‘Mind the Gap!’ Integrating Approaches to Internal and International Migration

Russell King and Ronald Skeldon

The interdisciplinary field of migration studies is split into internal and international migration, characterised by different literatures, concepts, methods and policy agendas. Most migration scholars nowadays research international migration, even though, quantitatively, internal migration is more important. Yet the distinction between internal and international moves becomes increasingly blurred, not only because of geopolitical events and the changing nature and configuration of borders, but also because migrants’ journeys are becoming increasingly multiple, complex and fragmented. We present a schematic model that sets out 10 migration pathways that combine internal and international migration, and return migration, in various sequenced relationships. We survey the limited literature that attempts to compare and integrate internal and international migration within the same theoretical framework, both general models and some case-study literature from Mexico. We consider three approaches where theoretical transfer seems to hold potential: systems approaches, migrant integration, and the migration-development nexus. We conclude that considerable potential exists for integrating the study of internal and international migration, at both the theoretical and the empirical level. Too often one is studied without reference to the other, yielding a partial analysis. However, we baulk at attempting any ‘grand theory’ of migration which incorporates all types of migration, in all places and at all times.

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Introduction

Amongst the many binaries that dissect the field of migration studies—forced vs. voluntary, temporary vs. permanent, for example—one stands out as fundamental, that between internal and international migration. Two almost entirely separate literatures exist, written from different conceptual, theoretical and methodological standpoints, which rarely talk to each other. This dichotomisation seems to have been influenced by several factors, including different data sources, different disciplinary backgrounds of researchers, different analytical techniques, and different research agendas that reflect different policy concerns and funding sources. According to Salt and Kitching, the persistence of this division ‘both hampers the development of migration theory and hinders our understanding of the role which migration plays in processes of population change’ (1992: 160) and, one could add, processes of social, political and economic change, too.

The mutual separation of these two ‘migration traditions’ is evidenced in striking ways that are all too easily overlooked, such as the reference to just one type under the general heading ‘migration’, as if the other type did not exist. Especially in the last decade or so, ‘migration’ has somehow come to mean ‘international migration’. Castles and Miller’s *Age of Migration*, first published in 1993, is an age of international migration; Myron Weiner’s *Global Migration Crisis* (1995) is a crisis of international migration; Robin Cohen’s *Cambridge Survey of World Migration* (1995) is a survey of international migration; Brettell and Hollifield’s *Migration Theory* (2000) is a theory of international migration; and so on.

Conversely, earlier theorisations of migration were about internal migration. Ravenstein’s ‘laws of migration’ (1885; 1889) were derived from his observations on internal movements of population. Somewhat later, Stouffer’s gravity modelling and his considerations of the roles of place utility and intervening opportunity (1960), Sjaastad’s cost–benefit analysis of migration (1962), Wolpert’s behavioural perspective on the decision to migrate (1965), Lee’s (1966) theorisation of migration à la Ravenstein, and Todaro’s (1969) model of migration and unemployment were all about explaining migration within countries.

Three further points need to be emphasised. First, there is the question of numbers and scale. The current estimate for the ‘stock’ of international migrants—i.e. those living outside their country of birth—is 200 million (IOM 2008: 2). This is less than 3 per cent of global population. Global estimates for the number of internal migrants are very difficult to make because of data unavailability and the incompatibility of national definitions where data do exist. The United Nations Development Programme was bold or injudicious enough to come up with an estimate of 740 million in 2009 (UNDP 2009: 21). To put the scale of internal migration into perspective, in China a transfer of 100 million people was estimated to have taken place between interior and coastal regions between 1991 and 2001 (Deshingkar and Grimm 2005: 10), while the Chinese government plans to resettle some 340 million rural dwellers in towns and cities over the next two to three decades (DeWind and
Holdaway 2008a: 16). Thus, internal migration in China alone may well soon exceed total global international migration. The ‘age of migration’ (Castles and Miller 1993, 2009) is therefore also an age of mass internal migration.

Second, there is the issue of the precise definitional distinction between the two forms of migration. Quite apart from individuals and households that are mobile both internally and internationally, the ‘boundary’ between internal and international migration can easily become blurred. Certainly distance is not a defining criterion: contrast a 10km relocation from Geneva across the border into France (where housing and cost-of-living are cheaper) with a 4,000km move from New York to California. Furthermore, the nature of international borders can change: the European Union and its frontier-free ‘Schengenland’ have created a borderless zone for mobility which is more akin to internal migration than ‘traditional’ international migration with its regime of passports, visas and border controls. Moreover, borders themselves can be mobile; they can appear or disappear, or move across peoples. The dismemberment of the Soviet Union and of Yugoslavia transformed erstwhile internal migrants into ‘international’ migrants or minorities (e.g. Russians in the Baltic States of the Former Soviet Union, or Bosnians in Slovenia). This process is not unique to Europe (see Brubaker 1998; King 2002) but also takes place in other parts of the world (see Adepoju 1998 on Africa; Skeldon 2006 on Asia).

The third and final introductory point concerns the variable stress on the differences as opposed to the similarities between internal and international migration. Adepoju (1998) maintains that, within Africa, emigration can be regarded as simply an extension of internal migration. Conceptually, according to Adepoju, both types of migration derive from the same set of fundamental causes: inequalities in development, employment prospects, incomes and living conditions between and within countries. These inequalities undoubtedly exist, but Adepoju’s African exceptionalist argument may be based too much on observations of large countries like Nigeria. The situation in other parts of the world may be very different. For Zolberg (1989: 405), international migration, especially to wealthy countries, inevitably brings in a political economy perspective that recognises the importance of international relations and the control that states exercise over their own borders. International migrants are moving into a different political entity with its own distinct legal system that impinges on their lives in a way that an internal move does not. Hence international migration is a ‘distinctive social process’ in which the container of the state has fundamentally different functions from a region or census tract within a country. Immigration controls and regulations have major implications for migrants in terms of the right to enter a country (with a visa for instance), to reside for a given length of time, and to access citizenship rights such as education, employment, healthcare, or political participation. Linguistic and cultural barriers often characterise international migration, although this is by no means always the case: in some instances such obstacles may be more evident in internal than in international moves.
We accept that a distinction between internal and international migration needs to be maintained. The fact that an individual is in a different state matters, despite that distinction becoming blurred, as outlined above. Nevertheless, internal and international migrations are generated by similar forces and, despite the crossing of an international boundary as an important distinguishing feature, close linkages exist between them. Our paper attempts to achieve two things. First, it presents a schematic model of the sequencing and linkages between internal and international migration, building in return migration as an additional element. This is essentially a mapping of the possible functional linkages in space and time between internal and international movements. We make reference to empirical studies of the various migration trajectories in a review of the limited literature that compares the behaviour and impacts of internal and international migrants in countries such as Mexico. Second, we look at approaches that have been applied to the study of the one that may have important applications for the study of the other. With this twofold approach that brings together structure and process, we try to work towards closing the gap between the internal and international traditions that so bifurcates the study of migration.

**Linking and Sequencing Internal and International Migration**

Figure 1 is an attempt to portray, in a simplified way, a range of options by which internal and international migration interface with each other. We imagine two countries, X and Y, each divided into two regions, Xa and Xb, and Ya and Yb. X is the migrant’s origin country, Y the destination country. We might further imagine that Xa is a rural region and Xb an urban centre, such as the country’s capital city. In the
case of country Y, Ya might be a principal city and Yb a provincial region. The various migration trajectories are numbered 1 to 10.

Pathway 1 is a simple internal migration, for instance from a rural district to a major city. Path 2 is a direct international migration—from a village straight to a city in another country. Path 3 sees internal migration preceding an international move: this is a stepwise migration, perhaps facilitating a staged adjustment to urban life along the way. Path 4 presents a different sequence: international migration first, followed by a subsequent internal migration in the country of settlement. Finally, pathway 5 combines 3 and 4 and sees the international move sandwiched by internal migrations both in the country of origin and in that of destination.

Before going on to examine how internal and international migrations may be linked, two factors need to be borne in mind. First, the scale of analysis is important: whether we are dealing with a single individual or family unit, or with larger aggregates such as village communities, regions, or entire countries. Second, it is also important to realise that internal and international migrations can occur simultaneously from any given population, or even from any single family at one particular point in time.

Internal Migration Leading to International Migration

This sequence is widely regarded in the migration literature as the most logical as it enables rural migrants to familiarise themselves with the urban environment of their own country before venturing abroad on a subsequent international migration. A period spent working in a town or city is often necessary in order to accumulate the financial resources and contacts needed to effect emigration. Also, the points of departure for overseas migration will tend to be a major city or port. Amongst well-known examples of this form of internal-to-international stepwise migration we cite Turkey (King 1976: 70–2), Thailand (Skeldon 2006: 22–4 quoting various Thai sources) and Mexico (del Rey Poveda 2007: 291–2; Lozano-Ascencio et al. 1999; Zabin and Hughes 1995).

The Mexican case is the most thoroughly documented. However, the results, based on research in different source regions and carried out within different time frames, are far from consistent. Zabin and Hughes (1995) found that more than three-quarters of Mexican migrants from Oaxaca in southern Mexico had worked in other Mexican states (chiefly Baja California and Sinaloa) before emigrating to the United States. On the other hand Lozano-Ascencio et al. (1999): 140) conclude that ‘direct migration from rural areas to international destinations seems to have been the norm in international migration flows from Mexico to the United States’. The Mexican material also provides evidence of other refinements to the ‘internal then international’ sequence. For instance, an initial migration from village to town and then abroad can lead to direct emigration from the village, facilitated by the social networks established by the previous stepwise migrants who had settled in the United States (Lindstrom and Lauster 2001). This stepwise evolutionary sequence has its
parallel in internal movements whereby migrants move first from villages to rented accommodation in the central parts of large cities. Once established, these migrants then move to build their own housing on the periphery of the urban areas, establishing linkages that generate direct movements from the village to the new urban periphery (see Skeldon 1990: 108–9). Another Mexican variant is direct migration from central and southern Mexico to the maquiladora border cities and export-oriented zones aligned with later movement across the border (see Cornelius and Martin 1993; del Rey Poveda 2007).

Linkages at broader regional and national scales can be observed in which internal moves lead ultimately to international migration across different cohorts of migrants. The cases of Japan and South Korea provide one type of situation, from the perspective of an expanding labour-demand economy (Skeldon 2006: 25). At ‘stage one’, the urban industrial and service economy is fed by streams of internal migrants from rural areas. Once this internal supply of rural migrants dries up, ‘stage two’ sees their replacement by international migrants from a variety of poorer Asian countries (plus, in the case of Japan, ethnic Japanese from Brazil and Peru). This staged model of internal migration leading to immigration in a rapidly developing (but demographically stagnant) economy has been more formally presented for southern Europe, especially the paradigmatic case of Italy, by King et al. (1997: 9–13). Over the period between the 1950s and the 1990s, the northern Italian industrial economy first drew labour supplies from adjacent rural areas, then from southern Italy, and finally from abroad in an ever-widening search for appropriate low-skilled workers.

The dominant role of capital over labour and its impact on migration is the guiding theme of the ‘Sassen thesis’. Through the purchase of land and the setting up of export processing zones in and around urban areas in the developing world, foreign corporations attract workers (especially females) from rural areas to the labour-intensive industrial plants. If structural change results in rising unemployment because of factory closure or it moves elsewhere, downsizes, or rotates its labour pool, the displaced workers move abroad. According to Sassen (1988), this sequence of events is underpinned by the predatory behaviour of global capital, which first dislodges rural labour to work in manufacturing zones. When the industry contracts or the labour is otherwise regarded as ‘expendable’, the newly redundant workers, unwilling to return to villages that offer them nothing, emigrate in search of new opportunities.

**International Migration Leading to Internal Migration**

The literature on this migration sequence is rather limited, since it tends to be split by two fields of study: international migration, and internal population redistribution. The latter has been quite extensively studied by population geographers in the UK and USA. However, their view has generally been less one of linking internal moves to the international moves that preceded them, but more of seeing the internal mobility of international migrants and ethnic minorities within the frame of overall internal
migration and regional population change (e.g. Belanger and Rogers 1992; Light and Johnston 2009; Nogle 1994; Salt and Kitching 1992; Simpson and Finney 2009).

As with path 3, it is very difficult to get good data on this dual migration process. Two solutions are population registers which separately record the internal mobility of foreigners (e.g. Andersson 1996 on Sweden) or linked census records such as the Longitudinal Study within Britain, used by Fielding (1995) and Robinson (1992). The latter two authors found that immigrants from the Caribbean had low geographical (and social) mobility over the 1971–81 intercensal period, whereas Indians were highly mobile inter-regionally, exhibiting high rates of upward mobility into the middle class. In a more recent paper, Fielding (2007) deploys his notion of London as an ‘escalator’ region (i.e. migration there accelerates social mobility upwards) to suggest that the capital functions as a social-class escalator for both internal and international migrants.

Another set of more indirect links between international and internal migration in countries of destination can be identified. These can be regarded as ‘knock-on’ effects, whose causality is not necessarily implied in one direction or another. Following Champion (1996), displacement (or, perhaps, replacement) describes the situation whereby the arrival of international migrants is accompanied by or precipitates the out-migration of natives (or, indeed, of previous cohorts of immigrants) from the areas where the new immigrants settle. Two lines of causality might take place: in the first, the migrants displace natives by undercutting the existing wage level and/or by reducing the residential attractiveness of the areas in which they settle. In the second case, immigrants replace the already declining population of natives by taking up vacancies in the job and housing markets left by the out-migration of locals. Alternatively, substitution refers to a situation where immigrants take advantage of opportunities in a particular area (again, jobs or housing) that would otherwise have been taken by internal migrants. Thus, international migration substitutes for internal migration which thereby becomes reduced. Salt and Kitching (1992: 153–5) describe the situation in the UK hotel and catering industry, concentrated in London and the South East, where employers have turned to international migrants because of their inability to recruit workers from the UK’s high unemployment regions.

An entirely separate form of international-leading-to-internal migration can take place within countries of origin. Large-scale emigration from one particular set of regions creates a vacuum into which internal migrants from other parts of the country can move in another form of replacement migration. Here, one phase of (international) migration changes the geography and structure of opportunity within a country, thereby influencing subsequent migration phases. Fitzgerald (2009: 150) has shown that wage differences between rural areas in Chiapas and Jalisco in Mexico are greater than between Jalisco and the United States. Migrants from Chiapas come into Jalisco to replace those leaving Jalisco for the US. Other cases of this type of stage migration are noted for South Asian areas of high emigration such as Mirpur (Pakistan), Kerala (India) and Sylhet (Bangladesh). In these areas, shortage of labour due to emigration and the new wealth created by remittances have stimulated the
migration of poor workers from adjacent regions (Gardner 1995: 67–8, 279; Nair 1989: 353–6; Skeldon 2006: 25). De Haas (2007: 25–6) has noted similar patterns of migration in Morocco, where internal migrant labourers from poorer villages and regions are attracted not only to the rural areas of origin of international migrants, but also to regional ‘migrant boomtowns’, where they work in the construction fuelled by investment in housing from international returnees.

Other Links: Adding Return Migration

Internal-then-international and international-then-internal are the two most obvious pathways linking the two forms of migration under examination, but other patterns are also evident, especially as multiple and mixed forms of migration and mobility become more common. Pathway 5—internal, then international, then internal again—is probably much more common than the limited research evidence suggests.

A more complete refinement of the scheme portrayed in Figure 1 occurs when we add return migration, which produces another five paths. Path 6 is the simplest—a ‘U-turn’ back to the place of origin. Pathway 7 is different: here the migrant left from rural area Xa but returns to urban area Xb probably because the likelihood of employment is much greater; Wiltshire (1979) calls this ‘J-turn’ migration. It could also be that, during the time that the migrant was abroad, part of his or her kinship network internally migrated from Xa to Xb, thereby creating a network that encouraged or facilitated the return of the international migrant.

Cases 8 and 9 are two alternative destinations of return where the emigration is preceded by an internal move. In 8, the return is to the place of origin, not of departure; in 9, the return is to the place the migrant emigrated from, which probably holds greatest utility in terms of employment or investment opportunities. In the former pathway, the migrant is perhaps coming towards the end of his or her working life and so is both a returnee and a retiree, looking for a quiet life amongst kin and old friends, perhaps linked to inherited or purchased rural property (see Cerase 1974 for a description of the ‘return of retirement’). Finally, pathway 10 sees the returnee, an internal migrant before emigrating, return to a place which is neither the place of origin nor the place of internal migration and departure.

In a study by Hernández Alvarez (1967: 23–4) of Puerto Rican migration to the US, a questionnaire survey of returnees (n = 307) who relocated to Puerto Rico during the early 1960s enables a quantification of pathways 6–10 in Figure 1. In this case, Xa is likely to be rural Puerto Rico, and Xb the capital San Juan. The largest percentage (52.4) followed pathway 6, a return to origin with no internal migration. Path 7, where the migrants leave from Xa but return to Xb, comprised 21.2 per cent of the sample. This, Hernández Alvarez notes, consists of two sub-paths: a direct return to Xb and a return to Xa followed by an internal migration to Xb. Another quite common path was 9, by which 20.5 per cent migrated internally (most likely to
San Juan) prior to departure for the US, and then returned to the capital. The two remaining pathways, 8 (4.1 per cent) and 10 (1.9 per cent), were followed by few returnees.2

Factors Differentiating Internal Migrants from Emigrants

An intriguing question is whether international migrants have different characteristics from those who migrate internally. Research on Mexico provides some answers, although this is complicated by the fact that many emigrants to the US are former internal migrants (cf. Lozano-Ascencio et al. 1999; Zabin and Hughes 1995). The spatial division of household labour reveals age/sex differences. Among Oaxacan migrant families in Baja California (northern Mexico) and California (USA), for example, Zabin and Hughes (1995: 410–13) found that migrants in California were more likely to be males and older than those moving internally. Aggregate data revealed that, whilst only 2 per cent of Mexican-US immigrant farm workers were under 18, the percentage amongst Oaxacan migrant farm workers in Baja was 32; the respective percentages of females in the two migrant populations were 19 and 50. Oaxacan migrant households allocate family members between Baja California and California in response to different work and wage structures, different child labour laws on either side of the border, and the dual social role of women as wage workers and primary providers of childcare. Finally, border crossing was regarded as physically and psychologically much more dangerous for women.

However, the special circumstances of this migration context must also be borne in mind. The expansion of labour-intensive export agriculture in Baja since the 1980s has turned the area into ‘a school for el Norte’ (Zabin and Hughes 1995: 413). Workers are attracted to Baja from southern Mexico by higher wages and regular work, but then after a few years many, especially men, cross the border where they can do the same work (but under more demanding work regimes) for higher wages. Meanwhile, Baja provides employment security for other members of the migrant household, especially women and children, and cushions the cost of failure for US-bound migrants.

A different approach was used by Lindstrom and Lauster (2001) in their study of out-migration (internal and to the US) from the Mexican state of Zacatecas. These authors used econometric modelling to show that emigration to, and return from, the US is mainly a form of investment-oriented migration, whereas internal migration is a lower-risk strategy geared more towards household survival. However, social networks are equally important for internal and international migration and act to screen out the probability of the other kind of migration. Somewhat analogous results are attained by del Rey Poveda’s (2007) three-way study of migration from rural Veracruz: to regional market towns, to the industrial estates along Mexico’s northern border, and to the US. Migrations to local markets and to the border are generated by precarious economic conditions in the places of origin, whereas the determinants of international migration relate to the capability to put this more expensive and
demanding migration into practice. US-bound migrants are overwhelmingly male, with more years of education; they have more agricultural property (as an indicator of family resources) and are more likely to have a family history of migration. Consistent with these factors, they are much less likely to be part of the ethnic indigenous population or to come from communal ejido villages. For local migration, distinguishing factors are high population density in the township of origin and prior family connections to the destination place.

A final perspective from Mexico is provided by Stark and Taylor’s (1991) analysis of 61 randomly selected households in a rural district of Michoacán. Their focus is on the role of relative deprivation within the rural community as a possible predictor of non-migration, internal migration, and migration to the US. At an absolute level, US migrants were more likely to be male, have greater household wealth (land, animals, machinery etc.), come from larger families (but not be household heads), and have kin already in the US, when compared to either internal movers or non-migrants. Internal migrants were often ‘intermediate’ in socio-economic and demographic characteristics between the other two groups, except for stronger kin links to internal destinations and prior experience of internal migration. So far, this is consistent with findings reported above.

In this study, however, internal migrants had on average more years of schooling (6.5) compared to US migrants (4.1); non-migrants had 3.9 years. This characteristic is relevant in explaining a key outcome of Stark and Taylor’s analysis: households sorted themselves in terms of high returns to human capital yet high risk of increased relative deprivation (through low incomes) for internal migrants, and low returns to human capital (because of low-skilled jobs offered to immigrants in the US) yet low risk of increased relative deprivation (through high remittances) for international migrants. So, ‘better-educated villagers are much more likely to migrate to (urban) destinations in Mexico, where returns to schooling are likely to be high, than to low-skill undocumented immigrant labour markets in the United States’ (1991: 1176). Stark and Taylor’s key empirical finding is that both absolute and relative deprivation are significant in explaining international migration, but they have no (direct) effects on internal migration behaviour. The authors conclude by pointing to an important policy outcome of what they term the ‘relative deprivation paradox of migration’: economic development that does not address intra-village income inequalities may lead to more, not less, international migration, even if overall incomes rise in a distribution-neutral way (1991: 1177).

It is difficult to compare this Mexican evidence with findings from other parts of the world simply because comparative studies on the two forms of migration are so few. An early study from the Philippines (de Jong et al. 1983) compared intentions to migrate from Ilocos Norte province to Manila and to Hawaii. The authors used a value-expectation framework alongside more conventional conditioning variables such as household demographic and economic characteristics, family and friendship networks, and personality traits such as risk-taking orientation. Results indicated that, compared to a control sample of stayers, intending migrants had more financial, human and
demographic capital. That is, they had more money, more years of schooling, larger families, more kinship contacts in destination places, more frequent travel experience and a more sophisticated ‘cognitive calculus’ of the costs, benefits and risks of moving. Moreover, individually held expectations of attaining important values and goals differentiate intended movers to Hawaii from intended movers to Manila.

A more recent study by de Haas (2008) on the role of internal and international migration in household livelihood strategies in a south Moroccan oasis revealed quite sharp contrasts between the two migration forms. International migrants typically do unskilled jobs in industry, agriculture and services in various European countries. Whilst many internal migrants perform similar low-status work, mainly in construction and services, a distinctive subcategory is made up of an elite—civil servants, professionals and university students. This finding reinforces Stark and Taylor’s conclusion that internal migrants are more educated than international movers. Other differences in the Moroccan study reflect the place of migration in household life-cycles. International migrants are more likely to be household heads, whereas internal migrants are much more likely to be the sons of household heads; and international migrants stay away twice as long as internal migrants (respectively 17 and 8 years on average).

However, Morocco, like Mexico, is contiguous to very large and dynamic economies—Europe and the United States—and this geographical position at the ‘labour frontier’ (Skeldon 1997: 144–70) arguably gives these migrant source countries distinctive characteristics in terms of migration–development dynamics, making a wider range of migration options available to greater numbers of people, including the poorer classes. International migration from poorer and more distant countries tends, on the whole, to exhibit greater selectivity.

Integrating Internal and International Migration Theory

The most ambitious attempt to link internal and international migration within the same framework is found in Zelinsky’s ‘hypothesis of the mobility transition’ (1971). Zelinksy drew on 1950s and 1960s modernisation theory and the notion of stages of demographic change to provide a logical framework for hypothesising connections between internal and international migration. In Zelinsky’s own words (1971: 221–2), ‘There are definite patterned regularities in the growth of personal mobility through space–time during recent history, and these regularities comprise an essential component of the modernization process’ (italics in original). Zelinsky decomposed mobility into international migration and various internal moves (rural-rural, rural-urban, inter-urban and circulation) that varied systematically and sequentially through the five stages of the mobility cycle: see Table 1. Underpinning this descriptive model was the parallel analogy with the demographic transition. Hence the supply of potential migrants, as generated by shifting patterns of fertility and mortality, was combined with a discourse of ‘modernisation’ and ‘development’ to produce a staged evolutionary model that essentially represented a post hoc interpretation of how
The strength of Zelinsky’s ‘hypothesis’ is that it combines different types of population movement—internal and external migration, and other mobility forms—into a single framework. But there are weaknesses in his approach and it has been widely critiqued (for instance, Boyle et al. 1998: 60–1; Cadwallader 1993; Skeldon 1990, 1997: 31–7; Woods 1993). First there are factual errors, perhaps the most notable being his assumption of an immobile pre-modern society, with industrialisation and urbanisation then drawing peasants away from this static rural milieu. A second weakness was the implied parallelism between the mobility transition and the demographic transition. Although Zelinsky demurred from expressing any causal
direction in the links between the two transitions, he never really demonstrated what
the links actually were: how mobility might affect fertility and mortality, or the other
way round. Thirdly, the rooting of the mobility transition in ‘old-style’ modernisation
and development theory was an obvious shortcoming. The path of global
development—and of development studies—over the last 30–40 years has invalidated
the teleological modernist notion that all societies are moving in a steady progression
through the stages of development mapped out by the adoption of Western-style
technologies, norms and institutions. Timing was particularly crucial since Zelinsky
presented his mobility hypothesis at a crucial juncture—both from the point of view
of migration processes (linked, inter alia, to the transition from fordism to post-
fordism in advanced countries), and from the viewpoint of the theoretical debate.

A decade after Zelinsky, Pryor (1981) issued a call for the integration of internal
and international migration theories. Pryor’s aim was not to present an overarching
metatheory of migration, but rather to ‘explore the possibility of integrating aspects
of existing theories and empirical findings in a new way’ (1981: 110). To this end,
Pryor presented three conceptual sets, summarised in Table 2. First, there are five key
questions which help to define and structure the building of theory. Second, Pryor
identified seven dimensions of similarity along which common ground can be sought
for the integration of theoretical approaches between internal and international
migration. He proposed that focusing on the behavioural interface and on systems
analysis offered the best possibilities for theoretical unification, informed by historical
and geographical comparisons of trends in different regions and countries over time
(1981: 125). Third, Pryor recognised the reality that the study of migration had been
fragmented along disciplinary lines—between sociologists, demographers, geogra-
phers, economists, anthropologists and psychologists, amongst others. This dis-
ciplinary compartmentalisation does not map on to the fission between the internal
and international migration traditions which, to some extent at least, replicates itself
within several of these single disciplines.

Pryor’s contribution can perhaps best be regarded as a road map for theoretical
integration, for he nowhere concretely or empirically demonstrated how the two
migration systems might be theoretically linked, something that we have tried to do in
our earlier discussion of functional linkages between internal and international
migration built around Figure 1. Moreover, the course of migration scholarship over
the last 20 years or so has, if anything, deepened the cleft between the two migration
traditions. The ‘age of (international) migration’ (Castles and Miller 1993, 2009), the
rise of the transnational approach since the early 1990s and the revival of studies of
diasporic communities (Vertovec and Cohen 1999) clearly leave no room for internal
migration except as a separate field of study. On the other hand, Pryor’s plea for
interdisciplinarity has not gone unheeded. As Robin Cohen (1995: 8) memorably
writes, ‘Those of us who have the migration bug recognize each other across
disciplines and across nations, languages and cultures. We are part of the webbing that
binds an emerging global society . . . We have found that our research is inadequate
without moving to history and to other social science disciplines with which we had
previously been unfamiliar ... We recognize that the study of world migration connects biography with history and with lived social experience. Fine words indeed; but much of this interdisciplinary collaboration and cross-feeding has been in the field of international migration, facilitated by the global growth of interest in the theme and accompanying national and international research funding opportunities. Internal migration has faded into the background and surely needs to be rehabilitated, for both its quantitative and its theoretical importance. We present just three approaches in which some kind of theoretical transfer or fusion between theories of internal and international migration seems appropriate: systems analysis, migrant integration, and migration and development. These approaches are neither exhaustive nor mutually exclusive but they represent significant pathways that have been used to approach an understanding of migration that, in our view, can be further strengthened if they take into consideration both internal and international migrations.

**Systems Approaches**

‘System’ is one of the most widely, and loosely, used words in the migration lexicon. Its genealogy in migration studies is, however, quite specific. Its first formal statement was in a pioneering paper by the Nigerian geographer Akin Mabogunje (1970), where it was used to describe and model rural-urban migration in West Africa. Key elements of the model were structural conditions, migrant flows, control subsystems,
adjustment mechanisms, and feedback loops. The theoretical significance and potential of the Mabogunje systems model has been repeated in many migration texts, especially those written by geographers (e.g. Boyle et al. 1998: 77–9; Skeldon 1997: 41–60; White and Woods 1980: 48–55; see also Fawcett 1989; Kritz and Zlotnik 1992), and it is also positively appraised by Hein de Haas (2010) in his paper in this JEMS special issue.

Despite the seminal status of Mabogunje’s paper, his model has had very limited practical application in subsequent empirical research. Several reasons can be suggested for this (Boyle et al. 1998: 78): data shortages, rigidity of the formulation of boundaries around the system in comparison to the greater fluidity of migration in real life, and limited recognition of the social element of migration networks (cf. Boyd 1989) in favour of a more mechanistic approach based on ‘energy’ in the system. In abstract terms, the systems approach is appealing, for it emphasises the dynamics of links and flows, causes and effects, adjustments and feedback. As a ‘sophisticated descriptive method’, it allows for any number of interrelationships to be built in, but in the absence of really good data the model cannot be fully operationalised and therefore cannot generate real results, explanations or theory (Zelinsky 1983: 33). This problem is even more evident when we note how widely the term’s meaning has come to be stretched. In fact there is little consensus as to what constitutes a ‘migration systems approach’ (Fawcett 1989: 672). Frequent reference is made to the ‘global migration system’ (e.g. Kritz et al. 1992; Skeldon 1997: 42–59), to regional migration systems based on world areas such as Europe, North America, the Gulf etc. (e.g. Castles and Miller 2009; Salt 1989), and to more local-scale (but maybe globe-spanning) family and chain migration systems (e.g. Lever-Tracey and Holton 2001).

Nevertheless, the systems approach remains attractive and it seems to offer a means to integrate internal and international migrations through different system layers and linkages. Some progress in applying the systems model to international moves has already been made. White and Woods (1980: 49–55) apply what they call an ‘integrated systems approach’ to the case of postwar labour migration into North-West Europe, based on a rather simple model of the structural context, areas of origin and destination, demand for labour, and flows of migrants. Kritz and Zlotnik (1992) draw on Mabogunje’s ideas in their advocacy of a systems framework for studying international migration in an era of enhanced global mobility and interdependence. Their migration systems comprise groups of countries linked by migration flows and exchanges whose importance is determined by their coherence and functionality. Such systems may be stable over time or, more likely, wax and wane in response to political and economic changes. Nijkamp and Voskuilen (1996) also use a systems approach to develop an explanatory framework for recent migration flows in Europe. They, too, pay homage to Mabogunje, but acknowledge a greater role for historical and social factors in patterning and maintaining migration flows. Their model adapts Mabogunje’s framework to the international context but makes no attempt to link these migrations with movements internal to the individual European countries.3
Migration systems theory holds promise for the integration not only of different types of migration—internal, international and return—but also for incorporating a wide range of disciplines and paradigms. It is both flexible and, up to a point, disciplinarily and ideologically neutral. Perhaps most importantly, it can be linked to a political economy approach if the system demonstrates the relevance of prior links between countries of origin and destination based on colonisation, political influence, trade, investment and cultural ties (Castles and Miller 2009: 27–9).

Integration

In studies of international migration, especially in Europe and North America, a massive literature on immigrant integration (or, to use alternative terms, assimilation, acculturation or incorporation) exists. The vastness and complexity of this literature defy effective summary but one simple point is relevant to our theme: much of this research on the integration of ‘foreign’ immigrants at their destinations, usually cities, has a largely unexplored relevance to research on internal migration. This point applies specifically to rural-to-urban migration where such moves bring population groups together that often have social, cultural, linguistic, ethnic and racial differences. It is a mistake to assume that internal migrants are necessarily more homogenous in terms of these characteristics than are international migrants. It is enough to think of the great migration of rural Southern African-Americans to the burgeoning northern industrial cities of the US in the mid-decades of the last century to grasp this point. Likewise, internal migrations in many European countries over the past 100–150 years brought rural folk face-to-face with an urban-industrial milieu that they found very strange and challenging, and often reacted to by maintaining their own cultural traits, regional dialects and links to their home regions. Much the same holds for internal migration situations in many developing countries in more recent decades.

We now highlight those aspects and concepts of the integration/assimilation debate that appear to have greatest relevance to the discussion of internal migrants. This assessment draws on a number of recent overviews (Asselin et al. 2006; Bommes and Kolb 2006; Castles et al. 2002; Heckmann 2005) rather than citing the extensive primary literature.

The integration process is commonly divided into a number of spheres—economic, social, cultural, political and spatial—that can be organised as follows (Heckmann 2005: 13–15):

- structural integration—the acquisition of rights and status within the core institutions of the host society: employment, housing, education, health services, political and citizenship rights;
- cultural integration (or acculturation)—the cognitive, behavioural and attitudinal change of immigrants and their descendants in conformity to the norms of the host society;
- interactive integration—social intercourse, friendship, marriage and membership of various organisations;
- identificational integration—feelings of belonging, expressed in terms of allegiance to ethnic, regional, local and national identity.

Heckmann (2005: 15) then defines integration as:

a long-lasting process of inclusion and acceptance of migrants in the core institutions, relations and statuses of the receiving society. For the migrants integration refers to a process of learning a new culture, an acquisition of rights, access to positions and statuses, a building of personal relations to members of the receiving society and a formation of feelings of belonging and identification towards the immigration society. Integration is an interactive process between migrants and the receiving society, in which, however, the receiving society has much more power and prestige.

This definition is very much a mainstream view. It connotes both a normative condition which is somehow to be expected or desired, and a pathway towards that norm. Castles et al. (2002: 112–15) take a more deconstructionist stance. They point out that integration is a very contested term, and open to a variety of definitions and interpretations. Moreover it is a two-way process, requiring adaptation on the part of both the immigrant and the host society. They also pose the question: ‘Integration into what? An existing ethnic minority, a local community, a social group, or [the national] society?’ Of course, the host society is not homogenous; it is structured and stratified in various ways, and it also has marginalised elements such as subcultures of poverty and welfare dependency, into which some immigrants may fall, thereby creating a situation of non-belonging or social exclusion from the wider society.

Heckmann acknowledges in his definition, but does not question, the hegemonic role of the host society. Castles et al. point out that in an open democratic society people have quite different lifestyles and values and hence different ideas about what constitutes the norm for that society or their participation in it. ‘In a multicultural society marked by differences in culture, religion, class and social behaviour, there cannot be just one mode of integration’, they write (2002: 114).

All these debates are commonly played out in the context of immigration, typically of poor immigrants into the urban, industrialised or post-industrial societies of ‘the global North’. But, once we change our mind-set from immigrant host societies in Europe, North America, Australasia or Japan to one of internal migrants in the cities of Africa, Asia or Latin America, the issues remain essentially the same.

Turning to the ‘spheres of integration’ framework, we can also draw parallels between the international and internal dimensions of these fields. Studies of economic integration have been numerous and have focused on the labour market and, more narrowly, on ethnic entrepreneurship (Bommes and Kolb 2006). Some models of work migration, especially those relying on comparative wage and unemployment levels, including income and job expectations, have incorporated frameworks that have been developed with reference to internal migration in developing countries
However, theories of dual and segmented labour markets have had a largely unrecognised relevance to studies of internal migration. For international migration, the classic study of Piore (1979) argues that foreign immigrants can only enter certain job sectors within the structurally inferior secondary labour market due to various barriers erected around the primary labour market by host-society market processes and prejudices. Certainly, those working on internal migration have emphasised the nature of segmented labour markets that have arisen because of the specialisation of particular migrant groups. Also, the informal sector was long, but largely incorrectly, assumed to be the primary destination of migrant groups in a binary division between informal and formal economies (see the review in Skeldon 1990: 161–3). Nevertheless, an integration of internal and international migrants into a common framework remains elusive.

Likewise, entrepreneurship amongst immigrants rests on a platform of research, especially in the US, into the ‘ethnic economy’ whereby migrant businesses are established in market niches relying on strong ethnic social capital. There is a burgeoning literature on the ethnic business phenomenon. Classic studies include New York’s Chinatown (Zhou 1992) and Koreans in Los Angeles (Light and Bonacich 1988); others take a more comparative approach (Kloosterman and Rath 2003; Rath 2002). Again our point is very simple: surely internal migrants also form entrepreneurial niches that can be identified and studied using similar theoretical frameworks and empirical methods.

The meaning of social integration is often widened to signify integration as a whole, i.e. comprising economic, political and cultural aspects. We narrow the definition to include key structural integration dimensions such as housing, health and education as well as interaction variables such as friendship patterns, intermarriage and memberships of voluntary organisations. Given that much of the research on social integration thus defined is set within an urban spatial context, developing from debates on assimilation, the ‘melting pot’ and its variants (see Glazer and Moynihan 1963; Gordon 1964 for key studies), the parallels with internal, rural-urban migration are potentially close, although rarely drawn out in comparative studies. In practice, the socio-spatial integration pathways beaten in earlier times by internal migrants in major European cities are often followed at a later stage by international migrants—as studies of Athens have shown (IOSIFIDES & King 1998; Leontidou 1990).

One important area of integration that has been studied by scholars of both internal and international migration with relatively little convergence between the two has been migrant associations—‘hometown’ associations in the international migration literature. These are institutions set up by migrants in destination cities where they can interact with people from their home-place, speak their native language or dialect, prepare local delicacies and exchange news of home. These, according to some scholars, help to integrate migrants into a potentially hostile environment. They often have a key social protection role to help fellow-villagers who may have fallen sick or lost their jobs; some are burial associations that ensure that the body of anyone who has died is sent back home. Others see these institutions as
vehicles that can promote hometown and even home country development. The complex debate is summarised in Skeldon (1977, 1990: 163–8). Despite the existence of thousands of such associations in the cities of both the global North and the global South, Fitzgerald (2009: 103–24), using examples from one particular part of Mexico, has been one of the very few to examine the changing roles of both internal and international migrant associations over time.

About political integration there is perhaps less to be said, given that the political participation and citizenship rights of international migrants are likely to be different from those of internal migrants. On the other hand, long-distance, rural-to-urban migrants moving, let us imagine, from interior China to coastal industrial cities, or from the Latin American countryside to capital cities, or from eastern Turkey to the gecekondu of Istanbul or Ankara, are all likely to be (or to feel) excluded from participation in the political life of the city, at least for a time. And studies of political transnationalism which focus on migrants’ political activities both ‘here’ (in the host society) and ‘there’ (in the origin country) have their parallel in the differential political activities exercised by internal migrants in their places of origin and destination—typically villages and small towns, and big cities respectively.

The sense in which migrants (internal or international) feel, or are made to feel, excluded from the life of the city links to the final sphere of integration, the cultural one, which relates most closely to Heckmann’s identificational integration. Common dimensions of cultural integration in studies of international migration are language and religion (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2006). These are less likely to be relevant in the case of internal migration but are by no means rare, as in the case of migrants with different languages and religions moving within former Yugoslavia, or Andalusians in Barcelona. The point we would make here is that studies of interethnic relations and multiculturalism should not be restricted to immigrant groups of different national origins.

Migration and Development

The relationship between migration and development, especially from the perspective of less-developed sending countries, has recently become the focus of a fast-growing literature (for recent overview studies see DeWind and Holdaway 2008b; Lucas 2005; Skeldon 1997, 2008, 2009; Sriskandarajah 2005; Van Hear and Nyberg Sørensen 2003). As a result of this literature on what is often called the ‘migration—development nexus’, international migration is now widely viewed as having the potential to contribute to development and poverty alleviation. Many governments and development agencies are seeking ways to maximise the benefits of migration, e.g. through remittances and return migration, and minimise its costs. Yet the focus of both scholars and policy-makers has tended to be almost exclusively on the relationship between development and international migration, overlooking the fact that, in most developing countries, internal migration is quantitatively more important. Part of this blinkered vision reflects a tendency on the part of many
governments of poor countries to view internal migration negatively. The current Chinese government is one of the few to recognise the positive relationship between development and internal migration: they observe that migration reduces the pressure on rural land and provides labour for manufacturing and services. According to various estimates, internal migration contributed between 16 and 24 per cent of China’s impressive GDP growth between the late 1970s and the late 1990s (Fang and Dewen 2008: 253–4). However, during the Maoist era, strenuous efforts were made to limit urban growth; policies at the time possibly halved what the urban populations might have been had these policies not been implemented (Banister 1987: 327).

Governments have often had a fear of being overwhelmed by masses from the countryside. That those masses tend to be made up of the better-educated and more employable rarely shifts the negative perception of rural-urban migration, and policies to restrict access to urban markets are commonly implemented. Clear parallels with international migration exist: those in power tend to fear the populations beyond the gates irrespective of whether they come from international or domestic sources.

Three generalisations and agendas for further research can be suggested within the nexus linking development on one side, and internal and international migration on the other side.6

The first arises out of the critique of Zelinsky’s migration model. As we saw earlier, Zelinsky’s mobility transition hypothesis, for all its shortcomings, can be regarded as a bold historical model relating together trends in urbanisation and economic development, on the one hand, with both internal and international migration on the other. It is, essentially, a post hoc explanatory model of how development and migration interfaced in the now-developed countries. The sequence may be very different for developing countries. But no comparable overarching theoretical statement has yet been made about the sequenced interaction between development and internal and international migration in the developing world beyond some initial steps (see Skeldon 1997, 2006). In the African context Adepoju asks whether rural-urban migration acts as an alternative to international migration, and suggests that, as Africa develops through internal migration, there may be less pressure for international migration (1998: 393). This is a question of enormous policy relevance.

Perhaps the key question to address in this area is to what extent development in poor regions of the world is bound up with the combined (or substitutable) effects of the two types of migration on individuals, communities and countries. Quite apart from the direction of causality between migration and development, we are dealing with combinations versus alternatives, three scales of analysis, time-bound effects of past and present and short and long term, as well as obvious differences between countries/continents. As yet, as we have seen, studies of migration within the developing world are largely split between the two non-conversing domains of internal and international migration, thereby yielding a partial insight into the complex livelihoods of migrants and their communities.
The second agenda question has already been mentioned above in our discussion of migration selectivity factors. The literature supports the generalisation that international migration normally has a much higher cost than internal migration (Massey et al. 1993: 461). Distances are greater, as are barriers to entry, especially if the migrant has no legal right to cross the border and to work. These costs are not just financial but also human and psychological—the costs of leaving and adapting to a new culture, of long-term separation from family and friends, of evading arrest etc. This affects networks, which in some cases are much stronger—precisely because they need to be—for international than for internal migration (Stark and Taylor 1991). This higher cost is however balanced by the expectation that earnings abroad will be higher, not only to justify and cover these costs, but also to attain higher goals. For instance, remittances from abroad are usually higher than internal remittances and their impact might also be more important. In his study of migration in Morocco, de Haas (2006: 569–72) found that the impact of international remittances at the family and the community levels was far greater than that from remittances sent by internal migrants. This was for two main reasons: the fact that so many have migrated from Morocco due partly to its ‘labour frontier’ position noted earlier, and because most international migration has been to Europe and not to other African countries, which substantially enhances the scale of the remittances. However, this pattern is not always the case. Although internal remittances are not measured as often and as systematically as international transfers, at times they can have a greater impact on communities of origin, as noted in some parts of Asia (Deshingkar 2006). But fully rigorous and focused comparative studies of internal and international remittances have yet to be made. Widening the comparison to social remittances (Levitt 1998)—norms and behaviours communicated back to migrant origin areas, which might include views on gender and family size, or on consumption patterns—creates further research challenges in monitoring these ‘invisible’ flows from different social and cultural fields within the country and abroad.

The third generalisation and agenda question concerns the way in which the internal vs. international distinction relates to the propensity to return. The cost logic expressed above leads to the conclusion that a move abroad is more likely to be long-term or irreversible because of the greater length of time needed to recuperate the higher expenses of migrating internationally (Kleiner et al. 1986: 313). Distances and costs of return may also be greater. However, this need not always be the case; in fact, quite the reverse: much depends on the national contexts. Circular migration, common in Africa, self-evidently involves short-term absences in cities, mines or plantations and repeated returns to villages or tribal homelands (Gould and Prothero 1975). Albanian evidence, however, suggests that migration to Greece and Italy is more likely to be temporary than rural-urban migration within Albania, which seems projected along a pathway of no return. On the other hand, Albanian emigration overseas to North America consists mostly of permanent settlement (King 2004; King and Vullnetari 2003). It is also possible that migrants to international destinations will have obtained a new nationality that may discourage permanent return.
However, increasing trends towards the recognition of dual nationalities may ultimately foster more effective transnational ties, international circulation and even long-term return (Vertovec 2009: 90–3).

Conclusion

There is no doubt that the relationship between internal and international migration is a neglected topic within migration studies, and undeservedly so. This paper has tried to respond to the challenge of identifying similarities and differences, and of creating both functional and theoretical linkages between the two types of migration. As we have seen, sometimes internal movement may lead to international migration; in other cases the sequence may be reversed or other complex combinations may arise, particularly after return migration takes place. Sometimes internal migrants are a different subset of the total population from international migrants. In other situations, internal and international mobility may be alternative responses to the same set of conditions; the selection of internal versus international mobilities can be viewed as competing strategies in a matrix of opportunities open to potential migrants. Thus, internal and international mobilities create an integrated system, which can be observed at a range of scales: family/household, community, national, and the constellation of countries linked by migration flows. To consider one form of migration without the other, as has so often happened in the past, is to look at only one part of the story, and results in a partial and unbalanced interpretation.

Any attempt to build a single overarching theory of migration for all types of migration, for all parts of the world, developed and less developed, and for all periods of time, is illusory. Such a quest risks ‘conceptual reductionism and theoretical imperialism’ (Pryor 1981: 128). On the other hand, it is not enough to rely on ‘empirical generalizations which ... tend to be ethnocentric and timebound’ (Zelinsky 1983: 19). Somewhere between these two epistemological extremes—an unattainable theoretical utopia and a myriad of empirical case-studies—some progress needs to be made at the level of what Castles (2007) and Portes (1997) have called middle-range theorisation in migration studies (see also their papers in this issue). We have suggested how this might come about with reference to internal and international migration, putting forward three possible areas for theoretical transfer or convergence: the application of a systems approach, originally derived from the study of internal migration, to international migration; the application of integration theory, traditionally applied with international migrants, to internal migrants; and the bringing together of internal and international migration in the debate on migration and development.

Theoretical convergence prompts one final question. Does it matter conceptually whether migration is internal or international, in terms of explaining the movement or predicting outcomes? Or, is there any migration theory (which either explains migration or predicts its consequences) which cannot equally be
applied to internal versus international migration? In general theoretic terms, perhaps not. The exception might be political theorisations of migration which apply only to international movement. But, as Hollifield (2008) acknowledges, politics came late to migration theory, and political theorisations about migration are perhaps less about its fundamental causes and more about its control, management and effects.

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Notes
[1] These return migration pathways are developed from the typologies of Bovenkerk (1974: 5) and Hernández Alvarez (1967: 21–8); see King (1978) for discussion and summary of these.
[2] Hernández Alvarez is at pains to point out that this survey cannot be regarded as fully representative. However, Puerto Rican census data on place of birth, prior residence and current residence do validate the phenomenon whereby external migration to and return from the US contributes significantly to a rural-to-urban redistribution of the population within Puerto Rico. Whereas only 10 per cent of return migrants were born in San Juan, 40 per cent were living there at the time of the 1960 census (Hernández Alvarez 1967: 22–3). It also needs to be pointed out that migration from Puerto Rico to the US is not true international migration. It is, however, long-distance migration from an island with a different cultural, linguistic and developmental set of characteristics from those of the large mainland destination territory (most Puerto Rican migration has been to New York).
[3] These examples of applying systems analysis to international migration are drawn from the European context. Other important work should also be acknowledged, such as that on Asia (Fawcett and Arnold 1987) and on Latin America and the US (Portes and Bach 1985); both of these are pioneering systems studies.
[4] In China the hukou, or household registration system, whereby rights are tied to ‘official’ residence, has created, through internal migration, a vast ‘floating population’ that cannot access the normal housing, education and healthcare rights associated with urban citizenship (Li 2004: 681). Alexander and Chan (2004) liken the hukou system to South African apartheid.
[5] Indeed, if we follow Fielding (1992) in his ‘culturalist’ reading of migration’s deeper meanings (migration as freedom, as joining in or opting out, as rupture, as success or failure etc.), the distinctions between internal and international origins and destinations blur into the background.
[6] These generalised questions stand alongside three broader theoretical questions about the migration–development nexus: Does development cause migration? Does migration cause development? Or are the two related in some kind of symbiotic or recursive relationship which might be called the migration–development–migration nexus? (Sriskandarajah 2005: 1). These questions become six when we place ‘development’ and ‘underdevelopment’ as alternative dependent or independent variables.
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