INTRODUCTION

The Politics of Victimhood

Laura Jeffery and Matei Candea

Politics:

The science and art of government; the science dealing with the form, organization, and administration of a state or part of one, and with the regulation of its relations with other states (hence, imperial, national, domestic, municipal, communal, parochial, foreign politics, etc.).

fig. Conduct of private affairs; politic management, scheming, planning.

Victim:

One who is reduced or destined to suffer under some oppressive or destructive agency.

One who perishes or suffers in health, etc., from some enterprise or pursuit voluntarily undertaken.

In weaker sense: One who suffers some injury, hardship, or loss, is badly treated or taken advantage of, etc.

(Oxford English Dictionary 2006)

There is a submerged tension in the title of this collection. Anthropologists have become so accustomed to the “politics of…” formula that it has lost its shock value and perhaps also its analytical sharpness. But combine it with victimhood, we will argue, and some of its edge comes back. Contributors to this special issue seek to understand the interface between victimhood and politics. Why might people seek to be recognized as victims? How do claims to passive victimization come up against counter-claims of agency or perpetration? How should we relate to claims to subalterneity when such claims are deployed also by states and powerful groups? How should we attend to expressions of suffering when such expressions obscure or deny others’ suffering? And what are the consequences for anthropology of sharpening the analysis of the politics of victimhood?

Correspondence to: Laura Jeffery, Social Anthropology, School of Social and Political Sciences, University of Edinburgh, George Square, Edinburgh, EH8 9LL, UK. Email address: laura.jeffery@ed.ac.uk.
These questions are prompted in part by anthropological attempts to approach suffering and memory, respectively, as social and cultural objects. Thus in their introduction to *Social Suffering*, Kleinman, Das and Lock note that:

*Cultural representations of suffering*—images, prototypical tales, metaphors, models—can be (and frequently are) appropriated in the popular culture or by particular social institutions for political and moral uses (Kleinman et al. 1997b: xi).

Having recast suffering as (in part) a social object rather than (solely) an individual or natural one, contributors to their classic volume on social suffering, violence and recovery explore a wide range of topics from the combined perspectives of anthropology, social history, literary criticism, religious studies and social medicine. Drawing on case studies ranging from the atrocity of the Holocaust to the “soft knife” of everyday invisible modes of suffering, they consider how suffering is learned, used and represented, probe its ethics and its political economy, and enquire into the medicalization and mediatization of suffering and healing, as well as the incommnicability of pain (Kleinman et al. 1997a; see also Das et al. 2000; Das et al. 2001). By comparison, the spread of this volume will seem partial, as there is no attempt here to cover a full, or even a representative range of instances of victimhood. In fact some contributors would argue strongly against the very possibility of such “representativity”. The essays in this volume focus in on one aspect amongst the many covered by Kleinman et al.: the politics of victimhood. But this involves a rethinking of what we mean by both terms.

While Kleinman, Das and Lock drew suffering into the anthropological frame, Antze and Lambek, in an equally path-breaking volume (1996a), did the same to “memory”:

In sum, the book is less about memory than about “memory”… That is to say, it is about how “the very idea of memory” comes into play in society and culture and about the uses of “memory” in collective and individual practice. Put another way, it is less about the silent effects of memory than about the invocation of memory, including talk about silent effects. Thus it raises questions about the possibility of any easy distinction between memory as an unmediated, natural fact or process, and the culturally mediated acts, schemata and stories—the memory work—that comprise our memories, and the way we think about them (Antze & Lambek 1996b: xii).

Contributors to this volume have taken a similar approach to victimhood—questioning any easy distinction between victimhood as unmediated fact and what we might call, following Antze & Lambek, “victimhood work”. But this prompts a reassessment of the extent to which our other term—politics—remains taken for granted.

**When Politics and Victimhood Collide**

The “politics of…” formula usually accompanies a standard form of argument: “here is something which you had thought universal, unquestionable, or banal; let us show you what lies beneath”. What lies beneath is “politics”—and the very lack of definition of this term in most recent usages suggests that it has acquired something of a
metaphysical quality. This formula and argument have been applied successfully to
gender, identity, the body, the family, truth, science, ritual, belief, ethics, anthropology,
and there is no suggestion that there could be any aspect of human existence to which
it might not apply. The hackneyed “everything is political” might draw a few sniggers,
but few of us would be caught arguing for the opposite statement: “not everything is
political”.

And yet that is precisely the statement which victimhood often makes. Victimhood
can be a prime way of suspending or attempting to suspend the political through an
appeal to something non-agentive and “beyond” or “before” politics, such as poverty
or suffering (cf. Jeffery this volume). Even in such cases, victimhood does not negate
politics through and through. Rather, victimhood establishes a space for a specific kind
of politics; but it clears the ground, it poses itself as the neutral or indisputable starting
point from which discussion, debates, and action—in a word, politics—can and must
proceed (cf. Candea, Ochs this volume).

Victimhood thus makes a claim for a non-political space, and this is a claim to
which many anthropologists have attended. In their introduction to a recent sympo-
sium in *Political and Legal Anthropology Review* on Anthropology and Human Rights
Administrations, Iris Jean-Klein and Annelise Riles argue that anthropological
approaches to human rights tend to be determined by the subject matter. Grassroots
research on “victims” often involves “co-construction”, that is, “moral and analytical
engagement with subaltern subjects in the field of study… which becomes the
medium through which moral and social or political support is administered” (Jean-
Klein & Riles 2005: 176). Top-down research on bureaucracies and administrations
connected with states, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and state-sponsored,
extra-legal Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRCs), by contrast, results in
“deconstruction” or “denunciation”, that is, “condemning the proliferation of
technocratic regimes and the injustices inherent in organized and official relief
efforts” (2005: 176). “As soon as emerging responses to violence become formalized
and institutionalized,” they suggest, “they become possible targets of anthropological
critique” (2005: 180).

These comments are valid beyond the specific field of human rights, in many
contexts where anthropologists have encountered suffering (see Benthall 1997). As Sue
Benson has suggested (Benson n.d.), anthropologists often first identify the victim and
perpetrator, and then suit their analytical methods to this prior ethical decision. One
might argue in fact that while the suspension of politics was until recently achieved by
appeals to “impartiality”, “objectivity”, or “science” (cf. D’Andrade 1995), it is increas-
ingly being achieved by appeals to the ontological primacy of victimhood or suffering.
This tension between politics and victimhood frames many of the articles in this collec-
tion, and it prompts various responses.

Some of the contributors argue that there is a specific politics to victimhood’s
negation of the political. Thus, Laura Jeffery points to the argument according to
which “depoliticization” is itself an eminently political act (Ferguson 1994). Victim-
hood, like “development” in Ferguson’s analysis, could be seen as an “anti-politics
machine”:
depoliticizing everything it touches, everywhere whisking political realities out of sight, all
the while performing, almost unnoticed, its own pre-eminently political operation (Fergu-

What Ferguson appears to mean by politics here (and it is interesting to note in passing
that the term is nowhere defined in the book) is quite akin to the Oxford English
Dictionary definition with which this introduction opened. Through an analysis of the
mobilization of displaced Chagos islanders, Jeffery shows how being recognized as a
non-agentive victimized community encourages external support for the islanders’
political and legal campaigns for compensation and the right to return. Recognition as
depoliticized “victims”, moreover, enables Chagossian organizations to appeal for
support from diverse patron groups that otherwise have ideological disagreements
amongst themselves. Other contributors interrogate the politics of victimhood in a
genealogical vein, unpacking the historical nature of specific understandings of victim-
hood (Major, Ochs this volume).

Another approach to the politics of victimhood would be to conceptualize the
encounter between “politics” and “victimhood” as a clash between two opposed
performative entities (cf. Austin 1975), each striving to establish its own reality and
ground. As Austin noted, performatives are not primarily true or untrue, they are
successful or unsuccessful. To put politics and victimhood back to back in this way is
to recognize that not only does victimhood attempt to suspend or trump politics, the
reverse is also the case. The analytical (and political) assumption that politics is the
starting point, that it really is what lies beneath, is no more innocent, then, than victim-
hood’s claims to ontological primacy. From this perspective, inspired by radical
constructivism (cf. Pels 2002), we do not need to decide whether politics really lies
behind all claims to victimhood, or whether victimhood really is pre- or meta-political.
These are not two “readings”, but rather two alternative configurations of reality: the
question is which alternative manages to establish itself at any given point. The
problem is thus reduced from a metaphysical to an ethnographic one—with a twist.
For in this approach, we are forced to recognize the performative power of our own
ethnographic accounts—to see or refuse to see our material through the lenses of
victimhood, or of politics, is to enhance or defer such performative projects
(cf. Candea, Ochs, Yaron all this volume). This has important ethical and epistemolog-
ic consequences for our construction and representation of victimhood and for how
we position ourselves in relation to victims, to which we will return.

Whichever approach one espouses, however, there is no comfortable mode in which
to do the anthropological analysis of the politics of victimhood, and if the papers in this
volume share one thing, it is that discomfort. Aside from the many specific issues thrown
up by the various contexts in which they work, the contributors have all faced a number
of common problems inherent in the anthropological conceptualization of victimhood.
The way in which—and even the extent to which—they have chosen to resolve them
varies enormously, and the aim of this volume is to depict not a consensus, but rather
a collection of attempts to analyse, to resolve or unresolve, efforts to enter into variously
defined relationships with difficult ethnographic and historical situations. In the rest of
this introduction, we will explore some of the common themes and issues that arise from
these papers. The connections we draw should not make the reader forget, however, the many dissensions, disconnections and potential disagreements within this volume. Victimhood is not a topic which lends itself to a unified account.

**Victimhood and Agency**

In his autobiographical writings on his experiences in Auschwitz, Primo Levi refers to the concentration camp as a “grey zone” in which one can no longer assume the incommensurability between victims and perpetrators since, he argues, survivors are implicated through their own petty acts of complicity or betrayal (Levi 1988; see also Scheper-Hughes & Bourgois 2004: 10–11). Questions about the blurring of boundaries between victim and perpetrator and the presumption of the victim’s passive innocence arise clearly in Emma Tarlo’s work on the Emergency in India (Tarlo 1995). During the Emergency (1975–77), the Government demolished slums in central Delhi and determined that the urban poor left homeless would be eligible for plots in resettlement colonies only if they agreed to undergo sterilization. Tarlo notes that literature on the Emergency “tends to portray the intellectual as the emotional sufferer, the bureaucrat as the active participant and the poor as the passive victim” (1995: 2927), but shows that “the poor” is neither a homogeneous nor an inactive category. Hundreds of those displaced in fact managed to acquire resettlement plots not by undergoing sterilization themselves but by “motivating” (i.e. bribing) others even more vulnerable than themselves to be sterilized on their behalf. Thus the assumption that the poor were merely passive victims conceals the Emergency regime’s “ability to draw all kinds of people, through fear, into participation” (1995: 2927). Debates about the attribution of agency to the “victim” are discussed here in the papers by Andrea Major and Hannah Starman.

Major’s paper charts the debates in colonial India concerning the prohibition of sati (a Hindu rite in which a widow is burned to death on her husband’s funeral pyre) in the specific context of the Rajput states between 1830 and 1860. British ideas about the “martial” character and agency of the Rajputs led to representations of sati as a demonstration of the widow’s volition to die, which in turn enabled her relatives to portray her as having committed the offence and themselves as having been the victims of her “self-determined sacrifice”. A central issue in the debates about sati was whether the widow voluntarily mounted her husband’s funeral pyre (in which case she committed the offence) or was physically or mentally coerced onto the pyre (in which case she was the victim of an offence perpetrated against her for which the perpetrators could be punished by law).

In her work on the transmission of trauma from Holocaust survivors to their offspring, Starman questions the psychological diagnosis according to which this trauma is simply “inherited” in a linear and near-genetic way. She argues that second generation trauma is an indirect result of the Holocaust itself, but one which is mediated through the troubling parenting styles of traumatized Holocaust survivors. The fully justified recognition of these parents’ victim status, she claims, has often impeded any critical analysis of their parenting strategies, however, and indeed masked the mechanism whereby trauma is transmitted.
In her contribution to this volume, Zerrin Özlem Biner analyses responses in Turkey to a plea-bargaining law that enabled PKK activists to receive reductions in their sentences in return for becoming state witnesses for the Republic of Turkey. On the one hand, the pro-Kurdish press dissuaded PKK guerrillas from turning themselves in since this would entail “repentance” of what was considered to be a legitimate Kurdish struggle. On the other hand, official Turkish documentation downplayed the “repentant” imagery and instead emphasised that the law enabled those regarded by the state as former terrorists to obtain moral and legal “reinstatement” into society and into their families, who were represented as the true victims of PKK terrorism. This case study thus reminds us that designation of victim, perpetrator, guerrilla, terrorist, witness and repentant is often a matter of perspective.

The importance of issues such as perspective, comparison and commensurability are illustrated by Pamela Ballinger in her paper on the politics of exclusive victimhood in the city of Trieste, Italy (2004). She argues that “divided memory” of the Second World War has ongoing repercussions amongst the ethnic Italian majority and the Slovene minority descended from members of the Resistance (2004: 146). Each group identifies itself as having been the victim of the other group’s genocidal persecution. On the one hand, ethnic Slovenes point out, most of those killed by Nazis and fascists in the local extermination camp Risiera di San Sabba during the war were Slovene members of the Resistance. On the other, Italian nationalists retort that the Yugoslav troops who occupied the city in April–May 1945 attempted “ethnic cleansing” by killing local Italian civilians and soldiers in karstic pits known as the *foibe*, leading to a mass exodus of Italians from the area.

Each group connects its own victimhood to other historical accounts of suffering such as the Holocaust (2004: 148), but denies the other group’s right to make the same connection. The other group’s suffering is redefined in political, rather than ethnic terms (as communists, or as fascists, rather than as Slovenes or Italians), and thus becomes incomparable to the own group’s victimhood. This “exclusive victimhood” refers to a situation in which all are unable to recognize overtly the atrocities perpetrated by members of their own group or the victimhood suffered by the other group (2004: 146–50). These impassioned debates hinge on the issue of what kinds of victimhood are, or are not, commensurable, an issue addressed by Juliana Ochs and Matei Candea in this volume.

Focusing on the Israeli state’s security policies, on Jewish “terror victims” organizations, and on Israeli Jews’ experiences of the Intifada, Ochs argues for the potency of what she calls an “allusive victimhood”, in which contemporary experiences of the Intifada are made analogous to Jewish experiences of the Holocaust and to sacred historic Jewish experiences of oppression, genocide and expulsion. Reminding us of Ballinger’s concept of “exclusive victimhood”, Ochs notes that the Israeli state’s formulation of Israeli Jewish victimhood in this way downplays the significance of Palestinian suffering and of Israeli agency.

Candea’s paper focuses on the images of “resisting victimhood” through which Corsican nationalists in the 1960s compared their struggle against the French state to
Algerian anti-colonial nationalism. This comparison is being increasingly frayed by recent accusations, from the French mainland, that there is a “characteristically Corsican problem” of racism against North African labour migrants. In these discourses, which often implicitly accuse Corsican nationalists of fostering xenophobia, the latter find themselves increasingly in danger of being compared to French anti-immigrationists, rather than to resisting victims of colonialism. Virulent debates rage over which comparisons are acceptable, and over how instances of individual victimhood are made to stand for “communities of suffering” (cf. Werbner 1997: 235ff).

For Ballinger too, one of the problems in attempts by Italians and Slovenes to designate “victims” and “perpetrators” lay in “the identification of victims and perpetrators not as individuals but as representatives of a larger ethno-national collectivity” (Ballinger 2004: 148; cf. Jansen 2000: 404–5). In her contribution to this volume, Hadas Yaron draws on Jewish pioneer life histories in a kibbutz in Israel to highlight how select individual “others” (German Nazis) were able through their sympathetic actions to transcend a stereotypical categorization as “perpetrators” in the survivors’ accounts.

Victimhood and Anthropology: Breaching Boundaries

Yet Yaron, following Antze & Lambek (1996a), asks a disturbing question: might blurring the line between victim and perpetrator in the anthropological account not in some senses reiterate the perpetration itself? Like participants in the politics of victimhood, anthropologists are constantly drawing comparisons and delineating “representative” instances. If, in doing this, we analytically breach the boundary between victim and perpetrator, where, if at all, do we locate the boundary between analysis and action? The anthropology of victimhood is one field at least in which neither side of the anthropological compound “participant-observation” is morally neutral (cf. Kleinman & Kleinman 1997). The argument that analysis can replicate victimization is suggested by anti-sati protesters in India (Major this volume) who claim that to accord agency to the victim of sati is to work on the same model as the practice of widow burning itself. As many of these accounts make clear, the politics of victimhood do not sit tamely as an “object” of study, but constantly overflow into the analysis and implicate the anthropologist, for better or for worse.

Judith Butler (1997) has opened a fascinating line of enquiry by introducing the question of performatives into debates about “free speech”, a set of issues which are centrally involved with a number of the arguments put forward in this volume. Butler comments on the mutual entanglement of saying and doing, noting that arguments which radically separate talk from action ("it’s just talk") forget the fact that we are all discursively enmeshed, accessible to words which can hurt or heal. The study of victimhood is perhaps the area in which such arguments have had the greatest salience for anthropologists. As Riles and Jean-Klein have pointed out, anthropologists have often seen their role as helping victims to “re-enter language” (Jean-Klein & Riles 2005: 178), or as facilitating their recovery through the therapeutic power of narrative (see also Das 1990; Kleinman et al. 1997a: xiii). But this positive power of speech has a darker side to which we have referred above: the potential for “comment”, “analysis” or “study” to
become in itself an act of victimization. And this carries the corollary that speech, in turn, is susceptible to the interventions of victimhood. This may happen, for instance, when, as Kleinman et al. suggest, “cultural responses to the traumatic effects of political violence… transform the local idioms of victims into universal professional languages of complaint and restitution” (Kleinman et al. 1997: x). If, as Werbner (following Levinas) has pointed out, perpetrators can violently enforce silence (1997: 245), the “professional languages” of victimhood can also operate potent elisions.

This is because, to employ a famous distinction from the work of Pierre Bourdieu, the politics of victimhood are often located on the interface between that which can be debated (orthodoxies and heterodoxies), and the broader realm of the doxa itself, that which “goes without saying because it comes without saying” (1977: 167). While some of these debates are public and open, others are precisely patrolling the boundaries of the unsayable and the unthinkable. In this sense, the politics of victimhood often involve what Douglas Holmes has defined as “illicit discourses”, which aim at:

> re-establishing the boundaries, terms, and idioms of political struggle. The resulting political practice is deconstructive… Its practitioners negotiate and map the points of contradiction and fatigue of particular positions. They scavenge the detritus of decaying politics, probing areas of deceit and deception. By doing so they invoke displaced histories and reveal deformed moralities. They strive to introduce the unvoiced and unspeakable into public debate (Holmes 1993: 255).

Comparisons drawn between anti-colonial nationalists and regionalist nationalists in Corsica (Candea this volume) are currently within the bounds of French public debate. Comparisons which neo-nationalists such as the Front National draw between themselves and “minority struggles” are not within the debate—but they are constantly attempting to push such comparisons into the realm of the speakable, and claims to victimhood are one of the strategies they deploy. Similarly, the comparisons drawn in Israeli debates described by Ochs (between Holocaust victims and “terror victims”, between Holocaust victims and settlers, between Holocaust victims and Palestinians) constantly stretch the bounds of the speakable and thinkable, and modify the contours of public debate.

**Conclusion: Danger and Complexity**

This brings us to George Marcus’s observation that there is a fundamental and deeply problematic affinity between the practices of purveyors of “illicit discourses” and the anthropologists who study them, and who also “negotiate and map the points of contradiction and fatigue of particular positions” (see Marcus 1999: 125). There is a very thin line between the anthropology of victimhood and certain of the illicit discourses it studies and engages with. Some readers are bound to feel that some parts of this collection will already have inadvertently crossed that line. For instance, analysing the contradiction in certain victim positionalities can amount to precisely the kind of de-legitimization which the most violent political perpetrators might wish to see enacted. Equally, merely by documenting a number of submerged discourses, resentful critiques and unacceptable comparisons, the anthropologist could be accused of helping bring
them to the surface, or even of publicizing them. Needless to say, this is not the aim of any of the contributors to this volume, and yet, we do not wish to suggest any simple or unified resolution to this uneasy situation. In a sense, it is precisely in persisting as a clear and present danger that this uncomfortable similarity between anthropology and illicit discourses is most valuable: it reminds us to remain vigilant and aware.

Taken together, however, the contributions all share one guideline for this continued vigilance: all are aiming, in very different ways, to make a single account multiple again (Strathern n.d.: 21). By excavating forgotten ambivalences and shifts, Major questions the stark dichotomies of current debates about sati, which are grounded in monolithic depictions of older colonial understandings of the practice. Starman questions linear and naturalized accounts of intergenerational trauma transmission by focusing on the particular mechanisms whereby suffering can rebound from one generation on to the next. For Yaron, blurring contexts and historical settings through narrative is a humanist attempt to portray human complexity. Biner’s analysis of the “Reinstatement into Society” law in Turkey reminds us that designations are not clear-cut: the PKK’s legitimate guerrilla needlessly turned repentant is the Turkish state’s terrorist turned legitimate witness. Candea looks to ethnographic and historical engagement with the complexity of particular situations as the key to avoiding invidious debates about commensurability and representativity. Jeffery unpacks the unitary victimhood of displaced Chagos islanders, showing how they can be different kinds of victims to different people and how the coherence of their political action arises from this multiplicity itself. Ochs argues that documenting internal contestation and resistance to victimhood discourses challenges binaries without resorting to a high-handed deconstruction of victims’ claims. Thus the contributors to this volume point to complexity as a guide through the difficult analysis of the politics of victimhood.

Acknowledgements

This special issue is the outcome of two events on The Politics of Victimhood: a workshop in Cambridge in May 2005 (organized by Zerrin Özlem Biner, Laura Jeffery and Marta Sofia de Magalhães), and a panel at the American Anthropological Association annual meeting in Washington DC in December 2005 (chaired by Laura Jeffery). We are grateful to our discussants Caroline Humphrey, Toby Kelly, Sharika Thiranagama and Sari Wastell. The authors would especially like to thank Toby Kelly, James Laidlaw and Juliana Ochs for their contributions to this Introduction.

References


