Contested Casamance: Introduction
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Contested Casamance: Introduction

Ferdinand de Jong and Geneviève Gasser

Résumé
Le conflit oppose en Casamance le Mouvement des forces démocratiques de Casamance (MFDC) à l'Etat sénégalais. Le MFDC, né et opérant dans la région de Casamance au Sénégal, declare l'indépendance politique de la région, prétendant que la Casamance n'a jamais fait partie du Sénégal. Le MFDC fait état de nombreux griefs, parmi lesquels l'accusation que le régime sénégalais a régulièrement manqué à sa responsabilité d'investir dans le développement économique de la région de Casamance. Les premiers mouvements d'agitation publique ont eu lieu en Casamance en 1982. En 1990, le MFDC a officiellement déclaré que le conflit armé était le seul moyen d'accéder à l'indépendance. Depuis 23 ans, environ 700 000 Casamançais vivent dans un climat d'insécurité, dans la crainte de vols à main armée dont les rebelles ou les bandits se rendent coupables, et de violations des droits humains de la part des forces gouvernementales. Il reste très difficile de maintenir une quelconque activité économique. L'infrastructure locale est en ruines et la croissance d'une industrie touristique prometteuse est maintenant interrompue. Au fil des ans, les deux partis opposés se sont engagés à respecter divers cesses-le-feu qui ont été de courte durée et ont donné lieu à d'autres combats. Mais les développements récents en Casamance, qui ont culminé avec la signature d'un traité de paix entre le chef du MFDC et le Ministre de l'intérieur sénégalais à la fin de 2004, laissent à penser que le conflit a enfin trouvé sa résolution.

Le but de ce numéro spécial est d'examiner les diverses relations entre la région de Casamance et le Sénégal. Les articles se penchent donc sur la représentation et l'interprétation du conflit, sur la gouvernance et la résistance au Sénégal, et sur les acteurs impliqués, tels que l'Etat, le MFDC, les hommes politiques, les populations, et les universitaires spécialistes du sujet. Les contributeurs sont des intellectuels appartenant à une gamme de disciplines très variée qui comprend des politologues, des anthropologues, des géographes, un économiste et un historien, mais la plupart d'entre eux peuvent être considérés comme interdisciplinaires et ce numéro spécial l'est aussi dans son ensemble. Tous les articles exami-
nent de manière explicite la Casamance dans sa relation avec le Sénégal et ils suggèrent que le séparatisme en Casamance ne peut pas être analysé isolément du Sénégal dans son ensemble. Tout en examinant les politiques d'intégration sociale et politique, les articles inscrivent le séparatisme dans le cadre de la politique sénégalaise.

The Casamance conflict opposes the Mouvement des forces démocratiques de Casamance (MFDC) to the Senegalese State. Originating and operating in the Casamance region of Senegal, the MFDC calls for the political independence of the region, claiming that Casamance was never part of Senegal. The MFDC puts forward a number of grievances, including the accusation that the Senegalese regime has consistently failed to invest in the economic development of the Casamance region. The first public protests took place in Casamance in 1982, to which the Senegalese regime reacted with political oppression and military interventions. In 1990, the MFDC officially declared that armed struggle would be the only way to achieve independence. For twenty-three years, about 700,000 Casamançais have been living in a climate of insecurity, fear of armed robbery by rebels or bandits, and human rights violations by governmental forces. Normal economic activities have been very difficult to maintain. The local infrastructure is in decay and the growth of a promising tourist industry has been interrupted. Over the years, the parties have committed themselves to numerous cease-fires, which many times failed and led to renewed fighting. But the latest developments in Casamance suggest that peace has finally been established.

On 30 December 2004, Secretary-General Diamacoune Senghor of the MFDC signed a peace treaty with the Senegalese Minister of Home Affairs Ngom. The treaty was signed at the public square in front of the governor's office, in the centre of Ziguinchor, the heart of the rebellious Casamance region. The signing was not attended by President Wade, who arrived shortly after the peace treaty had been signed in the presence of a cheering crowd. It was to be made clear to all bystanders that the peace treaty was not a treaty between heads of states, but between the Minister of Home Affairs and an insurgency leader. Yet the President was one of the first to congratulate the Secretary-General with his "historical gesture," to signal that the agreement had his
full support and was in fact realised under his Presidency. However, at the same meeting the Mayor of Ziguinchor questioned the significance of the peace treaty. This was not the first peace treaty signed with the insurgents and a local radio station, invoking the history of the peace process, referred to “a cemetery of peace deals.” The peace process — *le processus de la paix* as it is called — has been long and many Senegalese are impatient to see it result in peace. Thus the crowd at the square cheered at the signing of the peace treaty and, as most of them were supporters of the Presidential party, cheered at the President too.

This meeting was as much a political victory for the President as a historical moment in the peace process. The meeting was therefore extensively covered by national media: the Presidential address to the Nation on New Year’s Eve opened with the peace deal. It was the most important achievement of 2004. However, most of the inhabitants of the Casamance region have grown weary of the many peace initiatives, peace talks, and peace agreements. They displayed a healthy scepticism. And in the days following the Presidential address, it emerged that there had been much confusion about the peace agreement. At the very last minute, so many interlocutors had tried to intervene in the peace process that the Secretary-General of the MFDC preferred not to read the speech that he was meant to read, and instead improvised one. In a sense, he de-authorised the peace agreement he had just signed. And in fact he wielded very little authority himself, as quite a few leaders of the various factions of the MFDC did not recognise Diamacoune Senghor as their Secretary-General, nor did they recognise the peace agreement. So the event that was so extensively covered by the media was in fact a public performance of an agreement between a Secretary-General, whose mental abilities are doubted in public, and a government that badly needed a political success in this southernmost region. And Senegal received the reward: the World Bank and European Union congratulated the country with its political success and announced that funds to finance economic development would be forthcoming.

In the months following the peace agreement, negotiations were scheduled to take place in Foundiougne, a town in the geographic centre of Senegal, another highly symbolic choice as it emphasizes the alleged joking relation between the Jola insurgents
and their Serer "cousins." The peace talks were attended by a great number of insurgents, members of "civil society," brokers of various kinds, Jola officials, and politicians. Whether or not these peace talks will be successful is hard to say. Whether the peace process will result in a definite peace is unclear. The current scholarship of armed conflicts suggests that the absence of such clarity, that continued warfare with an eternal prospect of peace, is more characteristic of current armed conflicts (Richards 2005). So when does protracted armed conflict turn into a peace process? Why would this peace agreement, as opposed to the former three, be successful? What are the critical junctures? Is the peace agreement the result of President Wade's efforts? Is it the result of the donors pouring in money? Is it because some hardliners of the MFDC died? Is it because Senegal cannot risk losing its public image of a democratic, stable state? These are some of the questions that politicians might be interested in, questions that seem increasingly hard to answer because the peace process is a fuzzy process, in which many interests are at stake, and in which public appearances seem to serve no other aim than to hide more important truths. In this special issue on the topic of Casamance separatism, we will be providing some context that will aid in an understanding of the current situation of peace / conflict, of the various ways in which Casamance is contested.

Thus far little academic attention has been given to the protracted conflict that plagues the Casamance region and the Senegalese State at large. The aim of this special issue is to examine the various relationships between the Casamance region and Senegal. The contributions therefore look at the representation and interpretation of the conflict, governance and resistance in Senegal, and the actors involved such as the State, the MFDC, politicians, populations, and academics in the field. The contributors are academics of a wide disciplinary range, including political scientists, anthropologists, geographers, an economist, and a historian, but most of them can be qualified as interdisciplinary, and this special issue as a whole very much is. All articles explicitly examine Casamance in relation to Senegal and suggest that Casamance separatism cannot be analysed in isolation from Senegal at large (Diop 2002). While examining the politics of political and economic integration, the articles write separatism into Senegal.
Before outlining our agenda we will first compare the Casamance conflict to other armed conflicts in postcolonial Africa. This is an ambitious task. We recognize how perilous it is to impose simple classificatory schemes on the wide range of African conflicts. These are, of course, as diverse in terms of their causes and origins as in their dynamics, consequences, and mechanisms of resolutions (Fawole 2004, 297). Since the 1990s, three quarters of all countries in sub-Saharan Africa have witnessed armed conflict. There is no doubt that armed conflicts are a major constraint to economic development in sub-Saharan Africa (Luckam et al. 2001). They also have a serious impact on the population. In 2000, twenty-eight percent of the world’s refugees were Africans (Pumphrey and Schwartz-Barcott 2003, 1). While some of these conflicts involve highly organized players with clear objectives (such as the Eritrea-Ethiopia war or the genocide in Rwanda), others involve shifting actors whose policies cannot be accommodated in state-political terms (the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda). Because these conflicts represent little strategic interest in the post-Cold War era only limited international attention is being given to resolving them.

The Casamance conflict in Senegal falls in between these two categories. For France, Senegal does represent a strategic interest. Senegal is one of the main partners in the Africa-policy of France and France has a vested interest in the resolution of the Casamance conflict. But the Casamance conflict is marginal in the sense that it has not disrupted sub-regional stability in a way comparable to other conflicts on the continent. Perhaps this explains why the conflict is not extensively covered by the media. Although the Casamance conflict remains the longest running civil conflict in West Africa, it is relatively unknown to the general public.¹

One characteristic of African conflicts is that many of them assume complex sub-regional dimensions (Democratic Republic of Congo, conflict in countries of the Mano River or Angola) (UK-DFID 2001). In such cases, conventional government forces are engaged in wars of attrition with other states, which are usually neighbours. Much use is made of factions, which act as middlemen and as a protective screen for conventional forces. Often these forces meet their logistical needs through the exploitation of local natural resources. The belligerents exploit and market natural
resources, thereby greatly restricting the role of the state. To some degree, the Casamance conflict is part of the political economy of war in the West African sub-region too. Arms and drug trafficking networks exist with connections into The Gambia and perhaps other West African countries. Combatants are exploiting natural resources in areas under their control, including timber and marijuana. But the Casamance region is not rich in minerals and maybe the conflict has therefore not reached the scale of the conflicts in Sierra Leone or Liberia. The ties of the Casamance conflict to neighbouring countries (Gambia and Guinea Bissau) are important as both countries more or less serve as a safe haven for the rebels. But both countries have also hosted various meetings aimed at establishing peace in Casamance (Evans 2000).

The Casamance conflict has surely been resilient, but in comparison to other African conflicts, it is small-scale. The nature of Senegalese state-society relations could be part of the explanation to the relatively low intensity of this conflict (but see Foucher, this issue). A recent issue of Politique africaine (2004), Sénégal, 2000-2004: l’alternance et ses contradictions, takes stock of the current political situation in Senegal and suggests that the “social contract” that long characterised Senegalese state-society relations needs to be revised. A discussion of the particularities of the Senegalese polity cannot be pursued here. It seems that the Senegalese state remains stable and Senegalese society open and pluralist, but the freedom of the press has recently come under pressure (Havard 2004). Although the public debate in Senegal is lively, the conflict in Casamance has been relegated to the margins of the national debate. With Wade’s ascendance to presidency, a more vigorous policy on the Casamance dossier was expected to emerge, but initially he made little progress towards establishing a peace deal (Foucher 2003). The Jola, the ethnic group amongst whom the MFDC recruits most of its rebels, are not very active participants in the public debate. Many Jola long for peace and do not not hesitate to state so publicly. However, the Jola population living in Dakar remains ambivalent about the political turbulence in its home region. The population is divided by ambitions for economic success in exile, the development of their native villages, and nostalgia for a Jola way of life that is no more. In as far as Jola migrants have been successful, they have not engaged themselves
in the struggle for secession. Quite the contrary, in Dakar, an association of civil servants and businessmen from Casamance is promoting a dialogue between the government and rebel factions, the MFDC, and opposing any fragmentation of the Senegalese state. Only the disgruntled, marginalized migrants have sought separation as both Senegalese state and society failed to provide them with the means to become successful (Foucher 2002).

Although the Senegalese government has in various ways tried to counter the geographic separation of the Casamance region, its remoteness remains an important blockage to economic development, as various articles in this issue demonstrate. In 2002, the shipwreck of Le Joola, the ferry that maintained the liaison between Dakar and the Casamance region was an unprecedented tragedy of human loss. The Casamance region lost part of its university-going generation and the enclave position of the region was reinforced once again. The Casamance region is remote (see Evans in this issue). But the Casamance region is not only remote; it is also in many ways different from the rest of Senegal. This difference has often been understood as a cause of Casamance separatism. Of course, difference in itself does not explain why the inhabitants of Casamance in general, and the Jola in particular, question their belonging to Senegal. But it does explain why Jola society has arrested the attention of so many anthropologists. The "noble savage" who resisted colonisation, conversion, and modernisation, has captivated generations of anthropologists. The work of one particular anthropologist springs to mind: the French ethnographer Thomas, inventor of le diola pur (1959). In various ways, the remoteness of the Casamance region has contributed to the "exoticisation" of its inhabitants. Such a fascination with the authentic Jola and their natural habitat is visible in the French anthology on the Casamance conflict (Barbier-Wiesser 1994). Visible, we say, because most of the illustrations in that volume reinforce the notion of the Jola as a quintessential farmer, inhabiting a picturesque, arcadian landscape. Several contributions to this special issue question the notion of such an authentic, a-historic Jola society. Their project inscribes itself in an intellectual trajectory of which we will briefly take stock here.

Historians were the first to point out that the societies on the Guinea Coast are historically produced; that trade and transport
had linked these societies formerly deemed isolated (Rodney 1970; Mark 1985; Barry 1998). While very fine ethnographies situated in face-to-face societies are still being produced (Schloss 1988), the majority of scholars working in Casamance now take wider contexts into consideration. The historicity of Jola modes of production (Linares 1992), religion (Baum 1999), and performance (Mark 1994; De Jong 1999) have now been fully acknowledged. And the ways in which the Jola contribute to the making of their own history are also accounted for. None of the more recent studies fail to attribute agency to the Jola. Agency also appears in scholarship that studies Jola migration. It has been convincingly demonstrated that the Jola voluntarily migrated to work in the emerging labour market of Senegal’s colonial cities (Van der Klei 1989; Lambert 2002). Current scholarship suggests that the integration of the Jola in Senegalese society at large is not the product of coercion. The Jola have not been forced into modernity, they have imagined and continue to imagine modernity on their own terms. Unfortunately, their own imagined modernity has failed to materialise.

Political scientists have made this the subject of their analyses of the Casamance conflict. While the first study on the Casamance problem suggested that the Jola were not properly integrated into the Senegalese state (Darbon 1988), recent studies argue that the Jola are generally well integrated into Senegalese society (Marut 2002; Foucher 2002; Gasser 2002). These new studies demonstrate that the MFDC insurgents are not resisting their integration into Senegalese society, but question the terms of their integration. It is here that the problem should be situated. This issue is explored by Marut who argues that the ties with the Senegalese state are probably stronger in Casamance than in most other Senegalese regions. However, Casamance nationalism does not recognise these ties and deliberately denies their existence. But the making of Casamance nationalism is in fact rooted in modernity. Marut demonstrates how various global agents (the Catholic Church, IMF, World Bank) have contributed to the construction of a local identity, which, ironically, negates its global roots.

The contributions in this issue suggest that primordial tribalism is not what is at stake in Casamance separatism. Yet the interpretation of the insurgency as a variant of primordial tribalism remains prevalent in the representation of the Casamance problem
[Lambert 1998]. The Senegalese regime has at various moments characterised the insurgents as "backwards" and "tribal." Although identities in this region have always shifted (Mark 2002), the current political process is indeed shot through with primary patriotism (Geschiere and Gugler 2000). Jola politicians and their electorate often play the ethnic card (De Jong 2002). Due to the ethnicization of the political process, ethnic "traditions" are increasingly mobilised as interfaces between Jola society and the state. Various contributions to this issue suggest that the interpretation and representation of the insurgency as an "ethnic revolt" hampers our understanding of the conflict.

MFDC separatism is sometimes explained as a result of cultural differences between the societies in southern Senegal and those in the rest of the country. While real differences cannot be denied, the intellectual production of such difference is now justifiably questioned (Foucher 2002; Marut 2002). Such issues of interpretation and representation are further explored by Foucher, in his article on the role of religion in MFDC separatism. A widespread interpretation of separatism holds that Jola traditional religion is at the heart of the MFDC, either as the cause of separatism or as its channel of organisation (Geschiere et Van der Klei 1987). Foucher questions this interpretation and the representation of the Jola as fétichistes. While he shows that this representation of the Jola is in fact shared by the MFDC, he suggests that the Catholic Church has played a major role in its making. The Catholic Church created the image of the industrious, rice-growing, palmwine-drinking Jola; the Second Vatican Council even endorsed the acceptance of Jola "traditions" into its liturgy. While Jola traditional religion does not provide a structure for separatist organisation, Foucher suggests that it is undeniably part of its symbolic representations. Thus we see that representations of the Jola are in fact made by others. Casamance nationalism, Foucher argues, is the result of the appropriation of such representations.

The representation of the Jola is also explored by Toliver-Diallo, who examines how Aline Sitoe Diatta, a Jola rainmaker operating in the early 1940s, has been interpreted and represented in Senegal since the 1980s. Aline Sitoe, as she is commonly known, was arrested by the French forces and sent into exile in Mali. In the 1980s, the Secretary-General of the MFDC turned her into the
Jeanne d’Arc of Casamance separatism. The Secretary-General claimed to continue her anti-colonial resistance. This in turn led to attempts by the national government to define her as a national heroine. So how should we interpret her history? How should she be remembered? Toliver-Diallo demonstrates that the interpretations of this historical figure contradict each other. While the MFDC succeeded in placing Aline Sitoe on the national agenda as a Jola priestess who resisted colonialism, the priestess was subsequently hijacked as a national heroine. Such ironies demonstrate that the Jola are not in control of their representations. As Toliver-Diallo demonstrates, the integration of the Jola past into the Senegalese memory-scape comes at a price.

The articles by Marut, Foucher, and Toliver-Diallo trace the making of Casamance representations to agents other than the Jola themselves. The Casamançais are the product of how others imagined them. The historical irony is that they have taken up the challenge to realise the imagined Casamance nation politically. However, while some Jola have engaged themselves in the struggle for political independence, a substantial and increasing number of Jola have had enough of the armed struggle and are no longer prepared to bear its costs—humanitarian and economic. Ever since the beginning of the conflict Jola politicians and dignitaries have been involved in attempts to negotiate between the insurgents and the Senegalese regime. Most of these attempts have been unsuccessful and it remains to be seen how the latest peace agreement works out. As an alternative to armed struggle and negotiation between officials a number of grass-roots initiatives has been taken that involve traditional authorities, or traditional methods of conflict resolution. The last set of articles explicitly deals with these so-called traditional methods of conflict resolution.

Tradition, as understood by Tomàs, consists of a religion focused on shrines and the symbolism the Jola attach to them. The author argues that in the kingdom of Oussouye the priest-king is a legitimate and credible peace broker in the Casamance conflict. The priest-king’s position has remained vacant for fifteen years, but with the “return” of a candidate to the position, the fervour for tradition in the village has been greatly rejuvenated. Both MFDC rebels and inhabitants of the village who strive for peace invoke Jola tradition. However, the villagers resent the MFDC claims to
represent a tradition that they do not recognize. For that reason, the Jola of Oussouye are as alienated from the MFDC as from the Senegalese state. In their view, the best option for conflict resolution resides in following their own tradition, embodied by the priest-king. As such, Tomàs suggests that the institution of the priest-king is a viable alternative to both state and separatists. The author feels that other localities in the region could find their own traditional solution to the conflict.

In his article, De Jong questions the authenticity of traditions as proclaimed by politicians interested in "tradition." He demonstrates how state officials and organisations in civil society turned a joking relationship — originating in historical patterns of exchange between Jola and Serer — into a policy instrument. While relying on the notion of cultural convergence — a term coined by Léopold Sédar Senghor — the joking relation was inscribed into a Senegalese nationalist discourse. The canonisation of customs such as the Jola-Serer joking relation serves Senegalese politicians in their making of a Senegalese unity. Tradition, in this analysis, is a construct by politicians and intellectuals, the authenticity of which is questioned by the insurgents. In contrast to Tomàs, the article by De Jong suggests that traditional conflict resolution is a contemporary construct, and does little to resolve the conflict. Objectified tradition cannot establish the same conviviality as can be generated in inhabited practice. However, the use of the joking relation in conflict resolution does contribute to the imagination of a Senegalese nation that includes the Jola.

In the peace talks and the public debate about the future of Casamance, what matters most to those involved is a resolution of the various transport problems that the inhabitants of Casamance face. Especially since the shipwreck of Le Joola, the situation has been unbearable. As almost every ordinary citizen was obliged to travel by public transport via The Gambia — travel by plane being unaffordable — travellers had to spend hours at the ferry across The Gambia. The Senegalese government has recently announced the construction of a bridge across the Gambia River, but these plans are not likely to materialize soon as The Gambia has never shown itself to be very co-operative in facilitating the traffic across its national territory. For the moment, the Casamance region remains an enclave, although a replacement for Le Joola finally arrived in
June 2005. The enclave position is one of the issues explored in the last set of articles on the different ways in which the Casamance conflict impacts on the agricultural production in the region. These articles address the relation between regional integration and the failing economic development in the Casamance region, especially in relation to Senegalese governmental policies. It is in this respect that much can be gained to appease the inhabitants of Casamance, weary that the development of their region has consistently been neglected.

Linares' contribution makes strong points against these governmental policies. After briefly mentioning other factors, such as severe drought and the conflict, Linares gives a detailed narrative of how the farmers of one village have, in the span of some thirty years, employed various strategies and subterfuges in order to avoid restrictions imposed by the government. In the opinion of the author, the interventions of the Senegalese State, through parastatals and other public institutions, have not served the peasant well. Instead of securing inputs, facilitating transportation, and marketing the Senegalese, parastatals have monopolized the marketing and processing of crops, lowered the price paid for those crops, and generally interfered negatively in rural production. In turn, the peasants adjusted either by growing different crops, by putting into motion novel ideas and new technologies, or even by migrating to urbanized regions.

Linares clearly sees the Casamance peasantry responding to governmental policies, thereby contradicting Hyden's (1998) thesis of the "uncaptured peasantry." Dramé's article also contributes to this point by showing how peasant organizations adjusted and flourished in reaction to State disengagement from the agricultural sector in the 1980s. In a careful account, Dramé describes how various peasant organizations in different parts of the region organized themselves. Peasant organizations have become important actors of social and economic change by inducing new units of production and informal financial channels. But Dramé also points to the current impediments to the development and effectiveness of these organizations, namely, the contradictions inherent in Senegalese agricultural policies, youth exodus, and the insecurity created by the conflict.

Last but not least, the article by Evans documents insecurity
very precisely. The armed conflict between the MFDC and Senegalese government forces has contributed to a range of economic problems for farmers dependent on the exploitation of natural resources for their livelihoods. Primary production is crucial to livelihoods of the Casamance villagers and they often undertake a diverse range of activities in order to survive. Although insecurity reduces access to primary production sites, Evans insists on the importance of other factors as impediments to primary production. The author stresses the importance of the wider context (poor transportation provision, national economic difficulties, and variations in rainfall) before making conclusions about the influence of the conflict on the livelihoods of the Casamance farmers. His detailed research demonstrates how difficult it is to establish the impact of armed conflict on livelihoods. One of the problems Evans signals in the marketing of produce is the lack of access to the market of Dakar, a problem that programs to secure peace in Casamance clearly have to deal with.

Before concluding, we would like to give a few points of explanation to better situate the Casamance region within Senegal. The region located south of the Gambian border has been subject to administrative reorganisations at numerous occasions (Darbon 1988). In 1984, the administrative region of Casamance, once known as the Lower, the Middle, and the Upper Casamance was subdivided into two regions instead: the region of Ziguinchor and the region of Kolda. Nevertheless, it is the old denomination of Casamance that is most frequently used by the Senegalese inhabitants and scholars alike. A majority of the Jola population live in the region of Ziguinchor, a territory slightly larger than what used to be Lower-Casamance. Most of the skirmishes, the exactions or explosions of mines have happened in this part of the region. To add to the confusion, even though Casamance has always comprised an area larger than the segment of Lower-Casamance, the word Casamance is often used loosely as a denominator for that segment. The confusion on delimitations is not insignificant. Quite the contrary, it is very politically charged. Both the Senegalese government and the MFDC have largely drawn on these ambiguities to forward their own agenda in that conflict (Marut 1994). The following maps are offered to guide the reader among the numerous geographic references of this special issue.
Map 1: The ten regions of Senegal since 1984

Map 2: The three subdivisions of Casamance before 1984

Map 3: The Casamance (Ziguinchor and Kolda regions)

Source: redesigned after an original by the African Studies Centre, Leiden, the Netherlands

Notes
1 See for example, Falowe's (2004) article focusing on how African national militaries perform during civil war and a recent book on armed conflict in Africa where the MFDC is barely mentioned (Pumphrey and Schwartz-Barcott 2003).
2 See the debate on the role of tradition in conflict resolution in Mites de fundació.

Bibliography


