Cultural Geographies of Diaspora, Migration and Transnationalism: Perspectives from the Study of Second-Generation ‘Returnees’
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Introduction

In this paper we aim to contribute to ongoing theoretical debates on diaspora and transnationalism by introducing empirical material to explore and substantiate two new concepts, namely ‘counter-diasporic migration’ and ‘second-generation return’. The paper is structured as follows. First we say more about counter-diasporic migration (which embraces second-generation ‘return’ – the ‘return’ is arguably an oxymoron) and frame this within the broader context of ongoing debates about the nature of diaspora and typologies of orientation and movement to an imagined or actual ancestral home. Second, we focus on the definition and problematisation of the second generation. Established literature views the second generation largely in terms of integration and assimilation processes in the host society. Whilst the transnational paradigm in migration studies has opened up a debate on links to the countries and societies of origin, relatively little of this is specifically concerned with return movements of the second generation. We introduce a new perspective which addresses important dimensions of second-generation mobility and ‘return’, including links between visits and more definitive settlement. This leads naturally into our third section, which examines the literature on return migration and its applicability to the second generation. As we shall demonstrate, there is an extensive if scattered literature on return migration, which almost completely overlooks the second generation. Finally we explore in some detail a number of key cultural-geographic implications of second-generation return relating to questions of ‘home’, ‘place’, ‘belonging’ and ‘identity’. These questions are critical to the whole counter-diasporic experience. The somewhat unusual – some might say counter-intuitive – circumstance of the ‘return’ of the second generation to the land of their parents’ birth places this migrant ‘cohort’ in a unique position to express feelings of where ‘home’ is, where they ‘belong’, and how their ‘place’ in the homeland reflects their own identities.

Although this is essentially a review paper which tries to capture, and bring together in an instructive and novel way, a set of literatures relating to (return) migration, diaspora, transnationalism, and the second generation, there is an empirical thread running through our account which draws both on previous work by the authors (Christou 2006; Christou and King 2006) and on new research which is the first phase of a project currently under way on the return of second-generation Greek-Americans and Greek-Germans to their diasporic ‘homelands’. This project is financed by the UK’s Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC) and runs over the three years 2007–09. The first phase (2007) included three one-month stays in, successively, Athens, Berlin and New York. Currently (March 2008) we are in the middle of the main phase of collecting data in Athens and other
parts of Greece. Our methodology involves a number of data-gathering approaches, but our core technique is the collection of in-depth oral and written testimonies from quota-samples of participants. This paper’s evidence base is the first-phase corpus of narratives from Athens (n=20), Berlin (n=19) and New York (n=17), which are currently being transcribed. In addition to our ongoing Greek research, we also refer in this paper to other settings where second-generation homeland relocation has been researched, such as the Caribbean and Japan.1

Counter-diasporic migration: a new migration chronotope?

The classical meaning of ‘diaspora’ connotes the scattering of a population, caused by some forced or traumatic historical event (Cohen 1995). However, the semantics and etymology of the term are unclear about return to the diasporic origin. Evidence of return is sporadically present in the literature on diasporas, but is not systematically conceptualised as a migratory flow. We introduce the notion of counter-diasporic migration to rectify this.

The semantic situation is complicated by the fact that diaspora has itself become a term of multiple and flexible meaning. Currently the concept stands in an uneasy and ambiguous relationship to ‘transnational community’ and few attempts have been made to analytically disentangle the two. Indeed they are often conflated and juxtaposed in the same phrase or narrative; Tölölyan’s (1991: 5) memorable remark that contemporary diasporas are ‘the exemplary communities of the transnational moment’ illustrates how the term mixes with and overlaps the meanings of words like expatriate, migrancy, exile etc. to form ‘an unruly crowd of descriptive/interpretative terms’ that ‘jostle and converse’ in the modern lexicon of migration studies (Clifford 1994: 303).2

Let us go back, then, to basics. In a seminal article, Safran (1991: 83–84) describes diasporas as ‘expatriate minority communities’ with six key defining characteristics:

• they, or their ancestors, were dispersed, most likely through persecution and genocide, from a specific original centre to two or more distant, foreign locations;
• they maintain a collective memory, which may be mythical, about their homeland;
• they believe that they are not – and probably cannot be – fully accepted by their host country, and therefore feel insulated and alienated from the host society;
• they see their ancestral home as their ‘authentic, pure’ home and as a place of eventual return;
• they are committed to the maintenance and restoration of their homeland to conditions of safety and prosperity;
• the group’s consciousness and solidarity are importantly defined by their ongoing relationship to their homeland.

Safran sees the Jewish diaspora as the ‘ideal type’ and acknowledges seven others as ‘legitimate’ in terms of all or most of the above criteria. These are
the Armenian, Maghrebi, Palestinian, Cuban, Greek, Chinese and Polish diasporas. Whilst we are gratified to see the inclusion of Greece on this list in view of our own research, in other respects this seems an odd and incomplete selection.3

A somewhat different approach is taken by Cohen (1997) who widens the definition of diasporas to include other historical processes, producing a five-fold typology. These types, with typical examples, are victim diasporas (Jews, Armenians, slave diasporas), labour diasporas (Indian indentured labour, Italians, Filipinos), imperial/colonial diasporas (Ancient Greek, British, Portuguese), trade diasporas (Lebanese, Chinese) and cultural diasporas (Caribbean). These types are not mutually exclusive; indeed certain migrant peoples fit the characteristics of two or more diaspora types, either simultaneously or at different points in time. The Greek diasporas are a case in point, moving successively through imperial, trading and labour-migration phases. Diasporas are constantly under production, thus creating ‘new diasporas’, ‘incipient diasporas’ or ‘diasporas-in-the-making’ (van Hear 1998). Existing diasporas may undergo new phases of scattering or ‘rediasporisation’ (cf. the Jewish and Greek diasporas; Clifford 1994: 305).

The danger with this progressive refinement and relaxation of the boundaries and meaning of diaspora is that it becomes coterminous with other established notions such as international migration, ethnic minorities, transnational communities etc. We certainly recognise the problems inherent to this broadening of the multicausal historical processes and the myriad individual journeys and narratives that lead to diasporas being formed; yet on the whole we find it helpful in explaining the spread of diasporic consciousness amongst so many exiled peoples in the world, be they the result of ancient population movements, either forced or voluntary (often the distinction is blurred), or of contemporary economic and political processes such as labour migration or refugee expulsion.

What distinguishes the diasporic condition from contemporary international migration and transnational communities, we suggest, is historical continuity across at least two generations, a sense of the possible permanence of exile and the broad spread and stability of the distribution of populations within the diaspora. In other words, ‘time has to pass’ before a migration becomes a diaspora (Cohen 1997: 185). This formulation, too, enables us to distinguish between straightforward return migration (of first-generation migrants) and counter-diasporic return, which only applies to second- or subsequent-generation migrants. Hence only a ‘child of diaspora’ can engage in the chronotope of counter-diasporic migration. The return, either as an individual event or as a sponsored or collective movement, resolves the contradiction between the current situation in the diaspora and its imagined home and past (Cohen 1997: 185).

Debates on diasporas have taken on new vigour in recent years. Anthias (1998), for instance, argues that there are two dominant approaches to diaspora: a ‘traditional’ approach which considers diaspora as a descriptive-analytical category mainly concerned with specifying criteria for inclusion (cf. Cohen 1997; Safran 1991); and a more ‘post-modern’ use of the term as a socio-cultural condition, associated with writers such as Brah (1996) and Hall (1990). To some extent this distinction corresponds to the division proposed by Mavroudi (2007) into theorisations of diaspora as ‘bounded’
homeland-oriented ethnic groups and identities; or as ‘unbound’ fluid, non-
essentialised, nomadic identities. Whilst there is undoubted heuristic value
in the ‘typologies of diaspora’ approach, particularly in the Greek case
where the sense of Greekness in the diaspora is so strong, but we try to
balance this with post-modern and post-structuralist reconceptualisations
of diaspora. Hence we wish to guard against the danger of ‘ethnic essentialism’
in diaspora studies (one of Anthias’s key criticisms), or its ‘fetishisation’ (cf.
Samers 2003); and to explore, instead, the notion of diaspora as exemplifying ‘multiple allegiances and belongings, a recognition of
hybridity, and the potential for creativity’ (Ni Laoire 2003: 276). This poses
a challenge to our analysis, because many members of the Greek diaspora
whom we interviewed seem to subscribe, deliberately or unwittingly, to a
kind of auto-essentialist discourse about themselves and the special
‘qualities’ of the Greek diaspora. However, by focusing explicitly on the
second-generation members of diaspora we can perhaps draw attention in a
more effective way to the complex intersections between diasporic
identities, geographic positionality, class, gender, age and generations. Not
all these intersections will be analysed in detail in this paper, because of the
preliminary nature of our empirical evidence at this point in time, but we set
these out as an agenda to guide our ongoing research.

Not only do we zoom in on the second generation, but we also focus on
its ‘return’. The teleology of an eventual return to the homeland is variable
between diasporas, across time, and of course amongst individuals. Van
Hear (1998: 6) notes that, if diasporic formation has accelerated in recent
time, so too has the ‘unmaking of diasporas, seen in the regrouping or in-
gathering of migrant communities…’ (emphasis in original). Examples
include the ‘return’ of ethnic Germans to unified Germany from the USSR,
Poland and Romania after 1989, the large-scale influx of Russian Jews to
Israel in the 1990s, and the ‘return’ of the Pontic Greeks from various parts
of the USSR, also in the 1990s. As indicated, in one sense ‘return’ is a
misnomer, for many of these populations have not seen their ‘homeland’ for
generations or centuries; indeed they may not speak its language.

‘Ancestral return’ is part of the recognised typology of return migration
but in these classifications it is usually mentioned only in passing, and
dismissed as ‘the return that is not return’ or as a ‘marginal form of return’
(Bovenkerk 1974: 19; King 1986: 6–7). This is where our notion of counter-
diasporic migration steps in to fill the conceptual void. But is the ‘desire for
return’ a necessary criterion for the specification of a diaspora, as Safran’s
African Americans, products of the slave diaspora, do have a ‘homeland
myth’ but it can no longer be precisely focused and only a tiny minority
have actually returned to Africa. The Parsees, mainly resident in the
Mumbai region of India, have no myth of return to their original homeland,
Iran, which they left in the eighth century. The Gypsies or Roma are a
special case (Safran calls them a ‘metadiaspora’) because their place of
origin has no clear geographical identity and because their nomadic
diasporisation is an expression or idealisation of their existential condition
(Safran 1991: 368). Even for the Jewish diaspora, the classic or ideal type,
return is problematic and variable as a condition for their diasporic identity.
For many members of this diaspora, their Jewish identity is expressed in the
diaspora and a ‘return’ to Israel is never contemplated, for either practical or theological reasons.

Homeland orientation and a universal desire to return are thus questionable as necessary criteria for the definition of diaspora, especially for long-established diasporas dating back centuries. For newer diasporas, those which are the result of labour migrations or refugee flows over the past half-century or so, the more specific phenomenon of second-generation ‘return’ does seem to be gaining in significance. Evidence for this comes from two main geographical regions: the Caribbean and Southern Europe, major migration reservoirs for postwar labour migration to Britain, Europe and North America. The South European case draws mainly on recent research by Christou on returning Greek-Americans (Christou 2006; Christou and King 2006; also Panagakos 2004) and by Wessendorf (2007) on secondos, second-generation Italians in Switzerland. The Caribbean case is more broadly based in an extensive literature on Caribbean multi-generational transnationalism (see, for instance, Byron 1994; Chamberlain 1998; Gmelch 1992; Goulbourne 2002), but has recently been spearheaded by important research by Potter and Phillips on second-generation return (see Potter 2005; Potter and Phillips 2006a; 2006b; Potter et al. 2005). These two geographically-defined bodies of literature are by no means the only settings for counter-diasporic return, and further evidence from other parts of the world will be referenced later.

The second generation and its transnational links

Variable definitions

Usage of the term ‘second generation’ poses challenges both as a descriptive notion and as an analytic category. Researchers and others are rather free with their use of the term to connote a specific collective of people, but their definitions are blurred and often imprecise, which in turn can affect the outcomes and interpretations of research. The strict or ‘classic’ definition of the second generation is that it is made up of children born in the host country to two immigrant parents, the latter being the first generation. Complications set in when we begin to relax this definition. What about children with one immigrant parent? How do we view children brought to a host country when they are very small? Census and population-register statistics record the latter as foreign-born, and therefore first-generation immigrants, but sociologically they are practically indistinguishable from the narrow definition of second generation. These definitional problems are not new. Irvin Child’s famous early study of second-generation Italians in the United States refers to ‘the offspring of immigrants, either born here or brought from the mother country at an early age’ (1943: 3). But how early is early-age? Fifty years on, in their already-classic ‘segmented assimilation’ paper, Portes and Zhou (1993: 75) gave one of a number of possible answers: ‘native-born children with at least one foreign-born parent, or children born abroad who came to the United States before the age of 12’. The situation is equally confused in European studies of the second generation. For instance Modood (1997), in a study of the qualifications achieved by ethnic minorities in Britain, includes those who arrived in
Britain up to the age of 15. In a study of African-Italians, Andall (2002) defines the second generation as those born in Italy or who arrived before the age of 6. Of course, any cut-off point is arbitrary, but Andall’s approach seems sensible, since it corresponds to the school starting age: Modood’s extension to 15 seems problematic in this regard. Yet another approach is a more graduated one: the ‘true’ second generation (host-country-born with two foreign-born parents); and then the 1.75, 1.5 and 1.25 generations, referring respectively to foreign-born children arriving before 6, between 6 and 12, and after 12 and up to 17 years of age (Rumbaut 1997).

To a certain extent, all this huffing and puffing over definitions of the second generation misses the point. It does have relevance in comparative studies of second-generation ‘performance’ (eg. in school or the labour market) based on statistical or survey data; much less so in qualitative studies such as our own which are concerned to explore the nuances and variations in the population of second-generation ‘returnees’. But there is another, more fundamentally conceptual reason why we question the existing literature on the second generation, which is nearly always framed with reference to an expected trajectory of assimilation into the host society. For instance, Child’s (1943) pioneering study of second-generation Italian-Americans (who have a similar immigration history to Greek-Americans) found them facing a dilemma: should they rush to assimilate, or should they assert their Italian ethnic identity? Subsequent landmark studies (Gordon 1964; Glazer and Moynihan 1973) reassessed this basic question with reference to other immigrant groups, but still adhered to the normativity of assimilation. Likewise, more recent revisionist challenges to classical or ‘straight-line’ assimilation, such as ‘second-generation decline’ (whereby the second generation underperforms the first; Gans 1992), or ‘segmented assimilation’ (whereby multiple pathways reflect different immigrant national backgrounds; Portes and Zhou 1993), still reflect the hegemonic assimilationist rhetoric characteristic of US immigration history and national self-identity.

There are two generalisations to be made about the now-vast field of American assimilation literature. First there is a persistent blind-spot over the national context – not so much of the immigrants themselves, but of the host society (Thomson and Cruel 2007). Second, the ‘transnational’, ‘diasporic’ and ‘return’ perspectives have been overlooked. Both these critiques derive from the self-narrative of the US as a large country ‘made’ by immigrants who become, eventually, ‘Americans’. Any comparative perspective – even with nearby Canada – is generally ignored; and the perception of immigration as a one-way-street reflects what King (2000: 28–33) has called the ‘myth of non-return’ in American immigration history.

To some extent, these two critical omissions are picked up in recent research on immigrants in Europe, where ‘integration’ is the favoured (but still problematic) term. The comparative context embraces studies both of different source countries and different destination states, notably in the ‘TIES’ project ‘The Integration of the European Second Generation’, which examines the ‘integration performance’ (mainly education and employment outcomes) of the Turkish, Moroccan and former Yugoslav second generation in Belgium, the Netherlands, France, Germany, Switzerland, Austria, Sweden and Spain, based on a common set of questionnaires (see
Crul (2007; Crul and Vermeulen 2003). Nevertheless, this important research is still based on an uncompromisingly one-track orientation to the host society and therefore to a hegemonic understanding of ‘integration’ into the structures, values and practices of the destination country’s economy, education system, and linguistic and socio-cultural spheres.

Transnational/diasporic links of the second generation

Meanwhile, another strand of recent research – based mainly on ethnographic methods – explores more complex articulations of second-generation integration and identity, including hybrid modes of cultural identity that reflect both the country of settlement and parental country of origin. Studies from as far apart as Boston, Massachusetts and Senegal (Leichtman 2005; Levitt 2001; 2002), as well as many other settings, find that immigrant transnationalism is not a phenomenon confined to the first generation, but one that can extend to the second and subsequent generations. Moreover, a rapid and successful integration/assimilation does not preclude the second generation from engaging in a range of transnational/diasporic activities linking them back to their ‘home’ country (Itzigsohn and Giorguli-Saucedo 2005). At the same time, the maintenance of a strong ethnic identity in the host society does not necessarily mean that the group has strong transnational ties to home. Indeed, it could be argued that the existence of a vibrant ethnic enclave which effectively reproduces most elements of the ‘home culture’ means that migrants do not need to visit their (parents’) home country (Vickerman 2002).

On the whole, however, it is remarkable how silent the now-burgeoning literature on migrant transnationalism is on the second generation.4 The major exception is the collection edited by Levitt and Waters (2002), which presents case studies of a variety of immigrant groups in the US – including chapters on Japanese, Chinese, Korean, Filipino, Vietnamese and West Indian second-generation links to parental home countries (but nothing on Greek-Americans). The links involve various kinds of communication – letters, emails, telephone calls, visits, remittances, property inheritance etc. – as well as participation in the more generalised transnational social spaces created and articulated by their parents’ lives and by ethnic or home-country media. Yet none of the studies in Levitt and Waters’ volume analyses the question of a more definitive ‘return’, once again reflecting the hubris of American immigration scholarship. Part of the reason for this is logistical: studies of second-generation return have to be based in the country of parental origin to which the migrants have relocated, and the chapters in Levitt and Waters are focused on US-based field and survey work. Nevertheless the case studies are fascinating for many reasons – the research methods used, the different historical contexts explored, and the contrasting results uncovered. For instance, Ueda (2002) examined 76 autobiographical ‘life-histories’ written by second-generation Japanese American high school students in Hawaii in 1926. The accounts revealed how these Nisei were pulled culturally in two directions – by ‘Americanisation’ and by their Japanese cultural heritage. Another chapter in the same volume, this time surveying the ‘new’ second generation (those whose parents immigrated from mainly non-European countries post-1965), finds strong evidence of
rapid assimilation, significant participation in transnational social fields – especially amongst West Indians, Dominicans and other Latinos (Foner 2002). Foner also notes (2002: 247) the quite widespread practice amongst these groups for immigrant parents to send their school-age children back to live with their relatives, often grandparents. The reasons for this may be to avail of childcare, to expose the second generation to the cultural values of the home society, or – perhaps most importantly – to protect teenagers from the dangers of inner-city high schools and street-life (gangs, drugs, sexual precociousness etc.). This back-and-forth movement complicates the classification of children as second generation. In our own field interviews we found surprisingly many cases where the respondents’ early lives contained episodes of moving back and forth for a year or a few years, according to family decisions taken by the parents – the first generation. For instance, Kathy’s parents had attempted to relocate back to Greece in 1981, when she was six years old. The family stayed in Piraeus for a year, ‘but things didn’t work out. They [her parents] couldn’t find work, and ended up moving back here [New York]’. Kathy remembered her year in Greece vividly, especially the greater discipline in school – ‘it was a total shock to the system’ (interview, New York, August 2007).

Later on in the life-course, first-generation retirement back to the home country may also reinforce the second generation’s ties: the (by now adult) second generation will make visits to see their parents, ensuring that the next (i.e. third) generation keep connected with their grandparents and their ancestral heritage. Financial and care duties may also be involved; the adult second generation may need to offer economic support, via remittances, as well as long-distance emotional support and emergency hands-on care during the last phase of their parents’ lives (Baldassar et al. 2007; Zontini 2007).

Visits ‘home’ by the younger-aged second generation can have various outcomes. Such homeland trips – which are usually motivated by tourism, seeing family and friends, and learning and (re-)discovering elements of the ancestral culture – may end up by simply reinforcing notions of how ‘American’ (or ‘British’ etc.) the second generation are, and convince them that their parents’ home country can never become their home (Kasinitz et al. 2002; Kibria 2002). For others, the return visit may be the precursor to a longer-term project of return. This more definitive return may or may not work out. Unanticipated difficulties and disappointments may disrupt the ‘homecoming’ project, to such an extent that a U-turn, back to the country of their birth and upbringing, may be contemplated. For yet others, the returns may subsequently evolve into an ongoing pattern of transnational living, constantly moving back and forth in order to sustain transnational business ventures, family relationships or cultural identity (Foner 2002: 250). Another of our New York second-generation interviewees, Harry, had wanted to relocate his business (he was a baker and a chef) to Greece but his wife (who, interestingly, was a first-generation Greek in America) was not keen. An excerpt from Harry’s interview relates key facts and feelings, and reveals how, in the end, he reconciles his Greekness and desire to connect to Greece by going there on frequent business trips:
During the years I was growing up I went to Greece two or three times a year, so I feel more Greek than American ... I'm, er, Greek-American, but culturally and family-wise I'm more Greek. (...) It's funny, I wanted to [relocate to Greece] but my wife didn't. Although she was born there, and I was born here, I wanted to go there and open a business, and continue what I do here. But she didn’t want it. (...) It would be a nice dream. I think life would be a little more relaxed, a little more laid back, there’s so much stress here ... we’re very disciplined, with work, with family, with everything. (...) When I go for business I go to Athens, I do my weekly trip every two months, but when I go on vacation I go back to my own village... I go where real Greeks live, and I enjoy it (interview, New York, August 2007).

Another form of transnational linkage occurs when members of the second generation seek (or are pressured by their families to seek) spouses from the ‘home’ country. This usually ends up with the ‘recruited’ spouse migrating to the host society, but it can also be a mechanism by which the second-generation individual settles, upon marriage, in the ‘homeland’ (Christou 2006). Beck-Gernsheim (2007), who has made a useful survey of transnational marriage practices amongst migrant communities in Europe, also shows how the parent-arranged second-generation holiday visit to the ancestral home can often be, in effect, a marriage-market exercise. This can frustrate and annoy the young visitor. Beck-Gernsheim (2007: 278) quotes the reaction of a young woman of Turkish origin: ‘You didn’t have a holiday, you were always visiting people… What they usually want is for me to marry there in Turkey and bring them over here [Germany]. That’s why they always came to see my parents’.

What does the literature on return migration tell us about second-generation return?

From the above we can see that a key question which needs to be addressed when dealing with second-generation ‘return’ is the family context of this counter-diasporic migration: are second-generation ‘returnees’ acting independently (and thus perhaps leaving their parents behind in the host country); do they move as individuals or as (married) couples; are they moving to a partner in the ‘home’ country; are they moving as part of a multi-generation family return migration instigated by their parents; or are they moving, not with their parents, but perhaps to be closer to other kin, such as grandparents or cousins? Part of our interest in second-generation ‘return’ is the fact that, where it is an independent migration, it is not only counter-diasporic but also counter-intuitive, in that parental ties are sacrificed to a more generalised emotional link to the ‘homeland’. Of course, there may be special circumstances – the parents could have died, a family rift might have occurred, the individual might be seeking a fresh start after some personal crisis such as job loss or relationship breakdown. But the fact that independent second-generation migration to the parental homeland is taking place, as the evidence from the Caribbean and Greece cited earlier certainly indicates, suggests that there are broader questions of
migratory causes, identity, homing and belonging which need to be explored. This we do in the final section of the paper, which follows this one.

For now, we follow a different line of investigation and plough into another literature. The argument that second-generation resettlement in parental homelands can be better analysed in the context of (or in comparison with) first-generation return migration calls for a review of the general literature on return migration. There is now an established body of scholarship on this, although it is fragmented across many disciplines and migratory contexts. The origins of this literature are traceable at least to the late 1960s, and it flourished especially during the 1970s and 1980s when there was, indeed, a lot of return migration of the labour migrants of the early postwar period. In surveying this return literature, which includes earlier ‘classic’ studies (notably Theodore Saloutos’ 1956 study on returning Greek-Americans) as well as more recent literature on the continuing return of labour migrants, refugees, skilled migrants etc., we have two aims in mind. First, what does this literature say about the second generation? Second, what theoretical concepts, analytical frameworks and empirical generalisations from the study of first-generation return can be fruitfully applied to the ‘return’ of the subsequent generation?

The first question is easy to answer: very little. The return literature concentrates almost exclusively on the first generation. This is as true of the early classic studies (e.g. Hernández Alvarez 1967; Saloutos 1956) as it is of the research on labour-migrant returns during the 1970s and 1980s (see, inter alia Baučić 1972; Bovenkerk 1974; Cerase 1974; Gmelch 1980; Kayser 1972; King 1979; 1986; Kubat 1984; Rhoades 1999) and of ongoing collections published in more recent years (Ghosh 2000; Harper 2005; Long and Oxfeld 2004; Markowitz and Stefansson 2004). It is true that, in these latest publications, one finds an emerging interest in ancestral return and other diaspora-homecomings (Basu 2005; Tsuda 2004), but almost none of this focuses on the specific experiences of the second generation. Meanwhile, from the earlier literature on labour migrants’ return, it is almost as if they had no families. What we find instead are fleeting references to the problems of the children of these returnees who are plunged into a school system with which they are unfamiliar, which is unprepared for them, and in which their educational progress may be seriously held back.5

The second question is more difficult to illustrate, for a number of reasons. First, return migration has remained rather under-theorised (Cassarino 2004; Rogers 1984; Weist 1979). Although rich in typologies (Bovenkerk 1974; Gmelch 1980; King 1986), most attempts to theorise return involve its incorporation or application to general theories of migration, which say little or nothing about the second generation except in the context of integration/assimilation, as we have seen. This means that we can only fall back on an attempt to systematically and rigorously review frameworks and typologies of (first-generation) return to see if they can potentially say anything useful about the second generation’s parallel experiences.

Cassarino (2004) provides a very useful template to enable us to do this. He recognises five theoretical paradigms for the study of return migration: neoclassical economics, the new economics of migration, structuralism,
transnationalism, and cross-border social network theory. We build on this conceptual categorisation below, and incorporate specific, albeit speculative, connections to second-generation and counter-diasporic return.

**Economic models of return**

Neoclassical economics explains international migration as the product of real income differences between sending and destination countries; the migrant is depicted as a rational, income-maximising individual who decides to go abroad to access higher wages, having calculated the costs and benefits of doing so. Viewed in this optic, the returnee is a failed labour emigrant who miscalculated the costs and benefits or who failed to land a job (Cassarino 2004: 2–3).

The new economics of labour migration (NELM) approach broadens the economic analysis in two senses: it incorporates the individual within his/her family or household unit, and it blends income maximisation with risk aversion. NELM remains a rational-choice model, but in sharp contrast to the neoclassical stance, which sees return as failure, NELM views return as embodying successful achievement of the target set. The typical mechanism by which this success is attained involves one household member migrating abroad in order to generate remittances which are part and parcel of a strategy of income and resource diversification. Once the migrant has provided the household with the income and liquidity required, return takes place.

The second generation hardly figures in these two economic models. However, if we run the models to their next stage, whereby the migrant unit, including other members of the family, is now resident in the destination country, then we can see some relevance.

First, the economic calculus may change over time – such as during the course of a generation. The low-income, high-unemployment country of origin may become more developed, perhaps through industrialisation, the discovery of a natural resource, or tourism. This is pretty much what happened in Greece, transformed from a largely rural, backward economy in the 1950s and 1960s – times of mass emigration – to a much more prosperous state in the last two decades. These improved economic conditions tempt back not only the first generation, but also the second. In making cost–benefit calculations, returnees and second-generationers will take into account not only headline wage but also cost-of-living and quality-of-life variables. As we shall see, our Greek data support these explanations.

Second, the NELM approach may become relevant if the family retains links to both migration poles. If some family members remain in, or return to, the origin country – such as cousins or other relatives – then this provides a kinship context which may have economic implications too. To give a concrete example, Reynolds (2008) found that an important motive for the ‘return’ of British-born Jamaicans to Jamaica was the availability of older family members to supply childcare for their children, thus enabling both the parents to work.

*A structural perspective*
It is well known that economic approaches to migration tend to detach (return) migrants from their social and political environments, overlooking both structural contexts and personal factors. Social, political and institutional factors, in both the migrants’ home countries and in their countries of settlement, deserve attention. Some of these structural factors may, indeed, be economic, such as the hypothetical situation of rising unemployment and falling standards of living in the migrants’ host country, and/or rising standards of living and improving economic conditions in their origin countries – as noted above. But these economic dynamics may also be connected to socio-political and policy changes. Government policies, such as repatriation or incentivised return, may hasten the return flow. Rising unemployment in host countries may lead to greater discrimination and racism directed at immigrants and their descendants, who are erroneously ‘blamed’ for the worsening employment situation. Reacting against this xenophobia, their thoughts turn to their ‘home’ country. Reynolds (2008) found that second-generation ethnic Caribbeans in Britain, who were never able to feel fully part of British society, tended to reorient themselves to their Caribbean parental home island, whose memory had been kept alive for them by their parents’ narratives and regular return visits.

Cassarino’s (2004: 4–7) account of the structural approach to return migration leans heavily on the work of Cerase (1974) in exploring both the reintegration pathways and challenges faced by the returnee, and the potential impact returning migrants can have on the economic, social and cultural environment of the places they return to. Neither Cerase nor Cassarino draw out the full theoretical implications of this structuralist perspective on migration, integration, return and reintegration, which in truth exhibits a classic structure–agency dialectic. And neither do they draw any attention to the potential applicability of this framework to the second generation.

In Cerase’s model of first-generation return, the type of return he posits (return of failure, of conservatism, of innovation, of retirement), and the impact this has on origin-country social and economic structures, are strictly related to the stage in the integration process the migrant has reached in the host country at the moment he or she decided to return. Although the model relies on a ‘linearist’ conception of integration, which has been heavily critiqued in more recent literature, we must remember the timing of Cerase’s research, and recognise its heuristic value, not least because it is about Italian migrants returning from the United States and so has parallels with some of our own research.

Cerase’s typology taps into the ‘success or failure’ binary which is surely a too-simple question to pose about returning migrants, or about second-generation resettlers. But there are aspects of the typology that can be extended to the next generation – although the various scenarios are speculative and need empirical testing. The relationship between ‘integration’ or ‘identification’ with the host society (in the case of the second generation, this is the society where they have spent all, or nearly all of their lives), and the propensity to migrate to the ‘homeland’, is one such dialectic. As noted above, second-generation individuals who do not feel fully integrated, for whatever reason (this could be a sense of marginalisation born of exclusion or discrimination, or produced by living in
a strong ethnic community), are probably more likely to consider a homeland relocation. But this is only one line of reasoning: it may also be the case that successful integration and material position in the host society give the second-generation the luxury to think about expressing or discovering their identity in a different place: linkages and identifications with ‘host’ and ‘homeland’ societies are not positioned in a zero-sum game (Itzigsohn and Giorguli-Saucedo 2005). In other respects, the relationships between ‘home’ and ‘host’ countries can be reversed for second-generation ‘returnees’. The ‘return’ itself may be a failure, so that the ‘returnee’ then ‘returns’ to the country of birth and original residence. In this instance, the failure of the ‘return to the homeland’ project may well be due to some of the reasons adduced by Cerase for his ‘return of failure’ – failure to get satisfactory work, learn the language, or cope with different cultural practices.

The conservatism–innovation dynamic may play itself out in different ways when the second-generation migrants settle in the homeland. Such migrants may resettle there precisely because of a search for ‘traditional’ values and lifestyles, and be happy for that; or they may be shocked at the suffocating nature of what are discovered to be personalistic or even corrupt practices (for instance in securing a job, or obtaining planning permission for a home or business); or they may be able to benefit from the human and cultural capital they bring with them (education, languages, ‘modern’ outlook etc.) in order to advance their careers and social life. Our interview data contain examples of all these variations, some of which will be illustrated later.

In his review of the literature and theories on return migration, Cassarino (2004) stresses the relevance of contextual and situational factors, both in the areas where the migrants are returning from, but more especially in the countries they are returning to. This is even more relevant in the case of second-generation return, where, unlike first-generation returnees, the individuals involved have no experience of living long-term in the ‘homeland’, except perhaps as small children. Situational factors can only be evaluated a posteriori and therefore second-generation resettlers in the homeland may be ill-prepared for the move due to the fact that they have not been able to gather sufficient information about the social, economic, cultural and political conditions which affect everyday life in the context of long-term residence and livelihood (Cassarino 2004: 5; Gmelch 1980: 143). The information that second-generation returnees possess prior to resettlement may be based on family narratives and short-term visits: both are likely to present a less-than-accurate portrayal of the homeland. Holiday visits generally reflect leisure, family fun, good weather and an idealised view of the ‘old country’; family narratives likewise may be outdated or idealistic.

A final structural point concerns the issue of precisely where the second generation settles in the homeland. Most postwar labour migration to North-West Europe and North America took place from rural areas in the various countries of origin; often these were villages in the poorest regions – hence the need to emigrate in the first place. For the sons and daughters of these original migrants, such marginalised rural contexts offer unpropitious settings for a sustainable ‘return’. Thus, to be viable, the ‘homeland’ return
for most can only be effected via settlement in a larger town or city – such as Athens or Thessaloniki in the context of our research.

Transnationalism and social networks

Given its rise to prominence in the last decade and a half, transnationalism intrudes inevitably into any debate about international migration and diaspora nowadays: the ‘transnational turn’ is inescapable (Bailey 2001). Self-evidently, transnationalism represents an attempt to formulate a conceptual framework for understanding the ties – social, economic, cultural, political – between migrants’ host and origin countries. Such activities are expressed, according to Portes et al. (1999: 219), by ‘regular and sustained contacts over time across national borders’. Viewed through the transnational lens, return migration is part and parcel of a system of ties and forms of mobility, but seen as an ongoing circuit rather than a definitive act of resettlement (Cassarino 2004: 7).

It was pointed out earlier how transnational studies rarely focus on the specific experiences of the second generation. This, for sure, is an oversight, which our own research seeks to rectify. Following Cassarino (2004: 8–12), we suggest three lines of transnational thinking which can illuminate return migration, including second-generation relocation. These are transnational mobility, transnational identity, and transnational social networks. Of course, all are interconnected.

Transnational mobility embraces a range of movements, physical, symbolic and virtual, which keep the migrant in touch with the place of origin and contribute to the creation of a ‘transnational social space’ which comprises both ‘hostland’ and ‘homeland’ (Faist 2000; Fortier 2000). Frequent return visits are the most tangible expression of this. For many migrant groups, return visits are regular, frequent events throughout their emigrant lives. Initiated by the first generation, the second generation gets taken along too, often from an early age, so that they become keenly aware of the ‘other place’ in their family biography, as we saw from Harry’s account, quoted earlier. Rebecca, second-generation Greek-German, was specifically asked about her early vacation visits to Greece:

Every year, every year. Every summer vacation, six to eight weeks, by car. Actually, it’s a traditional Greek-German vacation – by car – so you can carry all the things you want to carry. This is the nightmare of everybody, three days in a car with all that stuff… It’s to bring gifts to the family… it’s also to bring Greek stuff back to Germany – it’s like litres of olive oil, of wine, and cheese and God knows what… that you cannot bring on a plane… I remember, like, in the beginning (laughs) it was vacuum cleaners and televisions… I mean, that has changed now because everything is available [in Greece]… but there was a time when everything that had a German name was better… So you were carrying all that stuff back and you were putting all the Greek stuff in the car and bringing it… (interview, Athens, June 2007).
Rebecca’s childhood reflections focused on the annual ritual (‘unload and reload’) of transferring what was ‘good’ from Germany (high-quality manufactured goods) and what was ‘genuine’ from Greece (food, wine, oil, products of the ‘Greek soil’), and the tedium of the three-day car journey.

Demetra, second-generation Greek-American, also reminisced on the importance of these childhood visits:

… we saved our money, every penny, for the summer vacation. Summer vacation was the biggest holiday and since my parents were economic migrants they saved every penny… to come back and see their homeland… it was engraved on me since I was 18 months old and my first trip… and since then it was back and forth, if not every year, every other year… We would come to Athens for maybe a week, maximum two weeks, and stay with my aunt, and then we would go to the village [her mother’s village of origin]… or my dad’s island, Cephalonia, and spend time by the beach… it felt like my big playground… I love those beaches even now… Was I getting close to my roots? Of course, because I would see my grandparents and the way they lived… but it wasn’t until I moved here that I really got into understanding that I was getting close to my roots (interview, Athens, May 2007).

Demetra’s memories of these early homeland visits are also reminiscences of the evolution of her own (and her family’s) transnational/diasporic kinship space, with links to Athens (her aunt) and the respective ‘home places’ of her parents, one of them an island. As a child, the beaches held particular appeal – ‘like a big playground’ – and she went on to tell how they remain important in her current activity space in Greece. Kinship links – especially those which are kept alive by regular visits and other forms of contact – are often important in structuring the ‘return project’ of the second-generationer.

A strong agrarian or gardening trope is also evident in the quotes from Demetra and Barbara – something that Cohen (1997: 177–8) has noted in diaspora studies more generally, with their frequent references to family trees, roots, replanting, ancestral soil etc. Our interviewees speak of ‘genuine’ Greek agricultural produce from ‘their’ soil, and of searching for their ‘roots’. Indeed Wessendorf (2007) uses the term ‘roots migration’ for the ‘return’ of second-generation Swiss-Italians to their parents’ hometowns in southern Italy. In another narrative, taken from an earlier project, which we have quoted several times elsewhere because it is so beautifully evocative on this point of ‘connection’ to the ancestral soil, a young second-generation Greek-American recently resettled in Greece stressed how he felt ‘emotionally and physically connected to the land ... at one with the soil’. He went on to describe how he visited the village cemetery where his grandfather was buried: he scooped up a handful of earth from the grave and ‘as it ran through my fingers I felt it run through my veins’.6

In social network terms, and more prosaically, return takes place when sufficient transnational resources (linkages, knowledge etc.) have been accumulated to facilitate the move, to make it a feasible and not-too-risky option (Cassarino 2004: 10–11). Various kinds of human, social and cultural
capital may be involved; and these will tend to vary by the social class and educational background of the ‘returnee’. For those with less education and hence fewer career options, kinship ties may be the most important. For the higher-skilled, possession of the right qualifications and knowledge of the labour market and hiring practices may be the key resources needed. Even then, personal ‘connections’ may be vital to getting a job, as many of our second-generation Greek informants confirmed. Or, as so often happens, luck is a decisive factor: being in the right place at the right time when an opportunity arises. Evgenia, the daughter of working-class, rural-origin Greek immigrants who settled in Boston in the late 1950s (Evgenia was born in Greece and was five years old when the emigration took place), came back to Athens in 1977 aged 24. Career-wise, she was inspired by an aunt who was a teacher. With her Master’s and some teaching experience in Boston, she was both well-placed and fortunate to find an immediate employment niche in a ‘Greek-American’ job in Athens – in the Hellenic American Union, from which she moved after a few years to the Athens branch of an American university. Note, however, that this was 30 years ago; such opportunities are much more competitively fought over nowadays.

On the face of it, possession of a strong transnational or diasporic identity is a sine qua non for second-generation migration to the ‘homeland’. How this identity is felt and expressed – and acted out – can vary, however. For some it will be an overwhelming sense of (for example) ethno-cultural Greekness derived from being part of the Greek diaspora. For others it will be manifested in the form of a ‘pull’ back to the parental homeland. For yet others, it will take the form of a dual or perhaps hybrid identity drawn from both the host society and the ethnic-origin society. Such double identities may be in conflict or in complementary harmony with each other, depending on situation and context. We provide more evidence on this in the next, and final, section of our paper.

The second generation in the homeland: place, belonging and identity

Diasporas exist in a triangular socio-cultural relationship with the host society and the homeland (Safran 1991: 372–3). Hence notions of ‘home’ and ‘belonging’ for the second generation are likely to be highly ambiguous and multi-layered. In her recent review of the cultural geographies of migration and diaspora, Alison Blunt (2007) draws attention to some of the creative interfaces between cultural geography and what has come to be labelled the ‘new mobilities paradigm’ or the ‘mobility turn’ (Hannam et al. 2006; Sheller and Urry 2006; Urry 2000). And yet here again there is a surprising silence on, or at least a lack of specific reference to, the second generation and a failure to recognise its strategic positionality with regard to fundamental cultural-geographic questions articulated in the context of a ‘return’ to the homeland. In the remainder of this paper we deploy more extracts from our field data to explore these questions further.

Where is home and where do I belong?

Amongst the second generation, the search for ‘belonging’ and ‘home’ is often an extremely powerful, emotional, and even life-changing experience:
an enactment of family heritage across time and space. For second-generation Greek-Americans (less so Greek-Germans), it is also a search for ontological security from a world which is otherwise confusing or perceived as moving too fast or in the wrong direction (cf. Christou and King 2006). For Greek-Germans the drive to relocate to Greece has more to do with the fact that they never felt they ‘belonged’ to German society, which has traditionally sanctified German ‘blood’ and marginalised foreigners, even those born in Germany, as ‘guestworkers’.

As an illustration, Rebecca described how, especially as a child in Germany, she felt – or was made to feel – part of a minority:

I felt different, I felt treated as different and this is something that I’ve carried throughout my life – being different… For a kid little things are extremely important, like when people at school or kindergarten would look at you and say ‘what kind of name is that?’… It’s also food… anything they were telling me they’d cook at home which is normal for other kids wasn’t for me, and what I was eating wasn’t for them. That’s a kind of difference (interview, Athens, June 2007).

German-born Zeno, interviewed in Berlin, was much more vehement about his racist treatment, both in Germany and also during the year that he and his brother had been packed off to school in Greece when his parents had split up:

The year I went to school in Greece … every day my brother and I got picked on by the other kids; they said to us ‘You Nazis, you fucking Germans … you have a better life than us’. And when I came back to Germany I got problems here; they said ‘You have a black head and brown eyes and black hair … you are no German…’. For Germans I look too much like Turks… Turkish people… When I go and buy my bananas, my apples… they always talk Turkish to me because [the shopkeeper] thinks I’m Turkish (interview, Berlin, July 2007).

This explicit account of racism should be set in context: much of Zeno’s interview was a rant from an obviously ‘angry young man’ (he was 30). But there was a clear difference in the pattern of responses to the question ‘Did you ever experience or feel any sense of discrimination whilst living in the United States/Germany?’. Many second-generation Greek-Germans gave responses like Rebecca, whilst most Greek-Americans gave negative responses (in the sense of ‘no discrimination’). Indeed, Harry went to the opposite extreme to Zeno:

No, never. Anything I’ve done in life, it was never an issue. As a matter of fact, when they know you’re Greek there’s a sense of security for them; they know that Greeks never give anyone any trouble (interview, New York, August 2007).
How can we interpret second-generation ‘return’ in terms of migration theory? We would suggest that the homeland return of the second generation should be seen not so much as part of the new map of global mobility, with its diversifying rhythms and motivations, but rather as an act of resistance against hypermobility and dislocation (King 2002). Thus we see how different mobility regimes are substitutable. For instance, new East European shuttle migrants move to and fro to richer West European countries, gathering work opportunities on short-term contracts, precisely because they want to conserve their Polish, Slovakian or Ukrainian roots and not migrate for good. Second-generation returnees may do the opposite, seeking a final resting-place against their existential anxiety about their in-betweeness and where they belong. As several of our interviewees would relate, ‘I am finally home, where I belong… the cycle is closed’. In other words, the exile’s return is fuelled by nostalgia for the imagined stability and coherence of past times and places: the plan is to relocate the dislocated self somehow in an earlier, more authentic, time and place.

Nevertheless, a sense of impermanence about the homeland return often remained, sometimes because of family circumstances (eg. ageing parents ‘left behind’ in Germany or the US), sometimes because of other objective difficulties like finding a job or earning a decent income (we come to these difficulties presently). One of our interviewees remarked that second-generation ‘returnees’ live for the first six years with the suitcase by the door, ready to pack up and return to their birth country. Another quoted a Greek author who wrote ‘It is unfortunate for you if you get to know two countries’.

Demetra, who was born in Oregon but lived most of her life in California before moving to Greece six years ago, had recently bought a little house by the sea outside Athens: her description of it, right at the end of the interview, reflected on her life as a journey which – possibly – might be coming to a settled end, or might equally continue on to new places. Interestingly, she projects her own uncertainty about her migratory trajectory onto her boxes of clothes.

It’s just weird to see my boxes here… you know, boxes full of clothes that, you know, keep getting packed and unpacked… I wonder if the boxes are ever going to have a home. I wonder if these clothes are ever going to have a home… This place, I’ll never sell this place. Because it’s by the beach… I’ll never sell it… it’s a great investment, right? If I ever have kids, or now that my brother [who lives in California] is having kids, it can go to his kids. So…life is a journey… and it’s about going through this journey, you know, going through the ride of the roller-coaster. Sometimes I think it’s, you know, a nice cruise in a convertible, sometimes it’s like riding the waves and you have to be careful of that wave crashing on you… so life is a journey… and you never know, you know, what the next day is going to bring… I think unpredictability is what keeps us alive. Yeah. We can end on that note!

The second generation’s ‘return’ is a profound homecoming at multiple levels. For sure, it can be understood as an existential journey to the source
of the self, as a return to the ‘cradle’ of a partially-lost collective identity, as the diaspora’s cathartic mission to reclaim its sacred sites and to re-enter its mythic space and time; but it can also be simply the discovery of that place where one feels one most belongs (Basu 2004a: 161), a search for ‘grounded attachment’ (Blunt 2007: 687). In her landmark book *Cartographies of Diaspora*, Avtar Brah makes her contribution to the discussion on the difference between ‘home as where one is’ and home as ‘where one comes from’. On the one hand, she writes, home is the ‘lived experience of locality, its sounds and smells’. On the other, home is a ‘mythic place of desire in the diasporic imagination… a place of no return, even if it is possible to visit the geographical territory that is seen as the place of origin’ (1996: 192). Once again, we note the lack of attention in writings on diaspora to the possibility of counter-diasporic migration; for Brah (and others) return is a desire, an imagination, perhaps a visit, but no more. As our research shows, definitive relocation of the second generation to the diasporic hearth does take place, although not always – in fact rarely – to the place exactly as imagined or anticipated. As we shall see presently, disappointment and disillusion may set in.

For members of the second generation relocating to the ‘homeland’, home is itself a two-way street. Narrative evidence for this dual allegiance comes from many interview accounts. Here is one which is pretty typical, from Lucy who had relocated to Athens at the time of her marriage to her Greek-American husband two years ago:

> I have to personally say that home is back in the States for me. When I am back there I tend to be Greek, I listen to my Greek music and I keep my Greekness around me. I have Greek friends, I like to go to Greek restaurants ... but I always felt very at home here [in Greece] when I came on vacation. But ... I got so beaten up after being here almost two years by the sort of backwardness to a lot of things and by the mentality of certain people here that I began to realise ... I was a lot more American than I thought I was. (...) So I tend to hold on to my Americanness here and when I am in America I tend to hold on to my Greek side, and I don’t know why that is... (interview, Athens, May 2007).

Material evidence for this double allegiance comes from the decorative landscape of the domestic sphere. Much has been written about migrants’ preservation and display of family photographs from ‘home’, landscape images and religious iconography – for two contrasting examples see Tolia-Kelly (2004) on artefacts in the British Asian home and Walsh (2006) on the home decoration of British expats in Dubai. Likewise the transport of souvenirs or typical food and drink (as Rebecca put it in an earlier quote, ‘All that Greek stuff’) from the ancestral homeland by migrants on return visits is a further signifier of the desire to incorporate ‘origins’ and ‘nation’ into everyday life, and even into the body itself. More generally, the tangible and visible display of the ethnos in one’s home or office space constitutes a memorialisation of the place of origin, and the enactment of performativity of a cultural self whenever the objects are shown to or consumed with others.
For first- and second-generation returnees to the homeland, the cycle continues. Rhoades (1978) described the way in which Spanish labour migrants returning from Germany adorned their Andalusian village homes with ‘Black Forest’ cuckoo clocks and lavish German-made drinks cabinets. And in Greek homes of the returned Greek-Americans and Greek-Germans we visited were also to be seen artefacts of their ‘other homes’. In a similar vein, Rebecca’s father, although he had no plan to return to live permanently in Greece, had restored the family’s old village home on the island of Lesvos where the family would visit and gather every year:

And then at some stage we decided, well my parents decided… to go back to the house in Lesvos, Mytilene, which was abandoned… My father had this idea of ‘I want to fix this house’… and he managed to put a little Germanised cottage in the middle of the village in the middle of nowhere… renovate it. It’s his own way of dealing with things. And as of then – every year, Mytilene (interview, Athens, June 2007).

Return as rupture and disillusionment

As we have seen, for the second generation return migration is often viewed as a project of homecoming. But, as ever, there is a blurring of the boundaries of where ‘home’ exists: is it the territorality of the homeland itself or a mythologised imaginative construction? In other words, homelands do not always offer the welcoming embrace of a longed-for homecoming. Experiences of return (this may be true of the first generation too) often invoke feelings of disillusionment and rupture. In the words of Markowitz and Stefansson (2004), homecomings can be ‘unsettling paths of return’.

Why is this? Hints of an answer have already been given; let us now develop our argument further. In an era of globalisation, increased global mobility and cultural hybridisation, migrant identifications find meaning in the interrelationship between the ethnic culture and the homeplace, especially when the illusion of the homeland experience is frozen in space and time, or distorted through partial experience. For the second generation, images of the ethnic homeland are preserved through the prism of their parents’ reconstructions of the ‘homeland in exile’ and by their selective memories and narratives of the ‘old country’.

Rebecca described her father (aged mid-70s) as typical among the older-generation Greek migrants in Germany who imagine Greece as a static place that exists exactly as it did when he left in the 1950s; this is the Greece that they try to pass on to their children. Even when return visits take place, they occur at a time of year (summer) and to places (villages, the seaside, islands) which are redolent of a holiday atmosphere where life is lived outdoors and at a leisurely pace. For the returning family on holiday, the homeland is indeed a ‘big playground’ (Demetra’s words, quoted earlier) where life is to be enjoyed away from work, and money spent not earned.

It is clear that, for many returnees who are settling long-term, the reality of life in the ancestral homeland severely clashes with the imagined notions of a mythico-historic homeland that reflects only the subjectivities of
migrant belongingness (Markowitz 2004). We need therefore to critically extend the theoretical and empirical angles of second-generation homecomings beyond the notion of an emotionally compelling existential project that mythologises the diasporic subject’s longing to be ‘home’, to that of a social project of return to the ancestral homeland (Stefansson 2004). In this ‘return of social realism’, the challenges of finding a place to live (a real home in the homeland), economic security (usually a job) and a circle of friends become paramount. If these necessities are not achieved, or realised only with great difficulty, the homecoming dream becomes severely compromised. Experiences of return may be marked by confrontations with the social and cultural institutions in the place of origin; these institutions, together with wider behavioural norms and practices of the home society (which for the second-generation resettler becomes a host society), obstruct the social project of homecoming, to the frustration and annoyance of the returnee.

Practically every interview with second-generation returnees contained multiple instances of this tarnishing of the ‘dream return’. Here are a few typical extracts on the three themes which cropped up the most consistently in the narratives. First, the linked topics of corruption and bureaucracy loomed large in terms both of general opinions and of personal experiences. Three examples from many:

Is there corruption? Yes. Is there nepotism? Yes. Here in Greece it’s completely disorganised. And I think if Greeks want to fight corruption they have to start from the top... The Greek system is such that it breeds corruption ... they don’t deal with citizens in an open, just way... So the citizen is not going to go back and treat the government justly, you know (Evgenia, Athens, May 2007).

Evgenia went on to describe how she and her husband had made a mistake on a tax declaration form about property inheritance:

My husband had inherited something from his father who had inherited from some uncle in Crete and, in filling out the form that we did ... instead of ... because there were twenty inheritants ... instead of putting down in the column one-twentieth of the value of the property, he made a mistake and put the full value of the property ... and he was taxed the full value. We went to the tax court, we went to court, nothing could be done... It was obvious that it was a mistake, it wasn’t like we were trying to hide something. They treat you like you’re out to trick them, to jip them. So how can I trust you? If you don’t treat your citizens justly...

The second example is from Kathy in New York, who tried to relocate to Greece but was frustrated by the bureaucracy:

... when George Bush became president we started doing our paperwork for the EU and tried to apply for dual citizenship ... that was, like, 2001, 2002... It’s been awful. So that’s been kind of an eye-opening experience as to the bureaucracy in Greece and, you
know, how things are... I guess if we had gotten our paperwork faster, who knows? I don’t see myself moving back at this point but it was definitely something I want to do... not too long ago (interview, New York, August 2007).

Thirdly Sophia, second-generation Greek-German, describes being swindled over payments by a teaching post:

... the worst was when I was given a post at a well-known private school. I met the school principal who asked me how much money I was paid at my previous job and offered to pay me more. I began working and, as I was feeling uneasy, I would frequently ask if I would be signing a contract and they would say ‘Don’t worry, everything is OK’... I felt very ill-at-ease, and I didn’t know whether I had health cover... And when the time came for payment, the amount which was in the envelope was so small I thought it was a down-payment. I went and asked, saying that, since we had agreed on another amount, perhaps this was only part of the salary? The principal said ‘No, why? What had we agreed upon?’ At that moment I felt my head swirling ... I was so angry. I told him that what he did was extremely dishonourable and that I could get more money by cleaning houses (interview, Athens, May 2007).

The second theme was a cluster of discourses around Greek everyday behaviour and the environment. Again, three interview clips to illustrate:

The degree to which people are conscious of their surroundings disturbs me. I love Greece, my dear little Greece, and to see young people and older ones constantly spitting in the streets, the younger generation throwing rubbish in the streets ... this is very alien to me (Sophia).

We still get frustrated about the things we never noticed before [when we used to come to Greece on holiday]. We didn’t notice the graffiti, we didn’t notice so much the garbage on the beach, and we can’t understand why they just can’t keep their environment clean, you know, and it really bothers us... That’s one of the really frustrating things about living here (Lucy).

Things in the US are very simple, they’re fast, they’re quick, you get it done. You run your errands every day, you run to the bank, there is no queue or lines, people aren’t shoving or pushing you. Here it’s different. Here you run out and you spend half the day trying to find parking so you can go to the supermarket, find parking to go to the bank, waiting in line an hour at the bank, people are cutting in front of you, people are being rude to you, which we weren’t used to back in the States (Lucy again).

The third theme related to immigration in Greece. We have treated this topic in depth in another paper based on earlier research (Christou and King
A whole range of issues arise around second-generation returnees’ reactions to the recent mass immigration into Greece of Albanians, Poles and other nationalities. Our earlier paper also documented returnees’ negative, indeed sometimes openly racist, reactions to this change in the composition of the population living in Greece, which somehow sullied the image of the ‘pure Greek homeland’. Our latest evidence suggests a more critical stance whereby returnees are horrified at the xenophobia which has become so widespread in Greek society. Coming from Germany, Sophia had a preconception about ‘warm, hospitable Greeks’ compared to the ‘cold, inhospitable Germans’. And yet:

I was astounded when I noticed the hostile behaviour towards foreigners. One such bad experience ... was on a bus I was riding on, someone cursed at a lady of foreign descent who was boarding the bus along with her children and a stroller. He shouted at her, saying ‘Why didn’t you stay in your homeland rather than coming to Greece to give birth to so many children? We stay in our homes and do not crowd the space on the bus with strollers’. Something like that. The incident sparked off a conversation with the other passengers on the bus and, although I imagined that some people would disagree with this stance, many of them agreed... It was the first time I opened my eyes and said OK, the fear of foreigners, xenophobia, exists everywhere. It does not have to do with an inhospitable race such as the Germans.

Evgenia had a similar story to tell, and she also commented on the treatment of immigrants in the Greek media:

You know, Greece was a homogenous society and they were very comfortable being that way, and they were also very comfortable criticising other societies that were racist... But they don’t see it ... we don’t see it in ourselves that we have become racist and prejudiced... Sometimes the media spend too much time ... this morning for example, on a TV news channel, they were talking about a Polish man who was on a bus and he was drunk and being aggressive and threatening... And he [the news presenter] was going on and on... I mean, hey, what kind of news is this? Big deal! I mean the world is suffering in so many ways and we really don’t have to hear five minutes’ worth of a Polish man who was on a Greek bus and he was drunk, the poor guy... My husband said, ‘If he were a Greek, would they spend so much time discussing it?’ No. There is a phobia, it’s obvious, a phobia in Greece... There are certain groups the Greeks don’t like, certain groups they can’t accept. (...) You know, there’s this big problem in Greece with Armenians – I mean, sorry, Albanians, the big Albanian issue... You guys, what are you talking about? Albanians are people and I don’t want to say I’m Miss Perfect ... [but] ... I can see things a little differently. Albanians are Albanians. And the way we treat them plays a major role in how they treat us and respond to us.
A final twist to the story of (return) migration and disillusionment is the way the second-generation ‘returnees’ from Greece and the US are treated as partial outsiders by Greek society. In other words, the diaspora heartland is not, by any means, completely welcoming to the return of its diaspora members. This is a topic we treat at length in Christou and King (2006), so let us round up with just one pithy remark from Berlin-based Zeno:

... we have relatives in Sydney and we have Canadian relatives. Some living in Albania because they had to move there after the war. And everybody has this kind of connection to Greece. But always when you are back, always when we are on holidays there ... you are always the German, you are the Canadian, you are the New Yorker ... from wherever ... the Australian. You do not become Greek because you moved back there. Why is it like that?

The Greek evidence is not the only case of all this counter-diasporic disillusionment. Other paths of second-generation return exist which are equally unsettling, or perhaps unsettling in different ways. For the ‘returning’ Japanese-Brazilians, the ancestral homeland of Japan, an alienating and potentially hostile place for all those who are not ‘pure’ Japanese, has become a home even if it does not feel like a homeland. In this instance, economic reasons override the trauma of racism and social marginalisation, for their ‘invitation’ to return-migrate to Japan stemmed from the latter’s shortage of labour to do factory and other low-status jobs. Not speaking much Japanese, and without the benefit of preparatory homeland visits, the Nikkeijin, mostly second- and third-generation, have reacted to their rejection by Japanese society by reviving their Brazilianness with regard to their culture and social gatherings (Tsuda 2004).

Scanning the still-small literature on second-generation return in other geographic, historical and political contexts, we appreciate the variety of situations that exist. For second-generation British Poles who were able to ‘return’ to Poland after 1989, the idealistic impulse to return soon received a reality check, and the dream of resettlement was replaced by some more pragmatic transnational homeland links such as buying a property or making periodic visits (Górny and Osipovič 2006). Almost the opposite was the experience of the ‘third culture kids’ studied by Knörr (2005). These were German and Swiss children brought up by their expatriate parents in Africa who ‘came back’ to Europe for their further and higher education. For them, ‘going back’ meant returning as adults to Africa, which many intended to do but few did. Different yet again have been the experiences of Europe’s colonial repatriates, who in many cases were forced to return in the wake of decolonisation and independence in Africa and Asia. Key groups here were the British from India, Belgians from the Congo, French from Algeria, Portuguese from Angola and Mozambique, Dutch from Indonesia and Italians from Libya. The experiences of these counter-diasporic migrants retreating from colonial diasporas have been little researched; but undoubtedly they share many things in common. According to Smith (2003: 31) these migrants are ‘true postcolonials’; they are ‘a population that arrived in a decolonizing metropole during an era of shifting understandings of their nation’s relationships to Europe while the colony and the colonial
era were quickly fading in significance’. They tend to suffer a common ‘internal strangerhood’ that results from their unwanted return – a displacement that is not only geographical, climatic etc., but also profoundly historical and political – to a different way of life and set of power structures.

The Caribbean case is more widely documented, thanks to a long tradition of migration research (and migration) in this region; particularly important has been the recent work of Potter and his associates, cited earlier. From the Caribbean literature it is apparent that the return as a ‘homecoming’ project is not a unified social process but a versatile cultural experience characterised by diversity, complexity and ambivalence. The return can be a source of creativeness and ingenuity that expresses strong agency and challenges fixity. For both first- and second-generation returnees to the Caribbean homeland, the experience of migration does not usually end with the return: transnational links generally continue, and both migrants and returnees are profoundly affected by their migratory experience for the rest of their lives.

Several themes emerge in studies of the second generation relocating from Britain to the Caribbean. First, such individuals are seen, and see themselves, as agents of change – as vindicators of Cerase’s ‘return of innovation’. According to research evidence from Barbados (Conway et al. 2007), second-generation returnees are a positively selected group in terms of their education and ambition. Hence they have much to contribute economically and socially, especially in an island-state where there has been strong economic development in recent decades, driven by tourism and service industries, notably offshore finance. Plenty of work and business opportunities exist for qualified ‘returnees’. According to Potter and Phillips (2006b), the returnees enjoy an economically and culturally privileged status within Barbadian society. Elaborating further, the returned second generation occupy a structurally intermediate position of post-colonial hybridity; they are both black and (because of their ‘British’ upbringing and their ‘English’ accents) symbolically white, reflecting a black skin/white mask identity (cf. Fanon 1967). Potter and Phillips’ interviewees articulated the contrast they felt between how they were treated in Britain (racialised because of their Afro-Caribbean ethnicity, stereotyped as low-achievers and potential trouble-makers) and how they were perceived, and were able to position themselves, in Barbados – as smartly-dressed go-getters who traded on their English accents and work ethos.

But, against this positive identification were set more contradictory and nuanced reactions. ‘Bajan-Brits’ (to use Potter and Phillips’ term) were frustrated at the slow pace of life and delays in getting things done; they railed against the water and power cuts and found local people simple-minded and lazy. Barbadians, for their part, construct a ‘madness trope’ as a strategy of ‘othering’ the ‘English’ (Bajan-Brit) returnees, thereby fixing them outside the mainstream Barbadian society. They are constructed as mad because of their behaviour (rushing around in the heat, walking in the sun instead of in the shade, talking quickly, over-concern with punctuality), and because of stories of high rates of mental illness amongst the Caribbean population in Britain (Potter and Phillips 2006a).
Who am I? Questions of second-generation returnee identity

Our final cultural-geographic theme touches on issues of identity amongst members of the second generation who relocate to the ‘homeland’ – or, if you will, the ‘who I am’ in the ‘where am I’ (Christou 2006: 209). Basu (2004b: 40) sees the return as mediated on a personal level as a process of (self-)discovery: ‘it is a matter of discovering continuities with that which is beyond the self; a locating of the narratives of the self within broader narratives of families, cultures, nations and diasporas… It is without doubt a matter of social identity’ (emphasis in original). Earlier sections of the paper have suggested that evidence exists to link the second generation’s ‘return’ with a powerful search for realising their ‘true’ identity – a kind of identificational closure, which results from the achievement of a well-thought-out, organised yet personal ‘plan of action’ to relocate in this way (Christou 2006: 68). Rebecca:

Well I’ve come back to Greece … and I figured out there’s something you… there’s something that feels different, and I started to look at this question of ‘who you are’ in a different way. It’s not who you want to be, it’s who you are, and that’s a different question, that you can feel with your body, your soul, with whatever you can… I have been able to find a sense of stability… I feel that I’m accepted and that people make me feel I belong… It’s a part of my life I haven’t discovered yet and I think I need to in order to become a whole.

But other evidence, such as that presented in the section immediately above, contradicts this image of finding home and true identity in the homeland: disillusionment and even alienation set in as a result of experiences which pile up. In her interview, California-raised Demetra described losing her teaching post in Athens and having to fight for the redundancy pay she was legally entitled to; getting robbed (twice) in the city; the corruption and laziness inherent in the public health service; the lack of a sense of customer service in shops and business; the bureaucracy which stifles every attempt to get ahead (‘You need a thousand papers for everything…’). After a few years, she said, you learn how to play the game:

I’ve been here six years. The longer you stay, you get to know how it works. Like, you know, playing Monopoly, or playing chess. If you practise you get to know the code, how the other person plays, so you’re going to play better….

But there are compensations: the closer family bonds, the greater safety in which to bring up your children (Demetra described how a bullet went through the door of a classroom in a school she used to teach at in California), the everyday friendliness (and the constant swearing!).

When it came to summing up her identity, Demetra struggled: was she Greek-American or American-Greek? Why was it always that the Greek part of the hyphenated word came first? ‘Where do I belong? I belong in the
Atlantic… it’s like a global mailman…’. Such ambivalence over identity echoed through most of our sample.

Let me put it this way… When we were in the United States we were Greeks, and now that we’ve come to Greece we are Americans, and that’s what we’ve realised – we’re neither … good here nor there! (Lucy, Athens, May 2007).

I don’t feel like a true American, and yet if I go to Greece I don’t feel like a Greek. So I think I’m in this mixed field [laughs] in the world and in life… I am, I guess you would say, a hyphenated American person (Katy, New York, August 2007).

There is no possibility to explain it. In Germany I am the Greek. In Greece I’m the German. So there is no land in between where I can put myself in and say ‘OK, here I am at home’ (Zeno, Berlin, July 2007).

Likewise, Potter and Phillips found that some ‘Bajan-Brits’ did not ‘belong’ anywhere: their identities, too, were suspended in ‘mid-air’ over the Atlantic. Their status of living in the plural world of their parents’ origin, after having been raised in the colonial ‘mother country’, could be described as one of ‘liminal, hybrid and in-between positionality’ (2006b: 592). Such a complex identity statement reflects cross-cutting issues of race, colour, class, gender, age and friendship which are likely to be inherent in the experiences of second-generation transnational migrants. For Bajan-Brits and other second-generation Caribbeans, the return to the Caribbean is not necessarily to be regarded as so counter-intuitive as the return of some other widely dispersed diasporic groups, given these islands’ ‘culture of migration’ based on economic necessity and flexibility, combining family loyalty with individual migration plans which can include the back and forth migration of the generations at different stages of their lives.

Undoubtedly there is much more that could be said about second-generation return and identity. The return adds another layer of complexity to the multiple, hybrid and hyphenated identities that have become increasingly discussed in the anthropological and cultural-studies literatures on migration (e.g. Chambers 1994; Hall 1996; Rapport and Dawson 1998). These authors (and many others, including ourselves) see identity in migration as relational, constructed, processual and situational. Rather than launch into an extended discussion of migrancy and identity, we close this part of the paper with a further commentary on what Rebecca says about her own relocation from Germany to Greece. Rebecca’s case is particularly interesting because of the ‘double duality’ of her ethnic background (Greek father, German mother) and of her migration trajectory (born in Germany, living in Greece). Here, Rebecca describes the dialectical duel that rained down on her as a small child from various members of her family asking what she preferred to be and what was better:

‘Are you Greek, are you German? Do you like me more or the other one?’ Things like that. For a kid, it’s like, ‘What the hell do they
want from your life?’ And I think that, what it was, it was for many, many years, trying to figure out both sides. It was just a reaction of trying to please people. OK, so they tell me ‘You’re more Greek’, so you try to be more Greek. Or they tell me, ‘You’re more this’ and you try to be more this… So there was a long, long time in my life, until my mid-thirties, where I have felt this thing, until I figured out: ‘Listen, you’re just Rebecca. You’re not Greek, you’re not German, you’re not whatever the hell you are. This is yourself and that’s what it is’… Meanwhile I don’t feel split any more, I do just fine.

**Conclusion**

Return migrants are the voices we never hear in migration history (King 2000), which usually focuses on the struggles and successes of those migrants who stay on. This paper, by focusing on a particular form of return, that of the second generation, exposes an even deeper historical amnesia associated with this mobility form. Paul Basu, whose writing on ‘roots tourism’ we find inspirational for our own research, regards such homecoming visits as ‘heuristic journeys’ to ‘sites of memory, sources of identity and shrines of self’ (2001: 338, italics in original). Such journeys, as we have shown, provide an opportunity for self-discovery through a process of self-narration. Our dialogic approach has demonstrated how the second generation’s ‘return’ and the narration of this return are performative acts during which the migrant, through the story of the self, is (re)located in the story of the familial, the ancestral, the national and ultimately within the transnational diaspora.

But there are multiple ambiguities built into both our conceptualisation of counter-diasporic migration as a neglected chronotope of mobility, and into the ambivalent experiences of many of our participants, whose returns seem to hover uncertainly between the closure of a definitive return ‘home’ on the one hand, and an expression of ongoing transnational identity on the other.

Let us take the empirical dimension of this dual question first. As examples of the actors of global post-modernity, our interviewees globalise their personal biographies beyond the borders of the nation-state; they articulate feelings of being at home (and also not-at-home) in several places – what Beck (2000) terms ‘transnational spatial polygamy’. Many of our interviewees have quite complex mobility histories, the full details of which we have not revealed in our account above; their siblings, parents and grandparents, too, have multiple migration experiences which, arguably, have shaped their families’ mobility narratives and identities. At a micro scale, one of the most revealing objectives of diaspora research is to illuminate the complex processes by which migrants mediate and reconcile the contradictions between the diasporic condition, the notion of ‘home’ and the role of the homeland as an actual (or denied or destroyed) nation-state. In this context, ‘home’, as a context and as a symbol, should be problematised as a social and kinship space; a signifier that encapsulates actions, interrelationships and feelings; thus a social, cultural and political container of meaning.
To return to the second, more theoretical part of the question posed above: Is counter-diasporic migration – defined as we have here as the return of the second and subsequent generations to the diasporic hearth – counter-intuitive or is it, in fact, part of the very essence of diaspora? The answer to this question turns around the different ways the term diaspora is itself defined and conceptualised. In its Greek origins, its meaning is to ‘sow or scatter across’ – thus it is fundamentally a movement of dispersal. This reflects the colonising/imperial scattering and settlement of the Ancient Greeks across the Mediterranean and beyond; an etiology which, for sure, admits a diachronic long-term relationality with the Athenian hearth but does not assume any inevitability of return. In the other, now more commonly-used version of diaspora theory, the desirability or inevitability of return is part of the definition of a diaspora; reference to Safran’s (1991) six criteria shows that return figures prominently, and so in that sense counter-diasporic migration is the quintessential concluding moment of the diaspora cycle. And yet, viewed through the more temporally restricted prism of the migration, integration and transnationalism literatures, second-generation relocation in the homeland is indeed illogical, unless it represents the deferred ambition of the first generation to return, transmitted explicitly or implicitly to the children of the immigrants.

This hypothesis of the cross-generational deferral of return – desired by the first generation but actualised by the second – is an intriguing conceptualisation. At first sight it does not seem too plausible: surely the first generation, born and raised in the homeland, would be more likely and able to return there than their foreign-born children, raised in a different society? But there are hints at this process of ‘return delayed by a generation’ in Reynolds’ (2008) work on second-generation return to Jamaica, as well as in our own data. The argument goes like this.

The first generation mostly emigrated to North America or Europe during the 1950s or 1960s; poorly educated, their origins were mainly rural or island Greece, and Greek society at that time was still seen as traditional and economically underdeveloped. Although periodic holiday returns took place, these were, by definition, brief and generally to rural, island or seaside locations, where a summer vacation atmosphere prevailed. Later on in life, 30, 40 or 50 years after the emigration, a return is theoretically possible, but they have not really kept up with the momentous changes in Greek society, which now has an urban-centred service economy, 1 million immigrants and a more European and materialistic identity. The second generation, meanwhile, can be seen to have accrued a better preparation for moving to Greece. First, most have good education, including many with university degrees. Second, they are at least bilingual – their knowledge of Greek having been nurtured within the close-knit family circle and at special after-school classes. Their holiday visits to Greece, initially with their parents and perhaps subsequently as independent travellers, have kept them in touch with their homeland and their kin there. Given their age and education, they are more likely to be able to tune in to the rapidly changing Greek society of recent decades. Hence for them a productive and successful return – despite some disappointments, as noted – is more achievable than it is for their parents, for whom even a ‘return of retirement’ might be
problematic and turn into a ‘return of failure’ (cf. Cerase 1974 on returned
Italian-Americans).

Lucy’s narrative contained some revealing insights into some of the
issues speculatively raised above. Lucy’s parents had emigrated to the US
and settled in Connecticut in the 1960s. Lucy herself was born in
Connecticut and ‘raised in a Greek household that was Greek to the bone’.
She ‘returned’ to Greece in 2005, aged 32 and just married.

They [her parents] seem to be perfectly happy there [in Connecticut].
They always wanted to come back to Greece ... but ever since we got
them a Greek satellite TV and they watch the news ... which of
course always tells you all the bad stuff going on in the world ... they’ve gotten extremely frustrated with the country [Greece]... My
father always had this vision that he would move back and he was
retired and ... um ... after my brother passed away five years ago, I
sent them to Greece to spend a few months to sort of, you know,
leave Connecticut and what they remember behind and sort of relax.
But ... being here in Greece I think just got them more annoyed.
They were seeing a lot of things that they said ‘Oh, now I know why
I left, now I know why people don’t like being here’, and they
complained about this and that, and what’s wrong with everything.
They were just constantly complaining about the government and
how the cities were run and the health system and all that kind of
stuff. (...) We had thought that after we came here ... we would move
them over here as well because they don’t have any other children in
the States or anything, um ... but my husband and I realised that it’s
going to be a very difficult thing to get them reacquainted with their
own country. I feel that we get by easier here than they do, which is
a little scary [laughs]... When my parents come to visit in Greece,
they’re constantly throwing out that hybrid language – the Greek-
Americans have created their own language, they’ve created this
‘Grenglish’ – and I found we are constantly correcting them, which I
find ridiculous, that I have to correct my Greek parents, you know,
when they speak... So I’m not really quite sure how we are going to
acclimatise them and not have them constantly complain about
everything... It’s going to be quite a challenge...

There is also the – usually unspoken – possibility that, having been made
aware of the sacrifices their parents made for them, as well as their parents’
repeatedly stated aspiration to return (but also that this gradually becomes an
unrealisable dream), the second generation are acting out their parents’
unfulfilled wish to go back. Further analysis of our ongoing field data is
necessary to provide more solid empirical support for these hypotheses.

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Notes

[1] The present paper is drawn from a longer Working Paper (King and Christou 2008) but is distinct from it in three ways: here the literature survey is shorter, the discussion on second-generation return and its relation to diaspora and to transnationalism is more focused, and we have added more ‘voices’ to the narrative analysis of our field data.

[2] Tölölyan is the founding editor of the journal Diasporas: A Journal of Transnational Studies, whose very title combines the diasporic and the transnational.

[3] There is no space to justify this remark here, but see Clifford (1994) who also points out that even the Jewish diaspora fails to meet the full set of criteria, notably the ‘real desire’ for return. We also wonder why Safran describes each of the listed diasporas in turn, except the Greek one which is completely omitted!

[4] This is not the place for a review of this transnational migration literature which, to some extent, overlaps with the literature on diasporas. For a geographer’s overview see Bailey (2001); for other reviews, which reference all the debates on migrant transnationalism of the 1990s, see the special issue of International Migration Review edited by Levitt et al. (2003)

[5] To cite one example, see King (1977) on the problems of school-age second-generation children taken by their returning parents to Italy where they were often put in classes with younger pupils. King found that quite a common reason for return amongst young married adults was so that their young children could be educated in the Italian school system; hence the return was timed before children had reached school age. This reasoning was often based on the migrants’ observation that other migrants who had stayed on found that, once their children were educated in the foreign school system (of Germany, France or wherever), return became very unlikely. On the other hand, prioritising children’s education in the home-country system and language meant an often difficult search for employment on the part of the parents. For some generalised remarks about educational issues of children in the context of family-based return migration see Dumon (1986).

[6] This quote is from a written narrative, not an interview; it derives from previous work by the authors (Christou and King 2006: 823–4).

[7] There are some special features of the Japanese Brazilian counter-diasporic migration which need emphasising. First, this is a form of labour-migration recruitment which is not dissimilar to that which characterised North-West Europe in the early postwar decades. Like this European guestworker migration, the movement of Nikkeijin started as temporary employment in the late 1980s, but has since matured to semi-permanent settlement bolstered by family reunion.
The Japanese for their part look down on their co-ethnic cousins from South America for several reasons: their origins are perceived as low-status Japanese who left Japan because of poverty and unemployment; they continue to be classed as of low status because the low-grade factory jobs they are employed to do, often on short-term contracts; and they are socially marginalised because of their poor Japanese language skills and their unavoidable loss of ‘Japaneseness’ by virtue of their living outside of Japan for most of their lives.

[8] It is not clear whether this is sample bias or a more-or-less true representation of the second-generation flow to Barbados. Potter and Phillips (2006a; 2006b) interviewed 51 ‘returnees’, including 32 born outside Barbados (29 in the UK); of the remaining 19 Barbados-born, all had spent significant parts of their formative years abroad, again the majority of them in the UK. For the sample of 51, the average age at the time of interview (in 2002) was 40 years; the average at return was 32 years. The sample was skewed towards females (38 out of the 51); again it is not clear whether this truly reflects a female predominance in the return flow (probably not).

References


King and Christou: Second-Generation ‘Returnees’


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