Representing Poverty and Attacking Representations: Perspectives on Poverty from Social Anthropology*

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I. INTRODUCTION

This article considers the potential contribution of social anthropology to the study of poverty in development. Despite increasing anthropological attention to the social and institutional relations of international development [Haugerud and Edelman, 2004; Ferguson, 1990; Mosse, 2004; Bornstein, 2003] social anthropology has remained to some extent outside the formal apparatus of development studies [Green, 2005; Cernea, 1995; De L’Estoile, 1997] to the extent that development studies has been viewed at least partially in some recent ethnographies of development as part of the research problematic [e.g. Ferguson, 1990; Escobar, 1991]. The ambivalent relationship between anthropology and international development has contributed to an apparent paradox in development studies, that despite the longstanding association of social anthropology with research in communities and countries where the effects of poverty are pronounced, social and cultural anthropology has not yet prioritised poverty as an object of study [Ferguson, 1997; Booth et al, 1999].

The apparent silence of anthropology on the subject of poverty should not be interpreted as indicative of that discipline’s irrelevance to or disengagement from the study of poverty. Anthropological research offers important insights into the causes of poverty and can reveal the diversity of experience among those classified as poor. I argue that an anthropological perspective throws considerable light on the constitution of poverty, as both a category of
development thinking and as a label applied to particular social categories. The application of these categories and the political implications of such classifications are explored through an exploration of some recent ethnographies of poverty as a process of classification. Anthropological perspectives on poverty prioritise poverty not as an absolute measurable condition but as a qualitative social relation. Anthropological accounts of poverty examine how the groups categorised as poor come to be so classified and by whom. This process of classification is of course essential to an international development effort which orients itself around the elimination of poverty. The final part of this article explores the social processes involved in attempting to establish the necessary systems for measuring and classifying poverty as the target of development through a brief analysis of the ongoing attempt to institutionalise internationally promoted definitions of poverty as the target of development interventions in Zanzibar.

II. INTRODUCING POVERTY

The concept of poverty has been central to the international development agenda for more than a quarter of a century. During this period the constitution of poverty, how it is conceptualised as a problem and the kinds of solutions promoted to address it, have shifted along with transformations in policy thinking, in political relationships after the Cold War and in the social sciences. Contemporary policy discourses promoting political inclusion, the participation
of the poor in policy dialogues and the recognition of the need for national ownership of strategies to reduce poverty are consequences of the paradigm shift which has sought to situate poverty reduction at the focal point of the international development effort. Economic growth in the current paradigm, as set out in the Millennium Development Targets, is not conceptualised as an end in itself but as a means through which poverty reduction can be achieved.

The World Bank as the principal agency in international development has assumed leadership in the attack on poverty. The Bank has also lead the way in establishing systematic ways of representing, analysing and theorising poverty. These have become internationally significant through the publication of the highly influential annual World Development Report; the promotion of academic research around poverty issues [Mehta, 2001] and, in the past five years, the introduction of the national poverty reduction strategies (PRS) which increasingly form the contractual basis of the relationship between donor agencies and developing country governments for countries having fulfilled the macroeconomic and regulatory requirements that are prerequisites to the new development partnerships. As the impacts of development efforts are tracked through global and national monitoring systems, the measurement and assessment of poverty has become institutionalised as a responsibility of government within aid recipient countries, as well as a specialist function within development agencies.
Increased alignment between donors around PRS and the use of direct budgetary support as the aid instrument to effect harmonization implies not only shared instruments of international aid, but shared conceptual frameworks. Reducing poverty has become not merely the stated priority of international development agencies and the target of the international development effort but certainly, within the social universe of international development at least, a total social fact. Poverty as a category of analysis, as the object of policies and as the frame through which countries, programmes and people are brought into the project of development unites seemingly disparate practices and institutions in a manner analogous to Mauss’s [1990: 3] perception of the totalising institution of the gift in non-monetised economies. More narrowly, the facticity of poverty is attested through the numerous studies and research institutions devoted to the empirical analysis of its scale and dimensions. The various poverty departments, research centres and systems for monitoring poverty nationally and internationally all point to the tangibility of poverty, its existence as an objective subject about which facts can be determined and known.

As development knowledge is first and foremost instrumental knowledge that can be made to work in realising particular policy priorities, topics for development research tend to be determined by particular interpretations of current policy agendas. The agencies and agents with a vested interest in
poverty as a policy objective determine the content of the agenda for the study of poverty in development and what issues are deemed central for the poor. This agenda is not determined by those people subject to categorisation as poor. Nor is it determined by the findings of other studies which have addressed poverty tangentially, although evidence from these studies feeds into the knowledge production cycle. The constitution of poverty as a research focus is predetermined by the current policy agendas of international development institutions, and the World Bank in particular [Escobar, 1995: 21-44; Finnemore, 1997: 208]. The discourse on poverty only began to be hegemonic after the World Bank under Robert McNamara vigorously promoted it in the 1970s. Prior to this poverty, viewed simply as the inevitable accompaniment of failure to develop economically, was rarely the explicit focus of development initiatives, or of academic study. James Wolfensohn’s Presidency in the 1990’s reinvigorated the commitment to making poverty the central focus of the Bank’s endeavours. It was only once the Bank realigned its policy priorities to the elimination of poverty that poverty assessments became central [Finnemore, 1997: 204-7]. The Bank set about trying to understand its enemy better through developing methodologies for poverty assessment and promoting the study of different aspects and dimensions of poverty. Quantitative and qualitative approaches to poverty were incorporated into Bank poverty assessments, at the same time as the Bank’s policies increasingly assimilated civil society and activist policy positions.
Conceptualisations of poverty have altered radically during this period, from the biologically informed basic needs approach of the 1970s to today’s more sophisticated understanding of poverty as multi-dimensional deprivation, not merely of income, but of capabilities, entitlements and rights [Rist, 1997; Carvalho and White, 1997; Ruggeri Laderchi et al, 2003; Kanbur and Squire, 1999; Sen, 1981; Gordon et al, 2003]. While current definitions of poverty represent a significant advance on the more restricted conceptualisations which preceded them, their widespread acceptance in policy making circles and in academia derives more from the multi-lateral framework of policy and institutions subscribing to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) than their ability to capture the experience of those categorised as poor, or from their explanatory potential in accounting for the state they set out to define [c.f. Ruggeri Laderchi et al, 2003]. Poverty as defined through MDG targets and consumption measures is a construct of international development organisations. We do not know what such categorisations mean for diverse individuals within diverse social and economic contexts. What poverty as a scale provides for development organisations is a justification for intervention and a means of ranking units, countries or regions, on a poverty index. Arguably, what the current emphasis on poverty assessment reveals is not so much the scale and magnitude of poverty in the world, as the power of development institutions to make it visible [Escobar,
1991: 664]. Poverty as an entity is brought into being through the institutions established to describe, quantify and locate it [Escobar, 1995: 21-22].

III. REPRESENTING POVERTY

Against this background of evolving policy it is not surprising that definitions of poverty, and thus proposed strategies for reducing it, differ significantly between the two World Development Reports at either end of the past decade [World Bank, 1990; 2001]. Whereas the 1990 report viewed poverty primarily in monetary terms, the 2001 report sees poverty as multifaceted deprivation not only of income but of the capabilities to achieve full human potential. Poverty from this perspective is not merely a matter of reduced income or consumption, but amounts to a state of relative powerlessness and exclusion from decision making processes. Being in a state of poverty is manifested in low levels of education, high rates of mortality and poor health, factors which also contribute to poverty [World Bank, 2001: 31]. Although the diversity of the experience of poverty globally is reiterated, through the ‘voices of the poor’ [Narayan et al, 2000], the 2001 World Development Report, in constructing poverty as an object, serves to homogenise attributes of poverty and the situation of those categorised as poor. Marginal, excluded, vulnerable, unwell, illiterate, and often indigenous and female, the poor predominantly live in remote rural areas and urban shanties, with few assets and weak social networks. Their relative powerlessness is emphasised, and by implication, the power of various groups over them, not
only of local and national elites and governments, but the power of development institutions to recognise and define them, and to determine when poverty matters. The poor have much in common in this representation and the proximate causes of their poverty, and hence policies for addressing poverty, are represented as being remarkably similar across geographical regions and national boundaries [Green and Hulme, 2005].

If the experience of poverty appears relatively homogenous, its quantitative dimensions seem equally striking. One fifth of the world’s population is represented as being in poverty; defined as living on less that $1 a day [World Bank, 2001: 3]. Graduations of poverty and the huge qualitative differences between extreme poverty and destitution on the one hand and, on the other, poverty as development policy informed by neoliberal leanings defines it are obscured in a projection of the problem, and hence the required interventions, which is made to seem amenable to economic rather than social policy prescriptions [Elson, 2000; Gledhill, 2000]. As the anthropologist Arjun Appadurai has shown in relation to the effects of the census in colonial India, technologies of representation have important consequences for the kinds of truths they reveal. Similar statistics can create an impression of the similarity of experience [Appadurai, 1993: 321; Geertz, 1984] and of the processes which contribute to poverty in diverse settings. An identity of form rather than content justifies the
grouping together of countries and populations that may be quite different, with different histories and different causes of poverty.

Quantitative methodologies and poverty lines help to create poverty as a tangible entity, a thing in itself, the scale of which can be captured through measurement. Assessing poverty, locating the poor and trying to measure comparatively the incidence and depth of poverty assumes that poverty is a state universally accessible to these technologies of representation. It is these devices that make poverty generalisable, as a state that shares commonalities across diverse settings [c.f. Hastrup 1993: 720]. Quantitative methodologies for assessing poverty allow magnitude to be addressed. Poverty can be seen to be increasing or decreasing, and the scale of poverty assessed. Quantitative indices also enable the calculation of measures to address poverty, the cost benefit analyses that are the basis of economic appraisals, and which, in the case of income and consumption, validate the models of growth needed to raise incomes and ‘lift the poor’ out of poverty. The language used in the World Development Report 2001, but which recurs elsewhere in other anti-poverty documentation from other agencies, reinforces this notion. Not only is poverty ascribed agency to impact on the lives of people who ‘fall into’ it. It is represented as an evolving entity that must be ‘attacked’ rather than as a consequence of social relations [World Bank, 2001: 21]. Size matters. The growth in poverty, its sheer scale, prompts a response. Poverty in these development writings is represented as inherently
problematic, not only for the poor themselves, whose suffering is graphically documented, but for the wider society which is threatened by it.

IV. ATTACKING POVERTY

At first sight these representations of poverty seem relatively straightforward, even obvious. Their acceptance comes partly from the fact that they are so familiar and partly because they have become a necessary and expected preamble to virtually any kind of development policy or programme documentation. In practice, such accounts are far from being unproblematic statements about the incidence of poverty in particular places, and are not intended to be. The kind of poverty they present is both highly subjective, depending on the perspective of the perceiver, and highly political, that is related to the wider context in which such rankings and accounts become important for justifying proposed interventions [Apthorpe, 1997: 24; Pansters and de Ruijter, 2000: 5]. Moreover, such descriptions are part of a long established intellectual tradition of perceiving poverty in ways which, in making poverty the object of analysis abstracts poverty from people and obscures the social processes that make certain people subject to its effects [O’Connor, 2001: 15].

The rich and processes of wealth creation are rarely the focus of these accounts. This is not because wealth and poverty are unconnected, far from it, but because such approaches are essentially concerned with a normalising vision of society
that is premised on the elimination of what is socially accorded the status of the deviant or pathological [c.f. Douglas, 1991; O’Connor, 2001]. Representations of society as functional and holistic characterised social theory for much of the twentieth century. These assumptions were not confined to the theoretical models developed by the founding fathers of sociology such as Emile Durkheim [1960]. They had significant practical implications in a period when knowledge about the social was beginning to be used as the basis of a scientific understanding of society, with implications of prediction and control [Rabinow, 1989: 171; de L’Esteole, 1997]. Michel Foucault has delineated the intellectual genealogy of this perspective in the context of the history of social policy in nineteenth century France. An evidence base concerning the spread of cholera associated the disease with the poor. Surveillance and social control were the imposed solutions, not only to epidemics, but to the potential social disruption that the poor presented. Poor victims of disease were to be treated in public hospitals not only for humanitarian reasons, but in order to generate the knowledge about the disease that was necessary to develop treatments for those with sufficient wealth to pay for it. Foucault [1976: 84] remarks, ‘What is benevolence towards the poor is transformed into knowledge that is applicable to the rich’.

Although the present day institutionalisation of knowledge about poverty in other countries is not directly comparable to the situation of medical knowledge
in nineteenth century France, the parallels are striking. Scientific, evidence based policies which adopt planning modalities based on the calculation of outcomes are not merely the accepted basis of development and wider policy practices, they are of course constitutive of the modern government with which such rational practices are associated [Rabinow, 2003: 65]. As with the medical profession’s capacity to define sickness and, backed by the state, to cordon infectivity, what constitutes knowledge about poverty and the demarcation of the poor is a consequence of the power of international development organisations and of the national governments with whom they work. With poverty as a subject the poor, who by definition lack the resources and entitlements to reframe the terms of this engagement, become objects of study.

To assert the social construction of poverty as a category within international development is not to deny that the phenomena grouped today in its classificatory frame exist or have always existed in some shape or form. Social and economic opportunities in all societies have always been inequitably distributed and large numbers have suffered the negative health and capability outcomes deriving from such exclusion. Many at the extreme end of the deprivation spectrum are destitute. Societies have always acknowledged the problem of destitution and social isolation, and distinguished this from idiosyncratic transient poverty [c.f. Iliffe, 1987: 4; Hulme and Shepherd, 2003]. What has not been so usual is the encompassing classification of substantial
proportions of a population as suffering from poverty, moreover a poverty determined largely through the application of internationally defined criteria. The social construction of poverty as the target of international development assistance means that what constitutes poverty changes depending on the perspective of those charged with its assessment. Shrestha [1995] has written about the impact of development agents’ categories of ‘poverty’ and ‘development’ on Nepalese rural communities, and the social consequences of being defined as lacking what outsiders think they should have. Similarly, Goldman [2001: 208], describing the introduction of donor driven development planning in Laos, quotes a government official poised to write his first concept paper on ‘poverty’ who remarked that it was not until Bank involvement that their government had ‘ever used the term ‘poverty’. The content of the category of ‘poverty’ is neither self evident nor universally pervasive. Indeed if it were it would surely have come to the attention of other empirical social sciences outside development, notably anthropology.

V. ANTHROPOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO POVERTY

The focus on poverty within international development institutions has fostered the emergence of a new sub profession of anti-poverty specialists and a burgeoning literature on its constitution and definition. Poverty as the object of the international development effort has become the overriding problematic in development studies, and especially in development economics, disciplines
which have a symbiotic relationship with the international development institutions that provide much of their financing. Development research and policy documentation represents poverty as an overwhelming problem of global proportions. However, despite the apparent scale and depth of poverty in the world, poverty as a research focus outside the industrialised countries of the West has yet to capture the attention of the qualitative social sciences to the same extent. This is particularly the case for social and cultural anthropology.

Social anthropology as it has evolved in the United Kingdom and cultural anthropology in the United States of America have been marginal to the policy discourses and funding steams associated with international development, at the same time as anthropological knowledge has pursued a trajectory of highly abstract knowledge influenced by deconstructionist tendencies which, is not readily adaptable to the requirements of policy makers [Horowitz, 1996; Little and Painter, 1995]. Of course, not all anthropologists have opted for deconstructionism. Applied anthropology as a distinct branch of the discipline specialising in policy relevant research, social appraisal and programming remains strong in the United States. The sub discipline is less autonomous in the United Kingdom setting, where it operates in practice under the interdisciplinary umbrella of development studies where some of the areas initially associated with anthropology have become mainstreamed into wider development practice through the adoption of participatory approaches. Although large numbers of
anthropology graduates and postgraduates are employed within development agencies in the US and across EU states, social and cultural anthropology as practiced within academic departments has effectively maintained a distinct separation from development, in recent years, except as an object of inquiry, and with it from research on and into poverty [Green, 2005; Cernea, 1995: 340-1; Little and Painter, 1995: 603; Horowitz, 1996].

The lack of engagement of anthropologists with poverty as an explicit research focus, albeit with notable exceptions [e.g. Farmer, 2003; Passaro, 1996; Scheper Hughes, 1992], is not simply a matter of the institutional context in which social and cultural anthropology operate in the US and UK. Nor is the reluctance of anthropologists to confront the topic explained by the continuing discomfort evoked by recollections of the discredited culture of poverty theorizing exemplified in the work of Oscar Lewis [O’Connor, 2001: 117-21]. More fundamentally, a qualitative analytical perspective from anthropology or sociology would start from a position of interrogating the assumed categories of analysis and the assumed object of study Accounts of ‘poverty’ from this perspective would not seek to refine globally applicable definitions, nor assume that the experiential dimensions of what was locally categorised as ‘poverty’ across time and space were similar, although there may well be similarities. Ethnographic research takes the categories through which people think their worlds and act upon them as the starting point for an analysis of the significance
of social practice. Such approaches at their best can challenge the imposition of apparently universal priorities on the social values of others. Ethnographic accounts of the constitution of social worlds, whether those of Western laboratory scientists [Latour, 1987] or of Ilongot head hunters [Rosaldo, 1980], expose the social processes of categorisation through which such worlds are constructed conceptually through practice [e.g. Douglas, 1996; Wenger, 1998; Bourdieu, 1977].

From this perspective, the anthropologist cannot be so much concerned with her own idea of poverty or with concepts of poverty derived from development documentation as with what concepts of poverty do or do not exist in particular places and at particular times. Where do these ideas come from? Who do these categories include? What does it mean to be labelled as ‘poor’, or as ‘destitute’ in these different settings? How do these categories relate to other social categories? Moreover, researchers in anthropology, in starting with human beings, as opposed to ideal types read off survey data, perceives poverty as a consequence of relations between people. For researchers in anthropology, as for our informants, poverty is a social relation, not an absolute condition [Sahlins, 1972: 37]. Ethnographic studies of communities and the social relations through which they are structured have yielded numerous insights into poverty and inequality. These include studies of rural society, and on caste, social exclusion, and the structural transformations brought about by rapid economic growth [Gudeman,
Displacement, dispossession, the social construction of property relations and how people have rights over other people are long standing anthropological themes. Anthropological studies have consistently demonstrated the social constitution of categories and the importance of social relations as the bedrock of inequality [Dumont, 1970; Douglas, 1991; Hart, 2001]. Such accounts point to the distortions inherent in viewing poverty in absolute and ahistorical terms and, in presenting poverty as a wholly subject position, of denying the agency of those so categorised.

As the gaze of anthropological researchers adjusts to accommodate post-colonial landscapes, anthropologists have looked inwards and upwards at their objects of study. Anthropologists now concern themselves not with local societies as self reproducing social universes [e.g. Evans Pritchard, 1940], or with the articulation of these into metropolitan or capitalist relations of production as in the Marxist derived visions of the unequal economic integration of third world local communities and first world industrial centres of the 1970s [e.g. Meillassoux, 1981], but with the entire span of social relations that comprise the contemporary world. No longer focusing solely on small-scale rural communities mostly in non-Western countries, anthropologists today conduct research into diverse social worlds in all social contexts and across all continents. Recent works by anthropologists explore the social relations around new fertility practices in the United Kingdom [Franklin, 1997], how ‘ordinary’ North Americans think about
mathematics in their daily numerical practices [Lave, 1988] and the implementation of education policy on Kilimanjaro [Stambach, 2000]. Anthropologists are also exploring the institutions through which contemporary international society is constituted. Examples include Richard Wilson’s [2001] study of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Laura Nader’s work on the social processes through which special kinds of knowledge come to have status as ‘science’, with all the claims to truth that this category implies [Nader et al, 1996], and Ian Harper’s [1997] ethnography of the IMF. 

As well as globalisation and the changing nature of contemporary life in all societies, anthropological research has become more concerned with larger issues of human suffering and how these are brought about by the conjuncture of specific social and political relations [Das et al, 1998; Farmer, 2003]. Pertinent examples include Malkki’s [1995] account of the relation between refugee status and the emergence of a politicised ethnicity amongst Hutu exiles in Tanzanian refugee camps during the 1980s, Harrell Bond’s [1986] classic ethnography of life for the recipients of humanitarian assistance in a refugee camp in Sudan, and Paul Richard’s [1996] empathetic analysis of the meaning and motivation behind an atrocity filled guerrilla war in Sierra Leone. Away from the aftermath of war, anthropologists have acknowledged ill-being in the unavoidable ‘violence of everyday life’ brought about by appalling social conditions in some very poor communities. Nancy Scheper Hughes’ [1992] description of the normalisation of
infant mortality in a chronically low-income *favela* in Brazil shows how because poor mothers expect that weaker children will die as a matter of course, they do little to save them. Dying infants and those perceived as having minimal chances of survival are treated as little ‘angels’ who are merely visiting the living and are not expected to be anything other than the most transient of guests. Schepers Hughes [2002] has since turned her attention to the transnational social relations of inequality that promote and sustain the trade in human flesh between first and third worlds- not slavery or prostitution, but the buying and selling of body parts, blood, kidneys and corneas.

If poverty as a state and status is the manifestation of social relations it is also a category of representation through which social agents classify and act upon the world. An anthropological approach explores the content of this category and its genealogy in relation to the specific historical and social contexts in which it has salience for different categories of persons. These approaches reveal the continuity between current notions of poverty in development and social policy, and the assumptions that inform them. As we have seen, these centre on normative ideas of social order and a perception of poverty as an inherent threat to this order. Poverty is not represented as the outcome of historical and social relations but as a problem that must be eliminated to maintain social functionality. Where social relations are described as contributing to poverty these are represented as flawed in terms of quality, rather than content, as in the
policy discourse about social capital where the low quality of local social relations is deemed to contribute to poverty, rather than the terms on which a community is embedded within wider regional, national and international economies [c.f. Bracking, 2003]. The ahistoricism of such visions is also echoed in some contemporary development representations of poverty in which poverty is presented as a state in the present with causal relations similarly present-focused, as exemplified in ‘livelihoods’ frameworks and some PPAs, rather than as the outcome of longer historical processes.

VI. MARGINALITY AS SOCIAL PROCESS

Historically informed perspectives on poverty reveal not only the social construction of the category within specific historical and institutional settings, and the key role of powerful institutions in globalising the poverty agenda, but also the fact that the constitution of the kind of poverty that development practitioners aspire to reduce is itself a product of the socio economic relations of modernity. If poverty is measured in terms of access to services and levels of income or consumption, those seemingly excluded from market participation and services require integration into state and market systems for poverty to be addressed [Green and Hulme, 2005]. This integration, or rather the terms on which the certain social groups are integrated, can be a point of transition from sustainable community to social exclusion, from locally enfranchised to disenfranchised and destitute. The San of Botswana, an ethnic and cultural
group associated with a semi-peripatetic lifestyle and a mode of subsistence based on the gathering of wild foods, hunting and casual labour on cattle ranches, provide a case in point. Land reforms have restricted their rights of access to game and wild resources, forcing an increased reliance on low wages in the ranching sector. Those without paid employment have been made dependant on meagre state handouts, which do not compensate for the loss of the hunting resources now claimed by the national elite. Although the San had previously been poor, occupying a kind of vassal position in relation to herding landlords, they had been able to mitigate this with access to game and the possibility of foraging [Wilmsen, 1989]. Their present situation of destitution is a direct consequence of the terms of their integration into the contemporary state [Good, 1999].

Marginality is not always perceived as wholly negative by those communities wishing to limit such engagement. Indeed, some groups strive to maintain their autonomy through marginal relations to mainstream society and the state, relations characterised by Roma and traveller communities in Eastern and Western Europe and by some contemporary hunting and gathering communities in Africa and Asia. Such groups may strive to evade entrapment into the economic relations that characterise the society they wish not to be subject to. This is achieved through the adoption of livelihood strategies involving nomadism, economic activities that yield immediate economic returns (for
example foraging) [Woodburn, 1981], and an emphasis on the redistribution of resources through gambling and sharing, rather than accumulation and saving. Such strategies are an important aspect of identity and self-definition for these communities, but the ideological emphasis on freedom is limited in practice by the very real powerlessness they face in relation to other social groups and the state. Subject to discrimination, often excluded from education and denied inclusion on anything other than the terms set by the majority, such groups become encapsulated within highly restricted economic and cultural niches [Day, Papataxiarchis and Stewart, 1999]. Marginality in relation to place is equally an artefact of social and historical processes, namely historical decisions to situate the centre elsewhere, rather than an inherent attribute of people or places. Anna Tsing’s [1993] account of a remote forest community in Indonesia reveals how they see themselves as fortunate to live in an ‘out of the way’ place, far from the parasitical state. The ethnography demonstrates how ‘out of the wayness’, and marginality, are socially, historically and intentionally constructed [ibid., 1993: 41-71], by those defined as marginal as well as by those with the power to enforce it.xii

VII. THE MORAL BASIS OF MARGINALITY

Marginality and social exclusion, once established, are often reinforcing. While deliberate processes of discrimination are rarely admitted, they are clearly evident in the kinds of mutually reinforcing policies applied to many marginal
communities and which serve to ensure that the odds against their integration into mainstream society are often insurmountable. Extreme examples of this kind of strategy are the policies pursued by the Australian government against Aboriginal communities [Mc Knight, 2002], the Botswana state’s policies on the San and the systemic institutionalisation of discrimination against black citizens in the United States of America. Mortality rates for black citizens of some US cities are higher than those in some of the world’s poorest countries [Sen, 1999] and a significant proportion of young black American men are in prison.xiii Discourses legitimating differential treatment for communities on the basis of differences in lifestyle and livelihoods accompany these exclusionary strategies, informing not merely the negative stereotyping of minority cultural groups but providing the rationalisation for a perception of exclusion as a problem of the excluded categories. Poverty becomes not only a problem of the poor, but also their responsibility.

The notion that certain individuals and social groups are undeserving of assistance because they somehow cause their own poverty is pervasive in the United States, where it informs racist discourse about non-white low income groups [Adair, 2002: 464]. The anthropologists Felipe Bourgois [2003] has written about the problems faced by young male Puerto Ricans in a run down district of New York City who find their access to even low income jobs restricted through a combination of institutional racism and the feminisation of the unskilled sector.
One of the few options for young men to earn good money in the neighbourhood is through the illegal drugs trade, selling highly profitable crack cocaine to a client group consisting of addicts from outside the Puerto Rican community. Only a minority of men in the neighbourhood earn their living in this way, but the high rewards and glamour of the big dealer lifestyle make an appealing, and rational, career option for those men willing to practice sufficient violence to gain ‘respect’ and ensure that their supply networks are protected.

Involvement in violence, drugs and crime perpetuate the stereotypical images of the neighbourhood, effectively a ‘no go’ zone for those who see themselves as law abiding and for the better off who can afford to live elsewhere. Ghetto dwellers working in the legal economic sector of the city become daily commuters out of poverty, only to commute back in once their working day is finished. Outsiders blame ghetto poverty on what they categorise as the drugs and guns culture of the ghetto. Bourgois shows how the ghetto and its poverty are best viewed in social and historical context, as the products of and reaction to particular social and economic configurations in the United States and the ongoing colonial subjugation of Puerto Rico. Puerto Rican poverty has very little to do with the cultural practices and attitudes of Puerto Ricans but rather serves US interests, both within Manhattan, where Puerto Rican migrants provide a source of cheap labour and in Puerto Rico where industrial production can take place for US firms free of the constraints for the firm and protection for the
labourer provided by US labour laws. Interestingly, the cultural values of the men that Bourgois worked with were not very different from those of mainstream American society – a desire to get on, make some money, a belief in the free market and individual freedom, and the belief that poverty is both an individual responsibility and an index of moral failure.xiv

The US approach to welfare is informed by an ideology of individual economic responsibility in which failure to achieve, and hence poverty, is viewed as a failure and thus as the responsibility of the individual, a kind of rational choice. The perception of poverty as a moral failure justifies punitive welfare interventions [Adair, 2002: 460-2]. Welfare regimes based on an assumption that the majority of the poor are undeserving and need to be closely monitored are oriented towards making public assistance hard to obtain and unpleasant to survive on. Various schemes aimed at getting people to work, often for very low wages, aim to make the poor more deserving of assistance through labour, hence the concept of ‘workfare’. Claimants must permit state scrutiny of their homes and private lives over their consumption and spending. These attitudes are not confined to the United States. They inform recent attempts at welfare reform in European countries, including the UK, and underlie the promotion of conditional transfer programmes more generally. These programmes, of which Progresa (now called Opportunidades) in Mexico is the best known, make access to support dependant on the recipient’s compliance with the objectives of other social
programming, notably in health and education [Lazar, 2004], that is on being able to demonstrate that they are not merely in need but are morally deserving.

Ideas about the responsibility of the poor for their own poverty have a long history in Western society.\textsuperscript{xv} They were the basis of discourses about poverty and social responsibility for the destitute in England until the mid twentieth century, hence the intentionally punitive welfare regimes in workhouses where the destitute could go to seek food and shelter in return for hard labour in conditions that were explicitly designed to replicate the prison.\textsuperscript{xvi} Related attitudes live on in popular perceptions of poverty even within poor communities [Woodhouse, 2003] and within the international development community [Hossain and Moore, 1999]. Donor preoccupations with accounting for even trivial amounts of cash when spent in villages reflect similar concerns whereas central spending of hundreds or thousands attracts little audit attention within country and head quarters offices where the emphasis is on millions. There is no doubt that the idea of giving cash as opposed to food aid in famine situations is still widely resisted because of a belief that this would benefit the undeserving poor, despite evidence to suggest that this is cheaper and more effective in supporting local grain markets and empowering local people than food aid [de Waal, 1989; Devereux, 2002]. Food for work programmes also promote this way of thinking, the idea that the work should be so menial and unpleasant and lowly paid that a person would have to be virtually starving to
want to do it, (what is referred to as ‘self targeting’) rather than simply allocate funds to those in need of support which it is feared would create ‘dependency’. The labour intensive public work schemes for minimal pay to provide relief for the very poor are similar. Such schemes may provide some people with some income but they will never alter the unequal structure of social relations nor address the macroeconomic conditions that keep people in poverty [McCord, 2003].

VIII. SOCIAL CRITIQUE AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION

The social critique of the society of the poor, rather than the society that produces poverty, is equally present in development thinking, even in the very paradigm of international development as a moral imperative itself. Certainly, where the development paradigm is premised on an explicit desire to transform societies deemed as poor and therefore as somehow dysfunctional, a moral judgement implying social failure is never far away. Although small scale sanitation and latrine projects may seem very different on the surface from the recent drive to foster strong social networks and relationships of trust through civil society support programmes thought to build social capital, both types of interventions depend on shared assumptions about the inappropriateness of certain kinds of social organisation and social practices for achieving development or conversely on an association between poverty and particular social and institutional forms. This kind of thinking is most evident in ambitious social modernization
programmes carried out by governments [Scott, 1998] and in some colonial social policy [Lewis, 2000]. It also informed the strategies of colonial Christian missions which strove to associate their ideas of desirable society with what was termed ‘civilization’, implying a wholesale devaluation of the societies that were the targets of conversion [Comaroff and Comaroff, 1991; Green, 2003]. Similarly, the sanitation policies so vigorously pursued in colonial Fiji [Thomas, 1994], the mass campaigns for the eradication of sleeping sickness [Lyons, 1992] and tsetse fly which involved large scale reorganisation of rural communities into new and more governable social forms were premised on the notion of the inappropriateness of certain kinds of social organisation and social practices for what was defined as positive change [Chachage, 1988].

Although accounts of the one sidedness of developer-developpee relationships are no longer an accurate reflection of development partnerships in which poverty reduction strategies are created nationally and in collaboration with those deemed to be stakeholders, the scope for equal partnerships is clearly limited by the political considerations of aid and the economic influence of donors [Lewis, 1998; Crewe and Harrison, 1999]. Opportunities for local and national initiatives are also constrained by the dominance of particular visions of development problems and solutions which attain legitimacy at particular times. This explains why the content of development strategies and plans, even when these are prepared under substantial national or local ownership and where participatory
modalities have been encouraged, reveal remarkable similarities across countries and continents. This uniformity comes about through the effects of a variety of mechanisms, including the policy influence of a limited number of organisations, the standardisation of development planning and analytical practices across many organisations in development from NGOs to multi-laterals, and the relatively restricted pool within which the same professionals circulate from agency to agency [Green, 2003]. Also significant is the production of what comes to be constituted as authoritative knowledge about development, and with poverty as the central problematic, about poverty itself [Cooper and Packard, 1997: 24; Goldman, 2001; Moore, 2001]. Current claims to authoritative knowledge are dispersed through the development satellite agencies universities, development research institutes and NGOs as part of the World Bank’s strategy to become, as ‘knowledge Bank’, the centre of knowledge about development [Mehta, 2001]. The Bank not only conducts research on development but assimilates different knowledge on development into its understanding of development to present a unitary but evolving vision. This perspective informs the increasing complexity of the Bank’s accounts of development and of the factors which may be significant for its realization.

This power to know is also, inevitably, the power to judge. Just as notions of the deserving poor and the culture of poverty seem natural to apply at the level of individuals within wealthy societies, so the same moral judgements are
implicitly made when advocating mass social transformation or cultural change as precursors to ‘development’. And, as with the intrusive state’s power to invade the domestic space of welfare mothers in the US to assess whether they have spent their rations wisely or have cheated the system [Adair, 2002: 460], so the inequalities of power mean that the benefactor also claims the power not only to judge the moral claims of the poor to assistance, and to police them, but to set the terms of the assessment. Participatory poverty assessments permit, at least formally, the poor themselves to engage in framing the terms by which poverty in particular places is recognised. They do not radically shift the relations of power through which the non-poor and the outside determines when and how poverty is to be recognised and assessed. New modalities for facilitating local ownership of development strategies through the PRSP process potentially offer space for local definitions of poverty and strategies for action to emerge within the global discourse of poverty reduction [Booth, 2003]. The extent to which such mechanisms provide an opportunity to address inequality and poverty must remain open to question [Weber, 2004]. Given that poverty is neither an absolute condition, nor a readily identifiable entity, and that the content of the category is ultimately politically determined, it is not surprising that the new institutional structures for perceiving poverty become politicised contexts where poverty can be claimed not so much as a problem for some social categories, but as a potential asset by others who stand to gain from the inputs associated with the development relationship. xviii
This process works itself out in different ways depending on the power relations involved in the construction of poverty. In South Africa under Apartheid for example, what was in effect a participatory poverty study although termed a ‘commission of inquiry’ financed by the Carnegie Foundation, a US charitable entity, became a forum where the politics of apartheid could be publicly critiqued, within and outside South Africa. Local ownership and involvement in the design of the study created credibility and ensured that the product was viewed as an indigenous, rather than an outsider, vision [Bell, 2002]. In contrast, the weight attached to development rankings in relation to determining priorities for spending makes the positioning in rankings critical for governments or regions seeking to maximise their credibility as deserving recipients of international assistance, even where these rankings are determined by outsiders. It is in the interests of some countries to be categorised as poor and to be ranked as amongst the poorest in order to justify claims for development support just as it is in the interests of donors to represent them this way. Development rankings, including poverty, are differently interpreted and assessed depending on the policy priorities of different donors and different governments [Viopio, 2000: 189]. These rankings and indicators are never just perceived as data (nor are they intended to be), but as ‘message, meaning and judgement... the most strongly identified and perhaps contested messages... [are] ... official social and cultural
values and open or hidden policy agendas seen to be driving, not driven by, numerical scores and rankings’ [Apthorpe, 1997: 24, my emphasis].

IX. INSTITUTIONALISING POVERTY: THE EXAMPLE OF ZANZIBAR

The centrality of poverty reduction to the national strategies of aid recipient governments has promoted the new institutionalisation of poverty outside the research centres and outside the Bank itself. While the Bank relied on consultants and its national offices to work with local research institutes and governments to provide data for assessments, UNDP were working with developing country partners to establish national systems for monitoring poverty that would provide indicators for progress in the implementation of National Poverty Reduction Strategies and Development Visions. The introduction of Poverty Reduction Strategy papers as vehicles for the formalisation of what are in effect national development strategies based on the development visions and poverty reduction plans legitimated the institutionalisation of poverty monitoring within governments as a state function. With the institutionalisation of poverty came the need to formally integrate poverty into policy and planning. This entails making all policies relate to the overarching policy objective of poverty reduction.

In practice the linking of anti-poverty policies with an evidence base about poverty is difficult. Not only are national statistical and information systems under resourced and weak, but also the indicators selected to represent for
poverty do not necessarily capture its multifaceted dimensions and may not be responsive to the proposed interventions [Lucas, 2000: 100]. In addition, it is far from clear in poor countries where the line should be drawn, if at all, between degrees of poverty, resulting in a tendency to categorise virtually all policies as poverty reducing and in the imposition of poverty as a blanket label justifying a broad brush approach to resource allocation within and between countries, perpetuating vast inequalities in the allocation of development resources [Baulch, 2003; Minujin and Delamonica, 2003].

An east African example clearly illustrates the way in which poverty is institutionalised at the national level as an object of assessment and the target of policy. These processes are evident in the ongoing drive to create a poverty focus in Tanzania and Zanzibar, the outcome of an initiative spearheaded by multilateral agencies, notably UNDP. What emerges from a brief comparison of the establishment of poverty as a development priority in these two settings is the politically constructed content of the category poverty and the ways in which poverty, once defined as the main development problem, comes to assume status as an analytical device which is used to account for other problems development policy seeks to address, ranging from agriculture to governance. Zanzibar is formally part of the United Republic of Tanzania, although it exists as a separate country within the Union, with its own parliament and own spheres of responsibility. Excluded from access to EU aid for much of the past decade, as a
consequence of political conditionalities over the management of elections (amongst other things), Zanzibar is in the process of seeking readmission into the ambit of Western development assistance. Excluded from the HIPC initiative (and hence from the necessity to produce a PRSP) due to the aid boycott and the fact that development assistance is a responsibility, formally at least, of the Union Government, in 2002 Zanzibar was nevertheless striving to demonstrate its commitment to the core aims of international development in a bid to re-build its relationships with aid donors. As a result Zanzibar has adopted the poverty reduction model piloted on the mainland, and was seeking to frame its development policies in terms of a Zanzibar Poverty Reduction Plan (ZPRP).

The poverty reduction plan approach was promoted by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), whose staff provided the technical assistance to adapt approaches developed elsewhere to the new setting. The ZPRP represented the situation in Zanzibar as defined by poverty which is equated, in background studies, to the extent and intensity of poverty on the mainland. Poverty on Zanzibar was attributed to various causes, and assigned various solutions, most advocating economic investment and industrial expansion. The ZPRP analysis at that time omitted reference to the political conflicts which have disrupted governance and public services since the 1960’s and contributed to asymmetrical subsidisation of the islands’ population of less than one million from the United Republic’s coffers. Indeed, according to some estimates Zanzibar
received subsidies from the United Republic of Tanzania in excess of $870 million US dollars between 1983 and 1999, an amount greater than the eleven years of Tanzania’s development expenditure from 1986-1997 [Maliyamkono, 2000: 214]. During this time Zanizbar was not starved of funds. It derived substantial wealth from its foreign exchange and tariff regimes that made its ports a channel through which international goods could be easily imported [ibid: 213, 187]. Against this background, poverty as an effect emerges as a result of significantly more complex relations and processes than represented in the ZPRP documentation with its emphasis on feeder roads and access to markets.

The analysis of poverty and equation of Zanzibar poverty with mainland poverty creates the impression that we are dealing with a phenomenon which is fundamentally similar in the islands and on the Tanzania mainland. While this may be the case at the level of manifestation, that is of effect in terms of poverty headcounts, poor nutrition and infant mortality for example, the causes of poverty, and hence realistic solutions to it, are radically different in the two countries which have radically different economies, different histories and, in all likelihood, different trajectories of development. As both cause and effect of the respective problems of Zanzibar and Tanzania the ZPRP says virtually nothing about the very different economic and social profiles of the two countries, nor about the very different historical and contemporary political relations which have contributed to the way they are today.
X. THE POVERTY OF REPRESENTATIONS

If poverty as a category in development is the outcome of politically contested processes of negotiation, with variable content, what then does it mean to assert that so many people live in poverty or that poverty needs to be attacked? As we have seen, the content of the category of poverty is not specific. It conveys a range of associations, including consumption measures and access to basic services, aggregated at rather crude levels with an emphasis on magnitude and scale. The quantification of poverty permits the homogenisation of poverty across time and space. This drive to generalise permits the construction of poverty rankings which aim to compare the amount and depth of poverty, rather than its causes and consequences. The tendency to generalise equally informs qualitative approaches – especially the participatory poverty assessments (PPAs) – to apprehending poverty which have concentrated on how poverty is similarly manifested in different places rather than on the historical and social factors which differentially contribute to poverty in different places. Such accounts tell us that people are hungry because of lack of access to food or that infant mortality is high because of poor health services. They do not however tell us why food cannot be accessed or why health services are inadequate, but this is essential if effective action is to be taken.
The emphasis on poverty as the problem and the locus of analysis diverts attention from the social relations, local, national and international, which produce poverty as an attribute of people. Very often it is not among the poor that we should be looking for those relations which have contributed most to the poverty of others. The reification of poverty deflects from the issue of agency. Poverty is not a ‘thing’ to be attacked, but the outcome of specific social relations that require investigation and transformation. Focusing on social relations highlights the centrality of the actions and strategies of rich and poor alike in determining poverty outcomes, and the quality of the embodied experience of deprivation. Robert Chambers [2001: 303] reminds us that for the most marginal the only asset they have is their bodies. While the able bodied can sell their labour as long as they are able, inadequate access to health services and high risk of accidents renders many destitute. Some are forced to transact this asset in other ways. Prostitution, bondage, slavery and the sale of human organs are the ultimate reminders that wealth buys life, literally, and other people. It is not so much the threat posed by the poor but the threats to the poor that should concern us. Quantification can capture the extent of the incidence of such practices. It cannot capture the nexus of desperation which forces people to consider them as choices. As well as encouraging us to be more reflexive about our categories and labelling, anthropology can make an important contribution here.
NOTES

i But there are exceptions. See for example Farmer [2003], Passaro [1996] and Scheper Hughes [1992].

ii See the Bank’s website for the full mission statement and accounts of how the Bank works with the poorest people in the poorest countries and its aspirations to be the primary source of knowledge about development (http://www.worldbank.org).

iii Once poverty reduction becomes a goal for public policy then poverty must be turned into something tangible that can be measured and about which correlates can be identified.

iv For a comparative example in the West see O’Connor [2001], who shows that while early poverty studies in the UK and USA were influenced by an activist agenda poverty knowledge since the 1960’s, certainly in the US, has been largely policy determined.

v James Ferguson [1990: 27] remarks of such statements apparently based on empirical research which find their way into development documentation and which are contradicted by more academic studies, which are not cited, that ‘It must be recognized that which is being done here is not some sort of strangely bad scholarship, but something else entirely.’


vii See for example Baumann’s [1998] description of the new ‘poor’ in consumer societies whose poverty is manifested through inability to share in the purchase of the consumer items through which identity is articulated.
For a discussion of the relation between subjection and agency in academic representations of the ‘Other’ see Prakash [1994].

The book is concerned with averagely educated adults in urban communities in the US, who have not had anything other than elementary education in mathematics. Lave shows how most think of themselves as unable to ‘do math’, but in practice are adept at managing essential calculations in daily life, a kind of popular mathematics.

Riles’ [2001] ethnography of transnational activist networks leading up to a UN summit is another pertinent example.

Devereux’s [2003] distinction between poverty and destitution is pertinent here, in highlighting the social nature of destitution as a situation where people are rendered dependent on others through social and economic constraints which render their livelihoods unsustainable.

Similarly, the economic stagnation of much of southern Tanzania, and its ensuing ‘poverty’, owes much to game protection policies of successive colonial and post colonial governments which have created and maintained one of the largest game reserves in Africa right in the middle of what was until the early twentieth century the economic heartland of the region [Green, 2003; Seppala, 1998].

According to the 2001 World Development Report, ‘the life expectancy of African Americans is about the same as that in China and in some states in India’ [World Bank, 2001: 46].

‘Like most other people in the United States, drug dealers and street criminals are scrambling to obtain their piece of the pie as fast as possible. In fact, in their pursuit of
success they are even following the minute details of the classical Yankee model for upward mobility. They are aggressively pursuing careers as private entrepreneurs; they take risks; work hard and pray for good luck’ [Bourgois, 2003: 326].

Prior to the introduction of the workhouse, parish relief in England was quite generous towards the destitute and was unconditional [Fogel, 2004].

For a contemporary account of the conditions inside workhouses at the start of the twentieth century, and for insights into Victorian attitudes towards poverty, see the novelist Jack London’s The People of the Abyss, originally published in 1903 [1998].

Aid, Mary Anderson [1999: 55] points out, and the way in which it is delivered conveys implicit and explicit ethical messages.

In the form of contracts, large scale, resource transfers, opportunities for employment, travel and study tours, capacity and institution building, seating allowances and so on.

For an overview of poverty in Tanzania in the context of PRS see Ellis and Ntenga [2003].

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