Abstract. “Race relations” are an ever-present topic of public discourse and state policy formation in New Zealand. The emphasis is generally upon the relationship between the indigenous Maori, on the one hand, and the state and the majority ethno-cultural population group, the European (especially British)-derived Pakeha, on the other. In particular, the past, present, and future of the nation’s foundational document, the Treaty of Waitangi, signed between the first nations and the British Crown in 1840, has dominated popular debate and official policy in recent decades. Other ethno-cultural and politico-constitutional relationships, including those between Maori and significant immigrant populations from countries within the Pacific region (Pasifika peoples), have received scant attention. This article examines Maori-Pasifika relations in the context of an emergent sociocultural and official biculturalism in New Zealand, investigating attempts to fit multicultural policies and practices within a broad bicultural framework.

Tangata Whenua, the indigenous Maori people of New Zealand (frequently called Aotearoa), and Tagata Pasifika, peoples from Oceania, together comprise more than a fifth of New Zealand’s population. There are synergies between these two broad groupings, and some tensions too, as is inevitable in the processes of social adjustment to and by immigrant groupings and their descendants. This article analyzes the relationship between Maori and immigrant Pasifika people principally in the context of the most overt and long-lived struggle against assimilation in New Zealand, that waged by the Tangata Whenua, or “people of the land.” The approach, then, is limited but useful in exploring both initial synergies in the Maori-Pasifika relationship and later complications in this nexus. The article finishes by canvassing some contemporary perspectives that find reason for optimism.

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for a harmonious future in this aspect of what is still generally called “race relations” in New Zealand.¹

Some scholars would no doubt demand deconstruction or replacement of the terms Tangata Whenua/Maori and Pasifika/Pacific Islander, especially given that Maori society remains at a fundamental level orientated toward tribal or subtribal identification and that the Pacific peoples in New Zealand came from various and varied nations (and often have weakening ties with their “home” islands over time). There are good academic arguments for doing so. But equally, terms such as Maori and Pacific Islander (or variations, such as “PI” or Islander) were used and seen as meaningful in the past by members of the various communities, and remain so, and to invalidate them implies denying agency to those who employ them. After colonization, sections of Maori had often sought unity among their own people, at least for certain purposes, both organizationally (as with the Maori King Movement) and conceptually. “Maoridom” and “Maoritanga” have been popular terms for encapsulating common beliefs, customs, and alignments among the Tangata Whenua, particularly vis-à-vis the British colonizers and their descendants. This was especially the case after Apirana Ngata had risen to dominate the Maori leadership’s relationship with the state throughout the first half of the twentieth century.² While Pasifika peoples later came from different areas in the regions commonly called Melanesia and Polynesia, moreover, Paul D’Arcy and others have noted that the cultural patterns of Oceania’s peoples might best be “understood as components of often overlapping regions of regular interaction.”³ In Epeli Hau'ofa’s words, Oceania was a “sea of islands” linked, not divided, by the Pacific.⁴ When Pacific Islanders arrived in New Zealand, cultural and other overlaps and commonalities continued and developed. Moreover, such continuity and enhancement took place interactively with the New Zealand Polynesians who had come from a place they generally called “Hawaiiki,” somewhere deep in Oceania, some hundreds of years before—the Maori.

While the relationship between Pasifika peoples resident in New Zealand and Maori might on the surface seem to constitute a standard set of “race”/ethnic interactions, it is a particularly complex one. Primarily, it reflects a number of political and social developments that have arisen from the 1960s, when people began migrating from Oceania to New Zealand in significant numbers. The most fundamental of these circumstances was the increasing strength of the Maori demand that the state (the Crown) respect their status as foundational parties to the “birth of the nation” in 1840. There were two significant concomitant developments: a growing commitment among the majority Pakeha population (generally interpreted as people of European (especially British) descent who primarily identify as
such) to respect Maori culture and empathize with Maori aspirations, and later (but relatedly) a developing preparedness on the part of the Crown to address Maori demands to honor the promises made to their chiefs in the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840.\(^5\)

Naturally enough, studies of ethnicity in New Zealand, whether contemporary or historical, tend to stress the relationship between Pakeha and Maori, the founding peoples of the colony whose leaders signed the treaty and who have always formed the two largest population groups. More particularly, most studies of racial/ethnic policy focus on the relationship between Maori and the Crown. These concerns reflect a dominating discourse in the nation since the early 1980s: the debate over ways of achieving both contemporary justice and historical reparations for Maori. This article, concerned with the relationship between Pasifika people in New Zealand and Maori, aims to contextualize the Maori response to migration from Oceania in terms of such national preoccupations.

One key theme emerging from modern scholarship on the Maori relationship with the Crown and, more broadly, with Pakeha in general, will be concentrated on. Recent scholarship has emphasized the ways in which, ever since the earliest days of colonization, the Tangata Whenua of New Zealand resisted intense Crown/Pakeha pressure to fully assimilate into “mainstream” society, culture, and politics. In rejecting the politico-cultural absorption sought by the state, and responding to the coercive and hegemonic mechanisms that underpinned its assimilation policies, Maori tribal and other collectivized entities used many and varied strategies. In recent years historians—especially those working within the Treaty of Waitangi claims settlement processes—have uncovered in great detail the ongoing Maori search for ways of enhancing their own culture and of organizing their lives according to their own priorities, while at the same time adjusting to Pakeha colonial and postcolonial dominance and to modernity.\(^6\)

The Maori quest for the treaty to be respected began to make considerable progress in the 1970s, when the Crown’s policy of full assimilation for minorities was finally abandoned under the influence of a number of factors. These included the changing international, intellectual, and ideological climate from the 1960s and greater social acceptance by Pakeha of Maori and other minorities through such developments as increasing intermarriage. But the key to understanding the overturning of assimilation as the major aim of “Maori policy” is the longevity of Maori resistance and its intensification following the advent of what is generally called the “Maori Renaissance” from the late 1960s.

In analyzing the Maori-Pasifika relationship, timing and demography
are both highly important. At the end of the Second World War, a mere two thousand or so Pasifika residents were recorded in New Zealand. While this figure had quadrupled ten years later, the Pasifika presence remained relatively low-profile, certainly vis-à-vis the rapidly urbanizing Maori. However, a big inflow of Pacific peoples began in the 1960s, and by the mid-1970s there were some sixty thousand Islander immigrants in the country. This heralded a remarkable upsurge (much more than a tripling of numbers) over the next two decades. In the 2006 census, Pasifika people constituted, at 265,974, 6.6 percent of the population, while Maori formed around 14 percent (although the percentage varies according to definitional circumstances).7

Maori had long been seeking acceptance and respect within a society that, as a result of state assimilation policies and a Eurocentric monoculturalism, was at best reticent to accept “difference” and at worst racist. Large-scale Pasifika migration to New Zealand, encouraged by the government as a means of acquiring unskilled and semiskilled labor for an industrializing New Zealand, coincided with the renewed assertion of indigeneity within Maoridom. In this renaissance, which built up momentum in the early 1970s, Maori demanded the right to retain and reclaim Maoriness: to accommodate to westernization and modernity in ways that preserved and enhanced their culture and sociopolitical organization, and to overturn the long-standing policy first expressed by the founding lieutenant governor, Captain William Hobson, at Waitangi in 1840, “We are all one people now.” The aim was, in essence, to replace this national slogan with a new one: “Two peoples in one country.” Their struggle, promoted disparately within Maoridom but with a general unity of desired outcome, reflected that of indigenous peoples in other former settler colonies and elsewhere. But in New Zealand it had a sharper focus because of the presence of the iconic and increasingly ubiquitous Treaty of Waitangi.8

Throughout colonial and postcolonial history the settlers, their governments, and their descendants had depicted the treaty as an enlightened document that established and symbolized New Zealand’s supposedly near-perfect race relations. Except for periods of warfare in the 1840s and the 1860s, New Zealand had been touted as possessing “the best race relations in the world.” Maori, however, stressed the Crown’s endemic breaching of the guarantees contained in the treaty’s second article. The Maori-language version of this article promised rangatiratanga (often translated into English as “chieftainship”), something many Maori had interpreted at the time and subsequently as embodying a significant degree of indigenous autonomy—the right to control, according to their own customs and methods, those matters relevant to them.
The history of Crown-Maori relations is essentially that of the state’s stripping of resources from Maori and its attempts to impose assimilation upon them, and of Maori resistance to their disappearance as a separate people with their own organizational modes and worldview. Both resistance and adaptation (voluntary and forced) to “Western” domination of official policies (and the two were not necessarily incompatible), guided by tribal and other leaderships in numerous and complex ways, had occurred from the earliest years of the colony. Means of doing so involved a continuum of resistant or accommodative methods, from pan-tribal alliances at the regional and national levels through to the everyday resistances and adjustments within the *whanau* (extended family) or individually.

After the Second World War, both push and pull factors into the cities and large towns turned Maori into an urban people in a few decades, “arguably the most accelerated shift for a national population anywhere” (in the words of a demographer examining the postwar decades). There was a common belief at the time (among some Maori as well as many Pakeha, including academics and policy makers) that detribalization would inevitably accompany such a fundamental phenomenon. Thus, urbanization would supposedly be followed by integration of Maori into Pakeha society—a milder form of assimilation that would allow some cultural continuity, though only a relatively small amount. Some continuance of Maori culture (itself expected to eventually fade) was seen as a small price to pay for the socioeconomic “uplift” of all New Zealanders that would flow from westernization of Maori and their provision of a cheap workforce in an industrializing country. The report of an official inquiry by J. K. Hunn in 1960 embodied the policy of accelerated integration for Tangata Whenua. The Hunn Report was generally initially welcomed by Maori (as well as by liberal Pakeha) for declaring the need for proactive special measures to help Tangata Whenua adjust to modernity and to close the socioeconomic gaps between Maori and Pakeha. But when the government accepted the report and set about implementing it, Maori quickly came to view integration as essentially no different from the old policy of assimilation and resisted it accordingly.

Urbanization had not, then, caused Maoridom to abandon its struggle for *rangatiratanga*. The challenge to “the Maori way of life” under the twin blows of urbanization and modernity had been met by both “traditional” community activities centered on *marae* (tribal meeting places) and reorganizing the struggle for *rangatiratanga*—utilizing, for example, official and quasi-official committees established at the end of the Second World War. Additionally, a nontraditional leadership had emerged in the big towns, cities, and suburbs, heading new pan- or nontribal groupings and organizations of various types. The need to struggle against accelerated assimila-
tion pressures after the Hunn Report, together with the radicalization of a number of young city-educated Maori, further nourished the reassertion of indigeneity in New Zealand. By the 1970s, especially during a reforming Labour government (1972–75), the Crown was obliged to address the Maori Renaissance and related national, as well as international, developments. When it quickly dropped assimilationist policies, at least overtly, it replaced them with what were generally called multicultural perspectives with regard to minorities.\textsuperscript{11}

Significant immigration by Pasifika people, followed by their own quest for economic progress and social inclusion, had begun at the very peak of urban Maori migration. This was a time of Maori rethinking of ways to effect \textit{rangatiratanga} in response to official implementation of the assimilationist thrust of the Hunn Report. Maori leaders were seeking more than greater or total inclusion; rather, they aspired in effect to a bicultural\textsuperscript{12} society and policy that would enable them not just to retain their culture and have it recognized as familiar and legitimate but also to entrench it as foundational and of equal value to that of Pakeha culture and polity.\textsuperscript{13} The values of both Maori and Pakeha cultures would be seen as overlapping and mutually enriching: in a bicultural society, it was argued, each ethnicity utilized aspects of the other’s culture, while respecting “an over-capping set of values, common to both groups.”\textsuperscript{14} While national unity should be paramount, and the contribution to social harmony of groups besides Maori and Pakeha would be recognized and multiculturalist diversity valued, in their status as original inhabitants of Aotearoa the Maori people required implementation of the autonomist guarantees that the Crown was seen to have promised in the treaty. When multiculturalism was discussed in Maori circles, then, it generally incorporated the demand for primacy of status and attention for the Tangata Whenua of Aotearoa.\textsuperscript{15}

In such complex circumstances the quest of Pasifika peoples for inclusion was not necessarily straightforward or guaranteed. A considerable degree of tension between Maori and “newcomer” migrants who had not shared the long Maori struggle for \textit{rangatiratanga}, and who competed in the workforce with them when the economy faltered, was to be expected. There were, however, relatively few difficulties reported between Maori and Pacific Islanders in the early years of Pasifika migration. One reason for this was the emergence of a de facto alliance—a joint protest by Maori and Pasifika peoples against their shared socioeconomic marginalization (all statistical indicators confirming that their communities were relatively worse off than those of the predominant ethnicity). Relatedly, the two broad groupings shared aspirations and activities for the preservation and enhancement of those politico-cultural matters of significance to each of them, especially
those that reflected commonalities of perspective and approach. This led to a certain solidarity of belief and action, albeit often inchoately, during their uphill struggles for both socioeconomic betterment and the carving out of spaces of autonomy (although Pasifika people wanted these latter mostly in cultural terms, rather than, as with Maori, constitutionally as well as culturally). Generally, the various Pasifika peoples and Maori lived alongside and interacted peacefully and cooperatively with each other.

Maori-Pasifika affinities were strengthened by ancestral ties between Maori, a Polynesian people who had arrived on waka (canoes), and Polynesians arriving from the Pacific by more modern means. As Terei Eaiwa and Sean Mallon note, such kinship relationships are ambivalent for many reasons relating to “precedence, rights, and equality”—but they are kinship relationships nonetheless. Pasifika political rights activist Will ‘Ilolahia once declared, in a line that became much used, that “the only difference between you Maori and the rest of us Pacific Islanders [is] that you came on a waka and we came on a jet.” Comradeship and cooperation between Maori and Pasifika was strengthened by shared attitudes and values on fundamental issues such as the relationship between indigeneity and the land, for example, or on the significance of spiritual dimensions to life.

Maori-Pasifika solidarity in New Zealand was further developed by shared living and working experiences in cities and suburbs, the spaces in which most new immigrants lived. The “special relationship” that developed, particularly within what was conceived as a broad “Polynesian community,” was nourished especially in the close spatial proximities of the poorer suburbs, primarily in Auckland, where two-thirds of Pasifika people in New Zealand lived. There was an increasing “ambiguity of ethnic boundaries,” in particular among young urban Maori and New Zealand–born Pasifika people who “learned together, played sports together, laughed together, and fiercely supported each other’s political agendas.” Both urban Maori and Pasifika people frequently voiced support for the importance of solidarity among working-class people, including Pakeha, and such currents fed into the overt class terminology used within radical circles. The “Maori liberation” newsletter Te Hokioi took account of the interests of “Pakeha class brothers,” while Pasifika activists in the leading non-Maori Polynesian pressure group, the Polynesian Panthers, took similarly broad solidaristic perspectives in the 1970s. The influential direct-actionist Waitangi Action Committee of the early 1980s continued a tradition of class-based rhetoric, arguing that indigenous peoples needed to join together in the “struggle against imperialism [and the] Capitalist State.”

Early affinities between Maori and Pacific Islanders might be seen, then, to be both ethnicity- and class-based. This was emphasized most explicitly
by young radicals from both sets of communities. Maori who had grown up in the cities, in particular, had by the late 1960s begun to organize in ways that challenged the methods of their elders. They sought faster, more fundamental results than those who were considered traditional Maori (let alone mainstream Pakeha and state authorities) tended to feel comfortable with. Pacific Island elders and householders were often just trying to get by in a country that offered economic opportunities, even if that meant starting on the bottom rung of the economic ladder. A number of young Pasifika activists, however, rejected such caution, and those in political vanguardist movements began to work with radical Maori, form their own action groups, and/or collaborate with socialist and other Pakeha groups.

Both Maori and Pasifika (especially Polynesian) radical youth groups sought rapid and sweeping change for their people. Many were influenced by overseas movements, especially those that were class- or ethnicity-based. Imbued with international comparative perspectives, Pacific Islander and Maori “militant activists” tended to see the struggle to preserve and enhance their culture, and to find “alternative” modes of political and social organization, as part of a broad assault upon “western imperialism.” The “colonisers” stood indicted for their past voraciousness in alienating indigenous resources and their present desire to “disappear” indigenous culture. The Polynesian Panther movement saw itself as part of a “Movement of the World” and supported “the struggle of other oppressed people because the local struggle is only part of a larger world struggle against racism, exploitation, injustice and oppression.”

While articulating their views less explicitly, Maori within both the so-called traditional milieus and new urban communities also generally saw Pasifika people as sharing their class- and ethnic-based struggles and aspirations. This did not necessarily conflict with their increasing focus on the iconic Treaty of Waitangi, the main symbolic weapon in their own struggles. While they stressed that Article Two endorsed their unique status as Tangata Whenua vis-à-vis the Crown, many also invoked Article Three, widely seen as guaranteeing equality of treatment to all citizens to organize and act as they wished (within the law). So long as the rangatiratanga promised in the second article was acknowledged, then, Article Three was seen as a kind of quasi-constitutional commitment by the Crown to allow people to organize collectively and live lifestyles in accord with their own cultures.

Equality of treatment was the state’s policy, too, although Crown pronouncements would stress a crucial caveat—that Article One’s governance and order requirements took precedence in the event of any clash. They would also imply that any sociocultural rights that minorities might possess necessarily fell within the parameters of a Eurocentric political
economy and its cultural norms. But the fact remained that Maori, Pakeha empathetic with their cause, and the Crown (for different reasons) all saw Maori aspirations as consonant with addressing equality-based multiculturalist goals.\textsuperscript{25} The discourse of equality particularly suited the aims of both Maori and Pasifika people precisely because it was difficult for the state or Pakeha to oppose a multiculturalism that was “grounded in a concept of equal citizenship.”\textsuperscript{26} Both groupings, moreover, gained valuable allies from such discourse, including liberal Pakeha once inclined to focus only on assimilationist “social and economic uplift.” For some time, then, Maori were generally comfortable with the concept and terminology of multiculturalism (or variations, such as multiracialism). At the height of post–Hunn Report assimilation policies, the government, influenced by the liberal Pakeha thinking that pervaded the affirmative action aspects of the Hunn Report, declared (in a booklet cowritten by Hunn himself, who had been appointed secretary for Maori affairs) that all citizens must be alert to “earn their reputation” as one of “the nations in the vanguard of those that are building multi-racial societies.”\textsuperscript{27}

However, the emergence of meaningfully multicultural Crown policies had been tardy; mainstream society had been wedded to assimilation for too long to move away from it so quickly, and in turn the Crown would never proceed too far in advance of public opinion. In the early to mid-1970s, Maori activists were still feeling the need to insist that protest needed to focus on combating white racism and overturning the monocultural imperatives that dominated society and policy in New Zealand.\textsuperscript{28} In 1976 anthropologist Joan Metge noted that while “advocates of multiculturalism champion the right of Maoris and other minority groups to be actively assisted to maintain their cultural identity,” opposition to this remained strong among the many who clung to the old “one people—one culture” model.\textsuperscript{29}

Nevertheless, the Race Relations Act of 1971 had indicated some progress on public and governmental developments within the “equality” paradigm. The legislation was deemed to be the “first general expression of the policy of full equality between the various racial and national groups that make up our multicultural society.”\textsuperscript{30} The Race Relations Conciliator’s official report for 1975 declared New Zealand to be a “multiracial and multicultural country” that included “various ethnic minority groups.”\textsuperscript{31} Such developments in the equality discourse had been assisted by the reshaping of assimilationist policies into the concept of integration in the years after the Second World War. Integration’s toleration of a degree of non-European culture allowed those arguing for leeway for all cultural minorities wishing to retain a degree of separateness to do so in the name of official policy. Even
radical Maori groups couched their demands in integrationist terms, asserting, for example, that “Maoritanga [should] be integrated more meaningfully into the national identity” or that the government “must live up to its so-called policy of integration.”

In tandem with the battles being waged to “educate” the Pakeha population in acceptance of cultural diversity, Maori, Pasifika, and Pakeha activists continued to form alliances to seek policy change. In 1974, for example, the Maori radical group Nga Tamatoa (Young Warriors) and the mixed-membership Citizens’ Association for Racial Equality (CARE) held a conference aiming to “bring together Maori, Pacific Island people and interested Pakehas to discuss the educational needs of a multicultural society.” Among other things, this resolved that “the introduction of Maori language into schools [was] a test of Departmental sincerity in producing a multicultural educational system.” In the previous year the radical public intellectual Ranginui Walker called for the adaptation of “the democratic system of majority rule to the needs of a bicultural and plural society.” He argued that there was need for widespread consultation with, among others, the “traditional base of Maoridom” so that “planning for the future of a multicultural society” could proceed. There continued to be no great distinction between multiculturalism and biculturalism in the works and speeches of Maori activists and academics (some of whom, such as Pat Hohepa, fitted both camps) throughout the 1970s. The most radical of activists often appealed to the commonalities of indigeneity, to the advantages and positiveness of “being black.” Non-Maori Polynesian activists would call for “Black unity before . . . White-Black Unity,” while Maori activists would talk of protecting “those needs essential to Maori/Polynesian existence in this Pakeha dominated society”—given that indigenous communities “think similarly.”

After race relations policy gains were made under the Labour government between 1972 and 1975, a conservative National government under Robert Muldoon took office. There was widespread fear in progressive quarters that the government and/or Pakeha society would begin to revert to the monoculturalist and assimilationist policies of the recent past. While this did not in fact eventuate to any great extent, there was a definite slowdown in addressing indigenous aspirations. There were some alarming developments as well, such as punitive actions (including dawn raids) in 1976–77 against Pacific Islanders who had overstayed their work permits, and increasing manifestations of racism toward Pasifika people. The Planning Council’s booklet Issues in Equity in 1983 lamented the slowness of progress toward multiculturalism.

Despite this turn of events, a great deal of material had been and con-
tinued to be produced to guide Crown and Pakeha on multicultural policies and practices. Indeed, the concept of multiculturalism had gained increasing currency in official as well as social circles from the 1970s, despite the tough line on alleged overstayers. In 1976 Metge noted that, despite considerable discussion among interested parties about its meaning, the term *biculturalism* had not passed into general currency. The concept, she concluded, “has proved unnecessarily restrictive because of its stress on two main groups. Over the last few years, the word that has gained most ground in popular usage in New Zealand is ‘multi-cultural.’”

By the late 1970s the major political parties were firming up a commitment to multiculturalism. The Labour Party leader spoke in 1979 of meshing “our people into a genuine multi-cultural society; a society in which values, traditions, and aspirations that have guided our Maori and Polynesian people for generation after generation, are essential and integral.” By 1981 even the governing National Party, despite its refusal to heed the huge protest movement against a national tour by apartheid South Africa’s Springbok rugby team, was endorsing cultural diversity. Bureaucrats were developing policies and practices accordingly. The Race Relations Conciliator’s publication *Race against Time*, in 1982, stressed the urgency of bringing to fruition the ideal of multiculturalism and the perception that all cultures had equal value.

By the early 1980s, then, progressive views and policies within society and state had come to support not just material betterment but also cultural survival and enhancement for all peoples within New Zealand who sought it. In the process, special treaty rights for the Tangata Whenua, though always part of the equation, had become downplayed within Crown policy. In turn, Maori increasingly felt that the government had seized upon the label of multiculturalism to avoid honoring some or all of its obligations to respect *rangatiratanga* under the Treaty of Waitangi. Even the most radical of Maori groups, which had initially declared that “the Treaty is a Fraud,” had come to see the value of promoting “Honour the Treaty” as their main organizational slogan—the way that the Tangata Whenua could, drawing upon the nation’s iconography and mythology, best further the struggles shared with first nations around the world. In common with indigenes in Canada and elsewhere, Maori were beginning to question the value to their own cause of officially endorsed multiculturalist strategies and policies.

There were many reasons for this development in New Zealand, in addition to Maori perceptions of state deflection of their treaty rights. As a critical mass of migrants from each island-nation came into being, for example, some groupings preferred to develop their cultural and political struggles within their own communities—especially those less close than others to Maori on *whakapapa* (genealogy) and worldview grounds. There
was also an economic dimension. When recession set in toward the mid-1970s, migrant groupings that had been encouraged into New Zealand to do unskilled or semiskilled work were seen in some quarters (both Maori and Pakeha) as a threat to their livelihoods. This perception was heightened by media handling of the issue and by the Muldoon government’s tough line on immigrants from the Pacific. Although they formed only a minority of alleged illegal overstayers, as readily identifiable targets Pasifika people came to be demonized in sectors of the state and society. While the National government responded to Maori pressures for better opportunities and set in place a *Tu Tangata* (Stand Tall) program within the Department of Maori Affairs that aimed at community empowerment, some Maori saw it as a marginal or even meaningless concession in socioeconomic uplift as well as rangatiratanga terms. For them and others, the government was sidestepping Maori requirements under the rubric of multiculturalism, and Pasifika people were the most readily identifiable “competitors.”

The equality discourse, then, was often seen by both Pasifika and Maori to be at odds with the realities of their lives and aspirations. Those realities led to perceptions of competition between minorities for resources and respect from both the Crown and mainstream society. With disillusionment over the government’s aims and intentions, a harder-line nationalist stance emerged in many Maori quarters. By the early 1980s, many Maori were declaring overtly that official policies in support of multiculturalism, focusing as they increasingly did on relatively recent arrivals in their country, provided a smokescreen for government (and Pakeha) retention of dominance over Maori in the guise of enlightened policies. Not only did multiculturalist policies ignore or downplay the special status of Maori under the treaty, they argued, but in both theory and practice such policies also neglected the cultural reality of New Zealand being *primarily* a nation of two peoples rather than of many. Pasifika peoples, for example, were concentrated in a limited number of urban areas, and many New Zealanders had little contact with them.

Many Maori argued, increasingly vociferously, that both Pakeha and the government needed to respect Maori as the Tangata Whenua before migrant nations should have their own autonomist and socioeconomic needs and desires attended to in any fundamental way. Major policy application to non-Pakeha needed to be sequential rather than simultaneous. Only when efforts were being made to address Maori socioeconomic and rangatiratanga demands should significant assistance and concessions be provided to people of recent migrant groups. A number of Maori activists and publicists for various Maori causes had in fact begun dropping their use of the term *multiculturalism* from the late 1970s, pointedly using
At the same time, themes of class struggle in non-white activism were also gradually becoming subordinated to those aimed at the metaphorical reintroduction of Aotearoa into “New Zealand.” Issue-based alliances between Pakeha, Maori, and Pasifika radical, antiracist, and class-focused movements continued (such as the 1981 protests against the “Springbok Tour”), but joint activity on fundamental goals declined.

Maori were increasingly pointing to those aspects of the treaty which gave them a specific relationship with the Crown—in effect, the tempering not just of Article One’s “Governance” but also of Article Three’s “Equality” by Article Two’s promises to respect and accord rangatiratanga. In 1981 Ranginui Walker, whose writings often reflected powerful strands of vanguard thought within Maoridom, argued that generally in New Zealand society “reality” remained “seen only through the Pakeha cultural frame of reference. Thus [New Zealanders] pay homage to the in-word multiculturalism, without even understanding the first step towards biculturalism.”

Race against Time picked up on Maori concerns the following year, balancing its promotion of multiculturalism with a call for special rights for the Tangata Whenua. It spoke in favor of prioritizing affirmative action policies, of proactive endorsement first of “a bi-cultural then a multi-cultural society.”

Maori did generally continue to support the struggles of Pasifika people, but saw this as contingent upon their own success to gain both socioeconomic progress and (especially) rangatiratanga. In hui (meeting) after hui, Maori spoke of a “bicultural imperative” that was necessary both per se and as a prerequisite for other non-Europeans to have their own sociocultural positions secured: “If biculturalism could not be achieved, then what is the call for multiculturalism?” While some Maori leaders continued to see their people’s future as part of a multiculturalist upsurge, Maori in general increasingly took the perspectives of the more radical commentators: Hirini Mead declaring multiculturalism to be a technique for Pakeha to hold on to wealth and power, or Tipene O’Regan seeing it as a way of avoiding the key problems of Pakeha-Maori relations. “By diversifying the question,” O’Regan declared, “you avoid the central issue.” Many Maori noted that migrants could always “return home”—that recent migration was never absolute. Even for urbanized Maori, actual or conceptual living in two (or more) places still meant New Zealand locations, while for Pasifika people it involved countries far away. Maori had nowhere else to go, even had they wanted to.

Enormous pressure was put on the government by Maori groupings and communities, supported by increasing numbers of Pakeha, to develop a bicultural policy under the treaty within or in place of multiculturalism. Many Maori leaders saw this as best achieved organizationally by the Crown
forging relationships with what were widely seen to be the primary units of internal Maori governance, those of the tribe (iwi). Maori hopes increased enormously in 1984 with the election of a Labour government that was pledged to seriously address Maori issues. Tangata Whenua demands on the state increased even further when the government showed itself willing to take action on a number of Maori demands: by promoting legislation to allow the Waitangi Tribunal (a standing commission of enquiry established by the previous Labour ministry) to hear historical grievances going back to 1840, for example, followed later by exploratory discussions on reparations. Any chances that progress on Maori issues would be developed within the multiculturalist conceptual framework faded amid broad agreement among Maori, their Pakeha allies, and “official New Zealand” on a bicultural road forward. The Bicultural Commission of the Anglican Church in New Zealand, for example, declared in 1986 that talk of a multicultural society “can be used to mask the primary reality expressed in the Treaty of Waitangi, and the obligation to live by its principles.”

The chances of primacy for a multiculturalist policy framework further disintegrated when opponents of Maori self-determination began taking up multicultural slogans to assist their own causes. In his influential “Korero” column in the Listener, in 1987 Ranginui Walker argued that “reactionary Pakeha” (like the editor of a conservative Catholic newspaper, the Tablet), in “expressing opposition to biculturalism in favour of multiculturalism,” were doing so to “mask . . . Pakeha hegemony and to maintain the monocultural dominance in New Zealand.” Increasingly, Maori and Pakeha commentators and leaders argued that bicultural policies were necessary to prevent the Crown from reverting to the “divide and rule” strategies that had been developed through the centuries. Sociologist David Pearson noted in 1990, when explaining how the Maori dream remained a deferred dream, that multiculturalism signaled danger to marginalized communities: “Dominant groups will use cultural diversity as an empty gesture to disguise the true nature of social rankings. . . . By setting one minority against another, majority rule is preserved.”

By 1985 it had become clear that there was a definitive official movement, in response to many pressures, away from multiculturalism in the pursuit of biculturalism (although that did not necessarily mean a resiling from a commitment to multiculturalism as well). The growing emphasis on Maori as tangata (people) with a special connection to the whenua (land) of Aotearoa gelled with an increasing acceptance that the tribes had signed up to “a partnership” with the Crown in the Treaty of Waitangi. In turn, Maori argued, they were entitled (at very least) to compensation for their subsequent dispossession and marginalization by the dominant partner in
the relationship. Such arguments reflected those of historical justice movements elsewhere in the world, and this international context assisted official circles to eventually concede that Maori were owed substantial reparations for past losses. Meanwhile, in rapidly coming to terms with the treaty implications of the “special relationship,” the Crown had become inclined to address both Article Two and Article Three pressures by devolving significant resources and governance responsibilities to Maori authorities, especially those based upon *iwi*. The development of such a policy was assisted by a governmental swing to the far right in socioeconomic policy (“Roger-nomics”): the Labour government, while ostensibly social democratic, aimed to minimize the state’s responsibilities for its citizens, including by devolving welfare and other social service delivery along with some degree of power and resources.

That same package of right-wing policies threw large numbers of working-class people out of employment, with Maori and Pasifika people suffering disproportionately, something widely perceived to be a recanting of the Crown’s “equality” obligations under the treaty’s Article Three. The impact of this calamity, visited upon an already poor Maoridom, nourished a perspective (though it was seldom couched so directly) that the demand for a special Maori partnership with the Crown also implied primacy in socioeconomic assistance. Since Maori had seen their resources and independence taken by the Crown or under its auspices ever since 1840, they should as of right be at the head of any queue for state attention. Only when *all* the needs and aspirations of Maoridom were attended to should recent migrants get full Tangata Whenua support and assistance for their own aspirations for adjustment assistance and respect from the Crown.

To recap, so long as there had been hope of significant government action across the board for all of the marginalized people and peoples of New Zealand, and provided that Article Two’s special relationship between the Crown and the first people on Aotearoa’s soil was respected, tensions between the old and new migrants from the Pacific had been minimized. Indeed, there had often been the perception of a common struggle. By the mid- to late 1980s, however, Maori tended to believe that politicians and officials were using multiculturalism as a cloak to ignore their responsibilities under Article Two and Article Three of the Treaty of Waitangi. In turn, the Tangata Whenua increasingly asserted themselves as the Crown’s partners under the treaty.

Those who still preached unity of all the oppressed now saw “divide and rule” official strategies at play in the Crown’s elevation of bicultural policy to primacy in race relations. This was partly because many Pasifika (and other immigrant) leaders accepted the logic of Tangata Whenua demands.
that bicultural policies be put in place before the needs and wants of other elements of society were addressed, at least in structural ways. They gave tacit (or greater) support to the Maori struggle for *rangatiratanga* and then to the reparations processes to redress historical injustice, which were systematized from 1989 onward. They had quietly gotten on with their own lives and causes, focusing on the micro level of daily interaction with the state and civil society. While the macro level relationships with Pakeha, Maori, and the Crown were not, of course, neglected, they were developed within bicultural discourses, and Pasifika leaders could take heart from the “equality” aspect of Treaty of Waitangi paradigms and policies.

Pasifika people had, then, gone along with an implicit Maori-Crown agreement that the quest for a genuinely multiculturalist policy for New Zealand, despite the increasing reality of a multicultural society, would be put on hold pending significant progress in Crown-Maori relations. This did not necessarily imply a long delay. A number of Maori aspirations were seemingly moving closer to fruition by the early 1990s, with such developments as the emergence of “treaty jurisprudence” and treaty-based reparative negotiations. These seemed to hold out prospects that the Crown would fully develop its treaty partnership with Maori, following which a serious dialogue with other ethnicities over their role in state and society could occur. A full revision of the New Zealand social contract, delayed until the leaderships of the two major cultures reached agreement on the way forward, might soon be able to progress in a way that provided inclusion for Pasifika peoples.56

Moreover, things did seem positive in treaty relationships by the time of the 1990 commemoration of 150 years of the country’s existence as New Zealand. The Crown had accepted that the treaty involved “two peoples in one nation.” In developing a partnership with “traditional” Maori tribal structures (although this was at most a half-hearted policy after the National Party returned to office in late 1990), and in soon making good progress in negotiating historical reparations agreements, the Crown seemed to be significantly advancing its bicultural policy. The major difficulty was that successive governments refused to discuss constitutional or other arrangements that might have implied overturning the long-standing doctrine of “Crown indivisibility,” and this came to dominate the Maori struggle for *rangatiratanga*. But in late 2008 when the Maori Party’s agreement to support a new National government placed such discussions firmly on the political agenda, this reflected some decades of broad advances (as well as some severe setbacks) for the Maori quest for partnership with the Crown under the Treaty of Waitangi. Such progress is perceived by many Maori leaders to be both too little and too late, but few of them have discounted its importance in
their long-standing pursuit of state recognition of rangatiratanga; and most acknowledge that bicultural policy has retained a certain primacy.\textsuperscript{57}

Much debate remains about the next stage of the journey toward appropriately fitting indigeneity into New Zealand culture, politics, and society. Increasing numbers are arguing that both Crown and Maori parties need to begin seriously examining how best to fit multiculturalism into the biculturally orientated policy mix—complementing what is already happening in everyday society. There has been growing interethnic discussion along these lines over recent years, building on past multicultural discourses that persisted even during the strongest days of the bicultural nexus from the later 1980s. Attempts to reconcile biculturalism and multiculturalism in ways that preserved Maori treaty rights had been renewed with particular vigor as treaty-based negotiations and settlements developed apace in the 1990s. A Conference of Churches statement in 1990 that the treaty implied the need to negotiate relationships between each cultural grouping and Maoridom set the scene for some of the discourse.\textsuperscript{58} While some of the debaters have lacked a sense of the historical trajectory of Pasifika-Maori relations, by the mid-1990s a number of them were explicitly looking back to ideas prevalent in the 1970s. Many of them expressed optimism that, while New Zealand still needed to be viewed as a bicultural nation, ways of accommodating multiculturalism could be worked out through discussion, negotiation, and goodwill.\textsuperscript{59} In the new millennium such voices have become louder; the pioneering scholar of Maori history, Michael King, was working with Tony Haas (a promoter of “celebrating diversity” policies) and others on such matters up to his death in 2004. Many commentators have taken up the call in the years since.\textsuperscript{60}

There is increasing acceptance that discourses of past decades can assist in finding an appropriate balance between biculturalism and multiculturalism—or the most fitting role for multiculturalism within biculturalism. Both the ready acceptance of the Pacific Islanders into the early Maori Renaissance and Maori support for Pasifika struggles at that time are remembered keenly. Some Pacific Island advocates are stressing the need to re-create the synergies of previous working alliances between Pasifika and Maori activists. After the Polynesian Panthers were established in 1971, they set about establishing a “loose Polynesian front” with Maori groups such as Nga Tamatoa and Tihei Mauriora, together with alienated Maori who operated in gangs.\textsuperscript{61} This and later such alliances, some observers have noted, went beyond solidarity of theory and action based exclusively on Polynesian whakapapa links or even on ethnicity in general. Discussions of class struggle in tandem or in association with the white working class, for example, in the hope that lessons of action and education would enable
Pakeha workers to discard racism or ethnocentrism imbued from the hegemonic influences at work ever since 1840 (and before), have remained on some agendas and have returned to others. More broadly, the publicity and philosophy of the Polynesian Panthers (from late 1972, the Polynesian Panther Party, or PPP) envisaged solidarity and cooperation with workers of all hues around the world in the international struggle against oppression, and such rhetoric is being revived in some circles. Moreover, it is being noted that, as well as stressing ethnic and working-class solidarity, the PPP and likeminded groups from within marginalized peoples in New Zealand found no problem working with white middle-class people, such as the Pakeha activists in CARE and the Auckland Committee on Racism and Discrimination (ACORD).

The international struggles to which the PPP and other Pasifika and Maori radical movements looked for information and inspiration often explicitly recognized that the first nations of former settler colonies had special status by dint of the very fact of indigeneity. In the 1970s, the natural propensity of organizations like the PPP to prioritize the aspirations of Polynesians migrating from Oceania could fit comfortably with Maori struggles for their rights as Tangata Whenua; all such struggles were seen as “indigenous.” Ranginui Walker, one of the major publicists for Maori causes over several decades, would speak of there being “basically only two cultures in the world,” Western and indigenous—of the need for a broad alliance of indigenous interests to overturn “the excesses of capitalism” and cast aside all modes of exploitation. He and others would sometimes extend the argument to the need for a bicultural strategy that would cause Pakeha “to realise that their human interests coincide with those of the Tangata Whenua”—an elaboration of the treaty partnership between Crown and Maori said to have been forged in 1840, but one which in its solidarization of “humanity” also encompassed the peoples of the Pacific.

In looking to learn lessons from the past, some Pasifika leaders are consciously reverting to the perspective that (as one educational writer argued in 1977) the key imperative was to “achieve bi-culturalism first, [with] the indigenous culture, the Maori culture, be[ing] given equal status with the majority culture”; and that, after this “deliberate development of a bi-cultural New Zealand,” the Maori-Pakeha relationship would provide (in the sentiments of Race against Time) “the foundation of a multi-cultural New Zealand” in which all other cultural minorities would benefit. A refocus on the latter had in fact begun to return once progress made on treaty settlements in the mid- to late 1990s held out hopes that broader Maori aspirations for rangatiratanga might be met. Toward the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, with an end possibly in sight for
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the reparations processes, there was increasing hope that the previous soli-
darity between Maori and Pasifika people could be re-created. One of the
most influential Maori leaders of the last three decades, Justice Edward
Durie, formerly chair of the Waitangi Tribunal, said in 2005 that he did
not regard “policies for bicultural or multicultural development as mutu-
ally exclusive [for] they address different things. Biculturalism is about the
relationship between the state’s founding cultures. . . . Multiculturalism is
about the acceptance of cultural difference generally.”

One thing that has become very clear among all interested parties since
the Maori Renaissance is that the treaty has become “a living document”
which changes through time in accord with many factors—social atti-
tudes, political ideals (and expediencies), judicial and Waitangi Tribunal
pronouncements, and so forth. Few who have operated under its rubric or
studied it would dispute that its ongoing relational development should be
frozen at any given point. There seems to be little impediment to the treaty
accommodating, and indeed assisting, social and political developments
that simultaneously “celebrate diversity,” provide an appropriate constitu-
tional or equivalent arrangement for the Tangata Whenua partners to the
treaty, and produce other institutional and societal spaces and policies that
respect the cultures and aspirations of Pakeha and other non-Maori groups.
The treaty’s Third Article, for example, while generally neglected in the
rangatiratanga-based discourses that dominate public debate on the treaty,
can nevertheless be seen as allowing special measures for any groups of
citizens who have not attained “equality.”

The policy statement titled *Principles for Crown Action on the Treaty
of Waitangi*, issued in 1989 by the Labour government at the height of offi-
cial bicultural policymaking, noted that the Third Article “has an impor-
tant social significance in the implicit assurance that social rights would be
enjoyed equally by Maori with all New Zealand citizens of whatever ori-
gin.” It talked of going beyond legal equality to allow “special measures” to
attain “equal enjoyment of social benefits.” While equal enjoyment is highly
problematic in a capitalist economy, in the New Zealand past the term has
generally implied equality of opportunity and (more recently) removal of
large socioeconomic gaps between ethnicities and classes. The *Principles
for Crown Action* document, which has been re-endorsed by Te Puni Kokiri
(the Ministry of Maori Development) this century, is still often cited by
governments and policymakers, and has been accepted by educational and
other institutions, as a set of guidelines.

Te Puni Kokiri has argued that one of the most effective measures
to ensure Maori have “a fair position in relation to the wealth of society
and the benefits of government” is to place them “in charge as much as
possible of decision-making which affects them, because Maori needs are best understood by Maori.”68 One can easily, in terms of Article Three, substitute “Pasifika peoples” or “Chinese” or “Indo-Fijian” for “Maori” in such as formulation, although this would need to take into account the Crown’s Maori partners as well as the Crown per se. There is a strong belief in a number of quarters that Article Three developments could be of considerable benefit to non-Maori minority groupings, who could learn from decades of Maori experience of operating biculturally within the dominant culture. There might also be lessons to learn from the long Maori struggle for autonomy, a goal sought by some Pasifika groupings in the sense of “the power to control their own destiny,” including their own “wealth, labour and business”—in short, the attainment of a form of self-determination.69

All interested parties appreciate that Pasifika forms of self-determination will be different from those forged between the Crown and the Maori.70 When, by the 1970s, it was clear that Maori were not going to disappear beneath officially promoted assimilative monoculturalism and the Crown set off on an (as yet uncompleted) journey in search of workable relational arrangements, Maori looked to Article Two of the treaty to find one of their most powerful and multifaceted tools of struggle. Clearly, this precise tool is not available to other minorities in New Zealand. But despite the bitterness and frustrations of their struggles with the state over some seventeen decades, Maori have shown themselves to be generous and adaptive in their capacity to share experiences and resources and to respect the perspectives of others—the more so, obviously, when the respect is reciprocal. For example, there has been strong Maori support for the Auckland Regional Migrant Services Charitable Trust, to name just one such organization that has appreciated Maori perspectives.71

Maori, wrote Canadian anthropologist Augie Fleras in 1984 on the basis of “participant observation,” are “not intrinsically resentful of immigrants such as the Polynesians per se.” Their stance was, rather, that the rights of immigrant non-Maori (“guests” in the country, or manuhiri, including the Pakeha) should “not interfere with the fundamental and irrevocable rights of the hosts (’Tangata Whenua”).”72 Maori leaders have at various times expressed approval that Pasifika and other immigrant groupings were not claiming any equivalence to the “fundamental institutional and symbolic changes embraced by the debate over Maori rights.”73 Such considerations made it easier for the Tangata Whenua to be generally supportive of the aspirations of other minorities in New Zealand society, especially those also marginalized and exploited. The Maori quest for rangatiratanga, generally for autonomy within the parameters of the existing nation-state, had taken issue with multiculturalism essentially over the ways in which the govern-
The inclusion of non-Maori minority interests under the rubric of the Treaty of Waitangi, including in formalized arrangements once the basic rights of the Maori have been secured, is increasingly being discussed. There is considerable hope that the “unity through diversity” advocated by the Race Relations Conciliator over a quarter of a century ago will emerge once the bicultural foundations of the nation in 1840 have been fully acknowledged and entrenched. All ethnicities (and classes and genders) would share in the two primary cultures, as well as having the right to retain and enhance their own cultures—whose flourishing would in turn enrich the others. The bicultural foundation of New Zealand is being seen, then, as constituting a sound base for tolerance and enrichment throughout society: once Pakeha “familiarize themselves with the imperatives of a bicultural philosophy, they are ready to accept the more encompassing responsibilities of multiculturalism.” It is increasingly realized among some minorities that it was the Maori Renaissance that both forced the state to begin listening more seriously to non-Pakeha voices and caused Pakeha in general to be more receptive to other cultures, tolerating or even celebrating diversity rather than seeking to assimilate it out of existence.

None of this is to suggest that full achievement of multicultural policies or goals (or indeed the degree of biculturalism in society or polity that Maori seek) is imminent in New Zealand. To be successful, official policy needs to reflect societal developments, but problems of “talking past each other” (as but one example) continue to occur in cross-cultural contexts. Some Maori commentary on multiculturalism (especially after governments opened the doors from the later 1980s to large-scale Asian immigration for economic motives), while based on sociopolitical reasoning, can appear as racist if decontextualized. Conversely, new migrants often find the concept of the treaty as a living document hard to understand. That scholarly contributions to indigenous social and political issues are often conflicted reflects real conceptual difficulties. The Dutch anthropologist Toon Van Meijl, who has conducted fieldwork in New Zealand, has expressed unease at strong Maori rejection of multiculturalism. “Anthropologists are ambivalent about this policy,” he has noted, “since it forces them to mediate their political commitment to multiculturalism and their solidarity with Maori.”

David Pearson has pointed out, moreover, that one key problem with both multiculturalism and biculturalism (in their various uses) is that they have left “the basic fault lines of a maldistribution of power and...
resources . . . firmly in place.” Nevertheless, community leaders have argued that if (among other things) the political and redistributive ramifications of Article Two and Article Three continue to be developed, and arrangements are negotiated between the Crown and the leaders of non-majority ethnicities and cultures that seek them, there are no theoretical or practical reasons why “the different rights demanded by different ethnic minorities cannot be met at the same time.”

Some scholars and advocates, however, argue that a harmonious future might require a revision of the concept of biculturalism (or at least its terminology) as the foundational policy of “New Zealandness.” In the late 1990s Maori scholar Paul Meredith noted that this can be seen as essentializing, dichotomizing, and adversarializing, one of the reasons that many—including Maori—embraced the term *multiculturalism* in the early years of the Maori Renaissance. There are precedents for such a rethinking among indigenous communities, with (for example) early radical Pasifika groupings having talked of “intercommunalism”: “In an inter-communal society we do retain our own culture . . . But we also live together. We accept the other person’s culture.” Drawing on international theoretical models, including postcolonial theory, Meredith canvasses the proposition of working toward an inclusionary and multifaceted identity politics. From this might emerge an interculturalism that moves beyond racial/cultural binarism and polarity to privilege crisscrossing, overlapping, and hybridization—opening up the possibilities of a “third space” characterized by interactive negotiations and productive social explorations. Such a “relational approach” would need to accommodate “the plurality of differences and visions” in New Zealand, including those of the various ethnicities, and would “demand negotiation, collaboration, compromise and much sacrifice.”

There are international resonances for such attempts at reconceptualization. In 2008, the European Year of Intercultural Dialogue, the European commissioner for education, training, culture, and youth stated: “We want to go beyond multicultural societies, where cultures and cultural groups simply coexist side by side: mere tolerance is not enough anymore.” What was sought instead was a “true metamorphosis in our societies . . . where cultures exchange and interact constructively, and where there is universal respect for human dignity.” Intermarriage has undoubtedly helped reconcile tensions between Maori and Pakeha. It is now being speculated that increasing rates of intermarriage and partnerships between these groups and Pasifika (and other) people might well have an enhanced reconciliatory effect—in turn assisting the development of policy that encompasses multiculturalism within a bicultural polity. Using 2006 census data, a study showed 16 percent of Pasifika men and 10 percent of the women had Maori
partners, and 25 percent and 21 percent respectively had Pakeha partners. Intermarriage, moreover, was much more common among the young, and analyses from the data suggested it was likely to increase.84

But intermarriage can only assist dialogue between cultures and ethnicities, not supersede it. Whatever the wishful thinking of many, and however stimulating the perspectives of a number of postcolonial and postmodern theorists, individuals live within one or more cultures as well as inhabit the spaces between. These cultures will continue to flourish, however much (or little) they “modernize” and adapt. Aspects of New Zealand history indicate that both respecting difference and combining various ethnocultural strands in bicultural or multicultural ways can assist the pursuit of social harmony. In particular, both incorporating elements of other cultures and exploring the liminal and exploratory spaces between them can lead not just to toleration but also to their mutual enhancement. Indeed, sometimes “the space in between . . . can be an anchoring point or a productive site for addressing the instabilities of social and cultural life.”85

The Tangata Whenua of New Zealand are now reasonably advanced along the process of entrenching respect for rangatiratanga. Scholars and advocates are therefore arguing that so long as policymakers continue to acknowledge, in Michael King’s words, that “Maori is the foundation human culture of the land, the first repository of its namings and its histories and its songs,” it seems timely for them to give Pasifika communities, long waiting in the wings for proactive attention, some priority.86 In his extended discussion of the deferring of the “two people, one nation” dream, in the year of the one hundred fiftieth commemoration of the Treaty of Waitangi, Pearson ends with “A Plea for Reflection.” This stresses the need to “look beneath the rhetoric, slogans, myth, and counter-myth” that are endemic in social and political debate on race/ethnic relations.87 There are few certainties in race relations, but one thing that is definite is that most Maori leaders—whatever social or tribal grouping they identify with—affirm that the issues cannot be resolved until their people are satisfied that rangatiratanga has been appropriately addressed by both the Crown and non-Maori in New Zealand. Given that there is a long history of Pasifika communities and leaders appreciating this ever since sizable migration from Oceania began, and of Maori appreciating this appreciation, the cautious optimism for a harmonious future for Maori-Pasifika relations expressed by a number of advocates and activists seems warranted.

Few scholars and community leaders, however, believe there are foolproof prescriptions for improving race relations in New Zealand. The difficulties inherent in the interactions between biculturalism, multiculturalism, and the Treaty of Waitangi can only be resolved by thoughts and deeds from
within the communities and parties concerned, and through their dialogue and interactions with each other and others. The late Michael King would probably not have altered his final words for any revised editions of his immensely popular Penguin History of New Zealand: “Most New Zealanders, whatever their cultural backgrounds, are good-hearted, practical, commonsensical and tolerant. Those qualities are part of the national cultural capital that has in the past saved the country from the worst excesses of chauvinism and racism seen in other parts of the world. They are as sound a basis as any for optimism about the country’s future.” While one does not need to agree with the specifics of King’s analysis of “most New Zealanders,” this article’s examination of the history of Maori-Pasifika relations since the Maori Renaissance has provided context for recent assessments that share—albeit cautiously—his optimism for the future.

Notes

This article is informed by discussions with a number of individuals within Maori and Pasifika communities in New Zealand who prefer to remain anonymous. My consideration of the issues canvassed was prompted by research for my book Maori and the State: Crown-Maori Relations in New Zealand/Aotearoa, 1950–2000 (Wellington, 2009), which should be consulted for background information on biculturalism. I would like to thank Dr. Gwyn Williams and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments, as well as informants within Maori and Pasifika communities.

1 For an outline of “significant tensions,” nationalism, citizenship, and other relevant matters, see Allen Bartley and Paul Spoonley, “Constructing a Workable Multiculturalism in a Bicultural Society,” in Waitangi Revisited: Perspectives on the Treaty of Waitangi, ed. Michael Belgrave, Merata Kawharu, and David Williams (Auckland, 2005). For issues grappled with in this article, including a chapter titled “Tagata Pasifika: No Longer Migrants,” see Augie Fleras and Paul Spoonley, Recalling Aotearoa: Indigenous Politics and Ethnic Relations in New Zealand (Auckland, 1999). The term Maori in this article refers to people identifying as New Zealand Maori (as opposed to Maori from the former New Zealand colony of the Cook Islands), and (as with Pasifika) it encompasses many and varied groupings and perspectives.


5 For complexities and nuances of the term Pakeha, see Michael King, Being Pakeha Now (Auckland, 1999).

6 For brief overviews of the history of Crown-Maori relations, see Richard S. Hill

7 James Belich, *Paradise Reforged: A History of the New Zealanders from the 1880s to the Year 2000* (Auckland, 2001), 532–33. This is the second volume in Belich’s general history of New Zealand, the best available historical interpretation of the nation’s development.


11 There is considerable literature on the demise of assimilation and its replacements. For an early example, see Pat Hohepa, “Maori and Pakeha: The One-People Myth,” in *Tihe Mauri Ora: Aspects of Maoritanga*, ed. Michael King (Wellington, 1978).

12 The terms biculturalism and multiculturalism are used primarily in this article to refer to sociocultural and policy phenomena. They imply connections rather than just coexistence between the relevant cultures, even if such connections might be dominated by one or more cultures—as in the case of the biculturalism referred to by Sir Apirana Ngata as characterizing pre–World War Two New Zealand: Jeffrey Sissons, “The Post-assimilationist Thought of Sir Apirana Ngata: Towards a Genealogy of New Zealand Biculturalism,” *New Zealand Journal of History* 34(1) (2000): 47–59. See, for example, the Maori Organisation on Human Rights’ statement: “Both cultures must survive, intermingling and enriching one another,” in *August Newsletter, 1972* (held in Alexander Turnbull Library, National Library of New Zealand; hereafter, ATL), 2.


15 Metge, *The Maoris of New Zealand*, esp. 311.


18 There are many international and national debates about the concept of indigeneity/first people and/or its relationship to the quest for historical justice;
for a recent example indicating the complexity of the issues, see Andrew Canessa, “The Past Is Not Another Country: Exploring Indigenous Histories in Bolivia,” *History and Anthropology* 19 (2008): 353–69. One crucial dimension of indigeneity that space precluded from coverage in the present article is that of the people’s relationship to the land, but it is endemic in much of the cited literature.


20 Anae et al., *Polynesian Panthers*, 31. Stressing such synergies should not be taken to downplay relational difficulties, some of which were later canvassed in popular fora such as the magazine *Mana*.


23 See Anae et al., *Polynesian Panthers* for examples, esp. 94. The influences ranged from the general, such as “the events” of 1968, to specific ethnicity-based activity such as that of Black Power or the American Indian Movement in the United States.

24 For these and similar statements, see the pamphlet *Polynesian Panther Party Platform and Programme*.

25 See, for example, Jacqueline Amoamo, ed., *Nga Tau Tohetohe: Years of Anger* (Auckland, 1987), for a selection of radical activist Ranginui Walker’s influential “Korero” columns from *The Listener*; and Hohepa, “Māori and Pakeha,” 98: “In brief, multiculturalism is built on two peoples and one nation.” The elision of biculturalism and multiculturalism continued, in some quarters, well after the early years of the Māori Renaissance, especially when juxtaposed with “monocultural policies and practices”: Donna Awatere, “Cultural Imperialism and the Māori: The Role of the Public Servant” (paper prepared for The Public Service in a Multicultural Society Conference, State Services Commission, Wellington, March 1982), 1. For a comprehensive discussion of such issues, and others pertinent to this paper, see Andrew Sharp, *Justice and the Māori: The Philosophy and Practice of Māori Claims in New Zealand since the 1970s*, rev. ed. (Auckland, 1997).


37 “Polynesians in Auckland: The Pakeha Problem,” in MS Papers, 94–106: 19/07 (MS Group 0314, ATL); see also pamphlet *Kotahitanga! Unity!*, calling for a meeting in January 1974 to form a united front, issued by Te Huinga Rangatahi O Aotearoa and the Polynesian Panther Party, and other material in this manuscript group collected by Herbert Roth.
44 For this and policing of Maori and Pacific Islanders, see Graham and Susan Butterworth, *Policing and the Tangata Whenua, 1936–1985* (Wellington, 2008), ch. 5.
46 Alan Blackburn, ed., *Racial Harmony in New Zealand: A Statement of Issues* (Wellington, 1979), has public perspectives on such issues, although organized around presenting “two views concerning racial harmony in New Zealand,” those being “New Zealand is a mono-cultural society” and “New Zealand is a society of diverse cultural groups” (1).
47 See Greenland, “Ethnicity as Ideology,” for a succinct discussion of such issues.
49 Race Relations Conciliator, *Race against Time*, 46; Fleras, “Monoculturalism,” 70.
50 This was a question asked by delegates at a public sector conference at Waahi Marae, New Zealand in 1982; see Sharp, *Justice and the Maori*, 211, 228.
51 Fleras, “Monoculturalism,” 66.
53 Sharp, *Justice and the Maori*, 232. But within a few years the church was prepared to organize itself along tripartite lines: Maori, Pakeha, and Pasifika.


This and other broad assessments in this article are based partly on analyses of the extensive newspaper clippings held at the Treaty of Waitangi Research Unit, Stout Research Centre for New Zealand Studies, Victoria University of Wellington.

Bartley and Spoonley, “Constructing a Workable Multiculturalism,” 139.


Anae et al., *Polynesian Panthers*, 58.

Walker, “Only Two Cultures” 228, 230.

Cited and discussed in Fleras, “Monoculturalism,” 70–71.


This was the line taken, for example, by the minister of Pacific Island affairs, Richard Prebble, in his “Address to the Auckland Ethnic Council’s 1990 National Conference,” Auckland, 30 June 1990, 15.


*Polynesian Panther Party Platform and Programme*.


Fleras, “Monoculturalism,” 70.


King, Hill, and Haas, “Reconciling Biculturalism and Multiculturalism in Aotearoa/New Zealand.”

Fleras, “Monoculturalism,” 71.


and Paul Havemann, eds., *Revisioning and Reclaiming Citizenship* (Hamilton, New Zealand, 2001); For “intercommunal” quote, see “Polynesians in Auckland,” MS Group 0314, ATL.

81 Meredith, “Revisioning New Zealandness,” esp. 6, 8, 10.


89 King, *Penguin History*, 518; see also King’s *Being Pakeha Now*. 