaganda and by pursuing
internal and external policies of delegitimization of the ‘other side.’

4. Middle Term Division/Partition is characterized by declining hostility between
units, and by implicit or explicit mutual acceptance of coexistence. There is also
a decline in the ideological/nationalistic animosity, and in the overt and covert
attempts to subvert the opponent’s regime. The border sealing is modified,
permitting a modest exchange of persons and ideas and, in some cases,
agreements about border questions, rights of visitation and repatriation of
families.

5. Rapprochement. In this stage close economic cooperation with respect to
tourism, trade and limited joint administrative apparatus is established. There is
a certain degree of political cooperation concerning common problems such as
relations with neighbouring states, or security issues, and there is a marked
increase in the movement of persons and flow of ideas across the divide or
partition.

6. Unification is marked by physical eradication of the divide or partition, and the
unification of not only the divided/partitioned cities, but also of the divided
nations and the partitioned states. Such unification could presumably be the
result of military action, or mutual consent.

Finally, Henderson and Lebow estimate that chances for rapprochement between
divided nations are shaped by factors such as the reluctance to co-operate by
leaders and institutions in the dyad states; economic disparities; bureaucratic
resistance to merger or prior ideological commitments (Henderson and Lebow,
1974: 441). The prognosis for resolving outstanding issues between partitioned
countries is even more pessimistic. Minority and refugee problems, and territorial
disputes still constitute major foci of contention between partitioned states.
Wherever rapprochement and integration were achieved, they presented a
formidable task to planners who had to try and bridge the divergent separate
development of the partitioned entities.

The review of the cases above point to a major problem in the study of
partition/division, in the words of Henderson and Lebow: “The phenomenon of
division is as varied as it is ubiquitous. This variety poses serious problems of
classification and notably precludes a truly comprehensive treatment of division’
(Henderson and Lebow, 1974: 433). This difficulty is projected on partitioned/
divided cities which is the topic of that study. It is not at all certain that there is
any clear-cut category of divided and partitioned cities.
The paradigm of division/partition of cities does not function in a vacuum. The split cities are an inseparable part of the divided nations or partitioned states, which have a decisive say in everything that occurs in the divided cities. This brings us to another issue of the somewhat sterile features of the above paradigm, which does not specify that each of the stages is formed by a variety of internal and external forces. These forces, which work individually and together, affect each stage of the paradigm of division and are responsible for the fact that divided/partitioned cities remain forever in the second, third or fourth stages, and never reach the rapprochement stage.

3.1. The divided city of Berlin

The division of Germany is based upon decisions made during and immediately after the Second World War. Germany was divided into the Western Occupation Zone (occupied by the British, French and American forces), and the Soviet Zone. These occupied territories became, respectively, Federal West Germany and Socialist East Germany. A new border between Germany and Poland was formed along the rivers Oder and Neisse. Berlin became an enclave within Eastern Germany and the city itself was divided between a zone occupied by Western forces and a zone occupied by Soviet forces (Pounds, 1962). The division of Germany which lasted until 1989 created, in addition to divided Berlin, other divided cities in Germany. Eastern Frankfurt, which is located on the eastern shore of the Oder River, became Polish, whereas the western side remained German. The city of Goerlitz, situated on the eastern shore of the Neisse, was divided between Germany and Poland. Guben and Kuestrin were also divided between Poland and Germany (Scholz, 1985).

3.1.1. Stage 1: pre-division

Berlin served as the capital city, first of the princedom of Brandenburg (1415–1700), then of the kingdom of Prussia (1701–1870) and finally of the German Empire and republic (1871–1945). For more than 550 years it constituted one entity until it was divided in 1945.

3.1.2. Stage 2: the actual division

The actual conquest of Berlin took place between 23 April 1945 and 2 May 1945 when German and Soviet armies were fighting in Berlin and its suburbs. After the cease-fire, on 8 May 1945, the Russian Army controlled the whole city. However, in June 1945, American, British and French troops entered Berlin, and the city and its surroundings was divided into four occupation sectors: the Soviet sector of 403 km² and 1.19 million inhabitants (1953); the American sector of 291 km² and 1.05 million residents; the British sector of 165 km² and 64,400 people, and the tiny French sector of 24.5 km² with a population of 44,400. The Allied powers agreed that Berlin would be governed by an inter-Allied Command, but in June 1948 the Allied Command ceased to function, after a rapid acceleration of tension between the Soviet Union and the other Allies. The Soviet Occupation
authorities began to impede and restrict communication with the sectors of Berlin occupied by the Western powers. The City Council (which managed the city as a unified entity) also disintegrated—most of its members migrated to the Western sector of the city. The Communist minority members in the Council established a separate authority for East Berlin. Following the split in the Command and the subsequent abortive Soviet attempts to force the Western Allies out of the city through the Berlin Blockade, the three Western sectors of the city were merged into one unit (Herz, 1974: 6). The actual division of Berlin was imposed upon it by the Allied superpowers, as Berlin in particular and divided Germany in general, became the frontline for the escalating ‘Cold War’ between the USSR and the West. The new boundary, which was forced on Germany and Berlin against the wishes of the German people, became the frontier between East and West Germany. It evolved from an internal administrative line into an international border with the most stringent military control (Pounds, 1962; Ritter and Hajdu, 1989) (see Fig. 1).

3.1.3. Stage 3: initial division

The initial stage of division of Berlin which took place between the end of the 1940s and the mid-1960s reflects, without doubt, a stage of intense hostility between East and West Germany and, as a result, between the two sides of divided Berlin. The antagonism between the two parts of Germany, and of Berlin,
was sustained and nourished by the Superpowers’ rivalry, and at least in the early years (1948–1952) there was no hostility between East and West Germans. The deterioration in their relations was triggered by the Soviet blockade of the surface routes into the city (Berlin was an island or exclave within Soviet-occupied German territory). During 1949 the Western powers mounted an airlift, bringing in by plane everything necessary for the survival of the city. On an average day 150 aircraft were flying a daily total of 1500 tons of supplies, in all 277,569 flights, at a cost of US$181,300,000. This operation prevented the surrender of West Berlin (Elkins, 1977). Coal, for heating and industry, made up about two-thirds of the airlifted tonnage, followed by food supplies. The USSR finally raised the blockade on 12 May 1949, and a new agreement between the occupation authorities provided for access to the Western sector of the city, and also for limited commercial exchange and movement of people between East and West Berlin. Certain railroads and canals were to be made available from West Germany into the Western sector of Berlin, and three air corridors were also specified for the use of the Western powers (Pounds, 1962: 113). The East–West rift in Germany culminated in 1949 in the establishment of two rival states: the Federal Republic of Germany, and the German Democratic Republic. From then on, hostility between the two sides of divided Germany continued to grow, and symbolically it was expressed in the fortification of the boundary between the two German states in 1952. This fortification was initiated and carried out by East Germany. The border zone became a restricted area, but people were still able to escape from the East to West Germany. Altogether some 1.3 million East Germans crossed from East to West Berlin between 1945 and 1961. However, in 1961, after the Berlin Wall was erected, the boundary between East and West was reinforced and the border became completely sealed off (Ritter and Hajdu, 1989).

It should be noted that this sealing-off was a gradual process. In 1952 it was estimated that some 400,000 people crossed the border daily. In Berlin itself, about 24,000 East Germans worked in West Berlin, while 40,000–50,000 West Berliners were employed in the East. There was also considerable movement between East and West Berlin for the purpose of shopping for produce and commodities (Robinson, 1953: 549). Also, in 1952, shopping within the border area, which had continued since the 1940s, was forbidden when rebuilding of the devastated areas near the border finally began; both parts of Berlin tended to turn their backs on the dividing line. The Border now included streets such as Friedrichstrasse, which was once the principle North–South traffic artery of Berlin, and was now unused. In addition to the disrupted transportation links (road and railways) and the development of separate and alternative links, the two Berlins developed independent water systems, but continued sharing the same sewage system.

After the blockade crisis of 1948, the most serious situation in Berlin arose in 1958, when Khruschev called for a revision of the Berlin position, urging that the four powers give up the occupation regime. He threatened to hand over all Soviet functions to the GDR in Berlin, which he regarded as the legitimate capital of East Germany. The Western powers, after consultation with the Federal Republic,
rejected the proposals (Mellor, 1978: 136). They held the view that the East German state was illegal, and threatened to suspend relations with any country that conferred diplomatic status on the East Germans (Pounds, 1962: 110). The West proposed a reunification of Berlin, as the first step towards reuniting the whole of Germany, in reality a return to the four-power status and single-city administration that had been in effect before 1948. No progress was made along these lines, due to the East’s insistence on a ‘free demilitarized city of Berlin’, which the Western powers suspected was an attempt to dislodge them with no guarantee of a unified Germany at the end. The outcome of the 1958 crisis has been mentioned earlier: the construction of the Wall to separate East from West. The USSR also challenged the Allied right to free use of their air-corridors to Berlin, and by way of an indirect threat it resumed its nuclear testing (Mellor, 1978: 137). In 1964 the USSR and the GDR signed a treaty which defined West Berlin as “an independent political unit.” The Western viewpoint did not agree with this definition, but remained officially under quadripartite administration. Legally the Western powers did not recognize the de jure existence of the GDR; only the freely elected legitimate government of the FRG was official for them. Thus, the characteristics of the initial division stage, as presented by Henderson and Lebow (1974) show the two sides of Berlin in full consonance with the model. The two sides of Berlin demonstrated mutual non-recognition, intense ideological conflict (fostered by the Superpowers), each claiming for itself the status of the only legitimate successor of the former Berlin, both sides fully aware of the fortified border with the ever-present possibility of military conflict (Fig. 2).

3.1.4. Stage 4: the middle term division in the 1970s

After years of tension in Berlin and between the two Germanies, the four Powers signed an agreement in 1971–1972, when Berlin’s status was redefined after many crises and confrontations. This agreement confirmed the status of Berlin, with no major changes (Herz, 1974: 6). Since 1972, East German citizens of pensionable age were allowed to travel to the West for one month each year, and younger East Germans could receive an exit visa to visit their families. Dissidents were also occasionally expelled to West Germany (Ritter and Hajdu, 1989: 330). By 1973, more relaxed relations between East and West led Britain and other Western countries to exchange ambassadors with the GDR (Mellor, 1978: 173–174).

In the 1980s, the decline in hostility between the Germanies continued, and the sudden rise in the number of legal emigrants from East Germany was related to a planned visit by Erich Honecker, the East German leader, to the FRG. Trade relations between the two sides improved, but the border mostly remained sealed.

3.1.5. Stage 5: rapprochement

Some signs of a thaw in the relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic appeared in 1987, when Erich Honecker, the East German leader, paid an historic visit to West Germany (Keesing, 1988: 35660). A cultural agreement was signed by the two countries in 1986 and, as a
result, they exchanged archive material which had been sent away during the Second World War. Important changes were announced regarding Berlin. The mayor of West Berlin met Honecker in East Berlin in 1988. A treaty was signed between West Berlin and East Germany providing for the transfer to West Berlin of 47 ha of land which had remained under East German ownership since the end of the War. In return, West Berlin was to cede an 87 ha site to East Germany. Another sign of rapprochement was in the area of emigration. Emigration permits from East to West Germany rose from 11,459 in 1987 to 27,000 in 1988—always a positive sign in the relationship between the two parts of Germany (Keesing, 1989: 36627). In 1988 the two Germanies agreed to a linkage of their respective electricity grids. Another agreement established joint procedures for dealing with ecological problems, and negotiations continued on cooperation towards the reduction of pollution in the Elbe river. Finally, on 14 December 1988, the East German government announced some relaxation in the regulations concerning family visits by East German citizens to the Federal Republic. However, East and West Berliners held separate celebrations in Berlin to mark the 750th anniversary of the founding of the city (1987) and East Germans, who had approached the Wall to listen to rock concerts on the Western side, clashed with East German police in the summer of 1987. Berlin had to wait for the destruction of the Wall in 1989 to see the physical barriers finally removed.
3.1.6. Stage 6: reunification

On 10–11 November 1989, 2 million East Germans streamed through breaches in the Berlin Wall and marched into West Berlin, in one of the most dramatic events to take place in the world during the last decade. Egon Krenz announced on 9 November that East Germans could in the future travel abroad freely. In the first week of November 1989, demonstrations by tens of thousands of citizens throughout East Germany became almost a daily occurrence. On 4 November, a rally of 500,000 people in East Berlin shouted “The Wall must go!” and five days later all the border crossings to the Federal Republic of Germany and Berlin were opened. On 22 December, Chancellor Kohl and the head of the East German state, Modrow, celebrated the opening of the Brandenburg Gate which symbolized the division of Europe. The old network of rail links and roads had remained from the time before the city was divided, though it had been disconnected at the borders; the sewage system, in contrast, had remained connected on both sides for the whole period. It was, therefore, relatively simple to remove the Wall and other material barriers and integrate the two divides in the physical sense (Frick, 1991). The present-day economic situation in Berlin reflects the situation in the whole of Germany—booming manufacturing and services in the West, collapsing enterprises in the East. The future of Berlin as the capital of a unified Germany will give rise to a major source of unemployment (Ellgar, 1992: 45). For the planner, the major tasks are to overcome the fact that West Berlin decentralized its residences and commercial land uses during the years that the two sections developed in their separate ways. Another challenge revolves around the revitalization of the old centre of the city, and the return of the city to its role as the capital city of Germany (see part III).

3.2. The partitioned city of Jerusalem

3.2.1. Stage 1: pre-partition (division)

Unlike divided Berlin, Jerusalem was a partitioned city between 1948 and 1967, namely it was bisected along ethnic-national lines separating Jewish/Israeli Jerusalem and Arab/Jordanian Jerusalem. The city has a very long history, which has been documented since the fourth millenium BC. It served as the capital of the ancient Kingdom of Israel and Judea (930–586 BC) and was conquered and occupied by Babylon, Persia, Greece, the Roman Empire, Byzantium, the ancient Arab Empire (638–1049 AD), the Crusaders (1094–1241 AD), the Mamelukes, the Ottoman Empire and finally in 1914 Palestine (and Jerusalem) became a Mandate Territory under British rule and remained so until 1948. Although Jerusalem was under siege and in a war situation for long periods of its history, and the Holy Places have always been bones of contention for contemporary world powers, it had never been partitioned until 1948 and always constituted one urban entity. However, proposals were often put forward to transform it into either a city with a special international regime, or corpus separatum, for either the whole city or only the Holy Places in the Old City (Cohen, 1977: 192–193; Bovis, 1971: 140–141). The British Mandatory Government proposals for Jerusalem in 1937 (Royal
Peel Commission) and the 1938 Woodhead Commission suggested that Jerusalem should comprise part of a British controlled zone, which would not be under either Jewish or Arab rule. Altogether, nine partition plans for the city were presented between 1936 and 1947. According to the 1947 UNSCOP plan, Jerusalem would be given the special status of an International Zone, which would separate it from both the Palestinian or Israeli state. The War of 1948–1949 changed these plans, and Jerusalem was partitioned as a result of it.

From 1920 to 1948, when Jerusalem was administered by the British, it served as the capital and administrative centre of British Palestine and its importance, both economic and political, expanded. The population of Jerusalem grew from 62,000 in 1922 to 165,000 in 1948. Though the proportion of the Jewish population of the city increased from 54% in 1922 to 62% in 1946, the Jewish percentage in the Old City decreased from 16.6% to 2.0% in 1947 (Amiran, 1986: 24). The Muslim population comprised 21.4% in 1922 and 20.4% in 1946, whereas the number of Christian inhabitants, who constituted 23.5% in 1922, dropped to 19.1% in 1946 (Bovis, 1971: 128–129).

The British Governments of Jerusalem understood well the crucial importance of Jerusalem to the Christian world and were anxious to prove that they were worthy custodians of the city. During the 30 years of their rule they prepared five plans for Jerusalem, which clearly defined land-uses and zoning regulations. The common feature of these plans was the separation of the sacred Old City from the secular territories that surrounded it (Kroyanker, 1989: 138). The most important regulation was the prohibition, in 1918, of building in tin or cement in the city, thus forcing town planners to use stone in construction. This has had an enormous impact on the aesthetic appearance of the city, earning it the title ‘Jerusalem of stone.’ During the British era the population of the city tripled, and the urban area increased from 20 km² to approximately 40 km². Both Jewish and Arab middle-class neighbourhoods were developed, and many public buildings were constructed by the British administration to house government offices, such as City Hall, the main Post Office, and Government House. The Jewish community developed its own infrastructure of communal institutions, such as the Jewish Agency and the Jewish National Fund. The Christian organizations erected the YMCA on King David Street, and important churches and monasteries (Kroyanker, 1989: 140–141). The British administered the whole city as one urban entity in all essential infrastructural elements, such as roads, water resources, public parks, street lighting and signs. However, the emerging feelings of dissonance and schism between Jews and Arabs in Jerusalem hampered the British efforts. The inter-communal struggle which affected the election of the city mayor (Arab or Jewish), the separate Arab/Jewish communal services and eventually the separate development of commerce and the economy, led to complete polarization of the two communities. Attacks on the Jewish quarter of the Old City (1920, 1929, 1936) brought the Arab/Jewish conflict to new heights of hatred and belligerence during the British period (Benvenisti, 1981: 92–96; Gosenfeld, 1973).

During the Second World War, the situation was temporarily frozen, but when the British nominated a Jewish mayor after the death of the Arab incumbent, the
Arab members of the Jerusalem Municipality boycotted its activities and it was dismantled. From then on, city affairs were managed by British administrators until the end of their rule. Thus, the seeds of partition were implanted in Jerusalem many years before its actual implementation.

3.2.2. Stage 2: the actual partition of Jerusalem

Arab irregular forces attacked and looted Jewish shops in the Old City of Jerusalem four days after the UN Resolution on the Partition of Palestine (29 November 1947) was announced. From that day on, Jerusalem was functionally and socially a divided city. The various ethnic groups began shifting their forces within the city, and civilians moved towards neighbourhoods with their own ethnic concentrations. Even before the UN Resolution on Partition, the city had in effect been physically divided. There were four British security zones in which British forces and residents were protected behind barbed wire, road blocks and strong fortifications. These security zones severed direct contact between the northern and southern portions of the city and cut across the major urban commercial arteries (Gosenfeld, 1973: 35).

Jerusalem and its immediate environs constituted the single most important spatial unit for each of the belligerents—Palestinian Arabs and Jews. The city's strategic location atop the Judean Hills formed glacis overlooking the Jordan Valley and, conversely, afforded any adversary from the east immediate access to the Israeli coastal plain (Gosenfeld, 1973: 23).

The War for Jerusalem was fought in several important stages. In the first stage, in March 1948, Jerusalem was cut off from the Coastal Plain by Arab Forces, and isolated. Jewish Jerusalem had been under siege from February 1948, and only a few vehicular convoys succeeded in passing through the Arab lines and bringing badly needed supplies and fuel into the city (Golan, 1973).

In the second stage, on 14 May 1948, the British High Commissioner left Jerusalem. In the absence of any orderly transference of authority, civil war immediately broke out upon his departure, Jewish forces moved into the major governmental structures that had housed the Mandate authorities in Jerusalem. By 15 May 1948, Jewish forces controlled all the Jewish settled parts of the city, except for the university quarter on Mt. Scopus and the Jewish quarter in the Old City. Since May 1948, the Arab Legion (the regular army of Jordan, which had been well trained by British officers) participated in the fighting and was able to cut off Mt. Scopus and secure Arab access to the Old City (15 May 1948). The Arab Legion also captured the four Jewish settlements of the Etzion Bloc. The Jewish quarter in the Old City fell, and its 290 defenders were imprisoned in Jordan. In the third stage of the fighting, in June and July 1948, hostilities were terminated by truces, but the fighting was later renewed. The Arab neighbourhoods of Ein Kerem and Malha at the Western edge of the city were captured by Israeli forces. On the other hand, the Arabs in the Old City repulsed the efforts of Jewish forces to recapture it. Fighting raged in the Abu Tor–Ramat Rachel region, but neither side emerged the victor. The physical delimitations of the city and the Arab–Israeli front lines were stabilized in June 1948, and an
extensive ‘No Man’s Land’ completely encircled Mt. Scopus and Government House, which was subsequently taken over by the UN. The cease-fire lines were straight lines running from the northern quarter of Nahalot Shimon to Abu Tor. They were agreed upon on 30 November 1948 and, together with the Armistice Agreement signed in Rhodes in April 1949, finalized the partition of the city for the next 19 years (Fig. 3).

3.2.3. Stage 3: initial partition

The year 1949 and the early 1950s were periods of adjustment to the new reality of partition, and difficulties arose in many areas because of the uncertainty and lack of accuracy over the demarcation lines. The Mt. Scopus enclave, which was manned by Israeli police, posed a special problem. The Jordanian army obstructed the passage of convoys to Mt. Scopus and parts of the enclave were held by Jordanian forces as part of the demilitarization agreement (Gosenfeld, 1973). Around the Government House area was a ‘No Man’s Land’ in which civilians on both sides were permitted free movement. Repeated attempts were made by Israel and Jordan to diminish the spatial extent of this zone. Jordan, for example, paved a road linking East Jerusalem with Bethlehem and Hebron, which crossed the neutral zone in two places. Israel extended cultivation of areas west of the de facto armistice line. Other problem spots were Beit Safafa and the Jerusalem Corridor, where parts of the Israeli railroad line passed through ‘No Man’s Land.’ Also, parts of the village of Beit Safafa were held by the Arab Legion and parts were in ‘No Man’s Land.’ Eventually, a single demarcation line which included all the railway line to Jerusalem within Israel was agreed upon, and Beit Safafa became a divided village: 500 of its residents became Israeli citizens and 2500 remained on the Jordanian side of the boundary. Limited contact continued between the two parts of the divided village, and smuggling of small quantities of consumer goods was frequent.

In the early 1950s, the Israelis and the Jordanians were busy incorporating their separate parts of Jerusalem within their national territories. Israel turned the occupied areas of Jerusalem into a military government area until February 1949, when it was replaced by a civil authority. The Israeli Parliament, the Knesset, began its sessions in Jerusalem in December 1949, and in January 1950 government offices were transferred to Jerusalem. The last office to move there was the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on 12 July 1953. Some 23 foreign embassies eventually acknowledged Jerusalem as the capital city of Israel by relocating their embassies there. All foreign governments had to partially acknowledge the new status of Jerusalem by attending frequent business meetings at the Foreign Ministry in the city, and foreign ambassadors had to present their credentials in Jerusalem.

Jordan integrated East Jerusalem into the Kingdom on 24 April 1950. Eastern Jerusalem was for a very short time under military government, similar to that of West Jerusalem. However, the Jordanian King, Abdallah, convened an assembly of 2000 Palestinian notables who expressed their wish and consent that the West Bank and Jerusalem should be integrated into one state with the East Bank of
Fig. 3. The partition of Jerusalem.
Thus, since 1950, Jerusalem has been fully integrated into Jordan. The annexation of East Jerusalem to Jordan did not benefit the city. On the contrary, it lost its status as a commercial centre to a wide hinterland. The Hashemite Kingdom, which relied heavily on the Bedouin population of the East Bank, did not need Palestinian Jerusalem as its capital. Amman became the capital city and all investments and commerce were directed there. East Jerusalem became a neglected frontier town controlled by the army, which often had to suppress the Palestinian inhabitants who resented the Hashemite rule. The Hashemites were successful in removing the political power and administrative authority of the city. The population decreased from 60,000 to 33,000 and in the early 1950s the infrastructure, especially electricity and water supplies, was badly affected by being cut off from West Jerusalem. East Jerusalem also had to develop for itself a new CBD, as the old CBD which served the two parts of the city in Mamillah and Princess Mary Street (now Queen Shlomzion St.) became partially border zone and partially Israeli controlled (Schiller, 1986). Unlike Berlin or Nicosia, the partition of Jerusalem was complete: the two sides did not share any infrastructural systems and contact was almost always hostile.

West Jerusalem’s population and its labour force were reduced following the war. Widespread destruction, coupled with a declining population, contributed greatly to the overall reduction of the urban consumer market in West Jerusalem. The boundary began to repel people on both sides of the border. On the Israeli side of the city some 22,000–25,000 residents moved away during the war and until the Armistice was signed in April 1949. However, the Israeli government, anxious to re-populate Jerusalem, placed new immigrants in the former Arab and mixed ethnic neighbourhoods, and new housing estates were created on the border itself. The Jordanians followed suit, and also settled the areas near the ‘Green Line’—the barrier in the middle of Jerusalem (Gosenfeld, 1973: 213). Until 1953 some 60,000 immigrants were settled in Jerusalem, thus offsetting the former population losses. The ‘Green Line’ and the border zone of Jerusalem were never quiet. Complaints about sniper fire began almost immediately after 1948. Most complaints arose from the renewed occupancy of two neighbourhoods adjacent to ‘No Man’s Land’: in Musrara, opposite the Old City and in Abu Tor in south Jerusalem. These skirmishes were mainly the result of ambiguity as to the jurisdiction over wide areas of ‘No Man’s Land’ which the two sides aspired to control.

3.2.4. Stage 4: the middle term partition

At the end of the 1950s and in the early 1960s, the two halves of the city developed in separate ways. The government’s efforts and investments to strengthen the city both economically and politically were partially successful. Many public and government offices were built in Jerusalem and, as a result, it became an impressive city from an architectural standpoint. The Israeli side of Jerusalem expanded its built-up area with inexpensive public housing in many new neighbourhoods, which were more practical than aesthetic. Many of these new areas were located further away from the city centre, and rural communities in the
hinterland gradually became suburban settlements. Jerusalem has over the years become a city of neighbourhoods, each with its concentration of homogeneous, socio-economic, ethnic and religious populations. Western Jerusalem developed its new neighbourhoods in the only directions available—West and South, with limited development of religious enclaves in the North-West. The commercial and business centre of the city moved gradually west along Jaffa Street to the ‘triangle’ of Jaffa, King George and Ben Yehuda streets. Towards the end of British rule, some parts of the centre (eastern Jaffa St.) became a closed security zone for the British military and civilian population. The eastern part of Jaffa Street, which was a commercial and business axis, was bombed and deserted in 1948–1949, and lucrative shops and hotels became slums. Other residential quarters, on both sides of the border, became cul de sacs, so that nobody wanted to live in them, a fact which quickly turned them into undesirable, impoverished districts. East Jerusalem businessmen also had to plan a new commercial centre for themselves after 1948, as the old centre now stood in the West and was inaccessible. Residential areas in East Jerusalem developed in the north, along the road to Ramallah, and in a similar fashion to West Jerusalem, some rural communities became integrated within the urbanized area. The urbanized areas of East Jerusalem were segmented, lacking continuity, with separate population concentration and lack of infrastructure such as water and electricity supply. Unlike West Jerusalem there was no organized planning or zoning process. The economy of the city expanded in the 1960s with tourism becoming the most important economic sector. Most of the tourists were Christian pilgrims, and the rest were Muslim pilgrims and tourists from Arab countries. This economic prosperity attracted people to the eastern part of the city, and the population reached 65,000 in 1966. The municipal boundaries of the city were restricted to only 6 km² as the Hashemite regime refused any demands to extend them. As a result, the city developed outside the municipal boundaries.

During these years constant discord plagued the mixed Israeli-Jordanian Armistice negotiations. The representatives of both states agreed on matters of health, sanitation and the eradication of malaria throughout the various parts of the city, but their deliberations often broke down over other issues. Jews demanded access to the Jewish holy places and to Mt. Scopus, as well as the use of the Jewish cemetery on the Mount of Olives. The Jordanians wanted the Palestinians to return to the Arab neighbourhoods in Western Jerusalem, and the return of some of these areas to Jordanian sovereignty. These discussions were discontinued at the end of the 1950s.

3.2.5. Stage 5: rapprochement

This stage was never reached in the history of the relations between the two partitioned parts of Jerusalem. The two parts remained hostile and belligerent until 1967, when the city was re-unified or integrated by occupation.

3.2.6. Stage 6: reunification

Despite Israel’s declaration that, if Jordan refrained from entering the conflict,
there would be no Israeli military actions, the Jordanians commenced hostilities on 5 June 1967, the day the Six Day War broke out (Cohen, 1977: 41). Mount Scopus and West Jerusalem were shelled by artillery and mortars, and Jordanian forces attacked Government House and Jebel Mukabar in the de-militarized zone. After three days of fierce fighting, the Old City and the most sacred Jewish sites—the Wailing Wall and the Temple Mount—were liberated (Israeli-oriented terminology) arousing deep emotions in all Israelis. At the end of the Six Day War, not only Jerusalem, but the whole West Bank was occupied by Israel. Less than a week after the war, the Israeli government took legal and administrative steps to integrate East Jerusalem within Israel. There were strong patriotic sentiments, and feelings ran high to incorporate East Jerusalem into Israel. Demolition of the barriers separating the two sides of the city began immediately, and municipal services such as electricity, water and telephone systems were unified (Bovis, 1971: 103). On 27 June, the Knesset passed three laws which extended Israeli law, jurisdiction and administration to Eastern Jerusalem (and the whole West Bank) and the municipal areas of Jerusalem were incorporated within Israel (Bovis, 1971; Benvenisti, 1981). But the de facto and de jure incorporation of East Jerusalem into Israel was not recognized by the international community or the Palestinians.

Beyond the legal aspect, there was also the reaction of the population and leadership of East Jerusalem itself. The people mingled freely for the first time in 19 years: old acquaintances were renewed and Arabs visited homes they had abandoned two decades previously. Mayor Teddy Kollek attended the noon prayer services at the Haram al Sharif mosque on Friday 30 June and officially invited the mayor and council members of the East Jerusalem municipality to join the incorporated, expanded City Council, but they refused (Cheshin, 1992: 179). About 2400 East Jerusalem residents left the city as a result of the occupation, but most of them remained, including the leaders. The physical social and political ramifications of the re-unification are studied in part III of this study.

3.3. Nicosia

3.3.1. Stage 1: pre-partition stage

Nicosia is an ancient city which became the capital of Cyprus in 1192, during the Third Crusade. Nicosia's history reflects the successive waves of foreign rule which controlled it and shaped its future. Its first recorded history is tied to the Byzantines (330–1191), the Lusignan Kings (1192–1489), the Venetians (1489–1571), the Turks (1571–1878) and the British (1878–1960). The city was invaded by the Genoese (1373), the Mamelukes (1426), the Turks (1570). In the 16th Century, Ottoman-Turks occupied this Greek island. As more and more of them settled there they exerted great influence on the Christian Hellenism which had been prevalent in Cyprus, thus changing the character and fortunes of the island and of Nicosia. Until the early 19th century Christians and Muslims shared the island in a relatively calm spirit of accommodation (Loizos, 1988: 643). But when Greek Cypriots began to identify with mainland Greek nationalism and with
Greece’s struggle for independence, tension rose between Turkish and Greek Cypriots. The two Cypriot communities are distinct in almost all their features: ethnic origin, religion, language culture and values (Salih, 1978; Attalides, 1979). Each of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities maintained separate educational and religious systems. Cypriot ‘nationhood’ had no opportunity to evolve before the inter-communal conflicts broke out in 1963–1964 (Oberling, 1982; Crawshaw, 1978: 21; Kyle, 1984: 5).

The two communities first clashed in 1958, in connection with the struggle against British colonial rule. Greek Cypriots preferred Enosis or unification with Greece, whereas the Turkish Cypriots would rather have kept either the status quo (continuation of British rule) or ‘Taksim’, i.e. partition of the island into two separate entities. Cyprus was proclaimed an independent state in 1960. As a compromise between these contradictory demands it was founded on a consociational constitution, which was supposed to safeguard the rights of the Greek majority (79% of the population) and of the Turkish minority (18%). However, the consociational regime of the Republic was short-lived and during the 1962–1964 civil war the territorial spatial separation between the two communities, in addition to the social, economic and political segregation, increased beyond repair. The two communities remained separated until the Turkish invasion of 1974. The Turks occupied 38% of the northern part of the island and the northern side, including the northern section of the Old City of Nicosia. Under their patronage the self-proclaimed federated state of Kibris (North Cyprus) was established, but this entity is considered illegal by the international community. In sum, the pre-partition stage of Nicosia ended in the early 1960s as a result of the inter-communal conflict. The partitioned city of Nicosia is in a unique situation, compared to Jerusalem and Berlin, which functioned as capital cities each for one state only (Israel and East Germany, respectively). Nicosia serves as a capital city of the (legal) Republic of Cyprus, the ‘South’, and for the Turkish Cypriot, North.

Finally, unlike Jerusalem or Berlin, UN Forces (UNFICYP) played an important role in Nicosia. Some observers even believe that the de facto partition of Nicosia and Cyprus was in some ways indirectly assisted by the presence of the UNFICYP. Although they were there ostensibly to relieve the tension, the force also helped maintain the status quo on the island (Ramady, 1976).

3.3.2. Stage 2: actual partitioning

The process of actual partitioning was a long one: it began in 1963 and ended in 1974 with the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, which sealed the partition of Nicosia. Because of the complexity and length of this stage it is possible to hypothesize that, perhaps, some elements of the actual partitioning are really, in practice, part of the next stage—initial partitioning.

An early foretaste of partition in Nicosia could be felt even in 1958, when the first stage in the civil war took place. This stage involved Greek anti-colonial struggle against British rule of the island and Turkish and Greek Cypriot inter-communal war (Foley and Scobie, 1975; Harbottle, 1970). In the war of 1958,
Turkish forces had succeeded in ousting the Greek population from one of the ethnically mixed suburbs of Nicosia, Omorphita. Six hundred Greek families abandoned their homes, and these were immediately seized by Turkish Cypriot squatters. The hastily drawn demarcation line separating the Greek and Turkish quarters of Nicosia (‘The Mason–Dixon Line’ as it was nicknamed) left Greeks and Turks on the wrong side with each community at the mercy of the majority (Crawshaw, 1978: 293). Altogether, the conflict lasted for 8 weeks, during which time British troops had to maintain the separation between the antagonists along a ‘Green Line’ in mid-Nicosia (Attalides, 1979: 48–49).

The city returned to normality in 1959 and remained as one entity until the end of 1963, when the two communities confronted each other as two opposing armed camps. It was not sheer coincidence that the inter-communal violence that erupted on the island began in Nicosia, and that most of the fighting took place there. Hence, the two communities had enough armed men not only to fight each other, but to spread the conflict throughout the island (Venezis, 1977: 30; Patrick, 1976).

During the first days of fighting, the Greek irregular forces captured some of the taller buildings, from where they could fire at the Turkish quarter of Nicosia. All Turkish telephone and telegraphic communications were cut off, as well as water pipes which were not needed by the Greek forces. Turkish forces seized the Nicosia gendarmerie and fired at the Greek forces in the mixed suburb of Omorphita. Once again, as in 1958, the mixed neighbourhoods suffered the most, with Omorphita as the target for Greek attacks until it was overrun and the Turkish inhabitants, who constituted a majority in this region, were driven out. Some 700 Turkish hostages were taken prisoner, and some were killed by the Greeks. The Armenians who lived in the Turkish quarter suffered the greatest property losses. In January 1964 many fled from the Turkish quarter and Turkish refugees were then moved into the abandoned houses. Two hundred and thirty-one Armenian houses were taken over by Turkish Cypriots (Patrick, 1976). To that figure must be added 236 Greek-owned houses which were in Turkish Cypriot hands by 1967. From 30 December 1963, British troops interposed themselves as a buffer between the two communities, but there was daily firing across the ‘Green Line.’ Greek Cypriot forces blockaded the Turkish quarter of Nicosia, causing much hardship to the Turks who lived there. As the conflict spread all over Cyprus, Turkish Cypriot refugees moved to other villages and towns, in their search for safety, thus creating some 42 Turkish enclaves. The Turkish enclave of Nicosia was the largest because refugees from all over the island moved to the city, where they thought jobs and housing would be easier to find. The Nicosia enclave also offered the most security, since it was here that the strong Turkish Army National Contingent was stationed. About 7000 Turkish Cypriots, mostly from suburbs of Nicosia, such as Strovolos, Eylenga, Ormorphita and Trakhonas, fled from those neighbourhoods which were occupied by Greek forces, and moved to the Turkish quarter of Nicosia or to new refugee villages in northern Nicosia. The spatial separation and ethnic consolidation continued until 1967. Over 600 shooting incidents took place in Cyprus during 1967 alone—according to UNFICYP sources (Fig. 4).
Fig. 4. The development of Turkish Cypriot enclaves, 1963–1974.

In addition to the territorial horizontal separation between the two communities, a process of vertical/horizontal segregation took place between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The most conspicuous component of that separation was the Turkish Cypriot Provisional Administration, which was officially established in December 1967, although its foundations had been laid earlier (Salih, 1978: 76; Attalides, 1979: 90). The Turkish Administration was comprised of the Turkish Cypriot members of the House of Representatives and members of the Turkish Cypriot Communal Chamber, which jointly constituted the Turkish Legislative Assembly. The Turks developed their own government, their own ad hoc courts and their own economy—relying heavily on Turkey for financial support (Purcell, 1969). The aid from Turkey amounted to £6.2 million per annum, and covered even the salaries of the civil servants who had left their positions in the Cypriot government’s administration. Between 1968 and 1974 Cypriot Turks led a separate political life, totally dependent on the Provisional Turkish Cypriot Administration (Hart, 1990). So in practice the actual partition of Nicosia was completed a decade before Turkey invaded the island in 1974 and established, together with the Turkish Cypriots, the pseudo-state of North Cyprus (1975).

The Turkish invasion erased the 42 Turkish Cypriot enclaves which had existed since 1963–1964. By providing a territorial hinterland to Nicosia, the city was able to overcome the semi-siege situation which had hampered it for so long. However, the continuation of the de facto partition of Nicosia perhaps indicates an optional conclusion that the stage of actual partition ended in 1963–1964, and that since 1965 Nicosia was in the stage of initial partition.
3.3.3. Stage 3: initial partition

Since 1974, there were two spatially distinct and mono-ethnic zones in Cyprus. An impassable ‘Green Line’ two miles wide and running over 100 miles across the island separated north and south Cyprus. The two divided entities developed two separate economies, transportation networks, governments and social organizations. North Cyprus occupied territory containing most of the fertile agricultural land on the island, and the larger portion of tourist attractions and manufacturing facilities (Fig. 5).

The mid-1970s, the first years of the Turkish occupation, were years of intensive construction in the South. First, thousands of residential units were built, most of them in Nicosia, to accommodate some 35,000 (out of 180,000) Greek Cypriots uprooted from the North. Secondly, the South had to invest heavily in infrastructure for tourism, trade and industry facilities in order to replace the losses caused by the Turkish occupation. Total damage to the Republic’s economy was estimated at C£714,300,000 in lost land, property, equipment and production facilities. The South had to build a new airport in Larnaca, which is the only internationally recognized airport in Cyprus. The Turkish Cypriots also had to construct a new road system.

In the first years after partition, the North experienced high rates of unemployment, a scarcity of goods and spare parts, most of the industrial and commercial facilities were paralyzed, and the Government had to intervene in order to activate the economy and services. The influx of settlers and soldiers from mainland Turkey (their numbers estimated as ranging between 65,000 and 80,000) was changing the Turkish Cypriot nature of the society. It was acquiring more of a Turkish and less of a Cypriot character (Council of Europe, 1992).

Fig. 5. Partitioned Cyprus: Green Line and buffer zone.
The North, also, had lost access to the international airport (that of Nicosia has been deserted since 1963) and was forced to build a new one in Ercan, which is used by Turkish planes only as a result of the international boycott on North Cyprus.

Nicosia itself became a partitioned city. The ‘Green Line’ of the years before 1974 is not identical with today’s separation line, as during the course of the Turkish invasion of 1974, the Greeks held areas in Omorphita, Neapolis and Trakhonas, and parts of Ayios Dhometios came under Turkish control or fell into a buffer zone guarded by UN troops. About one-sixth of the total area of Nicosia is occupied by the buffer zone, and is of no use to the inhabitants (Heinritz, 1985). The International Airport of Nicosia is also located in this buffer zone. The partition cuts across the middle of the Old City of Nicosia; Hermes and Paphos streets, which used to be the most important shopping areas, are now derelict and neglected. In a similar manner to Berlin and Jerusalem, partitioned Nicosia found itself in a cul de sac within Cyprus—all exit roads from the city that lead to the West, South and East were cut off and are now blind alleys (or cul-de-sacs). Many streets within the Old City were cut in two by the wall separating the two partitioned sides. On both sides of the ‘Green Line’ in the first years after occupation, there were houses and land which belonged to members of other national groups. These houses, especially on the Greek side, remained empty and decaying. Many of the residential areas on the Greek side needed restoration and were occupied by the poverty-stricken, or used in an unsightly way as workshops, garages, etc. The Greeks, however, did convert one block in the Old City into a pedestrian mall, with shopping precincts.

The 1970s and early 1980s were years of adjustment in which partition was like an open wound which cried out to be healed. The two sides had to adjust and plan how to deal with their damaged, partial territories. In addition to the development of ‘dual landscape’ (two airports, two road systems, two governmental administrations), the two sectors had to solve many problems of infrastructure. For example, many of the areas on the Greek side adjacent to the Attila Line have been affected by the partition due to the interruption of irrigation, communications, markets, etc. (Venezis, 1977). Basically, this has been a period of great hostility and little cooperation between the two sides.

3.3.4. Stage 4: middle term partition

It is difficult to pinpoint exactly this stage in the development of Nicosia. Perhaps the second half of the 1980s best represents this period, which is characterized by two opposing forces. On the one hand were the successful efforts of the Republic of Cyprus to impose an economic and political boycott on the tiny, self-proclaimed state of North Cyprus. As a result of this boycott, North Cyprus has very few transport links with the outside world, except for those with Turkey (Borowiec, 1983). Air and shipping lines carrying passengers or freight to or from the northern ports have been warned that they may face arrest if they later call at any of the southern ones; this pressure has been effective. The same
policy was, and still is, imposed on holders of passports with Turkish Cypriot stamps in them.

On the other hand, the Cypriot government has shown signs of taking responsibility for the Turkish Cypriot Northern population, by providing them with free water and electricity, and by admitting patients for medical care into Southern hospitals. Tourists and visitors are allowed to travel to the North (through the UN crossing point at the Ledra Palace Hotel) for day trips. The Southern economy is thriving, while that of the North is stagnating. This is reflected in the extensive construction for the refugees from the North (Government Housing Estates) which has greatly contributed to the further expansion of the city, and by shops which cater to the taste and desires of the affluent in Nicosia, as against the very modest development of North Nicosia (Lefcosa as it is called).

One of the most striking features of the partitioned city is the significant disparity in the employment pattern of the two parts. Thus, the percentage of unemployed on the Turkish side is 8% and 2.9% on the Greek side. Trade and productive business is only 34% in the Turkish part as against 40% in the Greek sector. Twenty-three percent of the work force on the Turkish side are civil servants, whereas this figure is only 12% in the Greek part. Finally, retail trade in 13% in the Turkish sector and 9% on the Greek side (Heinritz, 1985).

The retail centres and the CBD of the two parts developed outside the Old City, a good distance apart from each other. The Turkish CBD and better shops are concentrated near Kyrenia Gate, whereas on the Greek side, the more superior shopping centres are in Makarios Avenue (see Fig. 6 and Kliot and Mansfeld, 1994). However, many Turkish shops and restaurants still remain in the Old City, physically adjacent to the wall which divides the city. On the Greek side, the area near the wall is extremely unsightly and neglected. The wall is fortified and guarded by three forces: Greek and Turkish Cypriot soldiers and UNIFCYP troops.

3.3.5. Stage 5: rapprochement

There are few signs of rapprochement. First, no agreement has yet been reached between the two sides, but negotiations are taking place on the future of Cyprus. In addition, the two sides cooperate in some areas, such as the use of Turkish Cypriot labour in the British sovereign bases and in Greek Cypriot construction sites (Matsis, interview, 29.10.92). Water and electricity (about 18% of the electricity production) are still being supplied to the North free of charge. The two sides co-operate in sewage treatment; the South’s sewage is treated in the North. The Turkish North delivers some 5000–6000 tonnes of water per day to Greek Cypriot farmers in the Morphou area (Bulunç interview, 23.7.92).

Greek visitors from the South may also visit the North. These visits are organized by the U.N. Usually the visitors return saying that Turkish hospitality was warm and friendly (Kristof Artemiou interview, 21.6.91).

The most important cooperation is taking place in Nicosia, where the Master Plan of the city, which was completed in 1984, was approved by the two sections
who adhere to its principles, including restoration and rehabilitation of old
neighbourhoods near the ‘Green Line.’

Under the auspices of the UN, Turkish and Greek Cypriots meet at the Ledra
Palace Hotel, which serves as headquarters of UNFICYP. Planners and officials
discuss matters which interest both sides, such as water and the sewage system,
and the implementation of a common Master Plan for Nicosia.

Interviewees on both sides reported on unusual transactions between North and
South Cyprus, examples being smuggling of various commodities between the two regions through the British sovereign bases, or newspapers from the South which are brought to the North by UN personnel or British nationals who cross over from South to North, and vice versa.

The government of Cyprus has adopted a non-discriminatory attitude in matters of technical assistance, which is demonstrated by its willingness to extend assistance to the Turkish Cypriots through various UN projects.

However, basically, North Cyprus and Nicosia remain a military and political outpost of Turkey, totally reliant on Turkish aid, which is said to have totalled more than US$500 million since 1974, in addition to loans from Turkish banks to assist the local economy. But even with all this, there is great disparity in the level of economic development between the two parts of the city. The per capita income in the South was US$10,000, but only reached US$3000 in the North (Council of Europe, 1992: 21).

4. Discussion and comparative analysis

The analysis of this study focuses on the form of spatial separation: the case of the divided/reunited City of Berlin and two partitioned cities—Nicosia (still partitioned) and Jerusalem (which was reunified in 1967). Berlin was divided along ideological lines, while Jerusalem and Nicosia (as well as Sarajevo, Beirut or Belfast) are split internally along ethnic, religious and linguistic lines. In the comparison, Berlin, Jerusalem and Nicosia will be analyzed in each of the six stages of the division/partition process, and internal and external forces which influenced these stages will be compared.

All three cities are old cities, with a long history, sometimes of hundreds of years, in which they served as civilian or religious capital cities of states and kingdoms. Therefore, the pre-partition/division stage in the process of their division applies to all three, and shows that they all constituted one urban entity for long periods.

The actual division and partitioning is generally easy to define; it was the direct outcome of the Allied Conquest and power-sharing in Berlin; a War of Independence or a Jewish–Arab struggle over Palestine, which ended in a state of status quo in Jerusalem; or the de facto partition of Nicosia which reflected a status quo between Turkish and Greek Cypriot combatants. In all three cases external forces had a decisive impact on the process of division/partition itself, and particularly on its outcome. The policies of British Colonial rule in both Cyprus and Palestine antagonized the local communities and exacerbated the hostility between the warring sides. The intervention of the international community, especially the UN, in the Israel/Palestine and Cyprus conflicts, helped to allay the actual combat, but the arrangements enforced by the UN and its Peace-keeping Force perpetuated the partition of the cities by promoting the status quo. The balance of power and status quo are also the key to understanding why the division of Berlin, as well as its re-integration, were
inseparable from the rivalry of the Super Powers. This can be seen specifically in the United States–Soviet Union competition over their influence on certain European areas, and the 1950s Iron Curtain which separated these two opposing powers. For this reason, it was easier to end the division of Berlin as soon as the superpower rivalry ceased.

A common important feature in the actual partitioning of Jerusalem and Nicosia is the movement of respective groups to safe zones in which the majority of the group resided. These movements, of Jews and Arabs in Jerusalem, and Turkish and Greek Cypriots in Nicosia in the 1962–1964 war, were sometimes voluntary, and in part compulsory. ‘Ethnic cleansing’, a brutal expression which was coined for the atrocities which are daily events in the former Yugoslavia, also took place in Jerusalem and Nicosia, and even in Beirut and Belfast. Each group found a safe haven only with members of its own group. As Purcell (1969) put it so succinctly, “History does not show if dissimilar people live in close proximity for centuries they will necessarily come to love each other. In fact, massacres are usually of internal minorities” (Purcell, 1969: 330).

The stage of initial division/partition is characterized in all three cities by the highest levels of hostility. This often reaches the stage whereby troops on both sides of the fortified border exchange fire in hundreds of daily skirmishes and incidents. The border area in itself is repellent, and people tend to keep away from it and neglect its land uses. This stage is also accompanied by both sides trying to overpower the other by political pressure and propaganda (Berlin), economic blockade (Berlin and Nicosia) and by turning one of the sides into an important political symbol. For example, Berlin became the capital of East Germany, Nicosia became a dual capital to a split city and West Jerusalem became the capital of Israel. It is important to note that although West Berlin did not become the capital of the FRG, it enjoyed high esteem, and political and economic powers were invested in the city. Only East Jerusalem, because of the specific interest of the ruling elite, was deliberately neglected and the centres of economic and political power transferred to Amman. It remained symbolically one of the most important cities in the world, because of its sacredness to all three major religions. Finally, the stage of initial division or partitioning is also typified by the strongest efforts by the inhabitants of the divided or partitioned regions to suspend all their connections and transactions with each other, and to develop separate connections, alternative networks of transport and communication and, often, new (and dual) infrastructural facilities. Horizontally and vertically, this is the stage in which the two divides are further apart from each other, segregation and separation are at their peak and contacts either non-existent or sparse. The stage of middle term division/partition is the first stage in the paradigmatic model of Henderson and Lebow, in which we find a great variation among the three divided/partitioned cities and also some deviation from the descriptors of this stage, as postulated by these authors. According to them, this stage is characterized by a significant decline in overt and covert hostility and attempts to subvert the opposing regime. In all three cities there was a very slight reduction in hostility; contacts and transactions were restricted and did not change significantly
in variety and volume when compared with the former stage of initial partition, or the next stage of rapprochement.

The variation among the three was also illuminating. Jerusalem remained with almost no cross-border contacts and minimal transactions. Berlin manifested the highest levels of contacts and Nicosia was closer to Berlin than to Jerusalem in this respect.

The most prominent characteristic of this stage is the spatial one. In all three cities this is the stage in which the spatial effect of division/partition is most noticeable. The two divides of Berlin and the two partitions of Nicosia and Jerusalem grew apart from each other. Each developed new residential neighbourhoods and commercial centres in areas relatively distant from the present divide or partition. Development is organized in those directions and axes which are allowed by the present partition or division. All the cities show in this stage that they coped very well with the division/partition and successfully evolved separate economies and infrastructure. The fifth stage of rapprochement is also problematic, if we look at the original model of division/partition. A modest degree of rapprochement was observed in Berlin, none was detected in Jerusalem and there were very few signs in Nicosia. In both Nicosia and Jerusalem, this stage could be combined within the former stage, middle term division/partition.

Finally, the last stage of reunification or reintegration took place only in Berlin and Jerusalem. Nicosia has been partitioned de facto for more than 30 years, and officially, by occupation, for over 20. Most students of divided cities believe that unification of formerly divided cities such as Berlin is a relatively easy task, not because old infrastructural connections help to integrate the two parts, but because there are minimal differences between Germans in East and West Berlin. Berliners wanted their city to be reunited, and despite some of the negative emotions expressed by East Berliners about their inferior status in the united city and their exclusion from the integration process, there is no doubt that Berlin is one city and will return to its former status as capital of united Germany.

This is not the case in Jerusalem and Nicosia. Jerusalem was reunified by occupation in 1967 after 18 years of partition. The Jewish/Israeli population of the city was overwhelmed with joy at the unification, but the Arab/Palestinian sector was profoundly shocked, and even now, after living together or trying to coexist for 28 years, the city is only physically united. As pointed out previously, the city is deeply divided between Jews and Palestinians. There are also seemingly irreconcilable dichotomies among various Jewish communities (orthodox vs secular and eastern vs western). The Palestinians demonstrated their national aspirations, and dissatisfaction during the ‘Intifada,’ and their spokesmen repeatedly assert that Jerusalem is the capital of the future Palestinian state and that the Palestinians will never renounce their rights to the city. However, the latter also declare that the city should remain unified and will never be repartitioned. In Nicosia, Turkish Cypriots did not wish that the island or Nicosia should be reunited. Only the Greek Cypriots in Nicosia and elsewhere expressed their hopes for reunification.
5. Part II: Partitioned/divided cities within the context of urban segregation

As put forward, one of the hypotheses of this study was that partitioned cities such as Jerusalem and Nicosia and the divided city of Berlin represent an ultimate form of a process of urban segregation and in that respect could be compared to the segregated black ghetto in North America and South Africa’s ‘homelands’. This analysis will follow general features: The role of group conflicts in urban segregation, size and spatial arrangement of the segregated zones, the political aspects of urban segregation, and the economic and social aspects of urban segregation.

5.1. The role of group conflicts in urban segregation

Various types of groups have left their imprint on the urban ecology and the segregation in cities and towns. Such groups can be identified by their common background based on: their culture; social values and/or norms; their economic status; their political affiliation; their colour; their race; their religion; their origin or the way they have been treated by society (Smith, 1989; Cater and Jones, 1989; Carling, 1991; Fainsein and Harloe, 1992; Morris, 1996; Peach, 1995).

In many cases, as a result of the variant backgrounds of these groups, interrelations between them are characterized by conflict (Marcuse, 1993). Conflicts between groups are a major factor in shaping the spatial, socio-cultural and economic processes occurring in urban settings (Huckfeldt, 1986). The level and the intensity of ethnic conflicts in urban settings play a major role in emerging residential segregation (Huckfeldt, 1986). Studies by Wilson (1971), based on the North American case, showed how urban segregation has emerged as a result of ethno-social conflicts between whites and blacks. In many western cities where the intensity of conflict events has been relatively low and where groups managed to secure latent conflicts, segregation was achieved by the housing market (as happened in the North American case) (Knox, 1982). In other cities, where often there have been outbreaks of hate and a high level of animosity, residential segregation is either imposed by one side (as happened in the South African case) or becomes a protective measure by the affected groups (DeWitt, 1992).

One of the on-going major concerns of social geographers, political geographers and urban planners is the impact of socio-cultural and ethnic group conflicts on the functioning and the well-being of the urban environment (Gottmann, 1995). This concern focuses mainly on the social, political and economic implications of urban segregation (Knox, 1982). Quite often, the groups’ involved in such conflicts are themselves a product of differential socio-economic status, cultural and ethnic background (Huckfeldt, 1986). Spatial segregation on an ethnic and socio-cultural basis is, thus, a result of these groups’ effort to maintain their political power and to assure their basic economic, as well as social, needs (Peach, 1995).

The process of partition/division as presented in the first part of this work, partitioned/divided cities represent the unfortunate final form of group conflict.
The partitioned city of Nicosia is a reflection of the socio-ethnic conflict between Turkish and Greek Cypriots. Jerusalem was partitioned because of old conflicts between Arab and Jews over the land of Israel.

It is also important to note that Jews and Arabs in Jerusalem and Greek and Turkish Cypriots tended to create exclusive zones for themselves (such as the Jewish quarter in Jerusalem and the Turkish quarter in the old core of Nicosia) long before the groups became antagonistic. It is difficult to place divided Berlin in this context. East and West Berliners did not differ in their social-ethnic characteristics, language or economic status. They differed in one main (crucial) feature: their political reference group. Also, there is no denying the fact that affiliation with the specific political reference group was imposed on East and West Berliners largely by their foreign occupiers.

Another characteristic which is closely related to the context of conflicts in urban ghettos and in partitioned/divided cities has to do with the degree of voluntarism/involuntarism in the process of exclusion of the groups. Involuntary separation typified the Apartheid regime of South Africa and the black 'homelands'. There were involuntary segregation and separation also in the division of Berlin and in the partition of Jerusalem and Nicosia.

5.2. Size and spatial arrangement of the segregated zones

When comparing the South African to the North American urban segregation models, one of the first dissimilarities that should be stressed is the size of the segregated population. In the US case, segregated black communities have always been a relatively small minority. In South Africa, on the other hand, blacks have always been the vast majority. In 1985, blacks made up 73% of South Africa's population, whites made up 15%, Coloureds made up 8%, and Asians 3% (Saff, 1995). In 1990, blacks (including Hispanics who classed themselves as black) made up only 12.6% of the US population (Hacker, 1992: 227).

The need to characterize the black ghetto in the United States in terms of size was first spotted by Rose in the early 1970s. He defined a black ghetto as a neighbourhood accommodating 50% blacks or more. Using a census tract as a geographical measurement unit, he defined core ghetto neighbourhoods as having 75% or more blacks and fringe ghetto neighbourhoods as having 50–74%. Neighbourhoods where blacks constitute 30% of the overall population were considered neighbourhoods in transition from white to black dominance (Rose, 1971). Unlike the North American case, in South Africa, inner-city racial segregation has not reached such proportions. In a study of Hillbrow (a high-density inter-city area), it was found that despite having experienced a fairly rapid racial turnover since the late 1970s, only 46% of the residents were black (Ludman, 1992).

The size of the separated-segregated units as seen in the partition of Palestine and Jerusalem and Cyprus and Nicosia, and division of Germany and Berlin could be compared favourably to the 'homelands' in South Africa if size and spatial arrangement of the separated entity are considered. The whole population
of Germany, Israel–Palestine and Cyprus was divided and all three partitioned/divided cities comprised of millions of people in the case of Berlin and hundreds of thousands in the case of Jerusalem and Nicosia. Black ghettos in one of the metropolitan centres in North America could also reach that size. However, the resemblance between partitioned/divided cities and urban black ghettos decreased when the arrangement of the respective communities was examined. The partitioned/divided entities have become exclusive territories for either Jews or Arabs in partitioned Jerusalem, for Turkish Cypriots in North Nicosia and Greek Cypriots in South Nicosia, or for East Berliners opposite West Berliners. This type of exclusion does not exist in urban black ghettos, as the survey above displayed, but the process of segregation-separation is shared by both urban ghettos and partitioned/divided cities.

5.3. The political aspects of urban segregation

The issue under discussion is whether municipal and local government could manage urban segregation and what type of policies were initiated by the local leadership and national leadership in this matter. The attempt by urban governments to filter and ease the segregation process was less effective. The national South African government managed to impose its urban segregation policies by splitting up administrative urban units on a racial basis. In the absence of such racial laws in North America, and as result of national policies to eliminate racial segregation, it was the national government that had to filter and ease local policies towards urban partition (Sa/C128, 1995).

Another interesting political dimension of urban segregation in North America and South Africa is the way local politics reacted to evolving urban segregation. Cities facing any kind of ethnic conflicts have witnessed the emergence of political groups that organized and acted to pursue their rights. In the 1960s, as a result of urban riots in US cities, the number of such political groups expanded. As the number of ethnic populations grew in those cities, more black and then Hispanic political groups took action to protect their interests (Fitzpatrick, 1987). The growing minority presence also stimulated the growth of new groups in predominantly white areas of American cities. Feeling threatened by racial turnover, whites who had resisted the move to suburbia formed neighbourhood organizations to preserve the stability of their residential enclaves (Thomas, 1986). The power and influence of political groups, primarily among the ethnic minorities, in the US grew steadily. Efforts made by formal political parties to replace these groups and to represent their interests, failed. Thus, local politics derived from conflicting interests has deepened the social segregation of minorities in many part of the United States (Thomas and Savitch, 1991).

Extreme political mobilization of Turkish and Greek Cypriots in Nicosia and Arabs and Jews in Israel–Palestine could be likened to the political mobilization of minority groups in black (and Hispanic) ghettos in the United States, which used local government politics in order to advance their interests. The blacks in South Africa for many years lacked the power to initiate transformation of their
discrimination and exclusion, but the shift in the government of South Africa eventually emerged as a result of their political struggle. However, because the scale and topics of urban politics of black ghettos in North America and particularly in South Africa focused on equity, equality, social justice and eradication of discrimination, they differ dramatically from the struggle for independence of the Turkish Cypriots, or of the irridenta of Mandatory-Palestine which led to its partition.

As for urban politics as a mechanism to alleviate the harms of exclusion and segregation, in none of the partitioned/divided cities was this type of policy implemented. All the cities were divided by war, and hostility between the partitioned/divided units was sustained by the respective governments. As the discussion in part III of this work will show, very little cooperation in infrastructural matters or planning issues was allowed between the partitioned/divided units. Local cooperation between the two halves of the divided cities depended on the political atmosphere prevailing between the two partitioned/divided countries.

5.4. The economic aspect of urban segregation

Urban segregation is often a result of an official or unofficial policy to maintain a wide economic gap between conflicting ethnic groups. Maintaining such a gap can serve a long term policy, seeking political needs to defuse ethnic groups’ search for power and independence. However, a major economic cost is involved when such socio-political policies are pursued (Olzak and Nagel, 1986; Parnell and Mabin, 1995).

One of the ways to achieve an economic segregation and to ensure black economic hardship in South Africa was to split functional homogeneous areas into separate administrative units. As a result, affluent white communities could maintain their prosperity because they did not have to support poor residential areas. This kind of economic segregation has some similarities to the North American case, where inner cities, such as Philadelphia, lost affluent residents who moved to the suburbs (Saff, 1995).

When urban segregation in South Africa had to serve the need for cheap labour for white-owned factories and other business, some blacks were allowed to live in urban enclaves only as temporary residents (Enterhalter, 1987). However, for the majority of blacks in this country, apartheid meant moving black communities far from white areas. This kind of segregation has caused economic hardship not only to the segregated non-white population, but also to the entire state.

This resulted in the waste of resources and the need to maintain multiple economic systems for every segregated urban environment. Segregation has led to undermined economic and employment growth by creating artificial barriers to trade, commuting and other economic interrelations (Pirie, 1992; Turok, 1994). Obviously, such policy had a bearing on the individual segregated South Africans, who had to spend a large proportion of their earnings and time on commuting. Their increased fatigue, loss of energy for domestic activities, and lack of free time
for recreation and study, affected their level of productivity at work (Pirie, 1992). As a result, firms have been less productive and less competitive (Turok, 1994).

Furthermore, spatial fragmentation has also increased the cost of urban infrastructure and public services. In such dual urban systems both capital and running costs (maintenance and operating costs) are increased, causing a major waste of resources (Berhrens and Watson, 1992).

Such extent of waste of economic resources has not affected the black ghettos of American cities. The reason for this is that their urban economy was manipulated largely by market forces. However, part of these so-called market forces has been manipulated by groups, such as real estate and mortgage agents, operating a discriminatory housing market (Knox, 1982). Thus, inaccessibility to reasonably priced rented accommodation in American inner-cities forced blacks to rent relatively high-priced deteriorating housing facilities near the CBD area. They were pushed into such urban enclaves as the demand for low waged and unskilled jobs has been located in and around the inner city areas (Knox, 1982). Therefore, while reducing commuting costs, black Americans had to face high accommodation costs and extremely low wages. It has been the interest of the white majority to ensure that this kind of low cost labour remains geographically close to the demand area to ensure long term profitability of their businesses located in inner city areas. Thus, although the economic rationale behind the South African and the American cases was different, the end result was similar. In both cases, blacks suffered economic hardship as a result of a segregating policy.

Only some of the forces which played an important role in the segregated ghettos in South Africa and the United States are also applicable to partitioned/divided cities. In all the three cities discussed in this research there is a vast economic gap between the two halves of the cities, but that gap is mainly an outcome of the differences between the socio-economic and political regime on both sides of the partition/divide. The social democratic regime of East Germany did not permit great personal affluence. West Berlin was prosperous as part of the West German economy. Turkish Nicosia and Arab Jerusalem also mirrored the general lower standard of living of their respective countries. However, the three partitioned/divided cities are similar to the South African segregated neighbourhoods in that they also maintained dual or multiple economic systems for every segregated urban community—a process which, no doubt, led to a great wastage of resources.

5.5. The social aspects of urban segregation

Both in South Africa and the United States, residential segregation provided a firm basis for a broader system of social injustice. The geographic isolation of Africans within a narrowly demarcated portion of the urban environment, whether African townships or American ghettos, pushed blacks to live under enormously harsh conditions and to endure a social environment of poverty and poor education systems, where families are fragmented, and crime and violence are unrestrained (Fainsein and Harloe, 1992; Massey and Denton, 1993; Turok,
Consequently, both African Americans and South African blacks have been trying to migrate to less overtly hostile environments. Generally, blacks in America have been less averse to do this, and over the years have migrated from the hostile South to Northern cities. Black South Africans were more reluctant to do so until apartheid was abolished (Cell, 1982; Fredrickson, 1981). The question, though, is whether by moving to a new city or a new neighbourhood both communities have also managed to improve their quality of life? For many North American blacks migration meant no improvement in terms of quality of life. Being trapped in the margins of the labour market, or outside it, meant no real improvement in their social situation and their social mobility opportunities, even within the black community (Fainsein and Harloe, 1992). However, only for those South Africans who moved to inner city neighbourhoods, such as Johannesburg, did this move mean improving both their quality of life and their standard of living (Turok, 1994; Stober, 1993).

Enormous waves of migrations preceded and accompanied the partition of Nicosia and Jerusalem and the division of Berlin. In Nicosia and Jerusalem, voluntary and involuntary population exchange was carried out when Greek Cypriots were expelled from North Cyprus and were replaced by Turkish Cypriots, and in Jerusalem when Jews were expelled or fled from the Old City and expelled Arabs fled from the Western side of the city. In the case of Berlin, hundreds of thousands of East Berliners emigrated to West Berlin before the ‘Iron Curtain’ completely sealed East Berlin.

Another feature which characterizes segregated black neighbourhoods, at least in South Africa, is that as part of security measures white-segregated neighbourhoods tended to defend themselves by walls and barbed wire perimeter fences encircling their homes and shopping malls (Marcuse, 1993; Turok, 1994). The Berlin Wall, and the walls of partition which separate the two halves of Nicosia, and used to segregate East Jerusalem from West Jerusalem epitomized segregation and defended separation in the most extreme method.

6. Discussion and conclusions

How valid is the comparative analysis of partitioned/divided cities with urban ghettos in North America or South Africa? Are partitioned or divided cities an ultimate part of the segregation process which is shared by all the above? In some of the five variables which were examined, such as the group conflict, economic and social aspects of segregation, the resemblance between partitioned/divided cities is considerable; but similarity is only partial when size and arrangement and the political aspects of urban segregation are compared.

There is enough similarity, though, to conclude that the same process of segregation is put to work in the formation of both black ghettos and partitioned/divided cities. Within the framework of territorial behaviour, mainly of segregation, separation and exclusion, social groups voluntarily or involuntarily separate themselves or are segregated. As the historical and political settings of
the segregation differ from one place to another, there is a great variation in the types of segregation and exclusion. For example, black ghettos in the United States were more segregated in the past then they are today and the black ghettos and legal discrimination of the Apartheid regime in South Africa were dissolved when the black majority ascended to power. There is no doubt that re-united Berlin and re-unified Jerusalem eradicated or, at least, eroded much of the segregation process which exercised full control of their territories. However, residents of East Berlin still stick to their ‘turf’ and Arabs of East Jerusalem keep exclusively to themselves as ever. Returning to Fig. 7, we may attempt to locate the various urban settings of segregation on one axis, according to their relative location on the axis in Fig. 8.

This portrayal is based on the features of segregating/separation of the various segregated entities when they were at the top of their segregated form: before the two halves of Jerusalem and Berlin were integrated and before the Apartheid regime was dissolved. One may assume that a movement towards the left edge of the axis may be anticipated following reunification and the removal of the discrimination of the Apartheid regime.

7. Part III: Features of segregation and separation and their impact on planning

7.1. Physical division and permeability: Berlin, Jerusalem and Nicosia

7.1.1. Berlin

The partition/divide in each of the three cities were particular in their form. In Berlin the process was gradual and the Wall of Berlin became an inseparable part of the ‘Iron Curtain’. The permeability of the divide in Berlin eroded slowly until it became totally sealed in 1961. People and trade crossed the divide until 1961, the year in which the Wall was erected. With the Wall came its fortification with fences, firing devices, and electrification. The Berlin Wall, 20 km long, became one of the most hostile borders and perfectly fits with the classification of it as an

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![Fig. 8. Partition/divided cities compared to black ghettos.](image-url)
alienated borderland. Very few crossing points remained open even in this alienated borderland, the best known was Checkpoint Charlie on Friedrichstrasse. However, the permeability and level of interaction allowed during 1961–1989 fluctuated according to the cooling off or warming up of the relations between East and West Germany. Such a period of relaxation took place in 1972.

The division of Berlin forced the two sides of the city to build and develop whatever had been lost or remained in the territory of the other side of the city (see Fig. 9). In addition to the difficulty of division which the two Berlins faced,
West Berlin encountered additional difficulty resulting from its status as an isolated exclave within East German territory. West Berlin was cut off from its hinterland and needed special aid from the western (Federal) Government. The economy of the divided city, which was founded on its role as a capital city of Germany, was badly hurt by the division. East Berlin retained its role as a capital city of East Germany, and was able to carry on economically in a similar manner to the pre-war economy of the integrated city, but employment patterns changed as people could not continue their work on the other side of the divide (Robinson, 1953: 555; Mellor, 1978).

7.1.2. Jerusalem

Jerusalem was partitioned as a result of the Israeli Arab War of 1947–1948. The Jewish quarter in the Old City and Eastern Jerusalem were conquered by the Jordanian army in May 1948. The partition line was the armistice line. But unlike Berlin and Nicosia, the physical delimitation of the Arab–Israeli front lines established wide areas of No Man’s Land, such as those around Mt. Scopus and the Government House—the seat of the United Nations mission in Jerusalem (see Fig. 3) (Gosenfeld, 1973: 72–73). The cease-fire lines which preceded the armistice lines cut across mixed neighbourhoods and each group moved to the safe areas held by their own community. Many disputes emerged because of the wide No-Man’s Land that the Jordanian and Israeli sides tried to obtain, and also because of empty houses near and around this zone being occupied by locals. Houses in the No Man’s Land have become Jordanian military posts.

The border line in the middle of the city was 7 km long and well fortified. The Jordanians constructed cement bunkers for their troops, the No Man’s Land was fenced by barbed wire, mined and had military posts along the walls of the Old City. Twenty-two military posts on the Jordanian side and nine on the Israeli side were manned, too, and streets and alleys near the hostile partition were defended by cement walls against sniper fire (Yizrael, 1986: 26; Yitzaki, 1986). The Jerusalem partition manifests an alienated hostile borderland at its ‘best’, namely a sealed borderland with very limited contact between the two sides. Only one gate, the Mandelbaum Gate, allowed passage from one side to another, only for UN personnel, diplomats, clergymen and celebrities (Yitzaki, 1986; Amiran, 1986). Hostility was reflected in shooting incidents and sniper exchange. During the 19 years of partition East and West Jerusalem cooperated on very few issues which concerned them both. The Israeli–Jordanian mixed Armistice Committee was able to reach agreement on matters of health, sanitation, and eradication of malaria throughout the various parts of the city (Gosenfeld, 1973).

As in Berlin and Nicosia, the partition of the city exercised its affect on the immediate environment around the partition line. First, on both sides of the partition, the harsh fighting damaged houses and left ruins in many places. This was a replica of the borderland in both Nicosia and Berlin. Jaffa Street, which was a prestigious commercial street with many elegant shops in pre-1947 Jerusalem, was bombed and damaged, and a sophisticated hotel became a slum. The same misfortune fell upon nearby Mamillah Street, its elegant shops became
workshops for car repairs, blacksmiths, carpenters, and other low-ranking land-uses. All the area near the border which had been an elegant commercial area deteriorated into a slum area.

In that respect the fortunes of the CBD of Jerusalem and its main commercial streets resemble the process of deterioration which took place in Berlin and in which Friedrichstrasse and Unter-der-Linden were cut off, divided, and parts of them ruined; the old commercial centres and CBD of United Berlin died after the division of the city.

The main streets of Jaffa and Mamillah, instead of serving as an important link between East and West Jerusalem, became a ‘cul-de-sac’ leading to nowhere. The Jordanian side was an identical reflection of the Israeli side: Nablus Street was deserted because of its close proximity to the new border. Finally, the 1948 war also transformed the location of Jerusalem. Jerusalem was located at the edge of a narrow corridor (only 7 km wide) which was a target for terrorist activities in the 1950s. Similarly to West Berlin, Western Jerusalem lost its hinterland to the east and became completely dependent on its connections with the coastal plain of Israel (Schiller, 1986).

7.1.3. Nicosia

A temporary demarcation line separated the Greek and Turkish quarters of Nicosia as early as 1958. However, the separation line disappeared when the hostilities stopped. But in the 1963–1964 conflict in Nicosia, ethnic cleansing and eviction of minority groups to the opposite side of the city became common. The refugees of each community never returned to their former homes. From the end of 1963, Turkish Cypriots did not allow Greek Cypriots into their quarter (Purcell, 1969: 325–326). This is considered the beginning of the ‘Green Line’ of partitioned Nicosia, which has remained divided ever since. British soldiers, from the British sovereign bases in Cyprus, intervened in the fighting and patrolled the Green Line. This line passes along Paphos and Hermes Streets, two of the most important commercial streets in the city, which also served as an important transport artery. Thus, similarly to Jerusalem and Berlin, the border or partition of Nicosia crossed the heart or the centre of the city and paralyzed it—turning it into a deserted and derelict zone. The ‘Green Line’ of Nicosia is presently patrolled and observed by UN Peace Keeping Forces which replaced the British soldiers. The 1974 Turkish invasion and occupation stamped the ‘Green Line’ in Nicosia and all over the island (see Fig. 5). There are observation posts along the border line and between the forward defence lines of each side. UNFYCYCP soldiers patrol a neutral buffer zone which extends along the 184 km length of the ‘Green Line’ (Grundy Warr, 1987: 76). Incidents occur quite often and in 1993 and 1996 a Greek Cypriot national guardsman was killed in Nicosia and in the buffer zone, respectively.

The buffer zone of Nicosia is similar to the one in Jerusalem with its large areas of ‘No Man’s Land’. Hermes Street resembles Mamillah and Jaffa Streets, and the Under-der-Linden in Berlin. The street had lost its importance already in the early 1960s, when frequent fighting broke out around it between Greek and Turkish
Cypriots. The Green Line partition is constructed from metal and cement walls often covered with barbed wire and piles of sandbags and well-guarded by manned posts of Greek and Turkish Cypriot soldiers; four posts are controlled by the UNFICYP. The military nature of the divide is stricter on the Turkish side of Nicosia than on its Greek counterpart. Access to the partition is generally easier on the Greek side than on the Turkish, and there are more signs forbidding access and photography near the border on the Turkish side. The partition has one gate—the Ledra Palace Hotel which is the official gate between Turkish and Greek Nicosia.

The ‘Green Line’ in Nicosia separated Turkish Lefkosa (35,000 people) from Greek Nicosia (population 150,000). The buffer zone of Nicosia includes the international airport of Nicosia—inactive since 1974. The buffer zone also includes areas in the Old City of Nicosia around Paphos and Hermes Streets which used to be one of the most important shopping areas of Nicosia (Heinritz, 1985).

Similarly to Berlin and Jerusalem, the areas of the borderland of Nicosia and the buffer zone are deserted and ruined; dilapidated houses and piles of ruins are spread along it (Field Survey, August 1992). However, there are also well-maintained residences physically adjacent to the Wall which divides the city and some of the rehabilitated houses and streets touch the ‘Green Line’ partition itself. Carpentries, metal workshops, garages and various packing houses are located on both sides of the border, together with deserted and dilapidated structures (Field Survey, August 1992). In that respect, the borderland of Nicosia resembles that of Jerusalem, but on Girne or Kyriinia Street, one of the main streets of the old city of Turkish Nicosia, in close proximity to the partition, a combination of food stores, restaurants, and wholesale markets are massed together with workshops and coffee shops abutting the wall itself. The same mixture of land uses is found on the Greek side of Nicosia.

The permeability of the ‘Green Line’ is clearly higher than that of Jerusalem or Berlin, and it is related to the Greek Cypriot perception of its obligations to its citizens in the North. Thus, Turkish Cypriots are allowed to cross to the South for work and for medical treatment. Greek Maronites cross the border to the North in order to visit the small Greek Maronite community in the far north. Tourists and visitors may cross for one day to visit North Cyprus as long as their passport does not carry a stamp issued by the illegal government of North Cyprus. Also freely crossing the border are UN personnel and British officials. Officials of the two municipalities of Greek Nicosia and Turkish Lefkosa also cross the border in the course of official missions of coordination in infrastructural matters.

Permeability of the ‘Green Line’ is also high in many infrastructural matters. Some infrastructural systems either remained integrated or were based on the provision of a particular service from one side to the other. The three major areas of cooperation are electricity, water and sewage treatment. Provision of electricity in the North is very dependent on the South, as about 82% of northern electricity comes from the south. The electricity is provided free of charge because the
Cypriot Government does not wish to negotiate with the Turkish Cypriot ‘Government’. The Turkish Cypriots complain that the electricity is provided at a bare minimal level and that sometimes during the winter the Greek Cypriots cut off the supply. The North has constructed a separate power station which is planned to start its production in the near future.

The sewage treatment plan (the only one) is located in North Cyprus and receives about 80–85% of its effluent from South Cyprus—mainly from Nicosia. The sewage system of Nicosia is integrated and works as one. There is an ongoing dispute between North and South on the construction of a tertiary stage to this treatment plant in order to eliminate its nuisance effect on the North. Water, a scarce resource in Cyprus also is partially shared. The Morphou region in the North provides water to the southern sector, while Nicosia provides water to Lefkosa. Here, too, the partnership is forced and uncomfortable and the North is trying to develop its own separate water-delivery system. There are a very limited number of telephone and telex connections between North and South. Also, the two sides cooperate in the implementation of the common master-plan of Nicosia and planners and officials from both sides meet often at Ledra Palace Hotel for that purpose.

In a comparison of the three cities on an imaginary continuum of permeability–nonpermeability of their partition/division, there is no doubt that Nicosia’s ‘Green Line’ is the most permeable compared to Berlin’s Wall or Jerusalem’s partition. A possible explanation is that the legal government hopes to sustain, as much as possible, the island as one sovereign state and considers many of the cooperation efforts are simply promotion of its sovereignty all over the island. Exactly because of the same reason, the North is trying to cut off all its ties to the South.

7.2. Planning and development in the divided cities

In all three cases the two sides of the city had to build and develop whatever had been lost or remained in the territory of the other side of the city. As a result, ‘dual landscape’ emerged in all three cities: schools, hospitals, roads, and public facilities were duplicated and replacement infrastructure of water, electricity and telephone lines appeared on both sides of the divide.

7.2.1. Berlin

In Berlin the sewage treatment plant in East Berlin was the only infrastructure facility which served both halves of the city. West Berlin had to develop for itself a new town hall, a new university museum and a new CBD (Ellgar, 1992). The division was felt most in the transportation network which was split and developed in different directions.

The division of the city left the old commercial centre and the CBD unused and in ruins. Friedrichstrasse, which once served as the principal north–south traffic artery of Berlin, was almost unused. Unter den Linden, the major east-to-west axis of Central Berlin was barred by the wall at the Brandenburg Gate. The planners of East Berlin, who were lucky to have in their possession the old
medieval centre of the city, developed in it the functions of a capital city. West
Berlin lost its capital role and its planners tried to spread the former city functions
as much as possible. Only those functions for which central position was essential
remained in the Old Centre City (Mellor, 1978). As a result, West Berlin became
more decentralized, whereas East Berlin became more centralized, as a result of its
planning process. The major spatial consequences of the division of Berlin were:

1. Isolation of West Berlin from the City Centre (which remained in East Berlin)
   and from the Brandenburg hinterland.

2. On both sides of the city there has been a very limited degree of
   suburbanization and urban sprawl. There was very little acquisition of
development areas for one-family homes: in West Berlin because of the
   extremely limited land reserves and in East Berlin because of political and
   economic decisions in favour of socialist mass housing (Frick, 1991: 38).

3. The two halves are also similar in the containment of urban sprawl.

4. The two sides of Berlin also preserved their industrial structure (Fig. 10).

The separate planning and development, though, was reflected in the trend of the
two Berlins to turn their back on each other. Thus, the old CBD and government
centre of Berlin became deserted and derelict. But West Berlin had been more
heavily affected by the division compared to East Berlin because of its island
situation and its isolation from Western Germany. Ironically, the planning process

![Divided Berlin: shared and separate infrastructure.](image)
in East Berlin and West Berlin, though motivated by completely contrasting social and political systems, eventually created similar spatial forms on both sides of Berlin: containment, compactness and lack of urbanization (Fig. 11).

7.2.2. Jerusalem

The economy of Jerusalem was severely damaged by the partition. Moreover, as Jews and Arabs were involved in many ways at least a decade before the actual partition, many of the commercial and economic activities of the city were disrupted and divided along ethnic lines in that period. Jerusalem was integrated into Israel and declared as a capital city of Israel in 1948. King Abdallah of Transjordan integrated East Jerusalem into his Kingdom in 1950, but East Jerusalem was not proclaimed as a capital city of Jordan—on the contrary, East Jerusalem was deliberately weakened politically and economically in order to promote Amman as the capital and strongest city in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. In contrast, the decision to proclaim West Jerusalem as the capital of

Fig. 11. Divided Berlin: land uses.
Israel was crucial for its economic well-being. Government offices were the largest employer of manpower in Jerusalem and were able to attract people to the city, which suffered from negative migration rates following the 1948 war. In this respect, Western Jerusalem is similar to Eastern Berlin where many were employed by the Government. Even in Western Berlin, which did not serve as a capital, administration of the city kept many people employed in public services. As for Eastern Jerusalem, although it was not a capital, it was a district centre and a religious and educational centre and many people were employed in public services (Schiller, 1986). West Jerusalem lacked most of the fundamental conditions necessary for a capital city. It inherited only a few of the central functions which were handled by the British Government during the period in which Jerusalem served as the capital of British Palestine. Jerusalem became a vulnerable frontier city: it lay at the end of a long corridor only tenuously tied to the coastal plain. Inefficient communication, relatively great distance from the country’s major trade and industrial areas doomed West Jerusalem to isolation. Comparable problems also faced East Jerusalem, which found itself cut off from the Mediterranean ports which used to serve it, and had to import and export from Beirut (Gosenfeld, 1973).

Dual landscape evolution has for Jerusalem more than one connotation. A dual landscape evolved in Israeli Jerusalem because the Hadassah Hospital and the Hebrew University Mt. Scopus campus remained under Jordanian control and were replaced by new buildings in Givat Ram and Ein Kerem.

Many of the services and infrastructure of Arab and Jewish Jerusalem evolved separately because the two communities were at war. But a dual landscape did evolve: separate municipalities, separate CBDs, a hospital, bus stations, etc. Between 1948 and 1967, East Jerusalem and West Jerusalem evolved separately in opposite directions: Western Jerusalem developed west and the new Government precinct was in Givat Ram, 9 km west of the Old City centre. East Jerusalem developed north and east. The CBD of East Jerusalem evolved northwards, but suffered from lack of roads and infrastructure. The Jordanian Government did not invest in Jerusalem and refused to extend its municipal jurisdiction.

7.2.3. Nicosia

The partition of Nicosia turned many sides of the borderland into a ‘cul-de-sac’ or dead-end road. All the exit roads from Nicosia that lead to the west, southeast and east were cut off. The traffic that before 1974 streamed between Morphou and Famagusta (now occupied by Turkish Cypriots) to Limassol via Nicosia, no longer exists. The Turkish Cypriots lost access to the main east–west link road which was bisected by the new border. The south lost the port and city of Famagusta. From the most important transportation centre, Nicosia became a last stop in a long road. Nicosia also lost its agricultural and industrial hinterland in the north—the area occupied by the Turks contained almost all the tourist industry in the island, most of its agricultural and irrigated land and most of the industry and mining capacity. The southern economy was completely devastated and had to develop its economy from scratch. Dual landscape, at an enormous
scale, had grown on the Greek side of the partition as the north ‘inherited’ houses, farming land, industry and tourist accommodation which were more than enough to absorb the Turkish Cypriot refugees. The South had to construct housing units to accommodate some 180,000 refugees. About half of the current residents of Nicosia are refugees. Greek Cyprus had to develop new ports (Limassol), airports (Larnaca and Paphos), large water projects (Paphos) to compensate for the water resources which remained in the South, a new motorway and a new tourist industry (Hudson and Dymiotou-Jensen, 1989; Field Survey, July 1992). The Turkish Cypriots have developed a new airport at Ercan, and expanded the port in Kyrenia instead of the one destroyed at Famagusta, but basically had all the infrastructure it needed for its quasi-statelet. Dual landscape of economies and infrastructure emerged in the two partitioned entities. Duplication of structures is especially prominent in the political and administrative systems. The Turkish Cypriots established for themselves a provisional administration and a government precinct with a parliament, presidential palace and government offices, which presents a capital-like appearance to Lefkosa. Nicosia has also two municipalities, and both sides of the city serve as capital city for their respective countries.

The partition reshaped the directions of development of the two sectors of the city—similarly to Jerusalem and Berlin. The two parts of Nicosia developed in opposite directions and the area on both sides of the partition is inferior in its location in relation to the current population dispersal. Population and shopping areas moved to other areas of the city. Nicosia developed shopping areas, residential areas and residential estates for refugees in the south, southwest, and southeast direction, but mainly on the main axis to Limassol. Turkish Lefkosa constructed new roads to Kyrenia and Ercan and developed along these axes—in the northern and north-west direction. Similar to the other partitioned/divided cities, Nicosia is dispersed on a wide area and in opposite directions—an evolution which poses serious obstacles if and when the two sectors are re-unified.

The dual landscape or multiplicity of public facilities and duplication of economic infrastructures housing hotels, etc., involved hoge expenditure. As in the cases of Jerusalem and Berlin, Nicosia found that partition is very costly. North and South Cyprus cooperate in the implementation of a Common Master Plan, which was completed in 1984 with the aid of the European Community, which also assists in its implementation. The conspicuous achievement of this plan is the rehabilitation of houses along the ‘Green Line’ on both sides.

7.3. Planning process after reunification

Two of the three cities discussed in this study were reunified: Jerusalem in 1967 and Berlin in 1989. Jerusalem will occupy the larger part of the discussion as the experience gained there is for almost 30 years, whereas Berlin’s experience is only 7 years old.
7.3.1. Berlin

After the abolition of the division of Germany and Berlin in 1989, Germany made the decision to transfer the capital from Bonn to Berlin by 1999, at a cost of US$13 billion. The planners faced problems mainly concerning the revitalization of the old ruined centre and overcoming multiplicity of functional centres. Berlin is becoming a ‘normal’ city, in the sense that inhabitants and economic activities are looking for new locations in the area width of the city. There is no plan yet for the derelict areas along the former wall. There is great pressure for the construction of a large office building, as many companies (German and international) are re-establishing their headquarters in Berlin. Planners are very cautious in the re-planning and re-building of Berlin. They are trying to blend modernism and traditional architecture together without offending East Berliners by removing some of the hideous German architectural products to which the East Berliners show great sensitivity (The Economist, 1997a: 30). On 8 March 1997, Berlin’s municipality tried to lure tourists who wanted to catch a last glimpse of the Cold War, especially the Berlin Wall, painted a red stripe, which crosses Berlin’s heart along the route of the demolished wall (The Economist, 1997b). However, many East Berliners are upset that 7 years after the wall fell, the city remained divided in odd ways: West Berliners still earn more, have larger flats, etc. It should be noted that West Berlin is sensitive to East Berliners. The city debated for a year before it was decided to paint the line for 20 km along the former wall (The Economist, 1997b).

7.3.2. Jerusalem

For 19 years Jerusalem remained partitioned, but in 1967, during the Six Day War, it was occupied by Israel and was re-unified. Many buildings and structures such as David’s citadel, the Old City walls and gates, churches and public facilities were bombed and damaged. Physically, the city was reunified within hours and days after its occupation. The cement defence walls and the barbed wire were removed a day after the occupation. Within days, the war ruins and damaged structures which lay near the partition were removed and the water delivery systems, telephone and electricity links were quickly integrated. Finally, the roads were connected and paved and new signs were posted: Jerusalem was physically re-unified. From being a frontier town at the end of the Jerusalem corridor, Jerusalem has regained its hinterland and become an urban metropolitan centre with 20 urban settlements and tens of rural communities (Kimchi, 1993).

The Israeli planners of reunified Jerusalem accepted and integrated within their plans three very important British (mandatory) principles:

1. To preserve the city structure as a contained and compact city (Kroyanker, 1988b).

2. Construction is limited to the higher topography only and valley floors will be kept as open space.

3. Separation between the old city as a sacred city and the modern secular city
which surrounds it. In all, the British plan of a green ring of parks and open space surrounds the walls of the Old City (Kroyanker, 1993: 121).

4. Finally, building Jerusalem with stone was also a British planning regulation. But the Israeli planning principles were subjected to political considerations concerning the future of Jerusalem; hence, not all the above principles were observed. The main political aim was to build, as fast as possible, Jewish neighbourhoods in the newly occupied territory of East Jerusalem. The municipal jurisdiction of Jerusalem was extended in a way which will maximize the number of Jews and minimize the number of Arabs in that enlarged Jerusalem (Benvenisti, 1986: 97; Kroyanker, 1988a: 58–62). The intention was to maintain a proportion of two-thirds Jewish and one-third Arab population in reunified Jerusalem (Kroyanker, 1975) in addition to the above political dictum, the planners encountered three major obstacles which were an outcome of the partition and the separate development of the two sides of the city for 19 years.

1. The urbanized settled areas of the two cities had evolved in different directions and had to be integrated.

2. During the years of partition the borderland of the two halves of the city functioned as a hostile borderland. Patching of the empty and vacated areas between the two entities of the cities became the first priority for the planners.

3. A dual landscape had evolved in the two partitioned entities of the city: two CBDs, two separate transport systems, two systems of public facilities and two separate systems of legal, economic and political organizations. Unified and centralized planning had to find ways and means to overcome this multiplicity.

The first and immediate aim of the planners was to create a continuous built-up area between western Jerusalem and Mt. Scopus. This purpose was achieved by the construction of Ramat Eshkol and Givat Hamivtar. Other neighbourhoods were developed on the northern axis to the airport to Atarot (Neveh Yaaqov, Pisgat Zeev), Ramot Alon in the northwest and Talpiot and Gilo in the South (see Fig. 12). Thus, a belt of Jewish neighbourhoods was erected within the metropolitan hinterland in order to change the ratio between Jews and Arabs in that hinterland. As a result, Jerusalem lost its contained and compact form and became a dispersed city, and large investments in infrastructure construction and roads accompanied this process of dispersal. Another outcome of this process was the weakening of the city centre as residents of Jerusalem moved to the new neighbourhoods—only the old remained in the centre. This process of decentralization also included commerce. An unexpected outcome of decentralization was that the municipal borders between Jerusalem and many of the villages and towns in its hinterland became blurred and diffused. The planners of Jerusalem faced many difficulties in their efforts to amend the torn patches between East and West Jerusalem, namely, to develop the Mamillah precinct—an important link between the two sectors of the city—and also failed in the construction and development of the former No-Man’s Land opposite Nablus Gate, Mandelbaum Gate, Abu-Tor and Beit-Zafafa (see Fig. 12). The planners
could not agree on the appropriate land use for this area, i.e. land uses which would enhance the contact between the two sides of the city (Kroyanker, 1988a). The Mamillah precinct is now under construction, after many changes in the original plan and many disputes concerning this area.

Success of the planners in bridging the gap between East and West Jerusalem was registered in some of the areas of the former borderlands. First, gentrification and rehabilitation of former slum neighbourhoods (Kimchi, 1986: 59). The second success was the revival of British plans for a ring park which would encircle the Old City wall. This ring park now surrounds the Old City and it also includes the ‘Cultural Mile’ of Jerusalem, namely a belt of museums, galleries, cinema, theatres and concert halls. The reunification of Jerusalem failed, however, in the eradication of the dual landscape. Following the unification, Hadassah Hospital returned to Mt. Scopus (though the hospital in West Jerusalem also continued to function). The city found itself with two museums, two YMCAs, two central bus stations, a number of duplicated consulate buildings, and even two separate electricity corporations (Kroyanker, 1975: 198). The Eastern Jerusalem Electricity Corporation does not exist any more.

Almost 30 years of planning Jerusalem for ‘unification and integration’ showed that removal of the physical barriers between the two halves of the city does not necessarily turn the city into one truly integrated city. The greatest failure concerns the Arabs of Eastern Jerusalem. Israel constructed very few housing units for the Arab residents of the city as compared to tens of thousands of units which were built for Jewish residents. Discrimination toward Arab Jerusalem is also reflected in the inferior maintenance of infrastructure and lack of development of public facilities. Though the city and government offices took it upon themselves to promote an economic and social union of east and west Jerusalem, the attempt failed in many areas. After 30 years of unification the city has two CBDs, one for the Arabs, one for the Jews; the city also has two separate industrial zones, separate public institutions and even the tourist industry remained separate (Romann, 1984, 1986). Students in East Jerusalem schools follow the Jordanian curriculum and money changers in East Jerusalem are allowed to work according to Jordanian regulations. This functional duplication and multiplicity is also reflected in tax election and membership in professional associations and economic organizations. Infrastructure, i.e. bus stations, taxi companies, is separate. Cooperation between the two sectors of Jerusalem is restricted to a few areas, such as trade and services, which Arabs purchase in western Jerusalem if they cannot be found in their own sector or Jews buy in East Jerusalem because they are cheaper (Romann, 1986; Benvenisti, 1986: 92).

A final note has to do with the sacredness of Jerusalem to Christianity, Islam and Judaism, and its international importance which make planning and development of Jerusalem a sensitive task. Almost any step which Israel takes in Jerusalem faces opposition—Arab and others; and many of its activities are interpreted as political ones. The residents of Jerusalem, both Jews and Arabs, are often not consulted at all in matters of city planning and the fact that too many
offices, authorities, and political interests were and are involved in the planning process has not assisted the planning outcomes.

From the experience gained in the re-unification of Berlin and Jerusalem, one can hypothesize that if and when the two sectors of Nicosia are ever reunified, the physical barriers between the two sectors of the city is the smallest problem that the planners will face. The antagonism between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots, who share a past of warfare and social conflict similar to that between Jews and Arabs in Jerusalem, and to a lesser extent East and West Berliners, will prevent them from complete integration and they will remain separated or perhaps segregated for a long time.

8. Discussion and conclusions

The partitioned/divided cities of Berlin, Jerusalem and Nicosia represented, during most of the period of their existence, alienated borderlands along their partition/division. No day-to-day cross-boundary interchange was allowed between the two sides of the divide. The Berlin Wall, which became a symbol for impermeability, evolved gradually between 1945 and 1961. During these years millions of people crossed from one side of the barrier to the other. Between 1961 and 1989 the number of gates between the two sides of the city was slowly reduced until only one gate remained: Checkpoint Charlie. Slowly, all the interactions between the two sides which enabled the borderland to become co-existent borderland, namely trade, employment, transport, were terminated. Between 1961 and 1989 Berlin's division was mainly alienated borderlands. For short periods the East German Government relaxed the restrictions on movement of people and trade (example 1972 or 1984), thus transforming the frontier, again to co-existent semi-permeable borderlands in which selective interactions were allowed. Only after Berlin was reunited in 1989 and the Berlin Wall removed, the borderlands became an integrated borderland and all economic and political differences had been taken away.

Unlike Berlin, the partition of Jerusalem and the sealing of the partition was an immediate outcome of the 1948 war and took place in a very short time. During the war and siege, population exchange, voluntary or involuntary, took place and when the cease-fire lines and the armistice line which followed were demarcated, the boundary completely separated Jews and Arabs. Jerusalem differed from Berlin also by the ambiguity of the borderland which was comprised of six ‘No-Man’s Land’ demilitarized zones and two Israeli enclaves within Jordanian territory and many incidents and disputes arose between 1948 and 1967 because the two sides tried to control the demilitarized zone. Jerusalem fits better than Berlin the classification of alienated borderland with one gate only at Mandelbaum Gate in which a few selected officials were rarely allowed to cross from one side to the other. Similarly to the Berlin Wall, the ‘Green Line’ partition of Jerusalem was fortified, wired, and mined, and symbolized the hostility and animosity between the two sides when Jerusalem was reunified. Its present
borderland after re-unification did not become an integrated borderland as the one in Berlin, but only an interdependent border in which the two sides are symbiotically linked to each other, but in which not all the economic and political differences have been removed. Nicosia remains partitioned, but the partition at Nicosia, unlike Jerusalem, has been semipermeable during all the years of its existence, allowing people to move for work, visits and medical treatment and also allows restricted exchange of communication. But the interchange is restricted and selective and relies on the atmosphere between the two Cypriot entities. The Nicosia borderland is a typical co-existent borderland in most of its features and inducing from the Jerusalem experience, it is likely to become (after reunification) more an interdependent border than an integrated one similar to Berlin.

The partition/division of the three cities disrupted their functioning as one entity because of the alienated borderlands, or co-existent borderlands, as in the case of Nicosia. There was little or no coordination or cooperation in area-wide issues such as air and water pollution planning, waste disposal and resource management.

There is a great resemblance in the processes which took place in all three cities after their partition/division. First, in all three cities the old CBD and commercial centre was partitioned/divided and high ranking commercial streets were destroyed and became dilapidated. The lucrative shops were replaced by obnoxious land uses and luxury residential areas became slums in all the three partitioned/divided cities.

The economies of all three cities suffered tremendously from partition/division. First, because all (except East Berlin) lost their hinterland and have become an 'end of the road city' (that is, except for East Berlin, which had a broad hinterland in East Germany). Critical was the economic situation of West Berlin which was transformed into an enclave within East Germany, but Jerusalem was also a 'semi-enclave' because only a narrow corridor connected it to the coastal plain of Israel.

The economy of West Jerusalem, East Berlin and the two sections of Nicosia were improved by their role as capital city for their respective countries, and at the seat of the government, because the most important employer in Jerusalem and Berlin, but also in Turkish Cypriot Nicosia, was the Government and other state agencies. In all three cities a dual landscape of public facilities, services, infrastructure, had evolved as a result of their division. New transport networks had to be constructed and new water and power networks, sewage treatment plants, municipal and cultural facilities were constructed at a large expense and an enormous wastage of resources.

The alienated borderlands in Berlin (1961–1989) and Jerusalem (1948–1967) and the co-existent borderland of Nicosia allowed a very limited cooperation and coordination in area-wide matters. The two Berlins cooperated in sewage treatment, a few transportation links, and a few cultural exchange matters. In Jerusalem the two sides cooperated only on sanitation and malaria eradication. In Nicosia the two sides cooperated most extensively: there was a common sewage treatment plant on the Turkish side, a power station and telecommunications
centre on the Greek side of the city, and an exchange of water resources in two
different places. However cooperation was difficult and the two sides tried to
eliminate the mutual interdependence to the bare minimum.

The re-unification of Berlin and Jerusalem showed that generally it was
relatively easy to connect the infrastructure of the two divided/partitioned entities,
but it is more difficult to reinstate a city which will constitute one functioning
whole. This is particularly prominent in Jerusalem, where East Jerusalem kept for
itself its separate CBD and commercial centre, much of the separate professional
associations and economic organizations and many of the public service facilities
which are separated for East and West Jerusalem.

Planners in Berlin, Jerusalem and Nicosia had to build a ‘substitute city’ for
their respective divided sectors. The spatial development of divided Berlin took
the two halves further apart and because of the differences in the social political
regimes in the two Germanies, each side of Berlin was planned differently. But the
two Berlins had in common the fact that there was very little suburbanization in
both parts. The two sectors were similar in conservation of their industrial
structure. The most important challenge for reunified Berlin is how to integrate
the two divided sectors and mainly how to revitalize the old ruined centre of the
city, and to overcome multiplicity of functional centres. The fact that Berlin is to
become the capital city of re-united Germany (in 1999) means that special
attention is paid to the construction of all the government offices in Berlin—
without returning to the notorious Berlin of the German Third Reich, the last
time in which Berlin served as the capital city of Germany.

Jerusalem, because of its sacredness to the three main religions, and because the
UN resolution to internationalize it was never implemented, is in the centre of the
world—at least from the planning perspective. Any construction or development
in the city is ‘political’ in the sense that it is carefully examined around the globe.
After 1967, the Israeli Government faced an enormous task: on the one hand to
preserve the visual form, landscape and character of the Old City, and on the
other, to repair war damage and renew the Old City’s disintegrating
infrastructure. In addition, planners had to overcome the same problems of
Berlin’s dual landscape and multiplicity of infrastructure, and empty, ruined areas
in the middle of the city, where the partition wall endured for 19 years. The Israeli
Government plans for Jerusalem were politically motivated by a desire to settle
the ‘liberated’ or ‘reunified’ territories by Jewish population in such a pattern
which will completely prevent another partition of the city. As a result, about 15–
20 new neighbourhoods were established on the ridges around the centre of the
city and Jerusalem has become a very dispersed city; provision and maintenance
of services and infrastructure is expensive.

The planning process of Jerusalem had modest success in patching the gap
between East and West Jerusalem. Some parts of the former ‘No Man’s Land’
areas remained undeveloped because the planners could not agree on the ‘right
concept’ for bridging the gap. The main failure of Israeli plans was to genuinely
integrate the two sectors of the city. The Arab sector of Jerusalem remained
neglected and there was almost no investment in the infrastructure of that part of
Jerusalem in housing for East Jerusalem’s Arabs. The Arab population of East Jerusalem also kept most of its separate infrastructure, services, economic organizations and educational facilities as a political declaration on the Palestinian nature of Jerusalem. Physically, there is no doubt that Jerusalem is reunified, but except for a limited and selective area in which Jews and Arabs do interact, the two communities remain separated and segregated.

Nicosia is still partitioned and developed separately though, unlike Jerusalem and Berlin, there is a greater level of cooperation in area-wide matters such as sewage treatment, electricity, water resources and telecommunication. Noteworthy is the common master-plan which is implemented cooperatively by the two sides, thus reducing the damage of separate spatial development of the two sectors of the city. But because Nicosia resembles Jerusalem or Beirut more than Berlin in its process of partition, one could expect that ‘bridging the gap’ between the two separated parts will be a very difficult task.

9. Concluding remarks

This study has attempted to investigate the political geography of divided/partitioned cities from three conceptual angles which do not combine together to one whole theory. The process of partition/division as envisioned by Henderson and Lebow was applied to the three partitioned/divided cities, in order to test its fitness with the specific partition of Nicosia and Jerusalem and the division of Berlin. In the second and third parts of this work, an attempt was made at a structural-functional analysis of partitioned/divided cities. The partitioned/divided cities were compared to the black ghettos in the USA and South Africa, mainly to see if those partitioned/divided cities represent an extreme case of urban segregation. Finally, the partition/divide which segregated Berlin, Jerusalem and Nicosia was likened to a border and its effect on the urban landscape was explored.

The main conclusion from the application of Henderson and Lebow’s model to Berlin, Nicosia and Jerusalem is that it works also for cities, not only for countries and nations. Nevertheless, it was found that the middle term division stage was sometimes very short or very difficult to observe in relation to former and successive stages. Also, it was found that the stage of rapprochement either did not exist or was so weak that it could not be differentiated from the middle term stage of partition/division. The Henderson and Lebow model could be fitted into five stages instead of six, to better accommodate the division/partition of cities.

The second conclusion is that there is no major difference between a divided city (Berlin) and the partitioned cities of Nicosia and Jerusalem in relation to the applicability of the model. On the contrary, it was well suited to the examples of certain other cities which had also been partitioned at various times and places (Belfast, Beirut, Sarajevo).
Third, the division/partition of cities is either maintained or resolved largely due to external intervention. Local needs and wishes are a negligible factor in the process of division or reunification.

In the second part of this study, Berlin, Jerusalem and Nicosia were compared to segregated black ghettos in North America and South Africa in order to locate them on a continuum of Integration–Segregation–Separation (see Figs. 7 and 8). Five characteristics of urban segregation were applied to the partitioned/divided cities which were examined: group conflicts in the process of urban segregation, size and spatial arrangement of the segregated zones, the political aspects of urban segregation, the economic and social aspects of urban segregation. Group conflicts were found very important in the formation of Jerusalem and Nicosia, and they have played a decisive role in the partition of Beirut, Belfast or Sarajevo. Size of the separated entities in partitioned/divided cities could also be compared to the size of black ghettos in the USA or the segregated homelands in South Africa. In the case of spatial arrangement, the partitioned/divided sectors resembled in their spatial arrangement more the homelands and black ghettos of South Africa than those of North America.

Urban politics which aimed at the advancement of minority groups had only partial relevance for partitioned/divided cities. In the economic sphere, though, it was found that wastage of resources took place in urban settings as a result of seclusion and segregation of black and Hispanic ghettos and in partitioned/divided cities as an outcome of the development of dual landscape of infrastructure and facilities. Resemblance was detected also in the social aspects of segregation as expressed in migration patterns and exclusion of the labour market. The voluntary self-segregation of the upper classes and the rich in North America and South Africa with guarded and fortified suburbs is similar to the partition/division of Berlin, Jerusalem and Nicosia.

In the last section of this study, the boundary components of the partition/division were investigated. It was found that the partition of Nicosia and Jerusalem and Berlin created alienated or co-existent borderlands. Little or no coordination characterized these divided entities and area-wide matters and spillover-effects of water and air pollution were not dealt with. The segregated sectors of the partitioned/divided cities developed separately, often in opposite directions, guided by different plans thus drawing the two sectors further apart from each other. The disruption of urban unity is most conspicuous when different aspects of planning partitioned/divided cities are examined, particularly when, like Berlin and Jerusalem, the cities are reunified. The reunification has at least two layers: the return of the physical unity to the cities, especially bridging the gap between the partitioned/divided sections, and a genuine integration of the split cities. As the examples of Jerusalem and Berlin succinctly showed, though walls and physical barriers may be removed and combat may cease, the ethnic, religious and linguistic groups who participated in the conflicts are reluctant to mingle and integrate, and continue to preserve their separate social and political systems—though they do tend to cooperate in the economic sphere. This trend is
also clearly reflected in Belfast and Beirut. Based on the experience in these cities, it is possible to assume that reunification of Nicosia will face the same difficulties.

Even if planners do succeed in overcoming the separate development of the two

Fig. 12. Partitioned Jerusalem: separate development.
sides and even in the repairing of the partition/division itself, it is not certain that integration of the two separated sectors will be achieved. Integration is taken as a free mixing of people in the market, in social and political circles and in residences. But evidence from Jerusalem (and also from Beirut and Belfast) point to the fact that communities remain segregated (see Fig. 12). Therefore, the reunited cities of Jerusalem and reunited Berlin will not be located on the extreme end of the axis (Fig. 13).

The integration of partitioned cities, such as Jerusalem, Beirut or Belfast, show that because of the ethnic rivalry, history of conflict and social differences, the various groups are reluctant to integrate. Residential and social segregation continue, and there are varied levels of cooperation in economic matters. Political participation is often limited to the particular interests of the relevant ethnic and social groups.

Finally, the various concepts of partition/division as examined in this paper may be tested in any other urban situations which point to internal divisions or partitions, whether based on class, race or international boundaries, as the comparison with black ghettos has shown. Of special interest to researchers is the phenomenon of ‘Twin Cities’ or urban agglomerations which practice trans-border cooperation and reflect similar characteristics to those of divided/partitioned cities.

Acknowledgements

The authors wish to express their deep gratitude to Dr Michael Roman for his comments.

Appendix A. List of interviews

29.10.92. Mr Symeon Matsis, Director of Planning, Central Planning Commission Planning Bureau.
21.6.91. Mr Kristof Artemiou, President of the Pan Kyprian Committee for Refugees.
23.7.92. Mr Ahmet Zek Bulunç, Undersecretary Prime Ministry State Planning Organization.

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