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In the Netherlands, a significant proportion of the immigrant population has established itself as self-employed entrepreneurs in the past few years, a process which has caught the attention of researchers. This article critically examines the output of these researchers. It is concluded that although research in the Netherlands has brought to light a number of interesting facts, it has not contributed a great deal to our understanding of immigrant entrepreneurship. The harvest is one-sided, local and theoretically not very far-reaching. Research on immigrant entrepreneurship has been dominated by social scientists, who show a great deal of interest in ethnocultural characteristics and processes of ethnocultural incorporation. In so doing, they reduce immigrant entrepreneurship to an ethnocultural phenomenon existing within an economic and institutional vacuum. It is suggested that researchers seek linkages with the latest developments in international theory-building and that they pay more systematic attention to the structural changes in the urban economy and the institutional framework of the welfare state within which entrepreneurs operate.

Although nearly all Dutch politicians are still very reluctant to acknowledge it, the Netherlands has become undeniably a country of immigration. For over three decades now, the number of immigrants has exceeded that of emigrants. The composition of this immigration has been very heterogeneous in terms of countries of origin, causes of migration and endowment of human capital, and also very different in sociocultural orientation. Moreover, this composition has been anything but stable over the years. In the 1960s, for instance, so-called guestworkers from Mediterranean countries constituted an important category of immigrants. More recently, immigrants from advanced economies (mainly other EU-member states and North America) and

1The authors would like to thank Sanna Ravestein-Willis for translating the text.
refugees from less-developed countries, mainly Asia and Africa (e.g., Somalia, Iran and Iraq), are on the rise.

This continuing immigration raises the question of which socioeconomic paths of insertion in Dutch society have been accessible for newcomers. This question is relevant both for obvious policy reasons as well as from a scientific point of view. For most of the more than three decades of continuous immigration, both policymakers and scientists in the Netherlands have been phrasing answers in terms of employment. Approximately 80 percent of the immigrant labor force population in the Netherlands in 1996 worked as employees (CBS, 1996:43). Those immigrants who are not employed are commonly considered to be looking for jobs and their insertion is first and foremost achieved by providing employment for them. This understandable focus on salaried employment is, however, less and less justified as immigrants set up shop in increasing numbers. In 1987, 9,393 immigrants from the so-called target groups of minority policies were self-employed, a mere 3.3 percent of the corresponding labor force. Ten years later, this number almost trebled to 27,380 immigrant entrepreneurs, which amounts to 7.4 percent of the corresponding labor force. The percentage of self-employed among Turks is rather higher and even exceeds the national average: 12.2 percent among Turks against 10.2 percent for the entire population (Tillaart and Poutsma, 1998:39–40).

Notwithstanding the overall focus of most researchers on the employment of immigrants, some studies have been devoted to immigrant entrepreneurship. In this article, we will present a critical review of this research on self-employed immigrants. We will put this specific research in a wider perspective to generate a better, more general, understanding of how immigrants are being studied. This will involve exploring the relationship of this research with societal developments and more specifically with policy priorities. In our view, immigrant entrepreneurship can be seen as located at the intersection of a number of rather different scientific disciplines: ethnic studies, sociology, urban studies, general and business economics, economic geography, management studies, political science and policy studies. Our “meta-study” will reveal salient differences in responsiveness of these fields of (Dutch) social sciences with respect to the contemporary rise of immigrant entrepreneurship.

In what follows, we explore what kinds of research have been carried out,

---

2 Surinamese Dutch Antilleans and Arubans, Turks, Moroccans, immigrants and other Mediterranean countries, and Chinese (including those from Hong Kong) constitute the majority of the so-called target groups of minority policies as conducted by the Dutch government. The target groups include second and third generation immigrants from these areas, but exclude immigrants from other origins.
what was their focus, what were their findings, and what has been ignored. We start with a brief overview of the development of immigrant entrepreneurship in the Netherlands. This is followed by a historical review of scientific research on this phenomenon. We will conclude with formulating five strategic research perspectives that will encompass not only the various scientific disciplines, but also may serve as an international, comparative research program of immigrant entrepreneurship.

**THE DEVELOPMENT OF IMMIGRANT ENTREPRENEURSHIP**

The increase in the number of immigrant entrepreneurs in the Netherlands can be seen all along the line. A closer look reveals a marked pattern with respect to its distribution among the different groups of immigrants as well as to its spatial pattern. Certain categories of immigrants – e.g., Chinese and Turks – show great fervor for entrepreneurship. It has also been shown that self-employment of Ghanians, Egyptians and Pakistanis, groups that are (still) too small to be included in these ‘large’ surveys, is also above the national average (Choenni, 1997). Other categories seem to lag behind (see Table 1).

<table>
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<th>Entrepeneurs in the Netherlands according to land of origin, and their share in the corresponding labor force, 1986, 1992 and 1997</th>
<th>Number of entrepreneurs</th>
<th>Share of entrepreneurs in the labor force (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Surinam</td>
<td>1,725</td>
<td>4,148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch Antilles/Aruba</td>
<td>405</td>
<td>1,003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1,895</td>
<td>5,385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>866</td>
<td>1,912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Mediterranean countries</td>
<td>2,074</td>
<td>3,241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal immigrant entrepreneurs from Surinam, Dutch Antilles/Aruba, and Mediterranean countries</td>
<td>6,965</td>
<td>15,689</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China (incl. Hong Kong)</td>
<td>2,386</td>
<td>3,224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest</td>
<td>450,649</td>
<td>541,087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>560</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


If economically successful, immigrant entrepreneurship provides work and income for those members of categories of the population who face, on average, substantial obstacles in the labor market, which leads to their persistently high rates of unemployment. The economic impact of immigrant entrepreneurs is even more important than providing jobs for themselves and their employees because they may indirectly contribute to employment
opportunities for immigrants by networking along the suppliers’ chain. The National Advisory Body of Turks (JOT) concluded that the growth of employment among the Turkish population between 1986 and 1992 was due mostly to self-employed entrepreneurship. The Bureau for Economic Argumentation assumed – without much proof – that ethnic minority entrepreneurs employ on average three workers and thus calculated the total effects on employment for the Netherlands to be roughly 50,000 extra jobs (BEA, 1994:iv-v). This does not mean, however, that all immigrants desire to work with their compatriots. Half of the Turks interviewed by Veraart (1996:87-88) adamantly did not wish to do so.

Immigrant entrepreneurship, although becoming more diverse, is still strongly oriented towards specific segments of the opportunity structure. About 60 percent of all immigrant entrepreneurs can be found in sectors such as wholesale, retail and restaurants (for recent studies, see Choenni, 1997; Kloosterman, van der Leun and Rath, 1997a and 1997b; Rath, 1995, 1999a and 1999b; Rath and Kloosterman, 1998; Tillaart and Poutsma, 1998). Within these sectors, they tend to gravitate to the lower end. Barriers to entry for setting-up businesses are relatively low in these sectors, where fledgling firms do not always require large outlays of capital and sophisticated skills. Restaurants and shops can be small-scale in operation, make use of simple technology, and can perform with a high labor input relative to that of capital. By employing family members and others from their own social networks, these immigrant entrepreneurs are in many cases able to increase flexibility and reduce costs. Many immigrants enter these markets through mom-and-pop stores, thereby partially replacing businesses of indigenous entrepreneurs through so-called vacancy chains. They often cater to the ‘captive market’ of co-nationals or co-ethnics, although many entrepreneurs after a while tend to cater to a broader clientele.

Because of the low barriers to entry, the markets in which these immigrant entrepreneurs operate are generally highly competitive. The main competitors are often co-nationals or co-ethnics, and competition is largely based on price rather than on quality. Consequently, immigrant entrepreneurs frequently have to accept small profit margins, while some are forced to close down after a relatively short period. To survive in these markets, they do not always conform to the prevailing laws and regulations, so that some of their

3BEA estimated roughly 1,000 entrepreneurs from these target groups. Baetsen and Voskamp (1991:49), however, counted in their survey in Rotterdam a significantly smaller number of employees: in total 126 jobs to 56 immigrant businesses.
activities may take on a (semi-) informal character (Kloosterman, van der Leun and Rath, 1998 and 1999). As such, this informal start is anything but exceptional – many fledgling businesses go through such a phase – but the subsequent phase of growth which is necessary to formalize often does not materialize. The national and municipal governments and various advisory bodies and sector associations have tried, differing in levels of involvement, to professionalize immigrant entrepreneurship with, up until now, relatively little success. Having said this, it cannot be denied that besides the large number of mere survivors, some immigrant entrepreneurs are doing extremely well (Tillaart and Poutsma, 1998; Lof, 1997; Tinnemans, 1989).

**RESEARCH DEVELOPMENT**

One of the first social-science studies on immigration in the Netherlands was carried out by the sociographer Frederik van Heek. This study, *Chinese Immigrants in the Netherlands*, was published in 1936 (van Heek, 1936; see also Wubben, 1986). Describing the position of Chinese seamen in their so-called ‘colonies’ in the Katendrecht neighborhood in Rotterdam and around the Bantammerstraat in Amsterdam, van Heek also paid attention to sundry Chinese businesses. These businesses ranged from boarding houses, laundries, import firms, eating places, pharmacies, barbers, small casinos, and opium traders to, notably, Chinese peanut cookie vendors. Although he only superficially touched upon the economic-sociological aspects of these Chinese entrepreneurs, van Heek was the first researcher to give serious attention to immigrant entrepreneurship. His pioneering role becomes evident when we consider that it took almost half a century before other researchers were paying attention to immigrant entrepreneurship.

Admittedly, nearly all research on contemporary immigrants in the Netherlands is a rather recent phenomenon. Apart from a few (overview) studies on repatriates from Indonesia (Kraak *et al.*, 1957) and Amboneese (Ambonezen, 1959), not much attention was paid to immigration in general. This started to change towards the end of the 1970s and in the early 1980s, when the Dutch government began to display a growing awareness of the more permanent character of the recent settlers (*compare* Rath, 1991 and 1993). Accordingly, the government took the initiative for extensive research on guestworkers and Surinamese (Verwey-Jonker, 1973; Penninx, 1979; van Amersfoort, 1982). In these studies, next to no attention was paid to self-employment. Even the Society and Business Foundation (SMO), sponsored by employers’ associations, in their report on guestworkers, made no mention
of immigrant entrepreneurship (SMO, 1972). This neglect is all the more remarkable as immigrants were already setting up their businesses – albeit still in modest numbers. Guestworkers’ hostels, run by immigrants themselves, attracted attention from the media and the authorities for being fire hazards, but social scientists had no eye for them. Neither did they see the emergence of – partially informal – Turkish and Moroccan Islamic butchers (Rath et al., 1996:74–75), or register the fact that the lower social classes were finding their way to Chinese take-out restaurants where, at very low cost, huge portions of exotic food were served (Rijkschroeff, 1998). These nascent business activities on the part of immigrants stayed outside the view of researchers at that time. During the ‘leftist’ 1960s and early 1970s, entrepreneurship was definitely unfashionable. Moreover, many considered small businesses and, consequently, self-employment to be something more from the past than for the future.

It was only in the ‘neo-liberal’ 1980s that explicit research on entrepreneurship was undertaken. In 1981, two undergraduate students from the University of Amsterdam, under the supervision of the cultural anthropologist Frank Bovenkerk, wrote an article on the ‘exceptional ways of making a living’ by Chinese entrepreneurs in the restaurant business (Blom and Romeijn, 1981). In their introduction, they argued against the rather strong preoccupation of the Dutch public with Chinese crime. They also criticized the so-called ‘ethnic minorities researchers,’ who apparently did not judge the ‘predicament’ of these Chinese to be interesting enough and thus completely ignored their specific economic activities. A year later, Bovenkerk (1982a) himself took a stand against scientific experts and social workers from the emerging and government-sponsored ‘ethnic minorities industry.’ They were clearly blind to the fact that a growing number of immigrants ‘were able to find the key to success on their own, without the help of the welfare state.’ This ‘negligence’ was all the more conspicuous since, in a typical immigration country such as the United States, self-employment is customarily considered as a classical route for social mobility.

Bovenkerk advanced five explanations for this blind spot on the part of social researchers. First, the fact that one of the largest categories of immigrants, the Mediterranean guestworkers, were purposely recruited for (temporary) employment. Second, researchers (incorrectly) assumed that small businesses inevitably would have to make way for larger enterprises. Third, they tended to associate immigrant entrepreneurship with ‘a number of obviously illegal practices.’ Fourth, immigrant entrepreneurs themselves had not
attempted to draw the attention of policymakers in marked contrast to immigrant workers. Fifth, the tendency of the ‘minorities industry’ was to be more attuned to ‘social needs’ than to ‘independent initiatives of this sort.’ Bovenkerk’s criticism of the social sciences was right on target, but he, remarkably, omitted economics from his critique. Economists and students of management were completely absent in research on immigrant entrepreneurs, a subject which, ideally, should be part and parcel of their field.

Bovenkerk’s article, still worth reading today, seems to have initiated a series of research on self-employed immigrants. We mention the most important of these. To start with, there were Bovenkerk’s own theoretical deliberations (Bovenkerk, 1982b and 1983) and his empirical research on Italian ice-makers, plasterers, chimney sweeps and terrazzo workers (Bovenkerk, Eijiken and Bovenkerk-Teerink, 1983; Bovenkerk and Ruland, 1984 and 1992). In addition, Boissevain and Grotenbreg (1984, 1987a, 1987b, 1988) and others (see Boissevain, Choenni and Grotenbreg, 1984) undertook studies on self-employed Surinamese. Pennings published on self-employed Greeks (Vermeulen et al., 1985), and Pieke (1987) on Chinese restaurants. Tap (1983) pioneered research on Turkish contractors in the garment industry, followed by his collaboration with Bakker on Islamic butchers (Bakker and Tap, 1985). Veraart (1987) explored Turkish coffee houses. Dijst et al. (1984; see also Cortie et al., 1986) took the Amsterdam inner-city neighborhood Oude Pijp as their starting point for research on immigrant businesses. Jeleniewski (1984, 1987), who compared the Oude Pijp with the Schilderswijk, a neighborhood in The Hague, took the same approach. Moreover, general overviews on immigrant entrepreneurs in the Netherlands, paid for by the Dutch government, were produced by van den Tillaart and Reubsaet (1987; see also van den Tillaart, 1993). Additionally, magazines published special issues (among others Kroniek, 1984), workshops were organized and discussion papers published (Gowricharn, 1985).

Most of these studies were centered on what was considered the ethnic nature of the immigrant businesses. Ethnic loyalties and ethnic markets were assumed to be the hallmark of immigrant entrepreneurship. Furthermore, many of these studies were, one way or the other, funded by the Dutch government. The Ministry for Economic Affairs led the funding of research in this field, but other departments followed suit. Immigrant entrepreneurship came to be seen as a form of socioeconomic self-help that snugly fit in with the policymakers’ prevailing neo-liberal views on ways of incorporation of immigrants. More pragmatically, it seemed to provide a cheap and easy solution for the staggering high rates of unemployment among immigrants at that time.
In the second half of the 1980s, however, euphoria ebbed as it became clear that entrepreneurship was not a bed of roses for every immigrant. The research now seemed to emphasize the other side of the coin. Studies appeared, such as that of Bloeme and van Geuns (1987a and 1987b; see also van Geuns, 1992) on informal activities, in particular the Turkish contractors in the garment industry in Amsterdam. Immigrants had managed to penetrate into this sector of manufacturing more than in any other economic sector, and this had not gone unnoticed by self-proclaimed political spokesmen, interest groups and journalists. They published indignant works about the unequal balance of power in the industry as a whole and about the abuses in the Turkish factories in particular (for example, van Putten and Lucas, 1985; Smit and Jongejans, 1989; Smit, 1994; Stichting Opstand, 1993; Zeldenrust and van Eijk, 1992).

In the 1990s, parallel with the then manifestly strong growth in entrepreneurship in general, interest in the subject increased again. Studies were carried out by both renowned and lesser-known commercial consultants, again paid for by government agencies. Coopers and Lybrand (Serzpfand, Engels and Linssen, 1993), the Bureau for Economic Argumentation (1994), Regioplan (Hulshof and Mevissen, 1985) and Kyble Consultants (Bayraktar and van der Weide, 1996) undertook research projects. In 1996, the fully state-sponsored Social and Cultural Planning Bureau for the first time paid attention to ‘ethnic entrepreneurship’ in their yearly report ( Tessier, van Dugteren and Merens, 1996). Furthermore, van den Tillaart and Poutsma (1998) provided another general overview on immigrant entrepreneurs. Finally, Choenni (1993 and 1997), van der Meulen and Heilbron (1995) and Rijkschroeff (1996) researched the development of entrepreneurship among specific immigrant groups. The starting point of most of these studies was still the (real or alleged) ethnic character of the business activities of immigrants.

Recently, research into immigrant entrepreneurship has entered a new phase. Researchers, influenced by more encompassing views on immigration and socioeconomic developments such as have been undertaken by Sassen (1991) and Waldinger (1996), have moved away from this focus on ethnocultural endowment and have started to pay attention to the more structural economic or sociological embeddedness of immigrant entrepreneurs. Rekers (1993) has explored the role of the urban economic structure within which immigrant entrepreneurs operate. Others (Bruin, Hellingman and de Lange, 1997; Kloosterman, van der Leun and Rath 1997a, 1997b and 1998; and Rath 1995, 1999b and 2000) have taken into account the role of the institutional framework (welfare state arrangements and its concomitant set of specific rules

The commissions for research during this period are mostly from the national government (and particularly from the Ministries of Economic Affairs and Internal Affairs) and municipal governments (especially Amsterdam and Rotterdam), but also from advisory bodies such as the Temporary Scientific Committee on Minority Policy (TWCM). During this period, business institutions such as sector/trade organizations, associated companies or Chambers of Commerce, although concerned, kept fairly quiet. Exceptions to the rule are the Association of Butchers (Bakker and Tap, 1985), the Dutch Bakers’ Foundation (Swinkels, 1991), the Board of Trade for the Clothing Industry (which was only looking for arguments to settle for once and for all with the Turkish c.q. illegal clothing contracting industry) (BEA, 1992), and the Royal Association of Restaurants (Bruin et al., 1997; van Brussel and Venninckx, 1997).

Much research has thus been strongly policy-driven and to a much lesser extent undertaken out of purely scientific interest. Research objectives and questions have been, accordingly, mainly based on policy priorities allowing for only limited theoretical reflection. Many social scientists, faced with poor employment opportunities themselves, were only too eager to go along with the prevailing political agenda. Historians, also struggling on the labor market but lacking in contract research assignments, could safely ignore the policymakers’ wishes. They have researched the activities of self-employed craftsmen, hawkers, tradesmen and manufacturers of various origins, such as immigrants from the Southern Netherlands (current Belgium), Portuguese and East European Jews, French Huguenots, Roman Catholic Westphalians and gypsies (see, e.g., Berg, Wijzenbeek and Fischer, 1994; Knotter 1995; Merens, 1996; Miellet, 1987; Schrover, 1996; Rath, 1998 and 1999a).

ONE-SIDED, LOCAL AND THEORETICALLY NOT FAR REACHING

What patterns can be discerned in this short history of research into immigrant entrepreneurship in the Netherlands?
First, we notice that the field of contemporary research on immigrant entrepreneurship has been dominated by social scientists, such as cultural anthropologists, sociologists and economic geographers. Economists have been notably absent, although there are many interesting economic aspects to study, ranging from the fast rise in numbers to innovations in various entrepreneurial activities. As far as the latter is concerned, the introduction of unknown products, the discovery of new distribution lines and the servicing of under-served markets, such as that of the immigrants themselves, can be called to mind (Kloosterman, van der Leun and Rath, 1997a). The conspicuous absence of economists is not confined to the Netherlands nor to the study of immigrant entrepreneurship. Contemporary economists have given short shrift to the study of entrepreneurship in general “exactly because of the bias to the assumption that profitable activities automatically take place” (Granovetter, 1994:453). Neo-classical economics has thus de-problematized entrepreneurship altogether by making it endogenous in their models: opportunities for entrepreneurs will be perceived and, subsequently, seized by rational economic actors (cf., Block, 1990; Light and Rosenstein, 1995). The fact that economists have taken so little trouble to examine entrepreneurship in general has hampered research into primarily economic aspects of immigrant entrepreneurship in particular.

Second, the majority of researchers on immigrant entrepreneurship have displayed a great deal of interest in ethnocultural characteristics and processes of ethnocultural incorporation. Completely in line with Dutch ‘ethnic minorities research’ (Rath, 1991 and 1993), they tend to regard entrepreneurship first and foremost in ethnic terms, something which is illustrated by the indiscriminate use of the term ‘ethnic entrepreneurship.’ Exactly what distinguishes ethnic entrepreneurship from entrepreneurship in general is seldom or never (theoretically) made explicit: does this adjective refer to the origins of the entrepreneur, his or her management strategies, personnel, clientele, products, or a combination of these? The majority of researchers assume without any further reflection that there are real differences, just because they are dealing with immigrants. Explanations for every aspect of immigrant entrepreneurial behavior are directly related to ethnocultural traditions, ethnic moral frameworks and ethnic behavior patterns, ethnic loyalties or ethnic markets. Thus, they reduce immigrant entrepreneurship to an ethnocultural phenomenon existing within an economic and institutional vacuum. Choenni (1997) made an attempt to give body to the term ‘ethnic entrepreneur’ – in a more general sense he uses the policy term ‘allochtonous entrepreneurs’. His search for entrepreneurship as a route of incorporation, however, by no means rises above the ‘ethnic minori-
ties knowledge.' Instead of affiliating with theoretical insights from economics or economic sociology, he sought refuge in culturalist notions and in van Amersfoort’s thesis (1982) on the formation of ethnic minority groups.

Third, many researchers seem to neglect much of the more recent theoretical developments in international research on immigrant entrepreneurship. The anthropologists Boissevain, Bovenkerk, and Vermeulen (1991) are among the few Dutch researchers who have made headway, insofar as they have explored articulated theoretical viewpoints in (international) publications. The lack of theoretical depth has much to do with the policy-driven character of most of the research so far. Most government agencies have little time for theoretical reflections and contract research is strongly geared towards more pragmatic questions. Those researchers that try to integrate theoretical insights mostly refer to the same sources. In general, they start with the viewpoints of Light (1972) and Bonacich (1973) and end with the interactive model of Waldinger and associates (1990). This interactive model – which is more of a classification than an explanatory model – is intended to assist the understanding of ethnic strategies, whereby the strategies are considered to be the products of group characteristics and the surrounding opportunity structures. The book, however, neglects a number of crucial questions: why are immigrants a priori depicted as unchanging ethnic subjects; why is the economic context within which their entrepreneurship develops viewed as more or less static and the institutional context simply portrayed by the listing of laws and regulations (see, more extensively, Rath, 2000)? Notwithstanding these criticisms, Ethnic Entrepreneurs, with contributions by a group of prominent international researchers (e.g., Blaschke, Boissevain, Light, McEvoy, Morokvasic, Phizacklea, Waldinger and Webner), is still a valuable book, illustrating the insights which were commonplace halfway through the 1980s. Viewing this book as a be-all and end-all of research on immigrant entrepreneurship makes one not only miss the more recent developments in international theory-building (such as Light and Rosenstein, 1995; Waldinger, 1996), but also means foregoing a chance to make a contribution to the current international debate on the subject. More recently, we ourselves have initiated an ambitious research program with an explicit international comparative dimension to try to advance this type of research in the Netherlands (see, e.g., Kloosterman, van der Leun and Rath, 1998 and 1999; Rath, 1999a and 2000).

Fourth, in conjunction with the ethnic bias, most scientific researchers have paid little systematic attention to the underlying structural changes of the economy in general and specific markets in particular. Neither have they paid much attention to the overall institutional framework of the corporate
welfare state within which entrepreneurs operate. Exceptions are Boissevain and Grotenbreg (1986 and 1987b), Bloeme and van Geuns (1987), Kehla et al. (1996), Raes (1996 and 1999), Rekers (1993) and our own work (Kloosterman 2000; Kloosterman, Rath and van der Leun 1998; Rath 1998, 1999a and 2000). When studying ethnic entrepreneurs, many researchers found it perfectly sensible to implicitly assume that market conditions are of little importance. As if bakers, car-repair shops, ice-cream parlors, garment factories and bureaus for intercultural communication operate under more or less identical market conditions, have to deal with the same set of regulations and institutions, and thus demand similar entrepreneurial skills and produce similar results. Obviously, this is not the case. Take, for instance, the strong rise of Turkish contractors in the Amsterdam garment industry during the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. The proliferation of contractors was very much linked to the changing consumption patterns and purchasing strategies of wholesalers and chain stores, as well as the fairly tolerant attitude of the relevant authorities towards informal practices. The collapse of the industry halfway through the 1990s was linked to the opening of new markets in Eastern Europe and with the more rigorous control on illegal work and tax evasion. The political mobilization of the contractors and their political advocates brought no change. This example shows the extent to which specific processes external to the entrepreneurs and their businesses can thwart entrepreneurship within one sector. To obtain a deeper insight on the functioning of entrepreneurship, a broad theoretical approach, which goes way beyond ethnic studies, is a necessity.

In sum, we must conclude that although research in the Netherlands has brought to light a number of interesting facts, it has not contributed a great deal to a more thorough understanding of immigrant entrepreneurship. The harvest is one-sided, local and theoretically not very incisive. This deficiency is, to a large extent, explained by the specific combination of a particular rather recent tradition of conducting research on minorities in the Netherlands and the fact that most of the research was commissioned by the Dutch government with the more or less explicit purpose of improving the socioeconomic position of immigrants in the Netherlands after 1970. The absence of economists, general and business, has resulted in a neglect of underlying economic processes and a narrow focus on (real or alleged) ethnic factors.

NEW DIRECTIONS FOR RESEARCH

The rise of immigrant entrepreneurship in the Netherlands during these past years has become ever more manifest. This development has prompted pene-
trating questions regarding the relationship of entrepreneurship with, for example, the immigrant’s social mobility or segregation of the housing market. As we have already seen, most researchers have approached these important questions from an ethnocultural perspective, showing a certain preference for case studies of specific ethnic groups. This more parochial approach to immigrant entrepreneurs and to immigrants in general, will, in the end, primarily re-ascertain essentialist conceptions of ethnicity and not contribute to the interrelationship between immigration and its wider context (cf., Cassarino, 1997; Rath, 2000).

In the case of immigrant entrepreneurship, where many strands meet, we propose a multi-disciplinary approach to assess this relationship from a theoretical perspective which allows explicit international comparison. We therefore seek linkages with economic-geographic or economic-sociological viewpoints on entrepreneurship in particular and business activity in general. Ethnocultural factors are not given a priori an independent role, but are integrated into a greater whole, while other variables are given their due attention. The change in the direction of the theoretical standpoint from ethnocultural to more general economic, sociological or geographical perspectives, makes it possible to build on other, possibly more fruitful research traditions of related disciplines. Moreover, we can immediately locate immigrant entrepreneurship in a broader context with far-reaching consequences. This line of reasoning constitutes no less than a plea for a break with the research tradition which has developed during the last fifteen years in the Netherlands. This, by implication, also means at least an arms’ length distance from the government and its policy-driven contract research.

To explore immigrant entrepreneurship, we suggest linking up with a number of current, more theoretically-informed research perspectives. We start with a perspective that sees the entrepreneur first and foremost as an economic actor; following this, we suggest a number of perspectives on the meso-level, and finish with an international comparative perspective.

The first perspective views the entrepreneur as an individual actor: Schumpeterian entrepreneurship. This perspective is advocated by the so-called Austrian School (Kirzner, 1997; see Light and Rosenstein, 1995 for a more critical view). Central in this perspective is the question to what extent the entrepreneur is really innovative and thus able to avoid the dictates of the market in the neo-classical sense. An entrepreneur can, through innovation of the product, the production-method, logistics, distribution or marketing, procure a monopoly – albeit generally short-term. Such an opportunity offers the entrepreneur the chance to temporarily raise prices and make monopoly
profits where other, non-innovative entrepreneurs have to accept the price and the lower rewards which ensue. To what extent are the immigrant entrepreneurs such ‘real entrepreneurs?’ How do they create their monopolies? To what extent are they able to maintain and exploit their monopolies? To what extent – to use a concrete example – is the first Turkish baker in a neighborhood an innovative entrepreneur; if so, on the basis of what (product, market, organization of production, otherwise); how long can he keep his monopoly – if it exists – intact; and which other businesses eventually usurp it?

The second perspective lays emphasis on the social embeddedness of entrepreneurs, a subject which preoccupies the contemporary economic sociologists (Light, 2000; Portes, 1995a; Portes and Sensenbrenner, 1993; Waldinger, 1996; Rath, 2000). The insight that entrepreneurs do not operate in a social vacuum, but that they are embedded in various social networks which they use and manipulate for economic goals, has taken root. The term ‘social capital’ is used in this context. Such social capital is an important prerequisite, but no guarantee, for economic success. Each social relationship has its own shortcomings, as well as inherent material and immaterial costs (Flap, Kumcu and Bulder, 2000). Thus, embeddedness in social networks of workers can be strong, and the embeddedness in economically relevant networks of suppliers and financial institutions, weak. More systematic and theoretically grounded research on the distribution, density and working of such social networks is absolutely necessary for a good understanding of immigrant entrepreneurship. Research on the international distribution of such networks and their extent and meaning for transnational economies fits this perspective (compare Aktar and Ögelman, 1994; Portes, 1995b; Strijp, 1997; Wallace, Chmoulari and Sidorenko, 1996).

The third perspective is closely related, but has as a starting-point the (line of) business and not the entrepreneur. It is based on general business studies and gives a pivotal role to firms in economic networks and value systems (Porter, 1990; Elfring and Foss, 1997). Economic networks can offer businesses various possibilities – for example, in the form of complementary assets: specific skills which in combination can lead to a more or less unique product – but can also trap them in traditions which can hamper innovation. Which position do immigrant businesses occupy in such networks and value systems? To what extent does their immigrant background determine their position? Under what circumstances is this an asset or a disadvantage?

The fourth perspective draws attention to the relationship between immigrant businesses and more general transformation processes in advanced
(urban) economies. Sassen’s work (1988, 1991), for example, places the economic activities of immigrants in the larger context of changes in the urban economic structure. In the Netherlands, also, an attempt has been made in this direction (Kloosterman, 1996; Kloosterman, van der Leun and Rath, 1997b; Rath, 1995 and 1999b). Further research will have to explore in more detail the relationship between immigrants’ activities and the rise of an urban service economy. In this way, more precise information can be gathered on the exact position which (immigrant) businesses occupy in economic activities in specific economic sectors (compare Raes, 1996, 2000).

The fifth perspective focuses on the political-institutional framework. Although this perspective is often found in international research on unemployment, it has not yet taken hold in research on entrepreneurship. It makes sense to develop this research avenue. What kinds of relationships exist between the political-institutional framework (in particular, the nature of the welfare state) and (immigrant) entrepreneurship, both direct and indirect (for example, via the labor market). With this latter viewpoint, links can be made with the research initiated by Esping-Andersen on the broad effects of the labor market’s institutional framework on the extent of employment in the post-industrial era (Kloosterman, 2000). The institutional framework includes the law and the issuing of rules and regulations concerning economic activity and its implementation (Freeman and Ögelman, 2000). To what extent are rules and regulations favorable or unfavorable for entrepreneurs operating in the more marginal sectors of the economy, and to what extent are economic activities carried out in an informal atmosphere (Kloosterman, van der Leun and Rath, 1997b; Rath 1999a)?

In principle, these meso-perspectives can be well combined with our last perspective, the international comparison. The renaissance of entrepreneurship and the role of immigrants is certainly not just of concern in the Netherlands. As stated, this development also takes place in other advanced economies. Until now, almost no international comparative research has been carried out (for exceptions, see Ward, 1987; Morokvasic, 1993; Morokvasic, Phizacklea and Rudolph, 1986; Morokvasic, Waldinger and Phizacklea, 1990; Razin, 1993).4 This scarcity is probably explained by the great conceptual complexity and problems involved with the gathering of comparable data (Kloosterman, 2000). The design and implementation of

4Under the auspices of IMES, University of Amsterdam, international comparative research of immigrant businesses in the garment industry in Britain, France, the Netherlands and the United States is currently being carried out. See: http://home.pscw.uva.nl/rath/immnet.htm
systematic international comparative research, for example, from within the institutional framework, could lead to the development of a new vision on immigrant entrepreneurship whereby new relationships may come to light.

Entrepreneurship has many facets; the ethnocultural background of the entrepreneur is just one of these. With the abovementioned suggested perspectives, it will be possible to link this specific facet systematically with others. Linking up with other perspectives to economic activities will allow for a broader understanding of immigrant entrepreneurship than is now possible and will, eventually, contribute meaningfully to other disciplines in the Netherlands and, more importantly, abroad. This step is, in the long term, not only fruitful for the incorporation of immigrant entrepreneurs in an advanced economy but for the emancipation of those who do research on this subject.

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Immigrants’ Pathways to Business Ownership: A Comparative Ethnic Perspective

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This paper provides a comparative perspective of pathways to entrepreneurship among Hispanic (mostly Mexican), Korean, non-Hispanic white, and Middle-Eastern/South-Asian entrepreneurs to identify common and unique circumstances conducive to business ownership. A stratified random sample business survey conducted in an immigrant neighborhood in Chicago is analyzed, to determine whether employment in a co-ethnic firm and informal self-employment serve as a stepladder to business ownership. The blocked mobility hypothesis is examined by considering self-reports about reasons for becoming self-employed. Results show that the informal economy is a common pathway to steady self-employment for Hispanics, whereas entry through employment in a co-ethnic firm was more common among Koreans than immigrants from Mexico, the Middle East, and South Asia. Koreans see business ownership as a way to overcome blocked mobility, but virtually all desire their offspring to acquire “good jobs” in the open labor market. For Hispanics, business ownership is not solely an instrument for overcoming discrimination, but rather a strategy for intergenerational mobility.

The rapid increase in the rates of self-employment and the number of immigrant-owned business enterprises spawned a plethora of studies to address why rates of self-employment are higher among foreign-born compared to non-immigrant co-ethnics, and why some groups, e.g., Koreans and Cubans, are more successful establishing small businesses than others, e.g., Mexicans and Filipinos (Light and Sanchez, 1987; Waldinger and Aldrich, 1990; Light

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682 IMR Volume 34 Number 3 (Fall 2000): 0682–0706
and Rosenstein, 1995; Rajmam, 1996). While there is general agreement that access to capital, labor and business know-how enable immigrants to establish small businesses in the United States (Aldrich et al., 1984; Portes and Bach, 1985; Portes, 1987; Light and Bonacich, 1988; Waldinger et al., 1990a), there remains considerable disagreement about how residential concentration promotes or inhibits the proliferation of immigrant enterprises (Aldrich and Reiss, 1976; Aldrich et al., 1985; Aldrich et al., 1989; Evans, 1989; Waldinger et al., 1990b; Boyd, 1991a; Logan et al., 1994; Light and Karageorgis, 1996). For example, several residentially concentrated groups, like Mexicans and African Americans, exhibit low rates of business ownership while other residentially dispersed groups, like Asian Indians, have high rates of entrepreneurial activity. Because the study of immigrant business ownership has largely focused on groups with high rates of self-employment, it is virtually impossible to ascertain whether under-represented groups access the business world by mobilizing social and financial resources differently than other immigrant groups. Consider the following two vignettes that exemplify contrasting pathways to business ownership.

Antonio Perez, a 35-year-old Mexican immigrant with only five years of education owns a grocery store in Little Village, an immigrant neighborhood in Chicago. Before opening the business, he worked in an American-owned factory from which he was fired. He began his business career as a street vendor until he opened the store in the community (in 1989), just ten years after immigrating to the United States. His business operated for three months without a license because he did not know about this legal requirement, which, ironically, he learned from a casual street vendor. The first year was very difficult and in order to make ends meet, he collected junk as a side activity. His wife and 16-year-old daughter also work in the current business. His strong entrepreneurial drive is evident in his response to shifting sales. When sales slump, Antonio smooths income flows by filling his truck with merchandise and selling on various streets in communities around Chicago. He is interested in having a family member take over his business when he retires.

Tae-Jon Kim is a 42-year-old Korean immigrant who arrived in the United States in 1987 with his 37-year-old wife, Hei. She holds a high school degree and Tae-Jon finished two years of college in Seoul (Korea), where he operated a marketing-consulting business for one year. Because Tae-Jon perceived very limited employment options in the United States, he decided business ownership was his only choice. That option also proved limiting for a Korean immigrant unaccustomed to the culture
and language of the United States. By working four years as a manager for a distant relative who owned a men's wear retail business, Tae-Jon learned the trade, language and the "American" way of doing business. In 1991 (3 years before being interviewed) he opened his first business in a flea-market mall. His wife held a job in a factory during the first year the business operated to provide supplementary income for the family, but subsequently returned to full-time homemaking. Although Tae-Jon helped his brother and sister start their own business, he is not interested in having his own kids take over the business.

These vignettes raise several questions regarding what aspects of entrepreneurial experiences are shared and which are group-specific. To answer these questions and understand the differential rates of business formation along ethnic lines, this article examines several ideas based on the wealth of theoretical approaches to ethnic enterprises. First, we consider how different groups access the world of business ownership. More specifically, we examine ethnic differences in the extent to which employment in a co-ethnic firm is a steppingstone to business ownership (Tae-Jon's case) and whether informal self-employment facilitates the process of business formation by serving as an alternative training sector for prospective entrepreneurs (Antonio's case). We also consider why different ethnic groups enter the world of business by testing the hypothesis that self-employment helps overcome blocked mobility for recent immigrants and comparing the reasons for accessing the world of business along ethnic lines. Although the ideas are not novel, no study has systematically compared entrepreneurs of various national origins to identify common and unique circumstances conducive to business ownership along these theoretical dimensions.²

To address these questions, we rely on a case study of ethnic-owned and operated businesses in Little Village, a predominantly Mexican immigrant community in Chicago. Little Village is an interesting case study for understanding ethnic variation in entrepreneurial activity for several reasons. First,

²Most of the studies that analyze determinants of self-employment in a comparative ethnic perspective are based on census data. See, e.g., Borjas, 1986; Razin, 1988; Boyd, 1991b; Butler and Herring, 1991; Sanders and Nee, 1996; Light and Rosensteil, 1995; Fairlie and Meyer, 1996; Razin and Light, 1998. However, from census data we learn about the demographic characteristics of the self-employed but virtually nothing about their establishments. Thus, to address the factors conducive to ethnic enterprise (beyond personal characteristics) a customized survey was required. Waldinger (1990) collected data for different ethnic groups (Puerto Ricans, white Americans, Dominicans, Chinese, foreign-born Jews, Italians, Koreans, Greeks, Cubans and Irish) in the area of Sunset Park, Brooklyn (80 interviews in 1986). Gold's ethnographic study (1992) compared Soviet Jews and Vietnamese refugees. However, neither comparative study addresses the issues we consider.
the neighborhood’s vital business community provides an ideal setting for studying in detail the prevalence of business ownership among Hispanics in general and Mexicans in particular. Our focus on Mexicans is novel as well. Previous research on ethnic entrepreneurship has implied that because of their working-class background, Mexican immigrants in the United States represent a wage labor pool destined to blue-collar and service jobs and not to business ownership (Portes and Bach, 1985:167, 297; Light and Bonacich, 1988:xi). Whether by design or default, the focus of most studies of ethnic entrepreneurship on groups with high visibility in small businesses, such as Koreans, Cubans and Chinese, has been taken as \textit{prima facie} evidence of their unique entrepreneurial predispositions. Because most studies have been based on single groups (Portes and Bach, 1985; Min, 1988; Light and Bonacich, 1988; Engstrom and McCready), it is difficult to ascertain what factors conducive to self-employment are group-specific and which are shared. Second, although predominantly a Mexican residential community, the Little Village business community is ethnically heterogeneous. During the last decade or so, various ethnic groups (Koreans, Arabs, Chinese, Vietnamese and Pakistanis) joined the white and Mexican business owners in Little Village. This rich ethnic diversity allows for an in-depth study of the Hispanic business community as well as a comparative study of business formation along ethnic lines.

After summarizing the key theoretical ideas on which our empirical analysis builds, we describe the survey used and present a comparative profile of business owners and their businesses. Subsequently, we contrast pathways to self-employment among Hispanic (mostly Mexicans), Korean, non-Hispanic white, Middle Eastern and South Asian business owners in Little Village. In the concluding section, we draw a typology of pathways to business ownership that summarizes the specific and general circumstances that promote entrepreneurship and discuss the implications of these differences for business formation.

\textit{T}heoretical Background

Several hypotheses have been advanced to explain how different immigrant groups access the world of business ownership, particularly in the context of concentrated immigrant neighborhoods. The stepladder argument maintains that immigrants’ employment in enterprises owned and operated by other co-ethnics, even at low wages, enables acquisition of knowledge and experience required to establish a business. From this perspective, time spent at low-wage employment is a form of on-the-job training rather than exploitation of
immigrant workers by co-ethnics. Moreover, social ties within the ethnic economy widen workers’ contacts and increase the chances that employees will move through a variety of jobs that allow for the acquisition of industry-specific business skills. With such training opportunities in place, the immigrant sector grows via a self-feeding process that allows newcomers to work in ethnic firms, from which a subset will set up businesses of their own after acquiring relevant skills and becoming acclimated to the U.S. labor market (Portes and Bach, 1985; Portes and Manning, 1986; Bailey and Waldinger, 1991; Waldinger, 1993; Light and Karageorgis, 1994). Although these ideas have been used to describe the experiences of specific groups, no prior study has documented from a comparative perspective whether entry into self-employment builds on a stepladder experience.

Another set of ideas about how ethnic groups access the world of entrepreneurship concerns the role of informal self-employment in fostering business formation. Informal self-employment also can be a stepladder to formal business ownership, particularly among immigrants whose skills preclude economic mobility in low-wage employment (Castells and Portes, 1989; Stepick, 1989). There exists very little empirical evidence on the share of immigrant businesses that began informally, except through anecdotal accounts that provide neither a clear sense of prevalence nor a sense of differential occurrence among national origin groups. Furthermore, even among established businesses, informality may play a role in enhancing the likelihood that immigrant businesses will succeed by permitting income smoothing during slow periods, by lowering transaction costs, or by providing risk insurance. Of course, not all businesses lend themselves to informal practice from statistical discrimination or the nontransferability of skills acquired abroad. The latter refers to the idea that high-skilled immigrants seek self-employment as a solution to anticipated discrimination in the U.S. labor market. Presumably, the lack of skills that can be readily transferred to the United States coupled with poor English fluency, drive immigrant workers into the small business sector. Owning and operating a business provides an avenue for economic mobility in a “protected” market, that is, a market relatively shielded from competition with native-born workers of comparable skills (Light, 1972, 1979, 1980, 1985; Bonacich and Modell, 1980; Min, 1988).

Both the stepladder and the blocked mobility hypotheses have been examined with Korean and other Asian immigrants (Light, 1972; Min, 1988) and, to a lesser extent, with Cuban immigrants (Portes and Bach, 1985), but
never with Arab or Hispanic origin immigrants. Notions about how informal employment activities are conducive to the development of formal businesses have been explored with Haitian and Cuban immigrants (Stepick, 1989) and, to a lesser extent, with other unskilled immigrants from Latin America (Portes and Sassen-Koob, 1987). That this practice has not been challenged reflects the absence of data to develop and test hypotheses comparatively. Evaluating the stepladder and blocked mobility hypotheses with groups other than those from which the original theoretical ideas were derived provides a more solid ground for falsification and verification than the single-group comparisons that have dominated the study of ethnic enterprises. In the following section, we reconsider these hypotheses by presenting comparative empirical evidence. Although most of the analyses are descriptive, they provide a preliminary foray to understand immigrants’ pathways to business ownership from a comparative ethnic perspective. We show that although business ownership is universally considered a source of economic mobility in the United States, ethnic groups have distinctive pathways to business ownership. Specifically, the informal economy is a common pathway to steady self-employment for Mexicans, whereas entry through employment in co-ethnic firms is more common among Koreans than for immigrants from Mexico, the Middle East and South Asia. Koreans see business ownership as a way of overcoming blocked mobility, but virtually all desire their offspring to acquire “good jobs” in the open labor market. For Hispanics, business ownership is not solely an instrument for overcoming labor market disadvantages stemming from low stocks of human capital, but also a strategy for generating resources to be transferred to subsequent generations.

THE LITTLE VILLAGE STUDY

Little Village, a neighborhood on the southside of Chicago, is the largest Mexican community in the Midwest. The neighborhood experienced considerable social and economic change between 1970 and 1990. In 1970, Hispanics constituted only 30 percent of the neighborhood population, which numbered 62,895 residents. During the next twenty years, Hispanics became the predominant ethnic group, comprising 82 percent of all residents by 1990. The process of residential succession generated a crucial market condition for the development of a business sector – that is, a critical mass of ethnic consumers to support ethnic businesses. Merchants and leaders in the community (with whom we met) proudly talk about West 26th street being the second most successful commercial strip in Chicago (after the Magnifi-
cent Mile on Michigan Avenue). Besides formal store fronts, street vendors (Mexican fruteros and eloteros, and Arab cassette vendors) augment the vitality of business activity in the community throughout the year, but especially during the summer months.

For this study, we conducted a survey of businesses located in Little Village. The survey is based on a stratified random sample of establishments that were in operation during the Spring of 1994. Our canvassing of the neighborhood yielded about 1,000 business establishments, which were stratified according to primary type of industry, product, or service. Relatively uncommon businesses, such as bridal shops, bakeries, iron works products and factories, were sampled at a rate of 100 percent. Relatively abundant enterprises, like restaurants, bars, auto repair shops and hair salons, were sampled at a rate of 35 percent. All remaining establishments were sampled at a rate of 50 percent. Weights inverse to the sampling ratio are applied to represent the universe of business enterprises.

We drew a sample of 340 establishments, of which 36 were closed by the date of the interview; ten were franchises or not-for-profit operations, five were secondary businesses of respondents in the sample, and three were owned by Cantonese-speaking Chinese, which we excluded for cost reasons. That is, it was not cost-efficient to translate the survey instrument for these cases. Our target sample was 200, therefore we surveyed 286 enterprises and successfully interviewed 204, with a response rate of 71 percent.

In addition, Little Village houses a Jewish-owned, Korean-operated discount mall that accommodates 120 small booths which are rented by Koreans, Arabs, Asian Indians, Mexicans, and other Hispanic immigrants. We drew a stratified random sample of these booths and interviewed 35 percent of Korean and Hispanic businesses and all booths rented by other groups. Of the 64 operators contacted for interview from the mall sample, 63 percent were successfully interviewed. As such, the response rate for the combined

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3It should be noted that the canvassing approach has limitations because it does not detect businesses that are not visible from the street, which are usually informal home businesses. Our household survey in the same community documented the pervasiveness and character of these economic activities, which mostly involve women in part-time domestic and child-care work (Tienda and Rajman, 2000).

4Professional services (such as lawyers and health services) were not sampled for theoretical reasons. Both the process and the formal requirements for self-employment in medicine and law are sufficiently different from those required to establish small business enterprises. Furthermore, most of the clinics located in Little Village actually were part of large HMO networks that were affiliated with one of the major hospitals in the City of Chicago. Thus, our sample represents all service industries except legal and medical services.
sample of stores from booths and businesses was 70 percent. This is a highly successful response rate given that we insisted on interviewing owners and declined to conduct interviews with managers or other employees.\(^5\)

The business instrument solicited information about household and respondent characteristics, a set of questions to measure risk disposition, employment activity before the current business, and inputs for business start-up, including sources of capital, use of credit, problems and financial barriers, family members’ participation, employees and clients, suppliers, social networks, organizational participation, and current financial status. The originality of the instrument lies in its emphasis on how ethnicity, through multiple social and economic domains, influences the creation and development of businesses. Another unique feature of the instrument is its reliance on extensive use of open-ended questions. To initiate the interviews, respondents were asked to narrate their business careers in general, and their current businesses in particular. This question generated rich data about the pathways to business ownership.

**ETHNIC ENTERPRENEURS IN LITTLE VILLAGE: A COMPARATIVE PROFILE**

We begin with a comparative socioeconomic profile of ethnic entrepreneurs in Little Village, focusing on dimensions relevant to understanding the applicability of the stepladder and the blocked mobility hypotheses for understanding the process of business formation. Table 1 reports selected characteristics of the business owners and their firms surveyed. As expected, the vast majority (75%) were of Hispanic origins (predominantly Mexican) and, of these, virtually all were foreign born (92 percent of Hispanic business owners were born abroad). Of the Hispanic foreign-born, 96 percent were from Mexico and the remainder from Central America. Half of the remaining business owners in Little Village were Koreans, while Middle Eastern, other South Asian (Indian and Pakistani) and non-Hispanic whites comprised 12 percent of total business owners. All Korean, Middle Eastern, and South Asian business owners were foreign born. Immigrant business owners were younger than non-Hispanic whites (43–45 years and 53 years, respec-

\(^5\)All interviews were conducted by bilingual interviewers. If a business had multiple owners, only one was interviewed. Respondents who had multiple businesses were queried about their main business. It was unnecessary (and too costly) to interview all owners because the instrument solicited detailed information about the nature of the partnership and the division of responsibilities among owners. Multiple interviews would have resulted in much redundant information. Less than 10 percent of our respondents were partners.
tively). Among immigrant business owners, the vast majority (80%) were married, compared to just over half of U.S.-born Hispanic establishment owners. Hispanic immigrants who owned businesses in Little Village averaged 23 years of U.S. residence compared to just eleven and fifteen years for Korean and Middle Eastern business owners, respectively. Foreign-born Hispanic business owners were less proficient in English than either Korean or Middle Eastern business owners.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Owner Characteristics</th>
<th>Hispanic Native-Born</th>
<th>Hispanic Foreign-Born</th>
<th>Korean</th>
<th>Middle East and S. Asia</th>
<th>White</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>53.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(10.7)</td>
<td>(9.5)</td>
<td>(10.3)</td>
<td>(8.9)</td>
<td>(11.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>% Female Respondents</strong></td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>15.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Marital Status</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Currently Married</td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>81.2</td>
<td>83.8</td>
<td>84.4</td>
<td>76.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Ever Married</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Never Married</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenure in the country years</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(9.5)</td>
<td>(5.8)</td>
<td>(6.5)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>English proficiency</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Very proficient</td>
<td>64.5</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Moderately proficient</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>83.8</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Not proficient</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of formal schooling</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.8)</td>
<td>(4.1)</td>
<td>(2.6)</td>
<td>(2.2)</td>
<td>(2.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Academic degree</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td>65.7</td>
<td>52.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Foreign-earned degree</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>60.5</td>
<td>88.6</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Owned a prior business</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>39.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% If prior business abroad</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry Distribution</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Construction</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Manufacturing</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Wholesale and Retail Trade</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>62.9</td>
<td>97.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>55.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Finance-insurance-real-estate</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Personal, business and repair</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Entertainment and recreation</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Professional and related</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Little Village Business Survey
Note: n.a. = Not applicable

Education and prior business experience provide general skills, training and knowledge – human capital – that enables individuals to organize and establish businesses in the United States. Ethnic groups differ appreciably in such human capital resources. Hispanic immigrant establishment owners averaged nine years of formal schooling, while Korean, Middle Eastern and South Asian owners (also foreign born) averaged at least two years of college. U.S.-born His-
panic business owners averaged twelve years of graded schooling. More than half of Korean and non-Hispanic white and two thirds of Middle Eastern and South Asian business owners received an academic degree, compared to one third and 10 percent of native-born and immigrant Hispanics, respectively. Among immigrants, the majority of the degree holders completed their education in their home countries. These characteristics, especially U.S. tenure, English proficiency and education, have direct implications for the likelihood of business ownership (Borjas, 1986; Portes, 1987; Evans and Leighton, 1989; Aronson, 1991; Butler and Herring, 1991; Fairlie and Mayer, 1996).

Previous experience in the world of business – what Frazier (1949) designates as “the art of buying and selling acquired in the sending countries” – has been singled out as the key factor promoting business growth within an ethnic community. Presumably, immigrants equipped with urban skills and trade experiences acquired in their countries of origin can be much more successful than other immigrant groups that lack that kind of training. Experienced businessmen are better prepared to cultivate economic activities in their host societies than their inexperienced counterparts because they bring know-how from their home countries (Portes and Bach, 1985). Ethnic entrepreneurs in Little Village differ considerably in their previous business experiences. Two thirds of all Korean business owners in the community had previously operated businesses, compared to 45 and 40 percent of Middle Eastern/South Asian and non-Hispanic white merchants, respectively. Hispanic business owners had less experience in business ownership. Only one fifth of U.S.-born and one third of foreign-born Hispanic establishment owners had previously owned businesses. Almost half of Korean business owners with previous entrepreneurial experience reported owning a former business in their home country, compared to one third of their immigrant counterparts from Mexico and Central America and one fifth of Middle Eastern/South Asian business owners.

The bottom panel of Table 1 reports the industrial distribution of business establishments in Little Village by the ethnicity of the owner. Retail trade was the modal industry, but there were notable differences by ethnicity of the owner. Virtually all Korean, Middle Eastern and South Asian owned businesses involved retail or wholesale trade activities, compared to only 63 percent of businesses owned and operated by Hispanic immigrants and half of all businesses owned and operated by U.S.-born Hispanics and non-Hispanic whites. Given the ethnic composition of the community, Spanish-speaking immigrants have a comparative advantage operating entertainment and recreation services, as well as business and repair services. Korean business
owners concentrated in clothing (nearly 63%) and other general retail concerns, such as electronics, jewelry and beauty supply outlets. By contrast, only 38 percent of Middle Eastern and South Asian entrepreneurs and less than 10 percent of non-Hispanic white business owners were engaged in retail clothing businesses.

Approximately 40 percent of non-Hispanic and U.S.-born Hispanic storefront owners were engaged in sale of furniture, music, photo-processing, laundromats, video rentals and jewelry. One third of U.S.-born Hispanic owners operated auto repair shops, compared to only 9 percent of Hispanic immigrants. Restaurants in Little Village were predominantly a Mexican immigrant concern, as were hair salons and barbershops. In these businesses that cater to an ethnic clientele, immigrants from Spanish-speaking countries have a clear competitive advantage. Koreans were notably absent from food-store and bakery ownership, which was dominated by foreign-born and U.S.-born Mexicans (nearly 20% were so engaged) and a few Middle Eastern/South Asian immigrants. This rich data from the business community of Little Village invites a comparative analysis of pathways to business ownership, to which we now turn.

PATHWAYS TO BUSINESS OWNERSHIP: A COMPARATIVE ETHNIC APPROACH

Given group differences in human capital resources, including prior business experience, and length of U.S. residence, we expected distinct pathways to business ownership, as shown in Table 2. The top panel reveals that over 60 percent of Hispanic, Korean and Middle Eastern/South Asian-owned businesses were started by the current owner, compared to only 29 percent of those owned by non-Hispanic whites. Whereas trivial shares of immigrant-owned businesses were inherited, 16 percent of establishments owned by non-Hispanic whites and 13 percent of firms owned by U.S.-born Hispanics were so acquired. That over half of businesses owned and operated by non-Hispanic whites were bought, rather than created, suggests a stronger capital position of this group relative to the immigrant minority populations. One third of Korean businesses were purchased outright. This confirms two circumstances documented by prior researchers, namely that Koreans are more likely to come with prior business experience (see Table 1) and greater capital resources compared to other recent immigrants (Light, 1980; Light and Bonacich, 1988; Min, 1988). With the exception of Koreans, the modal prior employment status of Little Village business owners was wage and salaried employment. Koreans were far more likely to have prior entrepre-
neural experience than any of the other groups, which indicates one pathway to business ownership. That 45 percent of self-employed Koreans and 24 percent of immigrant Hispanic and Middle Eastern/South Asian business owners reported being self-employed in another business prior to the current business implies a high turnover rate of immigrant establishments. Business turnover results from various causes, including relocation, consolidation of multiple sites, opening of new enterprises, or outright failure.

Although these tabulations reveal important group differences in the precursors to business formation, they do not speak to the theoretically interesting issues concerning the role of ethnic communities in providing training for business ownership. The key questions revolve around the extent to which and manner in which businesses owned and operated by ethnic compatriots function as training platforms for future immigrant business formation and also whether and how groups differ in their reliance on ethnic ties to acquire experience relevant to self-employment.

**The Stepladder Hypothesis of Ethnic Entrepreneurship**

The idea that ethnic economies function as training sectors for future self-employment implies that informal mobility ladders structured along race and ethnic lines are conducive to self-employment (Portes and Bach, 1985; Portes and Manning, 1986; Waldinger, 1985). This would help explain how limited English proficient and/or educationally disadvantaged immigrants can
establish ethnic enterprises. Previous studies suggest that working for an ethnic compatriot may facilitate entry to self-employment, but this presupposes the existence of ethnically circumscribed opportunity structures to acquire experience relevant to establishing a small business. Our training function hypothesis implies that acquisition of work experience either in an ethnic-owned business or a firm in a related line of work serves to acquaint newcomers with the customs, practices and regulations governing business ownership in the United States, that is, “the American way of doing business.”

The bottom panel of Table 2 provides information about prior employment experience, with a special focus on the ethnicity of the current owners, their relationships to previous employers, and whether respondents’ previous occupational experience provided them with skills relevant to the current businesses. The data reveal striking differences by ethnicity of business owners. First, all non-Hispanic whites and Koreans reported having previously worked for co-ethnic employers, compared to only 48 and 45 percent of native and foreign-born Hispanics, respectively. Second, only 38 percent of Middle Eastern and South Asian merchants acquired business-relevant skills in their previous jobs, compared to 54 percent of foreign-born Hispanics and 67 percent of Koreans.

These results indicate that experience in the ethnic economy is a more common pathway to business ownership for Koreans and non-Hispanic whites than for other immigrant groups. In other words, Korean-owned enterprises serve as training platforms for further self-employment of other Koreans in ways that are not reproduced by other ethnic groups. Although Hispanic business owners were less able to access the world of entrepreneurship through employment in the Hispanic-owned firms compared to Koreans and non-Hispanic whites, those who worked for co-ethnic employers were more likely to report having acquired business skills compared to their counterparts who did not work for a co-ethnic employer before opening their current businesses.

**Informality as a Stepladder to Entrepreneurship**

Table 1 shows that ethnic enterprises operated by immigrants in Little Village are concentrated within the retail and personal service sectors of the economy, which are conducive to small enterprises with low initial capital outlays. Table 2 also presents the actual shares of businesses that began informally according to the ethnicity of the owner. For all groups, informality was not the primary pathway into self-employment, although it was much more salient for Hispan-
ic immigrants – those we earlier identified as having the lowest levels of education and resources at time of arrival.

Over one quarter of Hispanic immigrant businesses were begun informally, compared to 8 percent of Korean and 15 percent of Middle Eastern and South Asian concerns. None of the businesses owned and operated by non-Hispanic whites were begun informally, compared to 8 percent of those owned by native-born Hispanics. Of the 46 Hispanic immigrant businesses that began informally, one was a construction firm, five involved business and repair services, eight were in personal services, and 32 (79%) were in retail trade. The relatively high percentage of Hispanic businesses that began informally indicates the prominence of the informal sector as a steppingstone to entrepreneurship among Spanish-speaking merchants in Little Village.

Many of the businesses owned and operated by immigrant minorities began at home or in flea markets, allowing potential entrepreneurs to experiment and explore the viability of a particular product in the United States. Of the total foreign-born Hispanic businesses that began informally, almost 60 percent were home-based during the first stage, and the rest were located in open flea-markets (garra), like the former Maxwell Street or in the open streets. Most of the informal businesses moved into their formal stage after their owners gained confidence, experience, capital, and "visualized" a market (Tienda and Raiman, 2000).

In our sample, only 15 percent of Hispanics who worked for co-ethnic employers began their businesses informally compared to one third of their ethnic counterparts who did not work in ethnic firms. To test the hypothesis that informal employment is an alternative pathway to self-employment for immigrants who lack opportunities to acquire business experience in co-ethnic firms, we estimate a logistic regression predicting the probability of beginning a business informally as a function of ethnicity of previous employer and a set of control variables (age, years of formal schooling, tenure in the country, and English proficiency). These results (available from the authors upon request) support the hypothesis that working for co-ethnic employers decreases the odds of starting the business informally. Hispanic business owners who worked for co-ethnic firms were 2.3 times less likely to begin their businesses informally compared to those who did not work for co-ethnic employers. Apparently, Hispanic businessmen who worked for co-ethnic employers benefited from training and experience needed to establish their own businesses in the same line of work. Therefore, these respondents were less likely to need the passage through the informal economy to acquire relevant skills to operate a business. Thus we
tentatively conclude that the informal economy provides an alternative pathway to self-employment for those lacking ethnic ties, capital resources, or opportunities to acquiring training in co-ethnic firms.

The Blocked Mobility Hypothesis and Ethnic Enterprises

The "blocked mobility" argument addresses why rates of business ownership differ among groups with varying levels of education. To examine this hypothesis, we consider respondents' self-reports about reasons for becoming self-employed. Table 3 reports responses to an open-ended question that inquired about the reasons for starting a business and entrepreneurial dispositions. The modal response for becoming business owners given by all groups except native-born Hispanics was a desire to make more money. This indicates that both relatively highly educated (i.e., Koreans and Middle Eastern/South Asians) and poorly educated (Hispanic) immigrants view self-employment – more specifically, business ownership – as an avenue to economic mobility in the United States.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reasons for Establishing Current Business and Entrepreneurial Dispositions by Ethnicity of Owner</th>
<th>Hispanic Born</th>
<th>Hispanic Foreign Born</th>
<th>Korean</th>
<th>Middle East and S. Asia</th>
<th>White</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disadvantaged in U.S. labor market</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficulties in previous job</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Make more money</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>28.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desire independence</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Always wanted a business</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desire flexibility of self-employment</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous business experience</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Had relevant skills</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opportunity presented itself</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Would you be willing to risk your house and possessions to start a new business&quot; (% willing or very willing)</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>59.8</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>34.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On a scale of 1 (Keep business in place) to 5 (Always think about ways to make business better), which number fits you? (% reporting 4 or 5)</td>
<td>86.9</td>
<td>79.3</td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>64.2</td>
<td>90.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Little Village Business Survey.

Note: Percent exceed 100 because respondents gave multiple answers.

*Other includes availability of location; "American Dream."

*The responses do not sum up to 100 percent because the question permitted multiple answers.
Both Korean and Middle Eastern/South Asian business owners viewed self-employment as an avenue to overcome labor market disadvantages, their second most frequent response. In fact, the most educated immigrant populations perceive the most intense blocked mobility. Disadvantages stemming from lack of English language proficiency and the imperfect transferability of their foreign-earned degrees are the basis for immigrants’ blocked opportunities in the U.S. labor market. When unable to find employment commensurate with their education, many college-educated immigrants seek higher incomes through business ownership. This is the case of a college-educated Korean immigrant who arrived in the United States in 1973 with a college degree and who owns a clothing store in Little Village. When asked about the reasons for becoming self-employed, he answered: “I could not get the job I wanted, that’s why I went into my own business.” Another college-educated Korean business owner in the community, with fifteen years of U.S. residence, admitted that it was difficult to find a job because he lacked English skills. “Most minorities when they come to the United States don’t know how to apply for a job .... I have a university degree in Korea ... they [American employers] don’t accept a foreign degree ... so I asked those who came earlier than me and they suggested the opportunity of doing business.”

U.S.- and foreign-born Hispanics do not perceive business ownership as a strategy for overcoming labor market disadvantages, as only 5 percent gave this as a reason for desiring to establish their own businesses. Rather, other noneconomic rewards, like the desire for independence afforded by business ownership, was the second most common reason given by Hispanics for becoming self-employed. This reason ranked first for immigrant entrepreneurs from the Middle East and South Asia, and third for Koreans. U.S.-born Hispanic business owners are a distinctive group insofar as 34 percent indicated that they became self-employed “because the opportunity presented itself.”

Interestingly, less than 10 percent of Korean business owners, compared to 34 percent of Hispanic and 25 percent of Middle Eastern/South Asian business owners, reported a long-standing desire for a business. Furthermore, Hispanics appear to be more willing than Korean immigrants to risk losing their houses and material positions in order to begin a new business. When asked to

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7It is conceivable that Hispanic business owners are highly selected in this community given that self-employment is less common for this group. We can shed some light on this question because we asked similar questions to respondents in a household survey that was conducted in Little Village simultaneously with the business survey. Self-employed respondents in the household survey were quite similar to the business survey respondents in their risk-taking disposition as 30% were willing to risk their possessions in order to start a new business. Non-self-employed respondents from the household sample were even less risk adverse than Korean business owners in this respect, as 18% of the wage-salaried workers who resided in Little Village were willing to risk their possessions in order to start a new business.
comment on how much time they invest thinking about ways to improve their businesses, the majority of Hispanics and non-Hispanic white business owners indicated they “always think about ways to make the business better” compared to only half of Koreans and two thirds of Middle Eastern and South Asian respondents.

Furthermore, and contrary to the restraining myths about Koreans’ unique entrepreneurial disposition, our results show that Hispanic business owners are both more committed to “growing their business” and keeping the business in the family than are other immigrant minorities. When asked about plans for expanding their current businesses, Hispanics were most likely to express a strong desire to expand. Over 55 percent of Hispanics desired to expand their businesses, compared to 43 percent of Koreans and 16 and 26 percent, respectively, of non-Hispanic whites and Middle Eastern and South Asian business owners, respectively. Moreover, an overwhelming majority of immigrant Hispanic business owners (75% and 48% of foreign- and native-born, respectively) indicated that they wanted to have a family member assume ownership of the business. This compares with only 10 percent of Koreans, 16 percent of non-Hispanic whites, and 26 percent of merchants from the Middle East and South Asia. Hispanic business owners prefer their children to assume ownership of the businesses, “so they will have resources;” “so they don’t have to go through what I went through;” and “to keep the business in the family.” Korean business owners rather prefer their children “to go their own way,” preferably through a profession to improve their lives, because having a business is “a jail in disguise;” and “hard work [that] you can’t get anywhere.”

These responses connect with our previous analysis regarding the reasons Koreans gave for becoming self-employed. The first generation sees self-employment as the primary pathway to economic mobility in the host country and a way of overcoming blocked mobility, but they aspire for their offspring – the second generation – to have “good” jobs, preferably professional careers. For Hispanics, business ownership is not solely an instrument for overcoming discrimination in the first generation, but rather a way of creating economic resources to be transmitted to their offspring. Probably anticipating low educational levels for their children, immigrant Hispanics see business ownership as an intergenerational wealth flow, and not as a transitional pathway to the U.S. labor market.

*Evaluating the Blocked Mobility Hypothesis*

In order to evaluate the blocked mobility hypothesis, we estimated a logistic regression predicting the probability of reporting labor market disadvantages
(e.g., being a foreigner, lack of language skills, lack of other opportunities, status inconsistency, being underpaid for skills) as a reason for becoming a business owner. These results are reported in Table 4. Model 1 includes only the effects of national origins and sex (for control purposes), and Model 2 incorporates a subset of predictors representing owner characteristics associated with labor market disadvantages, that is, language proficiency and tenure in the country.

**Table 4**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Origin*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean</td>
<td>2.4*</td>
<td>2.6*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle-East/S Asia</td>
<td>2.1*</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.39*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English Proficiency*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-1.6*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenure in the Country*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-10 years</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 10</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-.19*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age squared</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.00*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1.17*</td>
<td>(0.56)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>(2.40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 2 Log-Likelihood</td>
<td>313.8</td>
<td>240.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\chi^2$</td>
<td>66.6</td>
<td>138.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Respondents</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Little Village Business Survey

Notes:  
* The omitted category is Non-Hispanic whites.  
* Education is a categorical variable code 1, if more than 15 years; if other 0.  
* Speaking good or moderately good is coded 1; other 0.  
* The omitted category is native-born.  
* Probability less or equal .05.

Model 1 reveals that only Korean and Middle Eastern/South Asian origin is associated with reported labor market disadvantages. Substantially, these results imply that Hispanics were no more likely to report labor market disadvantage as a reason for becoming self-employed than white business owners. However, compared to white merchants, Korean and Middle Eastern businessmen were significantly more likely to report labor market disadvantages as a reason for entering self-employment. Model 2, which includes additional indicators relevant for testing the blocked mobility hypothesis, shows that blocked mobility describes the experience of Koreans but not other groups. Thus, our results for Koreans are highly consistent with those produced by other scholars for different cities (Light and Bonacich, 1988, in Los Angeles; Yoon, 1991 in Chicago; Kim, 1981, 1987, in New York and Min, 1988, in Atlanta). Blocked mobility seems to be the critical factor explaining high rates
of business ownership among Koreans and probably other well-educated immigrant groups. Specifically, controlling for language proficiency, tenure in the country, schooling and age, Korean business owners were 24 times more likely than white merchants in Little Village to report blocked mobility as a reason for establishing a business.

As expected, language proficiency and level of education also affect the likelihood of reporting blocked mobility as a reason for becoming self-employed. Respondents who reported a good command of English and lower levels of education were less likely to report blocked mobility as a reason for becoming business owners than their respective counterparts with low English proficiency and high levels of education. Finally, females and young respondents were less likely than males and older respondents to report disadvantages in the labor market as a reason for becoming self-employed. The absence of a Hispanic effect on labor market disadvantages indicates that blocked mobility is not a salient mechanism driving their self-employment. That is, because the majority of Hispanic (mostly Mexican) immigrant business owners have relatively low levels of education and limited English proficiency, their labor market disadvantages can be traced to human capital shortfalls and not to a mismatch between their skills and job opportunities in the labor market like in the case of Koreans. From an analysis addressing different questions, Waldinger (1990:270–271) arrives at similar conclusions. In his words, “We can locate the source of Koreans’ business drive in the mismatch between their skills and the opportunities that they encounter for salaried employment – not in any special feeling or affinity for business. Moreover, the circumstances of Koreans’ migration seem to make the consequences of blocked mobility more severely felt. By contrast such a mismatch is not characteristic of the Hispanics; hence, their recruitment into business takes the form of a more or less natural succession into vacant places.”

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

The main objective of this paper was to understand how and why different ethnic groups access the world of business. We sought to identify what circumstances are unique to specific groups and which are common to all. Table 5 summarizes the discussion by presenting a typology of pathways to business ownership by ethnicity. Although not exhaustive, the typology includes the main dimensions relevant to understanding why and how individuals of different ethnic backgrounds enter the world of business ownership.
### Table 5
Typology of Pathways to Business Ownership by Ethnicity of Owner

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Hispanics</th>
<th>Whites</th>
<th>Koreans</th>
<th>Middle East &amp; S. Asia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Why do different ethnic groups access the world of business?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avenue to economic mobility</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blocked Mobility</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk Disposition</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How do ethnic groups access the world of business?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior business experience in home country</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inheritance</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Native born only)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous employment in a co-ethnic firm</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Started in the informal economy</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One reason for becoming a business owner is the desire of all respondents — regardless of ethnicity — to improve their economic situation. Only immigrants from Korea, who had high levels of education, reported that mismatch between their skills and the jobs available in the labor market was an important reason for becoming business owners. That only Korean business owners reported having been pushed to self-employment because they could not find suitable jobs raises questions about how discrimination manifests itself in the labor market and why some ethnic groups have better chances than others to achieve jobs congruent to their skills. Had Koreans had “adequate” job opportunities, would they still be self-employed? If yes, would their rates of self-employment be lower? And would their main industry of employment be in the retail trade? In this regard, the findings suggest that the blocked mobility hypothesis obtains for Koreans, who view self-employment as the “price” of immigration to be paid by the first generation. They expect their children to enjoy better labor market opportunities than they experienced as immigrants. Our findings also challenge conventional wisdom about the unique entrepreneurial disposition of Koreans. Hispanics ranked as the most entrepreneurial among business owners in Little Village as compared to Koreans, Arabs and non-Hispanic whites based on their risk-taking ability.

We document clear differences among ethnic groups with regard to previous business experience. Hispanics have comparatively less experience in the world of business (whether in the United States or in their home countries) than either Korean immigrants and U.S.-born non-Hispanic whites. This means that for a substantial share of Korean merchants in the community, business ownership in the United States is merely an extension of previ-
ous experiences in their home countries. Our findings also show that the informal economy was a more common pathway to steady self-employment for Hispanic immigrants, whereas the passage through employment in a co-ethnic firm was more common among Koreans. Native-born Hispanics reported fewer experiences in the informal economy, probably because their human capital resources (higher education, language proficiency, American citizenship) and family resources facilitate alternative routes to business ownership or to the general labor market, for that matter. Indeed, for U.S.-born Hispanics and non-Hispanic white business owners in Little Village, inheritance is an alternative pathway to self-employment not shared by immigrant groups.

Mexicans and Koreans differ in their chances of entering the world of business through employment in co-ethnic firms. For Koreans, access to employment in the ethnic economy is more prevalent than for immigrants from Mexico, the Middle East and South Asia. That means that for Mexicans, even though training experiences are available in co-ethnic firms, the multiplier effect that facilitates proliferation of new firms is smaller. Thus, the aggregate, this pathway to Mexican business ownership, may be smaller owing to the smaller base of ethnic businesses that provide training opportunities to compatriots (compared to Koreans). To what extent this could explain different rates of self-employment is a question that needs to be addressed in future research.

Lacking a strong ethnic economy to acquire training and skills, many Hispanic immigrants use the informal sector as a means of acquiring the skills and capital necessary for starting a business in the formal realm. In some instances, informal self-employment is a conduit to formal self-employment in the small business sector. Informal economic activities allow enterprising immigrants to experiment and explore the viability of particular types of businesses. By testing the market, possibly accumulating capital or learning about its availability, acquiring rudimentary skills in a particular line of work, and learning “American ways,” informal self-employment can serve as a stepladder to successful business formation. Although this study provides some clues for understanding the linkage between informal activities and small business ownership, a longitudinal study is necessary in order to better understand the transition from informality to a formal business formation.

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Balkin, S.  

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Boyd, R.  


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Immigrant Entrepreneurship and Business Patterns: A Comparison of Koreans and Iranians in Los Angeles

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There are currently two theoretically controversial issues concerning immigrant and ethnic entrepreneurship in the literature, one on its causes and the other on its consequences. The first is the debate about whether ethnic or class resources are more central to the establishment of immigrant/ethnic businesses. The second issue is whether there is a causal connection between ethnic business and ethnic solidarity. Based on a comparison of the two most entrepreneurial immigrant groups in Los Angeles (Koreans and Iranians), this article addresses both issues. Korean immigrants rely more on ethnic resources, whereas Iranians depend more on class resources. Relative utilization of class vs. ethnic resources determines the patterns of immigrant/ethnic businesses rather than their development in the first place. Korean businesses on average are smaller, more concentrated, and serve more co-ethnic and low-income minority customers, while Iranian immigrants are larger, more dispersed, and largely serve white customers. As a result, Koreans have encountered severe intergroup conflict, whereas Iranians have sidestepped it. Our comparison of these two groups suggests that only middleman business strategies strengthen ethnic solidarity, although all types of immigrant/ethnic businesses may contribute to ethnic attachment. Paying special attention to business patterns (e.g., size, type, and location) – much neglected variables in research on immigrant/ethnic entrepreneurship – helps in resolving both theoretical issues.

1This paper is based, in part, on the results of independent surveys of authors on Korean and Iranian immigrants in Los Angeles, funded by the National Science Foundation (grant nos. SE-8608735 and SE-8512007, respectively), and in part, on PSC-CUNY grants to the second author. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, New York, 1996; Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies, University of Amsterdam, 1999; and the Fourth International Metropolis Conference, Washington, DC, 1999. We thank Ivan Light, Roger Waldinger, Georges Sabagh, Steve Gold, Barbara Lal, Arlene Dallalfar, Claudia Der-Martirosian, and Madeleine Tress for their useful comments, and Y-Uyen Nguyen for her help with preparing the final draft.

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Koreans and Iranians in Los Angeles have emerged as major new immigrant groups in the city since the early 1980s. As will be shown shortly, they are the two most entrepreneurial groups in Los Angeles, which is itself one of the top metropolitan areas in the United States in self-employment rate (Light and Roach, 1996). Despite this similarity, the two groups differ significantly in the level of group diversity and reliance on ethnic vs. class resources for establishing businesses. Iranian immigrants depend upon class resources for establishment and operation of their businesses far more than Korean immigrants. These differences in resources, in turn, contribute to differences in business patterns and intergroup conflicts. Most Korean immigrants run small mom-and-pop businesses, and many of them engage in middleman businesses in low-income minority neighborhoods. In contrast, Iranian immigrants are heavily concentrated in professional and large-scale businesses. As a result of their involvement in middleman businesses, Korean immigrants have encountered severe conflicts with both minority customers and white suppliers, which has further strengthened their ethnic solidarity. Iranian immigrant entrepreneurs have not experienced business-related intergroup conflicts and thus, unlike Korean merchants, have not had to use ethnic collective action to protect their economic interests.

A comparison of Iranian and Korean immigrants in Los Angeles will shed light on two theoretically important issues pertaining to immigrant/ethnic business, one on its causes and the other on its consequences. A major current theoretical debate is whether ethnic or class resources are central to establishment and operation of immigrant/ethnic entrepreneurship. A comparison of Iranian and Korean immigrants makes it clear that whether class or ethnic sources are more important for immigrant/ethnic entrepreneurship is not the relevant issue. Relative utilization of class vs. ethnic resources can determine the size and type of immigrant/ethnic businesses rather than their development in the first place. The other theoretical issue is whether there is a causal connection between ethnic business as the independent variable and ethnic solidarity as the dependent variable. Our comparison of these two new immigrant groups suggests that only middleman businesses strengthen ethnic solidarity, although all types of immigrant/ethnic businesses may contribute to ethnic attachment. Paying special attention to business patterns (e.g., size, type and location of businesses) – much neglected variables in research on immigrant/ethnic entrepreneurship – helps in resolving both theoretical issues.

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL SIGNIFICANCE

The increase in small business activities among immigrant groups in the United States and Europe has revitalized research on ethnic business in the
last two decades (Boissevain, 1984; Light and Karageorgis, 1994; Waldinger et al., 1992). Research on immigrant entrepreneurs is particularly thriving in Europe now (Rath, 2000). Many articles, as well as several monographs and edited books, on ethnic business have been published over the last two decades (Cummings, 1980; Langlois and Razin, 1989; Light and Bonacich, 1988; Light and Gold, 2000; Light and Rosenstein, 1995; Min, 1988a, 1996; Portes and Bach, 1985; Razin, 1993; Razin and Light, 1998; Waldinger, 1986; Waldinger et al., 1992; Ward and Jenkins, 1984; Yoon, 1997).

Recent research has led to conceptual clarifications and theoretical refinements on the phenomenon of ethnic business. Researchers consider “labor market disadvantages” and “opportunity structure,” as well as “group resources” and “embeddedness” as major factors for the development of immigrant and ethnic business. However, most previous studies on this topic are case studies focusing on a particular immigrant or minority group. As such, they have limitations in developing theories that explain intergroup differences in the causes and consequences of immigrant/ethnic entrepreneurship. In particular, the case study approach has not helped researchers to resolve the two major theoretical issues regarding the causes and consequences of immigrant/ethnic entrepreneurship outlined in the introduction.

Class vs. Ethnic Resources

Despite significant improvements in theoretical and conceptual clarifications, the dominant trend in sociological research on immigrant and ethnic entrepreneurship has been, following Light’s classic study (Light, 1972), to examine ethnic resources or ethnic ties as the major factor facilitating the entrepreneurial performance of a particular group. Ivan Light and other researchers have since revised the ethnic resources argument by making a distinction between ethnic and class resources, thus acknowledging the role of class resources in the formation and operation of immigrant and ethnic businesses (Light, 1984; Light and Gold, 2000; Min, 1988b; Yoon, 1990, 1997). However, there is no case study of an immigrant group that has established businesses in large numbers using mainly class resources, with the exception of a report on Hong Kong Chinese immigrant entrepreneurs who entered Ontario, Canada through the Immigrant Entrepreneur Programs (Margery and Hoffman, 1992). In contrast, there are numerous empirical studies that have documented the significance of ethnic resources for the establishment and operation of immigrant and minority enterprises (Kim and Hurh, 1985; Light and Bonacich, 1988; Lovell-Troy, 1980; Min, 1988a; Waldinger, 1986).
While sociologists and anthropologists have emphasized ethnic resources as the major contributing factor for establishing businesses, economists have claimed that class resources largely determine immigrant and ethnic enterprises. Karl Marx considered money or physical capital as necessary for the development of capitalism. However, contemporary economists consider human capital in the forms of education and work experience, in addition to financial capital, as determining the development of entrepreneurship (Balkin, 1989; Bates, 1987, 1994, 1997; Becker, 1995; Borjas, 1996). For example, in his most recent work, Bates (1997) has claimed that African Americans and other disadvantaged minority groups are underrepresented in small businesses mainly because of disadvantages in two forms of class resources: financial and human capital. During recent years, some researchers who have emphasized class resources of entrepreneurship have expanded the definition of human capital to include cultural and social capital, as well as education and job experiences (Becker, 1995). Both cultural capital and social capital can be considered ethnic or class resources, depending upon whether the resources are derived from the owner's ethnic group or social class. But neoclassical economists have emphasized only cultural and social capital derived from one's social class as conducive to entrepreneurial development.

The deadlocked debate regarding class vs. ethnic resources is not productive because, as indicated by Light and Gold (2000), there are no longer pure cases of groups with either only ethnic or class resources. But we argue that one way to resolve this controversy is to take into account the neglected factor of business patterns (type, size, and location). Ethnic resources in the forms of private loans, unpaid family labor, and co-ethnic members as cheap sources of labor are important for establishing and operating small mom-and-pop businesses. However, class resources such as high education and access to financial capital are more important than ethnic resources in establishing and running large businesses that require sophisticated managerial skills and a large amount of capital. Figure 1 shows the relative use of class vs. ethnic resources for Korean and Iranian immigrant entrepreneurship. The indicators of class resources are education, English fluency, dependence on personal savings for capitalization, and premigration business experience. The indicators

\(^2\)Cultural capital as a class resource refers to class-derived cultural elements, such as frugality and work ethic, which are conducive to entrepreneurial development. Social capital as a class resource indicates advantages for entrepreneurship associated with class-based social networks such as alumni connections. See Light and Gold, 2000: ch. 4 for an extensive discussion of forms of capital, including human, cultural and social.
for ethnic resources include use of private loans and rotating credit associations; dependence on relatives, co-ethnic employees and customers; and purchase of businesses from co-ethnic owners. Based on research, Koreans and Iranians are ranked from low to medium to high for each indicator. In terms of overall use of class resources, Koreans range from low to medium, whereas Iranians range from medium to high. Conversely, in terms of overall use of ethnic resources, Koreans range from medium to high, while Iranians are in the low to medium range (see Figure 1).

**Figure 1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Resources</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Class</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Koreans High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Iranians High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>English Fluency</td>
<td>Low High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dependence on personal savings for capitalization</td>
<td>Medium High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Premigration business experience</td>
<td>Low Medium’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Overall use of class resources</td>
<td>Low to Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Medium to High</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic</td>
<td>Use of private loan and rotating credit associations</td>
<td>Medium Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dependence on relatives</td>
<td>High Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dependence on co-ethnic employees</td>
<td>High Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Purchase of businesses from co-ethnic owners</td>
<td>Medium Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Overall use of ethnic resources</td>
<td>Medium to Low to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low Medium</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: *Low class resources for Baha’i & Muslims, high class & ethnic resources for Jews & Armenians.

Sociologists’ overemphasis on ethnic resources may have been due partly to the fact that the pre-1965 entrepreneurial immigrants did not have many class resources, thus establishing mom-and-pop businesses mainly using unpaid family work and ethnic ties. However, new immigrant entrepreneurs include groups that are well endowed in class resources such as Iranians (Bozorgmehr, 1998) and Chinese from Hong Kong and Taiwan (Marger and Hoffman, 1992). Although Korean immigrants have been portrayed as middle-class entrepreneurs (Kim, 1981; Min, 1984; Yoon, 1997), Iranian immigrants are generally perceived as affluent entrepreneurs and self-employed professionals (Kelley and Friedlander, 1993). This comparative study will demonstrate that Iranian immigrants in Los Angeles have developed a high
level of business participation largely using their class resources. When they utilize both ethnic and class resources, the rate of self-employment skyrockets to the highest recorded level in the literature, as indicated by an exceptionally high self-employment rate (83%) of Iranian Jewish males.

**Ethnic Attachment vs. Ethnic Solidarity**

This article also addresses another important theoretical issue, *i.e.*, the effects of immigrant/ethnic entrepreneurship on ethnicity. Traditionally, researchers treated immigrant/ethnic entrepreneurship as the dependent variable to be explained and focused on examining intergroup differentials in representation in small business. In reaction to the traditional cultural approach, an increasing number of researchers have paid attention to positive effects of ethnic business on ethnic ties (Bonacich and Modell, 1980; Fugita and O’Brien, 1991; Gold, 1992; Min, 1996; Reitz, 1980). For example, using a sample of second- and third-generation Japanese Americans in California, Bonacich and Modell (1980) found that self-employed Japanese Americans were more highly involved in ethnic networks than those employed by others (*see also* Fugita and O’Brien, 1991:chapter 7). Reitz (1980) demonstrated that the Chinese, Eastern European, and Southern European ethnic groups in Canada were more successful in retaining their mother tongue and in practicing endogamy than other ethnic groups because they were more highly represented in small business.

In discussing the positive effects of ethnic business on ethnic ties, however, we need to make a distinction between ethnic attachment, defined as participating in ethnic networks, and ethnic solidarity, defined as using collective action to protect ethnic interests (*see Min 1996:5*). Ethnic business generally increases ethnic attachment because it usually depends on co-ethnic partners, employees and customers. The more a business is based on class resources, however, the less it relies on co-ethnic ties, resulting in a lower level of ethnic interaction and attachment to the group. Therefore, there is no necessary connection between ethnic business and ethnic solidarity. Bridging suppliers from the dominant group with minority customers, only middleman businesses contribute to ethnic solidarity because they often involve high levels of business-related intergroup conflicts with both suppliers and customers.

Bonacich and Modell (1980) described Japanese truck farmers, wholesalers and retailers of farm products in California in the first half of the twentieth century as a middleman minority. They theoretically argued that these
middleman businesses generated intergroup conflicts and thereby increased the ethnic solidarity of the Japanese entrepreneurs. Yet, they were not middlemen because they neither served mainly minority customers nor depended upon white suppliers for their farming and commercial activities. Moreover, as noted above, Bonacich and Modell did not show how Japanese immigrants’ concentration in farming, as well as wholesale and retail of farm products, enhanced their ethnic solidarity; rather they showed it increased their ethnic attachment. This comparative study will show that Korean businesses in Los Angeles, because of their middleman nature, have experienced far more intergroup conflicts than Iranian businesses. As a result, Koreans have generated far more ethnic solidarity than Iranians.

DATA SOURCES

This study is based on several data sources: a 1986 survey of Korean immigrants in Los Angeles and Orange counties and a 1987–88 survey of Iranian immigrants in Los Angeles County; subsequent fieldwork in the Korean and Iranian communities in Los Angeles; the 1990 U.S. Census PUMS data; ethnic media; and previously published materials on Korean and Iranian immigrants in the United States in general and those in Los Angeles in particular. The two surveys need further clarification. Although both surveys relied on the white pages telephone directories, by necessity they used different sampling techniques. The "Kim Sampling Technique" (Shin and Yu, 1984) was used for sampling Korean immigrants. Households with the surname Kim comprise approximately 22 percent of total households in Korea. Moreover, no other nationality is associated with the Kim surname in the United States. Thus, instead of using all typical Korean names, researchers often list all Kims from master lists and then draw a random sample. Accordingly, 1,020 Kims were randomly selected from eleven Los Angeles and Orange County public telephone directories. Of the originally selected households, 152 were not eligible for interviewing because they were married interracially, U.S.-born, unemployed, students, or part-time workers. Of the 868 Korean households eligible for the study (i.e., employed adult immigrants), 497 (57.3%) were interviewed in person in the fall of 1986. Approximately 15 percent refused

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3As indicated by Der-Martirosian (1989), neither Bonacich and Modell (1980) nor Reitz (1980) proved definitively that the individuals involved in business are more ethnic than their wage and salaried counterparts because they only used cross-tabulations. Yet, it is reasonable to assume that in both cases participation in ethnic business increased ethnic attachment.
to be interviewed; the rest were not interviewed because they were not available due to long work hours.

As there are no comparable Iranian surnames, all typically Iranian names were extracted from the eight Los Angeles County telephone directories. In terms of distinctive surnames, Iranians were divided into Persians and Armenians (most of the latter names end in “yan” or “ian”). Altogether, 1,714 Persian names and 1,059 Armenian names were identified, of whom 360 and 126 were interviewed, respectively. Another 155 householders were selected from ethnic community lists to yield a subsample of about 100 for the smallest Iranian subgroup (Bahais), and roughly 200 from the other three subgroups (Armenians, Jews and Muslims). The refusal rate varied according to the list (telephone vs. community) and by subgroup, but it was on average twice that of the Korean rate. In person interviews were conducted in late 1987 to early 1988 (Bozorgmehr and Sabagh, 1989).

**IMMIGRATION AND SETTLEMENT**

Koreans and Iranians are among the new immigrant groups that have emerged since the enforcement of the liberalized immigration law at the end of the 1960s, although for different reasons. While Koreans responded to the new U.S. immigration law that abolished discrimination based on national origin, Iranians’ reaction had much more to do with the events in Iran. Iranian immigration started as the temporary movement of foreign college students, who were joined later by exiles from the Iranian revolution of 1978–79. There are significant differences between the two groups in motives for immigration and settlement patterns.

Although Korean immigration to America has a 90 year history, until 1970 the Korean population in the United States was negligible (less than 70,000, according to the census). However, Korean immigration accelerated with the enforcement of the 1965 Immigration Act. As shown in Table 1, the number of Korean immigrants was a few thousand annually in the late 1960s, but it rapidly increased in the early 1970s. More than 30,000 Koreans immigrated to the United States annually in the 1980s, making Koreans the third largest immigrant group in the decade, after Mexicans and Filipinos. In the 1990s, Korean immigration dropped substantially below the level of 20,000 per year. Great improvements in economic and political conditions in South Korea and the knowledge of Korean compatriots’ adjustment problems in the United States have slowed down Korean immigration in recent years. Still, the massive influx of Korean immigrants in the last quarter century has led to a radi-
TABLE 1
NUMBERS OF KOREAN AND IRANIAN IMMIGRANTS TO THE UNITED STATES, 1965–1998

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Korean Immigrants</th>
<th>Iranian Immigrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965–1969</td>
<td>17,869</td>
<td>5,935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970–1974</td>
<td>93,445</td>
<td>12,901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975–1979</td>
<td>148,645</td>
<td>24,666</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980–1984</td>
<td>162,178</td>
<td>56,799</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985–1989</td>
<td>175,803</td>
<td>83,491</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990–1994</td>
<td>112,454</td>
<td>79,448</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995–1998</td>
<td>62,739</td>
<td>37,810</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>755,264</td>
<td>310,050</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


...cal growth in the Korean population in America. The 1990 Census counted approximately 800,000 Koreans in the United States.

The Iranian immigration is relatively more recent than the Korean immigration and can be traced back only 50 years in the official INS data. Like the Koreans, the Iranian population in the United States was negligible before 1970. Whereas the 1965 U.S. Immigration Act fueled Korean immigration, the Iranian oil boom in the early to mid-1970s and the revolution in the late 1970s mainly account for the migration of Iranians to the United States. As such, Iranian immigration has come in two back-to-back waves: before and after the Iranian revolution of 1978–79. Before the revolution, it consisted primarily of college students majoring in technical fields to meet the needs of the rapidly industrializing oil-based Iranian economy. In the late 1970s, Iran led all other countries in the number of foreign students in the United States (Bozorgmehr and Sabagh, 1988). Many of these students, who had originally planned to return to Iran, remained in the United States after the revolution. They partly account for the preponderance of professionals, including self-employed professionals, among Iranians. After the revolution, Iranian migration consisted of exiles, political refugees, and asylees (Bozorgmehr, 1998; Modarres, 1998). These exiles were disproportionately members of religious minorities who experienced, or feared, persecution in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Among these, Armenians and Jews are classic examples of middleman minorities in Iran; thus their presence contributes to the preponderance of entrepreneurs among Iranian immigrants, especially in Los Angeles. As shown in Table 1, from 1965 to 1994, over a quarter of a million Iranian immigrants were admitted to the United States, of whom one fourth were refugees and asylees (data reported in Bozorgmehr, 1996:Table 10.1). Most of the immigrants enumerated in the Table arrived in the United States as nonimmigrants (e.g., students or visitors), and subsequently adjusted their status to immigrants — hence, the gradual increase in the number of immigrants showed in the table. According to the
1990 Census, 285,000 persons reported that they were either born in Iran or their ancestry was traced to that country (Bozorgmehr, 1998).

Post-1965 Korean immigrants in the United States are primarily economic immigrants who crossed the Pacific mainly to improve their conditions. In this sense, they differ from Iranians, many of whom are refugees fleeing an unfavorable political climate. Korean immigrants, like many other Asian immigrants, have high educational and occupational backgrounds. The 1990 PUMS data showed that 38 percent of Koreans, 25–64 years old, in the Los Angeles metropolitan area completed four years of college education in comparison to 20 percent of the white population. Census data do not show whether these college degrees were obtained in the United States or abroad. But the 1986 survey revealed that the vast majority of the college-educated Korean immigrants completed their education in Korea. It showed that only 20 percent of the Korean respondents with a college education completed two or more years of college education in the United States. Also, 54 percent of Korean respondents in Los Angeles held professional, executive, and managerial positions prior to immigration, and only 4 percent had blue-collar occupations.

According to 1990 PUMS data, 45 percent of Iranian immigrants 25–64 years old – 57 percent of the male immigrants – in the Los Angeles metropolitan area completed four years of college education. Iranian immigrants have a higher educational level than Korean immigrants in Los Angeles. In the 1987–88 Los Angeles survey, more than half of the Iranian immigrant respondents in Los Angeles reported that they obtained additional education outside Iran, mostly in the United States. Thus, a much larger proportion of Iranian immigrants than Korean immigrants completed their college education in the United States.

The premigration occupational background of Iranians is almost identical to Koreans, i.e., 48 percent of Iranians held white-collar and only 4 percent blue-collar jobs in their last jobs before leaving Iran. Iranians on the whole are more fluent in English and have more relevant occupational skills and more readily identifiable credentials than do Korean immigrants because they have obtained their education in the United States. These human capital advantages have facilitated the occupational adjustment of Iranian professionals more so than the Koreans, who by necessity have had to turn to self-employment.

Honolulu and San Francisco were enclaves of earlier Korean immigrants, but Los Angeles has become the magnet for post-1965 Korean immigrants.
By 1970, Los Angeles had the largest Korean population (9,395) in the United States. In the late 1960s and the early 1970s, 15–24 percent of annual Korean immigrants chose California as the intended state of residence. Most of these California-bound Koreans settled in the Los Angeles region, especially Los Angeles and Orange counties. The proportion of Korean immigrants who settled in California has gradually increased since the late 1970s. The 1990 Census showed that approximately 260,000 Koreans resided in California, accounting for 32 percent of all Korean Americans, and that nearly 200,000 Koreans, or 24 percent of Korean Americans, lived in the Los Angeles metropolitan area (see Table 2).

### Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Numbers of Koreans and Iranians in the United States and the Los Angeles Metropolitan Region, 1990</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Koreans</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Iranians</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1993a, Table 107 and 1993b, Table 49.

As far back as 1965, Los Angeles had the highest concentration of Iranians in the United States (Bozorgmehr and Sabagh, 1988). The primacy of Los Angeles as an Iranian center increased dramatically after the Iranian revolution of 1978–79. Before the revolution, Iranians in the United States consisted mostly of college students who were enrolled in colleges and universities throughout the country. After the revolution, the immigration of families led to much greater concentrations (Modarres, 1998). By 1990, of the 285,000 Iranians (both native- and foreign-born) in the United States, about 80,000 resided in Los Angeles County and about 100,000 in the Los Angeles metropolitan area (see Table 2). Thus, more than one of every three Iranians in the United States resided in Los Angeles, a higher level of concentration than Koreans (one out of four). Moreover, a higher percentage of Iranians than Koreans in Los Angeles were foreign-born (87% vs. 81%) (see Table 2).

The Korean community in Los Angeles has developed a physically segregated community known as “Koreatown,” located about three miles west of downtown Los Angeles. In the early 1960s, Koreatown was a working class white neighborhood, with whites making up more than 90 percent of the residents. However, the influx of Hispanic and Asian immigrants since 1965 and the concomitant “white flight” drastically altered the ethnic composition of the Koreatown area. In 1990, Mexican immigrants made up the majority of the population in Koreatown, while Koreans comprised about 15
percent of the residents (Clark, 1996). Koreatown is not only a residential, but also a commercial center for Koreans in Los Angeles. Approximately 3,500 Korean-owned businesses, almost all with Korean language signs, are located in Koreatown. The vast majority of Korean businesses in Koreatown cater to Korean customers by providing their native cuisine, groceries, books/magazines, and so forth, and services for other distinctively Korean cultural tastes (Min, 1993; Yu, 1985). Koreatown has also become the community’s social and cultural center. All major Korean ethnic organizations, including the Korean Federation of Los Angeles, major business associations, and major Korean ethnic media, have offices in Koreatown.

Although Iranians are heavily concentrated in Los Angeles County within the Greater Los Angeles region, they are dispersed in Los Angeles County itself. Iranians are less segregated from native whites than most other ethnic groups in Los Angeles (Bozorgmehr, Der-Martirosian and Sabagh, 1996). Iranians have, by and large, settled in the few remaining non-Hispanic white neighborhoods in Los Angeles, adding to their visibility since few immigrants reside in these affluent neighborhoods. Iranians are concentrated and highly visible in Beverly Hills, as well as affluent parts of the Westside and San Fernando Valley. However, there are some noticeable differences in settlement patterns of Iranian subgroups. This is most pronounced in the case of Armenians from Iran, who mostly have settled in Glendale, a distinctive pattern among all Iranian subgroups. Similar, but less pronounced, concentrations are found among Iranian Jews, who have settled in traditionally Jewish neighborhoods (e.g., Fairfax and western San Fernando Valley). Thus, as a whole, Iranians are more widely distributed in this metropolitan area and less segregated than Koreans.

LEVEL OF GROUP DIVERSITY AND COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION

In terms of group diversity, Korean and Iranian immigrants represent the two extremes. Whereas Korean immigrants are a very homogeneous group in language, religion and historical experience, Iranian immigrants consist of several major ethno-religious groups, each with its own unique premigration histories. The differential levels of homogeneity partly explain the differences in settlement patterns between the two groups, which, in turn, affects their levels of ethnicity or ethnic attachment.

Almost all post-1965 Korean immigrants have come from South Korea, a culturally homogeneous society. They speak only one language and do not
have significant regional differences in customs and food habits. The mono-
lingual background of Korean immigrants in particular gives them an advan-
tage over other multilingual immigrant groups for maintaining their ethnic
attachment. Korean immigrants, almost all of whom can speak, read and
write the Korean language fluently, depend mainly on Korean-language eth-
nic dailies, as well as Korean TV and radio programs for news, information
and leisure activities. In the 1986 survey of Korean immigrants in Los Ange-
les, 85 percent of the respondents reported that they subscribed to at least one
Korean newspaper or magazine. There are five Korean-language UHF and
cable stations and four radio stations in Los Angeles. Two of the TV stations
broadcast Korean programs 24 hours a day, providing news edited by the
Korean Broadcasting Station in Seoul via satellite at 9:00 in the evening. One
radio station, Radio Korea, broadcasts 24 hours a day, providing Korean
immigrants with news from Seoul at regular intervals.

In the post-1965 era, the ethnic media have played an important role in
integrating geographically dispersed immigrants by keeping them informed
of what is going on in the home country and in the local community (Naﬁ-
cy, 1993). The ethnic media play an even more important role in the Kore-
an community because Korean immigrants use only one language. Korean
immigrants in Los Angeles can maintain their cultural traditions and ethnic
identity more effectively than Iranian immigrants partly because, as noted
above, they are residentially more clustered. Moreover, even Korean immi-
grants in Los Angeles who do not live in a Korean enclave are more tightly
integrated into their community than Iranian immigrants partly because, by
virtue of their monolingual background, they have been able to develop an
extensive ethnic media.

Iran, on the other hand, is a culturally heterogeneous country. Ethno-
religiosity is the strongest source of subgroup affiliation among Iranian immi-
grants in Los Angeles. While this reinforces ethnic attachment at the sub-
group level, it mitigates against ethnic attachment among Iranians as a whole.
Although all Iranians can speak Persian, there are distinctive ethnic and reli-
gious groups in Iran with other mother tongues (e.g., Armenian, Assyrian,
Turkish and Kurdish, to name the most prominent ones). This linguistic
diversity is made more complicated because of the variation in proficiency in
speaking, reading, and writing in Persian and other languages among Irani-
ans. As such, Iranian subgroups, and even individuals within each subgroup,
do not rely only on Persian-language ethnic media. This is especially the case
for Armenians who have a sizable co-religionist presence in multiethnic Los
Angeles. In addition to Iranian and Armenian programs, Armenian Iranians
view Armenian TV programs produced by non-Iranian Armenians (Naficy, 1993:Table 16).

The main difference between Iranian and Korean TV programming is that the former, with the exception of one program (Aftab), is produced mostly by exiles in the United States, whereas the latter is largely imported from the homeland. The Korean Broadcasting Station plays an active role in production and distribution of TV programs and even subsidizes station time in the United States. In contrast, all major Iranian language TV programs in the early 1990s were produced in Los Angeles (Naficy, 1993). With the exception of Hispanic programming, Persian-language television topped all other locally produced ethnic programming in the Los Angeles area (Naficy, 1993:63). According to the 1987–88 survey, however, less than half of Iranians watched Iranian TV programs. This is the main difference between Iranians and Koreans, who, as a much more homogeneous group, mainly watch Korean TV programs. Although numerous Persian language newspapers, magazines, and books are available in Los Angeles, less than a quarter of Iranians surveyed read them.

South Korea is a small country, smaller than the State of Georgia, and more than half of recent Korean immigrants have come from the capital city Seoul (Park et al., 1990:31). More than 80 percent of them completed high school and/or college education in Seoul and other large cities. Thus, alumni associations play an important role in maintaining friendship networks among Koreans. There are more than 150 active alumni associations in the Korean community in Los Angeles, with more than one third college based and the others high school or middle school based.

Although internal ethnicity along religious lines can be further extended to regional origin, this is not the case for Iranian subgroups in Los Angeles since most immigrants have come from the capital city of Teheran. Although they were not all born in the capital, the vast majority (over 85%) of all Iranian respondents resided in Teheran before emigration (Bozorgmehr, 1992). Heavy concentration in one city and the relatively high social class background of Iranians mean that many attended a handful of selective schools and universities. However, in stark contrast to Koreans, the few Iranian alumni associations that exist in Los Angeles are dormant. The lack of alumni and other association activities among Iranians is too complex to explain and beyond the scope of this study. However, suffice it to say here that Iranians had very little, if any, experience of participation in voluntary organizations in Iran, which could be carried over to the United States. Minority
groups from Iran had more experience than the Muslims, but they direct their efforts to organizations with minority-specific concerns rather than alumni associations, which often cut across subgroups.

Although only about one fourth of the population in South Korea is affiliated with Christian religion (19% Protestants and 6% Catholics), Korean immigrants are drawn largely from the Christian population in Korea. Survey studies reveal that about 55 percent of Korean immigrants were Christians in Korea (Hurh and Kim, 1990; Park et al., 1990). A significant number of Koreans who were not Christians in Korea attend Korean churches because of various social services provided and fellowship. As a result, more than 70 percent of Korean immigrant families regularly attend a Korean Christian church; about 55 percent attend a Protestant church and the other 15 percent a Catholic Church (Hurh and Kim, 1990; Min, 2000). As of 1994, there were approximately 800 Korean churches in the Los Angeles metro area. Ethnic churches in Los Angeles, as well as in other Korean communities, play a pivotal role in sustaining Korean ethnicity by helping Korean immigrants to maintain social networks with co-ethnic members and Korean cultural traditions (Min, 1991, 1992).

In terms of religious affiliation, the Korean immigrant community has three subgroups: Protestants (about 60%), Catholics (20%), and people with other religions or no religious affiliation (20%). However, unlike the Iranian community that is fragmented by religion, the Korean community does not have significant cultural barriers between Protestants and Catholics, or between Christians and non-Christians. Whereas religious subgroups in the Iranian community differ markedly in culture and historical experiences, all Korean immigrants share values and customs associated with Confucianism and common historical experiences. Confucianism had a powerful cultural influence in Korea for several centuries before Christian religions were adopted in the early twentieth century. Thus, Confucian values that emphasize filial piety, family/kin ties, patriarchal family order, and children’s education regulate the attitudes and behaviors of all Koreans, whether Catholic, Protestant, Buddhist, or atheist.

Although originating from a predominantly Muslim society, the whole spectrum of religious groups is disproportionately represented among Iranians in Los Angeles (Kelley and Friedlander, 1993). To a large extent this is due to the 1978–79 Iranian revolution and the subsequent establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The result is the so-called internal ethnicity, i.e.,

Buddhists comprise 28% of the population in South Korea (Park and Cho, 1995).
the presence of different ethnic groups within an immigrant group (Bozorgmehr, 1992, 1997; Light et al., 1993). Among Iranians, this corresponds to ethno-religious minorities such as Christian Armenians and Assyrians, Jews, Bahais, Zoroastrians, and of course, the Muslim majority. Unlike Koreans, however, Iranians cannot participate in common congregations due to their religious diversity. Moreover, even among Iranian subgroups, a secular outlook among these high-class origin immigrants mitigates against attendance at a religious congregation (church, temple, or mosque). In sum, Iranians in Los Angeles consist of distinctive ethno-religious subgroups, whose history, background, characteristics, and post-migration experiences in American society vary despite having much in common as Iranians.

DIFFERENCES IN BUSINESS PATTERNS

Although Korean and Iranian immigrants are highly entrepreneurial, they turn to self-employment for different reasons and develop businesses using different kinds of resources. These differences in motives for self-employment and business resources contribute to significant differences in types of businesses.

Table 3 shows self-employment rates of selected immigrant and ethnic groups in Greater Los Angeles based on 1980 and 1990 census data. Among all foreign-born groups, Korean males had the highest self-employment rate (35%), and Iranian males had the second highest self-employment rate (28%). Our surveys of Korean and Iranian immigrants in Los Angeles showed that the two groups had much higher self-employment rates than those derived from the census data. Among males, 53 percent of foreign-born Korean respondents were found to be self-employed. Iranian immigrant males in Los Angeles County had even a higher self-employment rate (57%), although there were significant intergroup differentials in the self-employment rate among the four religious groups. Jewish Iranian males had the highest self-employment rate (83%), whereas Armenian Iranian males had the lowest rate (43%).

Korean and Iranian immigrants in Los Angeles differ significantly in motives for starting businesses. High levels of educational and occupational backgrounds characterize Korean immigrants. However, the vast majority completed their education in Korea, and as such have severe disadvantages for employment in the United States in terms of language and job credentials. Accordingly, Korean immigrants start their own businesses mainly because of their disadvantages for employment in the general labor market (Min, 1984).
In contrast, Iranian immigrants turn to self-employment for different reasons than Koreans. Iranian immigrants have fewer disadvantages for employment in the general labor market than Korean immigrants, not only because they have higher educational levels, but also because many of them completed their college education in the United States. Historically, Jews and Armenians have played the role of trading minorities in different societies (Zenner, 1991). Classic examples of these minorities, a large proportion of Jewish and Armenian Iranians in Los Angeles engaged in businesses prior to emigration, and their previous business experiences facilitated their establishment of businesses in terms of economic networks (Der-Martirosian, 1996). These Iranian subgroups draw heavily upon “tool kit” or orthodox resources of entrepreneurship (Light and Gold, 2000:107–8), including how to do business and how to function as a minority group while limiting conflicts with the hosts. They also have access to non-Iranian co-religionists (American Jews and Armenians) in the United States. The majorities of Muslims and Bahais have completed college or graduate education in the United States, and have no difficulty in finding professional occupations in this country. These Iranians turn to self-employment largely for the benefits of independence and higher earnings (Bozorgmehr, 1992; see also Mobasher, 1996), although some Muslims chose self-employment to escape discrimination, especially after the “Iranian Hostage Crisis” (Bozorgmehr and Sabagh, 1991).
To put it simply, Korean immigrants choose entrepreneurship largely because they have few options in their occupational adjustments, whereas Iranian immigrants opt for it because of their proclivity to entrepreneurship (Armenians and Jews) and because of their class advantages for self-employment (Muslims and Bahais). This difference in motives for starting businesses, combined with differences in ethnic versus class resources, lead to differences in business patterns. Business patterns include type, location and size. In regards to type of business, Korean merchants are heavily concentrated in labor-intensive small businesses such as grocery/liquor retail, dry cleaning, wholesale and retail of Asian-imported goods, and garment subcontracting (Min, 1996: chapter 4), which are unattractive to Americans. In contrast, Iranian immigrants with professional certificates and ample class resources are concentrated in professional and capital-intensive businesses such as medical firms, real estate agencies, garment manufacturing, and construction (see Table 4).

Table 4 presents data from the 1990 PUMS on Iranian and Korean niches in the L.A. region. A niche is defined as an occupation in which a group is overrepresented by 50 percent compared to its share of the general labor force (Waldinger and Bozorgmehr, 1996). As shown in Table 4, Iranian and Korean

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational Niches</th>
<th>Index of Rep.</th>
<th>% Group in Occ.</th>
<th>% Self-Employed</th>
<th>% Female of Group</th>
<th>Earnings 1989 $</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Koreans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervisors in sales</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>31,320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cashiers</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>18,050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others in sales</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>18,660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Printers</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textile sewers</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>9,730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooks</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>14,880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managers in food/lodging</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>39,650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales apparel</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>16,690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physicians</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>115,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hairdressers</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>15,390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iranians</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervisors in sales</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>42,690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountants</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>34,530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others in sales</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>17,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale rep.</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>24,850</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civil engineers</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>45,700</td>
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<tr>
<td>Managers in food/lodging</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>26,570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physicians</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>96,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real estate (sales)</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>43,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hairdressers</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>12,180</td>
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<tr>
<td>Engineers N.E.C.</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>38,840</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 1990 U.S. Census PUMS data.
Note: A niche is defined as an occupation in which a group is overrepresented by 50% compared to its share of the labor force.
niches are comparable, except that there are more professional niches among Iranians (e.g., accountants, engineers and physicians) and more manufacturing and service-oriented niches among Koreans (e.g., printers, textile sewers and cooks). Moreover, Iranians are more overrepresented in professional occupations and Koreans in low-level service occupations, as documented by the Index of Representation in the first column of Table 4. Reflecting the generally high self-employment rates of these two groups, the most distinguishing characteristic of both Korean and Iranian niches is their very high level of self-employment. Table 4 shows that these rates of entrepreneurship often exceed the overall rates of self-employment for these groups (more than 50%). Not surprisingly, Iranian niches, on the whole, tend to be more lucrative than the Korean ones, especially supervisors in sales, engineers and real estate sales. The professional self-employed (e.g., physicians) niches are particularly high earning occupations. The high degree of concentration in an ethnic niche is not necessarily indicative of embeddedness in ethnic networks. The literature overemphasizes the role of networks in creation of niches (Waldinger and Der-Martirosian, forthcoming), but this emphasis is not warranted for professional niches such as engineers and physicians. Clearly, education and skills determine these niches more so than ethnic networks among Iranians.

Iranian businesses are more dispersed geographically and occupationally than Korean businesses. There are 450 Korean medical firms and 350 Korean real estate agencies in the Korean community in Los Angeles, but most of them, located inside or close to Koreatown, serve mainly a Korean clientele. In contrast, the Iranian community in Los Angeles has more medical firms and real estate agencies in proportion to the population than the Korean community, and a larger proportion of them serve a nonethnic, white clientele. In terms of business size, for instance, both Korean and Iranian immigrants in Los Angeles are highly represented in garment manufacturing and construction work. However, Korean garment manufacturing and construction businesses are smaller than their Iranian counterparts. More than 90 percent of Korean garment owners are, in fact, subcontractors from white-owned (particularly Jewish-owned) garment manufacturers, whereas most Iranian garment manufacturers are independent owners. Although Jewish Iranian immigrants specialize in jewelry and other trade businesses dealing with manufactured goods, their businesses are usually larger than Korean retail businesses specializing in similar items.

The location of Korean and Iranian businesses also dictates the ethnic composition of customers and clientele. We previously noted that, by virtue
of their group homogeneity, Korean immigrants are more residentially segregated and more tightly involved in ethnic networks than Iranian immigrants as a whole. This suggests that Korean businesses in Los Angeles serve a larger proportion of co-ethnic customers than the Iranian businesses. The 1986 survey showed that 32 percent of Korean businesses in Los Angeles and Orange Counties mainly served Korean customers. The survey revealed that 73 percent of Korean businesses in Koreatown served mainly Korean customers. Koreatown in Garden Grove (Orange County) and other Korean enclaves in Los Angeles have over 2,000 Korean businesses that largely depend on Korean customers. On the other hand, the vast majority of the customers and clients of Iranian businesses are not Iranians (Der-Martirosian, 1996:118).

Another major difference in location is that many Korean businesses are in black and Hispanic neighborhoods in South Central Los Angeles, whereas Iranian businesses are almost nonexistent in these minority neighborhoods. Iranian immigrants, many of whom have received an advanced education in the United States and possess enough capital, are not interested in businesses in minority neighborhoods that involve frequent shoplifting and much physical danger. Thus, Iranian businesses are heavily concentrated in middle-class white neighborhoods such as the Westside, Western San Fernando Valley, downtown Los Angeles, and Glendale (Light et al., 1994). Korean immigrants are attracted to businesses in minority neighborhoods in South Central Los Angeles where they can establish such businesses with smaller amounts of capital and run them without much competition with big corporations (Min, 1996). A large proportion of Korean businesses in Los Angeles, as well as in other major cities, is located in low-income black and Hispanic neighborhoods. In fact, Koreans control grocery and liquor stores, swap meet stores, and gas stations in many black neighborhoods in South Central Los Angeles (Korea Times Los Angeles, 1992a). Korean merchants, owning and operating these businesses, play a typical middleman role in contemporary America, bridging big corporations and minority customers (Bonacich and Jung, 1982; Kim, 1981; Min, 1996).

In contrast, the Iranian community in Los Angeles has a very small number of businesses that serve largely Iranian customers. Development of a territorial community, like Koreatown, is a precondition for the development of “enclave businesses.” Iranian immigrants in Los Angeles lack an ethnic enclave (Light et al., 1994). Our 1987 survey of Iranian immigrants in Los Angeles did not include a question about the ethnic composition of cus-
customers. But field observations and interviews with business leaders indicate that only a small number of Iranian businesses (mostly Iranian restaurants and grocery stores) mainly serve co-ethnic customers. Iranian women who run home-operated small businesses (e.g., retail clothing and makeup) cater to other Iranian women (Dallafar, 1994, 1996), but the extent of these businesses is limited.

**DIFFERENTIAL LEVELS OF INTERGROUP CONFLICTS AND ETHNIC SOLIDARITY**

The differences in business patterns between Korean and Iranian immigrants have contributed to differential levels of intergroup conflicts. Historically, middleman merchants have been subjected to host hostility, often by both the ruling classes and customers (Eitzen, 1971; Palmer, 1957; Zenner, 1991). As middlemen in urban America, Korean merchants in black neighborhoods in South Central Los Angeles, as well as in other cities, have encountered hostility in the forms of media attacks, physical violence, boycotts, arson, and riots. In the mid-1980s, when the number of Korean stores in South Central Los Angeles began to increase, the black media led the attack against the city’s Korean merchants. By the early 1990s, Korean immigrants had monopolized several types of businesses in South Central Los Angeles, which turned black hostility toward Korean merchants into more violent forms. The shooting death of a young African American girl and an African American robber by Korean storeowners in 1991 in two separate incidents escalated Korean-African American tensions in Los Angeles (Min, 1996:chapter 5). Approximately 2,300 Korean stores, mostly located in South Central and Koreatown, were partially or wholly destroyed in the 1992 L.A. riots (Korea Times Los Angeles, 1992b). A post-riot investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) revealed that black gangs, who were responsible for planning the L.A. riots, targeted Korean-owned stores for arson and looting (Korea Times Los Angeles, 1992c).

In contrast, Iranian merchants in Los Angeles, who do not depend on minority customers, have not encountered hostility in any significant form. There were some incidents of arson that reflected anti-Iranian prejudice during the Iranian Hostage Crisis and, ironically, the Gulf War (Bozorgmehr, Der-Martirosian and Sabagh, 1996). But, in general, Iranian immigrants in Los Angeles have not experienced business-related intergroup conflicts. For instance, during the 1992 L.A. riots, only one photograph documented a Persian sign posted outside a burnt-down business. Iranian merchants some-
times encounter prejudice on an individual level when clients who have had little interaction with immigrant entrepreneurs question their business practices, such as bargaining. But there has been no collective boycott of Iranian businesses.

Differential levels of business-related intergroup conflicts have, in turn, contributed to differential levels of ethnic solidarity. While Korean merchants have established trade associations and responded collectively to deal with black hostility and unfair treatment by white suppliers, Iranian merchants have been able to continue in business without using collective action. There are two dozen Korean business associations in the Los Angeles area, which have exercised a powerful influence in the community. In contrast, there are very few occupational associations in the Iranian community of Los Angeles. Of the few occupational associations that exist among Iranians, several correspond to professional types such as the Iranian CPAs Association of Southern California and the Iranian Association of Architects and Engineers. In general, Iranian occupational associations are not as well organized as Korean business associations. Korean entrepreneurs have organized trade associations far more effectively than Iranian entrepreneurs, partly because of their group homogeneity. However, Korean associations have used collective action in response to conflicts with black customers and white suppliers. Korean grocery and liquor storeowners in minority neighborhoods, as typical middlemen bridging big corporations and minority customers, have encountered more serious business-related intergroup conflicts and threats than Korean merchants in any other business specialty. For this reason, they have used collective action to protect their economic interests more than any other group of Korean merchants. A review of Korea Times Los Angeles and interviews with business leaders indicate that the Korean-American Grocers Association of Southern California, with 3,550 members as of 1994, has taken a number of measures to moderate and challenge black hostility toward Korean merchants. The Korean-American Grocers Association of Southern California has also used several collective strategies to protect their economic interests from suppliers. They include price bargaining, collective purchasing, and a boycott of a manufacturer in 1992 (Min, 1996).

The victimization of many innocent Korean merchants during the 1992 Los Angeles riots, as the most significant historical event that occurred in Korean-American history, has solidified not only Korean merchants but also Korean Americans in general, including second-generation Koreans. The day after the riots ended, 30,000 Koreans in Los Angeles held a rally for peace and
solidarity. Korean Americans from all over the United States participated in fundraising drives to help the Korean riot victims, raising more than 5 million dollars. The Korean Riot Victims Association organized noisy demonstrations outside L.A.’s City Hall, making several demands. Several hundred Korean riot victims participated in these rallies that went on for approximately one month on a daily basis. The victimization of Korean merchants during the riots also heightened Koreans’ political consciousness and second-generation Korean Americans’ ethnic identity.

Iranian associations serve mostly a social function in the Iranian community. None of the few existing Iranian trade associations in Los Angeles have actively used collective strategies to protect their economic interests, in part because Iranians have not encountered any major business-related interethnic conflict. This is not to suggest that Iranians have been immune to prejudice and discrimination. Indeed, after the “Iranian hostage crisis,” they have suffered intermittently from discrimination, but only in times of crisis have these been business-related (e.g., arson of Iranian-owned businesses or reduction in patronizing visible Iranian businesses such as restaurants) (Bozorgmehr, 2000).

CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

Our comparison of Koreans and Iranians in Los Angeles, the two top entrepreneurial groups in the city, shows how the level of diversity of an immigrant group and its class background can determine its settlement patterns and community organization. Korean immigrants are a culturally homogeneous group with a single language and a heavy Christian background, whereas Iranian immigrants consist of different ethno-religious subgroups with unique histories. Korean immigrants have an advantage over Iranian immigrants for maintaining ethnic ties by virtue of their group homogeneity. Korean immigrants are more segregated residentially and more tightly integrated as a community than Iranian immigrants as a whole. The differences in settlement patterns and community organization are also due to the differences in the social class backgrounds of the two groups. Iranian immigrants are more highly educated than Korean immigrants, with a much larger proportion having completed their college education in the United States. Therefore, Iranian immigrants are more fluent in English and more familiar with American customs, and as such do not need to maintain residential segregation or strong ethnic ties for successful adjustment.

The differences in class background and group homogeneity between Korean and Iranian immigrants have contributed to differences in their busi-
ness patterns. Although Korean and Iranian immigrants in Los Angeles are highly entrepreneurial, they differ markedly in their business patterns. Disadvantaged in start-up capital and language, Korean merchants are concentrated in labor-intensive small businesses and overrepresented in several “middleman” businesses, such as grocery and liquor retail, in minority neighborhoods, distributing products of big corporations to minority customers. By contrast, Iranian businesses in Los Angeles are more widely dispersed, often in white neighborhoods, and consist of higher-skilled professional and service businesses. Korean immigrants’ middleman economic role has made business-related intergroup conflicts, particularly with black customers, inevitable, whereas Iranian entrepreneurs have bypassed any serious business-related conflict. In turn, intergroup conflicts encountered by Koreans have further reinforced their already high level of ethnic solidarity.

Our findings on the major differences in patterns of Korean and Iranian businesses in Los Angeles have important theoretical implications for understanding determinants and consequences of immigrant and ethnic entrepreneurship. The dominant theoretical view in sociological research on immigrant/ethnic entrepreneurship since the early 1970s has been that ethnic resources are the most significant facilitating factor for the development of immigrant and ethnic business. Although sociologists make a distinction between ethnic and class resources, they still assume that ethnic resources are a necessary precondition for the development of immigrant/ethnic businesses. By contrast, economists have emphasized class resources in the forms of financial capital, education and work experiences as determinants of immigrant/ethnic entrepreneurship. However, our comparison shows that Iranian immigrants with greater class resources were able to establish larger businesses, serving largely white customers, while Korean immigrants with greater ethnic resources managed to establish smaller businesses, mostly located in ethnic enclaves and low-income minority neighborhoods. Depending upon whether immigrant/minority groups have more class or ethnic resources, they can develop different business patterns in terms of size, type and location. Therefore, the debate regarding ethnic vs. class resources between sociologists and economists can be resolved by taking into account the business patterns of immigrant entrepreneurship.

In the past, almost all immigrant businesses were of the mom-and-pop variety as immigrants generally originated from low-class backgrounds. Private loans from relatives and friends, coupled with unpaid and cheap family and co-ethnic labor, were of central importance for the establishment and successful operation of such small businesses. Thus, traditionally researchers
emphasized ethnic resources as the major determining factor for immigrant and ethnic entrepreneurship. However, contemporary immigrants are socioeconomically heterogeneous, with a large proportion of Asian, African and Middle Eastern immigrants originating from middle-class backgrounds. Immigrant entrepreneurs with enough class resources do not have to depend on ethnic resources as much as earlier small business owners. We have shown that Iranian immigrants in Los Angeles have developed many businesses using their extensive class resources.

We may have exaggerated the differences in class vs. ethnic resources between Korean and Iranian immigrants. Iranian Jews have strong ethnic resources while Korean immigrants have more class resources than many traditional immigrant groups concentrated in mom-and-pop businesses. But, as pointed out by Light and Gold (2000:101–104), there is no pure empirical example of an immigrant entrepreneurial group that relies only on class or ethnic resources. Koreans and Iranians are perhaps the best contemporary examples of these ideal types. Thus, our comparison has enabled us to make a theoretical point. The finding that Iranians with less ethnic resources than Koreans have developed lucrative businesses suggests that ethnic resources are not a necessary condition for developing immigrant businesses. Ethnic resources may be necessary for the development of small-size businesses; large firms and professional businesses require class resources. By not making a distinction among businesses by size and type, the sociological literature on immigrant/ethnic business has privileged ethnic resources at the expense of paying attention to class resources.

The literature on immigrant/ethnic entrepreneurship has also overemphasized the causes of immigrant entrepreneurship at the expense of its consequences. Yet, strongly influenced by the structural approach to the adjustment of immigrant and minority groups in general, an increasing number of researchers have recently paid attention to positive effects of ethnic business on ethnic ties. Currently, there seems to be a general consensus that ethnic business and ethnicity mutually reinforce each other. However, in examining the effects of ethnic business on ethnicity, we need to make an important distinction between two interrelated, but separate social phenomena: ethnic attachment and ethnic solidarity. Ethnic attachment indicates the degree of the cultural, social and psychological attachment of members to a group, while ethnic solidarity points to the use of ethnic collective action to protect the common interests of a group. Yet no study, with the exception of Min’s study (1996) on contemporary Korean immigrants, has examined sys-
tematically how an immigrant or minority group’s middleman economic role has strengthened its intergroup conflicts and thereby its ethnic solidarity.

The effects of immigrant/ethnic entrepreneurship on ethnic solidarity depend upon business patterns. Korean immigrants’ concentration in several types of middleman businesses has contributed to a high level of ethnic solidarity because it often involves great business-related intergroup conflicts with both customers and suppliers. In contrast, Iranian entrepreneurs, who are concentrated in professional and white-collar businesses in white neighborhoods, have not encountered business-related hostility and conflicts. Therefore, they have not had to use collective action to survive in business. This study shows that there is no necessary connection between immigrant/ethnic business and ethnic solidarity.

It is beyond the goal of this study to examine the relationship between ethnic/immigrant entrepreneurship and the other component of ethnicity, namely ethnic attachment. Yet we would like to suggest that immigrant/ethnic entrepreneurship does not automatically increase ethnic attachment either — immigrant/ethnic entrepreneurship contributes to ethnic attachment to the extent that it has tapped into ethnic resources. Unfortunately, we do not have comparable data on Koreans and Iranians to address this issue systematically, but Koreans’ heavier reliance on ethnic resources than Iranians for developing businesses is likely to have led to a higher degree of ethnic attachment among the former. Among Iranians, Jews and Armenians have utilized ethnic resources to a greater extent than Muslims and Bahais, which in turn has enhanced their internal or subgroup ethnic attachment. Previous studies on the relationship between ethnic business and ethnic attachment have been based on case studies of commercial minorities that depended heavily on ethnic resources of business. To test the differential effects of ethnic business on ethnic attachment between ethnic-based and class-based businesses, future research should compare a trading group, well endowed in ethnic resources, with another, which is heavily dependent on class resources.

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Race, Ethnicity and Nativity, Family Structure, Socioeconomic Status and Welfare Dependency

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There is major policy interest in knowing whether immigrants are more likely to depend on (as opposed to temporarily participate in) welfare compared to native-born persons. However, little systematic empirical research has directly addressed this question. Using longitudinal surveys from the California Work Pays Demonstration Project, a mother's chance of welfare dependency in a time interval is examined. In general, the results are not consistent with the perspective that foreign-born race and ethnic subgroups are more likely to depend on AFDC than are native-born race and ethnic subgroups. This finding holds true irrespective of whether socioeconomic and demographic characteristics are controlled.

On August 22, 1996, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act was signed into law. One aspect of the act eliminates public assistance to immigrants. Although there were many reasons for terminating public funds to support immigrants, one of the reasons was the general growth in welfare caseloads, which inevitably led to spiraling welfare costs (Moffitt, 1992). Moreover, welfare participation rates seem to be growing disproportionately among immigrants relative to native-born individuals (Borjas and Trejo, 1991; Trejo, 1992; Borjas and Trejo, 1993). Evidence from recent studies shows that, although public assistance receipt was lower among immigrants than native-born persons in 1970, immigrants were more likely to receive public assistance than native-born persons in 1980 (Trejo, 1992; Borjas and Trejo, 1993) and in 1990 (Fix and Passel, 1994).

One of the questions that arises in policy debates about immigrants is whether immigrants are costly to native-born Americans (e.g., Huddle, 1993;  

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Bean and Sullivan, 1985). Immigrants may place a financial burden on native Americans if they disproportionately participate and depend on welfare compared to natives. There is no evidence in the current literature to definitively state that immigrants place an undue burden on the American welfare system. For example, studies have shown that the relative welfare participation rate of immigrants compared to native-born persons changes depending on whether persons with similar socioeconomic characteristics are compared. In particular, cross-sectional individual-level studies of public assistance participation have found that immigrants have a slightly higher rate of participation than native-born persons. However, these same studies have found that, when controlling for socioeconomic and demographic characteristics, immigrants were less likely to receive public assistance than native-born individuals (Blau, 1984; Tienda and Jensen, 1986; Borjas and Trejo, 1991).

Although literature exists on the race, ethnic and nativity difference in welfare participation, little research has been done on the race, ethnic and nativity difference in subsequent and continued welfare participation – or welfare dependency – among those who are already on welfare. Knowledge regarding the welfare receipt patterns of the “dependent poor” would help in the process of policymaking. Welfare-dependent poor account for most of the money spent on public assistance (Leahy, Buss and Quane, 1995). Recipients who stay on welfare account for a large fraction of the total welfare caseload at any given time (Jencks, 1996). The paucity of knowledge in this area can be partly attributed to the scarcity of appropriate data sets to study race, ethnic and nativity variations. An investigation of nativity difference in welfare dependency among those who are already on welfare is done most effectively with longitudinal data with a large sample size of immigrants from a variety of countries. However, most samples in national longitudinal data sets contain only a small number of immigrants on welfare at a given time, and the variety of immigrants’ countries of origin is limited.

This study examines whether immigrant welfare recipients who belong to particular race and ethnic subgroups are more likely to depend on AFDC than are native-born recipients who belong to other race and ethnic subgroups. It also investigates some of the socioeconomic and demographic processes underlying welfare dependency in general. We analyze longitudinal data from the

2Public assistance in these studies include AFDC, SSI and general assistance. However, AFDC is the largest component of the three; therefore, results from studies of public assistance participation are generally reflective of AFDC participation.

3The term "dependency" refers to continued welfare use of those who are participating in welfare, as opposed to welfare participation at a point in time in the general population. In other words, those who participate in welfare become at risk of depending on welfare.
Foreign Language Survey (FLS) and the English-Spanish Survey (ESS) of the California Work Pays Demonstration Project (CWPDP). We investigate socioeconomic and demographic sources of variation in dependency on Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) among five race, ethnic and nativity subgroups in California. Two are immigrant subgroups (Southeast Asians and Latinos) and three are native-born subgroups (non-Hispanic whites, Latinos and African Americans). Multinomial regressions are applied to a sample of mothers on AFDC to predict welfare dependency at two levels, continuous and interrupted receipt, relative to no receipt at all since the baseline interview. Measures of race, ethnicity and nativity, family structure and socioeconomic status are used to predict a mother’s chance of welfare dependency. These regressions provide specific insights into whether immigrants are more welfare dependent than are native-born persons. More generally, these analyses examine the relationships of family structure and socioeconomic status with welfare dependency.

**BACKGROUND**

This section links family structure, socioeconomic status, prior dependency, and race, ethnicity and nativity to welfare dependency. We first introduce existing arguments about the relationships between a mother’s welfare use and socioeconomic status, family structure, and prior dependency. This discussion is important in understanding part of the race, ethnic and nativity variation in welfare dependency in so far as much of the observed race, ethnic and nativity differences in welfare dependency may be a reflection of subgroup differences in these three dimensions. We then discuss the processes that may lead to some “residual” race, ethnic and nativity variation in welfare dependency, net of the variation attributable to differences in socioeconomic status, family structure, and prior dependency.

We borrow some of the theoretical discussions and empirical findings from studies of welfare participation to better understand the processes

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4The panel surveys from the CWPDP provide ideal data to study the race, ethnic and nativity variations in welfare dependency among the poor for at least two reasons. First, the baseline survey is conducted on a stratified sample of AFDC recipients in California in 1992 and contains a large number of immigrants on welfare. Second, because the data are collected in California, the longitudinal data set contains information concerning a variety of immigrants and minority subgroups on welfare. Thus, this survey gives us the unique opportunity to examine the race, ethnic and nativity variation in welfare dependency among mothers who are at high risk of becoming dependent.
underlying welfare dependency. One of the substantive reasons for using information from studies of welfare participation to understand welfare dependency is that welfare dependency may be viewed as subsequent and continued welfare participation among those who are already participating in welfare. In other words, welfare dependency and welfare participation may be viewed as distinct but related processes.

**Balancing Work and Family among Poor Women**

Some researchers argue that mothers find ways to balance work and family in part to minimize the impact of work on their children's well-being (Spain, 1996; Rindfuss and Brewster, 1996; Hofferth and Deich, 1994; Harris, 1996). Due to lack of resources, effectively balancing work and family is crucial for poor mothers and their children because it directly affects their chances of survival.

Although all poor women are faced with the problem of balancing work and family under a tight budget, some mothers may have an advantage in striking the balance, and hence they may be less likely to utilize and depend on welfare. For example, employment and better employment prospects, fewer children, and having persons with whom the mother can pool resources may place a mother in an advantageous position to reduce her level of welfare dependency.

**Employment and Employment Prospects**

Employment provides a mother with a source of income apart from welfare. As a result, employment is expected to have a major dependency-reducing impact on welfare mothers. Previous studies indicate that maternal employment reduces the chance of re-entry and increases the chance of exits from welfare (Hutchens, 1981; Petersen, 1995; Harris, 1996). Harris (1996) shows that employment is more effective over the long term in keeping women off of welfare than is either marriage or cohabitation.

Separate from the impact of employment, a mother who has better employment prospects may also reduce her dependency on welfare by improving the stability of her employment (Harris, 1996). Some researchers argue that employment prospects improve with more human capital, such as education (Becker, 1964; Mincer, 1974; Blau and Duncan, 1967; Featherman and Hauser, 1978). As a result, measures of human capital, such as education, should reduce the level of a mother's welfare dependency, even when controlling for current employment. However, evidence that a higher level of education reduces welfare participation and increases welfare exits is mixed (see, e.g., Blau, 1984; Petersen, 1995; Plotnick, 1983; Cheng, 1995).
Children

The need for child care is likely to be a function of the demographic characteristics of the children. Having a larger number of children is expected to raise the mother's probability of welfare dependency by increasing her need for child care (Ellwood and Bane, 1985; Duncan and Hoffman, 1988). Separate from the number of children, the presence of a young child should also increase the need for child care, thereby increasing the chance that a mother is AFDC dependent. Previous studies report that both the larger number of children and the presence of a young child increase the chance of welfare participation (Nichols, 1979; Blau, 1984; Petersen, 1995; Tienda and Jensen, 1986). Also, evidence of reverse causality has been found, that welfare use reduces fertility (Rank, 1989).

Pooling Resources

Some researchers argue that poor women employ “income packaging” strategies in order to survive and to ease the difficulty of balancing work and family with a limited budget (Harris, 1996; Duncan, 1984; Spalter-Roth and Hartmann, 1994). In particular, women pool income from a number of sources, including men, the state welfare agencies, friends, and family (Duncan, 1984; Spalter-Roth and Hartmann, 1994) to meet the family's economic needs without making a major compromise in their children's well-being. The range of alternative financial sources available to a poor woman depends on the demographic structure of her social ties. For example, if she is not married or does not have a cohabiting partner, then her chances of pooling income with a man may be small. Thus, marriage or cohabitation are hypothesized to lower the risk of AFDC dependency (Rank, 1986) and has been found to increase the risk of exiting AFDC among single mothers (e.g., Cheng, 1995). Co-residence with another adult who is not a spouse or a partner may also be a way in which a mother can pool resources. For example, co-residing with the mother of the AFDC mother (i.e., the AFDC child's grandmother) may reduce welfare dependency because the grandmother may function as an alternative breadwinner and caregiver. The dependency-reducing impact of the presence of another adult who is not a spouse or a partner in the household should be particularly large among "single"5 AFDC mothers — women who are not likely to receive social and economic support from

5The word "single" is in quotations because it excludes single persons cohabiting with a partner, who are in a marriage-like relationship. This is the definition of singlehood used throughout this paper.
the fathers of the AFDC children. These single mothers are likely to benefit substantially from the support of a co-residing female adult.

Prior Welfare Dependency

A mother with a history of dependency is expected to be more likely to continue to depend on AFDC than a mother without a history of dependency. Persistent dependency on welfare can be attributable to at least two processes. First, there may be a state dependence, otherwise known as a “welfare trap,” where prior dependency increases the probability of future dependency (Heckman and Borjas, 1980). However, the current evidence for state dependence is weak (Duncan and Hoffman, 1988). Second, prior dependency may also capture unmeasured heterogeneity in characteristics that make some women more dependent than others (Duncan and Hoffman, 1988; Harris, 1996). An example would be refugees, whose relaxed AFDC eligibility criteria may make them more dependent than others. Empirically separating state dependence and unmeasured heterogeneity is difficult, and thus far it has not been done. As a result, any evidence that prior welfare dependency is related to continued dependency would reflect either or both of these processes.

Race/Ethnicity

Whether there are race and ethnic differences in welfare dependency, after accounting for minority groups’ relatively disadvantaged socioeconomic and demographic status, is often debated. Some studies report that African Americans and Latinos are persistently less likely to exit and are more likely to stay on AFDC than non-Hispanic whites net of differences in socioeconomic and demographic positions (Duncan and Hoffman, 1988; Boskin and Nold, 1975; Gottschalk and Moffitt, 1994). Others, however, find that socioeconomic and demographic compositional differences explain any apparent race and ethnic variation in welfare use (Hutchens, 1981; Plotnick, 1983; Rank, 1988). The processes underlying the remaining race and ethnic differences in some studies are not well understood. The remaining difference may reflect residual differences in sociodemographic composition unaccounted for by the analytical model. The residual race, ethnic and nativity differences may also reflect differences in socialization and motivational factors, even though available evidence for motivational differences is weak (Duncan and Hoffman, 1988).
Nativity

Previous studies of welfare participation found that non-refugee immigrants, such as the Latinos, have a lower public assistance participation rate than the native-born with similar sociodemographic characteristics, including race and ethnic background (Blau, 1984; Tienda and Jensen, 1986; Jensen, 1988). According to some researchers, the processes underlying the lower rate of welfare participation of voluntary immigrants over native-born individuals net of differences in socioeconomic and demographic positions include selection and ethnic ties (Tienda 1980; Jensen 1988; Borjas 1994). International migration has been characterized as a self-selection process in which only those who are likely to be successful in the country of destination expend their resources to migrate (Blau, 1984; Borjas, 1987, 1994). If some immigrants find the environment of the United States incompatible with their preferences and skills, then they may return to their countries of origin. In addition, non-refugee immigrants may have opportunities to find jobs through ethnic network ties (Tienda, 1980). They may also avoid race or ethnic discrimination (Fix and Passel, 1994) by engaging in entrepreneurial activities with ethnic customers (Waldinger, 1989). Previous findings in studies of welfare participation support these findings (Tienda and Jensen, 1986; Jensen, 1988).

While some immigrant race and ethnic subgroups may be able to utilize networks to avoid welfare participation, other subgroups may not have such support. Because of the type of selection that occurs with migration, the level of immigrant advantage may differ based on the immigrants’ country of origin (Borjas, 1994). For example, refugees may be placed in conditions that make them more economically dependent than native-born individuals and non-refugee immigrants. According to Borjas and Hilton (1996), Southeast Asian refugees, such as the Vietnamese, have a higher AFDC participation rate than every native-born race and ethnic group and immigrant origin group included in their study. Refugees may have a substantially higher AFDC dependency rate than that of voluntary immigrant and native-born mothers in part because of the relaxed eligibility criteria (Trojo, 1992; Parker, 1994; Fix and Passel, 1994). Moreover, compared to other immigrants, refugees may be a less “select” group because their migration is forced by political situations. In addition, refugees who have difficulty with adaptation may be unable to return to their countries of origin (Fix and Zimmerman, 1995). Thus, part of the reason that refugees have a high rate of welfare participation may be that the dependency-increasing effect of being a refugee
more than offsets the dependency-reducing effect that applies generally to immigrants, such as ethnic ties.

DATA

Longitudinal surveys from the California Work Pays Demonstration Project (CWPDP) were analyzed. The CWPDP conducted surveys of welfare recipients in 1992 from four California counties: Los Angeles, Alameda, San Bernardino and San Joaquin.6 The respondents were sampled from major language groups. One of the surveys focused on a sample of the English-speaking and the Spanish-speaking AFDC recipients (ESS). The other survey focused on foreign-born AFDC recipients from Southeast Asia and Armenia (FLS). Completed in 1994, the surveys contained interviews from approximately 3,000 female caretaker figures of AFDC children. In 1996, the recipients were followed up for the second wave of data collection. Approximately 75 percent of the original sample was followed up. Due to dropouts, there is some selectivity in the sample at the second wave (Becerra, Lew, Mitchell and Ono, 1998).7

The sample used in the analysis (N=2,038) includes five major race, ethnic and nativity subgroups: native-born non-Hispanic whites, African Americans, Latinos, and foreign-born Latinos and Southeast (SE) Asians. Subgroups of small size (e.g., Native Americans and foreign-born non-Hispanic whites and blacks) were excluded as were respondents with missing data for the dependent variable (N=452).8

6These counties were used as regionally "representative" counties in California: whereas Alameda and Los Angeles represent urban counties, San Bernardino and San Joaquin represent relatively rural counties. According to the figures published on the internet by the California Department of Finance (www.dof.ca.gov/html/fs_data/profiles/ps_home.htm), these four counties contain approximately 40 percent of the state's population. Both the ESS and FLS samples are stratified probability samples of the population of AFDC cases in California. The samples are stratified by county and program type. The sampling probability differed by language group (see Becerra et al., 1996 for further details).

7Most of the characteristics of the respondents by which attrition is observed (e.g., education, employment, and age) are controlled for in the regressions. As a result, selectivity due to attrition is not likely to affect our results regarding the race, ethnic and nativity variations in welfare dependency in a major way.

8Approximately one third of the missing data arise from the exclusion of subgroups of small size. The remaining two-thirds of the missing data arise from missing values (approximately 30) and the exclusion of cases that were on AFDC in January 1992, but were not on AFDC at the time of the survey. By the time the surveys were conducted on the sample drawn from the AFDC cases of January 1992, approximately 270 of recipients had exited AFDC temporarily or permanently.
ANALYSIS

Dependent Variable: AFDC Dependency

Our dependent variable is a woman’s AFDC dependency between the two waves of interviews. Following Gottschalk and Moffitt’s (1994) suggestions within the confines of data availability, the current analysis uses a simple measure of a mother’s time on AFDC in a time interval to measure welfare dependency. This variable is constructed from variables in the second wave of the survey. Although the survey does not provide a complete receipt history between the waves, it asks two related questions: 1) whether the receipt was continuous between the two waves; and 2) the number of breaks in receipt between the two waves of interviews. The dependent variable is constructed from these questions, and it has three categories: “continuous receipt,” “received AFDC with at least one break,” and “did not receive AFDC between the two interviews” (omitted). This variable is constructed to capture dependency at two levels. Continuous receipt is viewed as a relatively heavy form of dependency. In contrast, receipt with at least one break between the two interviews is treated as a relatively light form of dependency. “Not receiving AFDC between the two interviews” is used as the reference category.

Covariates

Race, ethnicity and nativity consists of five subgroups: “native-born non-Hispanic whites,” “native-born Latinos,” “native-born African Americans,” “foreign-born Latinos,” and “foreign-born Southeast Asians.” “Native-born non-Hispanic whites” is the reference group and is omitted from the analysis.

There has been some effort to separate the effect of race and ethnicity from the effect of nativity in previous studies of welfare participation (e.g., Jensen, 1988). However, separating these effects with any reliability may be difficult when examining the welfare dependency patterns of mothers who have participated in welfare because of the skew in the sample caused by selectivity into welfare use. In addition, whether it is appropriate to assume that there is a common race and ethnicity effect across immigrant status and a common immigrant effect across race and ethnic groups is questionable (Bor-

---

9Evidence suggests that differential selectivity into welfare by nativity in most race and ethnic groups is large enough to practically "designate" a race and ethnic subgroup to a nativity group. More specifically, according to Becerra, Lewin, Mitchell and Ono (1996), even in a sizable sample of welfare recipients, almost all of the Southeast Asians on welfare are foreign-born, and almost all of the non-Hispanic whites and African Americans on welfare are native-born. Latinos are the only ethnic group that has some distribution in both nativity groups.
jas, 1994) – and this assumption would be inherent in the approach to separate the additive effect of race and ethnicity from that of nativity.

Given that we cannot effectively compare nativity patterns within a particular race and ethnic group, and given that constraining the “immigrant effect” to be equal across race and ethnic groups may not be substantively appropriate, we take the less constraining approach of assigning dummy variables based on a cross-classified table of race and ethnicity against nativity. Using these dummy variables, we conduct two tests to assess the nativity difference in welfare dependency. First, we examine whether the two foreign-born subgroups have chances of dependency similar to or lower than non-Hispanic whites. For the second set of tests, we investigate whether the subgroup with the highest chance of dependency among the foreign-born subgroups is more likely to depend on AFDC than the subgroup with the highest chance of dependency among the native-born subgroups. We also investigate whether the subgroup with the lowest chance of dependency among the foreign-born race and ethnic subgroups is more likely to depend on AFDC than the subgroup with the lowest chance of dependency among the native-born race and ethnic subgroups. If only one of these two conditions are fulfilled, then we would only have weak evidence that foreign-born mothers are more likely to depend on AFDC than are native-born mothers, given the race and ethnic spread in the chance of dependency within a nativity group.10

The race, ethnic and nativity variations in the chance of AFDC dependency are examined when controlling for the respondent’s age, year of first receipt, county of residence, and duration between the two interviews. The age of the respondent at the time of the interview has three categories: 10s–20s, 30s, and 40+ (omitted). Year of first AFDC receipt is the calendar year in which the respondent started receiving AFDC for the first time. It consists of five categories: pre-1975, 1975–1979, 1980–1984, 1985–1989, and 1990s (omitted). County consists of four categories: Alameda, Los Angeles, San Bernadino, and San Joaquin (omitted). Duration between the two interviews in months is included as a linear term.

In addition to the four control variables, measures of family structure and socioeconomic status are included in the analysis. “Marital status” has three categories: married, single (i.e., separated, divorced, or never married), and

10We also test whether foreign-born Latinos are more likely to depend on AFDC than are native-born Latinos. Latinos are the only race and ethnic group that has sufficient distribution of mothers across nativity.
Another adult female present in the household" is coded ‘1’ if yes, ‘0’ otherwise. “Only one child present” is a dummy variable coded ‘1’ if the AFDC mother has one child, and ‘0’ if the AFDC mother has more than one child. “Presence of a young child” is coded ‘1’ if the AFDC mother has a child under age 6 and ‘0’ otherwise.

“Respondent’s and spouse’s education” are included as linear terms in years. “Employment of the respondent and the spouse” are included as dummy variables coded ‘1’ if employed and ‘0’ otherwise. “Prior welfare dependency” indicates continuous receipt from the time of first receipt to the first wave of the survey and is coded ‘1’ if yes and ‘0’ otherwise.

The information for all covariates included in the analysis are obtained from the baseline interview. The covariates included in the analysis had only a few missing cases, for which means of the variables were assigned. The means and standard deviations of the variables in the analysis are presented in Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Means</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Welfare Dependency</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuous</td>
<td>0.827</td>
<td>0.378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spell</td>
<td>0.071</td>
<td>0.257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not on AFDC</td>
<td>0.101</td>
<td>0.302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race, Ethnicity and Nativity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native Born Latinos</td>
<td>0.114</td>
<td>0.318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native Born African Americans</td>
<td>0.178</td>
<td>0.382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Born Latinos</td>
<td>0.167</td>
<td>0.373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Born Southeast Asians</td>
<td>0.162</td>
<td>0.368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native Born Non-Hispanic Whites</td>
<td>0.377</td>
<td>0.484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Structure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital status</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>0.466</td>
<td>0.498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not married</td>
<td>0.466</td>
<td>0.498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohabiting</td>
<td>0.067</td>
<td>0.251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other adult female</td>
<td>0.127</td>
<td>0.394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One child only</td>
<td>0.195</td>
<td>0.396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young child</td>
<td>0.334</td>
<td>0.468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socioeconomic Status (SES)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>8.294</td>
<td>4.506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>0.120</td>
<td>0.328</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Analytical Strategy

We use multinominal logit regressions: 1) to test whether foreign-born subgroups are more likely than native-born subgroups to depend on AFDC, and

---

11Although the covariates are lagged relative to the measurement of the dependent variable, we note the possibility of simultaneous causality between marriage and AFDC dependency, which may be reflected in the results (Bahr, 1979; Bennett, Bloom and Miller, 1995).
TABLE 1 (CONTINUED)
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF THE VARIABLES INCLUDED IN THE ANALYSIS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Means</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Control Variables</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year of first receipt</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior to 1989</td>
<td>0.113</td>
<td>0.235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980–1984</td>
<td>0.233</td>
<td>0.422</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985–1989</td>
<td>0.286</td>
<td>0.452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990+</td>
<td>0.367</td>
<td>0.482</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration between the first and second waves in months</td>
<td>20.231</td>
<td>1.739</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuous receipt up to Wave I</td>
<td>0.678</td>
<td>0.467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residing County:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alameda</td>
<td>0.230</td>
<td>0.421</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>0.326</td>
<td>0.469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Bernadino</td>
<td>0.123</td>
<td>0.328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Joaquin</td>
<td>0.319</td>
<td>0.466</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age at Wave I</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10s–20s</td>
<td>0.311</td>
<td>0.381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30s</td>
<td>0.391</td>
<td>0.488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40s</td>
<td>0.297</td>
<td>0.457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>2038</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2) to examine the associations of family status and socioeconomic status with AFDC dependency. Tests are conducted on the full sample as well as on the union status subsamples, namely those who are single and those who are married or cohabiting. These regressions predict the chance of being dependent on welfare at two levels, continuous and interrupted receipt. For the analysis of the full sample, we use three regressions that each include a different number of covariates. The first regression includes the four control variables with race, ethnicity and nativity. It tests whether the two foreign-born subgroups have higher chances of AFDC dependency than native-born non-Hispanic whites (Model 1). Second, we control for prior dependency to examine whether there are differences in AFDC dependency between the two waves when comparing persons with similar histories of continued receipt up to wave I (Model 2). Third, we test the extent to which the race, ethnicity and nativity variations in AFDC dependency after wave I are explained by compositional differences in family structure and socioeconomic status. To do so, we add marital status, the presence of another adult female, having only one child, the presence of a young child, education, and employment to Model 2 (Model 3). The coefficients estimated in Model 3 are then converted to relative risk ratios, which provide the values of multiplicative change in the relative probability of dependency with a unit change in a covariate.

The analysis is repeated with two subsamples of mothers defined by union status, namely mothers who are married or cohabiting and mothers
who are single (not shown). The main results from this analysis are summarized in this article.

Results

Continuous AFDC Receipt. Model 1 in Table 2 contains results from Models 1–3 applied to all respondents. The results in Model 1 indicate that the two foreign-born subgroups and African Americans are significantly more likely than non-Hispanic whites to receive AFDC continuously in the interval (relative to not receiving AFDC at all) when controlling for the respondent's age, year of first receipt, duration between the interviews, and country. When further controlling for prior dependency in Model 2, both foreign-born subgroups have chances of continuous receipt similar to native-born non-Hispanic whites in Model 2. The only significant race, ethnic, and nativity contrast that persists from Model 1 is the higher relative likelihood of continuous welfare receipt by African Americans relative to native-born non-Hispanic Whites. When controlling for pre-existing dependency, there is no evidence that foreign-born persons are more likely than native-born persons to continuously receive AFDC.

When persons with a similar family structure and socioeconomic status were compared in Model 3, there is also no evidence that foreign-born mothers are more dependent on AFDC than are native-born mothers. In particular, all subgroups have chances of receiving AFDC continuously between the interviews similar to native-born non-Hispanic whites. With the inclusion of family status and socioeconomic status covariates in Model 3, the higher chance of continuous AFDC receipt by African Americans in Model 2 disappears.

Having more than one child in the household as well as having a young child increase the chances of continuous receipt (see Model 3). The estimated relative risk ratios using Model 3 indicate that having only one child reduces

---

12 An analysis was conducted separately by union status in part because we had a priori expectations that if a mother were single, the presence of an adult female other than the mother had a major impact on the chance of dependency. In contrast, we expected that if the mother were married or cohabiting, an adult female had a minor impact on the chance of dependency.

13 Although the tables reporting the union status-specific results are excluded from this paper due to space limitations, they are available from the first author upon request. The union status-specific analysis consisted of several regressions. Models 1 and 2 applied to the pooled sample were also applied to each union status subsample. A version of Model 3, which excludes marital status, was also applied to each union status subsample. For the subsample with a spouse or a partner, results from an additional regression, Model 4, were applied. In Model 4, we added the socioeconomic status of the spouse or a partner to Model 3.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Covariates</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Relative risk ratios</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Continuous</td>
<td>Interrupted</td>
<td>Continuous</td>
<td>Interrupted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>2.121*</td>
<td>-2.500</td>
<td>2.673*</td>
<td>-1.879</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race/ethnicity and nativity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NB Latinos</td>
<td>0.493</td>
<td>0.812*</td>
<td>0.317</td>
<td>0.671</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NB African Americans</td>
<td>0.846*</td>
<td>1.376*</td>
<td>0.661*</td>
<td>1.279*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FB Latinos</td>
<td>0.648*</td>
<td>0.707*</td>
<td>0.465</td>
<td>0.563</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FB SE Asians</td>
<td>1.532*</td>
<td>-1.509*</td>
<td>0.249</td>
<td>-2.512*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NB Non-Hispanic Whites</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Structure</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital Status</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohabiting</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Married</td>
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<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other adult female</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One child only</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young child</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Covariates</td>
<td>Model 1</td>
<td>Model 2</td>
<td>Model 3</td>
<td>Relative risk ratios</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Continuous</td>
<td>Interrupted</td>
<td>Continuous</td>
<td>Interrupted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior dependency</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuous from first receipt</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.782*</td>
<td>2.852*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year of first receipt</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior to 1980</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-1984</td>
<td>0.286</td>
<td>0.652</td>
<td>-0.174</td>
<td>-0.110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985-1989</td>
<td>0.419</td>
<td>0.281</td>
<td>-0.534</td>
<td>-0.349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990+</td>
<td>-0.022</td>
<td>0.312</td>
<td>-1.755*</td>
<td>-1.300*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration between waves</td>
<td>-0.048</td>
<td>0.072</td>
<td>-0.073</td>
<td>-0.067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residing County</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alameda</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>0.110</td>
<td>0.067</td>
<td>0.256</td>
<td>0.213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Bernadino</td>
<td>0.063</td>
<td>0.175</td>
<td>0.312</td>
<td>0.385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Joaquin</td>
<td>0.487*</td>
<td>0.933*</td>
<td>0.577*</td>
<td>1.019*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10s-20s</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30s</td>
<td>0.065</td>
<td>-0.186</td>
<td>-0.171</td>
<td>-0.382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40s</td>
<td>-0.627*</td>
<td>-1.788*</td>
<td>-1.080*</td>
<td>-2.187*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo-R squared</td>
<td>0.096</td>
<td>0.242</td>
<td>0.357</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log-likelihood</td>
<td>-1062.304</td>
<td>-890.547</td>
<td>-779.910</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Reference category for the dependent variable is "not being on AFDC at all since the first wave."  
NB=Native born, FB=Foreign born.  
* P < .05  
* * P < .01  
* * * P < .001  
The estimated numbers may be unreliable because of the small number of Southeast Asians who receive AFDC with a break (N=11).  
N = 2,038
the relative probability of continuous receipt by one fourth. The estimates also indicate that the probability of receipt of mothers with a young child is three times higher than the probability of receipt of mothers without a young child. These results are consistent with the argument that the demographic characteristics of the children influenced the chance of welfare dependency by affecting the need for child care (Ellwood and Bane, 1985; Duncan and Hoffman, 1988).

A higher level of education and employment of the mother reduce the chance of continuous receipt (see Model 3). According to the estimated relative risk ratios, employment reduces the relative probability of continuous AFDC receipt by 90 percent. An additional year of education reduces the probability of continuous AFDC receipt by less than 10 percent. The similarity of these results with those from previous studies of welfare entry and exit (Hutchens, 1981; Petersen, 1995; Harris, 1996) suggest that welfare use and welfare dependency may be governed by similar socioeconomic processes.

Interrupted AFDC Receipt. Model 1, Table 2, also includes the results from investigating the likelihood of receiving AFDC with an interruption versus not receiving AFDC between the interviews. When predicting the chance of this “lighter” form of dependency, native-born Latinos and African Americans and foreign-born Latinos have significantly higher chances of interrupted receipt between the interviews compared to native-born non-Hispanic whites. In contrast, foreign-born Southeast Asians are significantly less likely to receive AFDC with a break than are native-born non-Hispanic whites. When controlling for pre-existing dependency, both foreign-born and native-born Latinos have a similar chance of interrupted receipt as native-born non-Hispanic whites. Compared to non-Hispanic whites, the higher chance of interrupted AFDC receipt of African Americans and the lower chance of interrupted AFDC receipt of Southeast Asians observed in Model 1 remain in Model 2. Thus, when prior dependency is controlled, there is no evidence that foreign-born mothers are more likely than native-born mothers to have interrupted AFDC receipt.

When further controlling for family structure and socioeconomic status, the results continue to suggest that foreign-born mothers are not significantly more likely to receive AFDC with an interruption than are native-born mothers. In Model 3, African Americans are still significantly more likely, and Southeast Asians are less likely, to have interrupted AFDC receipt than non-Hispanic whites. When adding family structural socioeconomic covariates in Model 3, native-born and foreign-born Latinos continue to have sim-
ilar chances of interrupted receipt with native-born non-Hispanic whites. As shown by the relative risk ratios derived from Model 3, African Americans are 2.5 times more likely to receive AFDC with an interruption than are non-Hispanic whites. The relative risk ratios also indicate that the probability of interrupted AFDC receipt of Southeast Asians is only 5 percent of the probability of non-Hispanic whites.

Model 3 shows that marriage, the two variables related to children, and employment have the expected associations with the likelihood of interrupted receipt. Although cohabitation with a partner and a higher level of education significantly reduce the relative likelihood of continuous receipt, they do not influence the relative likelihood of interrupted receipt in a major way.

The results in Model 3 indicate that employment reduces the relative chance of continuous receipt by a much larger increment than it reduces the relative chance of interrupted receipt. The estimated relative risk ratios indicate that employment reduces the probability of continuous receipt to 9 percent of the probability of the unemployed. In contrast, employment only reduces the probability of interrupted receipt to 24 percent of the probability of the unemployed.14

The analyses by union status (not shown due to space limitations) indicated that the presence of an adult female significantly reduced the chance of interrupted dependency among single mothers, but had little impact on the risk of dependency among mothers in unions. This result is consistent with our hypothesis that single mothers are particularly likely to benefit from the support of a co-residing female adult.

Table 3 summarizes the race, ethnic and nativity differences observed in Models 1 – 3, Table 2, as well as those from the union status-specific regressions. We tested whether immigrant subgroups were more likely than native-born non-Hispanic whites to depend on AFDC with respect to two levels of

14To assess the difference in the race, ethnicity and nativity variations in welfare participation and those in welfare dependency, we applied equivalent models to the CWBRP survey data and the 1994-1995 March CPS. More specifically, using the same set of covariates, we predicted continuous and interrupted receipt (CWBRP), and the risk of welfare receipt (CPS). The covariates included race, ethnicity and nativity, marital status, having only one child, having a young child, education, employment and age. We found that some race, ethnic and nativity groups were more likely to participate in AFDC, but were not more likely to be welfare dependent than native-born non-Hispanic whites. In particular, while native-born Latinos were more likely to participate in AFDC than native-born non-Hispanic whites, they were not more likely to depend on welfare. In addition, while foreign-born Asians (not necessarily Southeast Asians) were significantly more likely to receive AFDC than native-born non-Hispanic whites, Southeast Asians were less likely to depend on AFDC than non-Hispanic whites.
dependency (i.e., continuous and interrupted). Within each level of dependency, we also investigated the relative dependency patterns of the race, ethnic and nativity subgroups using three levels of controls included in the model. First, we controlled for basic demographic characteristics such as age (Model 1). Second, we further controlled for prior dependency (Model 2). Finally, we incorporated family structure and socioeconomic status into the model (Model 3).

The shaded areas in Table 3 contain the results from the regressions where at least one of the two-foreign born subgroups were more likely than non-Hispanic whites to depend on AFDC. Due to the race and ethnic variation in the likelihood of dependency within a nativity group, we cannot conclusively state that foreign-born mothers are more likely to depend on AFDC than are native-born mothers from the results discussed so far. To further investigate whether foreign-born mothers are more likely to depend on AFDC, additional tests are conducted.

In particular, we test whether the subgroup with the highest or lowest likelihood of dependency in the foreign-born group is significantly more likely to depend on AFDC than the subgroup with the highest or lowest likelihood in the native born group, respectively (see Table 3, “Max” and “Min” columns). In general, we do not find that the foreign-born subgroup with the highest (lowest) chance of dependency is more likely to depend on AFDC than the native-born subgroup with the highest (lowest) chance of dependency with one exception. There is weak evidence that foreign-born subgroups are more likely to continuously receive AFDC than are native-born subgroups when not controlling for prior dependency, family structure and socioeconomic status.

At least four other race, ethnic and nativity patterns are observed in Table 3. First, single African Americans have a persistently higher chance of interrupted receipt compared to single native-born non-Hispanic whites. Second, foreign-born Southeast Asians have a persistently lower chance of interrupted dependency compared to native-born non-Hispanic whites. Third, there is some difference in the dependency patterns of foreign-born Latinos and native-born non-Hispanic whites. In particular, single foreign-born Latinos are more likely than single native-born non-Hispanic whites to receive AFDC continuously and are also more likely to receive AFDC with an interruption, but only when not controlling for family structure and socioeconomic status differences. In addition, when controlling for family structure and socioeconomic status, married or cohabiting foreign-born Latinos are less likely to continuously receive AFDC than married or cohabiting native-born non-
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Continuous receipt</th>
<th>Level of dependency</th>
<th>Receipt with an interruption</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model 1, All</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 1, Spouse/partner</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 1 + Dependency history</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Model 2), All</td>
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<td>N</td>
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<td>Model 2, No spouse/partner</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Model 2, Spouse/partner</td>
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<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 2 + Family structure and SES</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Model 3), All</td>
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<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 3, No spouse/partner</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 3, Spouse/partner</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: AA=African Americans, Lat=Latinos, SEA=foreign born Southeast Asians. The table contains the signs of the coefficient of the significant effects. Native born non-Hispanic whites are omitted as the reference group. The "Min" and "Max" columns contain results from testing 1) whether the foreign born subgroup with the largest coefficient has a higher chance of dependency than the native born subgroup with the largest coefficient (see Max); and 2) whether the foreign born subgroup with the smallest coefficient has a higher chance of dependency than the native born subgroup with the smallest coefficient (see Min). "Y" indicates yes and "N" indicates no.
Hispanic whites. Additional analysis suggested that these differences between foreign-born Latinos and native-born non-Hispanic whites may be in part due to race and ethnicity rather than nativity. In particular, when foreign-born Latinos are excluded from the regression rather than native-born non-Hispanic whites, the coefficient of foreign-born Latinos is not significantly different from the coefficient of native-born Latinos in every regression presented in this study (not shown). Thus, although single foreign-born Latinos and single native-born non-Hispanic whites have differences in their chances of AFDC dependency when not controlling for family structural and socioeconomic status differences, foreign-born and native-born Latinos have similar chances of AFDC dependency. Finally, there is minimal difference between the welfare dependency patterns of native-born Latinos and non-Hispanic whites. These results suggest that differences in the rates of welfare dependency between single native-born non-Hispanic whites and single foreign-born Latinos may surface only when combining the effect of their contrasting race and ethnicity and the effect of their contrasting nativity.

SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

This study explores the race, ethnic and nativity patterns of AFDC dependency among mothers who are already on AFDC. It also examines the influence of socioeconomic and demographic compositions on AFDC dependency in general. AFDC dependency between the first and second waves of interviews is measured at two levels: continuous receipt and interrupted receipt. For the most part, our results are not consistent with the patterns expected from the view that foreign-born mothers are more likely than native-born mothers to depend on AFDC. The range of the chance of dependency of the foreign-born race and ethnic subgroups was similar to the range of the chance of dependency of the native-born race and ethnic subgroups. However, there is weak evidence that foreign-born mothers are more likely to continuously receive AFDC than are native-born mothers when not comparing persons with similar dependency history, family structure and socioeconomic status. Therefore, contrary to the policy concerns that immigrants are costly to native-born Americans because they are more dependent on AFDC than are native-born mothers (e.g., Huddle, 1993; Bean and Sullivan, 1985), almost all of the results in this study do not support this view.

There was no consistent evidence that immigrant mothers were less likely to receive AFDC than were native-born mothers. Among the Latinos – the only race and ethnic group that had a large enough sample size in both native-born
and foreign-born subgroups – we find no significant difference in the chance of continuous or interrupted receipt of welfare by nativity. One possible interpretation of our results is that the potential immigrant advantage derived from selective migration and ethnic networking was not available to those who received welfare.

Although the sign of the coefficients of race, ethnicity and nativity shifted with the inclusion of socioeconomic and demographic variables in the model, we noted at least two persistent patterns. First, among the native-born mothers, African Americans deviate substantially from the dependency patterns of native-born non-Hispanic whites. In particular, the pooled regressions indicate that African Americans have a persistently higher rate of interrupted dependency than non-Hispanic whites. When comparing persons in similar socioeconomic and demographic positions, African Americans are also more likely than native-born and foreign-born Latinos and Southeast Asians to engage in interrupted dependency. Thus, the higher rate of African Americans’ dependency on welfare compared to native-born non-Hispanic whites as well as the other native-born and foreign-born subgroups is not explained by measures of prior welfare dependency, family structure, and socioeconomic status included in this study. The unexplained higher rate of African Americans most likely reflect socioeconomic and demographic compositional differences that are not accounted for by the model. Alternatively, African Americans may experience psychosocial processes that make them more dependent on welfare than other race, ethnic and nativity groups that are on welfare (Duncan and Hoffman, 1988). Further investigations into the question of the higher rate of interrupted welfare dependency of African Americans should be pursued.

Second, the welfare dependency patterns of Southeast Asians in this study also deviated substantially from those of all other foreign-born and native-born race and ethnic subgroups. Without controlling for prior dependency, family structure and socioeconomic status, Southeast Asians were more likely than native-born non-Hispanic whites to receive AFDC continuously. However, when prior dependency, family structure and socioeconomic status are controlled for, foreign-born Southeast Asians were significantly less likely than other native-born and foreign-born subgroups to depend on AFDC. Prior dependency for foreign-born Southeast Asians probably accounts for, in part, the impact of their wider eligibility criteria as refugees. Their relatively low dependency rate, net of the impact of a wider eligibility criteria, is consistent with the argument that immigrants have some advan-
tages in economic survival over native-born mothers due to, for example, their ethnic ties (Borjas, 1987; Waldinger, 1989; Tienda and Jensen, 1986; Jensen, 1988). This immigrant advantage may be observed among the foreign-born Southeast Asians rather than among the Latinos in part because their wider eligibility criteria may lead to little selection of refugees into welfare participation. In other words, even among welfare participants, the process of immigrant advantage may apply to Southeast Asians partly because almost all who entered the country as refugees were eligible to receive AFDC. However, as a cautionary note, the unusually low subsequent dependency rate of Southeast Asians may also be partly influenced by the small number of Southeast Asians who intermittently receive AFDC. Larger samples of Southeast Asian recipients need to be collected to better understand their interrupted dependency patterns.

In contrast to the African Americans and Southeast Asians whose dependency patterns deviated from those of native-born non-Hispanic whites, the foreign-born Latinos had dependency rates similar to or lower than those of non-Hispanic whites when comparing persons of similar socioeconomic and demographic background. In particular, when comparing persons with similar dependency history, family structure and socioeconomic status, foreign-born Latinos and native-born non-Hispanic whites are essentially equally likely to receive AFDC with one exception. Among those who have a spouse or a partner, foreign-born Latinos were significantly less likely than native-born non-Hispanic whites with similar prior dependency, family structure, and socioeconomic characteristics to continuously receive AFDC. When compared to native-born Latinos, foreign-born Latinos are similarly likely to continuously receive AFDC even among those without a spouse or a partner.

Although the results suggest that the immigrant advantages reportedly found in welfare participation may be absent in welfare dependency, they also suggest that many of the socioeconomic processes that apply to welfare participation may also apply to welfare dependency. For example, family structure, particularly the components related to children, has a major impact on welfare dependency. The presence of more than one child and the presence of a young child increase the chances of both continuous and interrupted forms of dependency. These results are consistent with the hypothesis and findings that the greater the need for child care, the more dependent the mother is on welfare (Ellwood and Bane, 1985; Duncan and Hoffman, 1988; Cheng, 1995).

The marital status-specific analysis indicated that, for single mothers, the presence of another adult female in the household reduces the chance of interrupted AFDC dependency. This result suggests that another adult female
is an effective person with whom a single mothers can pool resources. The supportive role of coresiding adult females among welfare recipients deserves further attention.

There are at least three limitations in this study. First, although prior dependency accounts for a major part of the nativity difference in subsequent welfare dependency, it is unclear what prior dependency measures. It could be capturing the impact of unmeasured heterogeneity in family structure and socioeconomic status. It could also be capturing the impact of a “welfare trap.” However, this shortcoming is not limited to the present study and is inherent in any analysis of welfare dependency due to the general difficulty of separating heterogeneity of characteristics from state dependence (Duncan and Hoffman, 1988). Second, the sample used in this study contains some selectivity bias. The selectivity takes place partly because of differential attrition and partly because the sample is based on only four counties in California. As a result, future studies should investigate the extent to which the findings in this study are generalizable, as more data on samples of immigrant and native-born welfare recipients become available. Third, the data set is limited to those who are already on AFDC. This prevents us from being able to systematically estimate the impact of selectivity into welfare use on the race, ethnic and nativity variations in the risk of subsequent welfare dependency. It also prevents us from “correcting” for selectivity in the estimation of the variations in the risk of welfare dependency across race, ethnic and nativity subgroups. A systematic study that models selectivity would be useful as more data that focus on welfare use and dependency patterns of immigrants become available. Even with these limitations, this study sheds light on some of the dynamics behind race, ethnic and nativity variations in welfare dependency and, more generally, the relationship of socioeconomic and demographic characteristics with welfare dependency.

What do our results imply for welfare reform, particularly for welfare-to-work programs? One of the implications is that the time limit on AFDC may have a particularly negative consequence for African Americans, especially single African-American mothers, rather than on immigrant subgroups. This especially may be the case for single African-American mothers. The results suggest that, even among those who work, single African Americans are more likely to depend on welfare intermittently than single non-Hispanic whites. Thus, even if single African Americans make the transition to work, they may still require intermittent dependency more than other race/ethnic and nativity subgroups included in this study.
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Tienda, M.
Tienda, M. and L. Jensen  

Trejo, S. J.  

Waldinger, R.  
A Validation of the Ethnosurvey: The Case of Mexico-U.S. Migration

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This article evaluates the validity of the ethnosurvey as a method of demographic data collection by analyzing the representativeness of the Mexican Migration Project (MMP) as a source of information on Mexico-U.S. migration. After briefly delineating the philosophy, structure, and organization of the MMP’s ethnosurvey design, we describe MMP’s public use dataset as well as Mexico’s Encuesta Nacional de la Dinámica Demográfica (ENADID) as a benchmark for its systematic evaluation. Although the MMP over-represents migrants in the western states and mid-sized communities, it yields a relatively accurate and valid profile of migrants to the United States. A comparison of multivariate models estimated using MMP and ENADID data suggests that whereas the former’s sampling errors are small and yield biases that are substantively unimportant, the latter’s potential for specification error and selection bias may seriously compromise results. Our comparison thus validates the ethnosurvey as an accurate and reliable method of data collection and the MMP as a good source of reasonably representative data on documented and undocumented migration to the United States.

The ethnosurvey is a multimethod data-gathering technique that simultaneously applies ethnographic and survey methods within a single study. The guiding philosophy is that qualitative and quantitative procedures complement one another and that, properly combined, one’s weaknesses are the other’s strengths, yielding a body of data with greater reliability and more internal validity than could be achieved using either method alone (Massey 1987a, 1994, 1998). The approach draws on the ethnographic traditions of sociology, anthropology, psychology, and education, blending them with survey research methods common to economics, political science, sociology, and demography. Whereas conventional sample surveys fail to provide historical depth, richness of context, the intuitive appeal of real life, ethnographic studies capture these elements very well. The lack of quantification, however, makes it difficult for ethnographers to demonstrate the validity of conclusions.
to other social scientists, and subjective elements of interpretation and selection are more difficult to detect and control.

The ethnoversay was designed to capitalize on the strengths of both methods while minimizing their respective weaknesses. It was originally employed to collect information on migration between Mexico to the United States (Massey et al., 1987) to overcome specific problems with official immigration statistics (see Levine, Hill, and Warren, 1985). During each year since 1987, the Mexican Migration Project (MMP) has conducted successive rounds of ethnoversays in Mexican sending communities and U.S. destination areas to build a public use database on Mexican immigration. The data are now publicly available via the internet at http://pop.upenn.edu/ mexmig/ and have found a growing array of statistical applications: estimating undocumented Mexican migration to the United States (Massey and Singer, 1995); measuring the annual flow of remittances into Mexico (Massey and Parrado, 1994); measuring the effect of migradollars on the Mexican economy (Durand, Parrado, and Massey, 1995; Durand et al., 1996; Massey and Parrado, 1998); examining how underenumeration and selective emigration affect models of immigrant assimilation (Lindstrom and Massey, 1994); testing migration theories (Delechat, 1994, 1995; Zahniser, 1996; Massey and Espinosa, 1997); assessing the effects of U.S. policies on the volume and composition of immigration (Massey, Donato, and Liang, 1990; Donato, Durand, and Massey, 1992a; Donato, 1993, 1994); and determining the effect of restrictive immigration policies on the wages and employment conditions of Mexican immigrants (Donato, Durand, and Massey, 1992b; Donato and Massey, 1993; Phillips and Massey, 1999).

Data from the MMP have also been employed in unpublished work undertaken by the U.S. General Accounting Office, the U.S. Congressional Research Service, the U.S. Department of Commerce, and the National Research Council, and they have formed the basis for estimates derived by study groups associated with the Binational Study of Mexico-U.S. Migration (1997). Given their apparently successful application to the study of Mexico-U.S. migration, ethnoversay methods have been applied to study international migration from eastern and central Europe (Frejka et al., 1995; Frejka, 1996, 1997; Sipaviciene, 1997), and they were included in a recent U.N. manual on demographic methods (Bogue, 1995).

Despite their seeming promise, however, a major unanswered question concerns the validity of ethnoversay data. To date, this issue has not been effectively addressed owing to the absence of a benchmark capable of assess-
ing how data gathered using an ethnosurvey might have differed were more conventional approaches to have been employed. A convincing empirical validation requires a representative social survey to use as a base of comparison in evaluating ethnosurvey data, but until recently this yardstick has been unavailable for Mexico or anywhere else.

In 1992, however, the Mexican national statistical institute implemented a demographic survey known by its Spanish acronym of ENADID (Encuesta Nacional de la Dinámica Demográfica). Although it was not designed to study Mexico-U.S. migration per se, the survey did include a series of questions to identify international migrants using definitions roughly comparable to those employed in the Mexican Migration Project, thus providing an unusual opportunity to validate the ethnosurvey empirically. In this article, we use the ENADID as a nationally representative standard against which to judge the validity of univariate and multivariate estimates derived from the MMP. Through a series of direct statistical comparisons between the two datasets, we assess the degree to which biases are incurred as a result of the ethnosurvey’s unique structure and design, the degree to which ethnosurvey results are broadly generalizable, and the extent to which multivariate estimates based on ethnosurvey are replicable from nationally representative data. Our comparisons suggest that results derived from the MMP are remarkably similar to those based on the ENADID, providing researchers with some confidence in the validity of the ethnosurvey approach.

THE MMP DATA

As in all ethnosurveys, the MMP employs a semi-structured survey instrument laid out in a series of tables with variables arranged in columns across the top and rows down the side which refer, variously, to persons, social categories, or years. The first table in the questionnaire gathers basic social and demographic data about the household head, the spouse, all their living children, and other persons residing in the sample household. For each person, the columns contain data on sex, household membership, relation to head, year of birth, place of birth, marital status, education, and occupation.

This initial table is followed by two others that gather information from each person about their first and last trips within Mexico and to the United States. The next six tables reconstruct the life history of the household head, focusing successively on marriage, childbirth, land ownership, home ownership, vehicle ownership, business ownership, and concluding with a detailed labor history beginning at age 15 or the first job, whichever came first. Two
additional tables in the questionnaire compile information about the head’s social connections to the United States.

Household heads with U.S. migratory experience are then led in conversation through a series of tables that establish the respondent’s complete history of undocumented border crossing and assess the range of social and economic ties forged on the last trip, also gathering data about the last job held in the United States and the use of various U.S. social services. The last three tables in the instrument apply to households that own or rent agricultural land and ascertain the quality and quantity of farmland and the degree to which family workers, non-family workers, machinery, and other inputs are employed for various tasks, as well as the number and kind of livestock owned by the household.

Within each community, households are selected for interviewing using simple random sampling. Sampling frames are constructed by carrying out a house-to-house census to list the dwellings (or potential dwellings) in each community. Usually an entire town or city is canvassed, but in large urban areas this is usually not possible and specific working-class neighborhoods are demarcated and sampled instead. December and January are generally the best times to locate and interview seasonal U.S. migrants within Mexico, because most return to spend the Christmas holidays with their families. In a few cases when preliminary fieldwork reveals that migrants also return during another period of the year, interviewers are sent back later to complete the sample. In general, however, the Mexican community samples are representative of dwelling units occupied during December of the survey year.

The Mexican community samples are supplemented with non-random samples of out-migrants located in the United States during the following year. Fieldwork and interviewing always occur first in Mexico and later move to U.S. destination areas because it is through connections established in Mexico that interviewers build relations of trust and confidence that give them access to the binational population of migrants. In the course of fieldwork they learn where in the United States migrants go; then they go to these places to interview people who have settled abroad and no longer return home with any frequency (generally those who have been abroad at least three years). The destination samples are compiled using snowball sampling methods (Goodman, 1961), in which the fieldworker enters the U.S. with a few names, phone numbers, and addresses, and then after interviewing these people uses them to gain referrals to additional community members who might be willing to participate in the study. At the time of
this evaluation, the MMP public dataset included 34 Mexican communities
sampled between 1987 and 1995 and five others surveyed in 1982 using simi-
lar procedures as part of an earlier project (described in Massey et al., 1987).
Information about these samples is presented in Table 1, and their approxi-
mate geographic location is depicted in Figure 1. The communities range in
size from under 300 persons to nearly 3 million, yielding an average size of
around 92,000. Survey years extend from 1982 to 1995 and center on 1990.
Samples sizes range between 100 and 400 households with a mode of 200 and
an average of about 187. To date, 7,293 households in Mexico have been sur-
veyed and incorporated into the database. Given the limited range of
absolute sample sizes, sampling fractions depend primarily on the size of the
community, yielding a rather wide range, going from .005 to .999, with the
former representing a random sample of a small metropolitan area and the
latter a complete census of a small, rural community.

Refusals generally have not been a serious problem for the MMP. The
arrival of ethnographic fieldworkers in the community prior to adminis-
tering the questionnaires allows the project to establish relations of confidence with
community leaders, local residents, and informants. Although the refusal rate
reached 15 percent in one community, in two cases no refusals were record-
ed (both rural villages) and in 25 cases the refusal rate was 6 percent or less.
The average refusal rate was 6.2 percent. High refusal rates generally reflect
distrust stemming from local conditions rather than suspicion about the
MMP per se.

Owing to the higher costs and greater difficulties of interviewing in the
United States, U.S. samples tend to be relatively small: the modal U.S. sam-
ple size was twenty and the average was seventeen. Whereas the Mexican
samples represent conditions in migrant-sending communities at the time of
the survey, the U.S. surveys depict conditions in the corresponding U.S. set-
tlements a short time later. When pooled, they offer a comprehensive por-
trait of binational communities formed through recurrent processes of inter-
national migration and settlement. In combining cases, however, it is impor-
tant to assign cases a weight expressing their relative contribution to the total
binational population (Sudman, 1983). These weights are the inverse of the
sampling fraction employed at each Mexican or U.S. site, shown in Table 1.

In Mexico, sampling fractions are easily computed by dividing the num-
ber of households in the sample by the number of eligible households on the
sampling frame. In the United States, however, sampling fractions must be
estimated by dividing the number of sample households by the estimated
## TABLE 1

**INFORMATION ON MEXICAN AND U.S. SAMPLES INCLUDED IN THE MEXICAN MIGRATION PROJECT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State and Urban Rank</th>
<th>Rounding Population</th>
<th>Year of Survey</th>
<th>Mexican Samples</th>
<th>U.S. Samples</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1990</td>
<td></td>
<td>Mexican Samples</td>
<td>U.S. Samples</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Population</td>
<td></td>
<td>Refusal Rate</td>
<td>Sample Size</td>
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<td>.074 201</td>
<td>.119 20</td>
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<tr>
<td>City</td>
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<td>.113 20</td>
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<td>.038 200</td>
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<td>.115 200</td>
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<td>.215 6</td>
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<td>.029 100</td>
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<td>Metro area</td>
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<td>.083 200</td>
<td>.056 20</td>
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<td>1992</td>
<td>.083 200</td>
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<td>1990</td>
<td>.045 200</td>
<td>.045 20</td>
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<td>Town</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>.010 200</td>
<td>.074 20</td>
</tr>
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<td>San Luis Potosí</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>526,000</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>.048 200</td>
<td>.232 0</td>
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<td>City</td>
<td>42,000</td>
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<td>.024 200</td>
<td>.580 20</td>
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<td>1995</td>
<td>.000 102</td>
<td>.999 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zacatecas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metro area</td>
<td>109,000</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>.142 239</td>
<td>.127 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Town</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>.127 365</td>
<td>.213 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rancho</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>.063 149</td>
<td>.512 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rancho</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>.025 187</td>
<td>.803 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>91,632</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>.062 187</td>
<td>.267 17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* Sample of urban neighborhood rather than entire community.
number of households in the out-migrant community. Following Massey and Parrado (1994), the size of the U.S. population was calculated using data on the current location of offspring of the household head who no longer live at home. Because the questionnaire gathers information about all children of the household head, whether or not they are currently living at home, nonmember children yield a network sample of the community population. The ratio of nonmember children living in the United States to nonmember children living in Mexico thus provides an unbiased estimate of the relative size of the U.S. community. When multiplied by the size of the Mexican sampling frame it yields an estimate of the total size of the out-migrant community in the United States, which is the denominator used to compute the U.S. sampling factions shown in Table 1 (yielding an average value of .274).

The Mexican communities themselves are strategically chosen to reproduce a range of conditions with respect to size, geography, ethnicity, and economic organization. The database thus includes many different community types: small agrarian villages, large agricultural towns, industrial towns, a fishing vil-
lage, a mining town, a number of commercial towns, a tourist area, and a variety of diverse metropolitan areas. The agrarian communities include some with land and some without; some with and some without an ejido (communal land set aside during Mexico’s agrarian reform); some that cultivate using traditional methods and others that use the latest capital-intensive technologies. In some cases, the farmland is irrigated whereas in others it is not. Most of the communities are mestizo, but some are predominantly Amerindian.

Although the project focuses on international migration, communities are not selected because they are thought to contain large numbers of U.S. migrants. As a result, the relative prevalence of migration varies quite widely between communities: in some places less than 10 percent of adults have been to the United States, whereas in others more than 60 percent have been (see Massey, Goldring, and Durand, 1994). The database thus embraces a diverse range of migratory experiences and is not composed exclusively of communities with well-developed migration streams.

The MMP was designed to reflect the historical importance of western Mexico in U.S. migration. Since the early 1940s, over half of all migrants to the United States have come from a handful of western states, principally Guanajuato, Jalisco, Michoacan, San Luis Potosí, and Zacatecas (Durand, Massey, and Zenteno, 1999). Of the 39 communities incorporated into the database so far, nine are in the state of Guanajuato, ten are in Jalisco, and seven are in Michoacán, which together comprise 41 percent of the total number of communities. Another five are in San Luis Potosí and four are in Zacatecas, accounting for another 23 percent. In the current database, two community samples are from the small state of Nayarit and one is from the small state of Colima. Thus, all but one of the communities are located in Mexico’s western region.

**ENADID: A BENCHMARK FOR THE MMP**

The ENADID was administered by Mexico’s Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática (INEGI) to a generate a representative sample not only for Mexico as a whole, but for each state in the republic. The design was a stratified, multistage probability sample of 2,000 households within each of the nation’s 32 states, yielding a target size of 64,000 households. The questionnaire was administered using face-to-face interviews during the months of September through November of 1992, with a final sample of 57,916 households and 277,552 individuals and a response rate of just over 90 percent (INEGI 1994). Since the sample design is multistage and dispropor-
tionately stratified, case weights must be applied to derive unbiased estimates of parameters at the national and regional levels.

ENADID sought to enumerate all persons who “normally” reside in respondent households, even if they were temporarily working or studying elsewhere. Thus, temporary U.S. migrants are recorded and included in the sample as long as at least one household member remained behind in Mexico to report on them and still considered them to reside “normally” in the home. For each household member, the survey determines place of birth, whether or not the person ever lived in another country “even if for a short time,” the location and duration of this prior foreign residence, place of residence in June 1987, and, for respondents aged 12 or more at the time of the survey, whether or not the person had ever worked or looked for work in the United States, along with the dates of departure and return.

Although these questions yield several possible measures of emigration, we defined international migrants as all those aged 12 or older who reported working or looking for work in the United States at any point in their lives. We chose this definition because it can be replicated exactly in the MMP; it focuses on labor migration (the primary outcome of interest); and because it maximizes the potential number of migrants to produce estimates of greater reliability and precision. Information on the calendar year of the last trip to the United States also allows us to estimate dates of departure and return and, hence, the trip duration.

Despite their use of a common definition of migration, several methodological differences between the two surveys should be borne in mind. Whereas ENADID was designed to provide representative indicators at the national and state levels, the MMP can only provide unbiased estimates for specific communities. The two surveys also have very different dates and schedules of implementation. The former was fielded within a short, three-month span during September through November of 1992, whereas the latter was fielded during November through January in 1982 and then during the same months in successive years from 1987 through 1995. Thus, the ENADID survey date refers to a specific period of time (the end of 1992); whereas in the MMP it refers to a series of different dates beginning in 1982 but concentrated in years after 1987. The longer period over which MMP data were collected makes them sensitive to social, economic, and policy changes in a way that is irrelevant for ENADID.

One final difference concerns the degree to which the two surveys sought to achieve coverage of permanent out-migrants. ENADID attempted to
gather data only from those migrants who “usually” resided in Mexico, excluding those who had settled in the United States permanently. Information about these people comes from the migrants themselves if they had returned, or from family members if they were gone at the time of the survey. In contrast, the MMP sought to compile a sample of permanent U.S. settlers as well as temporary migrants, specifically targeting settled U.S. households with no members left behind in Mexico to report on their activities. In most of the comparisons we undertake, we restrict our analysis to the Mexican samples. In our multivariate comparisons, however, we add in the U.S. samples to assess the degree of bias stemming from processes of emigration and settlement that are quite selective.

**VALIDATION OF THE MMP DATA**

**Geographic Coverage**

The sample design of the MMP obviously yields a skewed regional distribution of U.S. migrants compared with a sample that is nationally representative. Table 2 demonstrates this fact by contrasting the regional distribution of U.S. labor migrants identified in the ENADID with those identified in the MMP. In this and subsequent analyses, we employ sampling weights associated with each dataset to yield computations that are representative of the region or state under consideration (in the case of ENADID) or the pooled sample of communities (in the case of the MMP).

According to the ENADID, around 2.45 million Mexicans aged 12 or older had been to the United States as of 1992, either working or looking for work (8,765 unweighted cases). Roughly 43 percent of these people were

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State and Region</th>
<th>Total Pop.</th>
<th>Persons Aged 12+</th>
<th>U.S. Labor Migrants 12+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Western Mexico</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
<td>21.8%</td>
<td>42.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aguascalientes</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colima</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guanajuato</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jalisco</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michoacan</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nayarit</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Luis Potosi</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zacatecas</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other States</td>
<td>77.8</td>
<td>78.2</td>
<td>57.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Mexico(000)</td>
<td>85,966</td>
<td>60,218</td>
<td>2,449</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Encuesta Nacional de la Dinámica Demográfica and the Mexican Migration Project.
from the states of western Mexico, compared to just 22 percent of the total population aged 12 and above. Thus, the degree of regional concentration is about twice what one would expect given Mexico’s overall geographic distribution of population. Although we do not show the data separately in the table, 6 percent of these labor migrants were in the United States at the time of the survey, and 3 percent lived in the northern border region and commuted regularly to work in the United States.

Even allowing for the pronounced pattern of regional concentration observed in nationally representative data, the MMP overstates the concentration of U.S. migrants in western Mexico by a considerable margin. Of the MMP’s 37,817 persons aged 12 or more who reported working or looking for work in the United States at some point in their lives (4,255 unweighted cases), 83 percent were from western Mexico, a fact that follows axiomatically from the fact that 38 of the 39 communities included in the MMP are located in the west. At this point in the MMP’s evolution as a dataset, nonwestern migratory experience is represented by a single metropolitan sample from the state of Guerrero (although more communities will be added in the near future).

Among western states, the MMP represents Jalisco roughly in proportion to its share of all U.S. labor migrants (13.6% in the MMP compared with 12.6% in the ENADID), a fact also true of Colima (1.9% in the MMP, 1% in the ENADID) and Zacatecas (5.9% in the MMP and 4.3% in ENADID). The absence of Aguascalientes from the MMP data does not appear seriously to misstate that state’s contribution to Mexico’s emigrant workforce, as owing to its small size it contains few international migrants (just 1.4% of the total); but the MMP substantially over-represents the contribution of Guanajuato and Michoacán compared with nationally representative data. Whereas migrants from the former state comprise only 8.4 percent of the ENADID’s sample of U.S. migrants, they make up 19.8 percent of those identified in the MMP; and whereas migrants from Michoacán comprise 11.4 percent of the ENADID sample, they make up some 27.8 percent of those in the MMP.

In sum, as expected given its sampling strategy, the MMP over-represents migrants from western Mexico, particularly the states of Guanajuato and Michoacán. In some sense, however, it is inappropriate to compare the MMP directly with the ENADID, as the former has never sought to achieve national coverage. We have simply confirmed what we already knew: that the MMP mainly contains migrants from western states. A more informative va-
idation focuses on western Mexico itself, comparing data from the two surveys within this region alone, a task undertaken in Table 3.

**TABLE 3**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States</th>
<th>U.S. Labor Migrants 12+</th>
<th>Migrants/Pers 12+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ENADID</td>
<td>MMP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Western States</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aguascalientes</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colima</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guanajuato</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>23.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jalisco</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michoacán</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nayarit</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Luis Potosí</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zacatecas</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (000)</td>
<td>1,083</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Core Western States**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States</th>
<th>U.S. Labor Migrants 12+</th>
<th>Migrants/Pers 12+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ENADID</td>
<td>MMP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guanajuato</td>
<td>21.6%</td>
<td>24.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jalisco</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>33.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michoacán</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>21.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Luis Potosí</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zacatecas</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (000)</td>
<td>956</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Encuesta Nacional de la Dinámica Demográfica and the Mexican Migration Project.

Considering the radical differences in sample design, the MMP does not perform badly as a sample of western Mexico. Within this region, the MMP comes very close to representing the proportional contributions of Colima, Guanajuato, San Luis Potosí, and Zacatecas. For each of these states, the percentage of migrants in the MMP is within five points of that derived from the ENADID. Jalisco, however, is under-represented by thirteen points, whereas Michoacán and Nayarit are over-represented by nearly seven and eight points, respectively. Historically, a huge share of U.S. migrants have come from five core states: Guanajuato, Jalisco, Michoacán, San Luis Potosí, and Zacatecas (Durand, Massey, and Zenteno, 1999). When these core western states are considered by themselves (excluding the relatively small states of Aguascalientes, Colima, and Nayarit), the range of differences between the two sample designs falls even further, ranging from 1.4 points in Jalisco to 7.5 points in Michoacán.

**Prevalence of Migration**

These geographic discrepancies are not surprising, given the sampling design employed in each survey. A different question concerns the relative prevalence U.S. migratory experience within each state. According to the ENA-
DID, about 4.1 percent of all Mexicans over the age of 12 have been to the United States as labor migrants, a figure that roughly doubles to 8.1 percent in the western states. According to the MMP, however, the frequency of labor migration in western Mexico is 10.1 percent. Thus, although MMP does not select communities because they are thought to contain U.S. migrants, it appears to overstate somewhat the prevalence of U.S. labor migration in western Mexico.

The right-hand columns of Table 3 present relative migration frequencies within individual states to reveal that the apparent overstatement migration prevalence by the MMP, although not pronounced, is fairly consistent across states. In each case, the prevalence ratio is higher in the MMP than in the ENADID. The degree of overstatement is generally modest, however, being roughly two percentage points in Colima, Guanajuato, Jalisco, and Michoacán, and just 1 percent in Zacatecas; but the percentage was five points higher in Nayarit and four points higher in San Luis Potosí. One way or another, the MMP captures more U.S. migrants than the ENADID.

**Migrant Characteristics**

The ENADID was implemented in order to provide Mexican public officials with basic data about the fundamental components of demographic change: fertility, mortality, and migration. In addition to the questions on migration already discussed, the survey also included items to estimate the under-registration of deaths and the under and late registration of births, as well as women's access to contraception and their knowledge and use of different birth control methods (see INEGI, 1994). Unfortunately, ENADID contained little information on the socioeconomic background of respondents. Personal characteristics essentially are confined to age, sex, relation to household head, marital status, and education; we can also determine the size of the respondent's community. Thus, even though we can readily identify current or former labor migrants, we learn very little about them from ENADID; and with respect to the migration experience itself, the only variable we can effectively consider is trip duration.

Table 4 compares the characteristics of labor migrants identified in the MMP and ENADID to provide an objective assessment of the degree to which the former yields a biased profile of Mexican migrants to the United States. In this table, we restrict our attention to respondents living in the core states of western Mexico (Guanajuato, Jalisco, Michoacán, San Luis Potosí, and Zacatecas). In each of these states the MMP has sampled multiple com-
munities, so they should in principle yield the most accurate, reliable, and valid estimates.

TABLE 4
SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF MEXICAN LABOR MIGRANTS TO THE UNITED STATES FROM FIVE CORE WESTERN STATES (GUANAJUATO, JALISCO, MICHOCÁN, SAN LUIS POTOSÍ, AND ZACATECAS) AS SURVEYED BY THE MEXICAN MIGRATION PROJECT (MMP) AND THE ENCUESTA NACIONAL DE LA DINÁMICA DEMográfICA (ENADID)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>MMP</th>
<th>ENADID</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Size of Community</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 2,500</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>38.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,500-19,999</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>23.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20,000-99,999</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 100,000</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>27.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Male</td>
<td>87.5%</td>
<td>87.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Female</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Age</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>37.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Age</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>40.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard Deviation</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relation to Household Head</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Head</td>
<td>65.5%</td>
<td>70.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spouse</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Son/Daughter</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital Status</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Currently Married</td>
<td>72.0%</td>
<td>79.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never Married</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Once Married</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of Schooling</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 6</td>
<td>52.4%</td>
<td>56.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-8 Years</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>27.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-11 Years</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12+ Years</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>4.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Median</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
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<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard Deviation</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration of Last U.S. Trip</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>19.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard Deviation</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>36.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Cases</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weighted (000)</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unweighted</td>
<td>3,948</td>
<td>2,608</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Encuesta Nacional de la Dinámica Demográfica and the Mexican Migration Project.

The MMP’s sampling design strategically selected communities at all levels of urbanism to ensure that a variety of migratory experiences would be represented. Within each state, the project generally included at least one metropolitan area, one small city, one town, and one rural village. As the database evolved, this skeletal distribution was filled in more fully, but the
basic strategy was not altered. As Table 4 indicates, this approach does not yield a representative distribution of migrants by community size. In general, the MMP over-represents migrants from the middle of the community size distribution, whereas migrants in smaller and larger communities are under-represented.

According to ENADID, 39 percent of U.S. migrants from the western region originate in communities under 2,500 inhabitants; 24 percent come from places containing 2,500 to 19,999 inhabitants; 10 percent from places between 20,000 and 100,000; and 28 percent from places over 100,000. In contrast, the respective figures for the MMP are 7 percent, 33 percent, 49 percent, and 11 percent. Thus, the MMP not only over-represents certain states within Mexico, it also over-represents certain kinds of communities—namely, places ranging in size from 2,500 to 100,000 inhabitants.

Aside from these differences, which are essentially built into the structure of the MMP by its design, the community surveys do a remarkably good job of reflecting the characteristics of international migrants. Apparently the social and economic processes that underlie international migration are quite similar across space and time, yielding similar migrant profiles regardless of the size or location of the community or the period under consideration. The sex distribution of migrants identified in the MMP, for example, comes to within 0.2 percentage point of matching that in the ENADID, despite radical differences in sample design. The MMP and ENADID likewise yield very similar age structures, here summarized by the first and second moments of the distribution, as well as the median. Although medians differ by one year, the means and standard deviations are virtually the same: 40.7 in the case of the MMP and 40.2 in the ENADID. Both data sources thus indicate that current and former U.S. labor migrants located in Mexico have an average age of about 41 years with a median in the late 30s, indicating a long upward tail that yields a relatively large standard deviation (about 16 years in both surveys).

The educational distributions are also remarkably close. Whereas 52.4 percent of U.S. migrants identified in the MMP have less than six years of schooling, 66.1 percent do so in the ENADID. The percentages with six to eight years of schooling are likewise similar—30.1 percent in the MMP and 28.2 percent in the ENADID. Only at the upper end of the educational distribution do differences arise, probably reflecting the MMP’s over-representation of mid-sized cities and its under-representation of rural villages. Whereas 8 percent of U.S. migrants listed in the MMP have twelve or more
years of schooling, only 4 percent of those in the ENADID do so. Despite these differences at the tails of the educational distribution, the means are roughly comparable (5.0 in the MMP and 4.6 in the ENADID). Thus, both surveys yield much the same educational profile of labor migrants to the United States: a majority have less than a primary education and relatively few are secondary school graduates, with an average level of schooling of four to five years.

Perhaps the most encouraging sign of the MMP’s validity is the remarkably close match with respect to trip duration. These durations were computed only for trips completed at the time of the survey, excluding migrants still in the United States. According to the MMP, the mean trip length was 21.2 months compared with 19.8 months in the ENADID, and the medians were both seven months. The remarkable correspondence between the two data sources is illustrated in Figure 2, which shows the cumulative distribution of trip durations by month for the MMP and ENADID. The match is startling, particularly the jump at the 24 month interval, which may represent heaping on a duration of two years. Whatever errors respondents make in reporting trip durations, they appear to be consistent across sources.

Figure 2. Months Spent by Return Migrants on Last Trip to the United States, Cumulative Percentage (Core Western States).
The distribution of trip lengths is generally more variable in the MMP, with a standard deviation of 46.5 months in core western states, compared to just 36.7 months in the ENADID. This discrepancy partly reflects the way that trip length was estimated in each survey. In the ENADID, migrants who reported working or looking for work in the United States were asked to give the month and year of their departure and the month and year of their return. Trip lengths are derived through simple subtraction. In contrast, U.S. migrants enumerated in the MMP provide their own estimate of the total trip length in years and months. Not surprisingly, our comparison suggests greater error associated with the MMP’s respondent-provided approximation than the ENADID’s direct calculation from exact dates (reflected in the higher standard deviation). Despite their greater variability, however, the MMP’s estimates do not appear to be systematically biased, as indicated by the close match for the means, medians, and cumulative frequency distributions. Although trip lengths may be less reliably estimated in the MMP than the ENADID, they appear to be equally valid.

In contrast to the foregoing variables, important differences between the two surveys do appear with respect to household position and marital status. Compared with U.S. migrants identified in the ENADID, relatively few of those captured in the MMP are household heads (65.5% compared with 70.9%) and relatively more are children of the head (27.0% compared with 17.0%). Likewise, only 72.0 percent of the migrants identified in the MMP were married (compared with 79.7% in the ENADID) and 23.7 percent were never married (compared with only 15.0% in the ENADID).

These discrepancies may be interpreted in one of two ways. The first is that the purposive selection of communities in the MMP yields a biased sample that does not accurately reflect the characteristics of Mexican migrants to the United States; but then one has to explain why the MMP matches the ENADID so closely with respect to sex, age, years of schooling, and trip duration. Although bias need not be consistent across variables, in general one expects it to be exhibited more uniformly across characteristics.

A second potential interpretation is that the MMP is more effective identifying unmarried children of the household head who are currently absent and working in the United States, yielding higher fractions of migrants in these categories. As a formal demographic survey, the ENADID uses standardized question wording to ask respondents who “normally lives here.” An additional probe asks whether “anyone else lives here, such as a newborn, small child, servants, friends, or an old person.” Before turning to the next
question, the respondent is asked to review the list and confirm that it is complete.

As the ENADID is not a migration survey, it does not include probes specifically designed to determine whether any household members are away working in the United States. Only if the respondent considered an absent migrant to reside in the household “normally” would that person be included in the list of household members; yet the very nature of transnational migration renders the concept of “residence” highly ambiguous (Massey et al., 1987; Goldring, 1992, 1996). After all, if a son has been in the United States for more than a year, does he “normally” live in the household, even if family members anticipate his return and regularly receive remittances? The MMP was designed explicitly to study the circular process of transnational migration, and it makes special efforts to enumerate family members who are working in the United States, particularly unmarried sons. After gathering information on the head and spouse, the questionnaire gathers information about all of the couple’s children regardless of where they live. Only then does the interviewer ascertain which of the head’s offspring are still considered to be household members. Sons who are away working in the United States are generally defined as members if they are unmarried and do not have a dwelling of their own in Mexico, even if they have been away for some time and do not “normally” reside with the family.

The fact that the MMP yields relatively more unmarried sons and daughters and slightly longer trip durations than the ENADAD suggests that the former source enumerates at higher rates those offspring of the household head who were away for sustained periods in the United States at the time of the survey and thus were not considered “normal” household residents. It is, of course, debatable which procedure yields a more “valid” profile of international migrants. The answer partly depends on the specific research question to be addressed. Because the MMP was designed as an omnibus migration and mobility survey, however, its designers chose to err on the side of inclusion and enumerate all migrants who might reasonably be considered to be household members and collect enough information about them so that researchers themselves could decide whether or not to define them as migrant family members. In this sense, we do not consider the discrepancy between the MMP and the ENADID to be a debility, but one of its strengths, confirming that it casts the widest possible net in defining the population of international labor migrants. Once enumerated, migrants can always be excluded for the purposes of any particular analysis; but if they are never
Counted in the first place, they can never be added to the survey at a later date.

**Multivariate Estimates**

So far our comparison of univariate point estimates suggests that, once obvious differences in design are taken into account, the MMP does a remarkably good job in providing an accurate and relatively unbiased profile of the characteristics of labor migrants to the United States. A more subtle and complicated issue concerns the replicability of multivariate findings. In recent years, data from the MMP have been used to estimate a variety of statistical models predicting the odds of out-migration to the United States (Massey 1987b; Massey et al., 1987; Massey and García España, 1987; Delechat, 1994, 1995; Donato, Durand, and Massey, 1992a; Zahniser, 1996; Massey and Espinosa, 1997). Now we seek to understand how the results of these investigations might have differed if they had been estimated from nationally representative data.

Table 5 addresses this issue by estimating successive equations to predict the odds of out-migration to the United States using data from the ENADID and MMP surveys. Following Massey et al. (1987), and other investigators who have studied U.S. migration using cross-sectional data, we focused on the three years prior to the survey and coded the outcome as 1 if the person undertook a trip to the United States during this time and 0 otherwise. A three-year window yields a relatively large number of trips and a better distribution on the dependent variable than a single-year reference period, thus permitting more stable and more reliable estimation.

We selected all persons aged 15 or older and estimated a logistic regression equation that expressed this binary outcome as a function of age, sex, household position, education, family size, family structure (nuclear versus extended), dependency (presence of children under 12), and community size. We first estimated the model using data from the ENADID and then re-estimated it using the Mexican portion of the MMP, including dummy variables for survey year (coefficients not shown to save space). The results of this exercise are presented in the first four columns of the table. A systematic comparison of coefficients across datasets allows us to judge how results derived from the MMP might have differed if they had been based on more representative data.

Estimates based on the ENADID data suggest that the odds of migration rise to a peak in the age interval 25-34 before falling in the intervals 35-44
### Table 5

**Effect of Selected Variables on the Odds of Migration to the United States in Two Surveys**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>ENADID</th>
<th>Mexican Samples</th>
<th>Mex./U.S. Samples</th>
<th>Mex./U.S. Samples &amp; Additional Variables</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>SE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Basic Model</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-24</td>
<td>1.193*</td>
<td>0.148</td>
<td>0.772*</td>
<td>0.107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-34</td>
<td>1.477*</td>
<td>0.124</td>
<td>0.956*</td>
<td>0.093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-44</td>
<td>0.595</td>
<td>0.128</td>
<td>0.680*</td>
<td>0.091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1.997*</td>
<td>0.133</td>
<td>1.678*</td>
<td>0.078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Head</td>
<td>0.877*</td>
<td>0.120</td>
<td>0.367*</td>
<td>0.087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.033*</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>-0.022*</td>
<td>0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Size</td>
<td>-0.019</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.027*</td>
<td>0.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear Family</td>
<td>0.039</td>
<td>0.093</td>
<td>0.100</td>
<td>0.085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children &lt;12</td>
<td>0.092</td>
<td>0.108</td>
<td>0.069</td>
<td>0.068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size of Place</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt;2,500</td>
<td>0.896*</td>
<td>0.102</td>
<td>1.345*</td>
<td>0.104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,500-99,999</td>
<td>0.236</td>
<td>0.236</td>
<td>0.851*</td>
<td>0.108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100,000+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Expanded Model</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent Migrant</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Family Migs.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent in U.S.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friends in U.S.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mig. Prevalence</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Documented</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior Migr. Exp.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. Prior Trips</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owns Land</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owns Business</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owns Home</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-6.687*</td>
<td>0.212</td>
<td>-5.373*</td>
<td>0.172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi Square</td>
<td>1106.1</td>
<td>1673.6</td>
<td>1829.8</td>
<td>3874.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Likelihood</td>
<td>6413.7</td>
<td>10473.1</td>
<td>12422.6</td>
<td>10168.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>27,183</td>
<td>21,454</td>
<td>22,911</td>
<td>22,818</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * p < .05
and 45+; that males and household heads are far more likely to migrate internationally than are women and other household members; that migrants to the United States are negatively selected with respect to education; and that the odds of migration are greatest from small rural communities with under 2,500 inhabitants (see the coefficients in the first two columns of Table 5). Other variables included in the model are not significant in predicting the relative likelihood of migration to the United States.

The results obtained using data from the MMP’s Mexican samples tell essentially the same story. Although the relative size of the coefficients often differ significantly (owing to the large sample sizes), with one exception the exercise yields the same basic pattern of coefficients. According to both surveys, the odds of migration are highest for poorly educated male household heads aged 25-34 who live in small rural communities. The only real difference between the two equations is that family size has a significant positive effect on the probability of out-migration using the MMP but not the ENADID, where the effect is negative and insignificant. This difference may reflect the ENADID’s less effective enumeration of sons working in the United States, which could significantly influence the estimation of family size and its effects on the odds of out-migration. In general, however, the community-based sampling strategy of the MMP does not appear to introduce important biases into estimates of multivariate models. Regardless of the data source, we would reach essentially the same substantive conclusions. Of course, the bias that results from the use of nonprobability sampling methods is not the only potential source of error in survey research. Selective patterns of return migration and settlement also yield sample biases (see Borjas, 1985, 1987; Lindstrom and Massey, 1994). In the current example, the population at risk of migrating to the United States during the three years preceding the survey consists of those who were in Mexico exactly three years before the survey date. If some household was living in Mexico at that time, left in its entirety at some date thereafter, and had not returned by the time of the survey, then using Mexican survey data alone we would be unable to include any of the household members in the population at risk. The systematic exclusion of settled U.S. migrants from the sample of all U.S. migrants underestimates both the number of migrants and the size of the population at risk, thus biasing models of out-migration.

In order to assess the degree to which this kind of selection bias affects estimates from the ENADID and similar surveys, we re-estimated the MMP model after adding those members of the U.S. samples who were present in
Mexico three years prior to the survey and thus at risk of migrating during the reference period. The inclusion of these cases changes the coefficients in subtle ways. First, the age effect moderates considerably. Those aged 15-24 have about the same probability of out-migration as those aged 25-34; and among those aged 35-44 the likelihood is only slightly lower. Second, a higher level of family dependency — indicated by the presence of children under age 12 — now appears to raise the odds of U.S. migration whereas the effect of family size per se disappears. The exclusion of families who have established themselves north of the border thus masks the effect of dependency on international migration, an effect reported earlier in Massey et al. (1987). Beyond age and dependency, however, the pattern of effects is similar to that uncovered using the ENADID.

One last potential bias stems from specification error — that is, the failure to include important, theoretically relevant variables in models predicting out-migration. In this case, the very small number of background variables available in ENADID implies a high likelihood that estimated coefficients are biased by the omission of crucial factors involved in the migration decision, such as access to social capital in the form of migrant networks (see Taylor, 1986, 1987; Delechat, 1993, 1994, 1995; Zahniser, 1996; Espinosa and Massey, 1987; Massey and Espinosa, 1997). The last replication thus adds several independent variables that are uniquely available from the rich MMP dataset: whether or not one of the household head’s parents was a migrant; whether other relatives of the head were migrants; whether a head’s parent was actually living in the United States at the time of the survey; whether the head reported friends living in the United States; whether the respondent had legal documents (a U.S. resident visa); cumulative experience in the United States; number of prior U.S. trips; and whether or not the household owned land, a business, or a home.

The results shown in last two columns thus reveal the degree to which specification error constitutes a potentially serious problem in general social or demographic surveys such as ENADID, which are not focused on migration and thus omit many potentially important variables. In keeping with prior work, various indicators of social capital and migration-specific human capital are highly significant in predicting the likelihood of out-migration to the United States (Massey and Espinosa, 1997). People with greater accumulations of U.S. experience, more prior trips, and legal documents are, not surprisingly, considerably more likely to migrate to the United States than people without these resources. Likewise, those with direct access to social
capital—family members with U.S. experience, friends living in the United States, and those living in communities where migration is prevalent—are significantly more likely to take a U.S. trip than people without such access. In general, ownership of physical capital in Mexico—land, businesses, or real estate—reduces the odds of international movement.

The inclusion of these variables flattens the age differential even more, eliminates the significant effects attributable to household headship and education, and reveals the formerly suppressed effect of family structure: people from households composed of a single nuclear family are now significantly less likely than those from extended households to migrate abroad, as the latter are obviously in a position to diversify their labor portfolio through international wage labor. Thus, both sample selection bias and specification error appear to affect estimates based on the ENADID data.

Confining our attention only to those variables available from ENADID, we obtain very similar results with the MMP when U.S. settlers and migration-related variables are excluded, but a qualitatively different profile of migration when they are included. If we were to rely on the ENADID alone, we would conclude that the odds of out-migration are strongly related to age, sex, household position, and education. Once biases stemming from selective settlement and model misspecification are corrected, however, we see that the likelihood of international migration is not strongly influenced by age, education, or household position, but that it is very strongly affected by household structure and dependency, by migration-specific human capital in the form of documentation and prior migrant experience, and by access to social capital in the form of network connections.

CONCLUSION

In recent years, investigators have made increasing use of ethnosurvey methods to study the process of international migration. One project, in particular, has systematically employed the ethnosurvey to compile a large public use database on Mexican immigration. Each year the Mexican Migration Project (MMP) selects samples of households within a carefully chosen set of Mexican communities and U.S. destination areas and interviews them using ethnosurvey methods. Using case weights developed for the purpose, the Mexican and U.S. samples are combined to create a single binational dataset that contains detailed information on documented and undocumented migrants to the United States. These data have been employed in a growing number of studies and statistical estimations.
Owing to the lack of a benchmark, investigators heretofore have been unable to validate either the ethnosurvey as a method of demographic data collection or the MMP as a source of data on Mexico-U.S. migration. Fortunately, in 1992 the Mexican government fielded a large representative survey of Mexican states and the nation (the Encuesta Nacional de la Dinámica Demográfica or ENADID), thus providing investigators with the necessary benchmark for comparison. In this article, we systematically contrasted estimates derived from the MMP and those derived from the ENADID to assess the degree to which the former provides an accurate profile of Mexican labor migrants to the United States and the degree to which ethnosurvey methods yield valid insights into the complex process of international migration.

Although the ethnosurvey design of the MMP over-represents migrants from Mexico’s western states and from mid-sized communities, this fact appears to matter little when it comes to constructing an accurate profile of the population of Mexico-U.S. migrants. Underlying processes of international migration seem to operate similarly across space and time, yielding a remarkably consistent set of migrant characteristics in the MMP and the ENADID. With respect to age, sex, education, and trip duration, U.S. migrants identified in the former dataset match very closely those identified in the latter. On this limited set of background characteristics, therefore, the two surveys yield very similar conclusions about who is migrating to the United States.

The only substantive difference we detected between the MMP and the ENADID concerned the distribution of migrants by household position and marital status; but we argue that these differences do not indicate problems stemming from the MMP’s design so much as its greater effectiveness in enumerating unmarried sons and daughters of the household head who are absent and working in the United States, a category of people that is generally excluded from the ENADID. We believe the MMP’s inclusion of such cases gives researchers greater flexibility to address a wider array of questions than those amenable to study using the ENADID, since they can always be excluded should researchers consider them inappropriate in any given analysis.

Our systematic comparison of multivariate results derived from the two data sources likewise suggests that the MMP data impart few biases when used to estimate models of out-migration. When the same model is estimated using data from the ENADID and the MMP, we find no real substantive differences between the two sets of estimates. Despite small differences between coefficients, each model yields the same basic conclusions about the
relative importance and direction of effects of different factors in predicting the odds of out-migration to the United States.

Against the relatively minor sampling errors introduced by its design, the MMP offers two very significant advantages compared with the ENADID. First, the more complete enumeration of migrant family members and the explicit incorporation of settled U.S. migrants into the sample provide investigators with a measure of control for biases stemming from selective process of emigration and settlement not afforded to those working with standard social surveys. Second, the inclusion of a rich set of migration-related variables greatly reduces the likelihood of incurring specification errors.

Thus, our systematic assessment of data emanating from the MMP should give investigators greater faith in the validity of the ethnosurvey as a means of demographic data collection and lend them greater confidence in the representativeness of its data as a source of information on Mexican migration to the United States. Considering the relative lack of sampling bias we encountered in systematic comparisons between the MMP and the ENADID, we see no reason not to use the MMP as a basic source of information on the processes and characteristics of Mexican migration to the United States; but considering the specification errors and selection biases encountered in using the ENADID, we see good reasons to avoid using general social or demographic surveys that confine themselves to one side of the border. A binational social process ultimately requires a binational dataset, and the MMP fits the bill.

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Zahniser, S.
Comparing the Context of Immigrant Homicides in Miami: Haitians, Jamaicans and Mariels

Ramiro Martinez, Jr.
Florida International University

Matthew T. Lee
University of Akron

We contribute to the field of immigration and crime research by conducting one of the first contemporary examinations of Afro-Caribbean homicides. Despite the growth of immigration across urban America, social scientists lack an understanding of both the extent and severity of immigrant violent crime. Several important findings emerge from our unique data set on Haitian, Jamaican and Mariel Cuban homicides in the city of Miami. Most notably, Miami’s homicide rate led the country at various points throughout the 1980s, but immigrant group-specific rates rarely exceeded the city total. By 1990, immigrant Caribbean victim and violator rates had declined to a level and rate far below the city average. Compared to other cities, Miami has a more diverse population and a greater potential for intergroup contact, yet most killings were between ethnic group members. In addition, while the “criminal alien problem” is a prominent image fueling contemporary attempts to restrict immigration, our findings undermine this conventional wisdom. We conclude

1This project was supported in part by a Ford Foundation Postdoctoral Fellowship, the Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation, and by a grant from the National Consortium on Violence Research (NCOVR), headquartered at the Heinz School of Public Policy and Management at Carnegie Mellon University. NCOVR is supported under grant #SBR 9513040 from the National Science Foundation in partnership with the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development and the National Institute of Justice. We are deeply indebted to the City of Miami Police Department, in particular, former Chief Donald Warsaw, Assistant Chief John Brooks, Lt. Bobbie Meeks, Lt. John Campbell, and the Sergeants and Investigators in the Homicide Investigations Unit. We also thank Oliver Kerr for providing publications from the Research Division of the Miami-Dade County Planning Department and Veronica Melton at the Miami-Dade Medical Examiners Office. Larry Hotchkiss and Dick Sacher provided valuable computer and data assistance. We are grateful to Karen Jacobs, Shara Linke and Jennifer Gusko for coding hundreds of supplemental homicide reports. Franklin Goza and Rogelio Saenz provided helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper. Special thanks to the NCOVR Race and Ethnicity group, especially Darnell Hawkins, for inspiring this piece. We alone are responsible for findings in the current manuscript. Points of view and comments do not represent the position of any official agency.
with suggestions for future elaboration on the causes and consequences of immigration and homicide.

Are new immigrants more crime prone than native-born Americans? This issue has been debated since the early 1900s and continues to fuel controversy on the “criminal alien” problem in contemporary society (Hagan and Palloni, 1998; Short, 1997). Some scholars speculate that immigrants engage in crime more than other population groups by using the growing presence of the foreign born in the criminal justice system as evidence of heightened criminal involvement (Scalia, 1996). Other writers encourage legislation designed to rapidly deport immigrant criminals, such as California’s Proposition 187 and the U.S. Congress 1996 Immigration Reform bill, despite any systematic evidence of an “immigrant crime problem” (Beck, 1996; Brimelow, 1995). Still others maintain that large labor pools of young immigrant males willing to work for lower wages than native-born Americans, in particular inner city residents, exacerbate ethnic conflict and contribute to urban disorders (Brimelow, 1995). The consequence of immigration, according to this view, is a host of social problems, especially violent crime (Beck, 1996).

This study probes the immigration and crime link by focusing on where immigrants live and how immigration might increase or decrease violent crime, at least as measured by homicide in a city that serves as a primary destination point for newcomers. Immigrants are undoubtedly influencing urban crime, but they are also potential buffers in stabilizing extremely impoverished areas (see Hagan and Palloni, 1998). Our primary argument is that while immigration shapes local crime, it might have a lower than expected effect on violent crime rates. The result is areas with high proportions of immigrants but low levels of violence, relative to overall city rates. The key question is whether immigrants have high rates of violence or if immigration lessens the structural impact of economic deprivation and thus violent crime.

It is, of course, preferable to study the impact of immigration and social institutions on violence across time and in diverse settings. While we do not directly test these variables with a multivariate analysis, we provide a starting point for this research agenda by conducting one of the first contemporary studies of immigrant Afro-Caribbean (Haitians, Jamaicans, and Mariel Cubans) homicide in a major U.S. city. Using a unique data set from a city with a predominately foreign-born population (Miami) that recently absorbed several waves of refugees from various countries of origin and sources of immigration (economic versus political), we examine the context of homicides among immigrants. Special attention is paid to a host of offenda-
er, offense and victim characteristics to gain a fuller understanding of the conditions that shape immigrant killings from 1980 through 1990. Finally, we examine the circumstances surrounding Caribbean homicides relative to all homicides in the city of Miami, Florida.

**PREVIOUS IMMIGRATION AND CRIME STUDIES**

Despite early research on the levels of crime among the foreign born, evidence of high immigrant crime rates is mixed (Shaw and McKay, 1931; see Short, 1997 for a review of the literature). Lane (1997) notes that white newcomers (e.g., Irish, Italian) were often disproportionately involved in violent crime in turn of the century Philadelphia and New York City. Crime rates declined, however, as settlers from abroad were assimilated into mainstream society and integrated into the economy (Short, 1997). This finding is particularly instructive, since most immigrant victims and offenders were young males without regular jobs and presumably fewer ties to conventional lifestyles, suggesting that, even a hundred years ago, gender and economic opportunities played a major role in violent crime (Lane, 1997).

Another early study (National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, 1931) found that immigrants from Europe, Asia and Mexico had high crime rates for vice-related offenses, but even those levels varied across locale, age, sex, and crime type. Yet again, recent newcomers were typically young single males, residing in segregated urban communities or isolated rural areas. The authors’ conclusions emphasized the extent of foreign-born arrests for minor crimes concentrated in gambling and liquor law violations. By comparison, native whites were engaged in violent crime at a rate and number much higher than that of “Mexican” and “Asian” (Japanese, Chinese, Filipinos) immigrants (1931:400) who had lower proportions of violence (see also Hawkins, 1999).

More contemporary studies on immigrant violence, however, have been scarce (Short, 1997). Many crime and violence studies rely on national statistics gathered from police agencies and forwarded to the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports (UCR). The UCR typically ignores the presence of ethnic groups such as Latinos or Afro-Caribbeans and directs attention to “blacks” or “whites” in compiling crime data. As a result, comparisons beyond these two groups are difficult to examine in contemporary violence research (Hawkins, 1999).

Furthermore, the handful of recent studies that have explored the connection between immigrants and crime have focused on property crimes or
criminal justice decision-making processes (cf. Pennell et al., 1989). One exception was an analysis by the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform (1994) of the link between immigration policy and serious crime in El Paso, Texas. They reported that El Paso had one of the lowest crime rates among similarly sized cities and a much lower than expected homicide rate, about one third that of all cities and 12 percent lower than the national homicide rate. After conducting regression analyses on both violent and property crimes for 244 U.S. metropolitan areas, the Commission also found that cities along the Mexican border had lower levels of violent and property crimes than other areas. These findings countered the widespread belief that violence was high as a result of more “illegal aliens” crossing the U.S. border from Mexico (Brimelow, 1995).

In a more rigorous examination of similar data, Hagan and Palloni (1998) studied the percentage of the immigrant population, both legal and illegal residents, and crime in 34 metropolitan areas on or around the U.S./Mexican border. Net of several important variables such as racial composition and economic deprivation, Hagan and Palloni found no significant relationship between proportion of illegal immigrants and crime as measured by arrests for violence and property crime. In spite of this research, the impression that immigrants are a major cause of crime remains entrenched (Hagan and Palloni, 1998:378).

Three studies of homicide in Miami provide the empirical foundation for the present article. First, Wilbanks (1984) contributed a descriptive account of white, black and “Latin” killings in Dade County (Miami), with a special focus on 1980 homicides. Both numerically and proportionally, Latin (Hispanic or Latin American) victims comprised the majority of all killings but were not overrepresented relative to population size. McBride et al. (1986) examined Dade County homicides (1978–1982) and discovered that “Latinos” and Jamaicans were slightly overrepresented as homicide victims in drug-related killings. The proportions, however, were an overall small percentage of all homicides. The studies by both Wilbanks (1984) and McBride et al., (1986) are useful in describing the contours of homicide in the metropolitan Miami area. Their utility is limited however since they precede a period of intense transformation in which Mariel and Caribbean blacks played a significant role in changing Miami’s urban landscape.

More recently, Martinez (1997) discovered that the 1980 Mariel refugees were rarely the high-rate killers portrayed by the media. Instead, relative to their group size, the Mariels were victimized at a proportion greater than their
population size. This finding suggested that the Mariels were in greater danger of victimization than other Latino groups who had been residing in the area for a longer period of time. Nevertheless, these results failed to examine the circumstances of other immigrant groups arriving in Miami during the same time frame as the “Marielito” refugees.

RESEARCH SETTING

The city of Miami, Florida provides a unique opportunity to examine the issue of whether or not immigration influences violent crime. Miami is one of the nation’s most ethnically diverse cities and prominently known for its hot weather, natural disasters, waves of refugees, and tourist killings. It is also well known for its record high rates of violence. At various points throughout the 1980s, the violent crime rate was over three times that of similarly sized U.S. cities, and the city was widely characterized as a “dangerous” city in the popular media (Nijman, 1997).

This perception is linked, in part, to the presence of its large immigrant population (Nijman, 1997). After several distinct waves of immigration from Latin America since 1960, Latinos, mostly Cubans, comprised almost two thirds of the entire city population in 1990 and had grown to almost one million in surrounding Dade County (Dunn, 1997). In 1980 alone, the number of Cubans increased dramatically as the Mariel boatlift brought over 100,000 persons to the United States, and most of these settled in the greater Miami area (Portes and Stepick, 1993).

Despite the monumental influx of Mariel Cubans into south Florida and negative publicity on the number of “undesirables” within the refugee influx, scholars rarely voiced concern about the lack of systematic research on immigrants and crime (Martinez, 1997). This is unfortunate since the heightened fear of crime associated with the arrival of Mariel refugees generated a moral panic in which the newcomers were labeled as deviants allegedly just released from Cuban prisons and mental hospitals (Aguirre et al., 1997:490–494). The creation of this identity was facilitated by Cuban officials who insisted on certifying the new exiles as deviants, prior to release through the Mariel Harbor in Cuba. Although the overwhelming number of Mariels never committed any type of crime, the resulting backlash precluded openly welcoming the emigrants into the United States (Aguirre et al., 1997).

Unlike the Mariels who were welcomed by government officials (at least initially), Haitian immigrants were alternately detained or released by the INS in the early 1980s while fleeing political terror and economic despair in
their home country (Stepick, 1992). In spite of having very low violence rates, Haitians were also stigmatized in the popular media like other recent newcomers (Martinez and Lee, 1998). Persistent stereotypes existed that Haitians were tuberculosis and AIDS carriers and therefore likely to spread communicable diseases at work, which was concentrated primarily in the local service sector. To further compound this image, Haitians were also viewed as uneducated and unskilled boat people destined to be public burdens (Stepick, 1992). All of these public images were erroneous or misleading, at best, but the result was yet another round of public hysteria that fueled popular fears and spread panic throughout south Florida about another new immigrant group (Stepick, 1992).

Miami was also a leading destination point for another Afro-Caribbean group – Jamaicans. Thousands of Jamaicans emigrated throughout the 1970s and 1980s, after open access to England was closed, but relatively little is known about the Jamaican experience in the south Florida area (Portes and Grosfoguel, 1994). Portes and Grosfoguel (1994:59–60) document that many were recruited from rural areas to work in the harsh sugar cane fields in Florida. Some were encouraged to work in the service sector, especially in the tourist industry, to accommodate English speaking clients (Cooper, 1985). Others were professionals in the health field, moving into well-paid and high demand occupations (e.g., nursing) that were in short supply at the time (Portes and Grosfoguel, 1994). Regardless of attraction to the United States, the Jamaican population in Miami-Dade County tripled between 1980 and 1990, becoming the second largest Caribbean black group in the area (Dunn, 1997:336).

As the newcomers converged in Miami, speculation arose that crime, especially drug related types surrounding the informal economy, was growing within immigrant and ethnic minority communities in Miami (Nijman, 1997; Stepick, 1989; see also Inciardi, 1992). The Miami Herald reported that throughout the early 1980s (Buchanan, 1985; Schenker, 1984) Jamaican gangs operated freely in the south Florida area, controlling a large share of the local crack-cocaine trade and engaging in widespread violence (see also Maingot, 1992). The local media therefore contributed to the perception that Jamaican “posses” were active in the city’s burgeoning drug economy. This notion, in turn, reinforced the strong link in the public mind between immigrants, violent crime, and drugs throughout the metropolitan area (Maingot, 1992).

In sum, it stands to reason that immigration should increase absolute crime rates in Miami if it brings in a large number of people, without a corresponding emigration to surrounding areas (see Hagan and Palloni, 1998).
In addition, given the historical context surrounding the immigration of Mariels, Haitians and Jamaicans into Miami (for example, the experience of a stigmatized collective identity and open discrimination or, in the case of Haitians, even official policies of repression) we might expect these groups to be disproportionately involved in violent crime. We should note, however, that the Afro-Caribbean appearance in Miami coincided with a time of chaos wrought by urban transformation – including a changing economy and suburban flight, among other urban dilemmas – that would have contributed to high rates of crime, regardless of immigration (Wilbanks, 1984). Yet despite the important empirical and theoretical reasons to anticipate that immigration should influence urban violence, this link has been largely ignored in the social science literature. In this article, we extend previous studies on the social mechanisms of immigration and crime by considering the violence patterns of three distinct immigrant groups in the city of Miami.

DATA COLLECTION

Data on homicides from 1980 through 1990 have been gathered directly from files in the Homicide Investigations Unit of the City of Miami Police Department (MPD). These “homicide logs” contain information on each homicide event including a narrative of the circumstances surrounding each killing not readily available from other data sources. Most importantly, extensive data on victim and, when known, offender or suspect characteristics such as name, age, gender, race/ethnicity and victim/offender relationship are also noted by the investigators on the logs.

Starting in 1980, homicide detectives began to note whether the victim or offender was white, black or Latin. As the year progressed, and in response to media inquiries, MPD personnel would also note whether the victim or offender was a Mariel Cuban refugee, Haitian, or Jamaican. These designations were based on a variety of sources. Some Mariels were identified through INS documentation such as a “Parole ID” discovered at the scene of the crime. A temporary tourist visa or INS green card was also frequently found on the victim or at his/her residence, usually in or around a northeast

2Writings on urban crime have been framed primarily at the city level so we restrict the analysis to the same. The overwhelming majority of homicides in the metropolitan area, however, have been largely concentrated in the city, regardless of time frame or space. We therefore direct our attention to violence and immigrants to the city of Miami.

3Most MPD homicide detectives are Cuban. This does not guarantee that ethnic identification is fully correct. It does, however, suggest that they are more sensitive of Caribbean group distinctions.
Miami neighborhood known as Little Haiti. Still other ethnic clues were gathered from witnesses, family members, friends, or neighbors including language (e.g., speaking Creole or English with West Indian accents), providing country of birth on death certificate, or names less than common to African Americans ("Michel Pierre" or "Augustine Seaga"). All of these clues taken together helped provide a more precise definition of victim and offender ethnicity.

Each homicide type is examined, including the level of gun use and circumstances surrounding each killing. The nature of the prior contact and the circumstances of offense type are often distinct and vary by ethnicity (Hawkins, 1999). Types of homicide are therefore placed into five categories. First is "other felony" or a type of homicide committed during the course of a felony other than robbery. The second category consists of "robbery" homicides. Next is "primary nonintimate" or killings among acquaintances, neighbors, friends, or co-workers. Third is "family intimate homicides" or killings between spouses, lovers, estranged partners, and immediate family members. Finally, an "unknown category" is included to account for homicides not cleared with an arrest.

Since our focus is on comparing and contrasting immigrant homicides, we concentrate our account on immigrant Caribbean killings and their characteristics across two time points, 1980 and 1990. Specifically, the average number of homicide suspects (offenders) per 100,000 population from 1980 through 1984 is used for the first, and the average over 1985 to 1990 for the second. Total city homicides are also included as a baseline comparison. We begin by directing attention to suspect rates, but, given the current limitation of missing data, victim and offender relationships will be more fully explored.

We also use the 1980 and 1990 decennial censuses to provide estimates of the population in each city. Reliable population figures for our three immigrant groups are, of course, notoriously difficult to provide. We did, however, employ several strategies. First, Portes and colleagues (1985) estimated about 75 percent of the Mariel population (roughly 125,000) settled in the greater Miami area after the 1980 census was taken across the United States. Of that percentage, most (61.1%) moved into the city of Miami, at least as we can best determine (Portes et al., 1985:40). Thus, we estimated roughly 57,281 Mariels were in the city limits between 1980 and 1990.

The number of Haitians and Jamaicans was equally difficult to estimate. Unfortunately, neither the 1980 nor 1990 Census provides specific informa-

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4These data are also supplemented by fieldwork experience.
tion on Jamaicans and Haitians at the city level, forcing us to use county estimates provided by Marvin Dunn (1997:336) on Caribbean-born blacks in 1980 and 1990. The following group-specific homicide rates are therefore based on the number of Caribbean blacks in Miami-Dade County born in Jamaica or Haiti. While these data are useful due to their detail regarding geography and ethnicity, we acknowledge that an undercount problem exists, especially among immigrants. It is therefore likely that the level of immigrant homicides is even lower because the denominator in the calculation of the rates is likely to be larger. With these cautions in mind, we believe that the following results are reliable guides on immigrant homicides.

**RESULTS**

**Caribbean Offender and Victim Rates**

Between 1980 and 1990, over 1,900 homicides were recorded by the Miami Police Department; 28 percent of these victims were Caribbean immigrants and 15 percent of all suspected killers were identified as Haitian, Jamaican or Mariel. While the percentage of Mariel victims was higher than Haitians and Jamaicans (78%;22%), the number of Mariels settling in the city of Miami (57,281) in the early 1980s was almost twice the number of Caribbean blacks in the entire greater metropolitan Miami area.

To further illustrate the distinct experiences of each group, we examine the homicide offending rate in Table 1. These results are especially important because much of the current anti-immigrant sentiment focuses on newcomers as killers rather than as victims. But with a lone exception, immigrants were not high-rate killers. In Miami during the early 1980s, the total city homicide offender rate was 67.9. This rate was higher, and in one case substantially higher, than the group specific rates for Mariels (55.5) and Haitians (26.4). One prominent contrast is the Jamaican rate of offending (102.2) – a level one and a half times the total city rate.

The offender data cannot be understood outside of their historical context, as the early 1980s proved to be a time of both social strife and social change in Miami. Wilbanks (1984) reports that homicide rates greatly

5This could be problematic if a significant percentage live outside the confines of “Little Haiti” in northeast Miami, an adjacent predominately African-American neighborhood (Liberty City), or even the city in general. We believe it is plausible to assume most reside within Miami’s boundaries since we are not aware of any large and distinct Jamaican or Haitian areas outside of the city. It’s also possible that using the county level data might compensate for undercounts in the city of Miami.
TABLE 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Immigrant Homicide Suspect Rates: 1980 and 1990</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haitian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaican</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mariel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


increased prior to the mass migration of Caribbean populations. This population change would greatly alter the city’s demographic composition in a short time and further strain relations among Anglos, native and immigrant blacks and Latinos (Portes and Stepick, 1993). Always a gateway city for drug traffickers, the “crack” cocaine trade and associated violence contributed to the turmoil in Miami (Inciardi, 1992). Furthermore, social and political frustration among the city’s African-American population erupted into violent riots touched off by questionable police killings in 1980, 1982 and 1989 (Dunn, 1997).

In general, however, as the local turmoil subsided throughout the 1980s, the Caribbean violator rate decreased dramatically and quickly, relative to the city as a whole. The Jamaican killer rate displayed the largest decrease of all three groups (84%), but the Mariel and Haitian rates also declined sharply by 1990. These decreases are even more noteworthy after considering the substantial Haitian and Jamaican population growth throughout the metropolitan Miami area. In 1980, less than 13,000 Haitians lived in the county, but ten years later that number quadrupled to over 45,000. Similarly, the Jamaican population tripled over the same time span to more than 27,000 (Dunn, 1997:336–337).

If the stereotype of Miami in the popular media as a high crime, drug-infested area, overrun by dangerous immigrants was correct, then immigrant Caribbeans should have rates consistently higher than the city average (Stepick, 1989). Recall that Haitians, in particular, were cast as a deviance-prone group, and a common stereotype existed that immigrant Jamaicans and Mariel refugees were a significant cause of violence in urban areas (Hagan and Palloni, 1998; Inciardi, 1992). Apparently, immigrant murderers, at least in most cases, were engaged in killing at a much lower level than the total city rate, and the lone exception was confined to a single time point.

In the absence of complete data on offenders, because some homicides go unsolved, we shift our focus to the victim and suspect intersection in Table 2. Haitian and Jamaican victims were killed by younger violators than were the
Mariels in 1980. Miami's typical offender was male, like other suspects arrested for violent crimes (Reiss and Roth, 1993:72), but Afro-Caribbean homicides involved a higher than average proportion of males, at least relative to the city total.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 2</th>
<th>CHARACTERISTICS OF HOMICIDE SUSPECTS: 1980</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Suspect</td>
<td>Victim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Age</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>95.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African American</td>
<td>36.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haitian</td>
<td>31.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaican</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mariel</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown race</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All numbers in percentages with the exception of age.

The most interesting offender finding is in the area of ethnicity. Typically, when the race of the offender is known, homicides are intraracial (white on white or black on black). A similar interaction occurs when scholars have examined ethnic group categories for Latinos – those are also intragroup (Martinez and Lee, 1998). While that is probably the case for Caribbean blacks, some group differences exist. Haitians were killed by an almost equal percentage of African Americans (36%) and Haitians (32%). A smaller proportion was victimized by non-Mariel Latinos (18%). However, in contrast, Jamaicans were usually killed by an African American. Yet another third were fatally wounded by fellow Jamaicans and one quarter by unknown offenders. At the opposite end of the Caribbean continuum, many Mariels were killed by fellow boatlift refugees (47%), less than a third by other Latinos (29.7%), primarily Cuban, but one fifth were also of an unknown ethnic group.

These findings remained similar in 1990, although some differences did emerge. As shown in Table 3, offenders were still primarily male and in their twenties and thirties. The proportion of (non-Latino) white, Haitian, Jamaican and Latino homicide violators remained roughly the same. One change from 1980 to 1990 concerned an increase in the overall city percentage of African-American offenders (32%-43%) simultaneous with a Mariel decrease (13%-4%). In fact, this concentration of African-American violators intensified with all three Caribbean groups. It is important to note that this percentage is still lower than the 1990 national average of 55 percent (Reiss and Roth, 1993:72). We will return to these findings later in the analysis.
TABLE 3
CHARACTERISTICS OF HOMICIDE SUSPECTS: 1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Suspect</th>
<th>Victim</th>
<th>Haitian</th>
<th>Jamaican</th>
<th>Mariel</th>
<th>Miami Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average Age</td>
<td></td>
<td>26</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td></td>
<td>93.5</td>
<td>93.5</td>
<td>98.3</td>
<td>96.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
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<td>1.9</td>
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<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African American</td>
<td></td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>43.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haitian</td>
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<td>42.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jamaican</td>
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<td>0.0</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mariel</td>
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<td>1.9</td>
<td>0.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Latino</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>27.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown race</td>
<td></td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All numbers in percentages with the exception of age.

Table 4 describes two variables linked to type of homicide characteristic – gun use and victim-offender relationship. The gun distribution of victims varied in some cases. Gun inflicted homicides for Caribbeans were always higher than for the rest of Miami at both time points, except for the Mariels in 1990, although percentages for Haitians and Jamaicans dropped that same year.

TABLE 4
CHARACTERISTICS OF IMMIGRANT HOMICIDE OFFENSE TYPE: 1980–1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offense</th>
<th>Victim</th>
<th>Haitian</th>
<th>Jamaican</th>
<th>Mariel</th>
<th>Miami Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1980</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gun</td>
<td></td>
<td>95.2</td>
<td>85.7</td>
<td>86.0</td>
<td>78.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Felony</td>
<td></td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery</td>
<td></td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonintimate</td>
<td></td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>60.9</td>
<td>48.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family/Intimate</td>
<td></td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stranger/Unknown</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1990</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gun</td>
<td></td>
<td>81.6</td>
<td>85.7</td>
<td>74.0</td>
<td>74.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Felony</td>
<td></td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>22.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery</td>
<td></td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonintimate</td>
<td></td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>55.8</td>
<td>46.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family/Intimate</td>
<td></td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.0</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All numbers in percentages.

The circumstances surrounding the homicide victim levels also varied. Table 4 reports that most Haitian victims were killed during the course of a robbery or by a non-intimate, regardless of the time frame. Jamaicans were usually murdered during the course of a felony, robbery, or by an intimate, but some variation occurred. For example, felony and robbery-related homicide increased in 1990, similar to the rest of Miami, while non-intimate killings dropped by half. Mariels, typically, were fatally assaulted by acquain-
tances, friends, or neighbors. This held true regardless of whether they were recent arrivals or had been in Miami for several years.

One finding worthy of special attention is that of domestic-related homicides between family members and intimates. A popular myth exists that immigrant Latinos and Afro-Caribbeans are more likely to engage in domestic violence, in part because of “traditional values” or “machismo” that encourage greater control at home, including physical responses to interpersonal problems (see Buchanan, 1985). Contrary to this image, we discover lower family/intimate proportions for immigrants than for the city as a whole.

**Geographic Results**

Because some of our findings involve intragroup interactions, we also analyzed the geographic patterns of Caribbean events. Three maps are presented to display the spatial location of Haitian, Jamaican and Mariel killings. Here we rely on the visual presentation of Afro-Caribbean homicides within Miami’s areas as measured by census tracts. To enhance identification, the specific neighborhood in which the killings are concentrated is referred to in each map. Figures 1 and 2 display the distribution of Haitian and Jamaican killings.

**Figure 1. Haitian Homicide Victims.**
The north end of Miami is predominately black. Creole-speaking blacks in Little Haiti live adjacent to predominately African-American Liberty City in the northwest part of town. It should come as no surprise that Haitian homicides in Figure 1 are concentrated in and around Little Haiti. Language barriers, in part, impede their dispersal throughout the city. Figure 2, however, reveals that Jamaican victims are found not only in Little Haiti but also in parts of Liberty City. This finding might partially account for the Jamaican offending rate in 1980. James Inciardi (1992) notes that migrant Jamaican workers introduced a crack derivative into Miami's African-American and Caribbean black neighborhoods in the early 1980s. The result was an underground drug economy predating the flourishing crack markets in the rest of the United States (Iinciardi, 1992). Despite immigrant status, Haitians and Jamaicans were killed in and around isolated and segregated black areas, accounting for the high level of intraracial homicides.

Figure 2. Jamaican Homicide Victims.

The Mariel victims were also confined to predominately Latino areas in Figure 3. Although Miami's most widely known Latino area is predominately Cuban (Little Havana), its contiguous and poorer neighborhood (Latin Quarter or East Little Havana) is now heavily Central American. Still other impoverished Spanish-speaking neighborhoods are Pan-Latino communities such as Wynwood and Allapattah and contain large numbers of Puerto
Ricans, Hondurans, Colombians and Dominicans, as well as a substantial Cuban newcomer population. Thus, most recent Caribbean immigrants were killed in segregated areas shaped by ethnicity and income rather than strictly race (Nijman, 1997). Ethnic group (African American versus Haitian or Cuban versus Nicaraguan) strife exists, but it is not necessarily driven by intense competition resulting in violence. Rather, patterns of violence conform to ecological conditions conducive to conflicts between intimates, neighbors, friends, family members, coworkers and others living in close proximity to the victim and offender (Nijman, 1997).

Figure 3. Mariel Homicide Victims.

DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY

A popular perception exists that immigrants are responsible for crime and violence in U.S. cities with large foreign-born populations (Hagan and Palloni, 1998). It is important to bring empirical evidence to bear on the policy debates surrounding this concern. To address this issue, we examined Afro-Caribbean homicides in the city of Miami. The picture that emerged from this examination undercuts claims that immigrants significantly influence violent crime.

We found that, almost without exception, Afro-Caribbeans had a lower homicide rate than the city of Miami total population. Comparing the early
1980s to the late 1980s, we also found a strong pattern of declining violence, especially for Jamaicans and Mariel Cubans, while Haitians continuously maintain an overall low rate of violent crime. As immigrant groups became more established, grew in size, and were less dominated by young males, the most violence-prone group, the homicide rate rapidly dissipates.

To illustrate this process, recall the high 1980 Jamaican offending level—the only immigrant rate to exceed the city average. It is possible that a high proportion of unattached and young Jamaican males migrated to south Florida and were employed in the informal economy. As the decade progressed, they left or were removed from the drug industry, and Jamaicans with more conventional ties to society followed the earlier entrants in search of legitimate work. Although our explanation is speculative and data are not available to directly examine this proposition at the city level, we believe this is a plausible account for our findings.

The results of this study have relevance for policies in vogue, such as targeted sweeps by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) or legislation designed to deport criminal aliens. Many of these policies are motivated by the notion that immigrants threaten the order and safety of the communities in which they are concentrated (Beck, 1996; Brimelow, 1995). The writings of immigration alarmists like Beck and Brimelow aside, we discovered that Afro-Caribbeans are usually at greater risk of victimization than engaging in predatory activities, and overall they are involved in violence less than the city of Miami population. Thus, the current INS strategy to remove “criminal aliens” in an effort to combat violent crime is questionable and is a misguided basis for limiting and restricting immigration.

Another important finding is the consistently high level of gun homicides in Miami. Afro-Caribbeans had a very high level of gun killing and the proportion remained extremely high over time—in fact, higher than the national average (Reiss and Roth, 1993:255). Miami’s gun use is probably best understood within the context of the illegal drug market during this period, which generated more conflict in urban areas with few escape routes for immigrants, and the culture of gun use in the south (see Inciardi, 1992).

The question of comparability to other areas naturally arises. We stress the caveat that our findings are, perhaps, unique to Miami for a host of demographic and historical reasons. It is possible that crime differences might arise relative to other cities with large immigrant populations (e.g., New York City, Chicago, Los Angeles, San Diego). Comparing our findings with those of Afro-Caribbeans in New York City might produce different results. Thus,
local conditions, social class in the home country, and manner of reception might be important determinants of immigrant well-being. We invite further inquiries along these lines.

Finally, this study extends a long tradition of social science research on urban violence dating back to the pioneering work of Shaw and McKay (1931). Our findings suggest that some of the key propositions of social disorganization theory must be revised to account for contemporary relationships among the immigration and homicide patterns found in cities such as Miami (see Grenier and Stepick, 1992). Rapid immigration might not create disorganized communities but instead stabilize neighborhoods through the creation of new social and economic institutions. For example, Portes and Stepick (1993) describe how immigrant-owned small business revitalized Miami by providing job opportunities for co-ethnics. The low rate of involvement in homicide of the three immigrant groups we studied demonstrates the value of exploring intra-ethnic distinctions in future research on neighborhood stability, economic conditions, and violent crime. Increased attention to the issues we have raised will likely lead scholars to challenge misleading and deleterious stereotypes and result in more informed theory, research, and policy on urban immigrant violence.

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Shaw, C. R. and H. D. McKay

Short, J. F.

Stepick, A.

———

U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform

Wilbanks, W.
Guess Who’s Coming to Dinner: Migration from Lesotho, Mozambique and Zimbabwe to South Africa

David A. McDonald  
Queen’s University

Lovemore Zinyama  
University of Zimbabwe

John Gay  
Sechaba Consultants

Fion de Vletter  
Mozambique

Robert Mattes  
Institute for Democracy in South Africa

Although a more balanced debate about cross-border migration in South Africa is starting to take place, xenophobic stereotypes about migrants of African origin are still all too common. Allusions to a “flood of illegal aliens” who bring disease and crime to the country and who are seen to be a threat to the social and fiscal stability of South Africa are, unfortunately, still rife in the mainstream press in South Africa. This article is an attempt to challenge some of these stereotypes. Drawing on national surveys recently conducted by the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) in Lesotho, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, it will be argued that much of the negative stereotyping around cross-border migration from these three countries in particular is unfounded. A profile of migration histories of those interviewed is followed by a discussion of peoples’atti-

1The authors would like to thank the following people for their input into the planning, implementation and/or analysis of this research: Jonathan Crush, Donald Taylor, Sally Peberdy, Monica Francis, Lazarus Zanamwe, Demetrios Papademetriou, Lutando Myataza, Vincent Williams, Victoria Esses, Tamara Armstrong, Abigail Poore, Kelly Mark Barlow, Anne Mitchell and Doug Palmer. Comments on an earlier draft of the paper from three anonymous referees were also extremely useful. Finally, the research would not have been possible without the hard work and dedication of over 50 research assistants, translators and data input people. To this group goes our most sincere gratitude and appreciation. The research was conducted by the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) and funded by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA).

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tudes towards cross-border movement and immigration policy as well as an analysis of possible future migration trends. The article concludes with a discussion of the policy relevance of the research and makes some general policy recommendations.

Cross-border migration in Southern Africa has a long and complex history. Originating with the need for large pools of cheap labor for the mines and farms of South Africa in the late nineteenth century, hundreds of thousands of contract workers from as far away as Malawi – but predominantly from Lesotho and Mozambique – have been recruited to work in South Africa as mining and agricultural laborers. Although some changes have been made to this contract migrant labor system over the years, there is little sign of it changing dramatically in the foreseeable future. In fact, recent trends have shown an increase in the percent of the mining workforce that is from outside of South Africa – largely as a result of increasing retrenchments of South African nationals.²

By far, the most significant change in cross-border migration in South Africa in the 1990s has been the dramatic increase in noncontract migration. Africans from other parts of the continent – mostly from the region but now from as far away as Ghana and Somalia – are entering South Africa in increasing numbers to look for work, to visit friends, to sell and buy goods, and so on. Documented border crossings from countries in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) alone have increased almost seven-fold to over 3 million visitors a year since 1990, and there are also significant increases in the number of visitors from Eastern Europe and Asia.

Undocumented migration would appear to have increased dramatically as well. Estimates range from 2.5 to 12 million undocumented migrants living in the country at any one time (out of total South African population of approximately 38 million people), and although these figures are most likely grossly exaggerated there can be little doubt that there has been a significant increase in the number of people overstaying their visas and entering the country without proper documentation (Crush, 1997).

In response to these changes in cross-border migration activity, and as part of the broader legislative changes taking place in post-apartheid South

²South African mining companies claim that they retain foreign workers because foreign workers tend to occupy skilled positions, while critics claim that foreign nationals are retained because they are less likely to be unionized and/or are less militant in the workplace due to a fear of deportation. The reasons for this imbalance are not entirely clear, however, and more research is required to provide a detailed profile of downsizing (on this point, see Crush, 1995).
Africa, immigration policy is in the process of being redrafted in the country. The release of a “White Paper on International Migration” in April of 1999 followed by a migration Bill by the South African Department of Home Affairs mark a radical departure from the current, apartheid-era Aliens Control Act. As the name implies, the current immigration act is styled in the tradition of control-and-expulsion and is a legacy of South Africa’s reliance on short-term, contract labor from the region. When needed, labor could be recruited; when not, it could be expelled. The Bill and White Paper are a first attempt at making South Africa’s immigration policy more consistent with the country’s human rights legislation as well as recognizing South Africa’s important role in the regional labor market (RSA, 1999). A White Paper on refugees was released in July, 1998 (RSA, 1998).

Needless to say, this policy reform process has not been without controversy. Immigration issues have been hotly contested in policy circles and in the popular press, and public sentiment towards foreigners of African origin has a decidedly negative streak in South Africa. Although not as negative or as widespread as one would be led to believe by reports in the popular press, anti-immigrant sentiment is, nevertheless, a real concern (Mattes et al., 1999). Physical attacks on foreign street vendors in Johannesburg by South African traders, xenophobic press coverage, and prejudiced comments by senior politicians about the “flood of illegal aliens” into the country are indicative of the kind of rhetoric that permeates the public debate on foreigners of African origin living in South Africa (Peberdy and Crush, 1998). There is also a large cadre of apartheid-era civil servants still working within the Department of Home Affairs (the ministry responsible for immigration issues in South Africa) and as border officials. Not surprisingly, these bureaucrats often have very conservative and racist views of people from other African countries and represent a major obstacle to more democratic modes of immigration governance.

This is, therefore, a crucial and sensitive time in the development of immigration policy in South Africa, and it is essential that policymakers, academics and the general public have as much reliable information on the causes and consequences of cross-border migration as possible. In an attempt to help fill this informational gap, the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) has been conducting research on a wide range of cross-border migration activities in the region. This current article summarizes key findings.

\[\text{Detailed information on SAMP can be found on the Project website at http://www.queen.su.ca/samp}\]
from national surveys conducted in Lesotho, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. The surveys were designed to gauge people’s experiences with, and attitudes towards, migration to South Africa and are the most comprehensive and methodologically rigorous surveys conducted on issues of cross-border migration in the region to date. The same surveys have been conducted in Namibia and Botswana but were not available at the time of writing.

The article begins with a brief discussion of research methodology to allow the reader to better assess the credibility of the data and its significance in comparison to related research. In light of some rather questionable research methodologies employed recently in South Africa on issues of undocumented migration, it is all the more important to define our methodological framework.

We then present the research data in three sections. The first section provides an overview of the migration histories of the sample population in an attempt to give readers a better sense of the quantitative and qualitative nature of out-migration from these three countries. The second section highlights peoples’ attitudes to migration and immigration policy and discusses how these attitudes are shaped by their perspectives of South Africa and of their home country. And finally, we look at the significance of these findings for future cross-border migration trends. The article concludes with a discussion of the policy relevance of the research and makes some general policy recommendations.

METHODOLOGY

The first point to make about research methodology is that the surveys represent a coordinated effort across the three countries surveyed and the data is entirely compatible. Beginning with a planning workshop in Harare, Zimbabwe, in October of 1996, and continuing through every stage of design work, sample selection, data input and report writing, the principal researchers worked together and were in constant contact with one another.

It should also be noted that these surveys are only one part of a larger public opinion survey cluster which included interviews with 3,500 South African citizens about their attitudes towards immigrants and immigration policy, as well as 500 interviews with migrants currently living in South Africa.$^4$ These additional surveys were coordinated by the same research team and correspond

$^4$The survey of South African citizens was a nationally representative, random sample of adults 18 years of age and older with over-sampling in key demographic and geographic areas. The survey of (im)migrants living in South Africa posed a difficult methodological challenge given
with the questionnaire and methodologies used in the research being reported here. The results of all of these surveys can be found in McDonald (2000).

For reasons of space, the current article deals strictly with the interviews conducted in Lesotho, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. In this respect, we do not purport to present the “full picture” of attitudes and practices with respect to cross-border migration in Southern Africa. What we will discuss here are interviews with people who are currently living in their home country and who may or may not have been to South Africa. It is important, therefore, to note that this gives us a somewhat biased sample insofar as it does not include residents from the three countries who are currently living in South Africa. It can be said, however, that results from the 500 surveys with migrants who are living in South Africa are remarkably similar to the results presented in this article. In fact, the only notable exception is that foreign nationals living in South Africa are slightly more likely to say that they want to stay in South Africa on a permanent basis. These caveats notwithstanding, the surveys provide us with a reliable and representative sample of the in-house populations of the three countries in question and offer some invaluable insights into people’s attitudes towards, and experiences with, cross-border migration in the region.

The reasons for choosing Lesotho, Mozambique and Zimbabwe are twofold. First, these are by far the largest source countries in terms of documented migration into South Africa and by all accounts would appear to be the three largest source countries of undocumented migration as well. Second, popular perception in South Africa is such that these are the largest and most problematic source countries for migrants — Mozambique in particular — and perception is just as important as reality when dealing with public policy. It should also be noted that the interviews in Mozambique only covered the southern half of the country — in part because this is where the overwhelming majority of Mozambican migrants originate, and in part because of the logistical challenges of including the northern half of the country (the population of the provinces covered is approximately 6.5 million).

The surveys themselves consisted of a lengthy questionnaire of approximately 200 questions ranging from basic demographics to people’s attitudes to immigration policy and their migration plans for the future. Given the volume that the total sample size is unknown (and perhaps unknowable). We therefore targeted a broad cross-section of migrant communities based on anecdotal knowledge of the likely sample composition of migrants in the country and the policy significance of certain migrant groups and used trained researchers to do snowball sampling in these communities. The study is therefore not a “representative” sample, per se, but it is the most comprehensive survey of migrants conducted to date.
of interviews, Likert and scaled questions as well as pre-defined response options were the only feasible options for data analysis and comparability across countries. This form of closed-option responses limited the scope and depth of answers that interviewees could provide, but this is a trade-off that had to be made in order to capture nationally representative samples. The wide range of questions that were asked and the complex layering of issues also helped to offset the shortfalls in this quantitative method and in the end provided an extraordinarily rich set of data.

In total, 2,300 interviews were completed – 692 in Lesotho, 661 in Mozambique and 947 in Zimbabwe – over a four month period beginning in February 1997. Fifty-six percent of the interviewees were men and 44 percent were women, with the minimum age for interviewees set at 15 years. A detailed demographic breakdown of the sample population is provided in Table 1.

Sample lists were initially compiled using census data and/or aerial maps (depending on what was most available and reliable) to form a list of enumerated areas. In Zimbabwe, equally weighted enumerated areas were randomly selected within various desired substrata (e.g., the proper portion taken from a list of urban and rural enumerated areas). In Lesotho and Mozambique, the census data was used to weight the probability of drawing an interview point (from which five interviews were done) from given geographic areas (using the smallest geographic unit for which we had reliable data). Once this random list was drawn, interviewers would go to every nth dwelling in a given direction starting at a certain point. A card selection procedure was then used to select household members. Some sampling points in particularly remote or dangerous areas were substituted with a point chosen from a geographic unit taken from a second, randomly selected list.

This random selection procedure was, in and of itself, an enormous undertaking given the dearth of reliable census material in some areas and the logistics of sending researchers to remote parts of each country, and we cannot overemphasize the effort that was made to ensure that sample selection was as representative and random as possible given the circumstances. Random field visits by the principal researchers in each country served to further ensure that these procedures were being followed by field staff. The same kind of detailed

5 This overall bias in favor of men is largely a result of a gender imbalance in the Mozambican subsample where the male/female ratio was 61/39. Although this bias can be attributed, in part, to the fact that many Mozambican women were away from their homesteads for an extended period harvesting in the fields, it is not entirely clear why this should have produced such an imbalance.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>TABLE 1</th>
<th>DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF SAMPLE</th>
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</tr>
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<td>Coloured</td>
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<td>Urban or Rural (%)</td>
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<td>Widowed</td>
<td>9</td>
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<td>Separated/divorced/abandoned</td>
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<th>Years of Schooling</th>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</table>

Note: Figures may not add to 100% due to rounding. A dash (-) signifies a value of less than 0.5% but greater than zero.

and coordinated planning also applied to translations (and back-translations) of questionnaires, training of researchers, pilot tests, and data input procedures.

It is impossible to present all the data from the research in a single paper. What follows is a summary of the key findings with an emphasis of the important similarities and differences between the three countries and between different demographic variables. The data also allows us to debunk some of the negative stereotypes around cross-border migration into South Africa from the three countries concerned and to “de-demonize” the migrants themselves.

**PAST EXPERIENCES WITH CROSS-BORDER MIGRATION**

As noted earlier, there is a long history of movement from Lesotho, Mozambique and Zimbabwe into South Africa, and this history shows up clearly in the interviews. Fifty percent of respondents have parents who have visited or
worked in South Africa and 34 percent have grandparents who have done the same. But more important to our discussion here is the number of residents in the countries surveyed who have themselves been to South Africa, who they are, their reasons for going, how often they go, and what methods of entry they use. We look at each of these questions below.

Profile of Visitors to South Africa

Clearly, cross-border movement into South Africa remains a widespread phenomenon from all three countries, with 42 percent of respondents saying that they have visited South Africa at least once in their lives. There are significant variations, however, in both the scale and make-up of visitors from the different countries. In Lesotho, fully 81 percent of the population has visited South Africa, while the figures for Mozambique and Zimbabwe are only 29 percent and 23 percent respectively. Of these totals, there are also variations in terms of gender and socioeconomic indicators (see Table 2). First, women make up a much larger part of the mobile population in Lesotho and Zimbabwe than they do in Mozambique. In the case of Zimbabwe, this reflects the large number of women traveling to South Africa to buy and sell goods, while in Lesotho it is more of a reflection of the number of women traveling to South Africa to visit relatives, go for medical care and go to work. Second, the overwhelming number of people crossing the border from Zimbabwe are from urban areas, while the majority of those from Mozambique are from rural areas. This difference may also account for the fact that average education levels of Zimbabweans who have been to South Africa are slightly higher than those for the other two countries.

There are also a number of important similarities between the three countries. Of particular interest is the type of people who have visited South Africa. Far from being the kind of rootless drifters that they are often portrayed to be in the South African media, the majority of visitors from the countries surveyed would appear to be well-established, family-oriented citizens. As can be seen from Table 2, almost three quarters of those who have visited South Africa are married, over half are heads of household, over 80 percent own their own homes, over half have annual incomes per household member of at least R1200 (this is slightly higher than the sample as a whole), almost half have full- or part-time work, and at least one third have a minimum of some high school education – hardly the stuff of desperate, uneducated criminals threatening South African society.

6With sampling error this figure could range from 38.5% to 45.5%.
### TABLE 2
**Demographic Breakdown of Respondents Who Have Been to South Africa**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Les</th>
<th>Moz</th>
<th>Zim</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent of Respondents Who Have Been to South Africa</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Male</td>
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<td>88</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban/Rural (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
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<td>44</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital Status (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unmarried</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Widowed</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separated/divorced/abandoned</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>73</td>
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<tr>
<td>Household Status (%)</td>
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<td>Household Head</td>
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<td>Other</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home Ownership (%)</td>
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</tr>
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<td>87</td>
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<td>Rent</td>
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<td>Live with others/illegally occupy</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income/Household member/ per year (in Rand) (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>160 or less</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>161–450</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>451–1200</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1200+</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of Employment Activity (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inactive</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Looking for work</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part-time</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full-time</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of Education (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No schooling</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some primary</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary completed</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some high school</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school completed</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-grad and further</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N = 2,300</td>
<td>561</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Frequency of Visits to South Africa**

The surveys also illustrate the short-term and temporary nature of these respondents’ visits to South Africa. This temporality is particularly pronounced in Lesotho where respondents have been to the country an average of 68 times in their lives – with some people having been to South Africa hundreds of times. These figures are significantly lower for Mozambique and Zim-
babwe (with averages of 5 and 6 visits, respectively), but there is clearly a regular and quite frequent cross-border movement from these countries as well.

Moreover, the length of each visit is quite short, with 60 percent of respondents staying in South Africa for less than a month at a time. There are important variations here, however, with people from Lesotho staying the shortest amount of time and people from Mozambique staying the longest.

**Reasons for Going to South Africa**

Not surprisingly, a large portion of those respondents who have been to South Africa in the past cited work, or looking for work, as the reason for their last trip to the country. But work is not the only reason people go to South Africa. As outlined in Table 3, shopping, visiting friends and relatives, taking holidays, receiving medical treatment, and an assortment of other, non-job related activities constitute a majority of the cross-border traffic. There are important differences between the three countries, once again, with Mozambicans citing work (or looking for work) and Zimbabweans citing “buying and trading goods” as the most common reasons for last being in South Africa, but for all three countries there is a significant amount of non-work related activity.

More important, perhaps, is the fact that for an overwhelming majority of respondents there was both a freedom of choice and a desire to return to their home countries. Contrary to popular opinion in South Africa, most visitors from Lesotho, Mozambique and Zimbabwe return home of their own free will when their planned visit is over. And, with the notable exception of Mozambique, very few of the respondents were deported from the country. These figures do not capture the residents of these countries who have decided to stay in South Africa, of course, but the survey results do suggest that much of the cross-border activity from Lesotho, Mozambique and Zimbabwe is highly circular and that a large percentage of the residents from these countries who do visit South Africa do so for non-work related purposes.

It is important, therefore, to distinguish between short-term, purpose-oriented migration that happens on a regular basis and long-term or permanent immigration. Even the term “migration” is somewhat misleading here given that much of this cross-border movement is for very short-term trips to shop, visit friends or go to doctors, in which case “visitors” or “tourists” would be a more apt description. Nomenclature aside, the important point to keep in mind here is that people from the countries surveyed are not only going to South Africa to work or look for work and most return home of their own free will.
TABLE 3
Reasons for Visiting and Leaving South Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Les</th>
<th>Moz</th>
<th>Zim</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What was the purpose of your most recent visit (%)?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To look for work</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To work</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buy and sell goods</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study at university/technikon</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shopping</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visit family or friends</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holiday, tourism</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Treatment</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Why have you returned to your country (%)?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returned after holiday or visit ended</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wanted to come back home</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family reasons</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sick/injured</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contract ended</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired from job</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lost job or retrenched</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Found job at home</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel documents expired</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expelled or deported from SA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Studies ended</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goods sold out</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N = 2,300</td>
<td>561</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Methods of Entry into South Africa

Of equal interest to the current debates on cross-border migration in the region is the question of how people enter South Africa. As the following quote attests to, there is a popular image in South Africa that most cross-border migration from neighboring countries is clandestine:

Various methods are used by illegals to enter South Africa. The most common is simply to cross the border clandestinely. In the case of Mozambican and Zimbabwean borders this may be difficult where there are border fences (some electrified) and other obstacles to cross first – not to mention crocodiles in the rivers that need to be swum, the lions in the game reserves and even land mines (Minaar and Hough, 1996:134).

Electric fences, crocodiles and lions are seen by many to be South Africa's only hope for keeping out the ravenous hordes, with the Minister of Defense even threatening at one point to turn the fence on the Mozambican border up to "lethal mode" if clandestine border crossings were not significantly reduced. There is also a perception in South Africa that border officials are
irretrievably corrupt and that noncitizens gain entry into the country *en masse* with false passports, bribes and other forms of corruption (see, e.g., Minaar and Hough, 1996:153–9).

There can be no doubt that clandestine border crossings occur in South Africa on a regular basis and that corruption exists within the immigration system – no country is immune to this. The question that needs to be asked is “How serious are these problems?” Our findings in Lesotho, Mozambique and Zimbabwe (as well as preliminary results from the surveys in Namibia and Botswana) would suggest that “illegal” cross-border movement is relatively minor and that the general picture is one of a highly organized and regularized movement of people. As a case in point, of the 971 respondents who said that they had been to South Africa in the past, 49 percent crossed the border on their last visit by car or minibus, 22 percent by bus, 14 percent by train, and 4 percent by plane or other formal modes of transportation. Of the remaining 8 percent that crossed the border “on foot,” many of these people took a bus or minibus to the border, went through immigration on foot, and then took another bus or minibus to their destination in South Africa – a particularly common phenomenon at the Zimbabwean border posts. In other words, there are relatively few people sneaking into the country under fences or swimming across rivers.

Moreover, 89 percent of these respondents had official passports from their home countries before entering South Africa, and 72 percent had the appropriate South African visas. Admittedly, this means that a significant number of people crossed the border without proper documentation on their last visit, but the figures are not nearly as high as one would suspect from anecdotal reports in the press in South Africa.

It is worth noting that the majority of respondents without proper visas were from Zimbabwe, due in part to the fact that it is so difficult and time consuming to get visas for South Africa in that country. At the time this research was conducted, there were only two places in Zimbabwe to get a South African visa (Harare and Bulawayo) and these two offices had to process up to 30,000 visas a month (personal interview with Mr. JNK Mambolo, South African High Commissioner, Nov. 19, 1996). For those who made the trek to these two locations (a rather expensive and time consuming task for those in rural areas – especially those in the southern part of the country who have to travel north before traveling south again to South Africa), queues at the visa offices begin well before dawn each day. The fact that so many Zimbabweans make the effort to get the proper visas – despite all the costs and obstacles involved – serves to reinforce the argument that clandes-
tine border crossings are very much the exception rather than the rule.

This image of the “law-abiding citizen” is also apparent in people’s perceptions of the South African border (including those who have never been to South Africa). When interviewees were asked a series of questions about whether they would know how to get across the border and stay in South Africa without the proper travel documents if they had to, over three quarters said they “did not know about this and do not know how to find out about it.” Only 10 percent of respondents said they “know about this,” with another 12 percent saying they “do not know about this but could [or might be able to] find out about it” if they tried.

When asked how concerned they would be about getting caught by the police and sent home if they went to South Africa without the proper travel documents, there was a similar level of concern among the respondents – suggesting once again that people from the countries surveyed take borders seriously and are not wantonly violating immigration rules and regulations. There are differences between the countries, with people from Lesotho being most concerned about border regulations, but the differences are really a matter of degree with citizens in all of the countries surveyed clearly wanting to operate within the bounds of the law.

It must be stressed, once again, that these interviews cover only a few key countries and that “illegal” border activities take place with nationals from other parts of Africa, Asia, North America and Europe (in fact, some of the worst visa offenders are from Europe and North America, with 10,910 Germans, 12,593 Britons and 3,149 Americans overstaying their visas in the first four months of 1996 alone (Crush, 1997:19)). Nor do we know for sure exactly how many undocumented migrants are currently in South Africa and what their methods of entry were. What the data do suggest is that we need to reassess the popular perception that most Africans from other countries enter South Africa illegally and/or overstay their visas.

**ATTITUDES TOWARDS MIGRATION TO SOUTH AFRICA**

We next explore people’s attitudes towards South Africa and their home countries, and towards cross-border migration in the region in general. These opinion-based questions allow us to better assess the rationale for migrating (or not migrating) to South Africa from the countries in question and to gauge the potential for people to migrate in the future. The findings also allow us to compare the actual attitudes of people from the region to the commonly held stereotypes of these attitudes in South Africa.
Comparing South Africa to the Home Country

Immigrant-receiving countries like South Africa often develop a very distorted view of migration. People are coming to their country for what they believe to be clear and obvious reasons: for economic opportunity and for a better quality of life. Residents of the receiving country assume that everyone in the world would want to come to their country, first because the large number of newcomers reinforces that impression, and second because residents of receiving nations, like anyone else, are proud of their country and biased in their beliefs about its virtues. Wouldn’t everyone want to live here!

Not surprisingly, then, South Africans have the impression that residents of neighboring countries are all anxious to leave their homes and come to South Africa. It is assumed that Africans from other countries are either pulled to South Africa by the country’s superior social, economic and political climate, or pushed from their home countries by poverty, chaos and a lack of opportunity. The perception that South African borders are relatively porous adds to the belief that the country is the destination of choice for the continent as a whole.

The results from our surveys present a much more complex picture. When asked to compare their home countries with South Africa, the majority of those interviewed identified their home countries as a better place to raise a family, with access to basic resources like land, water, and housing seen to be much better than in South Africa. Levels of crime and safety were also seen to be better at home, and even South Africa’s much vaunted democratic reforms would appear to carry little weight with people in the countries surveyed, with over two thirds of respondents saying that they find “peace,” “freedom” and “democracy” to be as good, or better, in their home countries as in South Africa.

Not surprisingly, job opportunities were deemed far better in South Africa than at home, as were opportunities for buying and selling goods, but this perception of job opportunities does not necessarily translate into a flood of migration. As we shall see, only a small percentage of those interviewed said it was likely that they would go to live in South Africa for even a short period of time. In other words, not everyone in the countries surveyed wants to move to South Africa just because job opportunities are better, suggesting that the actual number of people wanting to settle in South Africa is much lower than one would be led to believe by the popular press.

There are two other revealing points about people’s attitudes towards their home countries that should be highlighted here. First, it is clear that the overwhelming majority of respondents are proud of their home countries. No less than 95 percent of respondents said that they “agree” or “strongly agree” when asked if they are “proud to be called a citizen of [their home country],” and 92
percent responded in this way when asked if “being a citizen of [their home country] is a very important part of how [they see themselves].” Second, although respondents were more circumspect when asked whether they approve of the way their government has performed over the past year and whether or not they can trust their governments “to do what is right,” the approval ratings are still reasonably high (47% and 40%, respectively). Moreover, disapproval of the government should not necessarily be seen as a sign of being “unpatriotic” or desiring to emigrate.

Nevertheless, jobs and social services like health care and education are perceived to be better in South Africa and would appear to be an important

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Les</th>
<th>Moz</th>
<th>Zim</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Land</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water and food</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Houses</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jobs</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opportunities for trade</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall living conditions</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safety of myself and family/crime</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education, schools</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health care</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Place to raise your family</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disease, HIV/AIDS</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Getting necessary travel documents</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shopping</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nothing</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the things we have discussed that would cause you to stay in [your country], which is the most important to you?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Les</th>
<th>Moz</th>
<th>Zim</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Land</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water and food</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Houses</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jobs</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opportunities for trade</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall living conditions</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safety of myself and family/crime</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education, schools</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health care</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Place to raise your family</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disease, HIV/AIDS</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom/Democracy</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Getting necessary travel documents</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shopping</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I grew up in [this country]</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 2,300
part of what pulls people to South Africa from the three countries surveyed. But the would-be push factors tell a different story, bringing into doubt the explanatory value of any simple push/pull model of cross-border migration in the region. As outlined in Table 4, the pull factors are counterbalanced by a very strong set of factors that would work to keep someone at home (or at least push them out).

**Perceived Impacts of Migration**

We were also interested in knowing people's perceptions of the impacts of migration on themselves, their families, their communities and their country. At the risk of over-simplifying a long history of scholarly research on the subject, it can be said that the bulk of the literature on cross-border migration in the region paints a very negative picture of the consequences of migratory labor and apartheid-era immigration laws. From exploitative labor practices and deferred pay systems to the transmission of AIDS and the splitting up of families, there is ample evidence to suggest that cross-border migration has served to undermine the social, cultural and economic integrity of SADC states. This is not to suggest that all cross-border movement has been seen to be negative or that it affects all people in the same way, but the overwhelming sense from the literature is that cross-border movement has had a deleterious impact on individuals, families, communities and states in the region (see, e.g., Bundy, 1979; Lacey, 1981; Murray, 1981; First, 1983; Packard, 1989; Crush et al., 1992).

Given the scholarly evidence, one would assume that our interviews would also be full of negative attitudes towards migration. And yet, we received an overwhelmingly positive response from interviewees when they were asked about the impact of migration. Important variations between the three countries notwithstanding, over half the people interviewed see cross-border migration as having a positive (or at least neutral) impact on them personally, on their families, on their communities and on their countries as a whole. Interestingly, the most positive responses came at the personal and family level, where a majority see the impact as positive.

Even more surprising is that women also have a largely positive outlook on migration – despite the enormous impact that the migrant labor system has had on family life and relationships in these countries in the past. Even on a personal level, 14 percent of the women interviewed said cross-border migration has had a “very positive” impact on them personally, 39 percent said “positive,” and 27 percent said “no impact.” These responses are balanced
somewhat by the fact that 26 percent of women (and 23% of men) identified “having an affair” or “having a second family” in South Africa as one of their three main concerns about a family member going to work or stay in South Africa, but the fact remains that a majority of women gave positive responses. Despite the many negative impacts that cross-border migration has had in the region, people also see benefits for themselves, their families, their communities and their countries. The fact that people say they like something does not necessarily mean it is in their best interest to be doing it, but it is important not to represent individuals in Southern Africa as mere “victims” of a migratory system.

*Immigration Policy Preferences*

We have already discussed the myth that everyone in the region wants to live in South Africa. Equally problematic, however, is the popular stereotype in South Africa that everyone in the region expects the South African government to throw open its borders to migrants. The South African press is full of articles which imply – directly or indirectly – that South Africa must “hold the line” on border controls and not fall prey to the entry demands of other SADC states. The rather vitriolic reaction of the South African media, as well as some policymakers and academics, to the 1996 SADC proposal (SADC, 1996) to gradually phase in a “freer movement” of peoples in the region illustrates this fear and has heightened suspicions that there is a concerted effort to undermine South Africa’s border controls on the part of neighboring states.

Once again, our data challenges these stereotypes. Although citizens of Lesotho, Mozambique and Zimbabwe would like to see a relaxation of border regulations and consider it a “basic human right” to be able to move from one country to another, they do not expect the South African government to abandon border controls altogether. As evidenced in Table 5, most people would like to see policies in place which make it easier to move from one country to another, and many question the legitimacy of borders that were created during the colonial era, but respondents do not advocate a radical dismantling of current border systems.

Approximately one third of respondents disagree with the suggestion that people should be able to move “freely” across borders and over half feel that borders are an important part of defining who they are. Even more important is the fact that a majority of respondents feel that the South African government should be able to restrict the number of (im)migrants allowed into the country and that they should also have the right to deport people who are
TABLE 5

ATTITUDES TOWARDS BORDERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Les</th>
<th>Moz</th>
<th>Zim</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>It is a basic human right for people to be able to cross from one country into another without obstacles.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither agree nor disagree</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t Know</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is ridiculous that people from this country cannot freely go to another country, all because of some artificial border.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Les</th>
<th>Moz</th>
<th>Zim</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither agree nor disagree</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t Know</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

People who live on different sides of borders between two countries are very different from one another.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Les</th>
<th>Moz</th>
<th>Zim</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither agree nor disagree</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t Know</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is very important for [the respondent’s country] to have a border that clearly differentiates it from other countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Les</th>
<th>Moz</th>
<th>Zim</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither agree nor disagree</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t Know</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 2,300

there “illegally,” are “not contributing to the well-being of the country,” or have “committed serious criminal offences.” As Table 6 illustrates, respondents would like to see the South African government define these restrictions and categories in a humane and rational manner, but do not reject the idea of selective (im)migration and do not expect the government of South Africa to grant amnesty to every non-South African currently living in the country. Nor do the majority expect preferential or privileged treatment for people from their own countries – despite their history of cross-border relations and proximity to South Africa.

It must be noted, however, that there are significant differences in attitudes towards borders between Lesotho and the other two countries surveyed and that Lesotho is, in many ways, a “special case.” This difference is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that 41 percent of Basotho said that Lesotho and South Africa should simply join as one country (as opposed to 7% and 9% of Mozambicans and Zimbabweans respectively). The reasons for this are no doubt rooted in the exceptionally high number of contract workers from Lesotho (by far the largest of all the SADC states) as well as the close cultural, linguistic and familial ties between Basotho and a large section of the South African population (i.e., Sotho and Tswana speakers). The fact that Lesotho is completely sur-
### Table 6

**Attitudes Towards Immigration Laws**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Les</th>
<th>Moz</th>
<th>Zim</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Let anyone into SA who wants to enter (%)</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Let people into SA as long as there are jobs available (%)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Place strict limits on the number of foreigners who can enter SA (%)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prohibit all people entering into SA from other countries (%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't Know (%)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

How about people from other southern African countries who are presently in SA? Which one of the following do you think the SA government should do? (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Les</th>
<th>Moz</th>
<th>Zim</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Send them all back to their own countries (%)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Send back only those who are not contributing to the economic well-being/livelihood of SA (%)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Send back only those who have committed serious criminal offences (%)</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Send back only those who are here without the permission of the SA government (%)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The government should not send back any people to their own countries (%)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't Know (%)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The SA government should offer amnesty to all foreigners now living illegally inside the country (%).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Les</th>
<th>Moz</th>
<th>Zim</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disagree (%)</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither agree nor disagree (%)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree (%)</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haven't heard enough about it/don't know (%)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 2,200

rounded by South Africa also contributes to the image of Lesotho as more of a province of South Africa than an independent state.

Another interesting finding is that respondents do not necessarily expect to have all the same rights and privileges as South African citizens. Although the majority of respondents feel that noncitizens should have the same access to jobs and basic resources like education, medical services and housing as South African citizens, they were much more hesitant when it came to questions of a more political nature: the right to vote; the right to become a permanent resident or a citizen of the country; and the right to request amnesty for nonnationals. In other words, people from the countries interviewed want the same basic human rights and the same economic opportunities as South African citizens, but they do not necessarily expect (or want) the political rights of citizenship – with the notable exception, once again, of Basotho.

It is also interesting to note that these attitudes to immigration policy are largely reciprocal. To the extent that respondents would like to see South Africa relax its immigration laws, people from Lesotho, Mozambique and
Zimbabwe are also willing to allow a freer movement of people and goods from South Africa into their own country (with the exception, in Lesotho and Zimbabwe, of a reluctance to make land available to foreigners for farming—no doubt due to the critical shortage of arable land in both countries. The fact that Mozambicans were significantly more agreeable on this point may, in turn, be due to the fact there is a considerable amount of arable land still available in that country).

Far from expecting the South African government to throw open its doors to whoever wants to enter, a majority of people in the region have a strong respect for the sanctity of borders. Even in Lesotho—where independence of the nation is itself in question—there is a pragmatic and selective approach to questions of sovereignty, immigration and border controls with South Africa.

The Attitudes of Women

A full discussion of the gender dimensions of the research is beyond the scope of this article but it is worth noting that women’s attitudes to migration and their perspectives on life in South Africa are remarkably similar overall to the men interviewed (for a more detailed analysis, see Dodson, 2000). Almost to a percentage point, women gave the same responses as men on virtually every opinion-based question in the survey. Their perceptions of South Africa, their reasons for going to South Africa (or for not going), their expected treatment by South African authorities and citizens, and their comparisons of South Africa with their home country were almost identical to that of the men interviewed. And although women were slightly less knowledgeable and slightly less sure of themselves in terms of their ability to get into South Africa and to find accommodation and work if they so desired, the differences were not enormous. Women outlined a similar pattern of family and friend networks in South Africa as did the men, and they expressed a similar understanding (or lack thereof) of how one lives as a foreigner in South Africa. In other words, women have the same general perceptions of South Africa vis-à-vis their own countries, and they have a very similar sense of what it takes to be a migrant in the Southern African context.

Interestingly, these similarities exist despite the very different first-hand experiences that men and women have with respect to migration to South Africa. As might be expected, more men have been to South Africa than women, men tend to stay for longer periods of time, and men tend to work in more formal, pre-arranged occupations than women (e.g., mining, manu-
facturing). More men claimed to be the “head of the household” than did women (57% versus 18%), more men claimed to be the person who “makes the final decision as to whether to go to South Africa or not” (57% versus 29%), and more men claimed that they “would be able to go to South Africa if [they] wanted to” (76% versus 61%). The questionnaire did not, unfortunately, capture the dynamics of joint decisionmaking between men and women – often an important part of the decision-making process in African households – but the statistics clearly imply that men are more in control of decisionmaking about cross-border migration than women. Nevertheless, the data do raise some counter-intuitive questions about women’s attitudes to cross-border migration and would appear to challenge the notion that women necessarily see migration in a negative light.

WHAT DOES THE FUTURE HOLD

It is impossible to say for sure what the future of migration from Lesotho, Mozambique and Zimbabwe to South Africa looks like given the uncertainties around the broader political and economic context within which cross-border migration will take place. What can be discussed is people’s propensity to migrate or immigrate to South Africa based on their stated intentions in the interviews. Although by no means a foolproof measure of future migratory patterns, we can nevertheless make some defensible comments on likely migration trends in the region – trends which once again challenge the stereotypes of gloom and doom.

We have already discussed the fact that not everyone in the region wants to live in, or even visit, South Africa. The popular notion that South Africa is an island of tranquility and prosperity in a sea of grief and poverty does not bear itself out in the minds of the majority of respondents – that much is clear. There are concerns about safety in South Africa and finding affordable housing and jobs, and there are concerns about leaving family and assets at home. Unless these underlying concerns change dramatically over the next several years, one can expect peoples’ opinions about migrating to South Africa to remain much the same.7

There were also questions in the survey which asked people directly about their “desire” to go to South Africa (for a short and long period of time) and the “likelihood” of their going to South Africa in the future. It is appar-

7The fact that there has not been a mass exodus, or any significant exodus at all, from Zimbabwe during the turmoil in that country since these interviews were conducted attests to the deep-seated nature of these attitudinal profiles.
ent from the responses to these questions that the majority of respondents are not interested in living in South Africa – at least not for an extended period of time. When asked “to what extent do you want to leave [your home country] to live in South Africa permanently,” two thirds of respondents said “not at all” and another 12 percent said “not much.” Only 13 percent said that they wanted to leave their home countries “to a great extent” (despite the fact that 69% of respondents said they would be able to go to South Africa if they wanted to). When asked how “likely” it was that they would go to live in South Africa permanently, only 6 percent of respondents said “very likely.”

Responses were slightly more positive when people were asked if they would like to go and live in South Africa for a “short period of time (up to 2 years),” with 18 percent saying they would definitely “want” to go and 12 percent saying it was “very likely” that they would go, but 41 percent of respondents said it was “unlikely” or “very unlikely” that they would live in South Africa for even two years (Table 7).

**TABLE 7**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Les</th>
<th>Moz</th>
<th>Zim</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>To what extent do you want to leave LMZ to go and live in SA permanently (%)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A great extent</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some extent</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not much</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t Know</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>To what extent do you want to leave LMZ to go and live in SA for a short period (up to 2 years) (%)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A great extent</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some extent</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not much</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t Know</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>How likely or unlikely is it that you would ever actually leave LMZ to go and live permanently in SA in the foreseeable future (%)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very likely</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likely</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither likely nor unlikely</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unlikely</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very unlikely</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t Know</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>How likely or unlikely is it that you would ever actually leave LMZ to go and live for a short period in SA in the foreseeable future (%)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very likely</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likely</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither likely nor unlikely</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unlikely</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very unlikely</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t Know</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 2,300
Further indication of the lack of desire to emigrate to South Africa can be found in a series of questions that were asked about how permanently people would want to stay in the country – with the number of negative responses increasing with the "degree of permanence." Not surprisingly, Basotho are more inclined than Mozambicans and Zimbabweans to say that they would like to take up permanent residence (33% versus 14% and 13%, respectively), but the overwhelming majority of Basotho do not even want permanent residence. Moreover, the percentages drop significantly as the stakes increase, with only 27 percent of Basotho saying they would like to retire in South Africa and only 17 percent saying they would like to be buried there. For Mozambique and Zimbabwe, these figures are lower yet, with only 1 percent of Mozambicans and 4 percent of Zimbabweans saying that they would like to be buried in South Africa. Clearly, "home is where the heart is" for the majority of the people interviewed (Table 8).

This is not to deny the fact that a significant number of those interviewed do want to live or work in South Africa for a period of time. The point being made here is simply that the stereotype that everyone in the region wants desperately to get into the country is not borne out in the surveys and that this is unlikely to change drastically in the near future.

In the end, the decision about whether or not to migrate will not be made easily. Although economic opportunities are deemed to be much better in South Africa, the quality of life on other dimensions is less positively perceived. Indeed, there are many aspects of life that are deemed to be much better at home than in South Africa. These are not the kind of circumstances

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 8</th>
<th>DESIRE TO STAY IN SOUTH AFRICA PERMANENTLY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Les</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would you want to become a permanent resident of South Africa? (%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't Know</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would you want to become a citizen of South Africa? (%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't Know</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would you like to live in South Africa when you retire? (%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't Know</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would you like to be buried in South Africa? (%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't Know</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 2,300
that are associated with people leaving their homes in droves to go to South Africa, which may help to explain the fairly large discrepancies noted earlier between those who said they want to go and those who said they will go.

**POLICY IMPLICATIONS**

*Immigration Management*

The first, and perhaps most important, conclusion to be drawn from the research is that cross-border migration into South Africa (at least from the three countries surveyed) would appear to be much less chaotic and overwhelming than has been previously thought. Both the volume of traffic and the methods of crossing the border, as well as the type of people crossing the border and their stated plans for the future, present a much more regularized, decriminalized and manageable picture of the migratory process than reports in the press and other research initiatives on undocumented migration would indicate.

The upshot of these findings is that a humane, management-oriented approach to immigration is not only a feasible option in South Africa, there is a highly regularized migration process already in place upon which to build. To create a more onerous, control-and-expulsion oriented approach to migration at this point in time in South Africa risks forcing people underground (quite literally) and therefore eroding the good will and legal practices that currently exist as well as undermining efforts to build on this regularized movement in the future.

This is not to suggest that there should be no border controls at all. Effective border monitoring and immigration law will always be needed at some level. Nevertheless, the fact remains that South Africa is at a crossroads in its immigration policy, and it can either take the path of “fortress South Africa” or it can recognize both the need and the feasibility of managing the growing levels of cross-border migration in a humane and rational manner.

*Immigration and Human Rights*

Concurrent with the previous point is the need for the South African government to address human rights issues within the immigration system and to create immigration legislation that is consistent with the new Bill of Rights in the Constitution (for a more detailed discussion, see Crush, 1998). The increasing criminalization of migrants from the region lends itself to the kinds of human rights abuses that continue to plague South African security and immigration authorities – not to mention the abuses that take place on the
farms and factories that employ both documented and undocumented laborers from the region – and aggravates what could be a very civil and regularized movement of people. If the profile of visitors from our surveys is any indication of the kind of person visiting South Africa from the region, there would appear to be little grounds for the paranoia and xenophobia that continues to permeate parts of the South African immigration system.

Regional Integration

As Southern Africa moves towards an era of greater integration, effective management of cross-border migration can strengthen and build on existing regional linkages. From the personal to the national, from the familial to the regional, cross-border migration is an integral part of the social, political and economic lives of people in Southern Africa.

This research has demonstrated many of these linkages, but it is perhaps at the economic level that we can draw our most concrete conclusions. As discussed earlier, the buying and selling of goods, working in South Africa, and sending remittances home are some of the core motivations for cross-border migration. Although difficult to quantify in absolute terms, these cross-border economic activities (both formal and informal) make up an important part of the national and household budgets in the three nations surveyed. In Mozambique, for example, official remittances in the form of “deferred payments” from Mozambicans working in South African mines alone makes up 55 percent of the non-aid budget of the Mozambican government (Personal Communication, Mozambican Minister of Labor H. E. Guilherme Mavila, Nov. 11, 1996) and is an essential part of the household budgets of most miners’ families (De Vletter, 1998). If one were to include goods brought back from South Africa, as well as other formal and informal income, the importance of cross-border movement on the economy of Mozambique would be difficult to overstate (for a discussion of informal cross-border trading, see Peberdy and Crush, 1998).

In terms of informal remittances, we found that 67 percent of the people who had worked in South Africa in the past had sent money home – an average of R321 per month (which worked out to over half the average monthly income). It is impossible to estimate an aggregate value for these remittances due to the different lengths of time that people worked in South Africa, but with close to a third of the entire national sample saying that they have worked in South Africa in the past and having sent money home this is a significant source of revenue. We also found that 85 percent of the respondents said they would send money home if they were to work in South Africa in the future.
Forty-five percent said they would send money to their parents, 26 percent said they would send money to their spouses, and 18 percent said they would send money to their children (with the final 10% divided between other family members and friends).

We are not saying anything particularly new here, of course. We are simply reinforcing the point that immigration policy must take into account not only the macro-economic linkages in the region, but also the ground level, micro-economic connections that are an essential part of building a robust regional economy. If handled properly, cross-border migration can work to the economic benefit of everyone in the region – South Africans included.

Having said this, it is also essential that policymakers understand the dynamics of these micro-economic linkages. Recent trends in South Africa towards the blaming of noncitizens for stealing jobs and competing for scarce resources are not only disturbing in terms of their implications for violence against foreign workers and residents, but also because they do not necessarily represent the realities of noncitizen participation in the South African economy. As noted earlier, research by SAMP has demonstrated that noncitizens in South Africa also create jobs and that competition for scarce resources like housing need not be a conflict-ridden process.

Migration Versus Immigration

We have already noted the need to distinguish between short-term, purpose-oriented cross-border migration of the sort described by the majority of respondents in this research and long-term permanent immigration. The “White Paper on International Migration” in South Africa also makes a point of differentiating between these two forms of cross-border movement and discusses the implications of these differences on immigration policy and management at some length, and there is no need to go into further detail here. What should be noted, however, is that the empirical evidence from our research supports the need for this distinction and lends credence to the argument that managing short-term migratory flows is feasible.

Special Status for Lesotho?

The South African government has already made special concessions to noncitizens from SADC countries by granting amnesties in 1996 to foreign miners and unauthorized migrants from these countries, and by granting amnesty to certain refugees from Mozambique. As we have seen here, there is good reason for this special treatment: citizens of SADC states make up the
overwhelming majority of visitors to the country (both authorized and unauthorized); there are important social and economic linkages in the region; and colonial boundaries have little to do with the geographic and ethnic realities of the subcontinent (Crush and Williams, 1999).

But what about Lesotho? With 81 percent of Basotho having visited South Africa an average of 28 times in their lives, and 41 percent of Basotho saying that the two countries should simply join under one government, there is clearly a need to at least recognize the uniqueness of Lesotho's relationship with South Africa. What this means in practical terms is beyond the scope of this article, but one can easily envision an easing of visa and passport restrictions between the two countries and perhaps an extension of certain employee benefits (e.g., pension plans) and other social welfare benefits (e.g., access to housing subsidies for homes built/purchased in South Africa).

Although a majority of Basotho (63%) disagreed with the statement that “people from Lesotho should receive special treatment” when it comes to immigration policy in South Africa (compared to 29% in Mozambique and 51% in Zimbabwe), the number of Basotho who visit South Africa, the frequency with which they visit the country, their stated desires to see an easing of border restrictions, and their stated desires for equal rights and benefits in South Africa (significantly higher, on all accounts, than Mozambique and Zimbabwe) would suggest that it is indeed time for a new – and perhaps “special” – immigration compact between South Africa and Lesotho.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the findings from these national surveys both reinforce and challenge some commonly held conceptions of cross-border migration from Lesotho, Mozambique and Zimbabwe into South Africa. The results reinforce the impression that cross-border migration is an integral part of the political, social and economic landscape of the region and that cross-border migration will continue to be an important part of regional linkages for many years to come. But the data also challenge some rather negative, and disparaging, stereotypes of cross-border migration that must be addressed by policymakers. Most importantly, migration into South Africa from the three largest source countries is not the chaotic, criminalized and overwhelming activity it is made out to be in the popular press and in much of the recent academic work on the topic in South Africa. South Africa can, and should, build on the highly regularized and legalized process of cross-border migration that is already taking place. South African immigration policymakers
need to capitalize on this opportunity to manage the cross-border migration process in a humane and rational way rather than forcing people underground.

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RSA (Republic of South Africa)


SADC (Southern African Development Community)

Sechaba Consultants
The Rural Exodus in the Context of Economic Crisis, Globalization and Reform in Brazil

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This article considers the rural exodus in Brazil between 1980 and 1991, a period of economic recession, globalization of agriculture, and neoliberal reforms. In this context, Brazil witnessed renewed capital penetration into agriculture, sustained employment growth in commerce and services, and rapid rural natural increase. As a result, rural populations in all regions of Brazil experienced losses due to net migration between 1980 and 1991 at a pace of over 1.4 million persons per year, a figure comparable to losses in previous decades. Further, rural-urban migration redistributed population to small urban areas as well as large metropolitan regions and included substantial interregional movement. These findings run counter to expectations, and the results suggest that rural-urban migration has proceeded in different historical and geographic contexts in Brazil.

Few topics in migration studies have been the subject of less research than the rural exodus in Latin America during the 1980s. Given the rapid urbanization of the region, many analysts have broadened their focus beyond rural-urban movements per se to discuss the problematic consequences for urban planning, environmental quality, economic growth, and citizenship (e.g., Gilbert, 1996; Roberts, 1995). While it is crucial to situate migration in broader contexts of change in Latin America, it is also important to maintain a focus on the rural exodus, for it is a key driver of urbanization. By most accounts, rural-urban migration declined in importance after the 1970s, but many appraisals tend to invoke monocausal explanations such as decelerating industrial growth or declining rural fertility. Moreover, existing work rarely presents reliable estimates of rural net migration that can be compared to previous periods. These are perilous oversights, given the departures of Latin American economies from import substitution and urban industrial policies of the 1970s to the debt crisis and neoliberal reforms of the 1980s. The com-

1I thank Charles Wood, André Caetano, Fabiano Toni, and three anonymous reviewers for valuable comments on earlier versions of this paper, and José Marcos Pinto da Cunha for providing key references.
plex interactions of short-term volatility with longer-term processes begs us to consider the significance of new configurations of factors surrounding rural-urban migration, for it is not altogether clear why the rural exodus should have declined during the 1980s. In particular, it is not obvious how globalization as it affected Latin America—especially through the insertion of agri-industrial products into global markets—would have arrested the rural exodus. The penetration of capital into previously marginal rural areas during the late 1980s is likely to have disrupted rural production relations and made urban destinations more attractive.

This article considers the rural exodus in Brazil during the 1980s and early 1990s. Brazil constitutes a useful case study of recent rural-urban migration because it possesses the largest rural population among Latin American countries, it exhibited a substantial rural exodus during the 1960s and 1970s, and it experienced an industrial slump during the early 1980s, followed by increased globalization and the adoption of reforms that reinvigorated agricultural growth in the late 1980s and early 1990s. I address three questions about Brazil’s rural exodus in the context of crisis, globalization and reforms. First, what was the size and geographic distribution of rural net losses during the 1980s? Second, did the rural exodus during the 1980s proceed on a scale comparable to those of previous decades? And third, what were the primary patterns of rural-urban migration in terms of the sizes of urban receiving areas and the distance of moves?

I begin by presenting a theoretical framework that highlights the importance of configurations of circumstances involving capital penetration into agriculture, non-agricultural economic growth, and rural demographic change due to natural increase, in order to account for rural-urban migration under diverse conditions. This framework serves as the basis for a periodization, which calls attention to reconfigurations in historical contexts surrounding Brazil’s rural exodus. In addition, a regionalization of Brazil shows relevant geographic distinctions in agricultural capitalization, non-agricultural economic expansion, and rural natural increase. This regionalization provides a set of more or less distinct contexts in which we can compare the rural exodus across Brazil during the 1980s. The first part of the analysis, in response to the first question posed above, presents indirect estimates of rural net migration between 1980 and 1991, the dates of the last two Brazilian demographic censuses, and shows rural losses in all regions of the country. The second part of the analysis compares 1980–1991 rural net migration estimates to those obtained previously for the 1960s and 1970s and indicates
comparable absolute and relative losses in all three intercensal intervals, though losses in specific regions varied substantially over time. The third component of the analysis uses direct estimates of rural-urban migration during 1986–1991 to see whether such movement was largely within states, between states, or between regions, and whether the rural exodus redistributed populations to smaller or larger urban centers. The findings indicate that most rural out-migration to small urban areas was localized, while redistribution to large cities and metropolitan regions was more interregional. The article closes with a discussion of the results in light of explanations and expectations about the rural exodus in Brazil and other developing countries.

CONFIGURATIONS OF CIRCUMSTANCES AS CONTEXTS OF THE RURAL EXODUS IN BRAZIL

The theoretical framework of this study focuses on three broad factors that interact to produce distinct historical circumstances under which rural-urban migration may take place. These factors include the penetration of capital into agriculture (see Roberts, 1995:Ch. 4; Taylor, 1980), employment growth in urban industries, commerce and services (see Brown, 1990), and natural increase in rural populations. Capital penetration, via agricultural commercialization and mechanization, may reflect state development policies and domestic economic development, as well as global forces (e.g., international commodity prices and investments by multinational corporations). Agricultural capitalization changes the rural sector by reducing land availability and labor demand, which generate rural-urban migration. But capital penetration into agriculture does not stimulate rural-urban migration in a vacuum; instead, it interacts with a larger context of industrial growth and urban employment opportunities and a rural demographic regime defined by rapid population growth due to natural increase (i.e., the excess of births over deaths). Historically, in configurations of urban industrial expansion and rapid rural natural increase, capital penetration in agriculture provoked or accelerated rural-urban migration in Brazil (Martine, 1987, 1993a; Wood and Carvalho, 1988:Ch. 9).

Because economic growth has proceeded unevenly in Brazilian history, and because population growth has declined over time, it is useful to periodize economic alterations (in agriculture as well as industry, commerce and services) and demographic changes in Brazil since 1970. The periodization is based on Martine (1993a), and I employ it to distinguish between the state-led economic expansion between 1970 and 1980, the onset of the debt crisis
between 1980 and 1985, and globalization and reforms in Brazilian agriculture between 1985 and 1996. Such a periodization is employed for two purposes. First, it reveals reconfigurations of circumstances due to short-, medium- and long-term changes in the context of Brazil’s rural exodus. Specifically, the periodization will show short-term reversals in the penetration of capital into agriculture, a medium-term decline in industrial growth, and long-term rural natural increase sustained at a high level. These short- and medium-term alterations and long-term continuities together suggest that the context of Brazil’s rural exodus in the 1980s differed substantially from those of previous decades. Second, the periodization shows how Brazil has become increasingly subject to global markets, finance, and capital. Globalization shaped Brazilian agriculture by inducing capital penetration through the expansion of agro-industrial complexes, which integrated soybean and cattle operations with the industrial sector and export markets. Globalization, as it has occurred in Brazilian agriculture, exerted ever stronger influences on national and regional conditions surrounding the rural exodus.

“CONSERVATIVE MODERNIZATION” IN BRAZIL, 1970–1980

Following the military takeover of the Brazilian government in 1964, the state pursued import-substitution industrialization by blocking imports of consumer goods and encouraging investments of industrial technology by multinational corporations (MNCs). To foster this industrial drive, the government biased spending toward the country’s largest urban centers, which received massive investments in infrastructure (see Howe and Goodman, 1992:14–17). Through policies of import substitution and urban bias, the state contributed to the emergence of heavy industries, particularly in auto and chemical manufacturing.

In 1970, the Brazilian economy was only beginning to feel the effects of the new development policies. Table 1 outlines the structure of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors from 1970 to 1996. First, it presents four groups of agricultural indicators: land concentration, mechanization, crop selection, and livestock. Figures for 1970 appear in column 1. The structure of landholdings in 1970 was highly polarized, such that smallholdings (rural properties of less than 50 hectares (ha)) accounted for 84 percent of agricultural establishments but occupied only 15 percent of the land, while largeholdings (properties of 1000 ha or more) comprised less than 1 percent of agricultural establishments, but occupied nearly 40 percent of the land. These figures, and a high Gini index of inequality (0.838), indicate an exceedingly
concentrated agrarian structure such that most of the rural population lived on small properties. Brazilian agriculture in 1970 exhibited little mechanization, indicated by the low prevalence of tractors, at only one per 30 establishments. The low level of technology in agriculture is reflected in the importance of three key crops: beans, a basic subsistence crop; coffee, a traditional export crop; and soybeans, a nontraditional export. In 1970, the area planted under beans was more than that under coffee and soybeans combined.

Below the agricultural indicators in column 1, Table 1 presents indicators of industrial, commercial and service activities. In terms of the number of

| TABLE 1 | AGRICULTURAL AND NON-AGRICULTURAL ECONOMIC INDICATORS, BRAZIL 1970–1996 |
|---------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| Economic Sector/ |       |       |       |       |
| Agricultural Sector: |       |       |       |       |
| Land Concentration |       |       |       |       |
| Agricultural Establishments (000s) | 4,924 | 5,203 | 5,802 | 4,850 |
| Agricultural EAP (000s) | 17,582 | 21,164 | 23,394 | 17,931 |
| Land Area in Hectares (000s ha) | 294,144 | 383,520 | 374,916 | 354,159 |
| Percent Establishments of <50 ha | 83.51 | 81.38 | 79.24 | 81.13 |
| Percent Area in Establishments of <50 ha | 15.38 | 12.10 | 13.16 | 12.75 |
| Percent Establishments of 1000+ ha | 0.75 | 0.98 | 0.87 | 1.01 |
| Percent Area in Establishments of 1000+ ha | 39.52 | 45.76 | 43.73 | 44.80 |
| Gini Index | 0.838 | 0.852 | 0.823 | 0.851 |
| Mechanization |       |       |       |       |
| Tractors (000s) | 166 | 548 | 665 | 822 |
| Tractors per Establishment | 0.034 | 0.105 | 0.115 | 0.186 |
| Crop Selection |       |       |       |       |
| Area under Beans (000s ha) | 4,082 | 4,660 | 5,480 | 3,208 |
| Bean Area per 1000 ha | 13.88 | 12.15 | 14.62 | 9.06 |
| Area under Coffee (000s ha) | 1,636 | 2,434 | 2,637 | 1,805 |
| Coffee Area per 1000 ha | 5.56 | 6.35 | 7.03 | 5.10 |
| Area under Soybeans (000s ha) | 2,186 | 8,684 | 9,435 | 9,180 |
| Soybeans per 1000 ha | 7.43 | 22.64 | 25.16 | 25.92 |
| Livestock |       |       |       |       |
| Cattle (000s) | 78,562 | 121,945 | 128,041 | 152,564 |
| Cattle per Establishment | 16.0 | 23.4 | 22.1 | 31.5 |
| Non-agricultural Sectors: |       |       |       |       |
| Industry |       |       |       |       |
| Industrial Establishments (000s) | 161 | 226 | 207 | N/Ab |
| Industrial EAP (000s) | 2,635 | 5,717 | 5,597 | N/Ab |
| Commerce |       |       |       |       |
| Commercial Establishments (000s) | 629 | 616 | 723 | N/Ab |
| Commercial EAP (000s) | 1,750 | 2,900 | 3,704 | N/Aa |
| Services |       |       |       |       |
| Service Establishments (000s) | 352 | 396 | 449 | N/Aa |
| Service EAP (000s) | 898 | 2,212 | 2,583 | N/Aa |

Note: * EAP refers to the economically active population.

**b** Brazil did not conduct non-agricultural economic censuses in 1995/96.

establishments and economically active population (EAP), in 1970 the agricultural sector was much larger than the non-agricultural sectors. The ratio of agricultural to all non-agricultural establishments was 4.5, and the ratio of the agricultural to the non-agricultural EAP was 3.3.

Table 2 complements the economic indicators of Table 1 by presenting demographic indicators for rural Brazil, including population size, fertility and mortality, and rates of natural increase. Column 1 presents indicators for 1970. Rural population in Brazil reached its historical peak at 41 million in 1970 (IBGE, 1992:207). Rural life expectancy at birth was only 53 years in 1970, but because the total fertility rate (TFR) was nearly eight (children born on average to each woman by the end of her childbearing years), Brazil’s rate of natural increase in the 1960–1970 period was approximately 3.3 percent per year. Tables 1 and 2 together depict a large but traditional agricultural sector, a relatively small non-agricultural sector, and a large, rapidly growing rural population in Brazil in 1970, a situation the military government sought to change.

### Table 2

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<tr>
<td>Demographic Indicators</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Population (000s)</td>
<td>41,504</td>
<td>38,616</td>
<td>35,843</td>
<td>33,997</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rural Population as Percent of Total</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>21.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rural Life Expectancy at Birth</td>
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<td>61.7</td>
<td>68.1</td>
<td>N/A*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Total Fertility Rate</td>
<td>7.74</td>
<td>6.50</td>
<td>4.10</td>
<td>N/A*</td>
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<td>Intercensal Interval</td>
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<td>1960–1970</td>
<td>3.29</td>
<td>2.78</td>
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<td>1970–1980</td>
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**Notes:**
- Rural population refers to the population outside municipal and district administrative seats, which may be of any size.
- Estimates of rural life expectancy are stated in years. Because they are based on retrospective measures of child survival, these estimates refer to a point in time approximately five years prior to the census date in question (in this table, 1965, 1975, and 1980).
- Estimates of fertility and mortality are not available from IBGE (1998b).
- Rural natural increase is stated in terms of annual percentage growth, and reflects rural population growth due to fertility and mortality.

Having focused its resources on urban-industrial expansion, the state embarked on policies of “conservative modernization” for agricultural development (see Martine, 1993a). The military government’s agenda eschewed land reform and instead created incentive programs for rural producers to adopt modern agricultural inputs. The agricultural sector would provide an internal market for Brazilian industries in which auto makers built tractors
while chemical factories produced fertilizers. Toward this goal, the state offered low-interest credit for purchasing land and modern inputs. MNCs (multinational corporations) also pressured the state to subsidize sales of tractors. This benefited both parties, for it ensured the companies their profits and, for the state, subsidies fostered the internal market for domestic industries through adoption of modern agricultural technology (Graziano da Silva, 1981; Howe and Goodman, 1992:Ch. 2; Kageyama et al., 1990:113–127; Martine, 1993a; Martine and Beskow, 1987; Sorj, 1980). The government thus subordinated agriculture to industrial expansion in order to displace rural labor with industrial outputs and redistribute population to more productive urban sectors of the Brazilian economy (Yap, 1976).

Conservative modernization policies led to major changes in Brazil during the 1970s. As many analysts have noted, credit and subsidies worsened the already highly unequal agrarian structure (see Graziano da Silva, 1981; Martine, 1987, 1993a; Martine and Beskow, 1987; Sorj, 1980; Wood and Carvalho, 1988:Ch. 9). The large majority of smallholders in Brazilian agriculture had no capital for investments and insufficient collateral with which to obtain credit. As available credit rose fourfold in real terms between 1970 and 1980, medium and large producers, who accounted for 10 percent of rural properties, received 66 percent of state credit (Howe and Goodman, 1992:49–50; Martine and Beskow, 1987:22–27). Low (or negative) interest credit thus favored larger, more capitalized producers over small family farms by allowing only the former to expand their landholdings. State credit and subsidies made agriculture profitable in more places than before, prompting the penetration of capital into heretofore unincorporated areas. This encouraged conversion of traditional estates into capitalist enterprises, which disrupted traditional production relations and resulted in the expulsion of tenant farm families. Capitalization also led to rising unemployment and underemployment as former tenants found only temporary wage work in rural areas with modern agriculture (Long and Roberts, 1994:374–375; Lopes, 1978; Martine, 1993a).

As these economic policies were implemented, the influence of global forces grew in importance in Brazilian agriculture. In addition to globalization via MNC investments to produce modern agricultural inputs, international commodity prices during the 1970s encouraged production of nontraditional export crops. While traditional exports such as coffee garnered low returns on global markets, nontraditional crops such as soybeans commanded much higher prices (Howe and Goodman, 1992:45–47). Because climat-
ic and soil conditions for soybean production were ideal in southern Brazil, and because soybean production requires machine and chemical inputs, producers able to take advantage of state incentives were poised to produce and export soybeans for substantial earnings. As a result of this interaction between national agricultural policies and global commodity prices, Brazilian soybean production expanded rapidly during the 1970s (Banck and den Boer, 1991; Howe and Goodman, 1992:41–45).

Comparison of columns 1 and 2 in Table 1 affords an assessment of changes in the configuration of economic circumstances associated with conservative modernization and emerging global forces during the 1970s. Between 1970 and 1980, land concentration intensified as the share of land area in small establishments decreased, while that in large establishments increased, reflected in a rise in the Gini index (to 0.852). The number of tractors tripled in ten years, and by 1980 there was one tractor for every ten establishments. Among key Brazilian crops, beans and coffee stagnated in terms of area planted, while soybeans expanded fourfold, such that by 1980, the land area under soybeans was greater than that under the two traditional crops. Credit policies also fostered the expansion of cattle ranching, evident by a 55 percent increase in cattle herds and a 46 percent rise in cattle per establishment. Alongside these agricultural changes, the industrial sector expanded rapidly, with the EAP (economically active population) more than doubling in size between 1970 and 1980. The non-agricultural EAP grew to 10.8 million by 1980, reducing the ratio of agricultural to non-agricultural EAP to 1.95.

Table 2 also reveals important demographic changes in Brazil’s rural population. The size of the rural population grew at a negative rate (-0.7% per year) and the percentage of Brazil’s population in rural areas declined from 45 percent to 32 percent. However, rural fertility remained high, while rural mortality declined during the 1970s as rural life expectancy rose to 62 years, maintaining a rate of natural increase near 3 percent per year.2

With this reconfiguration of circumstances – the conservative modernization and emergent globalization of agriculture during a time of rapid non-

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2Estimates for 1960–1970 and 1970–1980 are exponential growth rates calculated using official census populations (at t1) and Martine’s (1987, 1993a) projected rural populations (at t2). The projected populations were calculated by subtracting Martine’s (1987:64) rural net migration estimates (from t1 to t2) from official population estimates (at t2). Because most net migration estimates were negative, this amounted to adding the two numbers. I employed Martine’s figures instead of alternatives from Wood and Carvalho (1988:Ch. 9), because only the former provides rural net migration estimates for Brazilian regions. Natural increase for 1980–1991 comes from the population projections described later in this article.
agricultural economic expansion in a context of swift rural natural increase – Brazil's rural exodus accelerated in both absolute and relative terms. While rural-urban migration had already proceeded on a massive scale during the 1960s, rural losses due to migration were even greater during the 1970s. Existing estimates suggest that rural areas lost populations of 12.8 to 13.8 million in the 1960s and 15.6 to 17.4 million during the 1970s. The rise in absolute population losses was paralleled by rising rates of losses relative to overall rural populations (Martine, 1987, 1993a; Wood and Carvalho, 1988:Ch. 9).


By the late 1970s, changes in global energy markets altered Brazilian economic development as oil shocks in 1973 and 1979 caused substantial increases in oil prices (Clark, 1990:Ch. 8). The military government refused to slow down spending, but after the second oil shock, the state was forced to borrow heavily. At the time, “petrodollars” were in plentiful supply from international banks with oil money. By 1980, Brazil was engaged in debt-led development, using petrodollars to finance not only oil imports but also the credit and subsidies for agricultural modernization. By 1982, international interest rates had risen, increasing the burden of financing the national debt. Brazil increasingly felt the impact of tightening global financial markets, and because it was denied credit for further loans, the state reduced spending by 60 percent between 1980 and 1987 (Hakkert and Goza, 1989:69). Cuts in state spending derailed not only the import-substitution and urban industrial agendas (Howe and Goodman, 1992:17–23; Melo, 1995), but also caused a 50 percent reduction in the agricultural credit and subsidies once part of the conservative modernization project (Howe and Goodman, 1992:50–51; Kageyama et al., 1990:166; Martine, 1993a:176). These reductions mark the onset of Brazil's economic crisis. As a result, Brazilian GDP growth dropped from 8.8 percent per year during the 1970s (Baer and Paiva, 1997:72) to -0.5 percent during 1980–1985, and recovered to only 2.5 percent during 1985–1989 (Gilbert, 1996:17).

In the context of the debt crisis, Brazilian agriculture exhibited changes that in many instances reversed trends evident during the 1970s. A comparison of columns 2 and 3 in Table 1 allows an assessment of changes in Brazil's economy between 1980 and 1985, the worst years of the recession. Land concentration dropped, as reflected in a decrease in the Gini coefficient (to 0.823). The reduction in land concentration corresponds to a decrease in the
number of largeholdings alongside an increase in the number of smallholdings, prompting some analysts to hypothesize a resurgence of family farms in spaces abandoned by failed estates (Martine, 1993a:176–178, 1994:39; Martine et al., 1988:50–51). Mechanization continued to spread as the number of tractors grew by 4 percent per year, though this rate was far below the 12 percent annual increment of the 1970s. The effects of the economic slowdown are abundantly evident for crop selection. Beans, which had been in decline, now rose in importance in terms of land area under cultivation. This indicates that traditional food crop production, neglected under the hegemony of conservative modernization, was renewed during the crisis years, perhaps in reflection of the resurgence of smallholdings (Howe and Goodman, 1992:52–53). The early 1980s also witnessed a slowdown in the expansion of land area under soybeans, from an annual rate of nearly 14 percent during the 1970s to less than 1 percent between 1980 and 1985. Similarly, the growth of cattle herds, which proceeded at 4.4 percent annually during the 1970s, declined during the recession to 0.5 percent. Overall, agricultural GDP growth proceeded at 4 percent per year between 1980 and 1989 (Baer and Paiva, 1997:72), and was negative in four years between 1980 and 1991 (Souto de Oliveira, 1993:12).

The debt crisis hit the industrial sector hardest, but other non-agricultural sectors continued to grow during the early 1980s. Between 1980 and 1989, industrial GDP growth was only 2 percent per year (Baer and Paiva, 1997:72), and in six years between 1980 and 1991, industrial growth was zero or negative (Souto de Oliveira, 1993:12). Comparison of columns 2 and 3 in Table 1 show declines in both industrial establishments and EAP (economically active population). While the downturn increased unemployment somewhat, its major effect on the economically active population was to decrease real wages. Between 1980 and 1985, per capita incomes declined by 12 percent (Souto de Oliveira, 1993:13). However, the urban non-agricultural sector as a whole did not shrink during the early 1980s. The commercial and service EAP grew by 1.18 million, more than offsetting the 0.12 million decline in the industrial EAP.

incentives and concomitant resurgence of smallholdings, the industrial downturn and urban wage declines, and a decline in the estimated rural TFR (total fertility rate) to 5.4 during 1980–1985 (Carvalho and Wong, 1996:387) contributed to expectations of a reduction in Brazil’s rural exodus. However, the lack of data for this period makes such expectations difficult to confirm. Data from the Internal Migration Information System (SIMI) in Brazil indicate overall declines in migration to large cities between 1979 and 1984 (Martine et al., 1984:1451–1458). On the other hand, SIMI data on rural-origin migrants entering Rondônia, an Amazon frontier state, show a rapid rise in volume between 1982 and 1986 (Goza, 1994:43). The limited and contradictory data available for the early 1980s preclude strong conclusions about the short-term effects of Brazil’s debt crisis on the rural exodus.

AGRICULTURAL GLOBALIZATION AND ECONOMIC REFORMS, 1985–1996

The recession of the early 1980s was followed in the late 1980s by the institution of policy reforms and the resurgence of capital penetration into agriculture (Homem de Mello, 1990). Despite the withdrawal of credit and subsidies and the industrial slump, agriculture experienced renewed growth for three reasons. First, the acceleration of inflation during the late 1980s nourished a financial service sector that administered speculative land purchases as a hedge against losses of financial capital. Second, the agricultural-industrial linkages forged during the 1970s created agro-industrial complexes capable of substantial exports of processed goods. And third, the state implemented new macroeconomic policies that ensured agro-industries based in Brazil a preeminent position in global commodities markets.

After Mexico defaulted on its debt in 1982, international lenders refused to make further loans to debtor countries such as Brazil. Despite the spending cuts, the state was forced to print money to maintain its payrolls and public services, which served to accelerate inflation from an annual average of 162.5 percent during 1980–1985 to 1,148.8 percent during 1986–1993 (Baer and Paiva, 1997:83). Faced with rising inflation, banks and investors sought to protect their interests by investing in land, a real asset that retains its value. The intensifying demand for real assets spurred growth of a financial service sector in Brazil (Melo, 1995:256) which facilitated speculative rural land purchases. The ensuing land rush had the effect of raising land values and encouraging further investments in the rural sector.

Much of the capital flowing into agriculture established or enlarged agro-
industrial operations (Long and Roberts, 1994:380–381). In previous decades, agriculture had served as a market for industrial goods, particularly fertilizers, pesticides, and tractors (Kageyama et al., 1990:128–154). During the 1980s, a new linkage further integrated agriculture and industry, as capitalized agricultural operations began to produce crops and livestock to be processed by industry into value-added goods, largely destined for export. In 1985, agricultural products comprised four of the ten most important inputs by value for industrial processing. This included two of the top three inputs, sugar and soybeans, both of which are key Brazilian exports (IBGE, 1992:616). Corporate firms invested in processing facilities for soybean products, fruit juices, packed beef, and poultry, which required integrated agro-industrial complexes that encompassed sequences of capital-intensive production processes (Kageyama et al., 1990:185–203). The resulting expansion of agro-industrial complexes in Brazil intensified capital penetration into agriculture, which reduced rural labor demand. This expansion proceeded because agro-industrial firms in Brazil found large markets for processed agricultural goods in OECD countries (Kageyama et al., 1990:204–211). As a result, between 1980 and 1989, while production of crops for domestic consumption grew at 2.1 percent per year, export crop production grew at 4.5 percent per year (Homem de Mello, 1990:23). Moreover, the real value of Brazilian crop and juice exports rose by 3.3 times from the 1970s to the 1980s (Brandão and Lopes, 1997:47), while the value of processed beef exports rose by 3.5 times (Brandão and Lopes, 1997:54).

In the political arena, the military handed the federal government back to civilian politicians in the 1985 elections, and the new regime instituted neoliberal reform measures as part of debt renegotiation. While the macroeconomic reforms amounted to austerity measures to stabilize the economy (Baer and Paiva, 1997:81–87), they had a positive influence on agro-industrial expansion. First, exchange devaluation raised the prices on exports from Brazil, making agro-industrial operations more profitable (Weeks, 1995). Second, trade policies changed to include an exemption for processed agricultural goods from tariffs on industrial exports, a move that specifically benefited agro-industrial firms. Finally, the government replaced credit incentives with minimum price guarantees, which reduced the uncertainty of returns to agriculture (Goldin and Castro de Rezende, 1990:10–13, 61).

While this reinvigoration of the late 1980s and early 1990s differed from the earlier period of growth due to new state policies and greater participation in global markets, the new growth renewed the disruption of traditional
rural production relations. Agro-industrial complexes integrated auto and chemical factories with large ranches, soybean operations and food processing firms, but excluded the vast majority of rural smallholders. Similarly, exchange devaluations and minimum price policies afforded the greatest benefits to capitalized operations that produced export crops. Finally, proposals for land reform after democratization were blocked by organizations representing largeholders (Tavares, 1989).

Columns 3 and 4 in Table 1 compare Brazilian economic indicators for 1985 and 1996 and reveal the changes set in motion during the late 1980s. While the number of rural establishments and land area claimed declined, land concentration rose such that the Gini index (0.851) was comparable to the previous high mark set in 1980 (0.852). The number of tractors rose by 24 percent, and in 1996 there was nearly one tractor per five establishments, nearly twice as many as in 1980 or 1985. Beans and coffee declined in importance, while soybeans remained a key crop. Similarly, the number of cattle grew by 19 percent between 1985 and 1996, and cattle per establishment rose to an all-time high. During the 1990–1995 period, agricultural GDP grew at 2.9 percent per year, compared to only 0.5 percent for the industrial sector and 2.3 percent for commerce and services (Baer and Paiva 1997:72). By maintaining positive growth, agriculture served to stabilize the Brazilian economy during the 1980s and early 1990s (Goldin and Castro de Rezende, 1990; Homem de Mello, 1990).

Table 2 presents demographic indicators for 1980, 1991 and 1996 in columns 2, 3, and 4, respectively. Brazil’s rural population continued to decline during the 1980s and early 1990s, shrinking to 34 million by 1996, or 22 percent of the national population. Estimates of vital rates from the 1980 and 1991 Brazilian demographic censuses show rapid declines in both rural mortality and fertility. Due to the mortality decline, Brazil’s rural population maintained a rate of natural increase of 3 percent during the 1980s.

This reconfiguration of circumstances during the late 1980s and early 1990s renewed capital penetration in agriculture, continued growth in commerce and services in place of industrial expansion, and sustained high rates of rural natural increase – changed the context of Brazil’s rural exodus from that of the early 1980s. While the debt crisis might have temporarily slowed rural-urban migration, the available evidence suggests that the insertion of Brazilian agriculture into global markets via exports of agro-industrial goods, the continued growth of some sectors of the urban economy, and rapid rural natural increase together would have sustained the rural exodus.
through the 1980s and early 1990s. Indeed, reductions in the rural population since 1980, despite high rates of natural increase, imply a continuing evacuation of the Brazilian countryside.

REGIONAL DIFFERENCES IN CONTEXTS OF THE RURAL EXODUS IN BRAZIL

At this point it is critical to recognize Brazil’s substantial geographic variation in capital penetration into agriculture, non-agricultural economic development, and rural natural increase (Haller, 1982; Lopes, 1981; Merrick and Graham, 1979). In past decades, regional imbalances in Brazilian development helped account for the redistribution of population from agricultural regions to industrial areas (Merrick and Graham, 1979; Yap, 1976). For purposes here, recognition of regional differences provides a basis for comparisons of the rural exodus under distinct configurations of circumstances. On the one hand, it is important to know if different economic and demographic configurations correspond to distinct rates of rural population losses due to migration. Conversely, it is important to see whether the rural exodus proceeded in a similar fashion under very different configurations of circumstances. In the case of Brazil in the 1980s, a key question is whether the rural exodus declined overall because rural-urban migration continued only in regions where capital penetration proceeded (Mueller and Martine, 1997). A regionalization thus complements the foregoing periodization by providing cases for comparative analysis of Brazil’s rural exodus under more or less distinct economic and demographic circumstances during the 1980s. I adopt the regionalization scheme used by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), which divides Brazil into five regions: the North (Amazon), Northeast, Southeast, South, and Center-west. Figure 1 shows these regions and their states. Table 3 presents selected economic indicators by Brazilian region from 1970 to 1996, and Table 4 does the same for demographic indicators.

The North (column 1 of Table 3) is a frontier region, affected by economic reversals through its growing articulation to other regions of Brazil.

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3The North region includes the states of Rondônia, Acre, Amazonas, Roraima, Pará, and Amapá; the Northeast consists of Maranhão, Piauí, Ceará, Rio Grande do Norte, Paraiba, Pernambuco, Alagoas, Sergipe, and Bahia; the Southeast includes Minas Gerais, Espirito Santo, Rio de Janeiro, and São Paulo; the South comprises Paraná, Santa Catarina, Rio Grande do Sul, and the Center-west includes Mato Grosso do Sul, Mato Grosso, Goiás, and the Distrito Federal of Brasília. The state of Tocantins, created from Goiás in 1988 and officially considered part of the North, is kept as part of the Center-west in order to maintain the comparability of regions in 1980 and 1991.
This region exhibits high land concentration and limited mechanization, soybean cultivation, cattle ranching, and non-agricultural development. During the 1970s, rural populations in the North grew rapidly due to migration from the other four regions, which expanded smallholder agriculture (see Schmink and Wood, 1984). However, during the 1980s and early 1990s, the rural frontier began to close due to the expansion of cattle ranching (Schmink and Wood, 1992), which contributed to a slowdown in migration from other regions, and gold strikes (Godfrey, 1992), which contributed to a rural-urban shift of population (Browder and Godfrey, 1997; Moura and Moreira, 1998). The rising importance of cattle and gold booms suggest that the rural gains in the North during the 1970s may have become losses during the late 1980s (see Martine, 1994:15), in part to urban areas of the frontier. Column 1 of Table 4 shows that while the North had a high rural population percentage, this declined dur-
TABLE 3
SELECTED AGRICULTURAL AND NON-AGRICULTURAL ECONOMIC INDICATORS BY REGION, BRAZIL
1970–1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator, Census Year(s)</th>
<th>North (1)</th>
<th>Northeast (2)</th>
<th>Southeast (3)</th>
<th>South (4)</th>
<th>Center-west (5)</th>
<th>Total (6)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gini Index of Land Concentration</td>
<td>0.834</td>
<td>0.851</td>
<td>0.752</td>
<td>0.716</td>
<td>0.851</td>
<td>0.838</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>0.830</td>
<td>0.857</td>
<td>0.749</td>
<td>0.735</td>
<td>0.840</td>
<td>0.852</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>0.798</td>
<td>0.805</td>
<td>0.765</td>
<td>0.740</td>
<td>0.835</td>
<td>0.823</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>0.807</td>
<td>0.860</td>
<td>0.761</td>
<td>0.702</td>
<td>0.820</td>
<td>0.851</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractors per Rural Establishment</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.089</td>
<td>0.051</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>0.034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>0.227</td>
<td>0.205</td>
<td>0.237</td>
<td>0.105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.240</td>
<td>0.239</td>
<td>0.290</td>
<td>0.115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>0.334</td>
<td>0.551</td>
<td>0.430</td>
<td>0.186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area under Beans per 1000 ha</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>22.13</td>
<td>11.27</td>
<td>28.32</td>
<td>4.07</td>
<td>13.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1.52</td>
<td>20.25</td>
<td>16.61</td>
<td>26.28</td>
<td>2.72</td>
<td>12.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>3.49</td>
<td>24.95</td>
<td>5.25</td>
<td>16.21</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>9.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area under Soybeans per 1000 ha</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>45.89</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>7.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>9.84</td>
<td>142.55</td>
<td>9.96</td>
<td>22.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>11.37</td>
<td>127.15</td>
<td>20.99</td>
<td>25.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>5.46</td>
<td>13.11</td>
<td>97.00</td>
<td>27.04</td>
<td>25.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cattle per Rural Establishment</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>68.2</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>125.8</td>
<td>23.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>126.2</td>
<td>22.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>196.3</td>
<td>31.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial EAP (000s)$^a$</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>263.0</td>
<td>1,853.8</td>
<td>442.8</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>2,634.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>145.6</td>
<td>597.1</td>
<td>3,801.0</td>
<td>1,058.5</td>
<td>115.1</td>
<td>5,717.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>149.8</td>
<td>694.3</td>
<td>3,598.4</td>
<td>1,121.7</td>
<td>122.3</td>
<td>5,506.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce and Service EAP (000s)$^a$</td>
<td>72.1</td>
<td>531.5</td>
<td>1,445.7</td>
<td>478.8</td>
<td>119.2</td>
<td>2,647.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>171.2</td>
<td>731.5</td>
<td>2,933.5</td>
<td>966.1</td>
<td>309.3</td>
<td>5,111.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>251.7</td>
<td>1,017.4</td>
<td>3,506.3</td>
<td>1,142.1</td>
<td>370.1</td>
<td>6,287.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Notes: $^a$ EAP refers to the economically active population.

ing the 1980s, despite a very rapid rate of rural natural increase. Because it is unlikely that urban rates of natural increase would be even higher, these figures imply rural net losses of population due to migration.

The Northeast (column 2 of Tables 3 and 4) is a region of older settlement and exhibits high land concentration, low mechanization, and a predominance of subsistence over export agriculture. This region’s limited industrial development and high rate of rural natural increase, combined with frontier expansion in the neighboring North and industrialization in the neighboring Southeast, generated a massive interregional rural exodus from the Northeast from the
1940s to the 1970s (Sampaio and Rocha, 1989:55–58). Much of this rural-urban movement came from areas near coastal cities experiencing agricultural modernization (Pinheiro, 1988:166–170; SUDENE, 1980:7–16). During the early 1980s, the Northeast shows some response to the recession – land deconcentration and a rise in the importance of beans – but between 1985 and 1996, land concentration rose, the importance of beans eroded, and soybeans and cattle expanded. Given frontier closure in the North and the industrial slump in the Southeast, it is possible that the rural exodus in the Northeast slowed during the 1980s. Some analysts have noted the persistence of family farms in the Northeast (Long and Roberts, 1994:379), while others have hypothesized a rise in urban-rural return migration from the Southeast (Hakkerl and Goza, 1989:92; Moreira, 1995:140–141). However, capital penetration into Northeastern agriculture may have led to rural out-migration to cities within the region, which grew by 3.5 percent per year between 1980 and 1991, above the national average of 3.0 percent (Martine, 1994:12). As Table 4 shows, the Northeast has a large but declining rural population percentage despite sustained high rates of rural natural increase, implying a sustained rural exodus during the 1980s.

The Southeast (column 3 of Table 3) is Brazil’s urban-industrial core, as is evident by the very large non-agricultural EAP. The debt crisis hit the Southeast hardest, for it is the only region to experience a decline in industrial EAP between 1980 and 1985. However, the number of tractors per establishment rose in the Southeast throughout the 1980s, while soybeans and cattle emerged, and the commercial/service EAP grew faster than the industrial EAP declined during the crisis. Table 4 shows that the Southeast had a small rural population percentage, which declined during the 1980s, despite a rate of rural natural increase of 2.9 percent per year. Under these conditions, the rural exodus in the Southeast may have continued after the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4</th>
<th>Rural Population Percentage and Natural Increase by Region, Brazil, 1960–1996</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>North</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Population Percentage</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>54.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>48.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>42.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>38.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual Rate of Rural Natural Increase</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-1970</td>
<td>4.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-1980</td>
<td>3.64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: population estimates: IBGE (1973b, 1983e, 1991b, 1998b); rural natural increase.
1970s, especially after 1985. In that scenario, it is unclear where rural-urban migrants went. The São Paulo metropolitan region, Brazil’s largest industrial city, experienced a net migration rate of -19.78 per 1000 population between 1980 and 1991 (SEADE, 1993:249). It is thus likely that the rural exodus in the Southeast either diminished or reoriented to other destinations.

The South (column 4 of Tables 3 and 4) is Brazil’s agro-industrial core, with the highest prevalence of tractors and soybeans and, after 1985, a substantial cattle herd. During the 1970s, agro-industrial soybean producers replaced many family farms (Banck and den Boer, 1991), causing a rise in the region’s rural exodus (Martine, 1987, 1993a; Wood and Carvalho, 1988:Ch. 9). The continued importance of soybeans, complemented by cattle in the late 1980s, suggests a continuation rather than a deceleration in rural out-migration from the South after 1980, much of which proceeded from the state of Paraná to Rondônia (Goza, 1994). Table 4 adds to this suspicion by showing that the South’s rural population percentage declined despite a fairly high rate of rural natural increase.

The Center-west became an agro-industrial frontier during the 1970s (Lopes, 1986). As indicated by column 5 in Table 3, the Center-west has a concentrated agrarian structure, a high prevalence of tractors, very little bean cultivation, and considerable soybean and especially cattle-related activities. While the recession slowed capital penetration during the early 1980s, economic expansion was reinvigorated after 1985, due almost entirely to agro-industrial expansion (Castro and Fonseca, 1994). Column 5 of Table 4 shows that the small rural percentage of the Center-west population declined rapidly during the 1980s despite a high rate of rural natural increase, which implies rapid rural out-migration.

THE RURAL EXODUS IN THE CONTEXT OF CRISIS, GLOBALIZATION, AND REFORM

The foregoing periodization reveals repeated historical reconfigurations in the circumstances surrounding Brazil’s longstanding rural exodus, while the regionalization adds variation in the contexts of rural out-migration by noting geographic differences in economic and demographic conditions before and during the 1980s. The rural exodus in Brazil since 1980 reflects a combination of a short-term slowdown in capital penetration in agriculture, a medium-term industrial crisis with sustained commercial and service sector growth, and long-term rural natural increase sustained at a high level, with distinct trajectories among regions of the country. The complex reconfigura-
tions of economic and demographic circumstances in Brazil during the 1980s has fostered many expectations about the rural exodus, particularly with regard to its geographic extent, its scale relative to earlier periods, and patterns of rural-urban moves in terms of distance and the size of urban receiving areas. The following three sections address these expectations with empirical analysis of rural-urban migration in Brazil between 1980 and 1991 to assess the rural exodus in the context of crisis, globalization and reform.

**RURAL NET MIGRATION IN BRAZILIAN STATES AND REGIONS, 1980–1991**

With respect to the geographic distribution of rural sending regions, many analysts suggest that Brazil’s rural exodus may have accelerated in some areas and slowed in others. Hakkert and Goza (1989:88–92) and Martine et al. (1984:1472–1476) suggest that the industrial slump would only reduce rural out-migration from remote regions with high transportation costs or where alternatives to local livelihoods disappeared. Mueller and Martine (1997) argue that the 1980s rural exodus was regionally selective, largely coming from parts of the Center-west where agricultural capital penetration proceeded fastest. However, the foregoing discussion of Brazilian regions leaves considerable ambiguity as to whether other parts of the country no longer experienced rural population losses, because other economic and demographic changes were also underway. Agricultural capitalization proceeded to some extent in all regions, and all exhibit sustained growth in the commercial/service EAP and declines in rural population percentages alongside rapid rates of rural natural increase. Based on this information, the regions most likely to have experienced low rural out-migration are the Southeast and South, given their small rural population percentages and relatively low rates of rural natural increase.

The first part of the analysis provides a geographically detailed assessment of Brazil’s rural exodus during the 1980s by presenting estimates of rural net migration between Brazil’s two most recent demographic censuses, conducted in 1980 and 1991. To estimate net migration, I employed the “residual” method, based on forward population projections. We can project the rural population in 1980 to 1991 on the basis of fertility and mortality estimates and compare it to the rural population actually enumerated in the 1991 census. The projection reflects population change due to natural increase only. In

*The total effect of net migration as estimated here includes both a direct effect (i.e., the net difference of rural in- and out-migration) and an indirect effect (i.e., rural losses due to children born to rural-urban migrants after relocating to urban areas).*
contrast, the actual population also includes the effects of net migration. Any difference ("residual") between the enumerated and projected populations will be due to net migration.

Data for population projections come from the 3 percent household sample of the 1980 Brazilian demographic census and the 10/20 percent sample of the 1991 demographic census. It was necessary to use sample data because the geography of rural areas in Brazil changed between the two censuses, and the residual method requires comparable definitions of rural and urban populations. In 1988, the new Brazilian constitution decentralized power as part of the process of demilitarization of the federal government, thereby facilitating the creation of many new municipalities. Since urban areas are defined in the censuses as municipal administrative seats, the creation of new municipalities reclassified some rural areas in 1980 as urban centers in 1991. This reduced the rural population, even where no migration had transpired. Because it occurred shortly before the 1991 census, and because it was done for administrative reasons rather than to recognize large new urban centers, reclassification yielded an "over-bounded" urban definition in the 1991 census, where "urban" areas include many places with populations that are effectively rural (United Nations, 1974:9–10). A reduction in the size of the observed rural population in 1991 due to reclassification between 1980 and 1991 would generate an upward bias in estimates of rural population losses due to net migration and lead to incorrect conclusions about the size of the rural exodus. To eliminate the effects of "over-bounded" reclassification, I defined rural populations as the population living outside the 1980 adminis-

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5The 1991 census used two household sampling proportions. Ten percent samples come from municipalities with populations of 15,000 persons or more, whereas 20% samples come from municipalities with populations under 15,000.

6In the residual method, the observed rural population minus the projected population yields an estimate of net migration. If the rural exodus continued into the 1980s, the observed population should be smaller than the projected population, yielding a negative estimate of net migration. Reclassification serves to increase the observed population, narrowing the gap with the projected population and reducing the estimated losses due to migration. Reclassifying urban populations of new municipalities as rural thus yields a conservative estimate of the rural exodus. If observed net migration losses are larger than expected in existing work, it cannot be due to reclassification, which served to reduce the estimate of net losses from that which would result from using the official rural population, without adjustment.

7Reclassification required a list of municipalities created since 1980. Credit is due to Joe Potter, Suzana Cavagnhi and André Caetano at the Population Research Center, University of Texas at Austin, for creating the list that indicates these municipalities. I used the municipality codes on this list to read the 1991 household sample files and reclassify urban populations in the new municipalities as rural. This allowed for identification of comparable rural populations outside 1980 administrative seats for both census dates.
trative seats and applied this definition to both the 1980 and 1991 data. This definition eliminates the effects of reclassification by counting the populations of administrative seats created between 1980 and 1991 as rural in 1991.7

For the adjusted rural populations, I gathered information on age structure, fertility and mortality in order to project rural populations of each Brazilian state from 1980 to 1991. Household data allowed for identification of male and female age groups in five-year intervals ranging from 0–4 years to 75+ years. Fertility data came from information about births in the year prior to the 1980 and 1991 censuses8 to women ages 15 to 49, corrected for potential biases.9 This yielded estimates of the level and age pattern of fertility in 1980 and 1991. Because input for the population projection required estimates in five-year intervals after the start date (1980), I conducted algebraic interpolations to obtain state-level rural fertility estimates for 1985 and 1990. Mortality assumptions came from indirect estimates based on information about child survival.10 The indirect estimates yielded male and female life expectancies for rural populations in each Brazilian state in 1980, 1985 and 1990. The population projections took the 1980 rural age and sex struct-

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8Fertility data are based on slightly different information from the two censuses. The 1980 census allows identification of births using the month and year of the last birth. Taking the census reference date of August 31, 1980, I counted births in the previous year as any last birth since September 1979. The 1991 census household sample allows identification of births during the previous year based on the age of the last child born. Here I counted births in the previous year by identifying women with a child under the exact age of one. This excluded children of exact age one, because children in that category also included children older than one year, but less than two.

9I used the P2/F2 method to correct for reference period errors in reporting (Shryock and Siegel, 1976:497–498; Wood and Carvalho, 1988:261–262).

10I employed the Preston-Trussel variant of the Brass indirect technique, outlined for the Brazilian case in Wood and Lovell (1990). The 1980 and 1991 census samples include information on children ever born and children surviving to women ages 20–34, for rural areas and by state. Survival rates of children born to women ages 20–24 correspond to child survival to age 2; similarly, child survival among women ages 25–29 corresponds to child survival to age 3, and child survival among women ages 30–34 corresponds to child survival to age 5. Each estimate can be applied to a model life table, where the child survival rate falls on an age-specific mortality curve with a corresponding level of life expectancy. I employed the "South" model life table that fits the Brazilian mortality pattern (Wood and Lovell, 1990:257). The estimates of child survival to ages 2, 3 and 5 each yielded an estimate of life expectancy based on the South model life table. For rural populations in each state, I took an unweighted average of the three estimates of life expectancy to obtain an overall estimate. From a state's overall life expectancy I derived corresponding male and female life expectancies (Wood and Lovell, 1990:258). Because the child survival information is retrospective, the resulting life expectancies refer to a point in time approximately five years prior to the census date. The 1980 life expectancies refer to 1975, and the 1991 estimates refer to 1986. To obtain 1980, 1985 and 1990 life expectancies, I again conducted algebraic interpolations.
ture of each Brazilian state and used fertility and mortality estimates for 1980, 1985 and 1990 to obtain expected populations in 1991.\footnote{Because the number of years in the 1980–1991 period is not exactly divisible by five, I conducted single-year year rather than five-year projections.}

To estimate net migration, I compared the enumerated 1991 rural population to the projected 1991 population. The enumerated rural population (corrected for reclassification) reflects changes due to natural increase and net migration, while the projected population only reflects changes due to natural increase. If the enumerated population exceeds the projected population, then net migration is positive, implying that more people moved into than out of rural areas. But if the projected population exceeds the enumerated population, net migration is negative, and this indicates that more people left than entered rural areas.

Table 5 presents estimates of rural net migration between 1980 and 1991 for the states and regions of Brazil. Column 1 presents the rural population in 1980, and column 2 shows the rural population in 1991, which is adjusted for reclassification, allowing for direct comparison among the two census dates. At the bottom of each column are national totals. In 1980, Brazil’s rural population was approximately 38.5 million, and by 1991, the adjusted rural population was virtually the same, at 38.7 million. The official rural population, however, was 35.8 million (IBGE, 1991a:161), which implies a loss of approximately 2.9 million persons due to reclassification of rural areas as urban. The question then concerns the effect of fertility and mortality on the growth of Brazil’s rural population during the 1980s. Column 3 portrays the projected 1991 rural population, which amounts to 54.5 million persons, nearly 16 million more than in 1980. This implies a rural natural increase of 3.1 percent per year, due to a rapid mortality decline that sustained rural growth by offsetting the fertility decline. A finding of no actual rural population growth (columns 1 and 2) implies that the rural exodus proceeded on a massive scale during the 1980s.

Examination of columns 4 and 5 in Table 5 affords us a sense of the geographic distribution and magnitude of Brazil’s rural exodus between 1980 and 1991. Column 4 presents estimates of rural net migration, calculated as the enumerated minus the projected 1991 populations. Rural areas of Brazil lost 15.8 million people during the 1980s due to net migration. This rural exodus accounts for most of Brazil’s rural population losses as it outweighs the effects of reclassification by a factor of more than five (15.8 million to 2.9 million). Column 5 places the scale of the rural exodus in a larger perspec-
### Table 5: Rural Net Migration in States and Regions of Brazil, 1980–1991

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>281,710</td>
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<td>661,725</td>
<td>921,836</td>
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<td>Pará</td>
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<td>92,166</td>
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<td>118,111</td>
<td>112,456</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maranhão</td>
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<td>17,853,364</td>
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<td>Paraíba</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Minas Gerais</td>
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<td>12,173,916</td>
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<td>Espírito Santo</td>
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<td>6,170,918</td>
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<td>Rio Grande do Sul</td>
<td>922,179</td>
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<td>1,217,397</td>
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<td>4,412,719</td>
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<td>-579,037</td>
</tr>
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<td>Rio Grande do Sul</td>
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<td>2,417,990</td>
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<td>-810,743</td>
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<td><strong>Center-west Region</strong></td>
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<td>2,696,093</td>
<td>3,435,806</td>
<td>-737,713</td>
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<td>Mato Grosso do Sul</td>
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<td>445,552</td>
<td>635,166</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mato Grosso</td>
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<td>764,941</td>
<td>695,471</td>
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<td>Goiás</td>
<td>1,457,774</td>
<td>1,400,371</td>
<td>2,046,809</td>
<td>-646,438</td>
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<tr>
<td>Distrito Federal</td>
<td>37,889</td>
<td>85,229</td>
<td>56,360</td>
<td>+28,869</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>38,527,510</td>
<td>38,743,024</td>
<td>54,496,142</td>
<td>-15,753,118</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: IBGE, 25% household sample of the 1980 Brazilian demographic census, and 102% sample of the 1991 Brazilian demographic census.

Notes: a The 1991 rural population is adjusted for reclassification. See endnotes 7 and 8 in the text.

b Net migration equals the observed rural population (column 2) minus the projected population (column 3).

c The net migration rate equals net migration divided by the projected 1991 population, multiplied by 100.

d The state of Goiás as defined here includes the new state of Tocantins, created in 1988.

Net migration is presented in Table 5 as the difference between the observed rural population and the projected rural population for each state and region. The rates are calculated by dividing the net migration by the projected population for comparison across different population sizes. The data suggest a significant rural exodus during this period, with the largest outflows occurring in states like Rondônia, Acre, and Roraima. The rural migration rate is particularly high in these states, indicating a substantial movement of population from rural to urban areas.

Table 5 also indicates that the rural exodus did not affect all parts of Brazil equally, with notable differences in migration rates across regions and states. The rural population losses due to net migration were generalized insofar as they occurred in every region of the country.
country. Not even the Amazon frontier (North region) shows a net gain of rural population during the 1980s. Three small states (Rondônia, Roraima and Amapá) show rural gains, but larger northern states, particularly Amazonas, experienced substantial rural depopulation by migration. That being said, the absolute and relative magnitude of the rural exodus was far greater in the other regions of Brazil. States in the Northeast, Southeast and South of Brazil exhibited the largest volume as well as the highest rates of rural population losses during the 1980s. The Northeast lost over 7 million people (largely from Bahia, Pernambuco, Ceará, and Maranhão) and exhibits a net migration rate equal to the national average. This region shows little variation in net migration rates among states. In the industrialized Southeast, the rural exodus reduced the rural population by 4.5 million, at a rate 28 percent faster than for Brazil as a whole. Rates of rural population decline due to net migration were highest in the largest states (Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo). The agro-industrialized South also shows a massive rural depopulation, losing 3.4 million, at a rate nearly as high as that of the Southeast. Most of the rural losses in the South occurred in Paraná, the coffee frontier in the 1950s, now agro-industrialized and expelling population. The Center-west region, becoming an agro-industrial frontier, shows rural losses in more southeastern states (Mato Grosso do Sul and Goiás) than in Mato Grosso, which borders the North region. The massive losses in Goiás, over 0.6 million, outweighed the gains elsewhere. At the regional level, Brazil experienced a geographically generalized rural exodus during the 1980s, with a few exceptions at the state level.

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF BRAZIL'S RURAL EXODUS DURING THE 1960s, 1970s, AND 1980s

The prospect of rural losses only from certain regions has generated a substantial body of work that anticipates an overall deceleration in the scale of Brazil’s rural exodus from the 1970s to the 1980s. Many analysts focus on short- or medium-term processes, particularly the debt crisis, which may have reduced the pull of urban labor markets (Gilbert, 1996:15–16; Goldin and Castro de Rezende, 1990:12; Martine et al., 1988:50–51; Sampaio and Rocha, 1989:65; Villa and Rodriguez, 1996:33). Moreira (1995:134–141) anticipates a deceleration in the rural exodus due to Brazil’s long-term rural fertility decline and rural population reduction. Even those who imply the possibility of a sustained or accelerated rural exodus (Martine, 1993a:178, 1994:38–39) judge that, on balance, a deceleration is the most probable out-
come, arguing that the slowdown during the downturn of the early 1980s was not offset by an acceleration during globalization and reform during the late 1980s, because of coinciding fertility declines. Martine (1994:38) estimates that rural population losses in Brazil between 1980 and 1991 amounted to 10.5 million, a substantial decline in the rural exodus from the losses of 15.6 to 17.4 million during the 1970s (Martine, 1987, 1993a; Wood and Carvalho, 1988:Ch. 9). If we annualize these figures to obtain more comparable rates for periods of unequal length, we obtain an anticipated decline in yearly net losses of 1.56 to 1.74 million per year during the 1970s to only 0.95 million per year between 1980 and 1991.

The second segment of the analysis therefore addresses the question of the pace of rural losses in Brazil during the 1980s relative to previous decades. Table 6 compares the findings presented in Table 5 to rural net migration estimates conducted for the 1960s and 1970s by presenting annualized net migration estimates and rates. Estimates of rural net migration in Brazil before 1980 are available from two sources in existing literature, Martine (1987, 1993a) and Wood and Carvalho (1988:Ch. 9). Table 6 presents overall net migration estimates in the 1960s and 1970s from both of these sources, as well as regional estimates from Martine.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Annual Rural Net Migration Estimates</th>
<th>Annual Rural Net Migration Rates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>-44.7</td>
<td>+0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeast</td>
<td>-437.3</td>
<td>-499.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast</td>
<td>-680.1</td>
<td>-503.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>-107.9</td>
<td>-439.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center-west</td>
<td>-13.5</td>
<td>-119.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>-1,283.5</td>
<td>-1,562.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>-1,379.0</td>
<td>-1,737.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:  
- Net migration rates equal annualized net migration divided by the projected population at the end of the time interval in question, multiplied by 100.  
- Net migration rates equal annualized net migration divided by the projected population at the end of the time interval in question, multiplied by 100.
- Total rural net migration estimates for 1980-1991 come from Table 5.

The key finding of Table 6 concerns changes in the overall level of annual rural population losses between 1960 and 1991. Estimates from Martine...
and Wood/Carvalho, respectively, indicate annual rural losses of 1.28 million and 1.38 million during the 1960s, and 1.56 million and 1.74 million during the 1970s. In comparison, annual losses due to net migration during the 1980–1991 period amounted to 1.43 million. Annual net migration rates from the same authors were -2.38 and -2.51 per 100 rural persons projected at the end of the 1960s, and -2.88 and -3.11 per 100 rural persons projected at the end of the 1970s. The annual net rate for the 1980–1991 period was -2.63 per 100 persons projected at the end of this interval. These findings indicate that Brazil's rural exodus in the 1980s declined somewhat from the peak of the 1970s, but was sustained at a volume and rate greater than those of the 1960s.

The finding of similar rural losses in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s obscures important changes in rural net migration among regions within Brazil. Table 6 shows that each of Brazil’s five regions exhibits marked changes in the pace of rural net losses from the 1970s to the 1980s. In the North, the Amazon frontier experienced small net gains of rural population during the 1970s, but began to lose population during the 1980s. The Northeast exhibits a rise in annual rural net losses, from 500,000 during the 1970s to 640,000 during the 1980s. In contrast, the Southeast, South and Center-west all exhibit declines in the volumes and rates of annual rural net losses from the 1970s to the 1980s. However, rural net migration losses during the 1980s did not drop as low as those of the 1960s. In addition, the Southeast and South continued to exhibit higher rates of rural net losses than the Center-west. Table 6 thus shows substantial changes in the geography of rural population losses in Brazil from the 1970s to the 1980s. In both decades, the Northeast, Southeast and South account for over 90 percent of Brazil's rural exodus, but during the 1970s, rural losses in these three regions were similar, whereas during the 1980s, losses became heaviest in the Northeast.

**PATTERNS OF RURAL-URBAN POPULATION REDISTRIBUTION, 1986–1991**

Observation of a sustained rural exodus in Brazil into the 1980s raises questions about patterns of rural-urban redistribution, particularly concerning the sizes of urban receiving centers and the geographic scope of such moves. Regarding rural redistribution to urban areas, observations of urban “deconcentration” during the 1980s raise the question of whether the rural exodus selectively contributed population to smaller urban centers. Many analysts have noted declines in the growth rates of Latin America's largest cities dur-
ing the 1980s (e.g., Gilbert, 1996:15–16; Villa and Rodriguez, 1996:40–42), including those of Brazil (Martine, 1993b, 1994; Moreira, 1995:143–145). In contrast to “concentrated” urbanization in Brazil between 1940 and 1980, the 1980–1991 period bore witness to “deconcentrated” urban growth (Martine, 1993b). While the growth of urban areas with 20,000+ population fell from 4.2 percent per year in the 1970s to 2.6 percent per year in the 1980s, growth of cities of 500,000+ population dropped especially fast, from 3.9 percent to 2.0 percent per year (Martine, 1994:25). Further, during the 1980s, small cities (under 100,000 in size) grew as a percentage of Brazil’s population in urban areas of 20,000+ population, from 19 percent in 1980 to 22 percent in 1991 (Martine, 1994:26). At the same time, the rural exodus contributed to a substantial portion of Brazil’s urban growth. The urban population as a whole in Brazil (i.e., including those under 20,000) grew from 80.4 million in 1980 (IBGE, 1992:207) to 108.1 million in 1991 (corrected for reclassification), a rise of 27.7 million. By comparison, the rural exodus during the same intercensal period amounted to nearly 15.8 million, or 57 percent of the urban growth. This implies that Brazilian towns and cities largely grew during the 1980s due to a rural-urban migration shift, rather than natural increase (or immigration).

With respect to the scope of movement, some analysts have speculated that the industrial downturn may have dampened long-distance migration, particularly between the Northeast and the Southeast, due to increased transportation costs and decreased urban wages (e.g., Martine et al., 1984:1473–1474; Martine, 1994:38–40; Sampaio and Rocha, 1989:55–58). As a result, most rural-urban migration in Brazil during the 1980s may have proceeded within states or regions.

Given the probable importance of the rural exodus for population redistribution in Brazil, this part of the analysis assesses expectations of selective relocation to smaller urban centers and localized rural-urban movement. To examine the geographic scope of migration, we must have information about the origin and destination of migrants, and this is only available directly from census data. The 1991 census household sample includes information on a person’s residence exactly five years prior to the census date on September 1, including state and municipality, as well as rural or urban context. While the implied migration period (1986–1991) does not cover the entire intercensal

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12 Estimation on the basis of residence five years ago misses migrants who left a place and returned during the five year interval. Hence, five-year migration estimates will be conservative.
interval (1980–1991), place of previous residence five years ago is the best single direct indicator of migration, for it offers a clear time interval for observation and specifies the previous residence in detail (Carvalho and Machado, 1992; United Nations, 1970). I identified rural-urban migrants as persons who resided in rural areas in 1986 and urban areas in 1991. I defined urban populations by tabulating people living in administrative centers at the municipal level, with the exception of Metropolitan Regions (MRs), such as São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. MRs may encompass many municipalities, so I tabulated metropolitan populations as single entities for purposes of size categorization. I then tabulated rural-urban migrants by the size of the urban center where they lived in 1991 and the geographic scope of their relocation since 1986. This differentiated rural-urban migrants in terms of whether they resided in urban populations of under 20,000, 20,000–99,999, 100,000–499,999, and 500,000+ (including all of the MRs), and whether they moved within or between municipalities within a state, between states in a region, or between regions of Brazil.

Table 7 shows the results of the tabulations, and columns 1 through 4 allow us to address the question of whether rural-urban migrants selectively redistributed to smaller urban areas of Brazil between 1986 and 1991. Column 1 breaks down Brazil’s urban population by region and urban population size and shows the largest urban areas in the industrialized Southeast. Column 2 presents the same breakdown for rural-urban migrants and reveals a similar regional pattern. Column 3 shows these migrants as a percentage of urban populations and indicates that rural-urban movers comprised larger proportions of urban populations in smaller urban centers in every region of Brazil. Column 4 provides migrants in each urban size category as percentages of all rural-urban migrants in a given region. In contrast to column 3, column 4 reveals a polarized rural-urban migration pattern in every region, where the largest percentages of migrants resided in the smallest and largest urban centers in 1991. Thus, relative to overall urban populations, rural-urban migration was most important in small centers, while relative to the overall volume of rural-urban movement, migration was most pronounced in small towns and large cities such as MRs. The rural exodus in Brazil, at least as it appears to have proceeded in the late 1980s, did not primarily redistribute population to small urban centers.

An additional question on duration of residence in urban areas allowed for identification of migrants who moved from rural to urban areas within a municipality. These migrants lived in the same municipality in 1986 and 1991, had not resided in another municipality in the interim, and resided in an urban area for less than five years.
<table>
<thead>
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<td>Urban Population Size (000s)</td>
<td>Population in 1991</td>
<td>Migrants as Pager. by Urban Pop. Size</td>
<td>from Same State</td>
<td>from Other State</td>
<td>from Other Region</td>
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<td>23.1</td>
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<td>100.0</td>
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<td>3.9</td>
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<td>27.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>20–100</td>
<td>3,671,639</td>
<td>153,944</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>84.3</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100–500</td>
<td>3,711,997</td>
<td>102,671</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>76.0</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500+</td>
<td>4,791,341</td>
<td>122,394</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>82.5</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center-west:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt;20</td>
<td>8,194,827</td>
<td>298,366</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>59.5</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20–100</td>
<td>2,204,622</td>
<td>108,872</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>70.4</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>24.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>100–500</td>
<td>1,383,591</td>
<td>64,635</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>66.4</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>26.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500+</td>
<td>2,948,074</td>
<td>75,073</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>52.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE 7
RURAL-URBAN MIGRATION BY REGION AND URBAN POPULATION SIZE, BRAZIL, 1986-1991

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>110,996,845</td>
<td>2,831,581</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>69.9</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>19.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>&lt;20</td>
<td>21,127,294</td>
<td>762,960</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>82.6</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20–&lt;100</td>
<td>22,354,218</td>
<td>673,325</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>78.7</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100–&lt;500</td>
<td>19,766,147</td>
<td>502,071</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>69.5</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500+</td>
<td>47,749,185</td>
<td>893,226</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>35.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IBGE, 1991 Brazilian demographic census, 10/20% household sample file.

Notes:
* The urban population is not adjusted for rural-urban reclassification.
* Migrants are defined here as persons living in rural areas in 1986 and urban areas in 1991. Estimates in this table differ from those in Tables 5 and 6 due to different methods and migration intervals.
* Migrants from the same state moved within a municipality or among municipalities within a state.
* Migrants from another state moved between states of the same region.
* Migrants from another region moved between states of different regions.
Columns 5, 6 and 7 break down rural-urban migrants further by presenting percentages who moved within the same state (within or between municipalities), between states of the same region, or between regions of Brazil. These three columns afford the opportunity to see whether rural-urban migration in Brazil proceeded largely with a localized geographic scope between 1986 and 1991. Column 5 shows the percentage of rural-urban migrants who moved within the same state, whether they moved within or between municipalities. Overall, 70 percent of rural-urban migrants made such localized moves, but regional differences also emerge. While the North approximates the national average, over 80 percent of rural-urban movement into the Northeast and South was within-state, while only 50–60 percent of such migration was localized in the Southeast and Center-west. Column 6 shows that in all regions relatively few rural-urban migrants moved among states within a region. Column 7 shows that large minorities of migrants moved between regions to urban centers in the Southeast and Center-west. One explanation for such differences lies with the redistribution of rural out-migrants among urban receiving areas. All regions show large majorities of rural-urban migrants making within-state moves to smaller urban centers. However, in regions with highly localized movement (the North, Northeast and South), the percentage of rural-urban migrants making within-state moves is also high in the largest urban size categories (column 5), whereas in regions with less localized movement (the Southeast and Center-west), these percentages decline as one moves from smaller to larger centers. Conversely, the Southeast and Center-west show rapid increases in the percentage of migrants moving interregionally as one goes from smaller to larger urban centers (column 7), such that most rural-urban migrants moving to MRs moved from other regions. These findings indicate a largely localized rural-urban migration pattern in Brazil between 1986 and 1991 that varies due to regional differences in the importance of large cities as receiving centers.

SUMMARY AND INTERPRETATION

Between 1980 and 1991, Brazil’s rural exodus reduced the rural population by 15.8 million, with losses in all regions and nearly every state. This finding contradicts arguments that the rural exodus became geographically selective during the 1980s (e.g., Mueller and Martine, 1997) and suggests instead that rural population losses were national in scope under conditions of crisis, globalization and reform. The second component of the analysis showed that annual rural net migration losses were between 1.28 and 1.38 million during
the 1960s, 1.56 and 1.74 million during the 1970s, and approximately 1.43 million during the 1980s. The continuation of Brazil’s rural exodus contradicts expectations among most analysts of a considerable decline in rural losses since the 1970s, including one preliminary estimate of only 0.95 million per year during the 1980s (Martine, 1994:38). Finally, the analysis shows that rural-urban migration between 1986 and 1991 was selectively directed toward small urban centers as well as large cities such as MRs. This result suggests that arguments about the small-town selectivity of rural-urban movement (e.g., Martine, 1993b:129; 1994:40; Martine et al., 1984:1475) provides only a partial picture of Brazil’s rural exodus, at least during the late 1980s. Moreover, rural-urban migration largely proceeded within states, and this accounts for much of the gains in smaller urban areas, but the predominance of local movement varied among Brazilian regions. Observation of substantial long-distance rural-urban movement during the 1980s, particularly to the Southeast and Center-west, also reveals that contentions about reductions in the geographic scope of rural-urban redistribution (e.g., Martine et al., 1984:1473–1474; Martine, 1994:38–40; Sampaio and Rocha, 1989:55–58) are only partial characterizations.

I interpret Brazil’s sustained rural exodus in terms of reconfigurations of circumstances involving capital penetration into agriculture, non-agricultural economic performance, and rural natural increase. While the onset of the debt crisis constituted an abrupt change from the military’s development model, the effects of the economic downturn involved both short- and medium-term reversals in key drivers of the rural exodus. With regard to capital penetration into agriculture, the crisis constituted a short-term reversal of fortunes, as the slowdown in agricultural growth due to the withdrawal of conservative modernization incentives lasted only from 1980 to 1985. Investments in agro-industrial complexes, particularly in a context of favorable global markets and generous macroeconomic policies, renewed capital penetration into Brazilian agriculture after 1985. This renewed disruption of traditional production relations and spurred on the rural exodus. The debt crisis had more lasting (medium-term) effects on Brazil’s urban-industrial sector, as industrial growth languished from 1980 to the early 1990s. However, commercial and service sector growth continued through the 1980–1995 period, and this maintained the attraction of urban labor markets for impoverished or displaced rural families. Finally, the continuation of Brazil’s rapid rural natural increase constitutes the perpetuation of a long-term trend. Despite declines in rural fertility, the anticipated deceleration in Brazil’s rural natural
increase did not occur, as it proceeded at approximately 3 percent per year between 1980 and 1991, similar to rates during the 1960s and 1970s. This was due primarily to a substantial rural mortality decline, which maintained a large population of potential rural-urban migrants. Understood as a whole, globally and nationally-driven alterations in the capitalization of agriculture, non-agricultural sectors, and rural natural increase did not reconfigure the circumstances surrounding Brazil’s rural exodus in a way that reduced rural population losses from the 1970s to the 1980s. The short-term slowdown in capital penetration into agriculture and the medium-term industrial slump did not offset the effects of expanding agro-industrial operations and export-oriented agriculture, the sustained growth of commercial and service sector employment in cities, and the persistence of rapid rural natural increase, so rural out-migration continued on a massive scale as before. In short, Brazil’s rural exodus continued despite reconfigurations of the economic and demographic context from the 1970s to the early 1990s.

The finding of a sustained rural exodus, central as it is, hides important changes from previous periods, one of which concerns differences in rural population losses among Brazil’s five regions. While each region exhibits a distinct configuration of circumstances associated with the rural exodus, all show similar short-term changes in capital penetration into agriculture, medium-term responses to the industrial slump, and long-term continuities with respect to their rural natural increase. The short-term slowdown in agricultural growth and long-term rural natural increase appear to have interacted with the relative size of the rural population and the importance of urban-industrial activities to change rural-urban migration from the 1970s to the 1980s. In the North and Northeast, the rural population percentage was large, so capital penetration into agriculture in a context of high rural population growth served to shift rural net migration from positive to negative (in the North) or accelerate the rural exodus (in the Northeast). In the Southeast and South, the rural percentage was low, but these regions bore the brunt of the debt crisis, so continued agricultural capitalization in a context of moderate rural population growth produced declines in the volume and rate of rural losses. In the Center-west, rural population percentages were also low and growth rates moderate, so while agro-industrial capital penetration proceeded at a rapid pace, it generated less net migration during the 1980s than the previous decade. These findings imply that capital penetration alone did not sustain the rural exodus among regions of Brazil between 1980 and 1991. Rather, it accelerated rural-urban migration where there were large, rapidly growing rural populations and limited urban-
ization, but agricultural capitalization could not sustain the rural exodus in regions with small rural populations or low rates of rural natural increase. In summary, regionally distinct economic and demographic configurations of circumstances led to divergent patterns in the pace of Brazil’s rural exodus during the 1980s.

Regionally distinct configurations of circumstances also help account for differences in patterns of rural-urban redistribution to urban areas of different sizes and the geographic scope of migration. In the North, rural expulsion due to cattle expansion, alongside rapid urban growth due to gold booms and expanding commercial and service activities, spurred a substantial intraregional rural-urban shift, particularly to small towns and large cities. As an urbanizing frontier region (Browder and Godfrey, 1997), the North also attracted many interregional migrants, and those making rural-urban moves constituted 22 percent of all rural-urban migrants in the Amazon. In the Northeast, the rural population was large, poor and growing rapidly, and this generated large-scale local rural-urban movement to urban centers of all sizes. Though Table 7 did not show it, the Northeast contributed 40–70 percent of the interregional rural-urban migrants to the North, Southeast and Center-west, the three areas receiving sizeable proportions of such migrants from other regions. The Southeast, with a large urban population and expanding commercial and service sector, remained Brazil’s main rural-urban receiving area in the late 1980s. While small urban areas primarily received local rural-urban migrants, MRs and other large cities primarily received interregional rural-urban movers. In the South, continuation of agro-industrial activities sustained a largely localized rural-urban shift, directly primarily to smaller urban centers. Local rural-urban redistribution may have contributed to further expansion of a semi-proletarianized labor force, which grew rapidly during the 1970s (cf. Goodman and Redclift, 1977). Finally, in the Center-west, the rapid expansion of agro-industrial cattle and soybean operations pushed the relatively small rural population into local urban areas. In addition, the dynamism of the agricultural sector, alongside rapidly expanding industrial, commercial and service activities, also attracted interregional rural-urban migrants to large cities of that region. Thus, dissimilar regional configurations of circumstances in Brazil also help account for variations in the size selectivity of urban receiving centers and the geographic scope of rural-urban migration during the late 1980s.

The central findings presented here for Brazil—a geographically generalized rural exodus, sustained at a high level despite reconfigured circumstances
across three decades, and complex patterns of rural-urban redistribution – call for renewed attention to rural-urban migration in developing countries. The increased importance of globalization in agriculture (Bonnanno, 1992) and the efflorescence of neoliberal reforms in the 1990s (e.g., Edwards, 1995; Weeks, 1995) imply the potential for capital penetration and reduced agricultural labor demand in countries other than Brazil (Loker, 1998). Similarly, fertility reductions were accompanied by mortality declines in most of Latin America during the 1980s, which may sustain high rates of rural natural increase (Chackiel and Plaut, 1996; Chackiel and Schkolnik, 1996). The pace of the rural exodus therefore remains open to question, and this points to the need for new empirical research on the rural exodus in Latin America and other world regions.

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Migration Policies for the Highly Skilled in the Asia-Pacific Region

Robyn Iredale
University of Wollongong

In relation to the increase in population movement in the Asia-Pacific region in the last decade, research and policy interest has focused on the increase in contract labor migration, mostly for unskilled work. The movement of skilled migrants, either temporarily or permanently, has also increased significantly. The major trends and patterns are examined within the various policy frameworks that enable such movements to occur. Issues of transferability of skills and protection of jobs for nationals are examined within this context. Regional agreements and the possible creation of a regional labor market under APEC are discussed. Finally, the issues facing policymakers in sending and receiving countries and the need for greater regional dialogue and cooperation are canvassed.

Migration in the Asia-Pacific region has grown rapidly in the last ten years. Within this context, contract labor migration has received considerable attention in the literature. Its patterns and problems, along with its unique characteristics which include the high proportion of females and the importance of recruitment agents, have been well documented (Abella, 1995).

On the other hand, the movement of skilled migrants has attracted much less attention. In the 1960s, ‘brain drain’ to developed countries, especially after the relaxation of Asian immigration restrictions by Canada, the United States, Australia and New Zealand was the major phenomenon. Skilled migration now encompasses a search for greater opportunities and better life chances and lifestyle by professional people from developing countries. At the same time, globalization and the liberalization of opportunities in newly developing countries has encouraged temporary or permanent skilled movements from developed to developing regions.

Global labor markets now exist in a range of occupations, and a person’s skills are their greatest assets to be bought and sold. The individual movement of highly skilled migrants could be called one part of the ‘highly skilled migration system.’ At the same time, countries such as Singapore see skilled immigration as a means of filling skilled labor shortages to ensure that economic growth is not held back in the short term or to meet social needs (Asian Migration News, May 31, 1999). For other countries, it has come to
be used as a means to improve the long-term stock of ‘brains’ generally or to train locals. The seeking of highly skilled, through whatever policy means, may be another part of the ‘highly skilled migration system.’ The two often overlap, and it is not clear that there is sufficient reason for trying to differentiate between them.

Some of the movement of skilled labor is closely related to the movement of capital and trade, and much of this movement tends to be temporary. The movement of capital and of this form of skilled labor are largely unimpeded. However, restrictions may apply to skilled migration of a more permanent nature, though a gradual loosening may become evident as countries attempt to gain as many benefits as possible from the international pool of skilled human resources.

The impact of the Asian financial crisis on skilled migration is as yet undocumented, but anecdotal evidence suggests that Indonesia and Thailand both experienced major losses of skilled expatriates as Japanese, U.S. and other investors withdrew, at least temporarily, from their economies. Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan also became less attractive destinations for skilled workers. Many skilled migrants who had returned from the United States to South Korea in the 1990s subsequently returned to the United States when the crisis hit South Korea in 1998 (Asian Migration News, February 28, 1998).

WHO IS A HIGHLY SKILLED WORKER?

Highly-skilled workers are usually regarded as those with university degrees or extensive experience in a given field. The category is not well defined and varies from one country to another. It includes highly skilled specialists, independent executives and senior managers, specialized technicians or tradespeople, investors, physicians, business people, ‘keyworkers’ and subcontract workers (OECD SOPEMI, 1997:21). Individuals in these categories may seek to maximize return on investment in their education and training by moving around the world in search of the highest paid and/or most rewarding employment. Others seek to take their skills where they feel they will be better able to use their capabilities and/or enjoy superior conditions of work and existence. Others are “commercial cross-border service providers ... who should in principle, neither seek residence or employment in the host country” (Garnier, 1996:368). Traditionally, other workers may be regarded as skilled (e.g., tradespeople), but they do not fall into the highly skilled category.
Salt and Findlay (1989) argue that a theoretical framework for highly skilled migration needs to incorporate four elements: the new international spatial division of labor, the nature of careers, the role of internal labor markets and the lubrication provided by recruitment and relocation agencies. This framework emerges from the fact that Salt, Findlay, Beaverstock, Garnier and others have tended to conduct their research within the concept of globalization and have concentrated their research on the highest echelons of intracompany transfers and recruitment.

This approach has led to undue emphasis on this group of skilled migrants and to the neglect of other forms of skilled migration. Other forms of skilled movement occur as a result of permanent migration policies, refugee flows and regionalism. Moreover, the emphasis on skilled business transfers has often meant the exclusion of women and gender issues from the analysis.

This article argues that a fifth element, at least, is necessary in the theoretical framework – the role of government policies and bilateral and multilateral agreements in explaining patterns of movement. Included within this is the role of professional organizations and regulatory agencies which determine the employment outcomes of skilled migrants. These, in turn, influence government policies on international migration. The inclusion of this aspect will enable adequate attention to be focused on noneconomic forms of skilled migration, skilled women migrants and skilled refugees. The argument in this paper is that skilled migration or the transfer of skills occurs in many different ways, not just by means of high level business transfers.

**AIMS**

The aims of the paper are:

1) To analyze the institutional or policy factors and/or barriers affecting the direction and scale of skilled flows in the Asia-Pacific region. Two broad categories of movement and the policies enabling each are analyzed:
   - policies enabling the permanent movement of highly skilled migrants;
   - policies enabling long term, transient or short-term movement;
2) To examine the role of major Asia-Pacific regional bodies; and
3) To consider major issues to be addressed and suggestions for future action.

The following discussion is largely gender neutral. The focus on economic skilled migration has tended to exclude women as in general fewer
women are part of intracompany transfers. Little research has been done on
gender bias in the selection or movement of skilled migrants. One exception
is the study by Fincher et al. (1994:116), which found that selection for
immigration to Australia under the skill category “is based on interpretations
of skill that can be of disadvantage to women” and that “definitions of skill
deployed need to be re-examined so as to include those skills that more often
characterize women.”

Part of the explanation for this situation may also lie in the general pauci-
ty of skilled migration statistics. Very poor data exist on skilled migration for
most countries, and the data available for this article were sparse. The lack of
data is due to both the difficulty of collection and the ‘invisibility’ of much
of the movement, as well as the general unwillingness by both sending and
receiving countries to acknowledge the flows of highly skilled labor (Bradd-
dock, 1998).

This contrasts with the situation in relation to ‘unskilled’ labor. Here the
‘feminization’ of contract labor migration has been identified as a marked fea-
ture of the 1980s and 1990s. This is more complex than it first appears, how-
ever, as many of these women are in fact skilled. The difficulty is that they are
going to fill unskilled positions in the Middle East and other parts of Asia
where they will not be rewarded for their skill level and where they will sub-
sequently experience a process of deskilling.

POLICY FRAMEWORKS

The patterns of movement for highly skilled workers are diverse. There are
two broad categories of movement, and their prevalence depends on the pol-
cy framework of each country: permanent settlement policies and policies
designed to enable short-term movement. The former are country controlled,
and migrants move to fill particular niches or to participate in, and benefit
from, the country’s economic development. The latter “rely largely on the
internal labor markets within multinational corporations, recruitment agen-
cies or Government offices. Skilled migrants tend to follow international
investment flows, and reflect the internationalization of firms in the ongoing
process of globalization of the world economy” (OECD SOPEMI, 1995).

Garnier (1996:380) identifies another three categories as well: “individu-
also service providers and specialists on specific assignments,” “short-term or
business visitors” and “diplomatic and international personnel.” Garnier
(1996:381–85) proposes a valuable expanded classification of migrant work-
ers (including permanent skilled migrants) and discusses the two opposing
theses that “collide when governments must determine how much access they will grant international service providers to their domestic market when this involves the movement of physical persons.” Even in relation to temporary movement, the arguments for easier access come up against those which argue against liberalization. The distinction between permanent and temporary is often fluid but from the policy perspective it is important.

*Policies for Permanent Skilled Migration – United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand*

The United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand have different ways of acquiring permanent skilled migrants, but it is one of the explicit objectives of all their immigration policies. Cobb-Clark and Connolly (1997:688) state that “skilled immigration is an important area for policy-related research because it is one of the components of demographic and labor market research which is directly under the control of policymakers.” Cobb-Clark and Connolly argue that Australia, Canada and the United States have become competitors in trying to attract highly skilled and entrepreneurial migrants and that the number of people available to each country depends on both the policies of the other two as well as internal factors in each economy. These internal factors include not just rates of economic growth and opportunities for employment but also the range of policies/practices in place that affect immigrants’ ability to gain employment in their field of training/expertise. The difficulty of gaining access to particular occupations in some countries (e.g., medicine, dentistry and veterinary science) in Australia, Canada and New Zealand is common knowledge, and immigrants make migration decisions that take this into account. So the ‘brain waste’ that has been a part of the post World War II experience affects migrants’ choice of destination.

*Figure 1. Number of Permanent Skilled Immigrant Visas, Australia, Canada and United States 1983–1995 (‘000)*

![Graph showing number of permanent skilled immigrant visas from 1983 to 1995 for Australia, Canada, and the U.S.](source: OECD SOPEMI, 1997)
Figure 2. Inflows of Migrants by Country of Origin, United States (1995–96), Canada (1996), Australia (1996–97) as a percent of Total Inflows

South and East Asia, and more recently Southeast Asia, have become important sources of migrants for all these countries. Figure 1 shows the levels of skilled migration to the United States, Canada and Australia over the period 1983 to 1995. Figure 2 shows the major source countries for total migration to these three countries in recent years.

The United States dramatically increased the number of ‘worker preference’ visas issued in 1992, when the number jumped to 116,200 from 59,500 in the previous year. This was a direct response to changes heralded in by the 1990 Immigration Act. The figure shows that numbers went even higher to 147,000 in 1993 before dropping again to 85,300 in 1995. Selection is largely in the hands of employers and there is no points system. In fact, in 1994, 40 percent of skilled migrants were already living in the United States and merely adjusted their status from temporary to permanent (Kramer, 1996:4). These people had entered on student or other temporary visas and secured jobs for which their employers argued there was no suitable resident available. The link between overseas study in the United States and permanent migration is well established and is much stronger than in Australia or Canada (Iredale, 1997). New Zealand introduced policy changes in 1998 to strengthen this link.

Table 1 shows the number of immigrants ‘admitted’ permanently to the United States on employment based visas from Hong Kong, China, the Philippines and Taiwan from 1992 to 1996. The high skill profile of these and other Asian birthplace groups was well established by 1989, when 22 percent of Asians admitted to the United States permanently were professionals, and a further 14 percent were executives. The countries with the highest skill profiles then were India and Sri Lanka, followed closely by Singapore and Taiwan (Gardner, 1992). Throughout the 1990s, China became the major contributor, partly as a result of the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989. The United States is the preferred destination for most skilled immigrants even though state legislation may make it difficult to gain access to particular occupations (Iredale, 1997).

Canada has been successful in attracting skilled immigrants, and the national pool of skilled immigrants is estimated to be growing by 60,000 per year (Mata, 1994:6). There are two major sets of skilled entry categories: 1) the business/investor class and 2) a points-tested skilled worker class. The main source countries for the latter were Hong Kong, France and India in 1995. The selection criteria for this class focuses largely on educational attainment and languages ability (English and French) along with an employment
requirement. There is very little formal migration assessment of educational qualifications for Canada, and in this way it differs from Australia. People are selected fairly generally for their education and skills, and there is no desire or intention to try to match occupational qualifications directly to jobs, for example in terms of pre-migration assessment of ‘registrability.’

Nevertheless, significant skills wastage among professional, technical and trade level settlers has occurred. This has partly been due to nonacceptance of qualifications by provincial governments/other bodies. The Agreement on Internal Trade (1994) is designed to overcome the problem of nontransferability for Canadians generally, but whether it will assist immigrants is not yet clear. On balance, Canada is less concerned about improving the human capital stock through immigration than is Australia, and there is much greater emphasis on generic skills.

The Australian data show considerable variation in the permanent intake in the skilled categories over the past decade. The major skills categories have been: Skill (Independent, Business, Employer Nomination) and Concessional Family (now named Skilled-Australian Linked). A high skills categories intake of 48,400 was reached in 1990–91 under a Labor Government, but there was a reduction to 19,697 in 1996–97 under the Coalition Government. There was also a reduction in the size of the overall program from 121,688 in 1990–91 to 85,752 in 1996–97, but the skilled component decreased considerably. The Coalition Government has now reoriented the intake and from 1997–98 there has been an upward trend in the skilled component of the intake.

In 1996–97, 51.5 percent of skilled settler arrivals (10,153) were from Asia: 2,454 from Southeast Asia, 5,729 from Northeast Asia and 1,970 from Southern Asia. As with the United States, Hong Kong, China, Taiwan and India were important sources for this category, but the country that continues to supply the largest number in this category is still the United Kingdom

| TABLE 1 | U.S. EMPLOYMENT-BASED IMMIGRATION, FROM HONG KONG, CHINA, PHILIPPINES, TAIWAN, 1992–96 |
|---------|---------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Hong Kong | 2,800 | 2,457 | 1,697 | 1,328 | 1,803 |
| People’s Republic of China | 11,058 | 65,424 | 54,856 | 17,970 | 20,354 |
| Philippines | 9,708 | 11,882 | 9,569 | 10,172 | 8,959 |
| Taiwan | 8,368 | 6,912 | 3,868 | 2,831 | 3,951 |
| Total for these sources | 31,934 | 86,675 | 69,990 | 32,301 | 35,067 |
| % of total from these sources | 27.5 | 59.0 | 56.8 | 37.9 | 29.8 |
| Total for all sources | 116,198 | 147,012 | 123,291 | 85,336 | 117,499 |

Source: Statistical Yearbooks of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Table 8.

This pattern represents a major change from the 1980s. In 1982–83, Asians were overrepresented in the refugee and special humanitarian categories and underrepresented in all other categories, but especially in the skill categories. Throughout the 1980s, this changed with a gradual spreading across all categories (Hugo, 1992).

But permanent entry figures by skill category underestimate the number of skilled people actually migrating to Australia. Table 2 shows settler arrivals by occupation from Asia and Oceania for 1996–97. Overall, 25,513 Managers/Administrators, Professionals, Para-Professionals and Tradespeople permanent migrants arrived. Asians comprised 37.4 percent of the total intake in 1996–97, but they accounted for 50.5 percent of the Manager/Administrator occupational group and 43.3 percent of the Professional group. They were underrepresented in all other occupational groups.

One of the major definitional problems to be resolved in the discussion of skilled migration is whether we take people’s stated education level/occupation before arrival as their level of skill or whether we count them according to the category in which they were admitted. Many refugees and female spouses are not credited with being skilled though they possess high level qualifications and work experience. In addition, many are not ‘recognized’ by occupational, government and other bodies as being skilled. What happens to them?

In Australia, there has been a gradual tightening of criteria to enable entry only to those who “have skills or outstanding abilities that will contribute to the Australian economy” (Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, 1998:13). Seventy percent of Independent migrants’ qualifications and employment experience are currently assessed by Commonwealth immigration officers as part of the selection process. The remainder are assessed by professional or other bodies.

The labor movement’s involvement in migration policy development generally and migrant selection in particular has been particularly marked throughout Australia’s history (Collins, 1991). The government’s view after 1949 was very much influenced by the trade unions. It was that “Australia did not want professionally displaced persons and that they would not be recognized by Australian professional bodies.” The Immigration Minister (Calwell) made it clear that “he would not be taking action to force change” (Moore, 1994:15).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source Country</th>
<th>Managers and Administrators</th>
<th>Professionals</th>
<th>Para-Professionals</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Not in Labor Force</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>616</td>
<td>885</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>468</td>
<td>1,819</td>
<td>3,894</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>745</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>533</td>
<td>1,191</td>
<td>2,681</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>1,032</td>
<td>1,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People’s Republic of China</td>
<td>770</td>
<td>1,785</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>1,704</td>
<td>3,183</td>
<td>7,761</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>1,570</td>
<td>2,808</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>582</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>1,253</td>
<td>2,180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total from these sources</td>
<td>2,535</td>
<td>3,975</td>
<td>667</td>
<td>3,846</td>
<td>10,048</td>
<td>21,074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Number from Asia</td>
<td>3,089</td>
<td>5,397</td>
<td>865</td>
<td>7,153</td>
<td>15,580</td>
<td>32,084</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of total from Asia</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>37.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>1,079</td>
<td>1,039</td>
<td>451</td>
<td>3,987</td>
<td>6,516</td>
<td>13,072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Oceania</td>
<td>1,233</td>
<td>1,367</td>
<td>556</td>
<td>5,204</td>
<td>8,401</td>
<td>16,761</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total for all sources</td>
<td>6,113</td>
<td>12,455</td>
<td>2,841</td>
<td>23,593</td>
<td>40,750</td>
<td>85,752</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, 1997, Table 1.3.
Occupational groups continue to have a large degree of control over access to occupations, often with government complicity. An analysis of the historical development of professional and other occupational groups shows that there are a number of reasons for wanting to control entry. They relate to the restrictive nature of the occupational group, wanting to keep the occupations for selected individuals and/or protecting the incomes of existing practitioners (Iredale, 1987, Hawthorne, 1995). The situation varies by occupation and by state/territory, so it is not possible to provide a detailed explanation of how this works here (see Iredale, 1997 for a comparison with the United States, Canada, New Zealand and the European Union).

The Federal Government’s Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Australia (LSIA) tends to underestimate the magnitude of skills wastage. Findings from this study are that 78 percent gain full recognition of their overseas qualifications, but the sample only includes those who attempted formal recognition (Flattau and Wood, 1997:34). Baker and Robertson (1995) and Iredale and Nivison-Smith (1995) identified problems but to a different degree. The difference depends on whether the sample for measuring recognition rates includes those who do not attempt recognition. Experience shows that many people do not attempt the process because they are discouraged by what they have heard, and therefore Iredale and Nivison-Smith (1995) argue that the sample should include all those with post-school qualifications. Other studies have also shown very high nonrecognition rates. For example, Chapman and Iredale (1990) found a 79 percent nonrecognition rate among holders of all types of post-school qualifications.

The Race To Qualify Report (Committee for the Review of Practices for the Employment of Medical Practitioners in the NSW Health System, 1998:13) highlighted the need to ensure that “separation of standards assessment from workforce-management questions or membership of particular organizations” in the accreditation of overseas-trained medical practitioners is very clear. There is a reliance on overseas trained medical practitioners – 22 percent of medical practitioners in New South Wales acquired their primary medical qualification overseas (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 1998:46). Moreover, temporary residents occupy medical training positions, but they are actually carrying out routine medical duties. Elements of the selection and recognition processes continue to favor doctors from particular backgrounds (mainly English speaking) and The Race to Qualify refers to the possibility of unlawful discrimination in relation to the differential treatment of permanent resident and temporary entry medical practitioners. Moreover, the NSW Medical Registration Board was withdrawing the registration of medical practitioners once they
became permanent citizens. As Jupp (1998:86) states the “White Australian tradition cannot be discounted.”

Further tightening of the overall situation occurred in Australia in 1999 with the exclusion of Independent skilled migrants over the age of 45 and the requirement that Independent and Skilled-Australian Linked (formerly Concessional Family) migrants be fully self-supporting for the first two years. The latter will serve to exclude many less wealthy migrants.

It is possible to differentiate skilled permanent migrants by sex in Australia. In 1989–90, 47 percent of Skill visas went to women and 33 percent of female immigrants entered in the Skill category. On the other hand, 37.8 percent of men entered in the Skill category. Increased awareness has led to changes in the administration of selection policy in Australia. The most qualified person in the family is now considered for the Independent category, or the two people are considered together and their points are pooled. Nevertheless, data for 1996–97 show that 53 percent of all Skill visas still went to males (Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, 1998:19).

The top three occupations of new migrants in 1996–97, for all entry categories, were general managers (2,920), accountants (1,338) and computer professionals (1,324). The proportion of females was 30 percent, 55 percent and 30 percent, respectively. For the next two largest professional occupations, registered nurses and secondary school teachers, the female proportions were close to 90 percent and 66 percent, respectively. Hawthorne (1996:3) notes that while the “predominance of women in traditional female fields such as nursing shows no signs of abating, there has been a marked rise in female representation in higher status fields traditionally regarded as male.” From 1982–83 to 1992–93, the percentage of female doctors arriving almost doubled from 22 percent to 41 percent and the percentage of female dentists increased from 2 percent to 51 percent. Hawthorne also provides evidence on the growing number of women (especially from Asia) migrating to Australia as Principal Applicants, often with their husbands and children as dependants.

In New Zealand, from 1991 skilled immigration came to be seen as a way of fueling economic growth. Entry in the skills and business category made up 70 percent of the permanent intake in the early 1990s. In 1995, New Zealand moved to a situation where in the skills categories the only people eligible for entry were those with actual registration/licensing or a three year ‘equivalent’ qualification (even when there was none available in New Zealand in the relevant occupation) (Iredale, 1997). This situation has now been released again due to the difficulty of acquiring ‘accredited’ skilled migrants.
Therefore, in most developed countries of permanent migration, the 1990s have witnessed a renewed effort to shift immigration preferences towards less universal criteria. Higher priority is being given to educated skilled migrants. This trend affects other categories as well, as seen in the recent change in Australia from the Concessional Family to the Skilled-Australian Linked category, with its much higher emphasis on employability.

Policies for Temporary Migration

Immigrant-receiving Countries of United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. In addition to the economic component of the permanent immigration program, foreign workers whose skills are in short supply or who can provide economic benefits are admitted to all four countries on a temporary basis. Table 3 shows the number of temporary skilled workers admitted to the United States, Canada and Australia from 1992–1995.

This is clearly a growing sector in the United States with the number of skilled workers increasing markedly in the last few years. The numbers under-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionals (visa H-1B)</td>
<td>110.2</td>
<td>92.8</td>
<td>105.9</td>
<td>117.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North American Free Trade Agreement (visa TN)</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>23.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers of distinguished abilities (visa O)</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total for the above three categories of workers</td>
<td>123.2</td>
<td>112.5</td>
<td>130.7</td>
<td>147.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of total temporary worker*</td>
<td>70.1</td>
<td>64.0</td>
<td>74.4</td>
<td>83.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers obliged to validate their job*</td>
<td>66.4</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td>42.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionals*</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reciprocal employment-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bilateral agreements (for 2 years)</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers with significant benefits for Canada</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total for the above four categories of workers</td>
<td>81.8</td>
<td>68.1</td>
<td>69.6</td>
<td>59.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of total temporary workers</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>43.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled temporary resident programme</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of total temporary worker*</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Notes: The categories of temporary workers differ from country to country. The figures for total temporary workers refer to the total work permits issued in Canada and the United States and to the sum of temporary programmes in Australia (excluding students).

* As percent of total temporary workers (excluding 112,120 intracompany transfers and 13,180 treaty traders).

Data refer to the number of employment authorizations.

The list of jobs that can be validated excludes unskilled jobs, those restricted to Canadian citizens, and those with a high rate of unemployment.

These workers are exempt from validation by an employment service of the government. The authorizations are usually delivered for 9 months. Reciprocal workers include professors and researchers admitted under bilateral agreements and some specialists.

As percent of temporary residents program.
estimate the impact since many temporary visas allow stays of more than one year. H-1B visas last for six years, and there are no labor market tests. Throughout 1998 there was heavy pressure on the government from employers to increase the number of H1-B visas, especially for the computer and information technology industries. Employers argued that the shortage of skilled professionals was holding back growth. The White House initially resisted these calls in the face of strong opposition from those who claimed that American workers were available and that employers were simply looking for cheaper workers (Pear, 1998). Eventually, there was a decision to lift the intake of H1-B visa holders.

While skilled workers have come to comprise a growing proportion of temporary entrant workers in Canada, as shown in Table 3, the actual number of such workers has not increased as in the United States. This led to a call (Trempe et al., 1997:68–9) for a revamping of the system for handling temporary foreign workers away from a government-administered program to an approval process that is “streamlined and commercially realistic. There should be a presumption of benefit to Canada based on the inherent cost to a business of bringing in a foreign worker, the transfer of new skills and ideas to the Canadian workforce, and the benefits of facilitating free trade.”

Table 3 shows that temporary migration to Australia has remained stable in recent years. Australia has traditionally not used short-term or contract employment programs to supplement its workforce, but foreign investment in Australia and internationalization of the economy have given rise to the temporary movement of specialists, skilled workers and managers within the organizational frameworks of foreign companies. Within this, there are short-stay or up to three months visas (288,288 in 1996–97) and long-stay visas (25,786 in 1996–97). The top five countries for short stay visas in 1996–97 were the United States, China, United Kingdom, Japan and Indonesia. Long-stay visas, for a maximum of four years, are issued to senior personnel of companies operating or wanting to operate in Australia, independent executives seeking to set up in Australia, and personnel coming under a labor or regional headquarters agreement. Major source countries were the United Kingdom, the United States, Japan, South Africa, China and Canada.

Movement within and to Asia. The flow of skilled ‘transients’ has become very important in the Asia-Pacific region with globalization and the new international division of labor. Older industrialized economies investing in newly industrializing countries often send their own managerial and professional staff. They consider it important to have staff who not only know the job but
know the company. Thus, firms and governments in sending and receiving countries are responsible for transfers of capital and the formation of economic linkages that function as bridges for both capital and labor (Sassen, 1994).

Most countries permit the inflow of skilled temporaries, though they may have policies to protect their own workers and ensure that nationals eventually displace expatriates. A few examples will be provided before looking at the major flows.

In Singapore, foreign nationals with overseas qualifications who satisfy all immigration requirements need only be accepted by employers to work. As part of the move to attract foreign talent, a recent development means that companies can now claim twice the corporate tax of 26 percent for approved relocation and recruitment expenses when hiring foreign talent on either a temporary or permanent basis.

In Indonesia, the situation is relatively more restricted both from the point of view of immigration requirements and in relation to entry to particular occupations. Skilled migrants can only come as designated employees—they cannot work privately or seek work privately. On December 31, 1997, there were 48,417 professional expatriates employed in Indonesia (Asian Migration News, February 28, 1998). Organizations wishing to employ foreigners first apply for approval from the government. The organization is required to state the occupation, period of service, details of the employee and plan for the eventual replacement of the foreign employee with an Indonesian. Once this document has been issued, the foreigner must apply for a work permit and a temporary residence permit. Acceptance is given “provided that the foreigner is clearly conducting activities in which there is a lack of Indonesian professionals qualified to do the work and that there is a transfer of knowledge and expertise to Indonesians” (National Office of Overseas Skills Recognition, 1996:8). With the financial crisis, the inflow of skilled migrants dropped markedly.

Before then, however, the process was lengthy and complex and in line with the position that foreigners working in Indonesia were accepted as an essential factor in sustaining the nation’s pre-1998 rapid economic development. The process was not conducive to easy skilled immigration and most foreigners worked on short-term contracts while on tourist visas. They flew out of Indonesia every 60 days to get their visas renewed. Therefore, the data on skilled migration were very unreliable.

The Philippines, which has a surplus of skilled workers in many sectors and a shortage in others, does not promote skilled immigration but allows foreigners to work provided they meet certain requirements. In the case of permanent immigrants, some registrable professions require three years’ residence before
registration is available to them. Others only allow foreigners to sit for professional examinations if there is a reciprocal arrangement for Filipino nationals in their country.

These examples have been cited to show that, while there are some restrictions on temporary movement, they are able to be circumvented. The restrictions are generally to try to protect positions for locals, but they do not prohibit others from coming in for temporary entry.

Any attempt to summarize the skilled labor flows within Asia is bound to be flawed. According to Pang (1994), however, three streams of skilled labor migration have expanded rapidly in the Asia-Pacific region since 1985 (Figure 3). Note that the size of the arrows does not indicate the magnitude of the flow. Much of the mobility is associated with the movement of capital, and most of the skilled labor migration is temporary rather than permanent, though there is an increasing amount of permanent movement of various forms.
The first stream identified by Pang is an intraregional flow between industrialized Eastern Asia and developing Southeastern Asia. It includes the flow of skilled and professional workers from Japan, Taiwan and Hong Kong to Southeastern and Southern Asia (and the flow of unskilled workers in the opposite direction). The southward streams to Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines are part of the flow of trade, investment and technology.

For example, Japanese policy continues to stress the exchange of high-level skills with other developed economies, the temporary exportation of Japanese expertise to the less developed countries and the newly industrialized countries, with some reciprocal movement of skilled personnel for training in Japan (United Nations, 1998:129). Whereas in 1975 the number of Japanese (excluding tourists) departing for overseas was 439,135, by 1988 this figure had reached almost 1.4 million (Skeldon, 1992:42). Just over one million of these trips were short business trips in 1988, but by 1993 the number of short business trips was 1.5 to 2 million (Garnier, 1996:394). Similarly, there were 300,000 annual departures for business from South Korea in 1989, representing a tenfold increase in the mid-1970s figure. Almost two thirds of these trips were to Japan, followed by the United States, Hong Kong and Taiwan.

Professionals and skilled workers migrate temporarily to manage capital, to oversee multinational projects, and to provide management and consulting services. They are joined by job seekers and investors, as well as by European, American, Canadian and Australian professionals, junior and middle-level managers, and engineers and data-processing personnel. Over time, the movement of skilled Asians to service these investments has increased as the costs of maintaining Western expatriates, the problems posed by different languages and cultures, and the availability of local specialists increased. Some governments have also imposed restrictions on employing foreigners, except where no national is available.

At the same time as there were these movements from Japan and South Korea, there were complementary flows into these two countries from within the region as well as from outside. The second stream is found within Southeast Asia and consists of the temporary flow of skilled and professional workers from Singapore to Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and southern China to service investments. In the 1990s, the Singapore government has come to see this movement as beneficial for the internationalization of Singapore’s economy. Concern about the permanent emigration of professionals to the United States, Canada and
Australia has been matched by attempts to improve the quality of life and education in Singapore.

This component also includes a large reverse flow of skilled technical labor into Singapore from neighboring countries. The skilled inflow is not subject to any restrictions, unlike the unskilled intake. Special programs are in place to attract skilled workers (especially Chinese from Hong Kong) to offset permanent emigration.

The third major stream occurs within East Asia and consists of a large flow (much of it is daily commuting) of professionals, managers and technicians from Hong Kong into the Pearl River Delta region and to other parts of the world and a short-term flow of professionals and managers from Taiwan into China and Vietnam. Both of these skilled flows are associated with the division of labor in the region, where China/Taiwan have come to be the site for investment in labor-intensive industries (such as garments, toys and electronics).

Pang’s three categories apply within Asia, but it is necessary to add a fourth category: movement between Asia and neighboring regions/rest of the world. Salt and Finlay (1989) explain the increased level of skill flows from developed to developing countries and the complex pattern of expatriate usage by American companies in terms of linkages with capital flows. Beaverstock (1992) has developed these ideas further in relation to the role of world cities which have become critical nodes in the ownership, locational organization and internationalization of capital (Sassen, 1991).

The permanent movement of many skilled migrants from Hong Kong to the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand in the 1980s and 1990s has already been discussed. Many of these people subsequently returned home or never left permanently but maintained a continuous connection with their businesses or employment in Hong Kong. Hong Kong became a major destination for professional and technical workers from many countries in the 1980s and 1990s, partly to replace skills shortages created by those who left but also because of the number of high level positions that were created by the rapid rate of growth of Hong Kong and its development into a global city. The number of highly skilled and professional and managerial workers imported increased from 6,000-7,000 in the mid-1980s to 11,000 in 1992. The majority were expatriates brought in by companies to fill senior positions in multinational corporations.

It is now argued that highly skilled professional and managerial skills are not only directed towards head offices in world cities, such as Hong Kong and Singapore, by intracompany transfers, but they are also attracted to these
cities to take advantage of the personal benefits they may accrue (Findlay, 1995). Findlay et al. (1996:50) argue that a “pool of skilled international labor is both a prerequisite and a consequence of being a global city. It is a prerequisite since a labor pool of this type is needed to offer firms the capability of coordinating activity ... and it is a consequence since operations of this kind attract those with specific international skills to global cities.” Thus, cities such as Tokyo and Hong Kong attract further investment because “they have pools of highly-skilled indigenous and migrant workers in situ produced by global labor market conditions” (Beaverstock and Smith, 1996:1393). The numbers going to Hong Kong continued to increase to 1997, but the effect of the crisis has been to bring about a policy shift and reduction in the number of visas issued because of fears of unemployment. “The move is in marked contrast to Singapore’s more accommodating stance towards foreign talents. Getting a work permit in Singapore can now be as quick as two weeks” (Asian Migration News, 1999).

Mainland China, Hong Kong, Taiwan and other Asian countries lose large numbers of skilled personnel, both as permanent migrants and in the form of overseas students who do not return home. For China this became such a problem in the early 1990s that the government introduced tighter selection of those sponsored to go as well as a contractual arrangement to encourage people to return to China. Other measures have been used to try to encourage the return of people, including the provision of generous research funds, better housing and work environments, and more flexibility in work arrangements (Yan, 1996).

Prior to the financial crisis, an increasing number of skilled people returned to parts of Asia after studying or working in Western industrialized countries. The number escalated with the slowing of growth in many developed economies, increased opportunities available in Asian economies, and incentives and programs which were designed to encourage people to return home (United Nations, 1998:125).

*The Role of Regional Blocs in the Movement of Skilled Labor in the Region*

This section looks briefly at the creation of regional blocs and whether they have had any role in the increased level of skilled migration. Space does not permit a detailed examination, and for a longer discussion see Iredale (1998). Will the growth of regional blocs in the Asia-Pacific region lead to the emergence of new arrangements along previously undefined lines?
**Closer Economic Relations (CER).** Australia and New Zealand are similar in many ways – both were settled by the United Kingdom, they are both Commonwealth countries, and they have similar institutions. There has always been free movement of people between the two countries, and no visa is required. The Closer Economic Relations (CER) agreement was introduced in 1983 to cover trade, but also to deal with a range of other issues. The Services Protocol includes free trade in all services except telecommunications, broadcasting, marine transport, postal services, banking and insurance. Some occupations are covered under the agreement. For example, there is mutual reciprocity of medical qualifications – facilitated by the fact the Australian Medical Council accredits medical schools in both countries.

In the 1990s, talks commenced on a Trans-Tasman Mutual Recognition Agreement (TTMRA), with wider effects and involving the freer movement of skilled labor and the mutual recognition of qualifications. The intention is to move to a mini-common labor market with mutual reciprocity arrangements (the preferred option) developing in some occupations while in others there will merely be a sharing of resources. There are no directives as in the European Union (Iredale, 1998), and the outcome is in the hands of each occupational group.

**Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN).** “ASEAN’s founders in 1967 intended ASEAN to be an association of all the states of Southeast Asia cooperating voluntarily for the common good, with peace and economic, social and cultural development its primary purposes” (Severino, 1998). It is not a supranational entity acting independently of its members. It has no regional parliament or council of ministers with lawmaking powers, no power of enforcement, and no judicial system.

ASEAN has been slowly moving towards a Free Trade Area – with the 1992 Common Effective Preferential Tariff scheme, a 1995 decision to accelerate the reduction in tariffs, and current negotiations on trade in services (gas, transport, etc). ASEAN is also building an ASEAN Investment Area to draw investments from within and outside the region, and an ASEAN University Network has been established.

ASEAN member states have not favored the free movement of labor, nor do they offer preferential treatment for workers from member states. Nevertheless, according to the United Nations (1998:163), “cross-border immigration industries in the region, involving employment promoters, manpower suppliers, trade associations and transnational corporations, have been pivotal in mobilizing market opportunities.”
According to the Secretary-General (Severino, 1998), ASEAN may have to move toward the greater use of more formal instruments and binding commitments in the future, as developments like the financial and economic crisis and the rise of transboundary problems such as pollution of the sea and air “press ASEAN’s members to ever closer coordination, cooperation and integration.” Population movement, especially labor flows, may also become one of these transboundary problems.

*Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Forum.* The 1993 Bogor Declaration stressed human resources development, but this was only intended to extend to the movement of skilled personnel or trade in services. Since then, there have been discussions about strategies for developing and sharing human resources but there has been little change. Skills shortages in many economies have put pressure on the need for a concerted strategy. But outside of Australia and New Zealand there is wide variation in training standards, styles of training (informal/formal), nature of occupations, degree of entry control to occupations, different licensing, registration and certification arrangements, and different bodies for controlling entry. There is little movement to date that is related to government policy. Most movement is employer initiated and organized.

There have been limited moves, especially by Australia, towards freeing up the movement of labor within the Asian region – mostly to enable the freer movement of Australia’s professionals, technicians and tradespeople to Asian countries. Australia’s National Office of Overseas Skills Recognition (NOOSR) compiled a directory of 39 occupations in ASEAN nations and Australia in the hope that improved information will assist the flow of labor and encouraged engineers to look at ways of developing bilateral arrangements for the movement of engineers between countries. The first project resulted in a publication, *Skills Recognition Directory for Professional Occupations in ASEAN and Australia* (National Office of Overseas Skills Recognition, 1996), which outlines the education and training, regulatory and professional recognition requirements and contacts for each occupation. The second has been an occupation-specific strategy between the Australian Institution of Engineers and similar bodies/government departments elsewhere (Indonesia, Hong Kong).

**CONCLUSION**

Much of the skilled labor movement in Asia is temporary and seen as advantageous as it is associated with economic interests. However, it has not just
been driven by economic forces as much of the literature would suggest. The flows are inextricably linked with political and social changes that are taking place in the region. To explain what is happening, it is essential that the framework be broadened to include policy and social factors.

Unlike contract labor migration, highly skilled migration has not been contentious. The voices of countries losing skilled personnel permanently have generally gone unheard. 'Brain drain' has been to the advantage of the developed countries – a form of "development aid from the developing to the developed countries" (Naidu, 1998). Developed countries have not engaged in discussion with less developed states in their region.

The situation is complicated by the fact that a 'loss' is not necessarily permanent or without return benefits as former migrants come back home, either permanently or temporarily, with newly acquired skills, business investment capital, and valuable overseas networks. To date, regional bodies have generally enabled trade in services (including temporary skilled migration) but have had little role in other forms of skilled migration. The exception is the Closer Economic Relations (CER) agreement between Australia and New Zealand which facilitates the movement of skilled labor. This situation is likely to continue as migration policies continue to be seen as a 'national endeavor' rather than a matter for regional cooperation (Battistella, 1998:9).

Thus state policies are of overwhelming significance as nations strive to gain an advantage from the importation of highly skilled labor. Governments work with firms to facilitate their access to skilled human resources, but when it comes to permanent skilled movements, other factors come into play.

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**Intercountry Adoption as a Migratory Practice: A Comparative Analysis of Intercountry Adoption and Immigration Policy and Practice in the United States, Canada and New Zealand in the Post W.W. II Period**

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The United States immigration and intercountry adoption policies and practice are compared with those of Canada and New Zealand. In the post World War II period, both the United States and Canada have been significant as receiving countries for intercountry adoptees, while New Zealand has proportionately been one of the least significant receiving countries in the West. Intercountry adoptions were addressed in legislation and incorporated into immigration criteria and procedures in the immediate post war period in response to the displaced children of Europe. The early immigration legislation for the migration of children for adoption tended to be reactive and temporary. By the 1970s, there was an increased demand for intercountry adoption, and permanent provisions were established in immigration legislation and criteria. Despite the endorsement of this practice through immigration policy, no national policy corollary that addressed the welfare of these children emerged in the United States or Canada. In contrast, in New Zealand, immigration policy and criteria has been shaped by a national policy on intercountry adoption as a practice since the 1960s. This article traces the development of immigration policy and intercountry adoption policy and practice in all three countries. It is argued that ultimately, with respect to policy priorities and practice, all three countries have prioritized national needs and well being over the 'needs and welfare' of child migrants for adoption.

The practice of intercountry adoption as a solution for children needing families and material security emerged in the post World War II period (Weil,

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1984; McRoy, 1991). Initially, recipient societies responded to the displaced children of Europe both during and in the war aftermath. From the 1950s to the present, the migration of children for adoption to First World nations became an established practice. The availability of children for intercountry adoption has been shaped by political upheaval, civil wars, natural disasters and domestic family policies in the Third World; notably in Korea, Cuba, Vietnam, Cambodia, Latin America, and more recently in Romania, the former Soviet Union and The People's Republic of China.

Historically the practice of intercountry adoption in the post World War II period can be conceptualized as having occurred in two waves (Westhues and Cohen, 1994; Alstein and Simon, 1991). The first wave occurred immediately after the war and lasted up until the mid-1970s. This wave has been characterized as a largely humanitarian response to the predicament of children in ‘war-torn’ countries. The second wave, from the mid-1970s to the present, has also been shaped by humanitarian concerns for children, often in war zones and always living in conditions of poverty. However, unlike the first wave, the second wave has also been driven by falling fertility rates in the West and a decrease in the number of healthy Caucasian infants available for adoption domestically. The two waves might be characterized from the recipient society view as: 1) finding families for children and 2) finding children for families.

This article provides a comparison of intercountry adoption and immigration policy in the United States, Canada and New Zealand in the post World War II period. Documenting and analyzing how recipient societies respond in policy to children migrating for adoption provides an insight into the social context within which the ‘humanitarian endeavor’ is embedded. The migration of children for adoption currently involves approximately 20,000 children a year. Of these, approximately 10,000 migrate to the United States, 2,500 to Canada and 500 to New Zealand (Weil, 1984; Sobol and Daly, 1995; New Zealand Citizenship, 1997).

All three countries share points of commonality with respect to their migration and immigration histories. As settler capitalist societies colonized by a predominantly British population, all three countries were incorporated into the world economy as semi-dependent producers of primary products and have been dependent on immigration to supply labor for expanding labor markets. All three countries have at various times employed discriminatory immigration policies on the basis of country of origin and race and all addressed these policies in the post war period (Ongley and Pearson,
1995:765). Child migration, specifically child migration for adoption, has occurred within this context and has been shaped by these more general societal similarities and immigration concerns.

**THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IMMIGRATION AND INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION POLICY**

The relationship between immigration policy and intercountry adoption practice is not only highly dependent, it has, over time, in all three countries changed in response to national and international realities and social pressure in the post-war period. This article considers comparatively two main policy arenas: 1) immigration policy and 2) intercountry adoption policy. While obviously these two policy arenas overlap and are interrelated, it is argued that intercountry adoption and immigration policies and criteria are shaped by quite disparate overriding concerns.

Generally, immigration policy stresses and is guided by the welfare of the state/nation and society. Here the control of immigration is motivated by a nation’s concern with self-preservation and enhancement. Immigration must not threaten nor undermine the functioning or continuance of a nation. The potential of immigrants from different nations, with differing cultural and social values, to enhance or undermine societal well-being has been central to immigration policy formation in all three societies and has impacted on child migration for adoption policy and practice (Hawkins, 1991; Edmonston and Passel, 1994; Ongley and Pearson, 1995).

With respect to intercountry adoption, the welfare of the child has emerged as the paramount concern. Various international conventions since World War II have stressed that the welfare of the child should be central to intercountry adoption practices and policies. While these two concerns, societal well-being and the well-being of the child, need not be incompatible or contradictory, it is important not to conflate the two as one and the same. Intercountry adoption can only take place if immigration policy facilitates the practice and, by extension, if the practice is considered to be in keeping with national objectives.

Historically, the adoption of children from some countries was not possible because of immigration criteria, rather than any established policy on intercountry adoption or concerns about the welfare of intercountry

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2These points of comparison are applied by Ongley and Pearson (1995) to the immigration policies of Canada, Australia and New Zealand. However, they are equally relevant to a comparison between the United States, Canada and New Zealand.
adoptees. Thus, ultimately, the welfare of the child of a different national origin and location has been secondary to the welfare of the recipient nation/society.

It is necessary to clarify what is meant by 'national concern,' and/or 'national interest,' which are invariably expressed through 'national policy.' It is argued that national concerns or interests encompass those actions that contribute to the functioning of and continuance of the nation. All actions at the macro level are at least in some way measured in terms of whether they will either enhance or undermine societal well being. Thus, nations consider their relation to the international community and how their national objectives and practices shape or impact on international standing, reputation and image. Nations also consider how they will sustain and reproduce themselves and attempt to predict how various policies and practices will enhance or could potentially undermine societal stability. All three nations have regulated their migratory flows in the post World War II period, and this regulation has been shaped by the aforementioned concerns.

The following argument also addresses the actions or practices of nationals/citizens, that is, the prospective and actual adoptive parents of children of another national origin. On the surface it appears that the practice of inter-country adoption is one that is instigated and achieved by individuals who are motivated by individual concerns and needs and that the nations' concerns, as manifest in policy and practice, are somehow separate or different from those of individuals (or nationals). However, it is misleading to conceptualize the needs and concerns of prospective parents as being somehow outside of or separate from the needs and concerns of the nation. Individuals who adopt from abroad do so within a particular domestic/international/political context. Their needs and desires are socially constructed and emerge out of the same domestic/international/political and economic context as the policies that formally address national needs and concerns. Thus, not surprisingly, the interests of individual families have at various times been one and the same as the interests of the nation, and at other times they have been at odds with the interests of the nation. But as we will see, in the post-war period, ultimately, individual family interests seldom stand in stark opposition to national interests, indeed there is a considerable degree of convergence. The actions of individuals (nationals) have often served national ends. For example, the concerns and practices of individuals (nationals) have contributed significantly to national image internationally, have complemented domestic race relations policy, have helped to promote domestic adoption objectives,
and have dampened dissatisfaction with domestic adoption policies and realities. Further, in more recent times national policy and practice has been shaped by the demands and needs of nationals, and it has been in the interest of these nations to address these domestic demands and needs. Ultimately, the nation's needs and the needs of nationals have been prioritized over the well being of the child of a different national origin migrating for adoption in the post World War II period.

**AD HOC RESPONSES: THE FIRST WAVE – FINDING FAMILIES FOR CHILDREN**

The first wave of migration immediately after World War II involved the placement of orphaned children from Europe. Finding families for children was both a domestic and international issue in the immediate post-war period. However, in all three countries immigration regulations provided an obstacle to the migration of children for adoption.

The United States has been a major receiving country for intercountry adoptees since World War II. Intercountry adoption into the United States constitutes a significant migratory trend. Beginning in 1947, this migration has seen over 200,000 children migrate to the United States for adoption by U.S. citizens or residents (Carlson, 1988:318). The first provision for intercountry adoption in the United States was President Truman's directive of December 22, 1945, which addressed the needs of displaced persons in Europe and allowed for the migration of refugees and unaccompanied minors.

While a humanitarian gesture, the President's directive did not compromise national objectives. Fears raised about a possible flood of migrants were appeased by retaining existing quotas, and humanitarian objectives were met by giving refugee applicants priority (Forbes and Weiss, 1985). Over 1,300 unaccompanied children entered the United States under these provisions. The children came primarily from Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Germany. Both federal government and private agencies in this instance shared the responsibility for these children and their care. Some of the younger children amongst this group were adopted by U.S. citizens and represent the beginning of the post World War II trend of children migrating for adoption to the United States (Forbes and Weiss, 1985:9).

All of the early legislative provisions for intercountry adoption in the United States were provided under refugee legislation, which tended to be largely *ad hoc* and reactive to global crises (Forbes and Weiss, 1985). The lack
of continuity in policy in the period 1947–1962 impacted at various times on the entry of both refugees and adoptees (Forbes and Weiss, 1985; Carlson, 1988). Following the President’s directive of 1945, Congress enacted the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, which contained a provision for the immigration of 3,000 ‘displaced orphans’ over and above existing quotas (Carlson, 1988:325). However, this provision was not made in terms of any long-term aspirations with respect to intercountry adoption as a practice any more than it was with respect to refugees generally. As Carlson (1988:326) observes, “Its purpose was not to facilitate trans-national adoption for the benefit of United States citizens or for orphan children generally, but to relieve an emergency refugee problem.”

However, only a decade later, in the United States the motivations for adopting children from abroad began to change. The adoption of children from Europe occurred at a time when domestically there were plenty of children available for adoption (Alstein and Simon, 1991; McRoy, 1991). By the 1950s, the demand for children, specifically healthy Caucasian infants, began to exceed the numbers of infants available domestically. Prospective adoptive parents increasingly saw intercountry adoption as a solution to the domestic shortage, but there were no legislative provisions to facilitate this (Forbes and Weiss, 1985; Carlson, 1988).

The earliest provisions for intercountry adoption were shaped by United States military involvement in Europe. By the 1950s, military involvement in Asia prompted further provisions. Specifically, special provisions were instituted in 1953 to enable military and government employees stationed in Korea to adopt Korean orphans. This provision created a precedent for interracial intercountry adoption and informed the next legislative move (Carlson, 1988).

The Refugee Act of 1953 addressed individuals fleeing Eastern Bloc countries and also allowed 4,000 special non-quota visas for orphans (Forbes and Weiss, 1985:10). Unlike previous legislation, this Act contained an explicit adoption-orientated definition and addressed the demands of prospective parents domestically (Forbes and Weiss, 1985:10). The Act provided for the first time a nonrestrictive intercountry adoption immigration policy that could be used by all prospective parents in the United States. The 1953 legislation marks the beginning of a trend, and when it expired in 1956 there was a ‘clamor of would-be adoptive parents,’ demanding further legislation to facilitate intercountry adoption (Pettis, 1958). Between 1954 and 1958 it is estimated that approximately 10,000 foreign children were adopt-
ed into American families. A significant number of these children were from Germany, Japan and Korea and were adopted by American military personnel stationed in those countries (Pettis, 1958:27).

Emerging out of more general refugee migration, intercountry adoption was viewed as first and foremost a migratory phenomenon. Issues and concerns connected with the emergency mass migration of adults from both traditional and nontraditional source countries shaped opinion and policy on the migration of unaccompanied minors for adoption (Forbes and Weiss, 1985). The earliest discussions which focused on this form of migration addressed concerns about possible chain migration, backdoor migration, and the possible influence that these migrants would have on American citizens. In the more extreme, discussions focused on whether these children, as nationals of countries with which the United States had been at war, would present a threat to national security or would serve as a drain on resources and whether or not they could potentially have a ‘bad influence’ on their American peers (Forbes and Weiss, 1985). These national concerns were central to debates that led to immigration policy formation on the migration of unaccompanied minors between 1939 and the mid-1950s. While the response to these children and their welfare needs might well be characterized as humanitarian, it was very much shaped by national concerns and needs. Ultimately, domestic political concerns took priority over humanitarian concern for foreign orphaned children.

By the 1950s, the migration of children for adoption became increasingly prevalent, and it was the domestic adoption laws that effectively dealt with general immigration concerns. Specifically, domestic adoption laws stipulated that all biological ties were severed on adoption, hence chain migration was not possible if the adoption was finalized in the United States. Concerns about backdoor migration and the character of these child migrants were allayed by age and quota restrictions and qualifying criteria for adoptive parents.

In 1956, agencies involved in intercountry adoption became concerned about the increasing number of adoptions that were finalized by proxy. With the adoptions finalized abroad, the screening of adoptive parents, which was standard practice for domestic adoptions, was not possible. A number of these adoptions had been detrimental to the welfare of the child (Pettis, 1958; Di Virgilio, 1956; Graham, 1957; Valk, 1957). As a consequence, an amendment in legislation in 1957 prohibited proxy adoptions. However, discrepancies between domestic and international adoption practices continued to emerge.
The lack of policy on intercountry adoption meant that the process had emerged and developed without regulation, and in the process the welfare needs peculiar to the child migrant for adoption were often overlooked. Parents wishing to adopt domestically at this time were subject to home evaluations; those who adopted abroad were not always subject to this scrutiny. Prospective parents who could not meet domestic qualifying criteria – for example, age, religious affiliation, marital status – increasingly turned to intercountry adoption, where the criteria in relinquishing societies varied considerably and in many instances was less restrictive. Intercountry adoption to the United States had also increasingly become interracial adoption at a time when interracial adoption domestically was not common practice. At this time there was an abundance of children of ‘mixed race’ available for adoption domestically and for whom welfare practitioners found it very difficult to find families and homes. However, while prospective parents would contemplate interracial adoption from abroad, many would not contemplate a domestic interracial adoption.

In 1957, the responsibility for implementing the Orphans program shifted from the Department of State to the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the Department of Justice. This change had a number of significant procedural implications. Prior to 1957, the issuing of immigration visas for children migrating for adoption depended on the recommendation of a recognized national, state or local child welfare agency. Under the 1957 provisions, these recommendations became supplementary to the INS’s own investigations of the prospective adoptive parents and their homes (Pettis, 1958:29). Many in child welfare circles were critical of this change and argued that INS staff lacked the qualifications to make these assessments. And while this was undoubtedly the case, this change clearly reveals the prioritizing of national concerns over and above child welfare concerns. This change in policy and procedure signals that the state considered the assessment of the suitability of these children for migration and the suitability of the adoptive families as primarily an immigration concern. As an immigration concern, the state considered the INS the most appropriate body to assess whether the migration and placement for adoption should or could take place.

The 1957 Act was followed by two more temporary acts that extended the orphan provisions. In congressional hearings in 1959, it was clear that provisions for intercountry adoption would be made permanent in the United States basic immigration law (Carlson, 1988; Weil, 1984). Intercountry adoption had become an accepted migratory practice; it was also by this time meeting a national need.
The Canadian response to intercountry adoption in the post World War II period was shaped by other wartime initiatives. With the outbreak of World War II, Canada, as with other British colonies, responded to the needs of child evacuees from Britain. In total, 4,000 children came to Canada from Britain during the period of the war (Wagner, 1982). This program was an emergency response, and adoption was not the intended outcome. Rather, these children were repatriated and reunited with their families after the war (Pask, 1990). However, it was this program which prompted a number of requests by ‘ethnic’ (Canadians who were not of British origin) groups to allow the entry of other children, for fostering and adoption, in the post-war period. This evacuee program represents the beginning of a trend whereby Canada offered the opportunity of migration and support to children in war-torn countries.

Thus, in response to requests from Canadian citizens in the war aftermath, Canada made a number of provisions for the orphaned children of Europe. The orphans were granted entry through Orders-In-Council, rather than through permanent provisions in immigration policy. In this period, Canada granted entry to 1,086 Jewish children, all of whom had to be ‘full’ orphans (i.e., both biological parents had to be deceased) (Dirks, 1977). However, while granting entry was a humanitarian gesture, it was subject to a number of conditions, all of which ensured no cost to the state. The children were brought to Canada under the auspices of the Canadian Jewish Congress, the Congress accepted the responsibility of both financing and managing the program. The Canadian government required the Congress to guarantee that these children would not become dependent on the state. In the same period, an Order-In-Council granted entry to 1,000 Roman Catholic children orphaned due to the war. The placement of these children was overseen by provincial child welfare departments and recognized Catholic children’s societies and was subject to similar conditions (Dirks, 1977:167).

An ad hoc and conservative response typified Canada’s stance with respect to child migrants for adoption, and this at least in part was shaped by domestic child welfare concerns. Canada had an abundance of children available for adoption domestically, and there was little demand for children from abroad. Canada itself relinquished children for international adoption in this period (Bagley, 1991). Interracial adoption was not practiced and the placement of First Nations’ children, and sending illegitimate Catholic children abroad was part of adoption practice in this period (Bagley, 1991, Personal Communication, Social Work Practitioner, Quebec, 1997). In comparison with the United States, the number of children migrating to Canada for adoption was
small, and all were of European origin. The migration of children for adoption from Asia, an emerging relinquishing region in this period, was not possible due to race criteria in the immigration regulations and would not become a feature of intercountry adoption in Canada until the 1960s.

As with Canada, the migration of children for adoption in New Zealand in this period was more conservative than was the case in the United States. The New Zealand government supported only group schemes and only under special circumstances considered granting entry permits for individual intercountry adoptions up until the 1970s. Prior to and during World War II, New Zealand granted entry to a number of child-evacuees. Among those granted entry in this period were a group of Polish children. Initially it was intended that these children would be repatriated after the war, and while some were, the vast majority remained in New Zealand. Some of the children who stayed in New Zealand were adopted into New Zealand families (Minister of Immigration, 1973, Appendix C:1–5).

However, by far the most significant migration of children for adoption involved children from Britain. During the war, as with Canada, the focus in New Zealand was on evacuees. Significantly, though, not all allied children in war zones were provided for. The arrangement was exclusively with Britain, and it was made clear that provisions would not be extended to allied child refugees or colored children (Wagner, 1982:251). The pre-war and the wartime initiatives between New Zealand and Britain provided a precedent for post-war efforts. In 1949, the Child Migration Scheme between New Zealand and Britain was launched. By the time the scheme ended in 1952, over 500 children had migrated for adoption or fostering to New Zealand (Wagner, 1982:251).

These children represent the largest group of children migrating for fostering and adoption to New Zealand in the post World War II period. Unlike later schemes, not all of these children would be adopted; rather, many were fostered until they were old enough to work. The scheme was optimistically embraced by both nations and was considered to be mutually beneficial. For Britain, it provided a means by which they could address the needs of the children of the urban poor in Britain. Sending these children to New Zealand, it was argued, would provide them with the opportunity of a ‘better life.’ These child migrants conformed to New Zealand immigration criteria at the time. That is, New Zealand stood to gain young migrants from a traditional source country, who were of an ‘appropriate’ ethnicity, and who would ultimately satisfy the nation’s labor requirements. However, it is now
clear that the welfare of these children was at best a secondary concern. Many of the children were unaware that they had been relinquished for adoption, some of the biological parents had not consented to their migration nor adoption, and many of the adoptions were clearly not in the interests of the child (Wagner, 1982:257, MacDonald, 1994). Ultimately, New Zealand's response to these children was measured according to immigration criteria and perceived national needs and obligations to Britain. It was assumed that because these needs and requirements were being met that the migration and settlement of these children would be unproblematic. This was not the case; for many of these children the migration, placement, and adoption/fostering experience was problematic, and insufficient attention was given to placement and post-placement follow-up (MacDonald, 1994:31). That is, the well being of the child was ultimately a secondary consideration.

In New Zealand, immigration concerns about intercountry adoption did not become an issue until the 1960s, when the proposed adoptions were from nontraditional source countries and would in almost all instances be interracial and involve the migration of children for adoption from Asia.

In all three countries, immigration regulations initially presented an obstacle to intercountry adoption, and by the late 1950s welfare concerns began to be incorporated into immigration criteria. However, intercountry adoption, in all three countries, was taken to be first and foremost a migration issue, and ultimately national concerns shaped which children would be allowed entry for adoption. So while there were many children needing families internationally, only those children that could meet immigration criteria had the opportunity of finding families in these recipient societies. Concerns about national security; concerns about how the adoptees might influence child nationals; domestic child welfare concerns; race relations policy, in particular attitudes toward migrants from Asia; and potential state dependency – these were all factors which constrained the migration of children for adoption in the immediate post-war years. It was also in this period that the first discrepancies between domestic and intercountry adoption practice emerged. However, with the exception of proxy adoptions, these discrepancies were not addressed legislatively nor in policy on intercountry adoption.

INTERNATIONAL POLICY AND PRACTICE

In the United States, under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1961, permanent provisions for the immigration of children for adoption were made (Carlson, 1988:330). The endorsement of this migration coincided
with an international conference on intercountry adoption. While no attempts had been made to establish standards for intercountry adoption nationally, internationally the establishment of standards occurred relatively early. In January 1957, a group of experts met to study the problems encountered in the intercountry adoption of children from European countries. As a consequence of this meeting a seminar was held in May 1960 in Leysin, Switzerland. Following this meeting a report, “European Seminar on Intercountry Adoption,” made a number of recommendations, and the twelve principles outlined in this report became known as the Leysin Principles (ICWR, 1961).

It was envisaged at the time that the twelve principles would be followed in adoption and would serve as a guide for caseworkers engaged in inquiries prior to adoption. It was hoped that eventually a convention would be established on intercountry adoption, simplified procedures would be introduced, and ultimately national legislation would be amended in accordance with the principles. In essence, the report and principles emphasized that the child should be the focus in adoption, that is, the needs of the child should be paramount. Significantly, the principles and overall report did not endorse intercountry adoption. Rather, it was argued, intercountry adoption should only be considered after all other options within the child’s country of origin had been explored and found to be unworkable. The non-endorsement of intercountry adoption as a practice remained central to subsequent international conventions and guidelines until 1993.

While the guidelines and principles were published and it seems highly likely that many social work practitioners were aware of the Leysin Principles, they did not find their way into any national legislation nor did they lead to any national policy on intercountry adoption in the United States or Canada. As with many international conventions and guidelines, the principles were not enforceable, and it appears at least at the national level, for these two recipient societies, they had little effect. In contrast to both the United States and Canada, New Zealand implemented the principles and recommendations into domestic/national policy on intercountry adoption. From this point onwards international conventions were to have a more persuasive influence on practice and policy formation in New Zealand and would to a large extent inform New Zealand’s more conservative approach to intercountry adoption as a practice for the next 30 years.

3The seminar was attended by 80 adoption workers, administrators and legal experts from 15 European countries. Also in attendance were representatives from the United Nations, International Social Services and the International Union of Child Welfare, the Council to Europe and the Hague Conference on Private International Law.
ASIA EMERGES AS A SIGNIFICANT RELINQUISHING REGION

By the late 1950s and early 1960s, Asia had emerged as a significant relinquishing region. Between 1953 and 1962, approximately 15,000 foreign-born children were adopted into American families. Between 1966 and 1976, a further 32,000 children were adopted by U.S. citizens, and approximately 60 percent of these children came from Asia (Alstein and Simon, 1991:3). In 1963, the United States established the I-600 program for the migration of children for adoption. This program allowed for the issuing of a standard visa for a child who had been approved for adoption from abroad. Between 1963 and the present, the program has undergone a number of revisions, all of which have liberalized qualifying criteria and removed restrictions on this type of migration and family formation (Weil, 1984; Alstein and Simon, 1991).

However, while Americans had been adopting children from Japan, Korea and Hong Kong since the 1950s, in Canada immigration criteria served as a barrier to the intercountry adoption of children of non-European origin. By the late 1950s and early 1960s, a number of changes globally impacted on Canada’s White Policy (Hawkins, 1991). As certain British Commonwealth countries gained independence in this period, pressure and condemnation of restrictions based on non-white immigration practices mounted (JIASC, 1963:6). It was during this period that some concessions were made for both adult and child migrants on humanitarian grounds. With World Refugee Year (1959–1960), many nations, including Canada, made efforts to demonstrate their humanitarian concern and commitment to the predicament of refugees and began to make exceptions for individuals and groups (Citizenship and Immigration, 1961–62). As was the case in the United States, provisions for children for adoption emerged out of these refugee provisions (Dirks, 1977:228).

In July 1962, as a result of proposals submitted to the government by the Canadian Welfare Council, Prime Minister John Diefenbaker announced that the government had created a policy with respect to the admission of orphan refugee children for adoption (JIASC, 1963:6). This policy dealt only with the adoption of specific, individual orphan children, not with any anonymous groups of children or any unspecified child. In order to qualify under this program, the child had to be a full orphan. The child also had to have refugee status, that is, it had to be demonstrated that the child had been rendered homeless or displaced from its country of nationality or citizenship by reason of war and political unrest and could not be permanently resettled
in his/her country of permanent residence. Under this policy, prospective adoptive parents had to apply for the admission of such a child, and this application was subject to a number of further provisions. Principally, the Provincial Child Welfare Council had to certify that there were no suitable children available for adoption for the prospective parents in their province of domicile. They had to approve the suitability of the applicants as adoptive parents and approve the placement of the ‘orphan refugee child’ in the home on arrival in Canada (JIASC, 1963:6). This rather restrictive policy did not attract widespread interest. The stipulation that the child be both a full orphan and refugee could rarely be met, and domestically there was an abundance of children available for adoption (JAISC, 1964). By the late 1960s, a total of 67 children came to Canada from Hong Kong, while smaller numbers from Korea also gained entry under this criteria (Hong Kong Department of Social Welfare, 1958–1969; Westhues and Cohen, 1991).

In 1963, the Canadian Welfare Council addressed Canada’s relative lack of participation in assisting orphans from abroad (JIASC, 1964). The policy initiative and response in Canada was compared directly with that of the United States, and it is clear that those involved in the process were concerned that Canada had not done as much as the United States. Canada’s image with respect to humanitarian endeavors and the possible national good that might result from this policy initiative were equally important to those who supported the program. Some suggested that intercountry and interracial adoption might help with the domestic problem of placing children of mixed race. Whether or not it was ethical to ‘use’ intercountry adoptees as a means to raise awareness of the plight of mixed race children available for adoption domestically was not questioned at the time. The consequent national good which would result was the measure used to gauge the value of the program (JIASC, 1962, 1964). The concerns raised with respect to this policy mirrored those which have been attributed to the abandonment of the White Canada policy in this period (Hawkins, 1991:39). That is, interracial, intercountry adoption from countries previously discriminated against became possible in 1962 because Canada sought to conform to the practices of other Western nations. Canada had also become sensitive to criticisms of their White Canada policy and the possible impact on their international standing. Canada wanted to demonstrate humanitarian concern and, finally, Canada could identify possible national good that would result from this form of migration.

In 1963, New Zealand’s second group scheme since the war was initiated, and for the first time entry was granted for adoptees from Asia. As a con-
sequence of representations made by the National Council of Churches and
the Society of St. Vincent de Paul, the Minister of Immigration using Minis-
terial discretion allowed entry permits to be issued to 50 children from Hong
Kong. Ministerial discretion was necessary as the Immigration Act did not
allow or have any provision for adoption from nontraditional source coun-
tries. Indicative of the government’s position with respect to immigration
from Asia at the time, requests on the part of church organizations to admit
refugee families from China were unsuccessful (Brash, 1963). In 1966, fol-
lowing representations by the Society of St. Vincent de Paul, immigration
permission was granted for a further twelve orphans from Hong Kong (Brash,

The Hong Kong orphans were the largest group of children allowed
immigration entry to New Zealand from a nontraditional source country,
where adoption was the intended goal and outcome. It was also the first
scheme where the majority of the adoptions would be interracial. The public
response toward these children was overwhelming. In contrast, as was the case
in the United States and Canada, interracial adoption was still relatively rare
in New Zealand in the 1960s. Indeed, domestic children of color, available
for adoption, were recognized as being ‘hard to place’ by welfare practitioners
(Minister of Immigration, 1973, Appendix C:1–5). As a consequence, New
Zealand was both a recipient and relinquishing country for child migrants for
adoption up until the 1970s. As in the United States and Canada, prospective
parents in New Zealand would contemplate an interracial adoption from
abroad, but they were reluctant to seek interracial adoptions domestically.

Intercountry adoption became more prevalent in the 1960s and by the
1970s had increasingly become a means by which to form a family. With a
decline in the number of healthy Caucasian infants available for adoption and
an availability of infants of color, welfare practitioners in all three countries
made concerted efforts to promote and encourage interracial adoption. How-
ever, by the mid 1970s a statement released by the National Association of
Black Social Workers in the United States, which described interracial adop-
tion as another form of genocide, led to a reconsideration of interracial place-
ments domestically. These criticisms prompted international debate and con-
sequently impacted on the practice of interracial placements in both Canada
and New Zealand. By the late 1970s domestic interracial adoption was
increasingly discouraged in all three countries (Hoksbergen, 1986:8).

However, while caution was being exercised with respect to domestic
interracial placements, by the late 1970s, intercountry adoptions continued
to increase and the vast majority of these adoptions were interracial (Tristeliotis, 1991). In this period, representatives of relinquishing countries raised objections which were similar to those raised by black activists in the United States, but the placement of interracial children from abroad continued unabated (McRoy, 1991; Ngabonziza, 1991)

Interracial placements ceased domestically because of the domestic implications of this practice. Race relations had emerged as a significant national issue for all three countries in this period, and it appears more general concerns about ‘racial harmony’ shaped the response to criticisms of interracial placements domestically. Interestingly, similar critiques and censure from representatives of relinquishing countries did not appear to have the same impact on intercountry interracial adoptions. The migratory aspect of this form of adoption undoubtedly protected the practice from critique, where common sense understandings of migration informed the evaluation of this practice. That is, the children from poorer nations (as with many migrants) were migrating for a ‘better life’; their ethnicity or racial identity was a secondary concern. Ultimately, however, the issues surrounding ethnic identity and racial identification, which had raised concerns with domestic interracial adoptions, were not addressed for intercountry interracial adoptees, despite being equally pertinent. A double standard now existed where ethnic identity for child nationals available for adoption was an issue, but ethnic identity for children migrating for adoption was not. Further, these adoptions were now meeting a national need, and it appears that the needs and desires of prospective adoptive parents also shaped the emergent double standard.

VIETNAM: CONTROVERSIAL ADOPTION PRACTICES AND REVISITING POLICY

Operation Baby Lift – An Anomaly?

While there was a steady ‘trickle’ of adoptions from Vietnam occurring through to the late 1970s, a large scale program to adopt children was initiated by the United States in 1975. Known as Operation Baby Lift, this program saw 1,945 children airlifted to the United States for adoption. This airlift was portrayed as an emergency humanitarian response to children in a war zone. It is important when considering this airlift to remember intercountry adoptions from Vietnam had begun in 1963 and that the practice was already established with respect to individual adoptions from Vietnam. Furthermore, intercountry adoption was increasingly meeting a domestic need in North America.
The motivations behind Operation Baby Lift and the actions on the part of the United States became very controversial. From the outset, the program encountered a number of problems. For example, one of the first 'helicopter lifts' ended in tragedy when the helicopter crashed and all of the children and assisting personnel on board died. The processing of these children for adoption was carried out within a very tight time frame, and it appears that personnel did not research the backgrounds of these children very thoroughly. Some of the children classified 'orphans' were in fact not orphans, but were instead children who had been separated from their families due to the war (Forbes and Weiss, 1985).

The airlift, in contrast to previous adoption endeavors, met with considerable opposition in North America. Many Americans believed that the airlift was a cynical attempt on the part of the U.S. government and the government of South Vietnam to gain sympathy for the war. This cynicism was not warranted; the press releases of communications between the Minister of Welfare of the government of South Vietnam and the U.S. embassy revealed that these suspicions were well founded (Forbes and Weiss, 1985).

This airlift has been described as anomalous for this period and more reminiscent of responses to refugee crises of the past (Weil, 1984). However, we need to ask: What was normative for this period? And, in what respect was the airlift anomalous? This migration of children for adoption to North America was unusual in that it involved transporting a group of children and the use of military resources. This contrasted with the more typical private transportation of individual children for adoption in this period. But arguably this is where the anomaly ends. The migration of these children for adoption was shaped by national needs and concerns, specifically the U.S. involvement in the war and domestic political concerns about waning support for the war effort. The problems in processing the children, the practice of proxy adoption, and the complete disregard for international guidelines for intercountry adoption, namely the Leysin Principles of 1961, was not anomalous in this period – rather it was normative. The prioritizing of national needs over the needs of the child has always been a feature of intercountry adoption as a practice. Operation Baby Lift merely provides a very dramatic and clear demonstration of this reality.

Revisiting Policy

The military involvement and presence of the United States in Asia had shaped the earliest intercountry adoptions from this region. All three coun-
tries’ involvement in the Vietnam War had prompted general initiatives to adopt children. In the United States, 3,267 children were adopted between 1963 and 1976, and in Canada approximately 700 children were adopted in the same period (Weil, 1984; Gravel and Roberge, 1984 cited in Westhues and Cohen, 1994). The Canadian adoptions were facilitated by a change in immigration regulations that allowed entry to children whose adoptions had been finalized in their countries of origin (Gravel and Roberge, 1984 cited in Westhues and Cohen, 1994; Montreal Gazette, 1974). In New Zealand, attempts were made to initiate two group schemes in 1968 and 1973, respectively. However, both schemes were unsuccessful (Minister of Immigration, 1973, Appendix C).

The failure of the New Zealand group schemes to materialize was due to a number of factors. The New Zealand government was advised by International Social Services that the numbers of prospective parents had exceeded the number of children available for international adoption in Vietnam and the South Vietnamese government had expressed opposition toward group schemes. The South Vietnamese government had requested that all adoptions be completed in Vietnam, and in almost all instances this would have involved adoption by proxy (Minister of Immigration, 1973, Appendix C). The New Zealand Department of Social Welfare policy on intercountry adoption, in accordance with the Leysin Principles of 1961, prohibited proxy adoptions and allowed only group schemes. Therefore, the Vietnamese adoption scheme could not take place without contravening policy on intercountry adoption and the international recommendations. Interestingly, both the United States and Canada ignored the international recommendations regarding proxy adoptions, and in the case of the United States they also ignored the 1957 amendment which prohibited proxy adoptions. The non-observance of warnings about proxy adoptions in effect meant that North American prospective parents could and did secure children for adoption from Vietnam. While national policy ensured that New Zealand could not proceed, it is also clear that by the time New Zealand entered into negotiations about possible intercountry adoption from Vietnam, the demand for children had exceeded the supply (Minister of Immigration, 1973, Appendix C).

The failure of the Vietnamese group schemes and emergent intercountry adoption trends prompted a review of policy in New Zealand in 1973. The

4It should be noted, that while the official schemes did not materialize, some unaccompanied Vietnamese children did migrate to New Zealand and some were adopted by New Zealand citizens. Problems later emerged with respect to their assumed ‘orphan’ status (Personal Communication, Welfare Practitioner, 1997).
review recommended that new criteria be approved for individual adoptions for New Zealand residents and that provisions for group schemes be formalized. Under the new provisions for individual adoptions, it was stipulated the child for adoption had to be known to the prospective parents and proxy adoptions would not be permitted. Within these parameters, allowances were made for the first time for infertile couples and couples wishing to adopt intraracially. The stipulation that the child must be known to the prospective parents contrasted markedly with intercountry adoption practice in both the United States and Canada. In both countries, interracial/independent/stranger adoptions represented the majority of intercountry adoptions in this period. Whereas, in New Zealand independent adoptions were rare, and the intercountry adoption of unknown children was only possible through the provisions for group schemes.

While the New Zealand criteria do appear to be comparatively very restrictive, it was formulated in response to the New Zealand context. That is, the number of prospective parents attempting to adopt from abroad due to infertility and/or same ethnicity needs remained small. In New Zealand, historically, the most prevalent form of intercountry adoption involved the adoption of children who were known to prospective parents. Intercountry adoptees from traditional source countries (principally the United Kingdom) adopted by known adoptive parents was normative in this period.5 With increasing adult migration in the 1970s from nations in the Pacific, the origins of adoptees began to change. Specifically, by the mid-1970s, adult migration from Western Samoa led to a steady flow of intercountry adoptees from Western Samoa (Minister of Immigration, 1973, Appendix C:4). In all instances, the adoptions were either kin adoptions or adoptions whereby the adoptee and parents had a long-standing relationship. The policy for individual adoptions was an attempt to address, formally, this reality. While welfare policy was sympathetic to kin adoptions from Western Samoa, some of these adoptions were used to circumvent immigration policy, and the immigration department at this time introduced policy changes to prevent this circumvention (Minister of Immigration, 1973, Appendix C:4). From the 1970s to the present, legitimate intercountry adoptions from Western Samoa, represent the dominant form of intercountry adoption to New Zealand.

With the exception of the passing of the New Zealand Citizenship Act of 1977 which ensured that intercountry adoptees were only subject to immi-

5The exception to this norm was the children who migrated from Britain under the Child Migration Scheme 1949–1952. In almost all instances, these children were unknown to both foster and adoptive parents.
igration requirements if New Zealand citizenship could not be established, intercountry adoption practice and policy remained unchanged until the 1980s.

Canada also addressed intercountry adoption concerns in the early 1970s. In 1973, a federal-provincial committee for intercountry adoption was established in response to a perceived lack of coordination in intercountry adoptions. The function of this committee was to discuss international adoption policy. In 1975, in response to the committee’s recommendations, the Adoption Desk was established within Health and Welfare and, with the exception of Quebec, all provinces chose to participate and utilize the services provided by the Desk (Lipman, 1984:37 cited in McDade, 1991:30).

The services and functions of the Adoption Desk include the negotiation of agreements with governments and approved agencies in other countries, the coordination of individual international adoption cases through provincial/territorial adoption authorities, and the coordination of federal responsibilities relating to adoption. However, the Desk does not have the authority to unilaterally establish international adoption policy. Jurisdictional responsibility for international adoptions rests with the Federal Department of Employment and Immigration, and they, along with other federal departments, provide direction to the Adoption Desk (Canada National Adoption Desk, 1988 cited in McDade, 1991:30) Thus, intercountry adoption remains primarily an immigration issue, advice with respect to adoption is sought from the Desk, but ultimately it is the federal department responsible for immigration policy which has jurisdictional responsibility.

While the coordination of intercountry adoption was a concern by the mid-1970s, the role of the Adoption Desk has always been constrained by the dominant form of intercountry adoption practiced by Canadian citizens (Bowen, 1992; Daly and Sobol, 1993; Sobol and Daly, 1995). With the most prevalent form of adoption being adoptions completed abroad, the Desk’s role has and continues to be largely restricted to coordinating the minority of adoptions completed domestically (McDade, 1991:30). By the late 1970s, intercountry adoptees were catered for under the family class of migrant criteria in Canada. As with the United States, intercountry adoption had become both a legitimate and normalized method of family formation. The Canadian immigration criteria and response to intercountry adoption in practice and policy was to remain unchanged until 1993 (Immigration and Citizenship, 1997, Press Release).
THE SECOND WAVE – SUPPLY TO DEMAND DRIVEN ADOPTIONS

By the mid-1970s, Latin America had emerged as a significant relinquishing region for adoptions to North America. The adoptions from Latin America represent the turning point from the first wave of migration of children for adoption to the second wave. In contrast to previous intercountry adoptions, the motivations for adopting from Latin America were not associated with U.S. military involvement nor any international conflict. The primary motivation for adoptive parents in these cases was infertility and the difficulties encountered in attempting to adopt domestically. The vast majority of these adoptions were interracial, and the children were unknown to the adoptive parents (Hoksbergen, 1986).

Along with increasing numbers of intercountry adoptions, a number of parental organizations had been established in the United States and Canada. These associations provided support for parents who had adopted interracially and from abroad and advice for prospective adoptive parents wishing to adopt internationally. These groups would become very effective lobby groups with respect to policy on intercountry adoption in both countries. In contrast, New Zealand did not have any associations for adoptive parents in this period, and infertility and a domestic shortage of children for adoption was only just beginning to have an impact in New Zealand.

In the United States in the post war period, the lifting of restrictions on intercountry adoption by the federal government signified federal endorsement of this form of adoption as a legitimate means of satisfying the needs of its own citizens, as well as the needs of homeless children in foreign lands (Carlson, 1988:334). While federal immigration regulations facilitate intercountry adoption into the United States, the various states’ control over the adoption process facilitates adoptions completed in the United States. State adoption law is very diverse, but the vast majority of states do not deal directly with intercountry adoption within their adoption laws. Rather, the majority of states rely on legislation intended for domestic adoption. When special legislation has addressed intercountry adoption, in most cases such provisions resulted from questions raised about the lawfulness of some intercountry adoptions and/or were measures aimed at easing the intercountry adoption process for residents of these states (Carlson, 1988:334). Ultimately, legislative provisions for intercountry adoption have been in the interests of U.S. citizens already engaged in the practice of intercountry adoption. None of the state measures have addressed the wider ethical, moral and practical con-
considerations that could potentially be addressed through a national policy on intercountry adoption as a practice.

Canada, like the United States, had also given federal endorsement of intercountry adoption through its immigration criteria, and like the United States it did not have any policy which addressed the welfare of intercountry adoptees at a federal level. As with the United States, there was considerable variability in how provinces responded to this practice. Most provinces relied on legislation intended for domestic adoptions. Further, the responses to federal requirements have been variable. This variability is evidenced by the consistent use of Minister’s Permits for adoptee entry into Canada (McDade, 1991). In short, Canadian residents increasingly sought intercountry adoption as a means to form families, but despite the increasing incidence of this practice, the welfare of the child was not addressed legislatively nor had any consistent form of federal regulation emerged.

In this period, two international conventions emerged which dealt with intercountry adoption – the 1986 UN Declaration on Social and Legal Principles relating to the Protection and Welfare of Children and the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCROC). However, as with previous conventions, they were not enforceable and were largely unsuccessful. UNCROC signaled clearly at an international level that further action in the intercountry adoption area was necessary. Yet despite the emphasis on the welfare of the child, which is central to these conventions, and despite the fact that none of these conventions endorsed intercountry adoption, no policy emerged at a national level in either the United States or Canada.

Since World War II, the lack of regulation nationally and internationally, and in particular the lack of enforcement of international conventions, has meant that abuse has always been a feature of this practice. It has been observed that in the United States, in this period, the state tended to overlook the methods used to obtain children and that this was because the Department of State considered international adoptions to be ‘private matters’ within the country where the child resided (Carro, 1994:143). This understanding was shaped by the fact that the majority of intercountry adoptions by United States citizens are completed in the child’s country of origin. Thus, the United States role has been very much limited to that of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (Carro, 1994:143). The INS, in most instances, then deal with a fait accompli. The reluctance to ‘interfere’ with the process in another country is understandable. However, it creates a situation whereby the procurement of children by less than legitimate means can remain ‘private.’
Asia and Latin America continued to be significant relinquishing regions in the late 1980s and early 1990s. With increasing demand for children came increased corruption on the part of intermediaries who managed the supply. Black markets were common, and increasingly large sums of money were being paid for children by adoptive parents to intermediaries. In Peru, Brazil, Honduras and Sri Lanka the sale of children, the emergence of baby farms, and the pressuring of poor women to relinquish their children occurred in this period. All of the respective governments responded by attempting to regulate adoptions and at times banned intercountry adoption until such measures were taken.

Children for adoption in these instances were being treated as commodities and in all of these instances their welfare needs were at best a secondary concern. Intercountry adoption, by this time, also involved a far greater number of countries. It had become a global practice, but a practice that was not being regulated at a global level.

It would be erroneous to suggest that the United States did not act on known abuses. At various times federal measures have been undertaken to address or circumvent abuses in intercountry adoption practice. However, not all of these measures have been successful (Carro, 1994:143). For example, with respect to adoptions from Latin America to the United States, the Organization of American States attempted to introduce some uniformity into adoptions from Latin America. The 1984 Inter-American Convention on Conflicts of Laws Concerning the Adoption of Minors attempted to define questions of applicable law and jurisdiction (Carro, 1994:153). In 1994, the Inter-American Convention on International Traffic in Minors attempted to reconcile regional laws on adoption with international conventions on the international protection of minors and was a response to satisfying the requirements of the UN Convention of the Rights of the Child adopted by the UN General Assembly in November of 1989 (Carro, 1994:153). Yet while all of these measures addressed abuse, abuse continued to take place. The abuse itself is also evidence of the increased need for intercountry adoption and the lengths that some prospective adoptive parents were and are prepared to go to secure a child as their own. In both the United States and Canada, abuse has tended to be more prevalent with independent adoptions, the most prevalent form of intercountry adoption in both countries. Because of New Zealand’s restrictive policy, which prohibited independent adoptions, abuses were considerably less common.
By the early 1990s, Asia had once again emerged as the dominant relinquishing region for international adoptions to North America. With China formalizing their adoption law with respect to intercountry adoption in 1991, China became an increasingly important relinquishing country for children for adoption to the United States in the mid-1990s, as too did the former Soviet Union. In 1995, 2,130 children were adopted from China and 1,896 from Russia, representing the top two relinquishing countries to the United States (INS, 1997). A statistical breakdown is not available for Canada, but it appears that these countries have also become dominant in the last decade (personal communication, Welfare Practitioner, Canada, 1997). New Zealand continued to hold to its policy on individual adoptions, but the New Zealand Department of Social Welfare, which administered this policy, was increasingly coming under pressure from prospective adoptive parents who now more commonly, for reasons of infertility, sought to adopt from abroad.


By the early 1990s, political changes in the former Soviet Union and Romania saw Eastern Europe emerge as a significant relinquishing region. The political and economic situation in Romania led to the international adoption of a large number of Romanian children. The United States became a major recipient society for Romanian children, and for Canada and New Zealand these adoptions represented the largest group of children to be adopted since Vietnam and Hong Kong, respectively. The Romanian adoptions were to become controversial and sparked renewed interest in international policy on intercountry adoption.

On December 25, 1989, the Romanian President, Nicolae Ceausescu was deposed and executed. The media quickly exposed his pro-natalist policies and the existence of over 100,000 children in state orphanages. The international media coverage created an enormous response and saw Romania almost immediately besieged with prospective parents from the West. While the media focused on the children in the institutions and those who sought to adopt these children, within weeks a black market had emerged. Prospective parents learned that many of the institutionalized children had hepatitis B and/or AIDS and as a consequence sought children from villages who were healthy. The black market was also in part sustained once abortion was legalized and the abandonment of children began to decrease. While prospective parents sought children in the villages, some Romanian parents learned that
with the help of a baby broker they could sell their children. Baby brokers took prospective parents to poor homes rather than the institutions. At this time, some organizations arranged group tours for prospective parents to Romania, where for as little as $375 per family, discount airline tickets were provided with packages outlining the preferred gifts for local officials (Carro, 1994:139).

In 1990, approximately 3,000 Romanian children were adopted abroad – in the first few months of 1991, 1,300 applications for adoption were in progress. By the end of 1991, 7,014 Romanian children had been adopted abroad; 2,388 of these children migrated to the United States. The majority of these children were infants or new-borns, and approximately half did not come out of the orphanages (Carro, 1994:137).

The Romanian government responded to the global demand for their children and the inability of their bureaucracy to adequately meet and regulate this demand by suspending all intercountry adoptions while they drafted new regulations. In July 1990, a new law was passed for intercountry adoption. This law gave the Romanian courts final authority for intercountry adoptions. However, this law generally failed to protect Romanian children in the intercountry adoption process (Carro, 1994:137). In 1991, after the Romanian media exposed the continued black market for babies, a National Adoption Committee was formed and again intercountry adoptions were suspended until legislation was passed in July of 1991. The new law outlawed private adoptions, and it became possible to impose criminal penalties for baby trafficking on those involved in the process. In 1992, the United States agreed, through a bilateral agreement, to limit the numbers of children migrating for adoption (Carro, 1994).

The recipient societies also responded to the Romanian adoptions. Working on the assumption that closer attention to the procedural delays would address or prevent the various abuses which were occurring, all three countries attempted to facilitate the adoption process for prospective parents. Thus, in 1991 the United States Congress focused on the difficulties encountered by American prospective parents and INS officials at the time. Specifically, the Subcommittee on International Law, Immigration and Refugees hearings addressed delays faced by American couples when dealing with the United States embassy in Bucharest. In response to these situations, the INS exercised the Attorney General’s parole authority on humanitarian grounds, which permitted the entry of these adopted children into the United States (Carro, 1994:147). In effect, adoptions from Romania, of which many were
questionable with respect to international conventions and immigration law and criteria, were ‘fast tracked.’ The children were granted entry on ‘humanitarian grounds,’ despite the irregularity and questionable practices surrounding some of these adoptions. A similar situation arose in both Canada and New Zealand. Whether this was solely because of the pressure applied on the state by prospective parents is open to question. However, it does seem naive to assume that by addressing the needs of the prospective parents you are at one and the same time addressing the needs and welfare of the child for adoption. While it may well have prevented some dubious adoptions, the bureaucratic process was the focus, rather than the practice of intercountry adoption and the long-term implications for the welfare of these Romanian children.

The intercountry adoption of Romanian children into Canada was the first large-scale movement of adoptees from one country since the Vietnam War. In total, 663 came to Canada between 1989 and 1991. The majority of children from Romania gained entry into Canada on Minister’s Permits (McDade, 1991:44). In September of 1990, a visa officer was posted to Bucharest primarily to process visas for children adopted by Canadians. With the adoptions being completed in Romania, the child welfare officials in Canada were not involved in the process. The various abuses and problems which occurred with respect to United States citizens adopting from Romania, also occurred with some adoptions by Canadians. For example, one Canadian woman described the adoption of ‘her’ daughter in Romania. She and her husband traveled to a village, where a man offered his daughter in exchange for a transistor radio. The exchange was made, but prior to boarding the flight to return to Canada the adoptive mother (now in law) learned that the natural mother had not wanted to relinquish her child and was devastated by what her husband had done. The adoptive mother described feeling moved by this – nonetheless, she boarded the flight to Canada with the little girl (Keyes, 1997).

In Canada, in response to concerns over the process of intercountry adoption from Romania, a federal interdepartmental committee was reactivated to review intercountry adoption policy. This committee comprised representatives of the National Adoption Desk, the Intergovernmental and International Affairs Branch of Health and Welfare Canada, Employment and Immigration Canada and the Department of Justice and External Affairs (McDade, 1991:44). However, no national legislation or policy addressing the welfare of the child migrating for adoption emerged as a consequence of this review.
The Romanian adoptions occurred at a time when intercountry adoption in Canada had been directly linked to demographic concerns. The relationship between immigration policy formation and intercountry adoption policy in Canada had become more explicit in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The focus on intercountry adoption by immigration policy advisors was spurred by concerns about the low fertility rate in Canada and the age imbalance of Canada’s population. In 1988 and again in 1990, the Canadian Employment and Immigration Advisory Council recommended that the federal government seriously consider making intercountry adoptions easier as a means to increase the proportion of younger persons in the total Canadian immigration intake (Canada Employment and Immigration Advisory Council, 1988:13, 1990:3 cited in McDade, 1991:1).

Thus, in the late 1980s the role of immigration in facilitating the practice of intercountry adoption was not only based on humanitarian concern, but also on domestic demographic concerns. It is now accepted that intercountry adoption would do little to alter the current demographic ratio. However, domestic demographic concerns were central to debates in Canada from the mid 1980s to the early 1990s (McDade, 1991:2).

Intercountry adoption has become more common in Canada since the 1980s. The increase in the number of children adopted abroad and migrating to Canada is related to a combination of factors, all of which are common to all three recipient societies. For example, rising infertility rates, reliable contraception and abortion, and changing family forms have all impacted on the availability of children – in particular infants available for adoption domestically. But as is the case in the United States, it is inaccurate to claim that no children are available for adoption. It is the lack of availability of infants that has led to an increased demand for intercountry adoptees. The Canadian Adoption Council recently revealed that there are currently 40,000 children in foster care in Canada, of whom a large number are in need of adoptive homes. Most of these children are older children and have ‘special needs,’ but older children with special needs are not sought by many prospective adoptive parents (Vancouver Sun, August 12, 1997). However, while some of these parents go abroad to adopt younger children, they are mistaken if they assume that they will be avoiding adopting a child with special needs. As others have observed, many (if not all) children adopted from abroad, irrespective of age, also have ‘special needs’ (Ames, 1997:6).

In 1990, Canada became a signatory to UNCROC and in 1991 ratified this convention. Yet, despite supporting declarations which urged govern-
ments to pass laws, establish structures to protect children and combat improper financial gain by intermediaries, and to set out a framework for enforcement, no action was taken domestically in Canada (Black, 1994:254).

Over the last decade, prospective parents seeking children overseas have emerged as a pressure group. As a group, they have asserted pressure on government to stimulate the flow of international adoptees in Canada and have requested that the government address procedural delays. The pressure on government in Canada is now largely a consequence of the frustration experienced by prospective parents who face long waiting lists for infants and cumbersome bureaucratic procedures domestically (McDade, 1991:46).

As with the United States and Canada, the Romanian crisis prompted a deluge of inquiries from prospective parents in New Zealand. A number of New Zealanders traveled to Romania in the hope of adopting a child. On September 24, the Prime Minister announced that he had sent a representative to Romania to "offer the Government's support" to the couples who were trying to adopt orphan Romanian children. With the assistance of the Minister of Social Welfare, a parental support group was formed to assist those who adopted from Romania (Else, 1990:22). Between 1990 and 1996, 179 Romanian children were adopted by New Zealanders, representing the second largest group of children intercountry adopted by non-kin in New Zealand in the post World War II period (Department of Internal Affairs, 1997).

The Romanian adoptions represent a turning point in New Zealand's policy stance. Not all of the adoptions conformed to policy and criteria that had been ratified by government. However, as with the United States and Canada, some of the prospective parents adopting from Romania were prepared to go to any lengths to secure a child, and the New Zealand response to this was to attempt to facilitate the adoptions and thus prevent abuses occurring. It appears that the relaxation of policy, which occurred in New Zealand, was largely a consequence of pressure from prospective parents. For the first time in New Zealand, prospective parents were represented by an association, Intercountry Adoption New Zealand (ICANZ), which promoted and supported those who had or wished to adopt from abroad. This organization was very active in representing the interests of prospective parents in Romania, despite not having the authority to process adoptions for New Zealanders. This organization had sought a partnership with the New Zealand Department of Social Welfare (the only body authorized to process intercountry adoptions). However, the Department rejected the proposed
partnership, arguing that it would represent a conflict of interest whereby it would be difficult to maintain a child-focused stance with respect to intercountry adoption in partnership with an organization that represented the interests of prospective parents.

Until this time in New Zealand, intercountry adoption was largely not endorsed by the state. This non-endorsement reflected a commitment to various international conventions. However, by the late 1980s, in response to a number of factors, New Zealand’s commitment was tested and a gradual softening of policy occurred. The key factors mirrored those that had already occurred in Canada and the United States. New Zealand faced a shortage of infants available for adoption domestically. In response to this shortage, greater numbers of prospective parents were now attempting to adopt from abroad. Prospective parents had formed and were supported by an organization representing their interests and which promoted intercountry adoption as a practice. And, more generally, all of these changes occurred in a context where, internationally, intercountry adoption had become more prevalent and was increasingly accepted as a ‘viable’ means by which to create a family (Report to Minister, No. 600/91, 11/10/91).

The changes in policy, however, were approached with some reluctance by welfare officials at the time. The initial changes acknowledged that intercountry adoption was a means to help children in situations of poverty, but prospective parents were encouraged to find alternative ways of helping disadvantaged children abroad. These changes conformed to the UN Declaration on Social and Legal Principles Relating to the Protection of Welfare of Children, of which New Zealand was a signatory. Interracial adoption had been discouraged in New Zealand, but by 1990 the criteria addressing interracial adoption were revisited.

Prior to 1990, parents were required to either share the same race or demonstrate cultural competence, that is, knowledge of the prospective adoptee’s cultural heritage. But, the Department of Social Welfare came under increasing pressure to remove this requirement and as a consequence the same-race requirement was deleted in 1990. It was estimated that the removal of this requirement would lead to a 400 percent increase in intercountry adoptions. In 1996, the cultural competence criteria was also removed from the Intercountry Adoption Policy and Criteria. In part, this clause was removed because it was at odds with domestic adoption policy and criteria and did not conform to UNCROC requirements. This clause also did not conform to the Hague Convention (1993) to which New Zealand
intended to become a signatory (Report to Minister, 2/2/96). But as importantly, it was acknowledged that this clause was serving as an impediment for New Zealanders who wished to adopt from abroad. Furthermore, at this time the Department had a number of children available for adoption from abroad and could not facilitate these adoptions under the existing criteria (Report to the Minister, No. 600/91, 11/10/90; Paper SEQ(90)M19/4, 18/7/90; Paper SEQ(90)63, 16/7/90; Circular Memo, 19/9/90; NZCYPs, Feb. 1996; Report to Minister, 22/2/96, 23/2/96, 8/5/96).

In New Zealand, unlike in the United States and Canada, the Immigration Department took its lead from the Department of Social Welfare (or as it was more latterly known The Children and Young Persons Service). The early formation of a national policy on intercountry adoption largely predicated the nature of the relationship between the two state organizations. The liberalization of intercountry adoption policy did raise immigration concerns, particularly with respect to the absence of an age limit for these migrants. Consequently, these concerns were addressed and an age limit of 14 years was instituted in 1992 (Report to the Minister, 23/11/92).

The controversial Romanian adoptions revealed clearly the inequitable relation between prospective adoptive parents in the West and relinquishing parents in Romania. The prospective parents not only had the capital but also the resources and organization to arrange these adoptions. Furthermore, the abuses that occurred, both on the part of the prospective parents and brokers in Romania, revealed clearly that the welfare of the child was at best a secondary consideration. The response on the part of recipient societies was shaped by the assumption that the interests and needs of the prospective parents and the children were complementary or one and the same. While, undoubtedly, bureaucratic delays do impact on the welfare of the child, in the long term there are many other factors that impact on these child migrants for adoption. These factors can and have been overlooked when the aim is to facilitate the process rather than investigate the practice. In effect, in all three countries, speeding up the migration became a priority, and in the process the procurement of children was overlooked and ultimately, too, the long-term welfare and interests of the children were to become a retrospective concern (Ames, 1997).

In all three countries, abuses occurred and retrospectively it has been argued that the bureaucratic process – in particular the difficulties encountered in obtaining a child from Romania – led parents to seek less orthodox methods of securing a child for adoption. While this may well have been the
case, accepting this argument also means accepting that prospective parents have an *a priori* right to adopt from abroad. All three countries faced considerable pressure from their nationals wishing to adopt from Romania, and all three countries responded to their nationals’ demands and chose to facilitate these adoptions. In making this choice, the wider ethical and moral questions which lie at the heart of the very practice of intercountry adoption were effectively side-stepped, and the assumed right to adopt from abroad was endorsed. All of the international conventions stressed that the welfare of the child should be the paramount concern, and none of these conventions endorsed the practice of intercountry adoption at this time.

**THE HAGUE CONVENTION (1993) – INTERNATIONAL ENDORSEMENT OF INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION**

The endorsement of intercountry adoption through immigration criteria in North America occurred after the war, but no policy corollary focusing on the welfare of the children with legislative implications emerged. Until 1993, international conventions addressing the welfare of the child and the practice of intercountry adoption typically emphasized the need to seek alternative care within the child’s country of origin and did not endorse intercountry adoption as a practice. Indeed, the relation between immigration criteria, international policy, and practice became increasingly contradictory in the period 1945–1993.

Of the three countries, only New Zealand incorporated international convention recommendations into a national policy on intercountry adoption, and as a consequence their practice was considerably more conservative than that of the United States and Canada. However, by the late 1980s, similar demographic issues had emerged in New Zealand and increasingly the state came under pressure to endorse intercountry adoption as a legitimate means of family formation. Indeed, by the mid 1990s New Zealand initiated bilateral agreements, and permission was given to nongovernmental organizations to act on behalf of New Zealanders wishing to adopt from countries governed by bilateral agreements (March 2, 1994, Cabinet Paper).

By the late 1980s, all receiving countries were aware of the increasing prevalence of intercountry adoption as a means of family formation, instances of abuse – in particular the sale and trafficking of children – and the lack of international regulation and protection afforded to those involved in the process. These issues and concerns were addressed and ultimately embodied in the Hague Convention on the Protection of Children and Co-operation in
Respect to Intercountry Adoption (1993). This Convention addressed the contradiction between immigration criteria and practice and previous international conventions, that is, this Convention endorsed intercountry adoption as a practice. Unlike UNCROC (1989), the Hague Convention (1993) represents the first intergovernmental endorsement of intercountry adoption as a practice, and for the first time intercountry adoption is elevated as a practice over and above institutional or foster care in the child's country of origin (Duncan, 1993; Pfund, 1994:56; Black, 1994:313).

The United States became a signatory on March 31, 1994, Canada became a signatory in April, 1994, and by late 1994 it was clear that New Zealand would also accede to the Convention (Pfund, 1994:55; Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 1994, 24/11/94 Report to Minister). Sixty-six states, with approximately half of these relinquishing countries, participated in the preparation of this Convention (Pfund, 1994:54). The United States and Canada are both Member States of the Hague Conference. New Zealand is not a member of the Hague Convention and as a nonmember did not participate in the formulation of this Convention (Report to the Minister of Social Welfare, 20/11/92). For the United States, Canada and New Zealand, deciding to become a signatory state was shaped in part because of acknowledged concerns about the welfare of children migrating for adoption and the increasing prevalence of intercountry adoption as a means of family formation for their nationals. However, the decision was also shaped by the recognition that to not become party to this Convention could jeopardize the ability of American, Canadian and New Zealand citizens to adopt from those countries of origin who were party to the Convention. The potential impact of non-signatory status on the supply of children for adoption was acknowledged by all three countries and, given the pressure that prospective parents applied post 1970, the inability to adopt from signatory states would undoubtedly have had domestic/political implications in all three countries (Pfund, 1994; Black, 1994; Report to the Minister of Social Welfare, October 1994).

The Hague Convention (1993) establishes minimum standards for Contracting States to maintain and is framed by three main objectives. The first objective is to establish safeguards to ensure that intercountry adoptions take place in the best interests of the child and with respect for his or her fundamental rights as recognized in international law. The second objective is to establish a system of cooperation among Contracting States to assure that the agreements made by them are respected and thereby prevent the sale of or
traffic in children. The third objective is to secure recognition in Contracting States of adoptions made in accordance with the Convention (Chapter I, Article 1).

Chapter II of the Convention (Articles 4–5) outlines the requirements for intercountry adoptions. The fundamental provisions that apply to all adoptions covered in the agreement include the provision that “competent authorities” must determine whether a child is suitable for adoption. Further, that consent must be freely given and must not have been induced by payment or compensation of any kind. Until these provisions are met, no contact between prospective parents and the child’s parents or child’s caregivers is permitted (the exception would be in cases of intrafamily adoption). The adoption can also only take place after “competent authorities” of the receiving state have determined that the prospective parents are “eligible and suited to adopt” and authorization has been given for the child to “enter and reside” permanently in the receiving state.

The mechanics for regulating intercountry adoptions are outlined in Chapters III and IV of the Convention and hinge on the creation of Central Authorities and Accredited Bodies. Here, each Contracting State is to create a Central Authority who will discharge the various duties imposed by the Convention. The duties include an obligation to prevent “improper financial gain” in connection with the adoption and to deter all practices contrary to the objects of the Convention. Central Authorities (which are intended to be the administrative agencies for intercountry adoptions) in both States must verify that there is no bar to adoption in either State and must ensure that the transfer of the child takes place “in secure and appropriate circumstances and, if possible, in the company of the adoptive or prospective parents” (Kennard, 1994:633).

The Central Authorities can license various agencies and agents within their own countries to perform the various functions outlined in Article 9 and in accordance with Articles 10 and 11. The accredited bodies must pursue only “non-profit objectives.” Under Article 22, independent agents or agencies that do not qualify for accreditation are still permitted to operate. These independent agents or agencies are not subject to the Requirements For Inter-country Adoptions outlined in Chapter II; however, they are obligated to follow the General Provisions outlined in Chapter VI. These General Provisions (in Articles 28–42) specify and reiterate the regulations considered crucial by the Special Commission, and overall these provisions are aimed at the ongoing regulation of the Convention. Article 32 under the General Provisions
makes it clear that no one shall derive “improper financial gain” and that only “reasonable” professional fees may be charged.

Overall, there is considerable emphasis placed on the role of the Central Authorities in regulating the process, curtailing the sale and/or traffic of children, and curtailing improper financial gain by adoption agencies and agents (Kennard, 1994:633).

The Convention, while certainly addressing the key issues surrounding the practice of intercountry adoption, does have a number of shortcomings. The issue of independent adoptions is interesting. The United States’ acceptance of this Convention hinged on the issue of independent adoptions, not surprisingly, given that independent adoptions are the main form of intercountry adoption practice for the United States. Inclusion of independent adoptions was controversial, with some experts from other countries and members of international organizations expressing reservations. These reservations were based on the observation that the sale of and trafficking of children usually occurred with independent adoptions. As a major recipient society, the United States managed to secure the main form of adoption practiced by United States nationals, despite the reservations that were based on known abuses connected to independent adoptions. Regulating independent agents and ensuring that they are not engaging in improper practices will be problematic and will rely on thorough reporting and auditing within contracting states (Kennard, 1994:648). By and large, this reporting and auditing will rely on the will of the State to carry out such procedures and hinges on the provisions which stipulate that “competent authorities” are responsible for independent adoption agents and agencies (Kennard, 1994:637). The problem here is that the “competent authorities” are not defined in the Convention (Kennard, 1994:637). Further, the Convention does not penalize independent agents/agencies who engage in the sale and trafficking of children. Rather, it requires that such activities be reported to the Central Authorities, but it is unclear from the Convention to whom the Central Authorities are then accountable (Kennard, 1994:638). The lack of definition and clarity with respect to accountability is problematic. Indeed, it appears that ultimately it is up to the will of the State to define, regulate, and act on irregularities.

More generally, within the Convention itself, many of the key terms are left undefined. For example, the Convention does not define what constitutes “reasonable compensation,” nor does it define what constitutes “non-profit objectives,” nor does it define “adoptability.” With respect to “reasonable
compensation,” the Convention does not address how “reasonable compensation” should be decided and by whom. And despite the emphasis placed on eliminating baby selling as a profit-making activity, the failure to define “improper financial gain” anywhere in the text allows potentially for a myriad of definitions which could be applied at any one time (Kennard, 1994:644). The same lack of definition for “non-profit objectives” also creates some ambiguity. That is, provisions are made for covering costs and expenses, as too are allowances made for reasonable professional fees; however, it is not clear what constitutes “profit” and what constitutes “proper remuneration” and therefore it is possible that even “non-profit” fees could become excessive (Kennard, 1994:643). Finally, the issue of what constitutes “adoptability” is problematic. The Convention requires the State of origin to ensure that the child is adoptable (Article 4), that is, the definition of adoptability is left to the State of origin. There have been instances (in South Korea, Chile, Romania, Russia) where the definition of adoptability has varied widely and instances where adoptability has been determined by demand and unscrupulous assumptions about what should happen to children born in poverty (Kennard, 1994; Carro, 1994). The lack of a standard definition of what constitutes adoptability means that this variability will quite possibly continue (Kennard, 1994:641–44).

It has been observed that the Convention does lay an adequate foundation for addressing abuses in the adoption process, however, and perhaps most importantly, the completion of the structure is left to the political will of the implementing countries (Black, 1994; Kennard, 1994). Given the history of intercountry adoption, responses to international conventions in the past, and the practice of intercountry adoption today, it seems reasonable to question the potential implications of this reliance on ‘political will.’ The will of any Contracting Nation is going to be shaped by domestic and international political realities and the ongoing realities that shape the demand for intercountry adoption. It seems likely that there will be an increasing demand for intercountry adoption and that poorer nations will continue to relinquish children for adoption abroad. It is also clear that intercountry adoption now occurs within an established industry, both within receiving and relinquishing countries. Independent operators in North America have already voiced concerns about the Hague Convention and the creation and role of Central Authorities. In particular, members of the industry argue that Central Authorities could create the potential for large agencies to ‘monopolize the market’ and thereby impact on the share of the market currently held by small
agencies (Bisignaro, 1994:145–146). With respect to relinquishing countries, intercountry adoption has been a means of attracting substantial sums of hard currency while at the same time addressing in an immediate way ‘child welfare concerns’ (Kennard, 1994:626). It cannot be assumed that these interests alongside an increasing demand for intercountry adoptees will not shape the ‘political will’ of Contracting States and ultimately the regulation of intercountry adoption as a practice.

The Convention has been referred to by Black (1994) as “GATT for kids.” It is an attempt to regulate the market, but the lack of definition given to the key features of the market means that the regulation can only be soft at best. Without clear definitions, the key features of this market can quite conceivably be left unregulated, and indeed regulation can only occur if the Contracting States choose to address these weaknesses through domestic legislation.

Finally, the Convention only covers Contracting States, children of noncontracting states are not protected. It is possible that prospective parents may turn to countries that are not party to the Convention because they think the requirements will be less demanding. Given that historically this happened when various relinquishing countries introduced controls (for example the shift from Romania to Russia in 1992), it is cause for concern that a shift may happen toward noncontracting countries as sources of children for adoption. The United States, Canada and New Zealand all adopt children from noncontracting states. In the case of New Zealand, Samoa is a noncontracting state, and, in 1996, 77 percent of New Zealand intercountry adoptees were from Samoa. Samoa has not indicated it will accede to the Convention, and while domestic legislation in New Zealand does afford these children some protection, it is largely inadequate and does not offer the same protection afforded to children from countries party to the Hague Convention (Couchman, 1997:443). In sum, while the Convention provides the fundamental framework, ultimately it is up to the political will of the Contracting State to ensure that definitions and related mechanisms are put in place to protect the welfare of children migrating for adoption. It remains to be seen what factors will shape this political will in these three countries.

SUMMARY
Since World War II, the migration of children for adoption has become an established migratory trend. The numbers of states involved in intercountry adoption, both relinquishing and recipient, has grown substantially in this period. The first wave of adoptions in the immediate post World War II peri-
od up until the early 1970s were typically responses to children in need and where the adoptive parents seldom sought adoption because of infertility or an inability to adopt domestically. The practice can be characterized as finding families for children. From the 1970s, changing domestic demographic realities prompted increasing numbers of prospective adoptive parents to seek infants from abroad. Increasingly, intercountry adoption became demand driven, where prospective parents attempted to find children for families.

While there are differences in terms of motivations between the first and second waves, both waves have been shaped by broader socio/political/economic realities. Concerns about the suitability of child migrants for adoption were central to the first wave, where their migration was taken to be the primary issue and concern. Accessibility and the process of intercountry adoption became a central concern with the second wave of adoptions, and here, meeting the needs of nationals seeking children abroad ultimately became the primary concern.

The comparative description and analysis reveals points of commonality and difference. All three countries share similar migration and immigration histories, and child migration for adoption has been shaped and constrained by immigration criteria and policy in the post World War II period. Immigration policy and criteria in all three countries reflect national concerns, interests and priorities. Initially, intercountry adoption was constrained by these concerns and priorities. The facilitation of intercountry adoption through immigration criteria occurred alongside increasing domestic demand, but in Canada and the United States no policy emerged which addressed the welfare of the child migrating for adoption nor, until 1993, the recommendations of international conventions. In contrast, New Zealand implemented international recommendations and criteria, and the response to intercountry adoption was consequently conservative in the 1945–1993 period. However, once the interests and needs of New Zealand nationals paralleled those of nationals in Canada and the United States, the New Zealand response became increasingly convergent.

It has been demonstrated that ultimately all three countries have prioritized the needs of their own citizens and domestic/international/political concerns over the needs and well being of the child migrant for adoption. All three countries have acknowledged the abuses that have occurred and have acknowledged the need for international regulation for what has become an international practice. Yet, while the concerns about abuse and the need for regulation are justified, all three countries have chosen to focus on the proce-
dures and problems associated with the process, rather than focusing on the wider moral and ethical questions which lie at the heart of this process. In choosing to focus on regulating the process, the inequities which predicate intercountry adoption as a practice are not being challenged or addressed. Rather, intercountry adoption is presented as a solution for the needs of Third World children and a solution for rising infertility rates in the West. The relation between adoptive parents and Third World children is presented as complementary. Nationals in all three countries are now no longer urged to invest in child-care services in the child’s country. The international endorsement of intercountry adoption also potentially mitigates against any serious intergovernmental action which might address the needs of all Third World children (Black, 1994).

Ultimately, all three recipient societies have, with respect to the first wave of migration, given primacy to national needs and concerns. And with respect to the second wave of migration, primacy has been given to the needs of their nationals to form families. With respect to the Hague Convention (1993), the key features of the ‘market’ are not defined, and ultimately it left to the ‘political will’ of the Contracting States to address the loopholes and ambiguities in the Convention. While all three countries were concerned about the well being of children involved in corrupt and unethical intercountry adoptions, it must be stressed that the decision to become a Contracting State, for all three countries, was clearly shaped by the need to secure access to children for adoption by their citizens. Ultimately, with respect to policy priorities and practices, national needs and well being have been prioritized over the needs and welfare of child migrants for adoption in the post World War II period.

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The Legalization of Aliens in Greece

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Like other Southern European states, Greece traditionally has been a land of emigration with little previous immigration by non-Greeks. The phenomenon of immigrant workers coming to Greece began in the late 1960s, but their numbers long remained very limited. Refugee arrivals constituted a larger phenomenon, but most transited to another country.

This situation changed abruptly in the late 1980s due to political change in Eastern Europe and subsequent opening of borders. Since 1990, Albanians in particular began to arrive in Greece en masse. Compared to other Southern European states, Greece’s singularity arises from presumably having the highest proportion of aliens relative to total population. Almost all of the aliens were undocumented.

The status of foreigners in Greece was regulated by a 1929 law which had last been revised in 1948. The initial effort to deal with the novel situation created by the influx of immigrants was the enactment of a new aliens’ law (L. 1975/91) which was ratified by Parliament in 1991 and which came into effect in June of 1992. The law sought to provide a legal framework for more efficient control of immigration. It included no provision for legalization of foreign workers already in Greece. As in the past, the law stipulated that foreign workers sign employment contracts while still in their homelands. The contract was to tie the foreign worker to a specific employer and job, and these contracts were to be accorded sparingly.

Discussion of legalization of immigrants in Greece began only several years after enactment of L. 1975/91. The first to plead for legalization of illegal migrants was the General Confederation of Greek Trade Unions which proposed the measure to the Greek government. The government reacted slowly but announced in February of 1995 that legalization legislation was being developed. After several postponements, a law, 2434/1996, was passed by Parliament in July of 1996. Article 16 of the law provided for the legal-
ization of aliens which would proceed in two stages. In the first, aliens would register with Greek authorities and acquire temporary resident permits. In the second, they would receive a limited duration residency permits.

Article 16 further provided for the creation of a Special Committee to prepare drafts of two Presidential Decrees, one for each of the two stages, which were to define conditions and procedures for the legalization. After consultation with the Economic and Social Committee, comprised of representatives of the social partners, as well as with certain other organizations and independent experts, the draft decrees were to be submitted to the concerned ministries. The ministries would issue the two decrees, the first of which was to be issued within a four month period.

The original draft of the first Presidential decree appeared at the end of 1996, and a final draft was promised for January 8, 1997. But delays ensued. By the fall of 1997, only drafts scrutinized by the Economic and Social Committee were available. However, the final texts were prepared by the ministries in September and October of 1997, and they made important changes, including inclusion of certain categories of aliens who were to be eligible for legalization that had not figured in earlier drafts. These additional categories included immigrants from bordering states and those employed in agriculture. Also, ethnic Greeks from Albania, so-called North Epirots, would benefit from a specific and more favorable legalization procedure. The two Presidential decrees were promulgated on November 28, 1997, and the legalization period began on January 1, 1998.

**THE FIRST PHASE**

The first Presidential Decree, 358/97, had two aims: the registration of aliens residing illegally in Greece and who were either employed or seeking employment and the initiation of a process which, under certain conditions, would lead to legalization. All illegal aliens residing in Greece on the date of the issuance of the Presidential Decree and who were employed or seeking employment became eligible. Only aliens employed in the merchant marine were ineligible. Aliens who had been charged and finally convicted to an imprisonment sentence of over three months for any offence beyond that of illegal entry and work, who figured on the list of *persona non grata*, or who suffered from an infectious disease were subject to reservations. Aliens were required to apply and to provide specified documentation. They needed attestations issued by the Ministry of Justice that they did not have criminal records. They needed attestations provided by local police stations, on the basis of a fingerprint check, that
they were not on the list of *persona non grata* maintained by the Criminal Investigation Police. They were required to provide certificates from a public hospital that they were not suffering from any contagious disease. Moreover, they were required to provide documents such as passports or certificates concerning their family situations which proved their identity.

Each applicant was enjoined to provide information about his or her address, family situation, educational level, length of stay in Greece and employment situation. Various documents would be used to establish the period of residency, including receipts, electricity and telephone bills, leases or social security stamps. Applications were to be made at local offices of the National Manpower Organization which were authorized to issue provisional residency permits. Aliens who failed to apply by the cutoff or closure date of May 31, 1998 were subject to deportation.

The aliens who concluded the registration procedure successfully and within the deadline were to be granted so-called white cards, temporary residency permits. This would enable the alien to enter the second phase of the legalization process. Moreover, possession of the white card safeguarded continued residency in Greece for the successful applicant and his or her family in Greece. It also authorized employment and certain other employment-related rights. However, the definitive status of white card holders remained unclear as only successful completion of the second phase and obtaining a green card would ensure maintenance of residency. The grant of white cards could be refused or revoked for reasons of public interest as decided upon by the concerned ministries.

Thus, the aim of the first phase was not to legalize all illegally resident aliens in Greece but to register them. The question of conferral of durable residency was to be decided in the second phase. The fact that no distinction was made between residence and employment permits bore witness to the aliens being viewed as a labor force, or as manpower, a perspective that would become more explicit in the second phase of the legalization. The General Confederation of Greek Trade Unions and various other associations and nongovernmental organizations sharply criticized the conflation of the immigrants with manpower policy. They argued that the right of immigrants to continue to reside in Greece should not be a function of the needs of the economy or of the labor market situation.

**THE SECOND PRESIDENTIAL DECREE**

To qualify for a limited duration residence permit, referred to in the second decree as a green card, an alien had to have successfully met the requirements
of the first decree and worked in registered employment from January 1, 1998 until the date of application for the green card. The second phase applicants needed to provide documents proving they had earned an income corresponding to at least half that earned by an unqualified worker for 40 days. However, requirements varied according to sector of employment. Agricultural workers who applied received preferential or privileged treatment.

The application for a green card was again to be submitted to local offices of the National Manpower Organization which were authorized to issue green cards. However, a green card could only be issued after approval of the application by a committee comprised of local labor authorities and other officials. The second decree did not clarify the role of these local committees. It was unclear, for instance, whether the role of the local committee was only to ensure that applicants met formal conditions and to decide about the duration of the green card or whether the local committee role included deciding whether individual applicants should be given a green card or not.

The duration of the green cards ranges between one and three years and is decided upon in view of labor market and other economic criteria. The permit can be renewed one or more times, each time for a period of two years. But renewals are not automatic. They are subject to the same criteria governing applications for green cards. It is further stipulated that applicants for renewal must have earned an income corresponding to that of a typical unqualified worker for half of the period between application for green card renewal and the date of receipt of the green card. Any green card holder who can prove that he or she has already lived in Greece for at least five years and who can provide evidence of self-support can apply for a five year residency permit.

The second decree established a national-level committee to hear appeals by those denied green cards. This committee was empowered to grant green cards to aliens on humanitarian grounds if they could not meet all requirements.

Under Greek law, family members of aliens who have lived for five uninterrupted years in Greece become eligible for family reunion. The green card grants its holder equal rights to those of Greeks in pay, employment conditions and social security.

**PROCEDURES FOR ALBANIAN CITIZENS OF GREEK ORIGIN**

A specific Ministerial Decree, 4000/3/10-C issued April 15, 1998, applied to ethnic Greeks of Albanian citizenship. This Decree established their right to a “specific identity card,” valid for up to three years and renewable. The card
authorizes both residency and employment. No formal conditions were stipulated for the granting of the specific identity card beyond proof that the applicant was of Greek origin and in possession of a passport with a valid or expired visa. Applications were to be made at local police stations and applicants needed to provide personal information and their addresses. Even though no formal conditions were stipulated, not even for applicants with criminal records, it could not be assumed that all applicants would automatically receive the identity card. In fact, the Decree allowed considerable discretion to be exercised. Hence, this procedure was more generous but also more opaque. The procedure was still on-going as of the end of January 1999, and there were no data on how many applicants received the identity card. However, some applicants were refused the card. Apparently, various police stations had different standards. Some required a valid visa even though the Ministerial Decree did not stipulate it.

**ANOTHER PROTRACTED AND CONTROVERSIAL LEGALIZATION**

Things did not develop as foreseen in the two Presidential Decrees. The deadlines were very short, leading to an accumulation of processing work for which administrations were unprepared. Above and beyond the overload of work created relative to administrative structures, there were other problems. Communication difficulties between employers and aliens hampered applications. The aliens were unfamiliar with public services. The complexity and specificity of certain cases were unforeseen by public authorities.

The barriers encountered by many alien applicants were difficult. They had to spend long hours waiting in lines while having jobs. Many felt insecure, even helpless, in their dealings with public officials. Many turned to compatriots for help. With the exception of assistance provided by a few associations, most immigrants had to pay for assistance. And many were cheated and given counterfeit certificates. When some such victimized applicants presented faked documents to Greek officials, they were deported or put on trial. Finally, due to the delays encountered in obtaining certificates attesting to their lack of a criminal record and to their health, postponement of deadlines became inevitable.

While the deadline for applying to be registered was strictly adhered to – those who had not applied by May 31, 1998 lost the right to enter the procedure – all other deadlines have been repeatedly postponed. The postponements necessitated two further Presidential Decrees amending the initial ones. The supplementary decrees also modified procedures somewhat. For instance,
aliens did not have to wait to receive white cards before applying for green cards. Moreover, certain rights were accorded those applying which originally had been reserved for only those who had received a green cards. The modifications were necessitated by the very long period of time it took applicants to get green cards. Meanwhile, they were in a very precarious and legally insecure situation. As of January 1999, the deadline for applicants to have completed forty days of work and to have earned the necessary level of income to receive a green card had expired after having been extended to the end of 1998. However, the deadlines pertaining to health certificates and attestations of no penal record were repeatedly postponed. The various governmental services responsible for providing the documents, in some instances, promised to accomplish their checks by May, 2000.

Hence, the Greek legalization has ended up becoming a very long process. Those who applied for registration numbered 373,000. Relative to the estimated illegal population of Greece – about 800,000 – the rate of application seemed low. As of the end of 1998, 41,946 applicants had received white cards and, by the end of January, 1999, 177,174 aliens had applied for green cards. Most applications were made in northern Greece. About 5,000 green cards had been issued, most for a duration of one year.

The major reason why many illegally resident aliens did not apply was fear of expulsion. This was particularly true of Albanians, who applied at disproportionately low rates. Many aliens found it difficult to find jobs covered by social security and for employers willing to declare them to the social security administration and thereby pay payroll taxes. Applicants like these will find it difficult to receive green cards. Employers became less interested in employing aliens if they had to meet social security and other legal obligations. This reaction does not auger well for those aliens dependent upon the employment situation for renewal of their green cards.

The legalization policy was accompanied by an intensification of deportations. While the 1998 registration period supposedly coincided with a halt in deportations and those who registered were subsequently protected from deportation, in reality only those in possession of white or green cards were protected. As elsewhere, the legalization policy of Greece seems to have had twin goals: to enable part of the illegally resident alien population to accede to legal residency and to clear the country of the rest.
A Model of “Reasonable Integration”:
Summary of the First Report on the
Integration of Immigrants in Italy

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Immigrant Integration Policies

We begin with a brief outline of what could be defined as the state of integration of immigrants in Italy today. The overall picture that emerges is somewhat ‘patchy,’ with a mixture of light and dark areas.¹

In relation to the statistics and real life, the picture seems to be mostly positive. There is an increasing number of family reunifications. Whereas approximately 92,000 permits were in effect on January 1, 1992, this totaled over 270,000 by January 1, 1999. In 1998 more than 56,000 permits were granted, an increase of 26.4 percent from the previous year. The number of foreign students in Italian schools has also increased. In the eight year period between the school years 1989-90 and 1997-98, the number of Italian students fell from 8.5 to 7.7 million, while the number of foreign students increased from 13,700 to over 70,600, reaching more than 85,000 in the year 1998-99. In the current school year the approximate estimate is close to 100,000 foreign students. Membership in trade unions has risen considerably (the number of foreign members in the CISL doubled between 1992 and 1998, increasing from 44,000 to nearly 89,000; at the end of July 1999, the

¹According to Legislative Decree no. 286, July 25, 1998, the Consolidation Act of the provisions concerning the regulation of immigration and rules on the condition of foreigners Article 46 section 2: “The task of the Commission is to prepare an Annual Report for the government, and, to fulfill its obligations, to refer to Parliament on the implementation of policies for the integration of immigrants.” A further task is to respond to specific questions posed by the government. In this connection, the Commission was asked to draw up recommendations concerning: a) the advisability of reforming the law on citizenship in Italy, b) whether to present an ad hoc law on Gypsies and Sinti peoples and create specific tools for the integration of these minorities, c) the possibility of extending the local vote to immigrants. Regarding these and other themes, the Commission has undertaken special surveys, organized conventions, and published working papers. The Commission is headed by Giovanna Zincone, and is made up of other experts on immigration and representatives of the main Ministries involved in migration policies. This article presents a summary of the Introduction, which in turn summarizes the whole Report. The full Report has been published in Italian: Primo rapporto sull’integrazione degli immigrati in Italia. (Bologna: Società Editrice Il Mulino, 2000. Pp. 571. $29.95.)
total in CGIL was 72,000). This year, for the first time, an organization set up by immigrants was approved in Palermo, following the example of other cities (Turin, Modena, Padua).

In relation to the labor market, there has been an increase in the number of regular jobs held by immigrants (rising by 10.9 percent between 1996 and 1997) and a decrease in the disparities between immigrants and citizens regarding labor turnover and wages. An unexpected, though not particularly comforting, piece of information regards the question of wage equality: it now appears to be more of a disadvantage being a woman in Italy than being an immigrant. A positive phenomenon is the fact that immigrant labor has revived certain important economic sectors, such as the fishing industry in Mazara del Vallo in Sicily, floriculture in Liguria, and sheep-farming in Abruzzo and Latium. Immigrant labor, on the whole, appears to serve a complementary rather than a competitive role in relation to native Italian labor. It would seem that it is even becoming crucial to the survival of our economy. In the 1999 Report of the Union of Italian Chambers of Commerce, it was estimated that by 1999–2000 one third of the labor demand in industry and services will be met only by making use of immigrant labor.

Another bright spot is the fact that immigrants are now for the most part no longer living in primary or secondary reception centers, but are moving towards 'normal' living arrangements, comparable to the average housing conditions of Italians themselves. (Between 60 percent and 80 percent of immigrants, depending on the place of residence, find living accommodations through the market. For most, 50 percent to 70 percent, the housing arrangements are 'decent' according to Italian standards.) Finally, the state of health of immigrants is, on the whole, good. Clearly, the adventure of immigration is not for the weak or the sick. Most foreigners who arrive in our country searching for better living conditions are between 19 and 40 years of age, and therefore rarely require health care. Moreover, even though they have the right to use the public health system, they tend to resort to private social organizations.

Nevertheless, dark areas still exist. First and foremost, the percentage of unregistered workers among those who hold an official residence permit is still high and was estimated to be around 30 percent in 1998. This means that legalizing the status of immigrants does not automatically resolve the problem of the underground labor market (i.e., jobs without formal contracts or social security contributions) with its low wages, heavy shift work, unhealthy conditions and, in the most extreme cases, subjection to slavery. Though, for
the moment, as already stated above, immigrant labor appears to be mostly complementary rather than competitive with regard to native Italian labor, this is not necessarily the case for unskilled labor or the informal economy, nor will it necessarily always be true in the future.

Education also has its darker areas. According to a study carried out in the province of Vicenza, the statistics regarding ‘slow’ students and examination failures among foreign children are rather worrying. A large percentage of foreign pupils, 31 percent in elementary school, nearly 67 percent in middle school and over 71 percent in senior school, are behind for their age. In all grades, the percentage of students who fail their year is higher among foreign pupils than Italian ones. In elementary school the gap is around 3 percent (over 97% of Italian students and approximately 94% of foreign students passed), it increases in middle school, where the corresponding difference is 94 percent to 81 percent. Moreover, although the exact numbers are not available, it is clear that dropouts are far more common among the foreign-born.

In relation to housing, the shadows are even deeper, with exorbitant rents being charged for dilapidated and crowded living accommodations, and discrimination in access to the market. Many landlords are reluctant to rent property to foreigners, citing irregular incomes and poor maintenance of rental property. Living and working conditions cause many illnesses that affect immigrants once they are in Italy: respiratory and digestive ailments, as well as psychosomatic disorders linked to stress and the fear of failure in their new life. Having left their countries in good health, many fall ill due to their poor living conditions in Italy. Inadequate prevention measures – which may be due to their culture, but often also due to the difficulty in finding time for medical examinations – explain the disproportionate number of complications related to pregnancy, childbirth and confinement. According to a study conducted in Lombardy, this category of illnesses is the most common in hospitalized immigrants: in 1997 alone over 3,000 cases were recorded in this region.

Data regarding the crime rate among immigrants is well-known and alarming: immigrants make up 25 percent of the prison population and over 50 percent in correction homes for juvenile delinquents. These statistics, however, must not be considered out of their context. Such high numbers are partially due to the fact that it is difficult to apply alternative measures to immigrants (such as house arrest, when they are without domicile) and the fact that the figures include many repeated arrests involving the same habit-
ual criminal. It should also be pointed out that immigrants are also the victims of crime – at the hands of other immigrants as well as Italians – just as they are the victims of greedy employers and unscrupulous landlords.

In relation to the perceptions and opinions of Italians about integration, it is comforting that the positive aspects seem still to prevail. Of course, this is not to say that there are no negative ones, some of which, such as fears that immigration tends to foster illegal and criminal activities, and skepticism about the ability of amnesties to reduce the large number of illegal immigrants, are empirically founded. However, it should be pointed out that tolerant and open-minded opinions and attitudes are well-rooted, as we shall illustrate later in this report.

We shall now briefly analyze the immigration law, looking at its promises and applications, and making some recommendations that may serve to complete or improve its action. But first, it is necessary to clearly define the goals that integration policies should pursue, using the criteria of good government rather than those of good scholarship. We believe that, for good government, integration means two things: a) personal integrity and good living, and b) positive interaction and peaceful coexistence.

Naturally, these two dimensions or goals of integration follow from each other: peaceful coexistence requires that no group should perceive the other as a source of attitudes and behavior that are harmful to its own integrity and good living. Therefore the model proposed is one of reasonable integration – a model which is not too rigid, not too ideological, nor too pretentious.

Fundamentally, the project behind the 1998 Law (no. 40) contemplates a model of ‘reasonable integration,’ made up of four basic elements, backed by an underlying strategy:

1) Interaction based on security. Positive interaction is built up through a shared respect of the rules and the belief that the other person does not pose a danger. The law provides instruments to prevent clandestine entry, to expel illegal immigrants and to fight crime. Measures include the provision of temporary custody centers to ensure the effectiveness of administrative expulsion, expulsion used as a security measure, and finally expulsion used as an alternative to, or following, a criminal sentence. Involvement in trafficking for the purpose of exploiting or initiating prostitution increases the penalty, and in the case of minors or when more than one person is involved, there may be a

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2The Commission appointed the Istituto per gli Studi sulla Pubblica Opinione to carry out an opinion poll among Italians regarding the question of immigration. The results of the survey have been published in a working paper, and have been used as a basis for the present Report.
fine of up to 50 million lire and imprisonment for five to fifteen years for every foreigner sold. The sanctions for employers hiring foreign workers without residence permits include imprisonment from three months to one year and a fine between 2 and 6 million lire.

2) Integrity of human rights for illegal immigrants. The aim of this second element of the law is to ensure at least a minimal respect of personal integrity for illegal immigrants, whose number is supposed to decline, by giving them access to fundamental human rights. Illegal immigrants are allowed, for example, to use any walk-in or emergency hospital service, and even ongoing health treatment if essential. They have access to public health services not only for urgent therapies, pregnancy and any therapy required by minors (as envisaged by the United Nations Convention regarding the rights of children), but also for any essential or preventive treatment needed to protect health conditions. In relation to schooling, all children on Italian territory, for any reason, not only have the right to education, but are required by law to go to school. To protect victims from forced prostitution and neoslavery, the law has introduced special residence permits “in order to provide social protection.”

A significant aspect of the 1998 Law is that, unlike the previous laws and decrees concerning immigration, it is not accompanied by an amnesty, a regularization of the position of illegal immigrants.

3) Full integrity for legal immigrants. The principal aim of this element is to make the status of legal immigrant practicable. The key to a workable policy is the innovative figure of the ‘sponsor’. It is possible for a foreigner to obtain a residence permit to stay in Italy for one year and search for work, as long as there is someone who will provide a guarantee for lodging, maintenance, the payment of health insurance, and reentry to the country of origin if work is not found. The option of legality has to be made attractive by providing rewards for legal immigrants, i.e., by increasing their rights. The 1998 Law and Consolidation Act envisages virtual equality between foreigners and citizens, not only with regard to civil rights, but also to a series of social rights: registration at the labor exchange, access to the health service, council housing, pension rights, etc. Legal immigrants are also given greater security and stability through the attribution of a Green Card after five years, another significant incentive to regulate one’s legal status. One of the strong points of the Bill, providing local participation for immigrants in public decision-making by granting the right to vote for the town council, however, was expunged and reproposed as a constitutional reform bill. According to the same logic,
the 1998 Law should have been followed not only by a relaunch of the local
vote, but also by a revision of the nationality law to reinforce the principles
of _jus soli_ (being born in the country) and _jus domicili_ (having lived in the
country) as opposed to _jus sanguinis_ (descent).

4) **Interaction based on pluralism and communication.** The 1998 Law pur-
sues the objective of fostering respect for cultural differences by allocating
funds to teach foreigners their own language of origin as well as Italian (avoid-
ing a ‘confining’ communitarian policy by building shared spaces and chan-
nels of communication). This element of respect and support for communi-
cation should have been accompanied by a new Religious Freedom Act and
by an attempt to open new agreements with Islamic associations.

Finally, the new law envisages the implementation of its policies using
private social organizations as intermediaries, thus introducing an indirect
integration strategy. In this respect, the approach follows the historical exam-
ple of the best European policies adopted for initiating the integration process
of the national working classes, as well as the experience in Italy during the
Giolitti period. In Great Britain, Belgium, the Netherlands and Sweden, rep-
resentation of the interests of immigrants and management of welfare was ini-
tially delegated to private organizations.

To summarize, after years of emergency policies, the 1998 Law finally
reinstates a ‘main door’ policy, opening a legal route to entry and residence
that had previously, in spite of public statements to the contrary, been
neglected by Italian governments. This decision complies with the policy
indicated by the European Union: “The European Commission thus defined
the key elements of a common policy: a) an action that can affect migratory
pressure; b) effective control over immigration; c) measures designed to
improve the position of legal immigrants” (from the Austrian Document of
the Presidency of the Council of Justice and Internal Affairs, November
1998).

The law also envisages a model of reasonable integration, because fight-
ing crime and curbing illegal entries are two fundamental aspects of achiev-
ing the goal of positive interaction. We shall now examine the consequences
of the implementation of the new law, point by point, making some recom-
mandations for future action.

1) **Interaction based on security.** Right after the passage of the law, the impact
of foreign criminals and the arrival of illegal immigrants on the perception of
security and integrity of nationals was underestimated. Moreover, the granting
of yet another large-scale ‘amnesty’ for illegal immigrants – the fourth in less than fifteen years – probably did not help in the construction of a proper integration process, even although the underlying intention was to turn over a new leaf. Such a policy presents the public decision-maker with an irresolvable dilemma. If amnesty is not adopted, the first step toward the integration process, i.e., a step toward the safety and legality of the immigrant’s status, is precluded. If amnesty is granted often and to large numbers, a devastating and uncontrollable mechanism of attraction is triggered. Therefore, such amnesties hardly ever achieve their objective, something of which public opinion is fully aware.

A survey undertaken by the Commission has revealed considerable distrust among Italians regarding the capacity of amnesties to reduce the number of illegal immigrants: only 8.6 percent believed that the current legalization would curb the percentage of illegal immigrants to less than 10 percent of total number of immigrants; 37.1 percent thought that there would remain between 10 percent and 30 percent illegal immigrants, 34.4 percent between 30 percent and 50 percent, and 20 percent thought that 50 percent of immigrants would remain in an illegal position. It would appear, however, that Italians have an ambivalent opinion in this connection. While they would like to see all illegal immigrants expelled, even if they have not committed crimes (61.8 percent), they are willing to legalize those who have jobs (72.7 percent). From this point of view, the sponsor solution is excellent because it contemplates a programmed entry of immigrants in search of work and a matching of supply and demand.

It should also be pointed out that the idea of ‘interaction as security’ was later strongly reinforced. There was in fact a considerable increase in the rejection and expulsion of immigrants (almost 61,000 deportations from January 1, 1999 to October 30, 1999, according to the Ministry of the Interior). The rules governing detention centers were also tightened, without weakening the fundamental rights of those held, though the practical functioning of the centers still leaves much to be desired. Important new measures have been taken to quash crime. The later decrees improved the tools for opposing illegal traffic by making it compulsory to arrest those caught in the act, and enabling the confiscation of the means of transport used.

The fact that the majority of information in the media regarding immigration concerns crime and its repression is certainly of no help in the attempt to establish low-conflict relationships and a climate of positive interaction. In this respect, it is helpful that the First Report of the Commission on the Integration of Immigrants provides empirical confirmation of the important contribution
foreigners are making to the national economy, and proposes further incentives to immigrants to regularize their status.

2) Integrity as respect of human rights for illegal immigrants. Regarding this area of rights, the implementation of the law has maintained its promise. This was largely due to one of its more innovative elements: the granting of residence permits for the purpose of social protection. The Regulations in fact provide for an operative Commission to be set up at the Ministry of Equal Opportunity, with the task of financing and monitoring activities carried out locally to protect the victims of illegal traffic. Special protection is also contemplated for minors, exempted from expulsions except when they present a serious danger to public order and state security.

The protection of human rights for illegal immigrants has, on the whole, become more concrete. Access to health care has been extended and rationalized. Anonymity has also been guaranteed to illegal immigrants who use the health service by assigning them identity cards with code numbers. Guidelines have been drawn up concerning access to state schools for foreign students regardless of their legal status: they should be admitted when possible to the same grade attended in their own country; excessive concentrations of foreign students should be avoided.

These are important steps forward in providing the minimal protection of personal integrity, but it is important that legal behavior should be rewarded and further illegal entry curbed. Otherwise there is a risk of giving the wrong impression that the divide between the rights of illegal and legal immigrants in Italy has narrowed. There is in fact a considerable gap between the two: legal immigrants have, besides the security of their legal status, the possibility of holding a regular job, full social rights, minimum income guarantees, maternity benefits, and full equality with Italian citizens with regard to the public health service, including care for common illnesses.

Nevertheless, these first two elements (‘personal integrity in legality’ and ‘interaction based on pluralism and communication’) have not so far received enough attention from Italian policymakers. The elements ‘interaction as security’ and ‘integrity as human rights for illegal immigrants’ have attracted more attention, with the result that public opinion has concentrated mainly on the emergency aspects, such as deviance and marginalization, which have assumed disproportionate weight compared to the aspects of legality, pluralism and communication, where integration is considered a situation of normality.
3) *Full integrity for legal immigrants.* As mentioned earlier, it is important to provide further incentives to legalize one’s status by rapidly implementing the institution of sponsorship and starting to issue Green Cards. It is also necessary to establish the right to vote in local elections, make access to citizenship easier, and to promote family reunifications, the learning of Italian, and the acceptance of children in school. By strongly linking the integration with legality, the government would also have the advantage of being backed by favorable public opinion. We now take a closer look at some of the instruments and measures that the Commission on the Integration of Immigrants proposes to provide such incentives.

The 1998 Law, which regulates the admission of legal immigrants, was not implemented in a timely fashion. The yearly quotas of 58,000 legal immigrants allowed for 1998 and 1999 were finalized in September for 1998 and in August for 1999. Only in 2000 was the quota of legal immigrants voted at the beginning of the year. Without these legal provisions, there would have been the risk of leaving the door open only to illegal entry.

Because of the delay in the vote on the 1998 and 1999 Regulations, it was impossible to implement two important instruments and incentives: the sponsor and the Green Card. However, if the government wishes to give even clearer incentives, the promises of a local vote and the revision of citizenship must be maintained. More work needs to be done on both these aspects.

The proposals for revision of citizenship regulations presented by the Commission, and backed by the Minister for Social Affairs, Livia Turco, recommended that Italy follow the mainstream of citizenship reform introduced recently elsewhere in Europe. Other countries of the European Union have lowered the number of years of residence required to apply for naturalization, and shortened the gap in years required for naturalization (which is discretionary and usually applied to those who submit an application after a certain period of residency) and the automatic acquisition of citizenship under the law (which is not discretionary and is usually applied in case of marriage or birth in the country). This has been done by simplifying the naturalization procedure, making it less discretionary, and thereby reinforcing the *jus domicilii* (stable residence) elements of European nationality laws. Almost all countries of the European Union have discouraged marriages of convenience by raising the number of years of marriage or residence required before the foreign spouse can obtain citizenship. All countries of the Union accept double citizenship, although some prohibit it under certain circumstances. Recent reforms throughout the EU have simplified the acquisition of citizenship for
native children of foreign parents; thus important elements of *jus soli* were introduced where not already present.

In Italy, the 1992 Law effectively went against all the above mentioned tendencies. The 1992 Law actually increased the period of residence required before applying for naturalization, from five to ten years, but its acceptance is still strongly discretionary, as confirmed by the clamorous case of Younis Tawfik, a famous writer whose application for naturalization was rejected. The same law granted citizenship to those born in Italy of immigrant parents, only if they were able to prove continuous legal residence up to the age of 18, a strict requirement that is difficult to certify. On the other hand, acquiring citizenship through marriage is much easier in Italy than in other countries. It is not surprising therefore that most naturalizations take this route. Surveys indicate that Italians are favorable to making it easier for children born or brought up in Italy to acquire citizenship. They are also in favor of drastically reducing the waiting period. Over 62 percent feel it is appropriate to facilitate the acquisition of citizenship for foreigners who have lived for at least five years in Italy as long as they have not committed crimes; 69 percent want to facilitate the acquisition of citizenship for those born in Italy and 52.5 percent for minors who have studied here for a certain number of years. The same favorable attitude applies to the right to vote, though to a slightly lesser extent: 50.2 percent in favor. It should be noted that the vote has already been given to non-EU citizens in other European countries (the Netherlands, the Scandinavian countries, more recently in Spain and, in certain communities under certain conditions, Portugal). In Great Britain, immigrants from the Commonwealth have the right to vote in national as well as local elections.

Another incentive to legalization is the possibility of family reunification. The new Regulation that influenced the 1998 Law made it easier for the families of legal immigrants to join them in Italy by lowering and redefining the housing conditions required (only a certificate of adequate sanitation). This leads us to hope that some of the difficulties encountered previously will be reduced, at least in Italy.

However, improvements could still be made: the limit of 18 years creates pressure to join the family before reaching the age of majority. This acts as a disincentive to finish schooling and results in the arrival in Italy of many young people at the difficult age of 16–17, too young to enter the job market, yet too old for constructive schooling. It would therefore seem advisable to raise the age at which children can join their family, especially for those
who need to complete their studies or fulfill military obligations in their country of origin. Another incentive to legalization would be a residence permit granted to adult relatives of parents (sisters, grown-up daughters free of family burden), mothers in particular, who want to rejoin children who have migrated to Italy.

4) Interaction based on pluralism and communication. As mentioned earlier, the government has achieved something in this area too, though the results are not very visible. The new law has strengthened the facilities for learning Italian as a second language and given support to multicultural activities, but unfortunately these activities do not have a particularly high profile. It is necessary to act more visibly to make an impact on public opinion. One example could be to give approval to the Bill on religious freedom. The Commission made a series of proposals that were partially incorporated in the modifications to the Bill presented by the Government: allowing the slaughter of animals according to the halal canons, acceptance of reserved areas in cemeteries, the building of mosques, the respect of major festivities when possible and the granting of space and time for prayer (making up this time with extra working hours).

It seems likely that the government could count on the large-scale support of public opinion regarding pluralistic and tolerant policies toward new minorities, since over 84 percent of those surveyed stated that members of minority groups should not abandon their own culture to be fully accepted as members of the community. Nearly 60 percent felt that minorities should not abandon their culture even if its cultural and religious practices prevented them from obeying the law. The recent law on linguistic minorities has unfortunately neglected romanès, the traditional language of many Gypsies. Although this language would require specific means of protection, we feel that, nonetheless, something needs to be done.

Another aspect deserving more visible action is that of communication, and in particular the teaching of Italian as a second language. From a practical point of view, courses need to be adapted to the needs of the users and scheduled at user-friendly times, such as evenings and weekends. Furthermore, to give greater status to the learning of Italian, we feel it is important to establish standardized certificates for the various levels of proficiency in Italian of the kind which already exist for French, German, and British and American English. Possession of such a diploma could be considered a favorable element when granting residence permits, and reduce the time required to acquire citizenship.
Knowledge of the language obviously facilitates learning at school, especially when attending advanced courses. To allow minors joining parents in Italy to be introduced smoothly at the beginning of the school year, our Commission proposes that entry should be organized in such a way as to allow them to attend an Italian language course before beginning the school year.

Immigrants report that not knowing the language is a serious handicap that generates frustration and humiliating situations. It also becomes a barrier to ‘integration as interaction.’ Not knowing the language can be a reason for immigrants to cloister themselves in their community of origin. This strong sense of community is perceived by Italians. Only 40.9 percent of respondents think that foreigners are integrated in society as well as at work. There is more optimism regarding interaction at school and the capacity of immigrants – in spite of their difficulties – to give a positive contribution to the other pupils: 73.5 percent thought that if schools made greater efforts, the presence of foreign children could positively influence education. Surprisingly, in the Northeast, where there is a higher degree of integration in the legal labor market, Italians are more pessimistic about the capacity of other cultures to enrich schooling. This apparent diffidence towards outsiders in the Northeast is confirmed by the answers to a question directly aimed at testing intolerance of immigrants: whereas nationally only 17.4 percent of Italians would be disturbed to have an immigrant as a neighbor, the figure rose to 27.7 percent in the Northeast. This proves (if needed) that economic integration and social integration do not necessarily go hand in hand.

A few words should be said about what we have called ‘indirect integration.’ The Regulations have encouraged the delegation of many functions to private organizations. However, due to the fragility and volatility of immigrant associations, in Italy as in other countries with recent immigration, these tasks are mostly delegated to Italian volunteer associations. The difficulty of establishing autonomous representation of immigrants’ interests tends to produce a ‘maternalistic’ policy, which provides care and protection, but without the typical severity of a paternalistic state. This affectionate protection causes a certain degree of impatience among those immigrants who are more sensitive politically and who wish to speak for themselves as individuals. Therefore, it is important to combine the indirect mechanism of protection with the normal form of representation through elections. Moreover, the delegated bodies, i.e., the Italian volunteer associations who represent the interests of immigrants, have tended, due to their charitable mission, to protect first and foremost the most vulnerable, i.e., the illegal immigrants. This
focus on those living in the difficult condition of illegality could become a risk for illegal immigrants themselves: excessive indulgence towards those who enter the country illegally endangers the strength of the facilities which are supposed to provide services for them. Fortunately, volunteer organizations have become more aware of this risk and have become more prudent in what they choose to do for illegals. They realize that the largest share of responsibility for any service offered to the uncontrollable mass of illegal immigrants is likely to fall on their shoulders.

If we wish to continue protecting the human rights of immigrants, including the illegal ones, their numbers must be reduced. To achieve this goal, it is necessary to widen the gap between the rights granted to legal immigrants and those granted to illegal immigrants, making it far harder to be an illegal immigrant in Italy. To do this, it is first necessary to keep the informal economy under control. In Italy, as elsewhere, a good chance of finding black market jobs attracts clandestine and illegal immigration.

In conclusion, we briefly reiterate the key aspects of the Commission’s proposals for nonrepressive measures aimed at reducing the number of illegal immigrants and increasing legal immigration: to clamp down on the informal economy, to convince volunteer organizations to collaborate in dissuading immigrants from entering and remaining illegally in Italy, to encourage legal immigration by rapidly enforcing policies regarding sponsorship, and to improve the civil and political rights of legal immigrants.

In brief, we consider the 1998 Law able to provide good legislation on immigration, precisely because it is reasonable and not radical. Nevertheless, the Commission feels that the integration strategy implicit in the law should be reinforced with tools and measures that reward legal immigration and emphasise its ‘normal’ character.
CONFERENCE REPORT

Smuggling and Trafficking: A Conference Report

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Smuggling is an estimated $5 to $10 billion annual business, based on estimates that at least one million migrants a year pay an average $5,000 to $10,000 each to be taken unlawfully across borders. Brunson McKinley, the director general of the International Organization for Migration, notes that smuggling people from one nation to another, the “dark side” of globalization, is a large and growing business: “The penalties are far less severe than for drugs, the up-front investment much smaller, and the evidence has legs and tends to run away.”

In March and June 2000, enforcement officials met with researchers in Tutzing, Germany and in Washington, DC in conferences organized by the European Forum for Migration Studies of Bamberg University and the Institute for the Study of International Migration, affiliated with Georgetown University, to discuss smuggling and trafficking patterns and policies.

Smuggling is the term usually reserved for individuals and organizations who, for a fee, move individuals unlawfully over borders. Trafficking is normally defined as smuggling plus coercion or exploitation, as when women agree to be taken unlawfully across borders to be hostesses and wind up as prostitutes, or migrant workers wind up in slave or indentured conditions to repay smuggling fees. Some analysts distinguish between, for example, a father smuggling his family across borders and an organization that smuggles people across borders on an ongoing basis.

The United Nations is developing a draft Convention on Transnational Organized Crime. Its draft definition would not include the father taking his family unlawfully across borders: “Smuggling of migrants shall mean the intentional procurement for profit for illegal entry of a person into and/or illegal residence in a State of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident. Trafficking in persons means the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbor-
ing or receipt of persons, either by the threat or use of abduction, force, fraud, deception or coercion, or by the giving or receiving of unlawful payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having the control over another person.”

The G8 leaders in July 2000 in their final communiqué said: “We reaffirm our support for the adoption by the end of 2000 of the United Nations Transnational Organized Crime Convention and three related Protocols on firearms, smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons for the establishment of an effective legal framework against transnational organized crime (TOC). We are particularly concerned to fight against those who organize and take advantage of illegal immigration and human trafficking.” In July 2000, President Clinton signed the Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict and the Optional Protocol on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography; both conventions were approved by the UN’s General Assembly as additions to the 1990 Convention on the Rights of the Child, which the United States also signed, in 1995, but has never ratified.

The number of aliens apprehended whom the INS believes were smuggled into the U.S. was 247,000 in 1999, up from 138,000 in 1997. Since Mexican border-crossers tend to rely less on smugglers than other illegals, the INS uses the number of arrested non-Mexicans as a gauge of smuggling activity; 58,000 non-Mexican illegals were captured in 1997, and 81,000 in 1999. The INS has 247 agents working smuggling cases. They arrested 4,100 smugglers and 40,000 smuggled aliens in 1999. Some 2,000 smugglers were prosecuted and 61 percent were convicted.

*Chinese and Ships.* The *Golden Venture* was the smuggling ship that went aground in New York on June 6, 1993 with almost 300 Chinese migrants on board. The migrants had paid about $30,000 each to be smuggled into the U.S., making the smugglers’ revenue about $9 million. As of June 2000, most of the migrants on the *Golden Venture* had been deported; four received asylum and 37 have asylum cases pending.

Most Chinese migrants do not seem to be fleeing persecution. Many are from the relatively prosperous coastal province of Fujian, which is marked by occasional two-to-four story houses built by remittances and smuggling. These visible successes make many Fujian residents eager to migrate, and willing to pay $30,000 to $40,000 a piece in smuggling fees. Smugglers often tell migrants that, even if they are caught, they have a good chance to win asylum. The U.S. has since 1996 granted asylum to persons persecuted under
restrictive family planning policies: about 3,000 Chinese have received asylum under this provision between 1997 and 1999.

Local recruiters find migrants willing to make a down payment on the smuggling fee. After they have assembled a group of migrants, the smuggler arranges for transportation to the U.S., often via Central America or the Caribbean. Smugglers are very sensitive to changing enforcement efforts. After the U.S. cracked down on efforts to smuggle Chinese by ship, ships with Chinese migrants were redirected to Mexico and Central America and Canada.

Four ships with 590 Chinese migrants arrived in British Columbia in summer 1999, and all applied for asylum — they were almost one-fourth of the 2,700 Chinese who applied for asylum in Canada in 1999. Mexican and Central American officials report that they too are receiving more boats with Chinese migrants, who then travel over land to enter the U.S. over the southwestern border: Mexico found two ships with 250 Chinese in Baja, California in September 1999. Mexico has a booming maquiladora or foreign-owned assembly plant sector, and some Chinese are smuggled into Mexico by shell Chinese companies that have few employees or facilities.

The Canadian government is considering individually the asylum applications filed by the Chinese migrants who arrived by ship in summer 1999. As of May 2000, 13 were granted refugee status, 113 were back in China and 273 remain in detention in Canada. Canada notes that migrants who are released rarely show up for their asylum hearings. Canada uses the number of asylum applications filed as one indicator of the number of persons being smuggled into Canada.

Apprehending shiploads of migrants makes the news, but far more migrants use false documents or slip across borders without inspection than arrive by ship. Smuggling by ship was deemed a special concern because of the degree of organization required, the potentially high profits, and the brutality of some of the smugglers. Chinese are closely associated with smuggling by ship, and the potentially large number of Chinese migrants, their willingness to pay $30,000 to $40,000 to smugglers, and the fact that Chinese migrants are smuggled everywhere makes China a special concern.

Some Chinese migrants may be redirected from North America to Europe; most estimates put the cost of being smuggled to Europe at half the $20,000 to $40,000 cost of being smuggled to Canada or the U.S.

1Among the clever schemes used to get Chinese into Canada was the entry of about 150 “Japanese eco tourists” who traveled from Greenland to northern Canada, but soon went to Montreal and then New York City.
Western Hemisphere. The U.S. apprehends 1.5 to 1.6 million persons just inside the U.S.-Mexican border each year; 96 to 98 percent are Mexicans and most of them agree to return voluntarily to Mexico. The INS uses the number of Other Than Mexicans as one indicator of smuggling activities along the southwestern border. In Fiscal Year 1997, when the INS apprehended 1.5 million foreigners, there were 40,000 OTMs among them, including: 8,800 Salvadorans; 8,100 Hondurans; 7,400 Guatemalans; 3,900 Canadians; 2,400 Colombians; and 660 Chinese.

Many of the OTMs apprehended along the U.S.-Mexican border are from Central and South America, where “smugglers” are likely to be travel agents or coffee shop owners. Their operators can help persons who want to travel to the U.S., usually to work or join family members, to obtain documents, make contact with transporters, and, once inside the U.S., arrange employment and housing, if desired.

In some cases, the OTMs are headed for a particular place in the U.S. The Delmarva region, centered in Georgetown, Delaware, is the sixth-largest poultry processing region in the U.S.; the 625 million broilers raised there account for about nine percent of the broilers processed in the U.S. Some 21,000 persons are employed by the Delmarva poultry industry; 7,000 mostly self-employed farmers are involved in raising chickens, and 14,000 in poultry processing.

About half of the processing workers are Guatemalan Indians from the San Marcos area. They began to arrive in significant numbers in 1992-93, both directly from Guatemala, and in secondary moves from Florida. Some paid $1,500 to $2,000 to be smuggled into the U.S., and at least 1,000 applied for asylum. There are also Korean immigrant workers in Delmarva.

Because of high turnover, poultry firms are constantly hiring new workers. If U.S. employer sanctions laws were functioning properly, it should be difficult for unauthorized newcomers to find jobs, especially because most poultry firms participate in the INS’s Employment Verification Pilot program, under which employers submit the A-number and first initial and last name of newly-hired immigrant employees to the INS, and the employers quickly receive an employment-authorized or not-authorized response. If the A-number is not work authorized, the INS can request additional information, including the full name of the newly hired worker and the name of the INS office that issued the worker’s documents. The third step is to have the newly-hired worker contact the INS to clear up the issue – in the Delmarva poultry industry, only one percent of the newly-hired workers go to step three
of the EVP process, and less than one percent of newly-hired workers fail EVP authorization.

However, it is widely believed that many newly hired Guatemalan workers are not authorized to be employed in the U.S. They frustrate the EVP system by, for instance, claiming to be U.S. citizens or “borrowing” authentic documents from friends and relatives. Georgetown is a city of 5,000 that has been transformed by immigration in the 1990s - it had virtually no Hispanics in 1990 and is about 25 percent Hispanic in 2000. The poultry companies do not provide housing, and most workers live in subdivided private housing. In some cases, 15 to 20 adults live in a one-bedroom house and private vans provide rides to work. The Guatemalan section of Georgetown includes both public and private assistance agencies as well as the infrastructure to obtain false documents and finance the smuggling of relatives and friends.

The Georgetown case illustrates a general point: once an unauthorized migrant is smuggled into the U.S., there are relatively few barriers that prevent her from getting a U.S. job. The ready availability of false documents permits U.S. employers and unauthorized migrants to satisfy the letter but not the spirit of U.S. employer sanctions laws.

*Europe.* In the U.S., most migrants are smuggled in to work; in Europe, the assumption is that most migrants are smuggled in to apply for asylum. Many Europeans argue that, because there are few doors through which migrants seeking jobs can enter, many migrants who would otherwise enter as migrant workers instead enter as asylum seekers. In one study, 29 of 32 Iranians who applied for asylum in the Netherlands used smugglers at some point in their journey.

Would the opening of other immigration doors reduce smuggling and trafficking? Many observers believe that, for instance, guest worker programs would reduce the need for migrants to rely on smugglers and then apply for asylum to get abroad. Brunson McKinley says: “Europe does need workers in certain areas, so why not put policy together in a way that takes the wind out of the sails of the traffickers?”

Others fear that guest workers will add to rather than substitute for aliens being smuggled.

Germany is the largest economy in Europe, and has an estimated 150,000 to 1.5 million unauthorized foreign residents. The wide range in the estimated number of illegal foreigners reflects the various ways in which a foreigner can be in Germany unlawfully, including entering illegally or entering legally and
then violating the terms of legal entry by working or overstaying. There is agreement that the number of illegals peaks in the summer, when “working tourists” from Eastern Europe find jobs in agriculture, construction and services.

In 1998, some 140,000 foreigners were detained by German police, including 40,000 at Germany’s borders; the number of persons detained near German borders peaked at 52,000 in 1993, and was 38,000 in 1999. The Department of Labor is responsible for workplace inspections, and it issued about 43,000 citations and fines in 1999, about the same as in the previous three years, but up sharply from 20,000 to 30,000 in the early 1990s. The number of cases referred by the DOL to public prosecutors for criminal violations of employment laws has been rising steadily, and reached 9,900 in 1999.

Researchers studying illegal migration into Germany note that the process of moving foreigners into Germany and into German jobs seems to be more organized, with specialization among those who recruit migrants, provide them with forged documents, and transport them to and within Germany. The emerging smuggling business offers different levels of service for different prices.

Prostitution. Many women are smuggled from Eastern and Southern Europe into Western Europe for prostitution; prostitution is legal in countries such as the Netherlands and Germany. European governments have found it difficult to regulate exploitative smuggling for prostitution. The woman may not be authorized to be in the country, but the prostitution is unlawful only if the woman is exploited, which is defined in various ways, including not permitting her to keep her earnings, making her dependent on drugs, or using violence to prevent runaways.

Western European governments are exploring ways to get women who have been trafficked for prostitution to testify against smugglers. Belgium, for example, permits women who testify against traffickers to obtain an immigrant status, provided they live in a government center for 45 days and show that they want to begin a new life. Many prostitutes reportedly seek out their old contacts for the drugs on which they have become dependent.

Women in Eastern Europe bore the brunt of economic restructuring. Many were in the labor force before 1989, and were laid off as state industries restructured. Thus, especially young women in rural areas and small towns see the opportunity to go to Western Europe as hostesses or dancers as a way to escape their surroundings and to earn money; some, but not all, know that they will wind up as prostitutes.
One potential best practice occurs on the Nepal-India border. Since 1997, some of the women who were trafficked from Nepal to India have been stationed on the Nepal-India border to warn Nepalese girls and women what they are likely to face. Since they have been stationed on the border, 70 traffickers have been arrested, and 240 girls rescued in the past three years. Nepal is trying to crack down on the practice of poor mountain villagers selling their daughters to traffickers who pass through promising them jobs as waitresses or maids in India.

**Conclusions.** Many migration researchers try to draw distinctions between smugglers and traffickers. Smugglers, they say, are simply migrant merchants helping people cross borders because of “flawed” immigration laws. They are, in this view, to be no more condemned than those who smuggled goods to avoid tariffs in the 18th and 19th centuries. Besides, since many legitimate asylum seekers use smugglers to get to a place of refuge, successful anti-smuggling efforts may leave more people vulnerable to persecution. Trafficking, on the other hand, involves the exploitation of people, and is to be condemned and prosecuted.

This distinction, which seems so easy to draw in theory, is problematic for several reasons. First, excusing smuggling also excuses violations of immigration laws. Second, it is often hard to draw distinctions in practice. Those who transport migrant farm workers for a fee in the U.S. are supposed to have their vehicles inspected, while workers who take along workmates for “gas money” do not need vehicle inspections. It has proven to be very difficult to distinguish between drivers who charge fees to take migrants to work in rural America and drivers who charge others gas money. Similarly, the distinction between smuggling and trafficking can be in the eye of the beholder.
Book Reviews


Alejandro Portes
Princeton University

This book is an invaluable contribution to the scientific research literature on international migration. The volume is the joint product of a Committee on South-North Migration, appointed in 1991 by the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population. Members of this international committee are the co-authors of the book and were responsible for initial drafts of chapters dealing with different world regions and the linkage between migration and national or community development. The overall responsibility for organization of the book and for the core chapter on theories on international migration rested on the Committee’s chair, Douglas S. Massey. He is also responsible for the chapter on migration to North America.

This is not an edited volume, but a jointly written book that exemplifies international scientific cooperation as its best. The original task was daunting: to systematically review all existing theories of the determinants of international migration, and then to examine the specialized literature in all global migration “systems” within the framework provided by the original theoretical review. Five such systems are identified: North America, Western Europe, the Persian Gulf, Asia and the Pacific, and South America. Additional chapters deal with the relationships between migration and national and community development, respectively.

The initial theoretical review chapter has been published previously as a journal article. It deals with origins of international migrant flows and of the continuity and directionality of these flows over time. Overall, this review is exemplary by its breadth and clarity of exposition. One might quibble with the attribution of concepts and propositions to certain authors to the neglect of others and with the obvious leaning of the review toward certain preferred positions, such as that labeled the “new economics” of migration. But these subjective preferences are understandable and do not detract from the general fairness and comprehensiveness of coverage. The authors clearly strive for balance and to give each theoretical perspective – from classical economics to contemporary social networks theory – their due.

The effort to systematically frame the review of the literature on each regional migration system into the typology of theories developed in this initial chapter is commendable. The effort does not succeed equally well in each case for two reasons: first, the typology itself is somewhat cumbersome, mixing ideas at different levels of abstraction; second, most regional research literatures are still too feeble to support the task of systematic theory testing. All the regional chapters are valuable because of the depth and range of coverage of the respective literatures. They would stand as distinct contributions even without the attempt to place them into the same theoretical framework.

Not surprisingly, this attempt succeeds best in the North American system, which generated most of the theoretical ideas reviewed originally. This chapter has also been published previously. The chapters on migration in Europe and in Asia, drafted by Joaquin Arango and Graeme Hugo, respectively, are notable by the deft integration of theory and research and the effort to bring regional studies to bear systematically on different conceptual perspectives. Even in these chapters, however, one discerns the evident strain of fitting regional literatures with different problems and concerns into a single common mold. That strain becomes even clearer in the chapters on South America and the Gulf systems, drafted by Pellegrino and Kouaouci, respectively.
The varying success of these integrative efforts yields two important lessons: first, theoretical development in this field is more advanced and better grounded in the North American research literature than elsewhere; second, the particularities and concerns of studies in each regional system are still too diverse to fit comfortably into a single overarching framework. Yet, at least some of the difficulty is attributable to the way this initial theoretical typology was conceived. It places in the same plane ideas at different levels of abstraction and does not differentiate well between theories yielding convergent and divergent expectations.

For example, the concept of “cumulative causation” is not really a theory, but a meta-theoretical sensitizing notion applicable in a broad range of settings at both the micro and macro levels. Similarly, “world-systems” and “segmented labor market” theories emphasize different aspects of the onset of migration flows, but their expectations are largely convergent. They both differ and put into question predictions stemming from the neo-classical camp. The overarching typology offered by the book still represents a valuable synthetic effort, but there is considerable room for refinement.

While the review of theories on the origins and continuity of migration are fairly eclectic, there is no such impartiality in the chapters devoted to consequences of these flows for sending areas. These chapters, focusing on economic effects to countries and communities of outmigration, were appropriately drafted by an economist in the Committee, J. Edward Taylor. As the chapters drafted by Massey, these have also been previously published as articles. Taylor does an excellent job of reviewing the prior sociological and anthropological literatures on the effects of labor outmigration, including the professional “brain drain” from less developed countries. But then, he goes on to advance and support a theory that differs from the prior consensus.

For the most part, the existing literature has concluded that outmigration is inimical to development as it depletes human capital in sending areas, fosters dependence on remittances, promotes a culture of premature consumption, and undermines previously integrated and self-sufficient rural communities. Remittances, in particular, are usually defined as “unproductive” because they are used mainly to improve the consumption levels of migrant families. Taylor argues that this view is too static and restrictive. It does not take into account the “multiplier effects” of such remittances as they work their way through the local and national economies. Nor do past negative assessments give due credit to productive investments by present and former migrants and to the contributions that professional emigrants can make to the scientific and professional establishments of their home countries.

By and large, this position is persuasive because it takes into account aspects neglected by prior studies and because it is based on a superior methodology. The latter provides estimates of the aggregate and long-term economic effects of migration rather than being limited to its short-term consequences for individual families. At the very least, these chapters provide a cogent and novel perspective on the relationship between international migration and economic development and lay the basis for fruitful studies in the area.

The substantive areas covered by *Worlds in Motion* do not exhaust all there is to the literature on migration and to theories of the process. A particularly important omission is immigrant adaptation in receiving countries and the alternative viewpoints from which it has been studied. These include assimilation in its various forms, ethnic resilience, and modes of incorporation, among others. By the same token, there is no mention of the second generation and of the resilient ethnic communities and ethnic identities that represent the principal long-term outcomes of immigration in host societies. This omission indicates that the book is not a comprehensive compendium of immigration theory and research, but in the areas that it does cover, it represents an extraordinary achievement. It provides the most
authoritative account of the state of current knowledge known to this reviewer. This is a "must" book for researchers of immigration and for courses on this topic.


**ROBERTA COHEN**
Brookings Institution

A defining feature of the post cold war era is the large number of internal conflicts pitting ethnic, racial and religious groups against one another in bitter fratricidal fighting. These conflicts devastate political, economic and social structures, spawn millions of refugees and internally displaced persons, and call forth international aid to relieve suffering and rebuild destroyed societies.

The international response, however, is riddled with shortcomings, and it is these that preoccupy the author of this new study. Maynard describes in detail how international aid focuses too narrowly on emergency relief instead of trying to address the fundamental causes that created the crisis in the first place. Moreover, the aid is often misguided and can disrupt communities, create dependencies, exacerbate local animosities, and prolong wars.

Instead, long-term strategies are needed that go beyond providing food and medicine, rebuilding infrastructure, and repatriating refugees. Ethnic divisions must be healed, trust reestablished, and communities rebuilt from the grassroots up. Sustainable political, social and economic foundations must be laid, with human rights protections, environmental concerns, psychosocial needs, gender issues, and the rule of law integrated into the project plans.

Maynard, to her credit, walks the reader through detailed programs that reflect this broader vision and urges international organizations, donor governments and NGOs to reorient their thinking and work toward more sustainable solutions. Without such a comprehensive approach, she warns, the societies concerned will too easily fall back into conflict.

The point is well taken, but the order is too tall. The "complete rehabilitation of the psychologically traumatized" (p. 190), for example, is but one example of the overambitiousness of the author's programs. Maynard needs to take more seriously the financial constraints of donor governments, their limited attention spans, and their national interests. Staying for five years or more in each country in conflict is more of an investment than anyone is prepared to make. Moreover, the active refashioning of other societies risks eroding national responsibility, however sensitively aid is provided and geared toward local capacity-building. Long-lasting stability for every society is just too unrealistic a goal.

Nonetheless, Maynard's approach should prove a valuable guide for those engaged in rebuilding communities to avoid the pitfalls and address more fully the deep-seated needs and inequalities at the core of the tensions. The textbook analysis employed will also prove an asset to students. It brings together in one place and in a cogently argued presentation the latest findings in support of a more integrated international response.


**SUSAN M. MARTIN**
Georgetown University

The growing problem of internal displacement is the focus of this absorbing and challenging book. *Masses in Flight: The Global Crisis of Internal Displacement* is the first book-length, comprehensive treatment of this important topic. Written by two of the principal authorities on the subject, *Masses in Flight* is essential reading for anyone con-
cerned with refugees, human rights and humanitarian issues.

Statistics and today's headlines both prove that Cohen and Deng do not overstate the case in discussing internal displacement as a global crisis. Internally displaced persons number in the tens of millions. In fact, the number of internally displaced persons now exceeds the number of refugees worldwide. Half of the persons assisted by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees are within their home countries, displaced by conflict, repression, human rights violations and other causes that would give them a credible claim to refugee status had they crossed an international border. Recent events in Kosovo, East Timor, Afghanistan, Sudan, Somalia and Colombia -- to name only a few -- testify to the extreme vulnerability of internally displaced persons.

The authors' experience addressing problems of internal displacement gives them a unique perspective to share in the volume. Cohen and Deng co-direct the Brookings Institution's Project on Internally Displaced Persons. Cohen's earlier writings and advocacy were instrumental in convincing the United Nations to give due attention to internally displaced persons, a move that led to appointment of the Secretary General's Representative on Internally Displaced Persons. This post is held by Deng, a diplomat from southern Sudan, who earlier served as his country's Foreign Minister and Ambassador to the United States. Since his appointment several years ago, Deng has traveled extensively to monitor and report on the situation of internally displaced persons.

To buttress their own considerable knowledge about internal displacement, the authors called on other experts to provide detailed analyses. The U.S. Committee for Refugees provided statistical information and contributed to a global overview of internal displacement. The Refugee Policy Group contributed to an analysis of institutional mandates and responsibilities. The Norwegian Refugee Council surveyed non-governmental organizations on their role in assisting and protecting internally displaced persons. World Bank staff assisted with reintegration and development strategies. Each of these issues is covered in a detailed chapter of its own.

In perhaps the most innovative part of the volume, Cohen and Deng, with the assistance of a team of international law scholars, develop a legal framework for addressing issues related to internal displacement. Using existing international human rights, humanitarian, and, by analogy, refugee law as a point of departure, Movers in Flight provides a normative basis for tackling such issues as prevention of forced displacement, protection of internally displaced persons during all phases of displacement, and access to humanitarian assistance. An appendix includes a set of guiding principles drawn from the legal analysis. Subsequent to the publication of the book, the guiding principles were adopted by the United Nations and have been widely circulated to field staff assisting and protecting the internally displaced.

Cohen and Deng do not avoid the difficult issues raised by internal displacement. Confronting head-on issues of national sovereignty, they establish a useful yardstick for international intervention. Equating sovereignty with responsibility, Cohen and Deng argue that no state claiming legitimacy can justifiably quarrel with the commitment to protect all of its citizens against human rights abuse. They state their clear view that sovereignty cannot be used as a justification for the mistreatment of populations. Equally important, they lay out practical strategies to prevent displacement as well as to improve assistance and protection responses. They make the important point that too often the international community waits until conditions so deteriorate that few responses other than military ones are possible. Earlier warning and more concerted action to create conditions conducive to protection of human rights would help prevent some of these tragedies from occurring. Never forgetting the human face of displacement, Cohen and Deng give special atten-
tion to strategies for assisting and protecting women and children.

In his September 1999 speech to the General Assembly, Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary General, spoke of an urgent need to forge an international consensus on humanitarian intervention. Fresh in his mind was the forced uprooting of hundreds of thousands of Kosovars and East Timorese. *Masses in Flight* should be required reading for all of those engaged in developing such a consensus. They will find it an excellent resource for articulating the challenges and opportunities facing the international community and for offering sound recommendations for change.


ANDREW PARKE
Flinders University

This book traces the way in which states recognize and respond to the ethnic diversity of their populations. The first section of the book stands somewhat apart from the rest and seems to draw most directly on the author's anthropological expertise. It analyzes a range of old non-Western "patrimonial" societies — in pre-colonial Africa, in the Aztec empire of Mesoamerica and in the Ottoman Empire. The rest of the book has a greater historical and analytical continuity. It deals, from the perspective of the same concern about ethnic recognition, with the emergence, development and ongoing dilemmas of advanced Western societies, analyzing in great detail the immigration-generated ethnic diversification of modern France, Britain and the United States.

In writing a book which encompasses such a wide range of applications — from African pre-colonial tribal practices to the latest British debates about multicultural education, from Aztec theology to the Salman Rushdie *fatwah*, from the literally Byzantine politics from which the Ottomans emerged to the metaphorically Byzantine ethnic politics of modern American cities — Ralph Grillo shows himself to be a knowledgeable and adept analyst.

There is, I think, some confusion about the book’s ultimate purpose. Grillo begins by setting out his "underlying" question: "to what extent is a plural, polyethnic, democratic society possible?" (p. 5). That seems to promise discussion of whether democratic values, processes and institutions can accommodate ethnic pluralism. As it turns out, Grillo engages in virtually no discussion of democracy *per se*, and the word does not even appear in the index. The question which he actually addresses is more like the following: to what extent can states, and especially advanced liberal (post-)industrial states, remain viable in the face of increasing ethnic pluralism?

That is still a good question. Grillo describes and evaluates the various adaptation strategies — ranging from forms of assimilationism to forms of cultural separatism — which seem available to advanced liberal (post-)industrial states as they encounter greater ethnic diversity and claims for particularistic ethnic recognition. But he does not seem particularly interested in whether these strategies are democratic — or even with what "democracy" might mean in a diverse society.

The slight confusion seems symptomatic of a deeper imprecision. The book attempts to apply both an explanatory social-science perspective (*i.e.*, how and why certain historical, social and political developments have occurred) and a normative philosophical perspective (*i.e.*, whether certain historical, social and political developments are desirable). There would be much to admire about a project which successfully encompassed both dimensions. At times, however, this book seems to slide between them. The normative standards intended to be invoked — certainly not democracy, but there is a clutch of other candidates which seems to include social harmony, social stability, cultural integrity, self-respect, liberal autonomy and social justice — are never quite sufficiently clarified or operationalized.
In the end, after traversing most of the globe and a fair slice of world history, Grillo concludes with an admission that "I make no claim to have any answers" (p. 236). That is a little too modest, and – having already recast Grillo’s underlying question – it seems appropriate to recast his answer, in something like the following terms. Grillo the social scientist concludes that ethnic diversification will be an increasing feature of advanced Western societies, while Grillo the normative philosopher seems impressed by the virtues of a form of multiculturalism which he terms “hybridity.” Grillo’s book provides a plausible case for both answers.


KEMAL KARAT
University of Wisconsin – Madison

This six chapter book is an important and interesting contribution to the growing volume of studies on migration and its socialization (adaptation of the immigrants to their new cities, or urban space, to use the author’s expression) in the new country. Humphrey has made the Lebanese immigration to Australia and how the social meaning “being Lebanese changed over the duration of Lebanese migration to Australia” (p. 24) the main subject of his study.

The Lebanese began migrating to Australia as early as the 1860s, but their numbers increased fully only in 1947-66, and 1967-75 as the result of the Australian government’s need for laborers. The civil war in Lebanon in 1975-90 turned the new migrants into quasi-refugees and also brought Muslims to Australia and thus ended the Maronite and Orthodox Christians’ near monopoly on representing Lebanon. Thus, the number of Lebanese born in Australia jumped from 1,500 in 1901 to 1,668 in 1966 and to 65,857 in 1989. The immigration of Muslims to Australia was a novel development which produced a variety of rather unforeseen problems of identification, urbanization and community formation. The fact that 80 percent of the Lebanese migrants are concentrated in Sydney and Melbourne facilitated the emergence of communities built not around one common Lebanese identity, but on family and sectarian divisions of the old country which reflected the divisions of the villages at home.

The author’s theoretical framework revolves around some key concepts, such as proletarianization, that is, the wage earners becoming subject to the labor market and its fluctuations; a city identity promoted by the state to achieve social standardization – homogenization – in the context of nation state needs; and internationalization caused by the movement of individuals and families across borders because of economic need, fear, etc. to a new area (space) to become part of an international workforce. The migrants formed communities which consisted of aggregates of groups where “social identity became increasingly articulated in terms of sect as the incorporating activity” (p. 47) thanks in part to the Arabic press. However, unity of language or Arabic which the Maronites, Orthodox Christians and Sunni and Shiite Muslims used in common did not create a sense of unity but served merely as a practical means of communication at home, in courts, and in other mundane areas. In chapter 3, Humphrey provides a picture of the “Lebanese Heritage,” that is, the background influence of family, community, and sect which interacted in the context of the Australian locality (city) and nation which became the new sites of social integration and cultural production. The Lebanese in Australia did not adopt secularism, but continued to adhere to the old Ottoman millet system without the latter’s safeguards, including the state’s supervision and various other social controls that had prevented sectarianism from assuming destructive character, at least until the missionaries and politicians made sectarianism a
part of their propaganda arsenal. Humphrey studies the functioning of the traditional family and the rise of the new communities (and the symbiosis of the two) in chapters 4 and 5, which are probably the most original parts of the book.

The author provides cases to prove the perseverance of the traditional patriarchal authority, dress codes, arranged marriages, kin relations, and of efforts to save the honor of the native village in Lebanon, along with the examples of the struggle to control the community between secular and religious elites. He also deals with the enforcement of the Australian Law on marriage and divorce which the immigrants and leaders seek to harmonize with their own customs and laws or exploit according to the need.

The book suffers from occasional repetitions and, in places, of a rather dense style and carelessness, scant information about the relations of the Muslims with their Maronite and Orthodox Christian compatriots and the Australian government. Nonetheless, the book is a serious, detailed and multi-sided anthropological-sociological study of the Muslim immigrants in Australia. It could be used as a model to replicate and to supplement the information provided by other studies on the Muslim immigrants in Western Europe and the United States. I recommend the book highly.


Martin O. Heisler
University of Maryland

Jeffrey Reitz has produced a superb exemplar of scholarship at the nexus of immigration policy and the fate of immigrants. He seeks to determine the influence of four types of institutions on the relative success of immigrants – ascertained largely, though not entirely, in occupational and income terms. The data are drawn from three "immigration countries": the United States, Canada and Australia. The similarities among these are sufficient to wonder a bit about the promise of "different nations" in the subtitle (that quibble is less a reflection of a flaw or a criticism than this reviewer's bent toward comparisons across more and more varied countries). Analytically powerful comparisons are provided by the larger number of cases at the urban level. Reitz is concerned with the period 1961-1990, though most of the data span only the early 1970s to the mid-1980s. Data selection and analysis are meticulous and, where necessary, conclusions are presented in qualified language.

The core of the book consists of four chapters in which the four sorts of institutions that affect the circumstances of entry – both the criteria for entry found in immigration policies and the status or condition of immigrants when they enter – are treated. These are "the skill selectivity of immigration policy," "education and the accumulation of credentials by the native born," "labor market segments and earnings disparities," and the workings and effects of the welfare state. But, while the analysis is fit into these compartments, Reitz recognizes the need to treat the four institutional areas as one institutional system, even while recognizing their autonomy (pp. 6-7). The policy and theoretical implications of the work are far broader, however, as I suggest below.

Reitz's research reinforces the proposition that entry-level status is important for immigrants' economic and social fates in the host society. While upward mobility and integration are possible (presumably, especially in the second and subsequent generations), there is strong evidence that visible minorities will fare worse, both in the amount of time such integration may take and in the levels they can ultimately attain. This is suggestive of racial discrimination in the host societies, but there is less direct evidence to conclude that it is an important factor in all cases. There are significant differences in entry-level incomes across the three countries for white immigrants, with those entering the United States lagging...
behind immigrants to Australia and Canada. Reitz observes some gender-based as well as ethnicity-based differences, both across countries and across cities.

Only a few of the book’s many trenchant findings can be noted here. Overall, Reitz has provided fresh and telling evidence of the importance of the institutional environment, especially at the urban level. That environment is far more complex than labor markets. Educational institutions are crucial, and their variations across cities and countries clearly leads to differences in immigrants’ fates. Institutions can also constitute major barriers to integration, as Reitz notes in the pithy statement that “rather than immigrants imposing a burden on society, at least from a comparative perspective, it seems more appropriate to say that U. S. institutions have imposed a substantial burden on immigrants” (p. 243).

A hallmark of a seminal book such as this is that it suggests interesting connections to current theoretical thinking and, more important, for analytic and theoretical directions we might fruitfully try in the future. I can only note three here.

First, while most aspects of migration are best understood on a cross-generational time scale, there is little or no consideration of time in the recent literature on migration. Although the constraints of Reitz’s research design and data available for exploring his hypotheses did not permit a systematic examination of time-related factors, the work as a whole contains several hints for future research and theoretical connections.

Reitz recognizes the crucial factor of education in this regard (e.g., at pp. 244ff.). Education and its credentialing functions establish positional goods – feelings of entitlement to higher status or better treatment based on having “earned” one’s position. Having “arrived” earlier and having established positions may provide rationale for both natives and earlier immigrants to disadvantage or discriminate against new immigrants. Greater economic, informational and other opportunities open more and better educational opportunities (e.g., prestigious universities instead of public institutions with lower status) to natives, and that, in turn, conveys advantages in certification or credentialing. Such certification then becomes the basis for excluding those without it. Much useful research could be carried out on the cross-generational fate of immigrants in various societies with different educational opportunities for different cohorts. For example, it would be worthwhile to know how changes in higher educational opportunities over time for the native population affect its perceptions of more recent arrivals’ efforts to obtain credentials associated with economic success.

Second, Reitz’s analysis leads him to suggest, in his concluding chapters, that the immigration policies of receiving countries should be (more?) responsive to changing “global trends.” This is a sound and valuable suggestion. However, sensitivity to changes within the host society is also important, especially in a framework of democratic politics. We could fruitfully build on this and related policy suggestions made by Reitz if we adopted a multi-level analytic and policy perspective. Immigration policy is at once foreign and domestic, national and local, and economic, political and cultural. Thus, for example, it is not sufficient to consider how the labor market’s needs for people with particular skills relates to the qualifications of prospective immigrants. It is also necessary to take into account chronic educational shortfalls or short-term imbalances in training in the domestic society, regional economic trends, and other related factors. Immigration policies need to be sensitive to domestic political concerns precisely because such policies are ultimately reflections of domestic priorities and norms. Both in terms of the realities of electoral and interest group politics and as a set of normative priorities, policymakers in democratic regimes are and should be principally responsible to their own populations.

Finally, the research and analyses in this book might be profitably linked to the central ideas in other recent scholarly and intellectual themes. Two of the most evident are
at the intersections of Michael Piore’s profound *Beyond Individualism* (of which Reitz makes limited use) and the discussion of social, economic and institutional changes in the nature of work and its impacts on people by Richard Sennett in his recent book, *The Corrosion of Character: The Personal Consequences of Work in the New Capitalism*. Reitz is concerned with the ramifications of a growing trend toward individualism in all three of the countries he considers. The influences of such a trend on the integration of immigrants is part of the story. Its effects on the host society constitute another, important, part. Both must be understood if we are to grasp the dynamics of immigrant adjustment and adjustment to immigrants. Reitz has written a book that contains solid, tested propositions about immigration in three major countries and, at the same time, provides an excellent point of departure for exploring such larger questions.

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EMILY A. COPELAND
Florida International University

In this book, Rasmussen attempts to move the debate on immigration in Europe beyond a discussion over the threats posed by migration and the effectiveness of policies to control unwanted migration to a more balanced perspective. In doing so, the author focuses primarily on variables emanating from the process of European integration, the internationalization of the world economy, and the demographic situation in Europe and neighboring regions.

The book begins with a brief introduction (Chapter 1). Chapter 2 contains a useful discussion on “who are the foreigners” and the difficulties in measuring the “foreign population” in Europe. Chapter 3 explores the origins of the late 1980s European crisis over migration issues. For the author, important causal factors include the end of the Cold War, looming European economic integration, racism, pressures stemming from economic globalization, concern over the viability of nation states to protect domestic interests, and the specter of demographic pressures for increased migration from developing countries. Chapter 4 places the current European situation in historical perspective by surveying the region’s role in migration history from the slave trade beginning in 1550 to the present asylum crisis. Chapter 5 describes existing pressures that could result in migration to Europe. In particular, the author focuses on the demographic situation in non-European countries bordering the Mediterranean. Chapter 6 discusses the aging of the European population and explores how immigration might contribute toward reducing associated negative effects. Chapter 7 traces the evolution of European cooperation on migration policy through the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty.

Rasmussen succeeds in offering a balanced assessment of the causes of Europe’s recent crisis over migration issues. While there is little new research, the book is a useful contribution in that it states clearly what migration and demography scholars have been saying over the past decade but which still seems to have gone unheard by the vast majority of the public. The book is also very readable and accessible to the general public. Readers should be aware that this book first appeared in Danish in 1996 with the English translation following in 1997. Thus, data is presented only through 1994 or 1995.

In this reviewer’s opinion, it is disappointing that the author spent so much time on placing the European migration problem in a broad historical context (Chapter 4) and so little time exploring where a more balanced, less politicized debate on migration and Europe would lead. The author concludes that, given the present structure of EU cooperation, a coordinated immigration policy is unlikely in the near future. Thus, the EU countries should focus on reducing the need for immigration, especially in the North African countries. However, Ras-
mussen cautions that it remains questionable whether future migrations can be prevented given the vast disparities in incomes between the two regions and increasing interconnectedness.


**Donna Gabaccia**
*University of North Carolina – Charlotte*

*Whiteness of a Different Color* is an important contribution to the rapidly evolving subfield of American ethnic studies that focuses on the social construction of "whiteness." This field emerged as scholars began to take seriously the fact that nineteenth-century Americans viewed immigrants from Europe as members of distinctive racial groups. Jacobson uses a multi-disciplinary approach to examine the racial status of immigrants – mainly Jews and other southern and eastern Europeans – focusing on what he calls the "manufacture of Caucasians" in the twentieth century.

After establishing the centrality of whiteness ("free white persons" in the language of the U.S. Constitution) to republican notions of the American nation, Jacobson notes the spread of racialized descriptions of difference among Europeans as mass immigration into the country grew and peaked. An early period (1840–1924) when Americans distinguished between "Anglo-Saxon" and other European races gradually gave way to scientific and popular notions of a Caucasian race, Jacobson rightly traces the intellectual origins of "Caucasians" to what he terms the crucible of (American) empire. While noting a persistent tension in American culture between racial dichotomies ("whites/"non-whites") and more complex schemes, the manufacture of Caucasians appears to have stabilized a dichotomous view of race that has shaped race relations since the 1940s.

Drawing on scholarly writing, literature and popular culture, Jacobson particularly emphasizes the change in perception that accompanied the invention of Caucasians. He explores the widespread belief that one could see Jewishness (and other forms of racial difference among whites) imprinted on the bodies of immigrants. Jacobson reminds us that discussions of race once focused almost exclusively on physical and cultural differences among Europeans. In working to eliminate Americans' perceptions of the physical differences among Europeans, racial liberals unintentionally naturalized racism and ignored the subjugation of African Americans. Jacobson even argues (p. 272) that "non-Anglo Saxon immigrants and their children were perhaps the first beneficiaries of the modern civil rights movement...." Not surprisingly, he then views the ethnic revival among "white ethnics" in the 1970s not as a critique of whiteness but rather as a denial of white privilege that continues to divide white from black.

Here, and throughout his book, Jacobson has effectively documented just how fundamentally and extensively American society altered its understanding of European immigrants, their children, and their place in American society. What he has not done is tell us how immigrants participated in their own transformation or viewed themselves in the process. In his discussion of American imperialism, Jacobson presents convincing evidence that some European immigrants actively embraced America's manifest destiny to vanquish lesser peoples in pursuit of democracy and that this represented, for them, a claim on whiteness as a form of property and of privilege. Immigrants from Asia also tried with little success to claim whiteness through challenges to naturalization law. One hopes that the next studies of whiteness will draw on an equally broad range of sources from within immigrant communities to examine these other dimensions of "becoming Caucasian." One hopes, too, that those studies will show greater sensitivity than Jacobson's to the fact that
Americans have "seen" race in deeply gendered ways.


CATHERINE WHITOL DE WENDEN CNRS (CERI)

This book, written in a very clear style by an expert of Africa, raises most of the questions arising from policy and practices of immigration flows in France. Starting from the central idea of a gap between immigration rules and the reality of flows, it concentrates on the trend transforming the legal gap in a social gap, led by the rise of the informal sector and the failure of integration at school and at work. With a historical background on immigration policy in France as well as with plenty of figures and data illustrating his assertions, the author shows how France is reaching "un Etat de non droit" (an underground appeal to immigration in a no-man's land legal framework). There, contradictions and paradoxes are many, leading to the hypocrisy of a policy of opinion: debates about data on immigration flows and stocks; gaps between the "fortress Europe" and the porosity of its borders and between the announcement of policies, the results expected and the effectiveness of their implementation; repression does not lead to a better border control; immigration that is no more of workers but of families who will stay and many people who will be neither subject to legalization nor to expulsion; there is no self-regulation of flows by authoritarian policies. France is thus confronted with a dilemma: how to reconcile the necessary control of flows with the French tradition of welcome and freedom.

The existing solutions to the global migration crisis and the idea that immigration could be a factor of development are only shared by political decision-makers. The trend is also a reaction to immigration pressure and an answer to the pressure of the street, even if the margins of action are very tight. So, the balance between openness and firmness looks suspect. Most of government answers are led by opinion policies, but the public opinion itself is shared between an opposition to illegal migration and a sympathy to the undocumented.

The situation is all the more complex between what is announced and what is actually done as there is no real alternative to migration, namely in Africa. So, the question is less how to master immigration than how to cope with immigration. A country cannot live today with all borders closed and without immigration unless it accepts to become older, to get rid of freedom of market and circulation, to be a closed society. Thus, immigration policies are conditioned by necessity: a debate which will continue during the next twenty-first century.

The only disappointing point of this book is the scarcity of solution proposed by the author. According to him the alternative would be virtual immigration, due to internet changes. Can we really imagine such a networking as replacing real flows with third world countries?


CATHERINE WHITOL DE WENDEN CNRS (CERI)

As a historian of law, Philippe Segur reminds us that the asylum right is first religious. According to the separation between two worlds during the Middle Ages, the one of God and the one of humans, the sacred territories were not violable. The recent situation of asylum rights in European countries has newly launched the debate: with the Schengen Agreement of 1985 and its Convention of 1990, only one State is responsible for asylum requirements, and each European country has to put its legislation in agreement with Schengen. Some have denounced the end of asylum rights, intended as the right of each country to appreciate the situation of asylum seekers. The trend of those refused to look for asylum in churches,
accompanying many hunger strikes, has given a new role to churches: is the religious asylum right extinguished? In France, the separation between the Church and the State decided by the law of 1905 gives the property of religious buildings to the State: there is therefore no more immunity; even if the church seems to maintain the principle. The Touvier affair, during the 1990s, has actualized the debate on outlaws of the Vichy regime having found shelter in monasteries. We can also argue, as does Philippe Segur, that the economic and political circumstance negating asylum rights to many applicants may give sense to a renewal of the religious form of asylum in churches and other holy places such as the Vatican. But it is not true juridically, because it is neither diplomatic asylum nor a natural law.

Only the duty of welcome (devoir d’accueil) may have some practical developments in the context of the crisis of asylum rights: here the religious asylum would represent the last remedy to the failure of the law.


CHRISTIANE HARZIG
Universität Bremen

The author presents a sociological analysis of migration strategies by Philippine, Somali and Peruvian women to Milan, Italy in the 1980s and early 1990s. The analysis is based on what the author calls a mix of methods, that is, the usage of quantitative and qualitative sources: church and public archives, personal files of charity organizations, participant observation accompanied by a field diary, and in-depth interviews with a number of informants of very different backgrounds and positions/statuses (local notables, community brokers, ”experts”) and – most importantly – the women themselves. Applying the method of “issue-focused” (problem-centered) interviews in which the interviewer provides a brief questionnaire to structure the conversation but leaves enough room for the narrative of the interviewee to unfold, she was able to interview some 60 women from the three countries, many of them illegals. Hillmann presents her findings about the migration experience of these women from the three different cultures in a parallel narrative structure. After introducing the women/her interview partners, a number of themes emerge: the travel and the role of agencies, prior knowledge about the receiving culture, migration routes and finances, education and employment before departure, motives for emigration, duration and strategies, self-perception within the framework of migration strategies, social networks and leisure in Milan. A separate chapter is devoted to integration into the labor market. Sixty percent of women work in the service sector, some in public (nurses) but mainly as household workers.

As a service to the reviewer – and the reader – the author summarizes her finding in the end in the form of nine concise and well-grounded theses:
1. Most of immigrant women are embedded in family strategies.
2. Family strategies are gender specific and related to cultural variables of the home country.
3. What migrant women decide to do in Italy very much depends on socioeconomic and political developments in the home country.
4. Family strategies and chain migration partly explain the ongoing movement of illegal immigrants to Italy.
5. Historically, migration is induced by colonial relationships as well as by the “European Myth.”
6. Immigrant women are part of the international gender-specific division of labor, in the culture of origin as much as in the receiving culture, Italy.
7. Immigrant women are often bypassed with help provided by the state, and they mainly depend on private support (church and personal networks).
8. Italy, as the mother-country of the Catholic Church, indirectly supports the ongoing movement of illegal immigration of women, with the Church helping to provide jobs in the informal sector of the labor market.

9. Tighter controls and more restrictive immigration policies do not lead to reduced immigration but only make emigration more expensive for the prospective emigrant (having to pay higher fees to the agencies).

Besides these general conclusions, which nonetheless stem from very detailed findings outlined in the respective chapters, there are a number of interesting details which enhance our understanding of present-day female migration.

Most of the women are quite well educated, having received more than primary schooling. They often have worked in lower white collar jobs, which did not pay enough to either satisfy their household needs (i.e., the needs of all the members in the extended family) or their own prospects for the future. Many women working in the public sector had become unemployed prior to emigration because of government downsizing. Thus, migrant women do not come from the most destitute strata of home-country society, and they usually experience social downward mobility in the receiving culture.

The main incentive to migrate abroad is “to make more money” which translates into “to make money so the next generation may be better educated.” Often women aspired to a better education for themselves when coming to Italy but soon had to realize that they could not do both: go to work and to school. They settled for earning money, so their younger siblings at home could go to private schools. Some Somali women explained that they went to Italy to work and make money, while their brothers would try to go to the Scandinavian countries which offered a better chance to get an education.

Many a national economy depends on the remittances sent home by migrant women. Here the Philippines are a prominent case, where one sixth of the population lives off the money sent from abroad (Pakistan is another case in point as V.S. Naipaul reports in his book Among the Believers: An Islamic Journey, New York, 1981). I would be interested in finding out whether these national economies actually promote the emigration of women because they culturally know that they have a better chance to receive remittances from female migrants (as has been shown for Irish immigrant women to the United States).

The Italian middle and upper class tradition to keep a domestic servant, which had died down in the 1960s, comes alive again with the availability of “Third World” household workers. The author argues, and I agree, that these immigrant women provide much of the productive work for Italian society. Their presence and their labor allows for Italian women (and men) to enter the (first) labor market and it eases over the fact that the state does not provide adequate service for the children and the elderly. A similar argument has been brought forward for Canada (see Abigail B. Bakan and Daiva Stasiulis, Not one of the Family: Foreign Domestic Workers in Canada, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997). A comparative study for Germany dealing with the impact of immigrant women in the service sector would be of great interest and is still missing.

Throughout the book the author searches for “strategies,” and the concept of strategies applied as a heuristic tool has become a very useful instrument to discover goal-oriented agency among migrant women. It provides for a paradigm beyond victimization, beyond the double or triple burden immigrant women have to suffer from and it allows the discovery of the many-fold relationships between micro-level personal wants, mezzo-level family decisions, and macro-level political and economic structures these women have to negotiate. I am convinced that “strategies” are a very useful analytical concept in gender-conscious migration research.

Being a book originally written as a (German) dissertation, it has a number of additional advantages and some minor
shortcomings. The sociological analysis is well grounded in a methodological and theoretical framework. Each methodological step is theoretically grounded and justified. It also provides a concise and well-structured overview of current theories in migration studies and can thus introduce the newcomer to migration research to the state of the art. Consequently, the very extensive bibliography not only provides information about research on gender and migration, but also about current migration issues. Though the book does not provide an index, its very detailed table of contents easily guides the reader to his/her point of interest. The summaries following each chapter are equally valuable in providing concise information, without making for repetitive reading. The book would have profited from an (American-style) copy editor, ironing out some of the bumpy language. However, this valuable service to the readers has become all too rare in German (and American) publishing.

Despite the fact that the book has been researched and written in the early 1990s, published in 1996, and despite the fact that this review most likely will not be published until the year 2000, it has not lost its current interest. It provides a wealth of information on a much understudied subject (migrant women) which is embedded in contextual information on push factors in “Third World countries,” migration patterns into and out of Italy, Italy’s political reaction to migration, and Milan as the political and economic urban magnet for migration systems. Placing the women at the core of her analysis, providing them with a voice, letting their insights and experiences shape and structure her theoretical findings (and not vice versa, as is too often the case) makes this book not only interesting to read but also greatly enhances our conceptual understanding of gender and migration issues. Hellmann has given the female inhabitants of the “seventh continent,” “the imaginary continent which houses all those people who are voluntarily or involuntarily on the move,” a space and a history.


ANDREW I. SCHOENHOLTZ
Georgetown University

Why are the levels of legal immigration as high as they are when the majority of Americans have wanted to reduce them since 1981? Kenneth Lee explores what he sees as the disparity between public policy and public opinion on legal immigration in this readable, compact book. Mr. Lee’s answer is that the media, politicians and lobbyists have made this possible by disproportionately emphasizing illegal immigration and portraying it in a very negative way in contrast to legal immigration. He traces this phenomenon from the 1970s, first by analyzing media coverage of these issues and then by examining the politics of immigration reform. The author looks at the key reform proposals and laws developed since the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy recommended “closing the back door to undocumented/illegal migration” to allow “opening the front door a little more to accommodate legal migration in the interests of the country.”

The book is best as it digs out the way in which politicians and lobbyists have manipulated the issue of illegal immigration as a means of promoting increased or high levels of legal immigration. As the author observes, it has been politically easier to attack illegal immigrants because, unlike legal immigrants, they do not have powerful interest groups to represent them. For members of Congress ideologically inclined to promote high levels of immigration, the best strategy to address the public’s desire for lower levels of legal immigration has been to pass and tout bills combating illegal immigration. For lobbyists from the right and the left who favored high levels of immigration, this strategy has protected the interests they represented.
Mr. Lee’s analysis of the political strategies manipulating illegal migration to deflect public concerns about legal immigration is useful as far as it goes. What the author generally overlooks, however, are certain connections between illegal and legal immigration. So when he comes to look at the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Mr. Lee does not see that the new law contains harsh provisions affecting legal immigration because they have been disguised in illegal migration terms. For example, Congress imposed a ten-year bar on aliens becoming legal immigrants if they reside illegally in the United States for one year or more. Congress may have done this to punish unauthorized migrants, but the persons disproportionately affected are the families of legal immigrants. Spouses are faced with a terrible choice: comply with the rules by remaining separated from their families during a five-year wait abroad for visas, or risk never receiving a green card. The 1996 law also established new public charge requirements for legal immigration, such that many family immigrants will not qualify at all or will have to wait much longer to immigrate while their family sponsor gathers the funds to meet those requirements.

The author rightly sensed that changes in admission numbers and categories for legal immigration seemed almost inevitable in the 104th Congress. His analysis of how this was prevented seems largely correct as well, although he does not describe just how close the political battle was. Having focused so much on the way in which illegal immigration was used to hamper legal immigration reform, he also misses the harsh effects of the 1996 law on legal immigrants, asylum seekers, and illegal migrants. IIRIRA is not a “modest illegal immigration” law; its intended consequences alone are massive.

On the whole, Mr. Lee skillfully portrays the political manipulation of illegal immigration as a buffer issue during the last quarter of a century. As such, he has made a worthy contribution to the thorough and judicious debate he rightly believes the subject of immigration deserves.


Calvin Goldscheider
Brown University

Studies of international migration have rarely been able to trace out over time the variety of streams from a common set of origins, incorporate systematically the characteristics of the community of origin of international migrants, and, in turn, investigate the relative changes migrants experience in different places of destination. Partly this reflects data problems, since details are needed from several different national locations over time. As a result, we have often focused either on receiving countries and the adjustment of migrants or on communities of origin to identify the reasons underlying migration streams. Moreover, the comprehensive examination of the complexities underlying migration requires a detailed understanding of cultural, historical, social, economic and political dimensions associated with the migrants and the areas where they originate and their new communities. The rarity of systematic and comprehensive studies of migration and migrants at both origins and destinations is understandable, even as it is lamentable.

This volume is a rare addition to the migration literature as it attempts to sketch out the emigration of one community, the Egyptian Jewish population, by focusing on their multiple destinations and by reconstructing their social, cultural and political lives at origins. The major theme examined is the construction of political identities among those who have been conspicuously confronted with conflicts of ethnic identity and questions of political/national loyalties. Questions of identity are placed in the cultural context of migrants in different com-
munities, linking these to the events that led to the contemporary exodus of the Jewish community from Egypt to the state of Israel, the United States, and France. The author is a historian of the cultural kind, sensitive to the nuances of the methods of cultural history (but less so to the theories and methods of international migration) and open to the examination of a variety of sources of evidence (but with significantly less attention to statistical data). His goal is to clarify the multiple dimensions of the Egyptian Jewish out-migration (which he refers to as “dispersion”) and the transformation of cultural and political identities of immigrants in three communities. This strategy is both the strength and weakness of this volume. The range of comparative insights derived from studying these communities will impress demographers and social scientists. They will be frustrated by the lack of empirical details to allow them to identify the selectivity of migration streams and to examine the volume and timing of migration and, thereby, to place the changing identities of migrants in their structural as well as cultural contexts. Social scientists will look in vain in the volume for a broader theoretical context for studying international migration and will not find parallels and comparisons beyond the specifics of the cases examined.

The thrust of the book is on the multiple personal identities and diverse political allegiances of Egyptian Jews before and after their migration to three different communities. The analysis views these identities internally (from the point of view of the migrants and their families) and from the point of view of the Egyptian population (and to a lesser extent from the perspectives of the receiving communities). The presentation is divided into three parts, plus an introduction and an appendix (consisting of a short interview with Jacques Hassoun, an Egyptian Jew expelled from Egypt because of his communist affiliations who resettled in France). Part One deals with discourses and “materialities” of identity, with an analysis of how Egyptian Jews identified themselves, a review of the Karaites (an Arab Jewish community in Egypt), aspects of the class structure and citizenship of the Egyptian Jewish community, the impact of the Israel-Arab War of 1948, the role of Egyptian Nazism, and the retelling of the Israel spy story (Operation Susannah) in the context of the Egyptian Jewish population. Against this background of the history and changes in the Egyptian Jewish community, there is a discussion in Part Two of what is referred to as the Egyptian Diaspora in Israel, France and the United States (this is, in part, a polemical use of the word Diaspora, since in Israeli/Zionist ideology Jewish communities outside of the state of Israel are those living in Diaspora). There is a discussion of Egyptians in Israel who are the graduates of Ha-Shomer Ha-Za’ir, a politically left Zionist youth movement, Egyptian communist émigrés in France, and the Karaites from Egypt living in the San Francisco Bay area. Part Three shifts to the “recovery” or transformation of Egyptian Jewish identity (mainly through an analysis of literature and other cultural expressions) and the trends in Egyptian historical writing about the Jews.

Beinin successfully argues against the Zionist construction of the Egyptian case, showing that many of the Egyptian Jews identified with Israel but were not Zionists in the sense of viewing Israel as the land of their redemption. On ideological grounds, many of the urban, economically secure Jews in Egypt were not committed to immigration to Israel. Even those who were most active in Zionist organizations, and particularly the ones that Beinin studied who were members of Ha-Shomer Ha-Za’ir, were not all committed to the rural ideological lifestyle that was the Zionist imperative when the state of Israel was founded. His focus on leftist kibbutzniks from Egypt in Israel who became disillusioned with their lifestyle begs the comparative question about the other Jews of Egyptian origins who lived in urban places in Israel and combined their Egyptian Jewish cultural origins with their new Israeli identities. Indeed, most of the immigration to Israel appears to have occurred after the various Egyptian-Israeli
confrontations but not immediately after the Israel War of Independence in 1948. Nevertheless, there is precious little evidence presented to sustain the basic thesis that the dispersion of the Egyptian Jewish community resulted in new connections among these immigrant communities. Nor it is clear how distinctive these international migrants are when they attempt to reconnect culturally to their places of origin.

The evidence presented is largely anecdotal, richly descriptive and insightful but it is too casual for my taste. Many of the insights are the author's personal experiences here and there as he interviewed this and that person, mainly among the elite. Thus, for example, the chapter on Egyptian Jews in San Francisco is fraught with unanswered questions. What is the relationship of the Karaites, a marginal group whose members do not systematically consider themselves Jewish, to other Egyptian Jews in the United States or elsewhere? How selective are his informants, so that we can assess how new communities influence their identities? How typical is the evidence on the elite families that he interviewed to allow for generalizations about community? While Beinin presents some detailed and well-formulated discussions and descriptions of selected families, there is not a sharp presentation of communal institutions, the social networks and anchors of cultural continuities and change, and the transmission of the Karaites culture between the generations. It is often an interesting story, although jumpy in parts and less coherently or elegantly argued. Hence, it is difficult to view the results as a basis for additional research or as a model for others studying different migrations.

There is value in reading the volume for the insights about these particular communities and their migration patterns. The fundamental premise of identity conflict and resolution are starkly and vividly presented descriptively but not analytically. Themes of identity in newly formed communities have become increasingly important in the modern world. This book suggests a series of solutions to the conflicts of political and cultural identity with an interesting set of cases. When taken together with other historical accounts of the Jewish community of Egypt or of migration streams of small exotic communities in the United States, France and Israel, the argument begins to reveal a broader story. The insights from one person who has mastered these communities are impressive. How one builds from this to other studies of identity or applies the results to other "Diaspora" communities remains challenging.


Lawrence Lam
York University

While hundreds and thousands of the Indochinese refugees have been successfully resettled and repatriated in the last quarter century, and an equally impressive number of books and articles (academically oriented or otherwise) being written and published regarding the many facets of this supposedly one-off experience of refugee crisis in this century, this book, Terms of Refuge, written in simple language, stands out as one of the must readings for persons who are interested in refugee and migration studies. It is a comprehensive study systematically capturing the intricacies and complexities of the Indochinese exodus and the international response. It sends a clear message to the concerned parties -- the countries of asylum, the countries of resettlement, and the countries of origin -- not only of the massive human sufferings of Vietnamese, Cambodians and Laotians, but importantly, the impact of their respective politically-driven responses such as summarily and conveniently defining the asylum seekers as "displaced persons, economic migrants" that have shaped and reshaped UNHCR's role to protect refugees, to preserve asylum and to help find solutions to their plight.

Beginning from the late 1970s, spea-
headed by the United States, resettlement in a third country was seen and readily accepted by the international community as the viable solution for the Indochinese exodus due to the massive international commitment and support. In that period resettlement abroad was available to one out of every twenty refugees, however by the mid-1990s the ratio had fallen significantly to about one in every 418. The author succinctly explains the multiplicity of factors that contribute to the declining importance of resettlement as a durable solution: compassion fatigue, widespread dissatisfaction with the outcome of the Indochinese resettlement program, the role of resettlement as a means of protection, and its becoming a “pull factor” helping to perpetuate the continuing outflow of “boat-people” and hampering the search for other durable solutions.

With the declining interest by industrialized states in resettling the Indochinese and the reluctance of countries of first asylum to even consider providing temporary refuge, the author documents the various measures introduced and subsequently implemented by all involved parties to deal with the continuing arrival of “boat people.” The measures include the implementation of humane deterrence measures in refugee camps by countries of first asylum in the region despite the onerous conditions of flight and asylum, the Orderly Departure Program allowing direct departure for resettlement countries from countries of origin, and the Comprehensive Plan of Action purporting to end the exodus. Simultaneously, repatriation, at times involuntarily (those being screened out as nonrefugees and who do not oppose being sent back to Vietnam) becomes increasingly an essential tool to solve this seemingly intractable refugee problem. The combined effort has resulted in having over half a million Southeast Asian refugees being returned home. The sheer size of repatriation has expanded the scope of UNHCR’s involvement in return and reintegration of refugees. However, the author has raised cogent questions such as UNHCR’s involvement in involuntary return, the length of time that the repatriated refugees should be the concern of the international community, and what responsibilities UNHCR has in ensuring success of reintegration which should, if taken seriously, sustain and expand the interest of refugee researchers, policymakers and practitioners in constructing a new refugee regime to ensure the security and dignity of refugees and asylum seekers and to alleviate the demoralizing effects besetting refugee lives.

The author successfully demonstrated that the Indochinese refugee crisis and the international response are testimonies to the innovative capacities of the so-called durable solutions and their limitations. The asylum seekers themselves have taught the world that their paths are not devoid of inner direction but reflect complex patterns of volition and choices made in the face of bad odds. The failure of the three durable solutions have engendered talks of a “new paradigm” considered to be proactive, homeland-oriented and holistic. This new arrangement includes activities such as monitoring and early warning, diplomatic intervention, social development, conflict resolution and many others.

Among the book’s timely and insightful analyses of exodus of some three million people who fled their countries in the last quarter century, the most outstanding contribution is its critical examination of the UNHCR’s capacity or incapacity to effectively implement the durable solutions – resettlement in a third country, local integration in the country of first asylum, repatriation, and the difficulties in negotiating the terms of refuge in the midst of competing political interests of all involved parties.


**ERIC RICHARDS**  
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As time passes, and the historical perspective on the age of the great European empires shifts, so the colonial migrations emerge as the most fundamental legacy of imperialism. The British Isles were the largest source of colonists and, among them, the Scots had a high propensity to emigrate. They maintained their position at the top end of the league table of European emigration, even after the end of the First World War. This is the subject of Dr. Marjory Harper's detailed study of Scottish emigration in the 1920s. In retrospect, the experience of this period begins to suggest a waning of the impulse which had propelled the huge European exoduses in the previous century. In Scotland, however, the outflows continued and this book examines its mechanisms and its place in the longer perspective of British emigration history. The Scots were generally regarded as good emigrants and one contemporary claimed that "the 'Scotch' are liked everywhere" (p. 176). But others thought that the interwar migrants were "pessimistic exiles," and their attitudes were significantly less "positive" than their Victorian predecessors.

The Scottish economy suffered more than most of Britain in the interwar years: its famous shipbuilding sector lost nine tenths of its employment between 1920 and 1932 by which time three quarters of its workers were unemployed; the iron, steel and coal industries all went into severe decline; in the Highlands and Islands, migration continued to be the main response to rural disillusion. Efforts to generate internal development seemed fated to failure. The incentive to emigrate was undiminished though conditions abroad were also brittle; emigration ceased altogether in the 1930s when there was significant return migration. Hence this is a story of emigration in a difficult context from a country highly experienced in the business of expatriation. Indeed much of the exodus of the 1920s followed previously-established paths out of Scotland. The outflow was much greater than from the rest of Britain. Despite a healthy rate of natural increase, the Scottish population fell by 40,000 in the 1920s, the difference accounted mostly by overseas migration but also by the drift of Scots into England. The Scottish net emigration rate was sixteen times greater than that of England (pp. 6–7).

British emigration in the twentieth century has not yet been given the attention it deserves. The emigration story is now overshadowed by inward movements: Britain has reversed its traditional status and is now mainly thought of as an immigrant destination. Sometimes this is misleading. For instance, more British people emigrated to Australia in the twentieth century than in the great age of emigration in the previous century. Harper sets the scene with great clarity and poses several key questions in what is otherwise a relatively sparse historiography. She particularly asks whether the First World War altered the character of Scottish emigration. She emphasizes the far greater post-war involvement of the British government in the direction and funding of emigration, in contrast to persistently laissez-faire attitudes in the pre-war world. The new policy was designed to relieve social tensions in Britain and revitalize the spirit of empire. The policy was promoted through the Empire Settlement Act of 1922 which, for fourteen years, was responsible for 36 percent of all British emigration to Empire destinations (p. 17).

Scotland was evidently one of the best recruiting grounds in the British Isles, especially for the Empire. The great strength of Harper's work is its precise descriptions of the mechanisms which, in the 1920s, carried overseas almost 500,000 Scots. Using a great deal of archival material from many locations, she reconstructs the institutional framework of expatriation. The promotional activities of the British and colonial governments were reinforced by the work of many philanthropic agencies including the churches, the Bernardo's Homes, the Salvation Army, and the Quaker's Homes. Harper gives special significance to the recruiting agents whose work in Scotland had already been prominent more than a century earlier. By the 1920s, however, they faced better
informed and more discriminating prospective migrants (p. 55). The emigration agents provided running commentaries on conditions in the homeland, especially in the depressed Western Isles. For instance, a Canadian agent reported in 1923 that “the Hebrides are the most hopeless places that I have ever seen in which to secure suitable emigrants for Nova Scotia” (p. 59). This was a curious conclusion after almost two centuries of emigration between the two places.

These detailed first-hand accounts offer myriad insights into the psychology of migration, though they are often contradictory. Not many people will know that departing migrants from Barra retained possession of their crofts in the expectation of return, anticipating the pattern so well known among the peasants of southern Europe. In both cases it was a matter of clinging to a foothold in the homeland (p. 81). Harper discovers excellent accounts of special schemes to recruit Scottish fishermen to Vancouver Island where they were expected to counteract Asian immigration, an agenda unlikely to have entered the consciousness of the Hebrideans. There were other, equally exotic manifestations of Scottish emigrations, including the recruitment to Patagonia and the Falkland Islands in the 1920s (pp. 93–4) and the weekly dances in Harlem which regularly attracted four hundred members from local Gaelic Societies (p. 100).

With the greater intervention of government and emigration societies, the story of the 1920s featured assorted schemes for group emigration, usually involving large Scottish contingents. The record was frequently punctuated by poor organization, inferior reception facilities and unrealistic expectations of rural prosperity on marginal lands, echoing the fate of many such enterprises in the previous two centuries. The transoceanic traffic in humanity was always subject to misunderstanding, corruption, complaint and disappointment. Often, migrants departed one set of depressed conditions only to be transplanted into alien circumstances no less fragile and depressing, and then disdained as “a plethora of misfits” (p. 126). One official was accused of “fishing in . . . the muddy waters of Edinburgh” and being likely to recruit only “runts and failures” for Canada (p. 183). Failures and fiascos tend to dominate much of the surviving record, obscuring the quiet success of most private individual emigrations.

Harper insists that the Scottish account should not be dominated by the Highland minority to the disadvantage of their less colorful cousins from the more populous south. Though somewhat confusing the issue by describing the latter as “Lowland Clearances,” she uses surviving shipping lists in a most novel fashion to clearly demonstrate that the emigrants were primarily urban/industrial people and mainly from around Glasgow. She also employs very unusual evidence from Poor Registers: these capture melancholy stories of returned migrants, soon to be down-and-outs in the homeland. Some were casualties of youth and child migration schemes. Harper provides sober chronicles of the work of bodies such as the YMCA. Her detailed archival investigations offer stories of individual emigrants’ lives. The best documented are the negative accounts such as “the bad boys of Glasgow” who received a free passage both ways across the Atlantic (p. 173). No amount of planning could cope with every idiosyncrasy and nothing could protect the emigrants from the devastation of the Great Depression which, by 1931, terminated most emigration, even that of the Scots. Before that catastrophe, Scottish patriots feared that their country was being “denuded of its population” and, worse still, that Scottish emigrants were being replaced by Catholic Irish immigrants (p. 209).

This is, therefore, a rich and illuminating story, vital for Scotland and the recipient countries too. As Harper points out, the essential problem at the center of her study is that the majority of emigrants, the self-propelled, the self-financing, private deparlers, are underrepresented in the institutional archives of emigration. This constitutes the critical “dark figure” in all emigra-
tion studies and inevitably distorts the general picture of Scottish expatriation (p. 36). Consequently we miss not only the faceless majority of overseas migrants but also those who went to England, as well as the large numbers who returned. The fate of those who stayed behind is another story beyond the present study. Nor do we yet know enough about the impact on Scotland of the virtual closure of emigration in the 1930s. Any evaluation of the long-term fate of the hundreds of thousands of migrants would, of course, require an expensive longitudinal study of representative samples of such migrants, well beyond the resources of an individual historian. Dr. Harper's account is the first systematic exploration of the relevant archives and it clearly deserves to sit next to Michael Roe's fine study of Australia, Britain and Migration, 1915--1940 (Cambridge, 1995). Harper now gives Scottish historiography the lead over the rest of the British Isles in the exposure of the great mechanisms of early twentieth-century migration.

Frenchmen into Peasants: Modernity and Tradition in the Peopling of French Canada.

ALAN GREEN
Queen's University

The peopling of French Canada (Quebec) has posed interesting questions not only about the nature of that society but about those who actually chose to move from France and take up residence in that distant land. Their numbers were not large, at least when compared to British emigration to North America. The author has estimated that gross emigration was about 70,000. Of this number, only about 20,000 settled permanently in New France during the French Regime. The latter came to an end in 1763 with the signing of the Treaty of Paris in 1763.

Economic theory suggests that migrants move from low to high wage regions. The implication is that the most likely candidates for such a move are those who originate in the poorest regions, since they stand to gain the most from the move. However, new evidence suggests that this is not necessarily the case. In fact, it is often that migration is dominated by individuals who come from the more prosperous regions. The author's findings tend to support this new interpretation. Using a micro database, the author is able to examine who actually emigrated from France in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The evidence is drawn from lists of "ancestors" which have been assembled over the years by several generations of French Canadian archivists, genealogists, and historians. It covers a sample of about 16,000 migrants and is rich in detail on the gender, age, region of origin, occupation, religion and date of departure of French emigrants to Canada.

Using this sample of migrants, the author is able to show quite convincingly that the emigrants to New France were from the more advanced sectors of the French economy. They were from urban areas as well as from those rural regions that had more advanced agriculture. Hence, they were the farmers who were tied into markets and the commercial network of information that went with such contacts. Furthermore, many of these emigrants were artisans and professional people as well as those who engaged in local and in long distance trade. These were clearly the people who had both the knowledge and the resources to undertake migration to North America.

The last segment of the book, and the one from which the title is derived, studies the long-term consequence of this migration. This part is based more on secondary sources. The author points out that migration to the New World did not change the basic commercial/entrepreneurial elements that characterized French emigrants during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Even with the defeat of the French, the attention to commercial opportunities persisted. It was not until the last half of the nineteenth century that things began to change. At that time, the booming French-
Canadian population could not be fully absorbed into the slower growing industrial factories of Montreal and so were forced either into the textile mills of New England or into subsistence farming in the northern parts of the province. It was then that the transformation took place.

This latter description of the transformation of the Frenchmen into peasants is the most provocative part of the book. Taken as a whole, however, this work provides us with a fascinating interpretation of the peopling of Quebec. Future studies on this topic will have to begin with this superb work of scholarship.
### Review of Reviews

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The key forces that shape the contemporary experience of forced migration are analyzed. Global, social, and personal dimensions of displacement are considered, demonstrating their close interrelationship in forging the experience of refugee. Recurrent themes include the importance of valuing the resources, capacities, and meanings indige-

**American Sociological Association, 94th annual meeting, Chicago, Illinois, August 1999.** The following papers were presented:

**A8, C1 Ghani, N., “The Use of Public Benefits by Immigrants in the United States.” pp. 18, plus tables.**

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**IMR Volume 34 Number 3 (Fall 2000): 0998–1016**
Based on a study of immigrants in California, Florida, and New York, this paper concludes that immigrants have helped the American economy and their contribution to the economy does more economic good than harm. Restricting immigration will make that objective more difficult to achieve.

A8, A13, C8, J

KNOWLES, P. D., “‘Breakfast in America’: (the American dream though the eyes of Bulgarian immigrant women in South Florida).” Pp. 23.

This paper attempts to unravel some aspects of the relationship among gender, individual aspirations, and the immigration process. It links personal stories to public issues to provide “real life” feedback to the immigration debate and to widen the perspective on immigration issues.

A4, A8, C1


Not only are the individual immigrants transnational in the reestablished sense of frequent communication and travel to India, and sociocultural interests involving maintenance of ties with people there, these individuals also form transnational networks that include other dimensions of transnationalism closely linked to the structure of their network ties.

A4, A11, C4, G, J


Based on surveys, interviews, and observations in both Brazil and Japan, this paper analyzes causes and consequences of the return migration of Japanese-Brazilian women to Japan. It brings out the contradictions built into Japanese immigration policies concerning gender, ethnicity, and legal status, and their consequences for immigrant populations and receiving societies.

A12, C7, E1


A detailed account of the pattern of each country in Southern Europe in dealing with informal employment of immigrants is placed within a setting of contemporary southern European immigration controls, particularly of illegal migration and employment in Europe. Policy options and strategies are identified and assessed.

A8, C1, E2


Indigibility for benefits and cultural preferences result in many older immigrants to Canada living with their relatives or sponsors in three-or-more generation households. A number of variables are significantly associated with those in such arrangements.

A13, I


The human rights provisions of the Dayton Peace Agreement are assessed and ways and means to improve the implementation of human rights with the assistance of various entities are explored. In particular, the main functions of the Centre of Human Rights of
the University of Sarajevo in the promotion of human rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina are discussed.


A brief account is given of how the housing pattern of immigrants in Oslo developed from the late 1960s, when the first foreign workers appeared, until the 1990s, when refugees dominated the influx. Then, the issue of the social mechanisms creating and maintaining spatial concentrations of immigrants is addressed. Essentially there is a question of whether economic or cultural explanations are the most significant.


The essays in this book examine and explore the many contradictions embedded within different discourses of globalization. They offer a wide-ranging critique of those accounts that represent globalization primarily, if not exclusively, as the classic story of European modernity and place questions of power at the center of global processes. Taken together, the essays establish connections across theoretical policy-oriented and political debates.


The focus of this paper is on Mexican migrants. It details how many new persons have come to Iowa by race and Hispanic origin on a country-by-country basis. It then discusses the impacts experienced by communities in Iowa as the new residents began to make a life for themselves.


These sixteen essays explore the roles and impact that race, racism, and ethnicity have had in determining the historical and contemporary experiences of select ethnic and racial minorities in America. There are four sections: an introductory review; a discussion of the role of science in molding perceptions about race and providing ammunition to justifying racial and social inequities; a review of the struggles of select American ethnic groups against the forces of racism; and some insights into the way that race and ethnicity is being altered under the changing political economic conditions of America.


The articles in this book look at the characteristics and numbers of immigrants who have arrived in recent years, where they have settled, and the impact on the workforce. The effect of immigration on Australia's population is analyzed, as are the advantages and disadvantages of population growth through immigration. The articles include an examination of research-based knowledge on economic, environmental, and social impacts.

The stories of both the subject and the biographer are told in this book. Both of them reflect on Korean American history, the changing terrain of the American social landscape, and the impact of that change on old customs.

A4, A8, G


This article examines the effects of migration on identity and the social position of Chinese women in Belgium from an intergenerational perspective. The majority group, while preaching and adhering to the integration of ethnic minorities in principle, shows a different attitude when dealing with individuals and groups with hyphenated identities, and holds on to essentialist and primordialist ideas of identity and affiliation.

A12, C1


This volume brings together studies of a number of major communities of the Greek diaspora. They help explain why the Greeks constitute one of the world’s archetypal diasporas.

C6, C12, C1


The establishment of the Japan Mail Steamship Company’s European Line Service with Middlebrough as a loading and coaling port, led to a growth of a community of Japanese seamen there in the inter-war years. This group is analyzed in the context of Japanese emigration and the past and present associations of North-East England with Japan.

A8, C8


The destruction of a Mexican American community, the Golden Gate Barrio, for the renovation of an airport, is a microcosm of public policy and Anglo-Hispanic relations in the U.S. Southwest. It exemplifies the conflict of cultures involving the Mexicano and the Anglo.

A4, A8, C8, J


This autobiography of a former corporate attorney and publisher of a magazine for Asian Americans, addresses the range of issues facing Asian American women, including dealing with family expectations, why their mothers can be so difficult to please, whether they can trust one another, what it means to be sexual and seductive in the face of geisha-girl stereotypes, where the place for anger in their lives is, and how to find power in the workplace.

A8, A12, C8


The essays in this book cover a span of four centuries and discuss Basques who played
prominent roles in the settlement of America, the experiences of the immigrant generation, and the successes of first- and second-generation Basques in the United States.

A8, C1, F1

This is a report of a study of 25 immigrant households in El Paso, Texas, which focuses on the impact of the elimination of food stamp benefits on them. It concludes that the effect has been severe and that U.S.-citizen children have been affected.

A8, J

An approach for analyzing the gender and geography of citizenship practices, using Mexico-U.S. transnational spaces is proposed. Citizenship is conceptualized as including formal rights and substantive citizenship practices that are exercised in relation to different levels of political authority and in different geographic sites within transnational spaces. Men find a privileged arena of action in transmigrant organizations and Mexican state-mediated transnational social spaces while women are excluded from active citizenship in this arena, but often practice substantive social citizenship in the U.S.

A9, C2, E1

Mexican consuls worked with U.S. growers to break four major agricultural strikes in Depression-era California. Further, such intervention did not end after the New Deal. It continued through the early 1990s.

A8, A12, J

The experiences of single female migrants in Preston, England and Paisley, Scotland, are compared with those in Lowell, Massachusetts. Neither the family economy nor the complete independence model of single women’s migration fits with any of these cities. While this is difficult, there are some general similarities in all three cities that do not fit with the older models.

A8, F1

This report assesses the impact of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act (PRWORA) of 1996 and the Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996 on low-income immigrant communities. PRWORA has been implemented unevenly, creating an environment of fear in immigrant communities and uncertainty among service providers. The Acts interact with each other and their effects vary by geography, immigrant status, and ethnic group.

C5, F1

Participants in the debate on refugee law should reflect on the normative commitments that underpin their empirical approaches and be more explicit about
them. Moreover, they must accept the varied nature of law's community in this context and that the perspectives accorded priority often influence the substantive positions advanced. Disputes about the foundations, purpose, and function of refugee law today, however, remain at the core of this debate.

A6, E1, G

This book on the premodern caravan trade and the Yunnanese Chinese opens a previously unexplored area of Southeast Asian history and ethnography. The various cultures of the Sino-Southeast Asian uplands are acknowledged, but a perspective based on the Yunnanese trade network and its regularities is provided. The book demonstrates how ethnic identities change in response to the process of localization and the larger structures of state, region, and their economies.

A11, E1

This social history describes the debate on indentured immigration, its demographic aspects, how the labor contract and the legal system functioned in practice, the basic social provisions at the plantation, and the social and cultural life. It concludes by highlighting the relationship between the state, the planters, and the contractants.

A8, E3, G

These books are a collection of statistics that provide information on a wide variety of topics. With a few exceptions, each table presents information about the Black and Hispanic populations, respectively, the White population, and a total for Americans of all races and ethnic groups.

A8, A9, C8, E2

Family dysfunction, nonmarried status, ineffective social support, nonpositive expectations for the future, infrequent church attendance, and lack of agreement with the decision to migrate are significantly associated with greater levels of acculturative stress.

A2, D1

A central cause of internal population displacement in Nigeria is state violence, which has as its basis, military rule, crude oil production, and communalism. There is a deepening link between state violence, insecurity, and population displacement. Humanitarian assistance and protection for displaced persons are also addressed.

A12, G

The effects of a poor structural context, an environment of insecurity, on the Kurdish ethnic nationalist mobilization in Turkey are examined. This population is worse off than the Turkish population. The Turkish Kurds’ environment of insecurity is a key package of both causal and intermediate variables behind the ethnic revival.
The Impact of Increased Economic Integration on Italy and the Rest of Europe, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., April 30 to May 2, 1999. The following papers were presented.

A12, E1

The European Union is comparable to the United States in many ways. Institutionally compressed regional wage differentials and limited labor mobility contrast with U.S. labor market patterns, however. European labor markets need to be different from what they were, but may find it difficult to approach their American counterparts.

A12

The delegation of monetary policy to a supranational central bank creates a conflict of interest between residents of different countries. The problems created by this conflict can generate both an inflation and primary deficit bias as well as an excess monetary discipline and recession bias. When information problems are particularly severe, monetary policy becomes relatively insensitive to business cycle conditions.

A12, E1

Several elements have resulted in regional unemployment differentials widening among Italian regions since the mid 1980s, especially between the leading Northern and Central areas and the underdeveloped South.

A12

The creation of a market for tradable deficits permits would be an efficient mechanism for the implementation of fiscal constraints in the European Monetary Union. This system would have a number of advantages over the current provisions of the Stability Pact.

A12
CHIORAZZO, V. AND L. SPAVENTA, "The Prodigal Son or a Confidence Trickster? How Italy got into the EMU." Pp. 19, plus tables.

Italy gained admission to the EMU by a successful last minute effort that defied adverse expectations, technical disbelief, and political hostility. The confidence tricks it played succeeded because most of the deserving work of fiscal adjustment had already been done. A final trick of a fast and steady decline in interest expenditures served its purpose and was grudgingly applauded.

A12, C1

The state of the art on globalization (and Europeanization) in the field of social movement and immigration is first discussed. This is followed by a description of mobilization by pro- and anti-immigrants in Italy. Finally, the impact of Europe, and the "resilience" of the nation state on three types of opportunities for protest are analyzed.

A12
GARRETT, G., "Economic Integration, Monetary Integration and Fiscal Policy in Europe." Pp. 21, plus charts and tables.

Greater exposure to trade is associated with less government spending and relatively heavier taxation of labor than capital. Increased capital mobility, per se, has little
impact on spending and taxation policies. Countries that fix their exchange rates tend to have smaller public economies and to rely more on labor than capital taxation. Thus, there should be a trend towards smaller public economies and less redistributive tax systems in Euroland.


This paper illustrates how electoral systems affect the adoption of fiscal institutions both within governments and the legislature. The paper, however, does not attempt to test this institutional explanation against other explanations as to why Italy qualified for the EMU. In addition, there is only a weak attempt to explain why these fiscal institutions could be introduced under the new electoral system, but not under the old one.


The potential gains from the creation of a fiscal federation in the EMU are assessed empirically. First, evidence is gathered on how large, asymmetric and persistent are the shocks to the EMU area. Second, the consequences of the Stability Pact via the counterfactual exercise of imposing its restrictions on the EMU over the last thirty-five years are studied.


A 1996 article by Asdrubali, Sorensen, and Yoshia proposed a method of assessing how much smoothing regions get via insurance and credit as opposed to the central budget. This article investigates this model with modifications and interprets it as postulating that all regional movements in consumption relative to the national average stem from output shocks, and thus are inapplicable.


Countries with weaker local representation in the legislature tend to have higher total government spending and transfers. This finding supports the notion that representatives with a strong local basis are more likely to use purchase of goods to enhance their electoral appeal, while representatives with broader constituencies or with strong party allegiance are more likely to use transfers for this purpose.


This paper explores the possible results if the regions of Europe were rearranged into new groupings that maximized their similarities, defined in terms of common exposure to shocks. The results are based on shocks to sixty-three regions in the European Union.


The main consequences of Europeanization are first discussed with emphasis on its influences on the domestic structure of a member state. This can include the creation of new institutions, new articulations of existing institutions, new functions of the old institutions, and a different working of existing institutions, or their branches.

A12 PADOAN, P. C., "Is European Monetary Union Endogenous?" Pp. 35.
The role of the euro as a potential global currency is analyzed in this paper, which discusses the economic policy options it faces. It also argues that labor market adjustment to the new monetary environment is far from being completed. Finally, perspectives for the definition of a common EU policy up to the challenge of the single currency are analyzed.

Pasquino, G., "The Impact of Europe on Italian Institutions." Pp. 35.

The ability of the Italian political system to implement the European directives is analyzed. The type of governments and the structure of the Italian parliament (as well as the Italian bureaucracy) present an obstacle to a rapid, reliable, efficient, decision-making process both in the ascending phase of European policies and in the descending phase.


A simple model of domestic political corruption, when extended to a multi-state federation, suggests strong incentives in favor of increased deadweight loss and increased divergence. Corruption will rise in all states, but countries with proportional representation will suffer greater damage than majoritarian ones and equities markets will reflect that expectation.


Behind the support for European unification, and for the strict measures enforced to meet the Maastricht parameters, there were contradictory expectations. The need to develop some kind of safety net, personal social and health services, more efficient labor market services, etc., clashes with that of reducing social expenditures.


The Italian situation suggests that entrenched institutions can be dislodged by international forces, which lead to a new balance of power among policy-making institutions. Societal actors may change their own calculations as the shift of institutional power takes place. This shift can give preference to some policy outcomes over others. Inter-institutional policies and policy change thereby become institutionalized, with societal actors playing a supporting rather than a leading role.


Institutional and political determinants of pay inequality are studied in sixteen countries from 1980 to 1992. The most important factor in pay dispersion is the level of wage-setting. Centralization’s impact does not depend on whether it occurs via collective bargaining or via government involvement. The concentration of unions and the share of the labor force covered by collective bargaining agreements matter. After controlling for wage-setting institutions, other variables have little impact. Economic, political and norm-based explanations for the association of centralization with egalitarian outcomes are discussed.

disadvantaged with regard to education and economic achievement in a secular society than less ethnically connected individuals. Moreover, those immigrating to Canada when relatively young have acculturated more rapidly and achieved higher educational and economic status than those arriving as teenagers. Finally, being more ethnic is negatively associated with educational achievement and economic success.

A12, C5, G

The relationship between the Jewish community and the two Irish states, with emphasis on the situation in the South in the 1930s is examined. It throws new light on the rise of anti-Semitism and on Nazi propaganda in the pre-war years, evaluates the anti-Semitism of the Irish envoy in Berlin in the context of the country's restrictive refugee policy, and emphasizes the friendship between Eamon de Valera and the Chief Rabbi of Ireland.

A6, J

The lives of "Asian" women on the Asian subcontinent and the West are explored. The influences of history, politics, class and economic position, religious affiliation, and family pattern on women's lives are examined. A particular influence on women is the impact of patriarchy and the traditional belief that men can control their lives.

A1, C4

Most of the problems that prejudicially affected the performance of the project for the provision of livestock to Eritrean refugees returning from the Sudan could have been avoided had a participatory planning approach been adopted in both countries. This experience shows that the role of outsiders, including governments, should be limited to increasing the options open to returnees and facilitating their choices.

C7, C1, C5, E2, G

Cultural and structural variables operate differently depending on how the dependent variable, academic achievement, is measured. Parents' social class status and cultural ties affect reading and math achievement. The exit and reception between the two groups and their diversity of social class and culture also help explain ethnic differences in academic achievement.

A12, C1, E2

The socioeconomic position of immigrant entrepreneurs can only be understood by taking into account their embeddedness in the socioeconomic and politico-economic environment of their country of settlement, as well as in social networks of individuals. After reviewing recent developments, this article examines the relationship of mixed embeddedness with informal economic activities. This concept is then used to explore a case study of Turkish and Moroccan Islamic butchers.
A12, A13, C5

The view that temporary protection of refugees from the former Yugoslavia emerged as a compromise between states’ desires to restrict asylum and demand from public opinion and international organizations to offer protection is questioned. The extent to which such protection for Bosnians was coordinated is analyzed to determine whether it actually provided the benefits that have been suggested.

A8, E1

Objective and empirical evidence of the effect of immigration to the U.S. is examined with emphasis on native earnings, industries, social mobility of natives, unemployment, public assistance dependence, and Social Security reception.

A12, C5

There is almost a complete absence of references to the movement of Belgians to England, the largest refugee movement in British history. This creates a gap in an understanding of World War I and the history of refugees. This article stresses the importance of local responses and reactions to the refugees and the significance of place in rebuilding lives and identities in Britain.

A1, A2, A3, A5, A8, C8, G

These essays, written mostly by Korean American scholars, approach interracial, multiethnic conflict by examining relations between Korean American and African American communities in Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York.

A6, A8, E2

It is imperative that care providers are able to work with interpreters who can interpret both language and culture. This study of the experiences of nurses working with Vietnamese clients provides evidence of the shared brokering concept. The concept provided a framework for providing complex, effective, and efficient care.

A12, E1, G

Migration from the former post-communist countries to Greece is not a homogeneous phenomenon. This allows for a distinction and comparison between the migration waves from Poland and Albania to Greece.

A12, E1, G

The Western “tourist-worker” is treated more favorably in Greece than Albanian migrant workers. The latter group is trapped in conditions of inferiority, immobility, and ultra-exploitation. This conclusion is based on fieldwork done in Athens and Thessaloniki.
Despite their superior academic and professional qualifications, immigrants from the former USSR to Israel are underrepresented in the business and financial services sector, the leading sector in post-industrial economies. They are most strongly represented in the personal services sector, where they replaced Palestinian workers. These findings lend support to both the restructuring and replacement hypotheses.

A12, G


Multivariate analysis is used in this study to examine the economic position of immigrants and their children on six dependent variables. The implications of the patterns developed from this study are discussed.

A9, C2, I


This book relates the story of one group of Mayas from Guatemala who sought refuge in Mexico. It combines autobiography, history, political analysis, and testimonial narrative to explore state terror and its human cost.

A13, C1, G


This volume contains seventy-five Soviet documents relating to the struggle for Jewish emigration from 1957-1989. They reveal the aspects of the problem that most preoccupied the leadership and the factors that had the greatest impact on the decision-making process. They also provide insight into the nature of the information that was received and how it was procured.
A12, C1, F

This report covers 1997 trends in migration flows, data and characteristics of aliens and demographic development of aliens, foreign born and target groups of immigrant policy, employment, remittances of migrants, and migration and immigrant policy. The appendix contains a number of tables.

C8

A8, C8

In 1963 and 1970, there were electoral revolts in Crystal City, Texas that resulted in Mexicanos winning control of the city council and the school board. The success and conflicts of the Chicano political movement in Crystal City are examined as is its eventual decline. The more successful second revolt in 1970 is scrutinized and its effect on political, economic, educational, and social changes for Mexicanos are detailed.

C8, G


The minority middle classes share a minority culture of mobility, a set of cultural elements responsive to the problems that usually accompany such status, including problems of interracial encounters in public settings and inter-class relations within the minority community.

C8


Learning how to learn about cultural differences is the key to being comfortable in a new culture. The two most important elements are communication and adaptation. This volume analyzes what is involved in managing differences and adapting cross-culturally and provides some suggestions to accomplish this task.

A8, C5


This report covers the fiscal year that started on October 1, 1996. It covers admissions to the U.S., reception and placement activities, domestic resettlement programs, key Federal activities, a profile of the refugee population, and their economic adjustment.

A12, F4


Newer Islamic movements among Muslim immigrants in Western Europe have developed a cultural trend. Islam in Western Europe is described and the organization, activities, visions and strategies of the European Islamic movements are investigated. Particular attention is paid to the most important Islamic trend among Turkish minorities, Millî Görüş. The conclusion is that Islamism is a collective political representation of an alternative position to the
dominant cultural and social marginalization.


The German treatment of Gypsies furnishes an element of continuity from Imperial Germany to the Federal Republic of today. The basis for the treatment of the Gypsies under the Nazis was laid during the Imperial and Weimar eras. Moreover, the persecution of the Gypsies resumed soon after the collapse of the Nazi regime.


The differences in the market rights of citizens and non-citizens are declining at the state level. The question of what constitutes the legitimate interests of states to determine their political community, however, has not been answered.


The articles in this special issue focus on the forces affecting the rise and character of grass-roots transnationalism and its effects in countries of origin and destination. Contrary to recent attacks, the increasing visibility of this phenomenon does not have disintegrative consequences for the host country and culture. In fact, the opposite is the case.


This article questions whether there is a general “mechanism” through which disparities in regional development affect patterns of cross-district migration; which aspects of regional inequalities have the most profound effect on inter-area migration; and which planning policies and strategies are conducive to increasing the migration attractiveness of peripheral development regions. Statistical data from Israel and Japan are used to answer these questions.


This volume is the work of a group of social psychologists who have been grappling with issues arising from increasing cultural diversity and contact within American institutions. The articles reveal the authors’ sharply different view on both the magnitude of racial and cultural problems and the nature of their solutions. They also reflect, however, the consensus that psychology can help in understanding and improving the outcomes of contact between racial and cultural groups.


State policy factors are significant determinants of the net interstate migration level of the states. State ideology and an investment-consumption ratio are also significant. A consumer-voter model explains a significant portion of the variation in aggregate migration behavior.
A5, A8


Chinese emigration to the United States was the result of the meeting of market economies. Both the old Cantonese market economy and new market economies decisively shaped the emigration.

A4, C1, J


The experiences of South Asian immigrant women are explored from a feminist theoretical perspective. The various organizational activities that unite and empower the women are examined. This paper draws on qualitative comparative data from original research among 286 women in Atlantic Canada.

A8, A9, E2


Survey participants had inadequate knowledge about symptoms of cancer and early detection methods. Salvadoran men would participate in cancer screening efforts if they had access to medical care. Education programs also may help to prevent cancer in this population.

A8, A9, E2


The difficulties encountered by Mexican-origin students are examined. The following factors are focused on in describing why some schools fall short and others have improved student outcomes: cultural values and practices; approaches to language instruction; different gender expectations; barriers to immigrant parent involvement; teacher professional development; and school policies and government legislation.

8, A9, C1


The response of Mexican immigrants to Anglo-American prejudice and violence early in the twentieth century is examined. The rise of México Lindo (return to Mexico) nationalism and the efforts of Mexican consuls to help Mexican immigrants defend themselves is traced. In all, an era in which civilian and police brutality, prejudice in the courtroom and disproportionate punishment too often characterized justice for Mexican Americans is described.

A8


The ties and asymmetries across the U.S.-Mexico border are addressed from the Mexican side of the border. The history, economics, and customs that have shaped this region are probed. Current issues are explored and the borderlands themselves are examined. In all, it is a portrait of the people, places, and issues that make up border life today.

A4, A5, A6, A8, A11, C8, G

Rustomji-Kerns, R., et al., Eds., Encounters: People of Asian Descent in the Amer...
The experiences of people of Asian descent in North and South America are explored in this anthology which focuses on the interactions of Asians with others outside the dominant culture. Their experiences among ethnic and cultural groups are explored.

A12, E1


Immigrants have been facing an increasingly difficult time integrating into the Swedish economy due to shifts in production and organization which have led to shifting labor demand. This shift has had negative consequences for immigrants, with those who are culturally most similar to native Swedes performing much better than those with greater cultural distance. The split between the 1970s and the 1990s is illustrated, as is the correlation between worsening immigrant performance and technical change.

A13, G


An argument that perceptions of cultural similarity among a country’s ethnic and ethno-regional groups, and perceptions of both cultural similarity and difference between these groups and the populations of other countries, shape and promote dimensions of national identity is evaluated using the case of Ukraine.

A8, G


The question of whether any social solidarity exists among Americans is addressed by exploring ideological differences, theoretical disputes, social processes, and institutional change. This conflict has not increased or decreased over the years and, in terms of social solidarity, has changed as the society itself has changed.

Social Science History Association, 1999 Annual Meeting, Fort Worth, Texas, November 11-13, 1999. The following papers were presented:

A5, A8, F

KESSLER, A. E., “Immigration, Partisanship, and the Political Economy of Chinese Exclusion, 1876-1902.” Pp. 24, plus tables. The late nineteenth century discriminatory exclusion of the Chinese is examined. A trade theoretic model identifies politics as the driving force behind exclusion and points towards the strategic manipulation of race as a key consideration for understanding the politics of immigration restriction.

A8, F

SPARROW, B., “Why They Got In: United States Immigration Policy from 1783-1882.” Pp. 26. There was a national immigration policy during the nineteenth century. It was to admit foreigners almost without restriction. State policies and private practices regarding immigration or naturalization were either of secondary importance or consistent with the national policy of open immigration.

A5, C3, E1


The East Asia international labor market is best viewed as bisected along productivity
lines. Protection of migrant workers is similarly beset with highly skilled and professional workers given special consideration, while measures to protect and facilitate the movement of low-skilled workers are virtually nonexistent. Suggestions are made for measures to protect migrant workers.

A9, I

An autobiography of Rigoberta Menchú drew world attention to the atrocities of the Guatemalan army and earned her a Nobel Prize. This book examines the earlier volume and concludes that while it may have distorted some of the facts, it achieved what it intended in a way that a person’s actual life never could.

A5, A8

Japanese immigrants to the U.S. were a select group relative to the Japanese population because of the restrictions on Japanese immigration by both governments. This selective nature contributed to the economic achievement of Japanese Americans before World War II.

A6, C1, J

The determinants of female migration to export processing zones in Malaysia are analyzed. The results suggest that explaining the daughter’s migration decision may require more than separation of the individual motives and familial needs.

A12, C1

To better understand the relations between the French and the Italians, it is necessary to assess the reactions of public opinion as it was confronted with Italian migration to southwestern France. The global context, the consequences of the Italian declaration of war against France, and the German occupation combined to transform the representations at work in public opinion and modified the relations between the French and Italians.

A8, A10, C5

Operation Pedro Pan, which smuggled children from Cuba to the United States after the Cuban missile crisis is traced from its political and social origins and details the roles of the organizations involved, especially the Cuban Children’s Program.

A2, G

The cultural, political, religious, and historical configuration of the Eritrean frontiers makes it difficult to demarcate a particular Eritrean identity, distinguishing it from Sudanese ethnic and religious identities, or historical-political and ethnic Ethiopian identities.

A4, A5, A6, A8, C8, G
TUAN, M., Forever Foreigners or Honorary Whites? The Asian Ethnic Experience
To determine the meaning of ethnicity of later generation Chinese and Japanese Americans, 95 people from the middle-class of these groups were interviewed to determine the importance of ethnic and racial identities and the concept of becoming a "real" American for both Asian and white ethnics.


The migration of the Filipinos to the United States and the rest of the world is part of an institutional response to a changing world economy. The role of government and private institutions is deeply implicated in the gendering of international labor migration. Also, a state's position in the global economy translates into different institutional pursuits and, therefore, different processes and patterns of international labor migration.


Tables in this report cover the total population of concern to UNHCR, changes in the refugee population, gender and age of the refugee population, global asylum applications and refugee status determination, asylum applications and refugee status determination in selected countries, 1989-1998, and asylum seekers in Europe.


Schools subtract resources from youth in two major ways. First, by dismissing their definition of education. Second, through assimilationist policies and practices that minimize their culture and language. A key result is the erosion of students' social capital that is evident in the absence of academically oriented networks among acculturated, U.S.-born youth.


The purpose of this study was to promote better understanding of what the changes in the population's ethnic composition mean for the nation's education of the labor force and for educational institutions and to explore the benefits and costs in closing the gap in educational attainment between ethnic groups.


The articles in this volume link three broad themes: the changing nature and explanation of contemporary migration flows; the revival of the idea of "diaspora" as a means of capturing some of the cultural and social meanings of multi-locality; and the emergence of "transnationalism" as a central concept in understanding how global identities are constructed "from below" and "on the move."

Warren, R., "Unauthorized Immigrants..."

This paper describes an approach that the Immigration and Naturalization Service is working on to estimate the size and patterns of the unauthorized immigrant population residing in the U.S. The paper gives a general description of the approach, as final decisions have not been made about all of the data sets and assumptions that will be used to construct the estimates.


Case studies from all over the world cover the production of multiple ethnic identities, the irrelevance of unitary monolithic views of nationalism and ethnicity, the relative significance of class or ethnicity, importance of education in multiethnic societies, and political connotations of ethnicity and migration, return migration and reemigration, and the mythology of “uniqueness” in immigration patterns. These studies demonstrate the reciprocal relationship between ethnicity and migration.


These eleven interviews with Japanese Americans who fought in Vietnam analyze the groups’ pre-war experiences of growing up in Southern California, their experiences in basic training, their selection of military jobs, and their experiences on returning home. The experiences of the others who were interviewed are also reflected.


The discrimination and exclusion experienced by immigrants and ethnic minorities in the workplaces of Western Europe are examined. Evidence from ten different countries shows the various forces of exclusion, including discrimination in both its legal and informal guises. Some of the implications of these issues for trade unions and employers are addressed.


The documents in this book indicate how Chinese women made a home in San Francisco from the gold rush years through World War II. It is an educational tool for researching and reclaiming women’s history, as well as a feminist lesson on how one group of women adapted to life in a different country.
International Newsletter on Migration

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The International Newsletter on Migration is a publication of the Research Committee on Migration (RC: No. 31) of the International Sociological Association. Address all correspondence to the Editor of the Newsletter, Catherine Wiltol de Wenden (50, Avenue Duquesne, 75007 Paris, France, Tel. 47-34-77-85) or to Lydrio E. Tomasi, Editor of IMR; E-mail: <cmshft@aol.com>.

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CONFERENCES

• “Community Politics in the New Century”: 17th National Conference of the Association for Asian American Studies, Scottsdale, Arizona, May 24-28, 2000. The conference theme questions the continuing growth of Asian American studies and its relationship with community politics that are geographically and historically constituted. The conference included 90 regular sessions with 360 papers and two plenary sessions. Contact: Association for Asian American Studies, Cornell University, 420 Rockefeller Hall, Ithaca, NY 14853-2602. Internet: apal@cornell.edu
• “Migrations: Scenarios for the 21st Century”: International conference organized by the Rome Agency for Jubilee Preparations held in Rome, Italy, on July 12-14, 2000. The conference analyzed the international migratory trends and processes, delineating not only their size but also their underlying causes and the economic, social and cultural changes they may produce. It included 18 scholarly papers and 20 presentations by public officials. Contact: Francesco Bandarin, Conference Secretariat, Univer/Fonema Service, Via Novara 2, 00198 Rome, Italy. E-mail: info@fonema.net

• “Findings on Reproductive Health of Refugees and Displaced Populations”: Conference organized by the Reproductive Health for Refugees Consortium, New York, July 2000. It focuses on applied research, program findings and use of data to improve reproductive health programs serving populations in crisis throughout the world. Contact: Therese McGinn, CPFH, Columbia University, 60 Haven Avenue, New York, NY 10032, USA. Tel: +1 212-304-5224.

• “International Migration: New Patterns, New Theories”: A Multidisciplinary Conference, Nottingham Trent University, Nottingham, UK, September 11-13, 2000. The conference aims to provide a forum for exchanges between specialists from a number of disciplines undertaking research on migration; to advance and evaluate work on migration issues and link this with general developments in economic and sociocultural theorizations; and, to encourage constructive dialogue between academics and practitioners in the field. Contact: Caroline Nagel, Department of International Studies, Nottingham Trent University, Nottingham, UK. E-mail: caroline.nagel@ntu.ac.uk

• “Intellectual Migration and Cultural Transformation: The Movement of Ideas from German-speaking Europe to the Anglo-Saxon World”: An international conference organized by the Vienna Circle Institute, University of Vienna, and the Centre for German-Jewish Studies, University of Sussex, held at the University of Sussex, Brighton, UK, September 25–28, 2000. For a detailed program see http://www.ucm.es/info/isa/cfgets8.htm

• “Self-Employment, Gender and Migration”: San Felin de Guixols, Spain, October 18-November 2, 2000. This EURESCO Conference focuses on the social and biographical embeddedness of entrepreneurial activities of migrant women and men and the adequacy of existing social policies aiming at promoting self-employment. Contact: Dr. Josip Hendekovic, Tel: +33 388 7671 35; Fax: +33 388 3669 87; website: http://www.esf.org/euresco/00/sc00160a.htm
• “The Places of Religion in Ethnic Self-Understanding and Immigrant Integration”: 5th International Metropolis Conference, Vancouver, Canada, November 13-17, 2000. Participants in this workshop explore the ways religion functions within the broader processes of contemporary immigrant integration in their respective countries. Contact: Dr. Paul Bramadat, Department of Religious Studies, University of Winnipeg, e-mail: paul.bramadat@uwinnipeg.ca

• “Social Transformation in the Asia Pacific Region”: An international conference jointly convened by the Centre for Asia Pacific Social Transformation Studies and the UNESCO-Management of Social Transformations Program, University of Wollongong, Australia, December 4-6, 2000. The conference explores the specific characteristics of globalization and social transformation in the various world regions. It includes a session on “migration, multicultural societies and the post-colonial Nation-State.” Contact: CAPSTRANS, University of Wollongong, 2522, Australia, e-mail: capstrans@uow.edu.au

• “International Migration: New Spaces and Trends”: An international conference organized by the Russian Academy of Science and other entities, to be held in Vologda, Russia, on March 14-17, 2001. The three plenary sessions will focus on “Globalization of International Migration and New Trends”; “New Spaces and Participants of International Migration”; and “Discrimination and Freedom in International Migration.” Working languages are Russian and English. The papers presented to the conference will be published in the original language. Preliminary costs of participation – 1050 U.S. Dollars for participants and 850 for accompanying persons, which includes accommodations, tea and coffee breaks, the conference materials, publication of the papers and transportation from Moscow to Vologda and back. Contact: Dr. Irina Malakha, Institute for International Economic and Political Studies, Novocheryomushkinskaya 46, 117418 Moscow. Fax: (095) 1286982, (095) 3107061; Phone: (095) 1286982; E-mail: malakha@transecon.ru

• “CMS 24th Annual National Legal Conference on Immigration and Refugee Policy”: Organized by the Center for Migration Studies of New York, Inc., and held at the Hyatt Regency Hotel on Capitol Hill, Washington, DC, April 5-6, 2001. Contact: CMS Conference Department, 209 Flagg Place, Staten Island, NY 10304; Tel: 718-351-8800; Fax: 718-667-4598; E-mail: <cmislf@aol.com>; website: http://www.cmsny.org

• “Jeunesses et Vieillesses: Quels défis pour les sociétés d’aujourd’hui et de...
domain?”. Fourth Seminar organized by the Réseau Démografie of AVF, Louvain, Belgium, May 29-June 1, 2001. The proposed themes include the role played by international migrations in the transition of aging. Contact: Francis Gendreau, CICRED, 133 boulevard Davout, 75980 Paris Cedex 20, France. Tel: (33) 1 56062136; fax: (33) 1 56062165; e-mail: gendreau@cicred.ined.fr

- XXIVth IUSSP General Population Conference: Salvador, Bahia, Brazil, August 18-24, 2001. The scientific program includes the following regular sessions:
  S26 International migration – Micro, organized by Nasra Shah, Faculty of Medicine, Kuwait University, P.O. Box 24923, Safat, 13110, Kuwait. Tel: +965 531 9485; fax: +965 533 8948; e-mail: <nasra@hs.kuniv.edu.kw>
  S27 International migration – Macro, organized by Douglas Massey, Population Studies Center, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104-6298, USA. Tel: +1-215-898-4688; fax: +1-215-898-2124; e-mail: <dmassey@pop.upenn.edu>
  S28 Internal migration, organized by Gordon De Jong, Population Research Institute, 601 Oswald Tower, Pennsylvania State University, University Park, Pennsylvania 16802, USA. Tel: +1-814-863-2277; fax: +1-814-863-8342; e-mail: <dejong@pop.psu.edu>
  S41 Spatial mobility, organized by Ronald Skeldon, c/o Mrs. Skeldon, ESCAP Editorial, UN Building, Rajdamnern Avenue, Bangkok, 10200, Thailand. Tel: +662 246.3147; fax: +662 288.1052 (attn. Mrs. Skeldon); e-mail: <skeldon.unescap@un.org>

The latest information on the XXIVth IUSSP General Population Conference can be found on website: www.iussp.org/Brazil2001

- World Conference on Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Forms of Intolerance: Convened by the United Nations General Assembly and to be held in South Africa on August 31-September 7, 2001. Major contributions are needed from the perspective and experience of migrants and those who address xenophobia, migrant rights, refugees and related concerns. An information page has been opened on the OHCHR Website at www.unhchr.ch

ITEMS

- Call for Papers
  1. The International Sociological Association Research Committee 31 on
the Sociology of Migration is organizing two Inter-Congress Meetings in Europe and in Latin America for which it is soliciting paper proposals for RC321 members and other interested colleagues:

a. “International Migration in Latin America Enters a New Millennium”: Buenos Aires, Argentina, November 2-4, 2000. This intercongress meeting will focus on the following themes:

1) International population movements in Latin America and international comparison. Historical and conceptual background. Specification of the regional characteristics and trends;

2) International migration in transition to political democracy; impact in country of origin and country of destination; return migration; international and internally displaced persons, refugees, etc.; migration policies and human rights; family reunification; and documented migration;

3) Migration and development; economic and social consequences of migration; international movements of highly skilled personnel; trade and services negotiations, regional integration (Mercosur, Andean Pact, NAFTA, and others), remittances, etc.; temporary workers;

4) Latin American countries of emigration and their diaspora; old migrants and the return of their descendants to their countries of origin; jus soli and jus sanguinis principle: nationality, citizenship and naturalization;

5) Social, economic and cultural integration of migrants; contemporary sociological models of contemporary migration flows.

Abstracts of papers (in English or in Spanish) up to 300 words should be sent as soon as possible, latest by September 1, 2000 to Prof. Enrique Oteiza, Riobamba 1042, 3 D, 116 Buenos Aires, Argentina; e-mail:<eoteiza@mail.soc.uba.ar>


International migration is one of the most outstanding expressions of the current process of economic and cultural globalization. At the same time, immigration control stands as one of the ultimate symbols of state sovereignty. As a consequence, there is a growing tension between the needs of the market and the prerogative of the state. All over the world production factors cross borders much more frequently than in the past. Transnational networks of all types are developing, often as a side effect of state policies, while the decreasing relevance of distance and the new media facilitate cultural exchange. All this occurs in
a context of growing needs for manpower of different skill levels in most of the traditional countries of immigration, where economic interests advocate opening up the borders, in spite of persisting unemployment. In contrast, states tend to dismiss such claims from the market, and to reemphasize their sovereign right to control their borders. Not only have immigration policies become stricter, but migrants are also looked upon with growing suspicion as potential frauds, no matter whether they come to work, to marry or to seek asylum. Immigration is increasingly seen as a threat to sovereignty and to national identity. Paradoxically, this happens in a situation where the major political decisions on these issues are no longer taken at the national level, but at an international or a supra-national level. Increasingly, the broad lines of immigration policy are decided by the European Union, NAFTA or similar organizations, and inspired by international treaties and conventions.

Mounting pressure from public opinion seems to have led states into a spiral of constantly tightening their immigration policies, while these same states see themselves obliged to develop a concealed open border policy. Proof of the latter are the occasional regularizations of undocumented migrants, the use of official and unofficial quotas as well as the often discretionary and selective granting of residence permits to newly arrived migrants. To satisfy public opinion, states suggested that they effectively control immigration, but in reality they are no longer able to exercise full national sovereignty in this domain.

This constant tension between state and market in a globalizing world also casts doubts on related concepts such as national identity and citizenship. Newly developing communities, based on a shared ethnicity, culture or religion, may be seen as challenges to national unity. Many states do not know how to handle claims for the recognition of difference. The growing importance of transnational communities threatens the concept of the territorial state.

Multiple affiliations undermine traditional ideas of citizenship and loyalty. States wonder how they can prevent large segments of their population from being alienated or excluded. New notions of political mobilization develop, in which ideologies perceived as foreign may serve as rallying points. The opening up of markets and the closing off of states also has an impact on the welfare state. The definition of membership changes, the principle of equality comes under fire and the social minimum may need to be redefined.
The Intercongress Meeting of RC31 will question and analyze the tensions between states and markets that result from immigration. It will also analyze the impact of immigration on identity, citizenship, loyalty, integration, cohesion and other notions traditionally linked to the concept of the nation-state, but now increasingly challenged and under discussion.

Abstracts of papers (in English) up to 300 words should be sent as soon as possible, latest by March 16, 2001 to: Marco Martiniello (Fac. De Droit, Bt. 31 Bte. 43, University de Liege, 7, blvd. du Rectorat, B-4000 Liege, Belgium. Tel: 32-4-3663040; fax: 32-4-36564557; e-mail: <m.martiniello@ulg.ac.be>

2. “Public Policy and the Institutional Context of Immigrant Businesses”: Conference sponsored by the European Union under its Targeted Socio-Economic Research program, Liverpool, United Kingdom, March 22-25, 2001. Prospective participants are asked to emphasize legal, institutional and public policy issues. Expenses for authors papers will be covered. Please send an abstract of your paper (300-400 words) by e-mail to Jan Rath (email: rath@pscw.uva.nl) or Giles Barrett (e-mail: g.a.barrett@livjm.ac.uk).

3. “Cultural-artistic Activity of Emigrants and its Role in Modern Culture”: Conference to be held in Slovenia in September 2001. Send your affiliation and abstract of paper by September 15, 2000. Contact: Zvone Zigon, Institute for Slovene Emigration Studies, Gosposka ul. 13, SI-1000, Ljubljana, Slovenia, Tel: +386 61 125 60 68, fax: +386 61 125 52 53; e-mail: izi@zrc-sazu.si

4. “Labor, Migration and the Global Economy: Past, Present and Future”: 23rd Annual North American Labor History Conference, Wayne State University, October 18-20, 2001. Please submit panel and paper proposals (including a 1-2 page abstracts and briefs cvs or biographical statements for all participants) by March 1, 2001 to Elizabeth Faue, Coordinator, North American Labor History Conference, Department of History, 3094 Faculty Administration Building, Wayne State University, Detroit, MI 48202. Tel: 313-577-2525; fax: 313-577-6987; e-mail: ad5247@wayne.edu

5. “Pan-Japan: The International Journal of the Japanese Diaspora”: The journal studies the migration of Japanese people and culture across the world’s boundaries, from the sociological to the political, from the legal to the economic. Historical and current contexts are addressed. Contrib-
utors should send their articles (in English, Japanese, Portuguese or Spanish) to: Nobuko Adachi, Anthropology 4640, 104 Edward Hall, Illinois State University, Normal, Illinois, 61790 USA. Phone: 309-452-5139; Fax: 309-452-5139; E-mail: nobuadachi@aol.com

- **Scalabrini International Migration Institute (SIMI):**
  Established in 2000 within the Faculties of Philosophy and Theology of the Pontifical Urbaniana University in Rome, Italy, SIMI is an international academic institute which promotes scientific formation and professional training for scholars, researchers and social workers engaged in different areas of human mobility. It is sponsored by the “Scalabrini Foundation,” as an extension of the congregations founded by Bishop John B. Scalabrini (1839-1905), who championed the cause of immigrants.
  Adopting an international, intercultural, interconfessional and interdisciplinary approach, SIMI intends to promote: 1) Research and study of human mobility; 2) Educational opportunities towards professional expertise at the academic level through an appropriate curriculum of studies; and 3) Professional expertise at the practical level through refresher courses for qualification and specialization, and ongoing formation.
  SIMI offers both short-term professional courses for social, cultural, health and pastoral operators involved in the field of human mobility as well as an academic program within the faculties of Philosophy, Theology and Missiology of the Pontifical Urbaniana University:

1) A two-year curriculum for a License in “The Social Philosophy of Human Mobility,” for those who hold a degree of Baccalaureate in Philosophy or, subject to examination, have completed two years of philosophical studies in an Academic Institution;

2) A Doctorate curriculum in “The Social Philosophy of Human Mobility” for those with a license in Philosophy;

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- Center for Refugees and Forced Migration Studies (CRFMS): Established in 1998 at the University of St. Cyril and Methodius, CRFMS has resumed its activities after the Kosovo crisis with the support of UNHCR. Its immediate objective is to build up its Resource and Documentation Centre and welcomes complimentary publications. Contact: Zvonimir Jankuloski, Ph.D., Director, CFRMS, Blvd. Partizanski odredi bb, P.O. Box 435, 1000 Skopje, Macedonia. Tel: +389 91 377 709, 365 195, 373 688. fax: +389 91 377 709, 361 282; website: http://www.isippi.ukim.edu.mk/crfms

- Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies (IMES), University of Amsterdam: For a copy of IMES research program for the period 1999-2004, contact IMES, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Rokin 84, 1012 KV Amsterdam. Tel: +31(0) 20 525 3627; fax: +31 (0) 20 525 3628; e-mail: imes@pscw.uva.nl; website: http://www.pscw.uva.nl/imes

- The International Migration Program of the Social Science Research Council seeks to foster innovative research that will advance theoretical understandings of voluntary and forced international migration to the United States, the process of settlement and outcomes for immigrants, refugees and native-born Americans. If funding becomes available it expects to offer the following fellowships for the study of international migration to the United States:
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Further information will be available beginning no later than October 15, 2000, at our website (http://www.ssrc.org). The International Migration Program can also be contacted at: Social Science Research Council, 810 Seventh Avenue, New York, NY 10019, USA. Tel: 212-377-2700; fax: 212-377-2727; e-mail: migration@ssrc.org
• The GED (Groupe d’Etude des Discriminations) appointed in France by Martine Aubry, minister of social affairs, have explored since 1999 several topics relating to discrimination in France: Discrimination at work, discrimination with access to public employment, discrimination at school, discrimination facing with the law. Contact: GED, 8-10 rue du Général Renault. Tel: 0155283919; fax: 0155283050.

• Lectureship in Italian Migration Studies: Department of Anthropology and Department of History, University of Western Australia, Nedlands WA 6907, Australia. Applications are invited for a 12 month fixed-term appointment from December 1, 2000. The position is funded by the Fondazione Cassamarca Unione Latini Nel Mondo. Further employment for two years will be dependent on the success of the program and the Foundation providing additional funds beyond the initial 12 months. Contact: Professor David Trigger. E-mail: dtrigger@arts.uwa.edu.au; or Dr. Iain Brash, e-mail: jibra@arts.uwa.edu.au

• IUSSP Working Group on Urbanization. This Working Group, which comprises Tony Champion (University of Newcastle upon Tyne, England, Chair), Graeme Hugo (University of Adelaide, Australia) and Alfredo Lattes (CENEP, Buenos Aires), was set up by IUSSP Council in 1999 to explore the dynamics of urbanization, with particular reference to the demographic components of urban growth. Among the type of questions about migration and urban areas that the Working Group wishes to consider include the following: How is migration affecting the size and composition of urban populations? What is the relative importance of internal and international migration? What are the links with fertility and mortality in both short and long term?

The proposed activities of the Working Group include 1) A session on urbanization at the IUSSP – XXIVth General Population Conference, August 18-24, 2001 at Salvador, Brazil; 2) A seminar on urbanization based on papers focusing on conceptual and methodological aspects and dealing with More and Less Developed Countries in 2002. Contact: Professor Tony Champion (Chair), Department of Geography, University of Newcastle, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE1 7RU, UK. Tel: +44 191 222 6437.

PUBLICATIONS


Books Received


Berry, C., Southern Migrants, Northern Exiles. Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press. 2000. Pp. 236. $44.95(c), $21.95(p).

Books Received


Palumbo-Liu, D., Asian/American: Historical Crossings of a Racial Frontier. Stanford,


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