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Transnational social fields and imperialism

Bringing a theory of power to Transnational Studies

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Abstract
Transnational Studies have allowed scholars to move beyond a methodological nationalism that conflates society and the nation-state. Yet rather than addressing globe-spanning systems of power, Transnational Studies that focus on transnational communities or diasporas obscure important relations of power. More recently there has been a spate of publishing on the ‘new’ imperialism that offers global theories of power. However, much of the emerging scholarship on imperialism fails to examine the processes that legitimate and assist imperial control. By theorizing transnational social fields, transnational migration studies offer insights into the social and cultural processes of imperialist intervention. Drawing from ethnographic research with fundamentalist Christians and Haitian long-distance nationalists, the article argues that our scholarship must examine the relationship between the transnational social fields and imperialist power.

Key Words
imperialism • long-distance nationalism • migrants • power • religion • transnational social fields • Transnational Studies

In the last 15 years there has been a flourishing scholarship – almost an industry – of Transnational Studies that has examined transnational flows of culture, ideas, capital and people. Transnational Studies have allowed scholars to move beyond a methodological nationalism that conflates society and the nation-state. More recently there has been a spate of publishing on the ‘new’ imperialism that offers theories of power that extend transnationally or even globally. Yet strangely, there have been almost no links made between the literature on transnationalism and the renewed discussions of imperialism. Such links need to be made in order to move Transnational Studies beyond the level of description and towards a new theory of society. This new theory building must analyze relations of culture and power that extend into transnational social fields,
while also noting the power of the institutional nexus of different states. In this article, I first offer a critical overview of the development of Transnational Studies focusing on: (1) the retarded development of Transnational Studies; (2) the theoretical advances facilitated by Transnational Studies; and (3) the processes that Transnational Studies tend to obscure. The article builds on recent efforts to theorize imperialism, which have developed within debates about empire. Drawing from my ethnographic research with fundamentalist Christians and studies of Haitian long-distance nationalism, I argue that in order to develop a theory of globe-spanning power and society, Transnational Studies must examine the relationship between the transnational social fields and the contemporary restructuring of imperial power. Of particular interest are questions of the dynamic between transnational networks and ideologies of legitimation, an interconnection that has not been examined by theorists of imperialism.

Before beginning, I want to distinguish between Transnational Studies and Global Studies, which I see as two different levels of analysis. In Global Studies the concern is with phenomena that affect the planet. Capitalism is now, for example, a global system that has become the context and medium of human relationships. The term globalization, accordingly, refers to periods of relatively increased unequal integration of the world through capitalist production, distribution, marketing, and consumption. Transnational Studies highlight processes and connections across specific state borders. State actors and institutions are understood to be important participants in shaping but not limiting the social, cultural, economic, and political linkages of people. Transnational Studies allow us to theorize about the changing role and nature of the state by keeping state processes and structures within our frame of analysis and yet not confining our field of study within the borders of any one state. This new scholarship allows us to see that the present phase of globalization is marked by a ‘hyper-presence’ and ‘hyper-absence’ of the state (Suárez-Orozco, 2001). However, neither Transnational Studies nor Global Studies have been able to adequately address the system of domination in which certain states use institutions of finance capital (euphemistically called ‘the international lending community’) backed by force to intervene in the affairs of other states. Before I tackle that issue by drawing on efforts to theorize imperialism, I first turn to my evaluation of Transnational Studies.

**CONCERN ONE: THE RETARDED DEVELOPMENT OF TRANSNATIONAL STUDIES**

Since even a cursory knowledge of world history reveals multiple long-distance connections of trade, culture, religion, and migration, why have Transnational Studies only emerged within the past 15 years? Why has their emergence been highly contested, especially in the field of migration? The short answer is methodological nationalism. Methodological nationalism has been a potent barrier to the study of transnational processes. Methodological nationalism is an intellectual orientation that assumes national borders to be the natural unit of study, equates society with the nation-state, and conflates national interests with the purposes of social science. When scholars shed the assumptions of methodological nationalism, it is clear that nation-state building was from the beginning a transborder process. While nation-states are always constructed within a range of activities that strive to control and regulate territory, discipline subjects, and socialize citizens, these processes and activities do not necessarily occur within a
single national territory. A deeper understanding of transborder processes is necessary in order to seriously address contemporary forms of imperial rule. Andreas Wimmer and I have written several papers offering a historical and conceptual analysis of the rise of methodological nationalism in the social sciences, current efforts to repudiate it, and its lingering resonance, so here I will move on to the next issue (see Wimmer and Glick Schiller, 2002a, 2002b, 2003).

CONCERN TWO: THE THEORETICAL ADVANCES FACILITATED BY TRANSNATIONAL STUDIES

The transnational paradigm allows social theorists to re-envision society. No longer equating society to the territorial boundaries of nation-states, they can bring theoretical clarity to the concept of transnational social fields of social relations. However, while there is a wealth of descriptive literature on multiple forms of transnational social fields (including those established by corporations, non-governmental organizations, religious associations and media of various types) and transnational migration, only a handful of scholars question the implications of their data for theory of power and society. For example, many scholars of transnational migration view the social fields engendered by transnational migration as anomalous. That is to say, while they extend the boundaries of their analysis to encompass transborder social relations or transactions, many researchers do not acknowledge the theoretical challenges implicit in their transnational studies.

A few migration scholars have taken the next step. Morawska (2003a, 2003b) proposes a conceptualization of migration as 'structuration' to posit the continuing dynamic between structure and agency that extends into a transnational domain. Faist (2000a, 2000b), reasoning along similar lines, strives to conceptualize a domain of cross-border social relations that he refers to as 'transnational social spaces'. He privileges social relations and institutions, defining these spaces as 'characterized by a high density of interstitial ties on informal or formal, that is to say institutional levels' (Faist, 2000b: 189). Guarnizo (1997) and Landolt (2001) refer to a 'transnational social formation'. Others have noted the influence of transborder citizens, who either with dual citizenships or as social citizens become incorporated simultaneously in multiple social locations in various states. These transborder citizens experience, shape, and contest the governmentality of more than one state (Bauböck, 2003; Glick Schiller, 2005a; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003). This work resonates with the growing number of social theorists who are seeking to move beyond 'the container theory of society' (Beck, 2000; Castells, 1996; Faist, 2000a; Urry, 2000).

However, in their efforts to think beyond the methodological nationalism of the container approach to society, some theorists of global processes downplay the concept of the social as they reconfigure the concept of society. Beck's formulation of 'reflexive cosmopolitization' and much of the related literature on cosmopolitanism, for example, largely abandons an exploration of social relations and social context. In Beck's (2000) cosmopolitanism, as in Luhmann's world society, communication technologies become key. Global media flows and consumerism lead to a new form of consciousness. Social relations and social positioning fall out of the analysis; the individual and the global intersect. Without a concept of the social, the relations of power and privilege exercised by social actors based within structures and organizations cannot be studied or analyzed.
In addition, by trying to move beyond methodological nationalism, much of this theory-building neglects the continuing power of the nation-state.

Instead I have suggested a view of society and social membership based on a concept of social field (Glick Schiller, 1999, 2003, 2004; Glick Schiller and Fouron, 1999; Levitt and Glick Schiller, 2004). The notion of social field exists in social science literature in several different forms. I draw on those proposed by Bourdieu and by the Manchester school of anthropology. Bourdieu used the concept of social field to call attention to the ways in which social relationships are structured by power. The boundaries of a field are fluid and the field itself is created by the participants who are joined in a struggle for social position. Society for Bourdieu is the intersection of various fields within a structure of politics (Jenkins, 1992: 86). While his approach does not preclude the notion of transnational social fields, he does not directly discuss the implications of social fields that are not coterminous with state boundaries. In contrast I begin with the social network that I define as an egocentric set of ongoing social relationships. A social field is a network of networks. The concept of transnational social fields, which are networks of networks that stretch across the borders of nation-states, should serve not only as an indictment of the container theory of society but as a step in the further development of a concept of society. Yet much of Transnational Studies has obscured and rendered invisible the structures of politics that stretch beyond state borders.

CONCERN THREE: THE PROCESSES THAT TRANSTATIONAL STUDIES TEND TO OBSCURE

Transnational studies continue in other ways to maintain a form of boundary-making that obscures important social and political processes that must be scrutinized in order for this research to contribute to social theory, including the revitalized study of imperialism and its configurations. It is possible to celebrate transnational flows of culture and people, or to censure or advocate for transnational capital and still think within the boundaries of cultural identities that are ultimately linked to territorially based nation-states and their maintenance or construction. Transnational Studies can resurrect methodological nationalism of a new type and become a form of transnational methodological nationalism. Scholars have tended to bring their ethno-gaze into their theories of society, as if everyone is always and necessarily constrained by some form of culturally based and ultimately territorially linked identity. Consequently, certain transnational connections have remained understudied and need to be examined and theorized.

For example, many researchers who study migration and other transnational processes speak of ‘transnational communities’. Among the many problems with such an approach is that it privileges an ethno-cultural unit of analysis. Researchers often define as their unit of study a population not bounded by time or space but contained within the boundaries of an ethnic/national identification. Serious distortions of the social relationships of migrants, both locally and transnationally, follow. Those persons who choose identities and social relations not confined to the ethnic population fall out of the research and the development of theory. Yet there are many possible ways that migrants organize their relationships and identities in both a new land and transnationally that take them beyond the confines of ethnic organization and identity. Even long-distance nationalists who identify with a nation-state building project in an ancestral homeland...
usually live within a social field that includes multiple social networks that are not ethnically based.

The growth of diaspora studies suffers from the same shortcoming or – I would even say – fatal flaw. Diaspora studies generally are concerned with nation-state based identities; the population being scrutinized is understood to be a nation that has been dispersed from its homeland or desires its own homeland. Bounded concepts of diasporic identities may shroud social and political processes and relations of power including the exercise of systems of imperialism. Even when migrants are identified by religion, the concern is often with an ethno-religious unit – Hindu nationalists who are part of an Indian religious movement, Sikhs struggling for Khalistan, Jews building Israel.

Alternative ways of being and belonging that include movements organized in terms of labor, social struggles, and religion often have been kept analytically separate from, first, migration research and now transnational migration studies. Recent scholarship has taken steps to rectify this problem by highlighting the dynamics of transnational families and worldwide religious networks (Allievi and Nielsen, 2003; Bryceson and Vuorela, 2002; Levitt, 2003; Vasquez and Friedmann Marquardt, 2003). Other developments within transnational social fields can further contribute to a social field concept of society. These developments highlight the interplay between the agency of migrants and the power of imperial states with a global terrain.

**THE POWER OF IMPERIAL STATES WITH A GLOBAL TERRAIN**

There is a tendency in Transnational Studies to treat all nation-states as if they were equal and sovereign actors within a global terrain. Such an approach obscures the extension of the power of some states through financial, military, and cultural means into the domain of others. The extension of the power of a territorially based regime into the political, economic, social, and cultural life of other territories and states can usefully be called imperialism. Lenin (1976[1917]), Luxemburg (1972), Magdoff (1969; see also 2003) and other Marxist theorists described several forms of imperialism. While in its classic form imperial states conquer and rule over colonies, the Marxist theorists were less interested in describing empires than in understanding the relationship between capitalism and systems of control that made domination possible even without military occupation and direct colonization. They saw in finance capital an instrument of intervention in formally sovereign states that facilitated control without constant colonial systems of supervision. Currently finance capital can take the form of loans, investment, and foreign ‘aid’. In non-colonial forms of imperial domination, the military force of a powerful state combines with the global reaches of finance capital to penetrate into multiple polities and constrain their actions and policies. Since the Second World War, this form of imperialism has dominated. Contemporary imperialism combines the power of capital wielded through the World Bank, and various development banks and funds, and the military force of a state or an alliance of states. When John F. Kennedy stated that ‘foreign aid is a method by which the United States maintains a position of influence and control around the world’, he openly acknowledged a relationship of power that has been widely understood by political leaders worldwide but was rarely openly acknowledged between the Second World War and 2001 (cited in Lens, 1971: 367).

The US ‘War against Terror’ has prompted, among other things, the re-legitimation of the terms imperialism and empire by the right, by liberals, and by the left (Haass,

At that conference, Frederick Cooper noted that there are various ‘modes of intervention by a powerful polity in the affairs of weaker ones’ and delineated three: ‘imperial (intervening in another polity without actually governing it), hegemonic (setting the rules of the game which others must follow), and colonial (governing internal affairs of a subordinated polity)’ (Cooper, 2003: 2). Differentiating various forms of imperialist domination of formally sovereign states is of some use because currently imperial states and those developing as imperial powers differ in their modus operandi. China’s form of intervention differs from that of the United States, and European states work through the European Union with greater investment in intervention through ‘development capital’ than military intervention. However, the problem with developing a typology, as Cooper himself notes, is that modes of domination often are either coterminous or deployed in rapid succession by the same imperial power. Unlike the concept of globalization, which does not address directly the continuing military significance of states, the term imperialism allows us to examine the ways in which ideological construction and economic and military force work in different ways to serve the interests of a particular state. And it allows us to develop a global perspective that puts politics back into the discussions of globalization by adding to the analysis of capitalist penetration the fierce rivalry for global dominance between competing and colluding imperial and sub-imperial powers. While in this article I will stress the role of US imperialism, in my use of the term imperialism I envision competing state-based imperial powers.3

Rather than differentiate modes of intervention, it may be more fruitful to see various forms of control by which some states are dominated by others as all forms of a single mode of domination called imperialism. Analysis can be centered on a different set of concerns by asking the following question: through what globally spanning systems of social relationships are ideologies that legitimate contemporary imperialism becoming part of the day to day life experiences and common sense of people around the world?

In this section of the article I draw from my fieldwork in two small-scale cities: Manchester, New Hampshire, in the United States and Halle/Saale in Sachsen-Anhalt, Germany.4 In both cities I worked with church movements deeply imbued with what I believe should be called fundamentalist Christianity. Scholars of Christian theological history use the term fundamentalism for churches that share with Pentecostalism a particular kind of ascetism and religious practice but have their own distinctive 20th century identity (see Robbins, 2004: 122). However, there is a transnational social field of churches, a network of networks whose members are as ‘fundamentalist’ in their insistence on excluding all other sets of beliefs and in advocating for divine law as the basis for all governments as any Islamic organization given that label. Their clearly stated goal is to convert the entire world and so end all other religions. Or, rather, they cast all other sets of beliefs as religions and maintain that what they believe is not religion but the truth. There is no generally agreed upon terminology for these churches that maintain, as a US Air Force Chaplain told a freshman in 2004, that anyone not ‘born again . . . will burn in the fires of hell’ (Reid, 2005: A04). This religious position, which welcomes
war and disaster as a marker of the approaching apocalypse, is sometimes called ‘Evan-
gelical’ Christianity in the United States. However, globally, this transnational social field
includes a section of the Pentecostal churches as well as churches as disparate as
individual storefront churches and charismatic sections within mainstream Protestant
denominations. In Halle, Germany, I have worked with two congregations of
Pentecostal Christians who maintain this form of fundamentalist Christianity and
struggle to win Halle for God. In Manchester, I have worked with a network of 18
churches of different denominations united in the Resurrection Crusade whose goal is
to insure that God rules in Manchester.

On first approach the congregations in Halle could be seen as ethnic organizations,
since God’s Gospel Chruch was predominantly Congolese and the Miracle Healing
Church was predominantly Nigerian. But it is significant that the members of these
congregations did not see themselves in ethnic terms – at least in the context of prayer
and of building the church. They were not building an ethnic church identified by the
cultural or national identity of its members. Rather, both churches in Halle situated
themselves within a global Christian mission and in organizations that linked them not
to homeland churches but to a Pentecostal movement now being organized throughout
Europe and globally. In the summer of 2003 members of the English-speaking church,
the Miracle Healing Church, attended a large prayer conference in Berlin that sought
to take Berlin for God. By 2005 the Miracle Healing Church, supported by a US
missionary Mennonite church and a German missionary project led by a German-
Egyptian pastor, held its own prayer conference in Halle. The conference, at which many
people were ‘healed’ and ‘delivered’ from ‘demons sent by Satan’, attracted more than
250 people, most of whom were German. The pastors of both churches belonged to
transnational religious networks which brought visiting preachers to their church on a
regular basis. Both the fact of these networks and the sermons of the visitors reinforced
for church members that they were part of a broader project of ridding the city of Satanic
forces and insuring that God would be victorious in Halle and Germany. Migrants of
both churches stated: ‘it was not by accident that I came to this city.’ They saw them-
selves as being sent by God to do his work.

In Manchester, New Hampshire, I found that the migrants and natives who belonged
to the 18 churches of the Resurrection Crusade held the same doctrine and participated
in transnational networks that fostered and reinforced this set of beliefs. The
Resurrection Crusade was organized by Heaven’s Gift, a Nigerian refugee who settled in
Manchester five years ago. He was able to obtain refugee status, at least in part, because
of his membership in a global Christian network, and he brought those network connec-
tions to Manchester. These member churches of the Resurrection Crusade included
migrants, but the majority of most of the congregations were white natives of New
Hampshire. In Manchester, the Crusade became significant enough that the Republican
Governor of New Hampshire and the Democratic Mayor of Manchester attended their
prayer breakfasts. Of the 150 people who also attended the breakfasts, most were non-
immigrant white New Hampshire residents, but about one-fifth of the participants were
immigrants from several African and Latin American countries and the Philippines. At
the breakfasts and during prayer conferences and other events, Heaven’s Gift repeatedly
led those assembled to pray that God would take over Manchester.

The Resurrection Crusade belonged to a ‘born-again’ Christian social field that
extends around the world. It included a Nigerian pastor now living in England and a husband and wife evangelical team from Texas who make yearly visits to Manchester in a circuit that takes them around the world. They brought with them and infused into the prayers of the Manchester churches a militant language calling for ‘spiritual warfare’ by ‘prayer warriors’. The Texas couple headed a US Prayer Center that produced books, videos, and DVDs and distributed them into dozens of countries. They were expert in ‘spiritual housecleaning’, a process of prayer that claimed to remove demonic forces from one’s place of residence. As do the pastors and members of the two churches in Halle and the churches of the Resurrection Crusade in Manchester, these preachers portray world events and human sickness in terms of an ever present battle between God and Satan.

When scholars address global Christian networks in the recent writing on Pentecostal and other proselytizing religious movements, they rarely address the differential power of states and the role the contemporary proselytizing Christian movements play in explaining and reinforcing this differential power. In fact a dominant view of the global Pentecostal movement has been that its true believers avoid involvement in the political processes of states. Therefore the relationship between these Christian networks and national and global political issues rarely has been addressed. For example, in a 2004 review article entitled ‘The Globalization of Pentecostal and Charismatic Christianity’, Robbins (2004: 119) noted that although Pentecostal Christians vote, most scholars have asserted that church members ‘tend to shy away from “hard” political acts that they consider immoral, such as working for parties, criticizing public officials, or running for office’. However true this generalization was in the past, it clearly no longer applies as fundamentalist Christianity, including a significant section of Pentecostal churches, takes stands on issues that resonate with the US neo-conservative agenda as stated in the Project for the New Century (2005). The fundamentalist movement has churches in just about every nation-state and is connected by website links, common texts, and traveling preachers. The churches in this movement may be financially autonomous but they participate in transnational social fields that circulate personnel as well as literature, sermons, and information. Many of the churches in these networks take stands on political issues and provide funds and votes to support political leaders who promise to ‘put God in command’.

Thoughtful analysts of the relationship between ‘globalization’ and religion argue that Pentecostal and other churches with transnational religious networks offer migrants and non-migrants alike alternative systems of meaning in a globalized economy in which local ways of belonging are at risk (Vasquez and Friedmann Marquardt, 2003). These scholars of religion ask the following necessary but insufficient set of questions about migrant participation in transborder fundamentalist networks. If migrants are not ethno-nationalists in their religious practice but instead espouse a global Christian identity, is the nation-state irrelevant in an analysis of their identities and practices? Should we abandon the term transnational when analyzing Christian networks and speak only of the global Christian cosmopolitans? Why are people all around the world responding to the growing inequalities, insecurities, local wars, and displacements that have accompanied the predominance of free market capitalism by turning to religion? However, to answer these questions scholars need to move beyond a discourse of globalization and examine the links between US neo-conservative political organizations
and spokespeople and US-based fundamentalist transnational religious networks. These networks, exactly because they so readily cross state borders, reintroduce and revalidate the significance of one particular state, the United States, and legitimate modes of intervention that facilitate US imperialism. They echo and reinforce conservative spokespeople such as William Kristol (2005), Chairman of The Project for the New American Century, who stated that ‘American leadership is good both for America and for the world; and that such leadership requires military strength, diplomatic energy and commitment to moral principle’.

The connections between current US foreign policy and fundamentalist Christians are both ideological and organizational. In their beliefs and their practices the fundamentalist churches to which the migrants with whom I have been working belonged did not repudiate nation-states, although they did not promote divisions between states or ethnic separatism. Rather than repudiating states, fundamentalist Christians supported special roles for certain states in the battle against evil. The United States was seen as a redeemer nation and the modern state of Israel was taken as evidence of God’s plan coming to fruition. Support for the United States in both Afghanistan and Iraq could be heard from both the Nigerian pastor and core migrant members of the Miracle Church in Halle and from the Nigerian head of the Resurrection Crusade in Manchester and core members of the Crusade in Manchester.

Among fundamentalist Christians the role of the United States in the world is linked to biblical prophecy. Multilateralism including the United Nations is understood as part of a current conjunction of evil, an Armageddon of war, disease, immorality, and natural disaster that the Bible foretells. If multilateralism is the work of the devil, than US unilateralism can be justified as the work of God. It is important to note that there is no single fundamentalist movement but a series of overlapping organizations, each of which has its own priorities but all of which have been loosely united in support of US actions around the world.

Key makers of US foreign policy and the President of the United States are members of this transnational social field. President George Bush is himself a fervent born-again Christian and belongs to religious networks that hold these beliefs. However, it is not just Bush’s personal beliefs that link US foreign policy and fundamentalist Christianity. It is the connection between the Republican Party and a broad grassroots network of fundamentalist Christians that has become directly engaged in supporting and articulating the goals of US imperialism. The Christian Coalition, founded in 1989 by preacher Pat Robinson with the goal of ‘defending America’s Godly heritage by getting Christians involved in their government again’, was at first seen as a stronghold of the far right (Christian Coalition, 2005). By 2004, the Coalition had become a mainstream player in the Republican Party and in the White House. Its ability to turn out the vote was made clear by the results of the Republican congressional victories in 1994 and directly contributed to George W. Bush’s ability to take the White House in 2000 and 2004. This activity and influence is increasingly acknowledged by both scholars and the press, especially after the religious vote proved to be significant in the 2004 presidential elections.

Less widely noted are the efforts of neo-conservative theorists to actually recruit a religious migrant constituency with transnational influence. There is a direct connection between which groups of people are viewed as legitimate refugees and granted entry to
the United States and powerful US neo-conservative theorists who support refugee status for people facing religious persecution in areas that are of interest to US foreign policy. Of central interest seems to be refugees from an array of countries linked to the US goal of dominating the world’s oil supplies. The United States has accepted Christian asylum seekers and supported political leaders and movements from such countries as Sudan, Indonesia, and Nigeria. Many of these countries are characterized by tensions between Christians and Muslims. Eliot Abrahms, who became a member of the National Security Council under George W. Bush, previously wrote about religious freedom and then served as chair of the commission established by the US International Religious Freedom Act of 1998.8

A significant sector of the current US political leadership builds on both the beliefs and practices of the fundamentalist Christian networks to which the migrants in my study belonged. In the current National Security Strategy of the United States, published in 2002, the world is divided into good and evil, a division that is basic to the world view of fundamentalist Christianity. This division is used to legitimate the US intention to dominate the world. It should be noted that this plan and its language were developed before the United States made its spurious case for war in Iraq. The 2002 US strategic plan states the following:

While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right to self-defense by acting pre-emptively . . . [our] responsibility to history is clear: to answer these attacks and rid the world of evil. (cited in Oldfield, 2004: 1)9

The Christian network, called the US Prayer Center, to which Heaven’s Gift and his Resurrection Crusade organization belong, distributed President Bush’s biography free in return for a financial pledge to their organization. The Prayer Center boasts that its members include 4000 pastors. Its slogan is ‘Disciplining the Nations’. This disciplining is linked to an identification with the United States portrayed in website rhetoric as God’s right hand under President Bush, who speaks directly with the Lord. Under the heading on its website ‘America in Crisis’, this global ministry wrote in reference to the presidential elections that the year ‘2004 is a dangerous and – possibly – a disastrous year for America’. Throughout the year that website, and others to which it was linked, portrayed the United States as founded in order to institute a Christian mission. Through such messages, people within fundamentalist Christian networks such as the one organized by Heaven’s Gift were encouraged to identify with the United States, even as they espoused a Christian identity. Heaven’s Gift insists that divisions over doctrine are the work of the devil and the goal must be Christian unity. Part of that unity is expressed by praying for President Bush because Bush had declared he is intent on obeying God’s commands.

Rather than classic US cultural assimilation of immigrants into an American identity that excludes identification with the rest of the world, the American flag that decorates the Prayer Center’s website was waved for the United States in its role of combating evil around the world. Within this belief system, there are no immigrants and foreigners. The only significant identity is as a born-again Christian. What was important was the acceptance of Jesus. Only those who believed would be saved.
Similar influences extend into the migrant churches I have been working with in Halle, Germany. Joshua, the Nigerian pastor of the Miracle Healing Church, maintains ongoing ties to and collects money for the Morris Cerullo World Evangelical Ministry, based in the United States and espousing the politics of US fundamentalist Christians. Cerullo circles the world holding evangelical gatherings of tens of thousands of people and meeting with third world leaders. It is important to note that Heaven’s Gift, the founder of the Resurrection Crusade in Manchester, is also a great fan of Morris Cerullo, has attended one of his conferences, and has filled the Crusade’s bookshelves with his books. Through the Cerullo Ministry, the Miracle Healing Church in Halle supports evangelical work in Israel. As Ruby, the Nigerian woman who serves as treasurer of the Miracle Healing Church told me, to be ‘on the side of Israel is to be on the side of God’. She also declared that the ‘United States must be doing the work of God in Iraq because it is a country with so many strong Christians and because it is a friend of Israel’s’. Through a network of networks the Miracle Church and the Resurrection Crusade are linked in their common support for Israel and its protector and major foreign donor, the United States.

In the past, missionaries served as ideological agents of imperial rule, legitimating the right of the imperial power to transform local belief systems and impose its values, standards, laws, and interests outside the borders of its state. This process continues today through the evangelizing of fundamentalist Christians. In the situation on which I have focused, it is Christians from Africa, Asia, and Latin America who provide the missionary zeal and the call for spiritual revival. When persons from these regions migrate to Europe and the United States, as part of their quest for belonging in the new land they become organizationally and ideologically linked to a Christian fundamentalism that claims the entire world as a US domain, and they support missionary activity that builds this social field globally. Their political project and relationship to imperialism is only visible when this religious field of activity is approached with an analytical lens that extends beyond a focus on the ethno/national identities of the actors.

SECOND CASE STUDY: HAITIAN LONG-DISTANCE NATIONALISTS AS AGENTS OF IMPERIALISM

My second case provides another glimpse into the contemporary nature of imperialist rule and its connection to the transnational social fields in which migrants and their descendants participate. In this second example, migrants do fervently identify with their homeland. However, even as they become long-distance nationalists, migrants operate within broader social networks and ideological constructions that facilitate contemporary imperialist intervention into their homelands, while preserving a semblance of sovereignty in those states. As in the previous case study, I argue that if migration theorists set aside the blinders of a transnational methodological nationalism that confines the analysis of migrants to their homeland politics, they will be able to analyze the active engagement of migrants and their descendants in sustaining forms of imperial power. By examining the intimate relationships that can develop between long-distance nationalists and imperial politics, scholars will deepen their understanding of the forms of imperialist intervention and the role of transnational social fields. This is a topic of increasing importance in untangling the politics and economics of Afghanistan, Iraq, Israel, Taiwan, the Philippines, and a range of other states whose intelligentsia and
political classes maintain households and participate in migrant organizations within the United States. An analysis of the dynamics of this form of intervention also gives scholars insights into the circumstances under which indirect imperial intervention becomes control through direct military force.

I take as a case in point the current situation of Haiti and examine it in light of the transnational social fields that stretch between Haiti and the United States, drawing on an analysis of Haitian long-distance nationalism and its role in sustaining an ‘apparent state’ that I previously made with Georges Fouron, a Haitian scholar and transmigrant (Glick Schiller and Fouron, 2001, 2003). Over a million persons of Haitian descent now live outside of Haiti, a small Caribbean country with about eight million inhabitants. The Haitian experience of so-called sovereignty that is actually imperialist intervention began shortly after the Haitians ended French colonial rule two centuries ago. Germany, England, France, and the United States all began to play a role in the so-called internal affairs of Haiti only a few decades after Haiti won its ‘independence’ in 1804. In a certain way, Haiti has been the proving grounds for an interventionist post-colonial imperialism. This form of imperialism preserves the appearance of sovereignty for the dominated state but uses finance capitalism backed by the military force necessary to shape the politics and economies of other states. Intervention of imperialist states in Haiti has usually taken the form of control of banking and the organization of debt, coupled with periods of more direct military intervention. In the past few decades, however, the United States in its imperialist domination in Haiti increasingly has benefited from the discourses and actions of transmigrants and their transnational social fields.

From 1957 until 1986 Haiti was ruled by the Duvalier dictatorship, initially kept in place by the United States as part of its Cold War politics in which the Duvalier family was an anti-communist ally. In response to the brutality of the Duvalier regime and its stranglehold on the Haitian economy, increasing numbers of Haitians emigrated. Most settled in the United States, although there are also significant settlements in Canada, France, the Bahamas, and the Dominican Republic. Until the 1970s, migrants maintained transnational family ties, but other forms of open transnational connections were impeded by the hostility of the government. Then the situation dramatically changed as part of the restructuring of global capitalism. Haiti became a target for the development of export processing factories that required compliant and low wage workers who received no social benefits or protective health and safety measures. At the same time, although the vast majority of Haitians are farmers, Haiti became a dumping ground for US surplus food and European state-subsidized agriculture. The rural economy was devastated. Non-governmental organizations including a range of Protestant missions established themselves in response to Haiti’s growing inability to feed itself. Meanwhile, Haiti increasingly received foreign loans, even though it was clear that the money went into the private accounts of the Duvalier family.

The economic restructuring in Haiti led to increased internal and international migration (DeWind and Kinley, 1988). The migrants to the United States and the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that flooded Haiti as part of the restructuring increasingly built transnational social fields which brought a renewed spirit of struggle for human rights and social and economic justice. Liberation theology brought by both Haitian and foreign priests contributed to the struggle. As a result, a grassroots movement developed in the countryside in Haiti and in the shantytowns and among
the urban poor. It increasingly included a cross-class coalition of a broad section of Haitians settled abroad and many non-Haitians interested in immigrant rights, human rights, and struggles for justice.

The first transnational consequence, then, of an increased level of penetration by US and European capital was widespread political unrest and the toppling of the Duvalier regime. The United States asserted its domination by supporting a series of military juntas whose leaders had close connections to the US military or national security apparatus. Meanwhile, the United States cast the grassroots movement as illegitimate and called for elections. Their favored candidate was Marc Bazin, a Haitian transmigrant who had spent most of his life working for the World Bank and clearly represented the World Bank agenda for Haiti. The major player in the World Bank is the United States, who not only insures that its candidate becomes Bank president but has shaped the Bank's agenda. The US support for Bazin was indicative of a trend. The United States systematically cultivates, both in Haiti and other countries around the world, transmigrants who have been active as long-distance nationalists but who have embraced the agenda of US dominated finance capital. These people are supported for leadership positions both in their homelands and in international lending institutions such as the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank.15

The Haitian grassroots movement accepted the rules of the game set up by the United States, ran Jean Bertrand Aristide as a candidate in the presidential elections, and won. Before he was elected, Aristide denounced the World Bank and US imperialism; once he became president he agreed to World Bank loans and significant aspects of their structural adjustment plan for Haiti. However, when President Aristide spoke to his base among the poor, he continued to promise economic justice so that the majority of the Haitian people could at least move, in Aristide's words, 'from wretchedness to poverty'.

Such rhetoric was more than the United States was willing to allow, despite the fact that Aristide was democratically elected. The United States promptly changed the rules of the game and turned to another form of imperial intervention: subversion by use of military force. Less than a year after he was elected, Aristide was overthrown by a US trained and equipped army led by a general with publicly acknowledged ties to the US Central Intelligence Agency. Then various US military juntas again ruled Haiti. What happened next confused many people, but understanding that imperialism deploys, often in rapid succession, different forms of intervention becomes a useful insight when it is combined with an acknowledgment of the role played by long-distance nationalists and the contradictions that ensue from this aspect of imperialism. When the Haitian military could not bring political stability to Haiti, despite repression, rape, and murder of the democratic opposition, the United States launched a military invasion and brought Aristide back as President in 1994.

There was widespread support among Haitian transmigrants for this invasion. But Aristide came back to Haiti a different man, not only because of his own personal weakness, but also because, in Mafia style, the United States made him an offer he could not refuse. Before he was restored to office, he was first brought to Paris and forced to sign a series of crippling economic and political measures. Again the United States set the rules of the game, which allowed Haitian governments the leeway for corruption and theft but little else.

At the same time, the United States turned to a different form of intervention. First
under President Clinton and then under President Georges W. Bush, the United States launched a ten year, no-holds-barred campaign of destabilization, discrediting the elected government of Haiti and any base it continued to have among the poor and disenfranchised. This continued when Preval, a political leader linked to Aristide, served as President and when Aristide was re-elected and resumed the presidency in 2001. The end result of the destabilization campaign was a degree of social insecurity that was so intense in Haiti that increasing numbers of Haitian intellectuals, middle class, and rights organizations began to actively work for the overthrow of the elected government of Haiti. They became part of a transnational social field that extended between the United States, Canada, and Haiti and into the Republican Party, the State Department, and US funded or credentialed ‘non-governmental’ organizations. A host of new organizations were developed such as the Haiti Democracy Project (HDP), based in Washington DC. Founded in 2002 and endorsed by members of the US State Department, the board members and leadership of the Haitian Democracy Project included former US ambassadors and envoys to Haiti as well as Haitian transmigrants working in NGOs based in Haiti, including the Center for Free Enterprise and Democracy funded by USAID (Haiti Democracy Project, 2002 cited in Reeves, 2004). At least one of the former US Ambassadors, Timothy Carney, who is prominently featured in articles and speeches by HDP, has been tied to the CIA and was a “political officer” in Cambodia and the Sudan during periods of US manipulation in local politics’ (Reeves, 2004).

The implementation of a US and World Bank structural adjustment plan for Haiti was accompanied by the growth of armed and violent gangs and the illegal importation of guns and drug dealing. Life became increasingly insecure, the price of daily staples continued to rise, food production in the countryside was drowned by US food imports from chicken to apples, and more people fled to the cities. Haitians fleeing to the United States on small boats were stopped in international waters by the US Coast Guard and returned to Haiti. At the same time, new loans from the so called ‘international lending community’ were frozen on various grounds ranging from failure to fully privatize state-owned utilities to irregularities in democratic elections. The Haitian government was bankrupt and unable to implement any programs or pay police, teachers, or legislators. People in power and people who desired power both turned to corruption and drug dealing for cash. Throughout all of this many people in Haiti were sustained by remittances sent by family abroad, while NGOs (often the agents of governments other than Haiti) provided some essential services such as healthcare. Meanwhile NGOs and Haitian transnational families internationally circulated descriptions of the growing chaos, violations of human rights, and corruption of Aristide and his supporters. And they were corrupt, as were most leading members of the opposition.

Elsewhere I have written extensively about migrants’ long-distance nationalism (Glick Schiller, 2005b, 2005c; Glick Schiller and Fouron, 2001). Long-distance nationalism is an ideology and set of practices in which persons declare that they not only identify with an ancestral land but also organize their daily activities in behalf of that land. In the Haitian case, many persons of Haitian descent permanently incorporated into other nation-states, often as citizens, still consider themselves part of Haiti. Since the 1990s the word Diyaspowa entered the Haitian Kreyol language to refer to all emigrants and their descendants. When Aristide became President of Haiti in 1990 he designated Haitians settled abroad as the 10th Department. Haiti had nine territorial departments,
so through this term Aristide indicated that Haitians abroad remained part of the Haitian nation-state wherever they settled. Haitians abroad, who in Haiti are designated the diaspora, emerged as among the most vocal and persistent voices for change.

Nationalism in Haiti fueled by the long-distance nationalism of Haitians abroad obscures the reasons for Haiti’s past and present poverty and leads Haitians to only blame themselves. Moreover, many Haitians living in the United States have become a force for law and order in Haiti at any price, including dictatorship. They want to insure that their investment plans are secured and that they can safely visit and retire, without interference. Such an agenda can bring to power those forces in Haiti who are most repressive to the poor and their aspirations. In addition, members of the Haitian diaspora vie to serve as ‘leaders’ of Haiti, putting a Haitian face on imperial domination. And that is exactly what happened when Aristide was again overthrown in 2004.

The toppling of Aristide in 2004 had several components. An opposition alliance was formed that included among its members former Duvalierists, members of the army that had overthrown Aristide, representatives of the old Haitian elite, the Haitian business interests who saw their economic possibilities blocked by the chaos and lack of support from the United States, and the Haitian ‘political classes’ who saw their way blocked by Aristide. Despite its large number of unsavory characters, some of whom had a documented history of human rights abuse and anti-democratic practices, the Bush regime legitimated this group as ‘the democratic opposition’. These forces were increasingly supported by the Haitian migrants and their descendants who wanted an end to insecurity so that they could visit, invest, and retire in Haiti, all made increasingly impossible by the chaos.

Finally, a so-called rebel army took to the field, dressed in new uniforms, armed with guns made in the USA, and led by persons convicted of drug dealing and massacres of peasants. Then the US-trained body guards of Aristide faded away and US diplomats put him on a jet plane headed for the Central African Republic. Within a few days the US military took control. They placed Gerard Latortue, a Haitian who had spent 30 years in the United States and had no government experience, as the titular head of the government. Despite the presence of foreign troops and the coup d’état against an elected government, US officials immediately began to talk about Haiti as if it were a sovereign state. Officially to bolster a new round of democratic elections, in 2005 the US lifted its arms embargo on Haiti, maintained even when it restored Aristide to power in 1994, and voted more than a million dollars for guns to arm the Haitian police.

As the Haitian experience makes clear, and as recent writing on imperialism has underlined, it is important to stop discussing world affairs in term of the internal politics of individual states and understand the relationship between the power vested in certain states, the concentration of military force, and the restructuring of capital that constitutes contemporary imperialism (Mann, 2003; Reyna, forthcoming). The military aspect must never be discounted. As Thomas Friedman (1999), a Pulitzer Prize winning New York Times journalist, noted in discussing globalization, ‘The hidden hand of the market will never work without a hidden fist – McDonald’s cannot flourish without McDonnell Douglas, the builder of the F-15. And the hidden fist that keeps the world safe for Silicon Valley’s technologies is called the United States Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps.’ However, the Haitian experience of destabilization and a 21st century coup orchestrated by a network of Haitian long-distance nationalists, the
Haitian elite, and US government operatives and agencies reminds us that discussions of imperialism and consent must include the study of transnational actors.

Transnational Studies can contribute to an analysis of what is happening in Haiti and, by extension, Afghanistan, Iraq, and many other killing fields. However, in order to make such an analysis scholars must set aside the new transnational methodological nationalism encapsulated in terms such as diaspora or transnational community and take a long hard look at emerging forms of imperial power.

CONCLUSIONS

In drawing together a conclusion, it is useful to turn to an exchange about culture and power that Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc Wacquant conducted with Jonathan Friedman in the pages of *Theory, Culture & Society*. Bourdieu and Wacquant were critical of terms such as ‘globalization’, which they state ‘has the effect, if not the function, of submerging the effects of imperialism’ (1999: 42). Their specific interest was what they called ‘US cultural imperialism’. As part of his response, Friedman (2000: 140) noted that ‘one needs to be more specific about the actual social processes involved. How does this imperialist diffusion occur in practice?’ He asks, of course, the classic question of those interested in hegemonic processes. How do certain understandings imprecate themselves into the daily lives, routines, practices, and taken-for-granted assumptions of disparate actors? How do we study and document a Foucauldian governmentality on global terrains so that we can understand how consent to imperialism becomes part of the everyday practices and understanding of those who suffer the consequences? Friedman answers the question by pointing to ‘global elite formation’. But far more than transnational elites are involved in imperialist hegemonic projects.

This article adds to the study of the contemporary transnational social fields and religious and long-distance nationalist ideologies that contribute to imperialist rule. In the article I have noted the discourses and organizational practices within transnational social fields created by fundamentalist Christians and long-distance nationalists that legitimate and valorize imperialist intervention. However, as part of the study of contemporary imperialist rule, it is important to point out that every form of imperialist intervention is fraught with contradictions from which people can learn. There are important fissures that also need to be documented. When many fundamentalist Christians call for the United States to act as the savior nation, they do so with a desire to end poverty, war, oppression and suffering. Many Haitian long-distance nationalists want their compatriots at home to live a better life within a democratic and civil society. Because imperial rule can not fulfill the desire of the long-distance nationalists or fundamentalist Christians – whether migrants or natives – for a better world, ideologies that are forged to legitimate US imperialism and the transnational social fields that imprecate imperialist discourses within people’s daily practices can be two-way streets. Migrants have multiple knowledges including first hand experience with the killing force of US imperialist rule. In my research with devout Christian migrants I have found several examples of this political contradiction. For example, Heaven’s Gift, the Nigerian pastor in Manchester, is an Ogoni. He and his wife personally experienced the murder and betrayal visited on their movement against the destruction of their land by Shell Oil. They carry with them a video about the Ogoni struggles and they are clear that the United States was very much a player among the political forces that led to massacres of
Ogoni and the imprisonment and hanging of the leaders of the movement. Some Nigerians in Halle participated in political programs that showed the same video. Ibo migrants in Halle linked the repression of the Ogoni to the experience of the Ibo in Nigeria. Congolese refugees and immigrants in Manchester educated US natives about the millions of people who died in the wake of roving militias in the eastern Congo. They repudiated press accounts of tribalism and ‘ethnic violence’ and explained that the United States supports the Rwandan militias who rape and pillage in the eastern Congo and are intent on annexing the mineral-rich region of BiKivu Province.

Migrants may flee their homelands with some knowledge of imperialist intervention but come to Germany and the United States with a vision of Europe or the United States as the golden land where their dreams will be realized. Once settled, they often learn new lessons about imperialism. It is in the context of the daily discrimination and economic hardship that so many migrants face that they turn to born-again Christianity or continue or deepen other forms of emotive Christian belief and practice. Given the difficulties, they begin to attribute every small success such as finding an apartment to their ‘best friend, Jesus’. But successes are few and failure is often prolonged since migrants in the United States and Europe serve as cheap labor. In regions of high unemployment such as Halle, this cheap labor often takes the form of illegal work or illegal activities.

People may accept the symbols or metaphors of imperialist rule and see in them multiple meanings and agendas. Migrants in fundamentalist churches adopt the language of territorial conquest and domination and apply it to their circumstances. When they speak of taking Halle or Berlin or Manchester for God, they say it as a critique of the dehumanizing conditions they have experienced at home and abroad and as a way of legitimating their rights in their locality of settlement. Although currently many Haitian long-distance nationalists justify the occupation of Haiti by foreign troops as a step to restoring security, prolonged occupation has in the past led to resistance. Haitians may once again turn to resistance, within a renewed worldwide anti-imperialist movement. Haitian migrants who had lived in the United States in the 1960s through the 1980s brought into the Haitian grassroots movement their experiences in the US civil rights movements, movements for black empowerment, and US anti-imperialist movements. They popularized an understanding of democracy that promised social and economic justice and power to the people. Even today, when migrants embrace the American flag they often see in it a promise of social and economic justice that the United States cannot fulfill at home or abroad.

Transnational Studies took an important step in re-envisioning society when scholars put aside the conflation of nation-state and society and began to examine the social relations that are shaped by transnational social fields. However, much more theoretical work remains to be done. Whether they use the term transnational social fields or transnational spaces, scholars must develop an analysis of the fields of uneven power within which the networks they trace are constituted. Much more research needs to be done on the ways in which power is organized, structured, and exercised transnationally within social relationships. In this article I have taken some steps towards an analysis of how US imperialist power is exercised globally within networks in which migrants play an important role. Transnational Studies must shed every form of methodological nationalism so that scholars can take on two pressing tasks. First, we must explore the
relationships between imperialist interventions and transnational social fields. Second, and equally important, we must note the contradictions that continue to emerge within these fields and use these insights to contribute to the new global anti-imperialist movements for social justice that these contradictions foster.

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Notes
1 Some theorists define globalization as periods in which there is an increased density of connections between various regions of the world and date this process as several millennia old. Global Studies have generally used the term globalization, however, either for the kinds of interconnections developed since the development of European capitalism or the manifestations of inter-dependency that developed since the 1970s. See Vasquez and Friedmann Marquardt (2003) for a useful summary.

2 Even during the age of colonial empires, certain formally sovereign states such as Haiti and China were subject to imperial domination by the United States and European powers. During the Cold War we saw low intensity warfare to maintain or advance the areas open to Western states for investment through an agenda of ‘modernization’. More recently, the United States has used debt and military force to extend its free market policies.

3 It is interesting to note that in much of this debate, such as in the quotation from the ‘lessons of empire’ conferences, Europe disappears and China, a significant military force and an exporter now of capital, is not mentioned. Yet to be useful in analyzing contemporary global processes, the term imperialism must enter into our analysis of globalization in ways that extend beyond a focus on the United States.

4 I build on Duane Oldfield's research on 'the evangelical roots of US unilateralism' and link it to the Christian narratives I find in my research on churches – some identifying with the Pentecostal movement and some more broadly identifying as 'born again'.

5 There are ethnic congregations in Manchester, but if we configure our research by
focusing only on ethno-nationalist churches or transnational communities that build such churches, we miss important transnational processes.

6 Because local churches tend to be autonomous in their structure, Stoll and other scholars of Pentecostalism repudiated the view that Pentecostal churches ‘are largely funded and ideologically shaped by the North American new right’ (Stoll, 1990 cited in Robbins, 2004: 119). Stoll labeled this approach to the Pentecostal movement ‘the conspiracy theory’. However, it is increasingly obvious that financial autonomy can be coupled with ideological unity.

7 Movements for abortion rights and gay rights are seen as indicators of the immorality of the times.

8 The US International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 was a part of the broader neo-conservative agenda first brought together in 1997 in The Project for the New American Century that called for ‘military strength and moral clarity’. Elliot Abrams, and others who emerged as significant actors in the Bush Administration including Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, and Dick Cheney, as well as fundamentalist Christian activists such as Gary Bauer, head of the anti-abortion, anti-feminist Family Research Council, signed the document.

9 This ideology of first strike had been an aspect of US strategic planning long before the current Bush administration. The new element is the introduction into strategic planning of language previously used for public Cold War rhetoric by Republicans such as Ronald Reagan, who portrayed the Soviet Union as the Evil Empire. However, until George W. Bush the battle against Evil was not given a central place in the discussion of US national security. Now it is.

10 His website contains a photo of him with the President of Indonesia during a 1999 prayer meeting in Jakarta.

11 While the focus of this article is on the relationship between recent long-distance nationalism and US imperialism, it is important to note that imperialist powers played important roles in migrant and refugee long-distance nationalist projects in the 19th and 20th centuries. The European imperial powers encouraged long-distance nationalists as part of their effort to break up the Ottoman Empire and control the nation-states from Greece to Bulgaria that developed in its wake.

12 When Haiti did not pay the debts owed to various imperialist powers and their banks, gun boats of the lending states steamed into the harbor of Port-au-Prince, the Haitian capital city. US imperialism in Haiti both in the past and present has used all three versions of imperialism, outlined by Cooper (2003), in rapid succession and always in the name of building democracy. The US military occupied and governed Haiti between 1915 and 1934, in 1994, and again in 2004.

13 Until the 1960s, Haitians migrated seasonally to work in sugar plantations first in Cuba and then the Dominican Republic, and some settled permanently in those countries, but large scale, multi-class migration and transnational connections of Haitians were not a part of Haiti’s experience of imperialist penetration until the 1970s.

14 US capitalists supported neo-liberal restructuring globally that allowed them to develop production facilities globally by eliminating tariff barriers. This was in part an effort to combat overproduction by lowering the costs of production and therefore increasing the size of the global market. They also sought to privatize public
industries throughout the world, thereby increasing the domain of investment (see Harvey, 2003).

15 The *New York Times* (Rohter, 2005: A3) explained that the Inter-American Development Bank, established in 1959, has 47 members and is one of the main sources of financing for infrastructure and economic and social development projects in the region. ‘To be elected the bank’s president, a candidate must first have the support of a majority of the 28 bank member states that are from the Western hemisphere. A majority of the bank’s shareholders must also approve the choice, thereby giving the United States, which accounts for 30 percent of the bank’s share capital, virtual veto power.’ In the July 2005 election the US candidate, Luis Alberto Moreno, was duly elected to the IDB presidency. Moreno obtained a Bachelors degree in Business Administration and Economics from Florida Atlantic University in 1975, and an MBA from the American Graduate School of International Management at Thunderbird University in 1977. As Colombian Ambassador to the US, he worked closely with the US government to organize a $4.0 billion foreign aid program for Colombia that increased the US military presence in that country.

16 According to the Center for Cooperative Research (2002):

The Haiti Democracy Project is funded by the wealthy, right-wing Haitian Boulos family, which owns several companies including Pharval Pharmaceuticals, the USAID-funded Radio Vision 2000, the Delimart supermarket, and Le Matin, a major Haitian newspaper. In February 2002, Rudolph Boulos was under investigation for his possible involvement in the assassination of Haitian journalist Jean Dominique who had been very critical of Pharval after contamination of the company’s ‘Afrebril and Valodon’ syrups with diethyl alcohol had resulted in the deaths of 60 children.

References


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