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Introduction: Expanding the Discourse on “Race”

In response to Mukhopadhyay and Moses’s call for biological and cultural anthropologists to reestablish a dialogue on race, anthropologists from the four major subfields join colleagues from two allied disciplines to address the possible ways in which the anthropological discourse on race can become more holistic and amenable to the urgent needs and interests of the public. This essay offers an overview of the current resurgences of race-focused scholarship in anthropology, as well as a framework for an intertextual reading of the articles featured in this theme forum. Anthropologists’ current conversation on race and racism is built on a rich legacy, elements of which are still being uncovered in gender- and race-cognizant explorations of the discipline’s past. Despite the considerable hiatus since the last major juncture of race-centered debate and research, that legacy has recently inspired a promising upsurge of critical analysis which, if mobilized effectively, may contribute to the subversion of the often subtle cultural and structural logics of contemporary racism, as well as clear the ground for a new culture for multiracial democracy. Toward this end, anthropologists and others interested in using anthropological tools must cultivate more richly nuanced analyses and intervention strategies informed by insights emerging from the cross-fertilization of ideas from the various subfields along with such fields as human genetics and ethnic studies. Anthropology’s unique role in interrogating, theorizing, and potentially disrupting the dynamics of racism may be dependent on understanding the conceptual and methodological significance of strategic intradisciplinary and interdisciplinary interfaces. [race, racism, holistic analysis of race, interdisciplinary dialogue, public anthropology]

A number of social analysts, anthropologists among them, have observed that at this particular historical moment—whether we designate it as a conjuncture of alternative or new modernities (Ong 1996; Robotham 1997) or as the postmodern era (di Leonardo 1991; Marcus and Fischer 1986)—the world has become more tightly integrated into a nexus of transnational and global fields (e.g., Appadurai 1990; Friedman 1994; Glick Schiller 1994; Nash 1994). Yet in this age of globalization—in which sophisticated telecommunications, an accelerated mobility of capital and labor, and rapid flows of commodities and culture compress both time and space across fractured technoeconomic, geopolitical, and sociocultural landscapes—differences in cultural and “racial” identities are being produced and/or reproduced with heightened intensity. In some contexts (e.g., the former Yugoslavia), populations with long-acknowledged claims on distinct ethnic histories are being redefined as racialized Others and “cleansed” from within newly drawn boundaries of national terrain. The deepening of identity politics, in many instances along dangerously essentialized lines of conflict and war, has—like the recenteration of wealth in the hands of only a small percentage of all human beings (Ransby 1996; Robinson 1996)—become a global problem that we must be better prepared to understand and resolve in both intellectual and political arenas of negotiation. What can anthropologists bring to these arenas, both on the domestic front, where we have a social responsibility to do “homework for political action” (Williams 1995:39), and in the distant places about which, in our quest for cross-cultural commonalities and variations, we develop expert knowledge and ethnographic authority—albeit increasingly under volatile conditions of contestation?

After quite a period of relative indifference and inattention to matters of race and racism (Cole 1992; Harrison [1991]1997a), anthropologists, in growing numbers, have regained their interest in and concern for the phenomenon that Du Bois ([1903]1990:16) characterized as “the problem of the 20th century” (also see Harrison 1992; Harrison and Nonini 1992). Contrary to the belief some hold that the conditions have already been created for a color-blind status quo, this problem, “the color line,” will be accompanying us into the next century and millennium, manifesting itself in historically specific new ways. Owing to racism’s persistence and ability to reinvent itself in new postcolonial and postmodern forms, including those that disguise and deny its continued existence, some
prominent scholars, including critical race theorist and
tele scholar Bell (1992) and sociologist Winant (1994),
feel compelled to assert the rather pessimistic view that ra-
cism is permanent, whether “races” exist or are ideologi-
ically marked or not. Winant argues that even policies and
struggles to lessen racial inequality would not “get us ‘be-
yond’ race” (1994:viii). He thinks that, despite its contin-
gency, race has become an enduring, deeply sedimented
“means of knowing and organizing the social world . . .
subject to continual contestation and reinterpretation,
but . . . [no more] likely to disappear than other forms of
human inequality and difference” (Winant 1994:xiii).
Based largely on his observations of Western Europe,
Balibar (1991) suggests that at this postcolonial juncture
race often fits into a framework of discursive practices
that denies the existence of race and hierarchies of races
and cultures (Harrison 1995:49). That is, as racism as-
sumes more subtle and elusive forms in the contemporary
world, it is being reconfigured without “race” as a classifi-
catory device for demarcating difference. The once
largely biologized notion of race is now commonly being
recoded as “culture” (Park 1996). This challenges anthro-
pologists to carefully “unravel culture” vis-à-vis the coun-
try’s “underlying racial hierarchy”—as Park (1996:495)
has done in the case of Korean immigrants’ relations with
African Americans—so that we can discern and detect
“race” when it is positioned at the deep level of shifting
subtextual meanings.
We have ample reason to believe that a sizable propor-
tion of anthropologists problematizes biological concepts
of race, and—especially in the case of cultural anthropolo-
gists—recognizes the force of history, power, and political
economy in constructing and reconstructing the bounda-
ries, categories, institutional configurations, and experi-
ences of race (Lieberman et al. 1989). Nonetheless, de-
spite this important baseline of shared understanding,
there is no theoretical, methodological, or political con-
sensus shared across any of the subdisciplines on how to
interpret and explicate the social realities that constitute
race. Consequently, anthropologists are apt to disagree
over whether or not race and racism are “in fact” operative
in any given case. Anthropologists are intensely debating
whether the ideologies and structures of domination that
characterize interethnic and immigrant-host relations in,
for instance, contemporary France and Germany consti-
tute a new form of racism or an altogether new order of
power and knowledge that represents a fundamental shift
in the structure of difference-making (Stolcke 1995). And
here in the United States, we find ourselves debating
whether current political discourses on, in one instance,
welfare reform and, in another, criminal justice encode
race and reinforce racial domination by pathologizing
what are being represented as irreconcilable sociocultural
differences (e.g., Buck 1992; Gilliam 1992; Harrison and
Nonini 1992; Maxwell 1992). Not independent of these
debates, there are also competing views among us on the
major targets of present-day racism in the United States.
Is post–civil rights American society more “color blind” and
characterized by a “declining significance of race” for his-
torically disadvantaged minorities (Wilson 1980), as
some current streams of political discourse claim? Or has
our peculiar tradition of anti-people-of-color racism
grown more insidious, or has it actually given way to a
prevalent form of “reverse racism” that discriminates
against whites (and Asians) as the new victims of a “trans-
muted Jim Crow” (Custred 1998)?
Within the past several years a racially cognizant an-
thropology has clearly been revitalized, as evidenced in a
proliferation of publications that directly and explicitly
address issues of race and racism (Baker 1998b; Gregory
and Sanjek 1994; Harrison 1995; Mukhopadhyay and
Moses 1997; Rigby 1996; Visweswaran 1998). By revis-
itng the discipline’s leading journals as well as newer se-
rals still establishing audiences (e.g., Identities and
Transforming Anthropology), one easily notices the fre-
cuency with which race-related issues are now being ad-
dressed. This represents a dramatic shift in anthropologi-
cal discourse, a shift that Cole (1992, 1995), among others
(e.g., Harrison [1991]1997a:3–4), has long urged more
anthropologists to make.
Exactly one year ago, in the pages of this journal, Muk-
hopadhyay and Moses (1997) challenged anthropologists,
particularly biological and cultural anthropologists, to
combine conceptual and methodological forces to cul-
tivate a dialogue on race and to bring the results of that dia-
logue to the public. This Contemporary Issues Forum is a
step in the direction of a productive and hopefully sus-
tained response to that timely call. For anthropologists to
effectively revive our discipline’s race-cognizance and
deploy it in strategic arenas of public debate, policy for-
mation, social action, and other loci of democratic prac-
tice, we need to expand and refine our discourse on race
to elicit perspectives from all of anthropology’s subfields.5
For this reason, we have not limited our conversation to
biological and cultural anthropology; perspectives from
archaeology and linguistic anthropology are also included
here. In reestablishing race as a central issue for anthropo-
logical inquiry and analysis, we should harness strengths
from the holism that distinguishes our discipline and gives
it a special vantage point based on a potentially innovative
and useful synthesis. For this potential to be realized, we
must overcome and offset the self-defeating fragmenta-
tion that has resulted from trends toward more narrowly
specialized anthropologies, increasingly disengaged from
disciplinewide webs of communication that permit the
production of a more integrated and comprehensive
knowledge. We also must recognize that we stand to bene-
fit from exchanging and cross-fertilizing ideas with col-
leagues working in other disciplines and interdisciplinary
areas, from the sciences to the humanities. Consistent with
Recapturing the Legacy

By reestablishing a dialogue on race, we resuscitate, promote, and build upon the rich—yet contradictory—legacy of the discipline’s historic participation in both academic and public debates on the socially contentious and politically salient matters of race and racism as they differentially affect the identities, social locations, and lifeways of the world’s peoples. Representing diverse positions along the intellectual and political spectrum, anthropologists have a history of having played a leading part in elaborating biological determinism, as well as the biological and sociocultural analyses that propelled the powerful critique against scientific and, to a much lesser extent, popular racism. Most notable among the researchers responsible for the latter direction were the Boasians—perhaps culminating in Benedict’s (1940) and Montagu’s (1942) watershed publications—and later Livingstone (1962) and Brace (1964), whose work probed some profound, and perhaps even revolutionary, rethinking.9 However, other trajectories of antiracist analysis also existed in American anthropology (Harrison 1995:52). It is also important to recognize that, as Lieberman (1997) has pointed out, women—most of whom lacked the visibility of Benedict and Mead—have borne a great deal of the responsibility for carrying out the discipline’s antiracist agenda, and their contributions during the first half of the century helped create the intellectual conditions for “deconstructing the race concept in the 1960s" (p. 553). Several of the women anthropologists whom Lieberman discusses had themselves “experienced racism and prejudice because of their African, Jewish, or Native American ancestry." 9 This should remind us that the lived experiences and multiple positionings of race, ethnicity, gender, and class are pertinent not only to the anthropological subjects typically studied but also to the study of the discipline itself, whose substantive, methodological, and theoretical development is embedded in a larger order of knowledge and power grounded in a cultural economy of difference.9

However revolutionary in conceptual terms, the dismantling of the race construct’s biological validity was not immediately followed up by a sustained examination and theorizing of the ideological and material processes that engender the social construction of race under the historically specific circumstances and cultural logic found here in the United States.10 As Shanklin’s essay here points out, anthropology’s earlier antiracist project gave such priority to exposing the “bad science” of racial thinking that the culturally resilient folk concept of race and its institutionalization in law and, it should be added and underscored, the economy were left unchallenged for a much too extended interim.

Perhaps that error of judgment and its consequent race-evasiveness (Frankenberg 1993) stemmed from the politically naive but not so uncommon belief in the power of truth itself to transform unjust social conditions. Many earlier-wave antiracist researchers, including the “race men” (Du Bois in his early career; see Harrison 1992:243) and “race women” (e.g., Ida B. Wells) making up the ranks of the activist intellectual tradition of “Black Vindicationism” (Drake 1987), had that once people were educated with “objective” knowledge, their unfounded attitudes and prejudices would eventually wither away. Apparently, the operative assumption was that many ordinary racists, if made aware of their unfounded beliefs, would become critical of their prejudices and no longer have reason or motivation to have and act upon racist intentions. This approach underestimates how racism in all its subtlety and intricate multidimensionality actually works as a complex social force. Drake’s (1987:34) analysis of institutional racism in the United States, especially in the aftermath of the “dominative” racism associated with de jure segregation, suggests that “rules, regulations, and norms [can be] set up in such a way that they automatically operate to the disadvantage of some racial group” despite the absence of deliberate intent” (Harrison 1997b:395, quoting Drake 1987:34). In a similar vein, Wetherell and Potter (1993), based on New Zealand research, argue that even without overt race-centered prejudice, racism can be the unintended consequence of everyday discourses and practices that perpetuate and reinforce an oppressive structure of power.

Naive assumptions about how to educate for change, however, are still widely held, as attested in the approach many scholars have taken to the most recent controversy
over African American English, or Ebonics. In her essay published here, Hill broaches the highly contested case of the Oakland, California, school system authorizing the use of African American English in its “linguistic” (or bidialectal) language arts curriculum. She claims that the moral panic that arose in response to Ebonics’s local legitimation and elevation is, ultimately, rooted not in ignorance concerning the linguistic integrity of African American English but in an “underlying cultural logic,” intensely resistant to change, that implicates a deeply sedimented stigma assigned to blackness.\(^\text{11}\) In this country as well as in many others, unfortunately, blackness has come to symbolize the social bottom (Basch et al. 1994) and a host of related characteristics (e.g., cultural deprivation, criminal threat, intellectual deficiency, economic parasitism, welfare dependency, hypersexuality, reproductive irresponsibility, etc.).\(^\text{12}\) Many of these meanings implicate racialized notions of gender, as in the allusions to “unembraceable” black masculinity (Page 1997) in public discourses on and representations of the most menacing criminal—or even political—behaviors, and in the association of black womanhood with the “welfare queen” syndrome. Even the way legal scholar Lani Guinier, misonomened the “quota queen,” was represented in the mass-mediated political discourse on her qualifications for a presidential appointment as Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights in 1993 was distorted by these color-coded meanings (Guinier 1998). Racist beliefs about blackness are embedded in a system of material relations that produces and reproduces taken-for-granted power and privileges, such as those associated with whiteness (Frankenberg 1993; Hartigan 1997). Racism, as Hill perceptively reminds us, is much more than ignorance or lack of knowledge. Exposure to correct information or valid anthropological analyses of the social phenomenon called race does not automatically lead to the democratization of the privilege, power, and wealth that sustain racialized—as well as classed—inequalities.

As we devise anthropologically informed strategies for intervening more effectively in the “culture of racism,” we should be reminded of the need to penetrate beneath the surface of ignorance and knowledge to educate and enculturate against the very cultural logic of the manner in which ordinary people feel, think, speak, and live their everyday lives in this increasingly multiracial and multicultural society and world. We will need to work together to develop methodologies for teaching people how to unlearn old lifeways in order to learn—and collaboratively create—a new culture for multiracial democracy. As students of the complexities and contradictions of both social and cultural stability and change in societies across both space and time, anthropologists can be expected to have the diverse forms of expertise needed to help develop tools for promoting a nonracist society by identifying the often subtle mechanisms through which racial hegemony and privilege can be either perpetuated or broken down in discursive practices, education (including, according to Shanklin’s insights, teaching introductory anthropology), labor market dynamics, mortgage lending, public health policy, criminal justice enforcement, patterns of economic development, and many other spheres in which “race” is continuously being made and remade.

Another factor that may have served as a disincentive for making the study of “social race” and its organizational and structural power (Wolf 1990) more of a priority before the current resurgence was the urgency, as Shanklin so aptly points out, assigned to doing “salvage ethnography” on rapidly changing and/or disappearing cultures. The emphasis was typically not placed on “complex societies,” but when ethnographic inquiry was undertaken in the United States, the populations targeted for study were “traditional,” at least in their precolonial origins. Of course, key among those ethnographically appropriate subjects were American Indians. When Native Americans were investigated under the salvage ethnography regime, a rather narrow and exoticized conceptualization of “Indian culture” often militated against an examination of the impact of the wider intercultural and structural contexts within which the studied communities were embedded. Hence, the specific forms of racism assaulting Native American reservation communities and the consequent processes of cultural change occurring in those settings were not adequately, if at all, explored. The “conventional wisdom” of producing a race-evasive ethnographic discourse on Indianness continued into the 1960s and beyond. In a poignant essay recalling his early 1960s fieldwork among the Papago (now called the Tohono O’Odham Indians), D. Jones (1997) notes that in graduate school he was socialized to impose interpretations on his data that underscored cultural continuities with the precontact past while obscuring observations on contemporary social inequalities that led him to see his research subjects as people with much in common with the poor, rural African Americans in the South with whom he was familiar.

Reflecting on the early ethnographies of southern African American folklore, another topic deemed appropriate for some limited ethnographic research, Willis (1975) argued that the folkloric research that Boas supervised was not designed to yield a critical analysis of the manifestations of Jim Crow repression in the adaptations and resistance that black folk effected in their strategies for everyday survival and dignity. A myopic view of the kinds of questions cultural anthropology could attempt to answer inhibited Boasian anthropology from producing the kind of ethnographic research on African Americans that could explicate the workings of racism. However, other anthropologists operating under other influences, doing research around the same time in different towns in Mississippi, opened promising windows of opportunity for pursuing
fieldwork focusing on the social organization and political economy of racial segregation (Davis et al. 1941; Powdermaker 1939).

Perhaps a third and, for this essay, final factor inhibiting the concerted interrogation of the social and cultural dynamics of racism before the current decade was the unintended consequence of Montagu's (1942) well-intended influence. Due to his important intervention, ethnicity came to be seen as the social phenomenon and the more politically appropriate intellectual category with which sociocultural groups and intergroup boundaries were to be understood. While ethnicity is certainly an important and useful concept for accounting for "processes of cultural identification among subordinate populations within nation-states" (Harrison 1995:48), as it has been conceptualized and approached in much of anthropological analysis, it has not adequately accounted for the processes of racial formation (Omi and Winant 1986; Winant 1994) that generally result in distinct structural and experiential outcomes, such as forced exclusion, stigmatized labor, and other types of dehumanization (Wolf 1982; 1994). In other words, conventional analyses of ethnicity have not explained how or why "racism" exists and persists, and why, under certain conditions, categories of human beings are subjugated or privileged because of differences purported to be fundamentally natural and/or biophysical.

In our ethnically plural society, the social significance of the invidious distinction (Berreman 1972) called "race" is hardly declining, contrary to Wilson's (1980) controversial argument of nearly two decades ago. A rejection of the biologized assumptions of "race," and even a rejection of the very term itself due to this dirty baggage, should not preclude our giving sufficient analytical attention to the ideological and material forces that categorically mark and stigmatize certain peoples as essentially and irreconcilably different while treating the privileges of others as normative. This quality of difference, whether constructed through a biocentric or a culturalist idiom, is what constitutes the social category and material phenomenon of "race." If the anthropological study of ethnicity, or ethnicities, is to do justice to the experiences of all peoples, including those who are identified and who self-identify in racial terms, then concepts such as racism, racialization, racial stratification, and racial identity formation need to be included in our analytical lexicon. Even when we accept the premise that biological races do not exist, we cannot afford to be blinded to, intellectually confused about, or afraid to address the malleable and persistent realities of racism, both here at home and around the world.

An approach to ethnicity that moved anthropological inquiry toward making reasonable sense of the differential structural locations that various "ethnic groups" have occupied—and still occupy—in American social stratification was Mullings's (1979) treatment of U.S. urban social stratification. In that analysis she explicated the divergent experiences and forms of ethnicity for white ethnics (or, according to Sacks [1994], "Euro-ethnics") and ethnics of color, particularly historically subjugated groups such as African Americans, Native Americans, and certain categories of Latinos (particularly Puerto Ricans and Chicanos). In some respects, Mullings's important intervention represented a conceptual distillation and refinement of the position taken more than three decades earlier in Drake and Cayton's (1945) analysis of blacks in Chicago (Harrison 1988, 1992, 1995). In that study, they questioned the applicability of an ethnic model that, in the context of U.S. race relations research, had been formulated to elucidate—and accept as normative—the experiences of European immigrants. Even more recently than Mullings, in an extensive review essay Williams (1989) examined ethnicity and race as different yet interrelated dimensions of identity formation in projects of nation building. Indeed, she argued that "race making" is, and has been, integral to nationalisms. From the rich vantage point of a historical anthropology critically self-conscious of the discipline's conceptual development in the context of shifting worldly demands, Wolf (1994) has also brought a more race-cognizant perspective into anthropologies's rethinking about the varying forms of ethnicity, including those informed by "perilous ideas."

Analysis that addresses ethnicity in contexts where race making has occurred may also illuminate how the process of ethnicization (or, as Hill's essay coins it, "ethnification"), which entails the assertion, revitalization, and elevation of ethnic cultural identity, may operate as a form of cultural resistance against racism and the denigration of the racial subordinates' cultural past and present. An instance of this kind of resistance against and cultural critique of the hegemonic construct of race is addressed in Hill's article, where she summarizes Urciuoli's (1996) insightful analysis of how Spanish can be appropriately and safely spoken in special "outer sphere" contexts, such as folklife festivals, while in more mundane outer-sphere settings it represents a racial difference signaling disorder and danger. Ethnicizing practices emphasizing cultural heritage are also present among African Americans, whose agonizing contestations over the cultural politics of racial categories and classifications have led to successive struggles and shifts in self-identification as "colored," "Negro," "Black," "Afro-American," and, most recently, "African American." An identity constructed as "African American" lays emphasis on the unabridged integrity of African cultural origins and, on the surface, renders Americans of African descent semantically—if not structurally—equivalent to other "hyphenated" Americans, who are marked by national or geographical origins. However, in light of the insidious covert mechanisms to which Hill's insightful linguistic analysis alerts us, we should question the effectiveness of an investment of ethnicized
meanings in view of the deeply implanted raced assumptions commonly made about African Americans—even by African Americans themselves. As we shall see, Smedley’s and Early’s essays shed complementary light on some of the contradictory dynamics involved in the “self-conscious construction of race” and ethnicity among Americans of African descent.

Taking Biological Variation Seriously without Biologizing “Race”

Over the course of its history as a “scientific” construct, race has been conceptualized in a variety of ways: as distinct polygenetically derived species, as discrete and mutually exclusive types, as geographically isolated subspecies, and as crossing gradients of populations or clines. The conceptual move from species- and subspecies-centered thinking to a clinal approach to analyzing and explaining human biological variation represented the beginnings of a major paradigm shift, a potentially revolutionary change in the criteria for “normal science” in the anthropology of biological differences (Kuhn 1970). However, that paradigmatic transformation has yet to be completed. We are still in transition without any certainty of what and where the final destination will be. If the assessment in Cartmill’s article is correct, it is not at all inevitable that the sizable minority of physical anthropologists still holding onto the race concept will be relegated to intellectual marginality or extinction. As Lieberman and Jackson (1995) have recently pointed out, the interpretation of the data of biological variation is not neutral or immune from societal influences, and included within “societal influences” today is what appears to some social critics to be an organized agenda on the part of certain neconservative foundations (e.g., the Pioneer Fund) to promote research that seeks genetic determinants for upward mobility, IQ, and violence, among other things (Kingsolver 1998). Thus far, it seems as though the results of that research mark a revival or an intensification of racializing discourses and practices in science (e.g., Current Anthropology 1996; also see Herrnstein and Murray 1994; Hutchinson 1997; Rushton 1994).

While considerable criticism has been leveled against cultural anthropologists’ negligence in exploring the sociocultural dimensions of race making in the wake of the “revolution” that Montagu, Livingstone, and Brace unleashed, recent criticism makes it also apparent that antirace physical anthropologists themselves have not done enough to propel the paradigm shift forward. Generally, since the debates of more than thirty years ago, very little research has been generated on clines as “a data-based alternative to the race concept” (Lieberman 1997:552). Along a similar line of criticism, Keita and Kittles (1997:541) claim that the “no-race school” did not “develop new terminology and concepts that acknowledge the complex nature of human population variation, biohistory, phenetic and genealogical affinities, and gradients of differentiation.” Lieberman and Jackson (1995:238–239) argue that while few researchers offer forthright definitions, the concept of race, nonetheless, persists in “molecular, biochemical and anatomical research in bioanthropology.” According to their critique, leading human origins researchers “continue to make ambiguous references to race and aggregates of racial characteristics in the testing of hypotheses, interpretations of their data, and development of their models.”

The possibilities for the post-race population biology that Montagu, Livingstone, and Brace adumbrated decades ago are being translated into the innovative research directions that a minority of scientists, both within and outside of anthropology, are following today. At an epistemological moment when so many anthropologists are becoming more self-consciously aware of the artificiality and ambiguity of disciplinary boundaries, it makes sense for more of us to take advantage of this state of blurred boundaries to facilitate flows of ideas and analytical tools, especially when important new anthropologically relevant developments are being made in sibling fields. Human genetics is one such related discipline, and Templeton is an internationally respected population geneticist whose work sheds important light on the kind of conceptual and methodological innovations from which biological anthropologists can benefit.

A geneticist trained also in zoology and statistics, Templeton brings newly formulated and designed techniques of quantitative molecular analysis to the discourse on the tenability of race. He offers further corroboration of the no-biological-race position by demonstrating the untenability of race operationalized as human genetic differentiation existing at the level of subspecies. Using an evolutionary genetic approach, he cogently demonstrates that data do not support the thesis of human subspecies, which are understood to be “geographically circumscribed, genetically differentiated populations” (p. 632) with the historical continuity of distinct evolutionary lineages. Statistical advances designed especially for molecular data indicate that compared with several other large-bodied mammals, humans, although geographically distributed across greater territory, have the lowest amount of genetic diversity within and among populations and owe their origins to a single evolutionary lineage.

Seeing no reason why historical splits and recurrent gene flow cannot operate on different or the same populations within a single evolutionary model, Templeton reconciles elements from competing evolutionary models previously assumed to offer mutually exclusive explanations. In other words, he formulates a new model of human evolution based on his innovative hypothesis testing. Using nested clade analysis techniques to make reasonable inferences from Y-DNA, mtDNA, and hemoglobin beta
sites about historical events, such as population range expansions and recurrent gene flow, he finds no evidence for a genetic split between Africans and Eurasians. African populations, therefore, were not evolutionarily independent and were always in genetic contact with other Old World populations. A nested clad analysis of geographical associations suggests that widespread genetic interchange has characterized the evolution and history of the human species. Interestingly, this view might prompt us to consider the "prehistoric" implications of Wolf's (1982) watershed anthropological history, which rewrites the precolonial Old World's cultural past, exposing the fallacy of bounded, isolated cultures, especially for the more "simple" non-Western societies (e.g., in sub-Saharan Africa) conventionally categorized as bands, tribes, chiefdoms, and primitive or pristine states.

In his reflections on the status of "race" in biological anthropology today, Cartmill, a respected voice in this subfield, describes how the heated debate on the utility of "race" continues among his colleagues, periodically erupting in polarizations over the reception given to scholars and scholarship that accept the notion of biological races (e.g., Current Anthropology 1996; Harpending 1995). Assuming the continued relevance of survey results from 20 years ago, Lieberman and Reynolds (1978:348) found that physical anthropologists who were proponents of the idea of biological races, "the prevailing view in [American society]," were more likely than their opponents to be "overdogs"—that is, to have "experienced greater privilege and less social marginality." In light of assumptions from a critical sociology of knowledge, the ascendance and dominance of a scientific orientation that promotes the denaturalization of race is just as dependent on the impact of sociocultural, political, and economic factors (e.g., whiteness, class privilege, and growing neoconservative power) on physical anthropology as an institution as it is on the internal consistency and cogency of logically defended and empirically validated pronouncements (Lieberman and Reynolds 1978:333).

Following Rigby's provocative line of thought, it would appear that the persistence of biological essentialism within anthropological science is a "constituent [element] of . . . capitalism, bourgeois culture, and alienated science, and is . . . necessary for their reproduction in their present form" (1996:3, emphasis in original). Paradigm shifts and the full-fledged epistemological transformations that may result from their success are somehow related to changes that occur in the larger social world. At this particular post-cold war conjuncture of global restructuring and realignment, the most powerful "overdogs" and their allies, a small minority of humanity, are embedded in a transnational nexus that has secured a decided competitive edge by successfully concentrating historically unprecedented quantities of wealth and structural power—including the power to produce and promote certain knowledges over others. There are social analysts who suspect that, ultimately, the current resurgence of racisms—intellectual variants included—is not unrelated to these wider trends.

Cartmill makes it abundantly clear that discarding race as an analytic frame does not mean not taking heritable biological differences in human adaptation seriously. However, like Templeton, he underscores that traits conventionally defined as "racially defined" are incommensurate with data on biological variations. Perhaps this point can be made even more strongly by taking a more multiethnic and multicultural approach to the discussion on the sickle cell trait, which is typically discussed in reference solely to African Americans. Livingstone's (1962) intervention three decades ago demonstrated that the frequency of this genetic trait is found among populations in tropical ecological niches in Africa as well as in certain environments in southern Europe and western Asia. He underscored the point that if sickle cell were "racial," then the so-called "race" that exhibits it "[consists] of some Greeks, Italians, Turks, Arabs, Africans and Indians" (p. 280). This kind of "unthinking" still needs to be done more consistently today.

Using sickle-cell anemia, Tay-Sachs disease, and phenylketonuria as "biocultural" examples, Cartmill explains that the extent to which biology shapes human traits is environmentally determined, with "culture [affecting] the interaction between genes and environment" (p. 658). Human biology must be understood as an integral component of a wider system in which nature and nurture interact in ambiguous and contingent mutually constitutive ways. A sustained dialogue across the subfields can promote greater understanding of this complex interaction.

Interestingly, Cartmill ends his article by shifting focus from human biology to the sociocultural world, asserting that the country would be better off, ultimately, if more Americans would resist racial classifications altogether. This view, which appears to follow quite logically from a "no-biological-race" premise, is consistent with the position the American Anthropological Association took when advising the U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) on revising the census. However, cultural anthropologist and historian of anthropology Baker (1998a:16–17) encourages anthropologists to consider, at least in the short run before the dawn of racial democracy or social racelessness, the necessary "evil" of taking strategic advantage of racial categories on a data-collection instrument that is "more about identification than identity." Baker's view is that racial categories, rather than the more contingent and elastic ethnic categories, better allow us to identify and track the systemic racism that now assumes primarily subtle and covert forms. He argues that government can make use of racial classifications to collect useful data on disparate impacts, which cannot be adequately explained in terms of class, "culture, behavior,
and lack of merit” (p. 17). He claims that the often subtle means by which race is institutionalized may be manifest in “disparities that range from low-birth-weight babies to per capita school expenditures” (p. 16). Baker goes further to argue that in the political climate that currently prevails, the AAA’s position risks “[providing] grist for people who call for a color-blind society that eliminates” (p. 16) social policies that have attempted to level the playing field for the historical and contemporary targets of racial inequalities.16 As Viswesvaran (1998:79) warns us, in light of this political context, “‘deracialization’ might actually be the sign of a more pernicious racialization.”

The political usefulness of reified racial categories is an issue requiring more nuanced discussion that takes into consideration as many as possible of the social, political, and economic implications of the competing positions. Also, the cultural logic underlying racial classifications must be exposed and penetrated. Recent research suggests that this insidious logic can endure under the guise of discourses and practices that transcend the explicit language of race and the overt discrimination traditionally accompanying it. The more subterranean and embedded forms that racialization assumes must challenge anthropological analysis today. Whatever conclusions anthropologists reach concerning “counting by race” (Goldberg 1997) and other heatedly debated issues should be informed by insights, evidence, and analysis from biological anthropology as well as the subfields (and fields) that specialize in the complex ideological and material conditions shaping the social reality of race. As Orser’s thoughtful essay illuminates, race always embodies contradictory tendencies—including the meanings and practices aligned with an enabling cultural politics of resistance and rebellion. Consequently, anthropologists, whether biological or cultural in their principal orientation, must learn to analyze race with a “dual vision” (Epperson 1990, cited in Orser) that denaturalizes race without failing to recognize the hard social fact that race consciousness, in some form (and it often assumes a multiplicity of forms) has been and continues to be a salient basis for survival, resistance, and opposition. Resisting and dismantling race entail more than a change in census categories.

Toward an Archaeology of “Race”

The sociocultural realities constitutive of present-day race and racism developed out of histories—ultimately, of colonial expansion and capitalist development—that need to be better understood. Orser, a noted historical archaeologist who has done important work on African Americans and plantations in the cultural past of the Americas, addresses the important question of whether interpretations of the archaeological record can occupy a central place in anthropology’s renewed study of race and racism. His essay points out that, to the extent that archaeologists have focused on African Americans and other racially oppressed populations at all, they have been primarily preoccupied with uncovering the material or artifactual markers for ethnicity, which has long been misunderstood as a bounded entity with identifiable Africanisms or African cultural survivals. In this respect, historical archaeologists have shared a great deal in common with their counterparts in cultural anthropology. Both groups have subscribed to problematic, reified concepts of “culture” (Abu-Lughod 1991; Basch et al. 1994), and both have beenblinded to race’s presence—but blinded with respect to different temporal contexts.

Despite the widespread retreat from race in the wake of the 1960s debates, cultural and biological anthropologists have not indicated any failure to recognize that in past centuries racism and what was popularly believed to be race were salient in American society. In light of what one might consider to be obvious historical circumstances (namely, slavery, the Civil War, Reconstruction, and post-Reconstruction racial repression), race was clearly an obsession among intellectuals and ordinary folk, especially during the nineteenth century. While perhaps acknowledging race and racism as problems of the past, cultural anthropologists (at least too many of them) have avoided these phenomena during the latter decades of the twentieth century, when racism has grown more covert and difficult to document in terms of recent criteria of political expediency. Historical archaeologists, on the other hand, have had great difficulty “seeing” and “imagining” the sociocultural impressions and inscriptions of race and racism on the seventeenth-, eighteenth- and nineteenth-century material landscapes that they unbury. Perhaps this problem of “sight” is, to some degree, symptomatic of archaeology itself; archaeologists frequently have to interpret between the lines and gaps of fragmentary and ambiguous data. However, historical archaeological interpretations can be richly informed by the archival record, which in the case of African American history is replete with all kinds of references to the most heinous form of racial domination. Even a cursory examination of the historiographical record would seem to suggest that race would be a potentially useful category around which to generate questions for research and theoretical construction. The role of a highly developed archaeological imagination, cross-fertilized with insights from other subdisciplines and disciplines, is particularly key for moving beyond accepting the mere category of race toward a full-fledged historical archaeology of race that denaturalizes racial hierarchy and boldly theorizes its place within a sociocultural system in which cultural signification, materiality, and power interact in complex and contradictory ways. Orser assures us that more archaeologists—although still too few—are beginning to inquire about race in their work. They are also bringing this growing race cognizance to their interrogations of archaeology’s own...
rational politics and racial economy of knowledge and the role they have played in creating the conditions for a historical archaeology that has denied and erased race from the sociocultural landscapes of the past (Franklin 1997; Patterson 1995; Singleton 1995).

Noting the virtually exclusive focus on African Americans among archaeologists who face the significance of race in their work, Orser encourages his colleagues to bring race-cognizant lenses to the study of whites, particularly those ethno-nationally defined European "sub-races" who were not always accepted as members of the privileged racial category. The best documented and debated case is that of the Irish, about whom a large number of scholars have written (e.g., Allen 1994; Ignatiev 1995; Patterson and Spencer 1994; Roediger 1991), including cultural anthropologist Smedley (1993) in her history of the race idea and worldview in North America. Similar to the Jews, about whom anthropologist Sacks (1994) has written provocatively, the Irish were once subjected to a form of racial Othing in Anglo-dominant U.S. society. That Othing, in the Irish instance, had its origins in the British Isles, where (as Smedley elucidates in her essay here and in much greater detail elsewhere) English colonial identity was constructed in opposition to the "Irish savage." Orser points out that in the United States Irish admission into white society was contingent upon their "[repudiating] the rights of those deemed non-white." (p. 665). Not surprisingly, that repudiation and struggle for higher status was often directed against enslaved African Americans. The power dynamics of race in many settings in urban and rural America was, then, more complicated than the conventionally conceived black-white tensions. There was a more complex racial hierarchy involved, with "buffer races" (Patterson and Spencer 1994) and Euro-ethnics shifting position along pipelines potentially leading to locations of whitened privileges.\textsuperscript{17} The potentially retrievable material dimensions of this historically contingent racial mobility and social whitening is certainly worth archaeological attention.

Orser queries how historical archaeologists can become more involved in public discussions on the historical depth and contingency of race, especially in view of rampant popular stereotypes that relate the subfield to the spectacular or to the claims of pseudoscience. In local settings across the country, archaeology is already taking on a more public face and contributing to community-based education and historical consciousness. Probably one of the most nationally visible instances in which historical archaeology is playing an important public role is in the interdisciplinary biocultural research project on the historic African Burial Ground in New York City. This project grew out of heated and, in many respects, racially polarized public debates over the historical significance of that archaeological site for New York City and the larger African American "community," elements of which demanded the right to have serious input into the design and implementation of the research. Out of this struggle, the decision was made that Blakey, an anthropologist based at historically African American Howard University, direct the project. The biocultural framework within which data analysis is being undertaken does not treat "race" as an appropriate or useful category for making sense of human or cultural remains; however, the results should advance our knowledge of the impact that racism had on the everyday sociocultural lives and bodies of that ethnically diverse population of enslaved Africans and African Americans (La Roche and Blakey 1997).

For a historical archaeology of race to develop along the most productive and democratic lines, Singleton (1995: 134–135) strongly insists that her colleagues confront the problem presented by the paucity of racially subordinate peoples’ perspectives within the subfield.\textsuperscript{18} Integrating perspectives from the racially subjugated themselves can be accomplished in a number of ways: by diversifying the field’s ethnocratic representation, using more diverse archival sources, cultivating a more formalized web of connections with ethnic studies specialists, and including racially subordinate communities in all stages of research, most importantly in "generating questions . . . and [interpreting] results." This, of course, would mean a real shift toward more participatory and collaborative research methodology that would permit archaeology to develop a role that would give it a more visible and, perhaps respected, position in public discourses.

\textbf{Cultural Criticism and the Biopolitics of Binary Opposition}

Shanklin (1994), who has played an important role in clarifying anthropological perspectives on race, addresses the historical development of color blindness and vision within the profession. She emphasizes anthropologists’ negligence in examining in any depth the folk concept of race, which here in the United States equates race with skin color and treats racial differences in terms of bipolarity—namely the binary opposition between black and white.\textsuperscript{19} This construct is difficult to uproot, even in the current context of an increasingly multicolored and multicultural society in which racial formation assumes a multiplicity of forms, many of which vigorously contest the hegemonic constructs of whiteness and blackness (Basch et al. 1994).

Shanklin’s view underscores that teaching is a form of praxis that many anthropologists engage in either by intention or default. Teaching affords an important opportunity to affect the way students think and view the world and to challenge them to rethink the relations of racism that produce privileged as well as oppressed positions of power. The most strategic contexts for this kind of conscientization are introductory courses in which anthropological ideas are introduced to a wide cross-section of
undergraduates. Emphasizing that there are real political consequences of what we do and do not teach, she reports that, overall, anthropology textbooks are teaching color blindness by seriously neglecting to give substantive coverage to questions of race and racism. Only a minority of introductory texts deal with race in any real detail. In the majority of the texts surveyed, the surface of race is superficially scratched, often confusing it with or reducing it to ethnicity or class. This state of affairs, she rightly argues, is especially problematic when over the past several years a proliferation of widely debated books on race have been published. Anthropologists have not seized the chance to intervene in a public discourse that “[uses] the black/white dichotomy unselfconsciously” (p. 672).

Shanklin argues that to become more effective cultural critics, anthropologists should reexamine and recast the knowledge and insights that the discipline has already produced. In her view, we can adjust our vision to restore its “living color”—not just black and white, but many shades of pinks and brown as well—by using the Foucauldian lens that has already had an important effect on the anthropological gaze, which now can unmask the violence of apparently neutral and innocuous institutions—including institutions that, according to the parameters of law, have been desegregated and cleansed of overt racism. Drawing on Stoler’s (1995) penetrating reading of Foucault’s unpublished lectures on the biopolitics of race, Shanklin points out that race, as “sexuality’s twin,” arose as an instrument of the state’s biologizing power. In this view, race is part of a discourse of state power which tactically deploys the binary opposition between an internal biologized enemy and the society that must be prepared to defend itself.

Shanklin insists that anthropology must use Foucault’s insights but go beyond them by extirpating itself from the fallacious black-white dichotomy that undergirds much of popular and academic discourse. We need to unravel and deconstruct that folk concept and examine segments of society that contest and express dissent against the established categories and binary oppositions, which are the constituent units in the racial worldview that Smedley (1993) elucidates so well. She suggests the possibility that we can gain some useful clues regarding how folk dichotomies might be dismantled, who is most likely to challenge them, and under what conditions and contexts, by investigating the lived experiences of nonconformists. Resistance and opposition to the folk dichotomy are evident in the rise of “multiracial” or “mixed-race” voices in public debates on race (Root 1992, 1996; Zack 1994), in new immigrants’ contestations of hegemonic constructs of race (Basch et al. 1994), and in the growing size and influence of established nonblack minorities, notably Latinos and Asian Americans. Shanklin’s criticism of the limitations and negative consequences of this folk con-

struct is timely, because Americans have to learn to talk about racial and cultural differences in terms much more complicated than the simple black/white opposition permits. Indeed, the dichotomy also inhibits a levelheaded discussion on the heterogeneity—in terms of class, cultural and regional variations, genealogical origins, and political orientations—among both blacks and whites. In other words, as homogenizing categories, black and white could stand some serious unraveling. In the less-known history of American anthropology, a few precedents were established for unraveling the folk binary. For instance, Foster (1931) and Willis (1971) both went against the grain of anthropological conventions to address a structure of race relations more complicated than what the white/black bipolarity suggests. Both were concerned with race, culture, and power in triracial settings of the U.S. southeast in which “whites,” “blacks,” and “reds” (Native Americans) interacted in a variety of ways—including in a few instances black/red alliances and fusions—over historical time and sociogeographical space. Their scholarship elucidated the historical contingency of shifts in racial meanings in the context of a state racism in which biopolitically manipulated polarizations and distances, based on a triangular set of folk and official meanings, were constructed to maintain and reinforce the political, economic, and cultural supremacy of whiteness.

Recent social analysis suggests that even in our increasingly multiracial society, where in only another few decades Euro-Americans will no longer constitute a majority, the folk dichotomy remains resilient (Harrison 1995:59). It has not only come to inform our perceptions of the obvious poles of difference that demarcate the apex and base of the ethnoracial hierarchy, but it has also come to permeate the hierarchy. For example, Ong (1996) claims that differences among Asian immigrants and Asian Americans based on national origins and class locations are being construed in discursive terms of whitening and blackening. In these oppositional terms, the “model minorities” (disproportionately Chinese and Japanese who are deserving of cultural citizenship, are entrepreneurial, and have high levels of educational attainment) are being contrasted against the minorities (e.g., Cambodians) dependent on the state and tactics of political agitation to get ahead. The stigma being attached to the latter population is being constructed very similarly to that associated with African Americans.

Research also suggests that in many of the sociocultural contexts where there is a more complex racial classification system or a color continuum that culturally marks a multiplicity of human shades, the meanings assigned to whiteness, blackness, and the colors in between may be as problematic and harmful as those obtaining in the U.S. folk dichotomy. In many Caribbean and Latin American contexts, despite the valorization of mestizaje (mixedness), whiteness (achievable through whitening, or
Covert Discourses in White Public Space

According to Frankenberg’s (1993:14) explication of the social construction of whiteness, there have been three major racial discourses among American whites: one in which race is essentialized and biologized in explicitly racist terms; another in which race and the power differentials structuring intergroup relations are evaded or denied; and a third discourse that is conscious of the double-edged character of race and is articulated from the vantage points of racial subordinates themselves. These discourses might be thought of as distinct phases in the historical development of race in this country, for at different moments one discourse is likely to be more widespread or dominant than others. Clearly during the nineteenth century, whether in the South Carolina low country or in major universities in the Northeast where U.S. anthropology was professionalized, a race-essentialist discourse was prevalent, in varying popular and academic permutations. In the current context of the post-civil rights era, a race-evasive, color-blind discourse has become more widespread among people who, for naiveté or self-serving purposes, deny the continued existence of racism now that segregation and discrimination are proscribed by law. Also in this period a race-cognizant discourse acknowledging racial differences and inequalities has been elaborated, particularly in certain streams of multiculturalism. Frankenberg also observes that elements from different discourses frequently commingle and interact, forming discursive repertoires. The discursive repertoires of considerable numbers of white voices today obscure race—indeed adamantly deny its relevance—without erasing its insidious meanings. Although race-denying discourse is subtle, it nonetheless has racializing effects that work “between the lines” and “beneath the texts.” In social contexts in which overt racism is no longer publicly acceptable, more subtly raced language appears to be more socially appropriate and morally defensible. This apparent legitimacy makes this form of racialized discourse all the more powerful.

Hill’s insightful essay makes us more aware of the specific linguistic features and dynamics of the various discourses that racialize subjects. She perceptively elucidates the way that vulgar racist discourse, elite racist discourse, and, the main focus of her analysis, covert racist discourse operate in a “culture of language” among racialized subjects—both marked and unmarked—whose accents and ability to speak the standard language form feed into racial formation processes. Her reflections on the inner and outer spheres of speech illuminate how racialization occurs when the dominant linguistic order is breached in outer spheres where language boundaries are carefully disciplined and policed. Linguistic breaches signal disorder, danger, and inherent difference—meanings invested in racial Others. The criteria for breaches, however, are not restricted to linguistic rules, for, as mentioned earlier, there are specific outer spheres in which racial subordinates can exhibit linguistic differences without being evaluated as disorderly and subjected to boundary policing. The Puerto Rican folklife festival is one such instance of this. In this very time- and space-limited context, it appears that the racial hegemony accommodates linguistic difference by setting its performance on a liminal stage separated from everyday life and the experience of daily normalcy and difference. This distance from everyday racialization creates the space for the performers’ publicly recognized “ ethnification.” On the other hand, Hill’s analysis suggests that the outer sphere display of linguistic difference that teaching Ebonics in public schools represents is clearly taken as a serious breach of linguistic, moral, and institutional order. The performance of African American English in this public space is perceived as a sign of danger, dysfunctionality, and academic deficiency rather than a marker of the legitimate cultural distinctiveness that is respected and permitted in the cases of populations with nonracialized ethnic status.

Hill’s article is most insightful in elucidating the linguistic permissiveness conferred upon white people in the outer sphere contexts that constitute white public space, where racial hegemony is symbolically and materially
enacted and reinforced without whiteness being made visible (Page and Thompson 1994). In white public space, linguistic behaviors are differentially evaluated and monitored by race. Using the interesting case of “Mock Spanish,” Hill demonstrates how whites are permitted to mix ungrammatical and substandard Spanish in their public speech while code switching among Puerto Ricans and Mexican Americans is penalized for being disorderly and threatening. In white public space, white speakers’ disorder is rendered invisible and normalized as “colloquial” or “cosmopolitan” while racial subordinates’ linguistic breaches are set up to be hypervisible objects of the moral panics and political campaigns constitutive of a backlash.

If we consider the implications of Hill’s analysis, which points to language being an important dimension of racial “subject-ification” (see Ong 1996), and apply them to an earlier era, we can perhaps assume that a linguistic discipline similar to that imposed upon contemporary racial Others was deployed in the past to police the language boundaries that marked the relationship that dominant Anglo-Americans had with the Irish, Italian, and Jewish immigrants whose whiteness was not automatic by virtue of their European origins and fair pigmentation. The extension of Hill’s approach to the cultural history that Orser and Smedley address would be apt, especially in view of the fact that the European “sub-races” were more visible as ethnoracialized Others in their language practices than in their phenotypes. Hence, it would seem that language disorder would have been particularly salient as a focus of moral panics and racial discipline. A historicized anthropological linguistics would be able to contribute to an investigation of the discursive processes that mediated those immigrants’ upward racial (and class) mobility.

Hill writes convincingly of Mock Spanish as a racist discourse at once elevating whiteness and racially Othering Spanish speakers. This process is not achieved through the means of explicit hate language. Instead, it is accomplished through a covert discourse characterized by indirect indexicality. The ability of Mock Spanish to reproduce white racist attitudes is rooted in its hidden and indirect character—that is, its ability to mobilize widely understood nonreferential meanings or indexes. Mock Spanish’s intelligibility is contingent on its speakers’ “access to racializing representations” (p. 683) of Spanish-speaking people. Knowledge of these racist images is presupposed by the “jocular or pejorative ‘key’” that is embedded in the several communicative practices that characterize Mock Spanish.

The incorporation of linguistic heterogeneity in white public speech draws not only on appropriations of Spanish. African American English crossovers are even more pervasively entangled in White English. Ironically, the social linguistic double standard allows whites to extensively appropriate “embraceable” (Page 1997) forms of African American English while denying African Ameri-
Negroid physiognomy, was not a mark of stigma. According to Drake’s interpretation of the records, when color prejudice existed it was not premised on the phenotypically different having an exploited, low-status social location; nor was this prejudice a component of an elaborate cluster of ideas on the kinds of essentialized differences that later came to be defined as “race.”

Giving us a sweep through thousands of years, Smedley paints a picture of intercultural tolerance and minimal strife, even under the conditions of state and empire expansion, which entailed the mobilization of violence, or its threat, both militarily and ideologically. However, based on her reading of historical sources (including the Bible), she extrapolates that in ancient societies’ worldviews, including those of highly stratified, politically centralized social orders, even “barbarians” were transformable, a point underscoring the belief in human malleability and reinvention. Perhaps this ontological orientation offset or contained whatever tendencies that might have existed for invidious forms of ethnic stratification and ethnic segmentation of labor, rendering the mass of newly incorporated people vulnerable to exploitation. As Paynter’s (1989) reflections on the archaeology of social inequality suggest, the “complex societies” that emerged over evolutionary and historical time were structured according to principles of dominance and exploitation. Conventional models of social evolution that treat as a given the functionality and stabilizing effects of increasing complexity evade, if not erase, the tensions and struggles that fed into and perhaps even drove the historical ebbs and flows of sociocultural change. Those struggles over political power, economic resources, and the cultural right to (re)define reality and legitimate some meanings over others in the contested space of public culture were likely to be informed, in one way or another, by competing and conflicting cultural identities.

The historic record, however, convinces Smedley as well as numerous other scholars (e.g., Drake 1987, 1990; Snowden 1983) that those early conflicts, no matter how intense or even bloody they may have been, did not create the conditions for a racial worldview. Racial meanings, signaling the social salience of superficial phenotypic differences, did not crystallize until the eighteenth century, and by the nineteenth century the relatively new folk ideology became the preoccupation of a modern “science,” which elevated the folk naturalization of difference to one of society’s most powerful legitimating realms. As Smedley states, at that juncture, race took precedence over “religion, ethnic origin, education, class, occupation, [and] language” (p. 695).25 The racial worldview affected not only conquered Native Americans and enslaved Africans but also racially suspect European “sub-races.” Like Orser, Smedley examines the Irish situation as a prime example of ethnic chauvinism bordering on racial Othering. The English brought this binary opposition between sav-
American racism, but these other discourses lack the politically charged visibility of popular and academic Afrocentrism, whose most essentialist streams have come to represent it in media accounts. Afrocentric scholarship is not as monolithic as it is usually depicted. It ranges from clearly essentialist inversions of biodeterminism (as in the melaninists [e.g., Barnes 1988], who attribute special capabilities and powers to dark skin color) and mythic glorifications of the “African motherland” to reasonable analyses that acknowledge race and African origins, among other dimensions of identity, as a salient axis that, in some way, informs—but not determines—one’s intellectual standpoint. Afrocentrism is a locus of debate over the significance of race, culture, gender, class, and power in the lives of peoples of African descent (e.g., Asante 1987; Collins 1991). Drake (1987) offered one of the best treatments of the various discursive streams in the historical development of Afrocentrism and other forms of black vindicationist intellectualism. Illuminating Afrocentrism as a mode of everyday practice, Y. Jones (1997) analyzes the popularization of these ideas as expressions of cultural nationalism in a variety of local settings, including study groups and small retail businesses.

Another important issue that Smedley confronts is the rise of mixedness as a locus of contestation over established racial categories that does not necessarily subvert the deepest precepts concerning race. She rightly underscores that mixed-race peoples and multimodal realities are not new phenomena, not even for Americans. Indeed, whiteness and blackness were among the inventions deployed to contain mixed people’s potential for subverting the dominant order of power. Smedley’s picture of the sociocultural past and present nicely complements Templeton’s and Cartmill’s accounts of the biocultural record, which indicates that interchanges among socially and phenotypically distinct populations have been an integral part of our species’ history. The protohistory of the kinds of social forces that Smedley illuminates accompanied and mediated the population range expansions and recurrent gene flows that have shaped humanity’s biological evolution. However, drawing on Friedman’s (1994:209) and Smedley’s insights, we should note that the scientific facts of extensive biocultural interchange do not necessarily translate into the social acts necessary for (institutionalized) multicultural identities. Moreover, the emergence of a mixed-race or multiracial identification and identity has historically specific ramifications beyond the open recognition of the facts of miscegenation. At a juncture when white dominance is being restructured and realigned in the face of an eroding white predominance, are mixed-race identities vulnerable to being appropriated as a buffer for buttressing white supremacy (Spears in press)?

Smedley’s analysis also reminds us of a basic tenet from Boas’s antiracism: that race, language, and culture are distinct and not mutually determining. The boundaries separating cultures and races—which Smedley, transcending Boas, understands to be social categories rather than biological types—are not coterminous, yet much of the discussion on multiculturalism seems to assume that “cultures” and “races” neatly coincide. Racially distinct segments of American society share a great deal of common culture, but these similarities are not adequately recognized by multiculturalists who emphasize differences. Early (1996:58) has also written on some of the consequences of this overstated emphasis on difference and separation. In view of Herskovits’s influence, we should perhaps consider that some of the differences in the way racially differentiated Americans experience and participate in the variants of American culture may have something to do with the legacies of their distinct cultural origins. For example, an African-derived cultural grammar—not necessarily most significantly manifested in the current commodification and consumption of kente cloth fashions—may be operative in informing black Americans’ interpretation of cultural values and their distinctive styles of cultural participation and performance. Moreover, to the extent that African reinterpretations still survive in U.S. society, they may, as entangled and reinterpreted “crossovers,” underpin and permeate “white” culture (especially among southern whites) as well (Philips 1990).

Smedley closes with an optimistic statement on the possibility of more “universal” identities emerging in light of the growth of cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism during the current global age. Will the rapid diffusion and interchange of commodities and cultural forms obviate race—or intensify it? Is it possible for human beings to return to more malleable, fluid expressions of ethnicity and transcend the limits of a racial worldview? At the present moment, ethnicity in many parts of the world is vulnerable to the forces of racialization, despite the global accessibility of Coca Cola, jeans, and dreadlocks, which are probably more likely to be emissaries of capitalist commodity consumption than of universal solidarity. According to Friedman’s analysis of global processes, “there is a logical connection between the decentralization of world accumulation [that is characterizing this stage of global capitalism] and the fragmentation of identities” (1994:210). Attempting to reconcile Smedley’s view with Friedman’s, the question then becomes, how can we offset and counterbalance these differentiating conditions so that the global culture that we do in fact share may inspire us to “imagine a universal community” (Anderson 1983) descended from a single ancestral lineage?

**Racial Redemption and the Politics of Memory**

Smedley’s essay levels a poignant cultural critique against the racial worldview and culture of racism that engenders the suppression of self-esteem and distorted
forms of consciousness in the lived experience of racial Others. She uses her erudite knowledge of the past to contextualize the present-day dilemmas that racial identities present for both selfhood and peoplehood. Early continues this concern with questions of history and the relationship between then and now, but he directs his attention to how racial Others themselves, specifically African Americans, (re)construct the past through a cultural politics of memory. While Smedley emphasizes the power of the racializing order to impose invidious identifications, Early focuses on the role that the self-conscious construction of race plays in forming a useable, enabling identity. Drawing on Du Bois’s ([1903]1990) insights, he underscores the virtually inevitable double-mindedness and double-edged character of black identities, whether as early-twentieth-century Negroes or as late-twentieth-century African Americans.

A prominent cultural critic whose essays are widely published in academic and literary outlets, Early shares his thought-provoking reflections on the contested constructions of the past and memory. Using a teaching experience at a historically black university as an engaging point of departure, he examines the sacred and profane dimensions of memory as the key to identity. Among African Americans in particular, contesting Euro-American claims to a superior history has been an integral component in the struggle against racism. This contestation has assumed the therapeutic form of claiming an equally (and, according to some claims, more) civilized past in Africa. The “dark” and “savage” continent promulgated in racist discourses is redeemed through a recognition of ancient Egypt’s Africanity and blackness. Early explains that Egypt has been the focus of the “races in antiquity” debates that Afrocentric and early Ethiopianists discourses have stimulated, because Egypt is the only monumental civilization in Africa that Europeans have recognized, admired, and appropriated as the roots of their own. In other words, Afrocentrists have absorbed, in inverted form, Eurocentric values and terms of reference concerning the criteria for civilization, a history worth remembering, and race. Early points out that even Garvey, whose success at mobilizing mass support for his repatriation project was a distinctive historical achievement, built his African nationalism around a double-edged admiration of the British Empire, which was responsible for oppressing him as a black Jamaican. Ironically, because of this indebtedness to the terms and structure of hegemonic discourse, Afrocentrists tend not to be interested in the very African states and empires that figured prominently in the historical development of the peoples from whom black Americans are directly descended.

Africa’s cultural and biological diversity encompasses both the Nile Valley and West Africa. That diversity is not adequately acknowledged in Afrocentric discourse, which ahistorically applies “U.S.-centric” notions of race to African antiquity. Although many Afrocentrist claims reflect the limitations of an ahistorical racial essentialism that serves as a trope for constructing a contemporary identity politics, more methodologically cautious scholarship (e.g., Bernal 1987, Drake 1987) has argued that established Egyptology itself has been a site of contestation over ancient Egypt’s relationship to Africa as a locus of culture and cultural variation. In other words, this is not an issue that Afrocentrists initiated themselves. It has also been an issue for hegemonic narratives of world history, which have been no less immune than Afrocentrism from mythmaking. According to Bernal’s research, as white supremacy took its hold on institutionalized knowledge production in Europe and North America, earlier research that accepted Egypt’s Africanity—based on the understanding that “African” denoted a great deal of cultural heterogeneity—was peripheralized and discredited, while scholarship that dismembered Egypt from Africa, constructed then as “the dark continent,” set the new standard for whitening Egyptian civilization.

In his attempt to place Afrocentrism in context, Early gives us a brief, but quite instructive, glimpse into the intellectual history of African Americans and their counterparts from the Caribbean and the African continent who subscribed to Pan-Africanism and other forms of African and race-focused ideology. In this examination, he illuminates interesting aspects of the thinking, politics, and, in some cases, even the personalities of distinguished thinkers, writers, and activists, who, although sharing a basic commitment to dismantling racism and colonialism, did not form an intellectual or political consensus. Early also broaches the subject of anthropology’s influence on certain figures, notably Du Bois and Hurston, both of whom had relationships with Boas. In this respect, he aptly reminds us that anthropological voices have long been part of a broader interdisciplinary discourse that extends far beyond the boundaries of academic departments and professional associations. Anthropological ideas have stimulated struggles to redeem racially subjugated people. Can they now inspire struggles to transcend “race” as we know it?

**Concluding Remarks**

Drawing on an expression from Jesse Jackson, who exposed the “stuttering” inhibiting the nation’s dialogue on race, Orser warns us of the dangers of becoming satisfied with “race entertainment,” that is, broaching the subject of race, scratching its surface, without probing deeply and redressing its most significant and fundamental problems, including those that are not readily perceived as “racial.” After an extended hiatus, anthropology has again reached a moment in its history when it cannot evade the pervasive power of racism. At a time when racial inequalities are being denied as a reality and as a priority for public policy,
anthropologists have a special responsibility to help form and mobilize a critical consciousness that can challenge both government and citizens to fulfill the promise of democratic justice. To this important end, we must recognize the importance of translating the results of our scholarship into an accessible language for democratic participation; otherwise, we run the risk of reproducing anthropology’s alienation from potentially strategic public arenas. Our unique disciplinary holism gives us the potential and the opportunity to enrich and extend the public’s consciousness and to point in fruitful directions for rethinking and change-provoking intervention.

Three decades after the profession’s last major upsurge on race (e.g., Mead et al. 1968), growing numbers of anthropologists are finally seizing the moment to interrogate and rethink race as it is constructed and as it operates both overtly and covertly in post–civil rights America and the late-twentieth-century world, in models of the evolutionary and historical past, and in the discipline itself. It is our hope that the several articles in this Contemporary Issues Forum will provoke more of our colleagues to accept the challenge of, and the responsibility for, critiquing, theorizing, and creatively intervening in the everyday cultural logic of “race.”

Notes

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1. Johnnetta B. Cole, along with other members of the Association of Black Anthropologists (ABA), has frequently urged anthropologists to face the power that racism, with its clear implications for human rights, still exerts in American society. Over the course of the association’s more than twenty-year history, the ABA has consistently addressed racism, both within the profession and in the wider society and world, in its sessions and publications. The association’s long-standing discussions on race, power, and culture as they affect the black world and beyond have been chronicled in newsletters (beginning with News from the Natives and its successor, Notes from the ABA), the relatively new journal, Transforming Anthropology, and a substantial body of publications that originated at least in part from organized and invited sessions convened at annual meetings of the American Anthropological Association (AAA). It is probably fair to say that black anthropologists, given their particular location in an ethnoracial hierarchy that consistently relegates blackness and sub-Saharan African origins to the lowest level, have played an important part in recapturing anthropology from its no-race retreat. In rethinking anthropology’s recent history, it is important to recognize that before the past 10–15 years, anthropologists who dared to interrogate the power of race and racism often found their scholarship peripheralized, if not erased (Harrison 1988,[1991]1997a, 1992). The kind of intellectually honest anthropology that Shanklin’s essay urges us to expand must grapple with the social forces that influence the discipline’s shifting “politics of reception” (Vincent 1991).

2. Robotham (1997), drawing on Scott (1996), points out that the juncture and condition designated as postcoloniality is characterized by the loss of the “happy assumptions” regarding the potential for change and development (including noncapitalist and socialist paths) that were associated with the nonaligned movement before the collapse of the eastern Communist bloc and the consequent “triumph of capitalism.” Bell (1992) and Winant (1994) seem to have relinquished the happy assumptions on racism that seemed to characterize antiracist intellectuals and activists before the entrenchment of the post–civil rights (and now post–affirmative action) “racial project” (Winant 1994).

3. During a 1997 AAA Annual Meeting public forum on affirmative action, anthropologist Glynn Custred, coauthor of the California Civil Rights Initiative, or Proposition 209, made the statement that affirmative action is a coercive set of government regulations that represents the “transmutation of Jim Crow” into a racism directed at whites. We can assume that this political stance is informed by Dr. Custred’s expertise as an anthropologist who has devoted much of his career to the study of Latin America. Although white proponents of anti–affirmative action campaigns have included (or appropriated the experiences of) Asian Americans in their arguments on discrimination and preferential treatment, a number of insightful analyses of how Asians fit into post–civil rights era racial politics have been done (e.g., Takagi 1993, 1994). The “model minority” status of Asian Americans has been extensively critiqued (e.g., Ong 1996; Takaki 1979; Yanagisako 1993). Indeed, Ong (1996) argues that the least economically and politically privileged categories of Asians, such as the Cambodians, are subjected to a racial Othertizing process that blackens them while more privileged categories of Asians (e.g., Chinese and Japanese) undergo a whitening that confers cultural citizenship and “subject-ification” upon them.

4. For a recent review of anthropological analyses of race and racism, see Harrison (1995). The article offers an “anthropology of knowledge” perspective on canonical and noncanonical trajectories of antiracist scholarship; a discussion on the intensification of racism and the rise of new racisms in the current global context; a comparative view of how race is constructed around the world, including in sociocultural settings for which
race-cognizant inquiry is fairly new for the anthropological gaze; an examination of the rethinking being done on Latin American “racial democracies”; a consideration of how race is being contested and reconfigured in an increasingly multicultural U.S. society; and a discussion on the growth of investigations that focus on whiteness.

5. Paule Cruz Taskash (1998:50) has criticized the AAA’s privileging of a black-white dialogue in highly visible sessions (notably the 1997 Presidential Sessions on race) at the expense of widening the disciplinary conversation to include the vantage points of other racialized subjects. Unfortunately, the selection of perspectives represented in this special forum is also limited in this very respect; however, an attempt was made to organize this “expanded discourse” around an intellectual diversity reflecting theoretical, subdisciplinary, and ethnoric racial differences. Due to any number of reasons and circumstances, everyone who was initially invited to contribute could not. Limitations of both time and space led us to restrict the issue to these seven articles and essays, which articulate the thought-provoking perspectives of a most distinguished group of scholars.

6. Although it is not at all uncommon for news media to call upon anthropologists to clarify questions on the scientific validity of “race” (e.g., see science editor Charles Petit’s “No Biological Basis for Race, Scientists Say,” San Francisco Chronicle, February 23, 1998), some of the most visible public intellectuals called upon to be spokespersons on race and related cultural matters, whether in print (e.g., "op ed" articles in The New York Times) or electronic media, tend to be “cultural critics” trained in the humanities rather than in the social sciences. Which anthropologists have the stature and platforms that philosopher Cornel West, literary critic Henry Louis Gates, and now historian John Hope Franklin (the distinguished senior scholar whom Bill Clinton appointed to lead the President’s Initiative on Race) do? While their celebrity may be well deserved, the relative inaudibility and invisibility of anthropologists are, nonetheless, troubling.

7. See Viswesvaran (1998) for a critical discussion on the distinctions Bosians made between race and culture, and their general acceptance of a biological definition of race separated from the negative evaluations stemming from racism. Montagu’s approach marked a major shift; however, it shared the assumption that race, despite its untenability, was a biological notion rather than a social and cultural fact.

8. A number of feminist anthropologists, especially in their third and current phase of intellectual development (Moore 1988) in which questions of difference are being probed, have recognized race’s salience in mediating gendered identities and experiences among women—and men.

9. For one approach to anthropology’s history that underscores these issues as they relate to the earliest generations of African American anthropologists, see Harrison and Harrison (in press).

10. During the 1960s and 1970s anthropologists (e.g., Harris 1964, 1970; Sanjek 1971) did investigate the “racial calculus” used within Latin America, particularly in Brazil. However, much of this work accepted many of the assumptions underlying mestizaje, which support the ideology of racial democracy and leave the Latin American variant of racism unchallenged. Before the current wave, a number of anthropologists went against the grain of established trends in order to conduct research in the United States that exposed the cultural and structural forces of racism (e.g., Berreman 1972 [whose work was conceptual and theoretical but addressed the U.S. situation]; Blu 1979, 1980; Davis 1945; Davis and Havighurst 1948; Davis and Hess 1951; Drake 1966; Leacock 1969, 1977; Ogbi 1978).

11. See Rickford (1997) for a more detailed explanation of the Oakland School Board’s language policy and the competing linguistic theories on Ebonics’ historical development and contemporary characteristics as a “systematically rule-governed speech variety” (1997:82).


13. Of course, these categories have had a contrapuntal relationship with much more offensive terms of reference, including savage, darkie, and nigger. See Baker (1998b) for a useful treatment of the sociocultural and politico-legal underpinnings of the movement from “savage to Negro.”

14. I would like to acknowledge that my characterization of this watershed discourse as “revolutionary” has been influenced by the approach that biological anthropologist Russell Reid took in a lecture on race he delivered to a race and ethnic relations class I taught in the early 1980s at the University of Louisville. The clarity and cogency of his synthesis of that literature was simply compelling and made an impact on me and, hopefully, my students.

15. Perhaps an implication of Lieberman and Reynolds’s analysis is that a greater presence of persons who have experienced social marginality (by virtue of gender, ethnicity or ethnic origins, having grandparents who were immigrants, etc.) would drive the paradigm shift forward so that a nonracialist position is accepted as normal science, the new scientific hegemony. It is interesting that Lieberman and Reynolds did not collect data on social class backgrounds, although this variable may have been implicit in ethnic and immigrant background. Or did the researchers assume that the population they were studying was largely born into the middle class? It would be interesting to know to what extent class figures in “underdog” status and experience.

16. Goldberg (1997) has a similar view of the social and political significance of “counting by race,” which he admits puts us in a “damned if we do, damned if we don’t” position. Despite this paradox, he argues that “race codes past and present discrimination, offering a rough and ready indication of opportunities that were (un)available at different moments in time. It serves as a ‘measure’ therefore of the sorts of odds against or under which middle-class black persons … attained or retained their middle-class status, or of the degree to which poorer blacks have been denied socioeconomic mobility. Counting by class doesn’t quite do, for … it undercounts the racially marginalized, but also benefits the whitened marginalized at the expense of the black” (1997:56–57). He also states that reference groups are needed for implementing compensatory justice, if we are committed to it.

17. There was also a process of darkening or blackening in operation. In some settings intermediate “races” were recognized and codified in law. The legal status of Native Americans, free people of color, and Asians (e.g., the Mississippi Chinese) shifted up or down depending on the sociopolitical and economic
climate. Over time, all persons of known African origins were blackened. For instance, this is reflected in the elimination of the “mulatto” category from the census by 1930. This category was used in all but one census from 1850–1920. In 1890 there were two additional categories (quadroon and octoctoron) coding the extent of miscegenation among people of African descent, and ten years later no distinctions were made according to black “blood” amounts. However, in the very next census the black and mulatto distinction was reintroduced, reflecting, as Goldberg (1997:41) suggests, “the struggle to balance blackness with the self-evident effects of miscegenation.” In 1930, when the homogenizing trend for African Americans took root, the census put all African descendants into a single category (“Negro”) while the number of categories for Asians increased considerably. Goldberg attempts to explain this shift in terms of “the prevailing institutional mandates of racialized segregation and immigration restriction … [prompting] seemingly precise [according to ideological definitions] specifications for reporting race” (1997:41).

18. Also see Franklin (1997) for a report on the dearth of African American archaeologists.

19. Although the folk ideology of race in the United States clearly emphasizes skin color in its idioms, cultural principles of descent—specifically hypodescent in the case of African Americans—govern the racial designation, regardless of actual color or phenotype. For example, a phenotypically white person belonging to a family of known African descent is not racially classified according to skin color but according to customary assumptions concerning socially salient ancestry. In this instance, that person would be categorized as “black.” Darker-colored individuals of publicly recognized European, North African, or Western Asian origins are defined as “white.” See Smedley’s essay for insights into the social construction of identification and identity among African Americans. Color and phenotype have more weight elsewhere in the Americas, where the first hypothetical person described above would be designated differently, perhaps even as “white,” depending on such factors as social class.

20. Shanklin’s concern with the color blindness articulated in textbooks was addressed in a series of sessions and workshops collaboratively organized by the Association of Black Anthropologists and the Association for Feminist Anthropology in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Transforming Anthropology’s theme issue, Teaching as Praxis: Decolonizing Media Representations of Race, Ethnicity, and Gender in the New World Order (Maxwell and Buck 1992), is one outcome of these events. Other outcomes may perhaps be found across the country in classrooms where anthropology is being taught. Just as an example, Pam Buck, who teaches community college students in a central Kentucky town, developed her own customized text from a “decolonizing perspective” that treats the social inequalities of race, class, and gender as integral factors shaping sociocultural landscapes throughout the global order. Buck was especially concerned that her students, mostly poor whites, have exposure to an accessible treatment of race and class so that they could come to understand their own location in relations of racism.

21. Anthropological insights into nonconformity and dissent can be found in Gwaltney’s The Dissenters (1986).


23. See Harrison (1998a) for a discussion on how Foster’s and Willis’s scholarship can be revisited for its clues for rehistoricizing the category of race in the colonial and early postcolonial history of the U.S. southeast. Also see Moses (in press) and Sanday (in press) for intellectual biographies of these negligible anthropologists. See Forbes (1993) for a thought-provoking analysis of relations, and in some cases fusions, between indigenous and African people in the Americas.

24. Basch et al. (1994) point out that in many Caribbean contexts postcolonial nationalist discourses have redefined blackness in more positive terms. Segal (1993), however, suggests that the subtext of the elaborate color terminology that is commonly applied to people of varying combinations of African and European descent suggests that lightening represents social improvement in both racial and cultural terms.

25. Smedley emphasizes the role of the United States as the major locus for the crystallization of race and as an epicenter from which racial ideology diffused throughout the world. Although the United States was certainly a major source of the racializing ideas impacting many other parts of the world, it is important to consider that there were also particular internal dynamics within other areas of the colonized and formerly colonized world that gave rise to a variety of racial formations and racial worldviews, few of which were as systematized and rigid as those that evolved in the United States and southern Africa. Stoler’s (1989) work on colonial Asia and Whitten and Torres’s (1998) work on the neglected racial dynamics in the history of Latin American societies are just two examples of the revised cultural histories to which anthropological research is contributing.

26. Forbes (1993) and Goldberg (1997) show that during much of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, U.S. racial classifications reflected public recognition of many of the “shades of human color” to which Shanklin’s essay refers. The meanings of negro, mulatto, mestizo, and so on shifted over time and space, making it difficult to know exactly which populations were the referents.

27. For a discussion on the history of “preferential treatment” in U.S. politics, see Harrison’s (1998b) counterpoint on affirmative action, which examines how the federal government subsidized white upward mobility at various points of the nation-state’s history. The period following Bacon’s Rebellion appears to be one of the earliest instances of this state-sponsored practice of racially differential preferential treatment benefiting whites and groups that have been incorporated into whiteness by shifts in social definitions and political priorities.

28. See Bond and Gilliam (1994) for several thought-provoking essays on the social construction of the past.

29. From his unique perspective on anthropology and history, Drake (1970) wrote a compelling essay on Ethiopianism and religious forms of resistance in African American and African Caribbean intellectual history. The themes initiated in this early scholarship are addressed more fully in his later work, particularly in Black Folk Here and There, Volume I (Drake 1987).

30. See Harrison (1992, 1995), Muller (1992), and Baker (1994) for more detailed treatments of these relationships.
31. Niara Sudarkasa participated in the 1960s’ AAA plenary session on race that resulted in the coedited book *Science and the Concept of Race* (Mead et al. 1968). During a discussion following the presidential session on race at the 1997 AAA meeting, Sudarkasa remarked on the cyclicality of the unresolved issues of race. Offering some hindsight, she pointed out that the 1997 discussion echoed many of the same issues raised in the earlier session. After Montagu’s early 1940s’ intervention, it took another twenty years before his no-race position crystallized in the advances made during the 1960s. Now, three decades later, anthropologists have built up momentum on the race issue again.

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