THE EMIGRATION STATE SYSTEM

NEW ZEALAND AND ITS DIASPORA
IN COMPARATIVE CONTEXT

Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the Degree of Doctorate of Philosophy

By
Alan John Gamlen
September 2009
AUTHORSHIP DECLARATION

I hereby certify that this thesis is the result of my own work except where otherwise indicated and due acknowledgement is given.

SIGNED ........................................... DATE ..............................................
To my sons

Home’s where you’re always going, it’s the place you’ve just
Left, where your father takes all the photographs
In the unfinished dwelling of the tribe. Tomorrow when it rains
He’ll fix the roof, dinner’s over and music
Still follows you into the street as night falls

Across the face of the brooding, neighbourhood hillside.
Hair falls across the faces of young
Musicians. They’re dancing, their paws are running and running
In the dream chase, their hearts are broken and they cross
The world for love and then they come home

Again, these flaneurs – they have eaten the meats of strange
Lands and heard the call to prayer startle
Doves from the battlements of seaside resorts where the gasoline
Was cheaper than at home. They’ve been where bear hunters
In the cold mountains make toys in the off-season.

They bring the toys back for us to look at.
There’s a painted doll that fits inside another,
And so on, until the story disappears. The tall
Stories of the tall boys. They come back
Like their great-great-grandfathers before them, lacquer-

Ware in their seachests, blue plates with unicorns
On the back, postcards of copulating gods,
T-shirts in languages not yet spoken,
An amulet, a faraway look. It’s great to be home
Again, say our wandering sons, as they wave goodbye.

By Ian Wedde (in The Commonplace Odes, Auckland University Press, 2001, p37.)

To my Father
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ABSTRACT

Title: The Emigration State System: New Zealand and its Diaspora in Comparative Context

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This thesis examines the case of New Zealand’s state-diaspora relations in order to explore state-diaspora relations as a wider field. Its primary aim is to understand how New Zealand relates to its diaspora, and to draw conclusions about how it should. This is achieved by examining the New Zealand case in comparative context, alongside an international survey of state-diaspora relations, and a detailed look at Ireland. The research questions through which these aims are achieved are: How do states relate to their diasporas? Why do they do so in particular ways? And, How should they do so better? The conclusion is that New Zealand’s way of interacting with the diaspora is incoherent and unfair, but does not have to be. Although New Zealand’s history as a migrant-receiving country has not equipped it well for managing emigration, by taking a strategic and integrated approach to diaspora policy – such as that taken in Ireland – these problems can be overcome.

In this thesis, state-diaspora relations are understood through the original notion of an ‘emigration state system’, defined as a portion of the state system dedicated to the management of emigration and relations with the diaspora. Existing studies of state-diaspora relations tend to follow either a ‘resource’ or a ‘constituency’ approach, where diaspora policies are either seen as resource-maximizing state strategies or as consequences of the idea that emigrants and their descendants are constituents of the sending state. The novelty and significance of this thesis lies in its combination of dynamic approaches to “diaspora”, “state”, and “citizenship”, and its emphasis on the regularity (as opposed to the widely assumed contingency) of sending-state diaspora policies as a standard type of political organization. Such ‘emigration state systems’ should be coordinated, so as to reduce arbitrary and unfair outcomes, to address imperatives arising from wider globalization, and to contribute to better global migration governance.
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PART ONE:
THE EMIGRATION STATE SYSTEM
1. **INTRODUCTION**

Consider the following scenarios. In the first, Irish President Mary Robinson declares, in her inaugural speech in 1990, “Beyond our State there is a vast community of Irish emigrants.... I will be proud to represent them” (Robinson 1994). Over the next decade, the world will marvel at the role of the Irish diaspora in the Celtic Tiger boom and in the Good Friday Peace accords which will lead to Ireland’s transformation from the sick man of Europe into one of the world’s most prosperous nations.

Robinson’s follow-up speech is less well-known outside Ireland. In 1995, she addresses the Oireachtas (Parliament), explaining, “I chose the title of this speech – cherishing the Irish diaspora – with care. Diaspora, in its meaning of dispersal or scattering, includes the many ways, not always chosen, that people have left this island. To cherish is to value and to nurture and support. If we are honest we will acknowledge that those who leave do not always feel cherished”. Her remarks will set in train a process that eventually leads to the establishment of a “strategic and integrated” policy approach regarding services for emigrants, coordinated by a dedicated unit within the Department of Foreign Affairs.

In the second scenario, New Zealand’s Economic Development Minister, Jim Anderton – in part inspired by the Irish model – declares, “I believe that New Zealanders, wherever they are in the world, are always New Zealanders. They retain a commitment to their homeland and identify themselves as New Zealanders. We need to network and keep our people contributing. I can see New Zealand as a nation with, in at least one sense, no frontiers” (Anderton 2001). As these words are spoken, in early 2001, bureaucratic machinery is already in motion to strip New Zealanders in Australia of their reciprocal social security entitlements. The Prime Minister’s response to concerns over the move is that New Zealanders in Australia have “turned their backs” on their country and “should not get a bean” (Alley, 2000). At the same time, a review of New Zealand’s pension portability arrangements has begun; it will eventually conclude that, even though they are “unstable”, “unsustainable”, “inequitable” and harmful to New Zealand’s
international relations,\textsuperscript{1} they “operate well”\textsuperscript{2} because any arbitrary discrimination only impacts negatively on those who wish to live abroad at some point in their lives.

Over the next two election cycles, the Prime Minister will push her ministers to take “action” in the face of public pressure over emigration, leading to a variety of ad hoc policy experiments encouraging expatriates to return and urging them to keep contributing from abroad. These initiatives overlay an older patchwork of now fading arrangements that originally evolved to maintain New Zealand’s transnational connections across the British Empire, but on the whole New Zealand’s approach to the diaspora will remain, in the words of one senior Government advisor, “very dispersed”.\textsuperscript{3}

How and why were these two scenarios different? And which one was ‘better”? Such considerations form the starting point for this thesis.

**The Problem and its Importance**

This thesis examines the case of New Zealand’s state-diaspora relations in order to explore state-diaspora relations as a wider field. Its primary aim is to understand how New Zealand relates to its diaspora, and to draw conclusions about how it should. This is achieved, as the thesis title indicates, by examining the New Zealand case in comparative context. A secondary aim that flows naturally from this is to understand – by implication – how states in general relate to diasporas, and how they should. The central research questions through which these aims are achieved are: How do states relate to their diasporas? Why do they do so in particular ways? And, How should they do so better?

This research is significant for both practical and scholarly reasons. On the practical side, it is not only relevant to me personally, but also addresses a topic of central importance for public and policy debates in New Zealand, in other migrant-sending countries, and in an international community seeking more efficient and equitable ways of managing migration. From a personal

\textsuperscript{1} OIA36.
\textsuperscript{2} OIA38.
\textsuperscript{3} IV160.
perspective, the research interests me as a diasporic New Zealander. I was born abroad to New Zealander parents of Scottish, English and Māori ancestry, grew up in New Zealand, and have now been based abroad and shuttling between New Zealand, Japan and the UK for several years. This project helps to keep me ‘home’.

My experience is a small part of a bigger picture: emigration and diaspora have shaped New Zealand’s past and present, and look set to shape its future. As historian James Belich (2001a) argues, the puzzle of New Zealand’s past lies in the “Expatriate Games” that were already ingrained in New Zealand culture by 1938, when New Zealand poet, novelist and journalist Robin Hyde (1938: 7), comparing New Zealanders to the migratory godwit bird, wrote, “most of us here are human godwits; our north is mostly England. Our youth, our best, our intelligent, brave and beautiful, must make the long migration, under a compulsion they hardly understand; or else be dissatisfied all their lives long”. In Belich’s persuasive account, the country owes much of its make-up to expatriates: to the artists, like Hyde, for whom “the dichotomy between being English and not English” and the “dreary wasteland” of everyday life in New Zealand were defining themes; to the magnates of the “protein industry” whose “bridge” of butter and lamb linked the antipodes and London; to the political elites for whom New Zealand was an extension of Britain; and to the soldiers they pushed across the world to fight for Empire, who swung New Zealand’s elections from their troopships, and scarred New Zealand’s communities with sullen, shell-shocked silences when they returned, or with sombre memorials when they did not. “There are few countries – Ireland is one possible exception – that have New Zealand’s long and intense experience of transnationalism”, writes Belich (2001a: 548-49). “We may as well use it.”

Today, the significance of the ‘Kiwi Diaspora’, spread mainly through Australia, the UK and the USA and encompassing almost a quarter of all highly skilled New Zealanders (Dumont and Lemaître 2004), is the focus of one of New Zealand’s greatest running debates. On one hand, expatriate New Zealand business leaders such as Chris Liddell, Chief Financial Officer at
Microsoft Corporation, and Andrew Grant, Director of McKinsey and Company Greater China, insist that the diaspora has something to offer New Zealand. Liddell explained to me,

There’s out to a million outside of New Zealand, and a reasonable proportion of those still have an interest in New Zealand.... They represent ... a resource ... an asset for New Zealand if you like, which is reasonably intelligent and got some resources and they're willing to contribute to New Zealand. They're also not a drain on New Zealand, so it's a relatively free resource which could have a relatively high impact if focused in the right fashion.⁴

Grant explained how he, Liddell and others had put this case to New Zealand Government ministers, saying “we’re just not proactive enough around the New Zealand diaspora.”⁵

On the other hand, the issue is always a political hot potato: Oppositions love to depict emigrants voting with their feet, as much as governments find the image hard to shake off. As Opposition Leader John Key explained to me, “we’ve got a very, very significant brain drain issue and it’s one that the Government in a large part has been in denial over.... I think what they’ve done has caused it.”⁶ Sure enough, Economic Development Minister Trevor Mallard shrugged off such criticisms, telling me, “people will try and make it an issue, or might try and make it an issue, but to me it hasn’t quite got the legs.”⁷ Predictably, the tables turned when Key became Prime Minister soon after, and was quick to highlight “anecdotal evidence” of a turning tide of return migration (Boland 2009), even though Statistics New Zealand had been reporting the highest net outflows to Australia ever recorded. And so the cat-and-mouse game continues. Belich (2001b: 4) elegantly encapsulates the fears and hopes framing this debate: “Is it a brain drain or is it a New Zealand world-wide web, a well-placed global network ready to help New Zealand? Are the 450,000 New Zealanders in Australia rats leaving a sinking ship, or the fifth-column of a Kiwi takeover of the West Island?”⁸

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⁴ Interview with the author (see Appendix 1).
⁵ Interview with the author (see Appendix 1).
⁶ Interview with the author (see Appendix 1).
⁷ Interview with the author (see Appendix 1).
⁸ “The West Island” is a tongue-in-cheek name for Australia, suggesting it is part of New Zealand (the two main islands of New Zealand, which lies to the southeast of Australia, are simply called the “North Island” and the “South Island”). (See for example Hugo 1999).
The fervour of public debate over emigration and the diaspora reflect the sense that the country's future is at stake. Economic analysts link highly skilled emigration with a steady, long-term decline in New Zealand's living standards relative to other OECD countries, and fears that "over time, we will become Fiji with snow" (David Skilling, interviewed in Macfie 2007). Policy pundits fret about the social security implications of emigration (see Lunt et al. 2006): in an aged population, who will care for the elderly, 'abandoned' by their emigrant children? Who will care for infants whose grandparents retire abroad? Who will foot the bill if emigrants return to claim their New Zealand pension entitlements after paying their taxes abroad? And cultural commentators ponder, what future solidarities will emerge from the constant exchange of New Zealand citizens for new immigrants, and the ongoing engagement of New Zealanders from abroad? Who are 'we' becoming? Again, Hyde's poetry prefigured these concerns:

> We are old and can wait, said the untamed soil against which she pressed her fingers; although it, more than anything else, was awake and aware of its need to be a country ... the integration of a country from the looseness of a soil. Maybe, responded the girl; though logically, living or dead, they ought to have the same compulsion to come back ... the godwits, I mean. And, of course, there's something fine, a King of the Castle feeling, about having the place almost to oneself. Fine but lonely....

> Only fools, said the sparse-ribbed rock, are ever lonely. (Hyde 1938: 8)

New Zealand is not the only country grappling with concerns surrounding emigration. For example, brain drain is a chronic problem not only in the developing world, where diasporas are coming to be seen as channels for development aid, but also in wealthier OECD countries such as Ireland and others dealing with high emigration rates. In fact, the fierce debates for and against immigration to migrant-receiving countries has an equal in debates for and against emigration from migrant-sending countries. These debates are not only internal but also international. Receiving states are blaming sending states for offloading their deviants and dole bludgers; sending states are blaming receiving states for poaching their best and brightest. International policy makers and academics, always eager to defray such conflicts, are revisiting the view that, with the help of policies to promote the involvement of diasporas in their
countries of origin, migration can benefit everyone at once. This contentious claim has become central to a vigorous international debate on migration and development, where parameters of global migration governance are currently being set. The significance of this research to those debates is in part indicated by invitations to present material from the thesis at the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization’s programme on Diaspora Knowledge Networks in October 2006; at the Mexican Foreign Ministry’s Third Conference on State-Diaspora Relations in September 2007; at an expert meeting for the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe’s Conference of European Statisticians in 2008 (Gamlen 2008c); and at the National University of Ireland’s Diaspora Strategy Workshop with international policy makers in January 2009.

In scholarly terms, this thesis makes a significant and substantial contribution to the interdisciplinary research literature on migration, diasporas and transnationalism. It takes an innovative approach to understanding a widespread but under-researched phenomenon, through original analysis of novel case studies, based on a substantial body of previously unpublished data. It identifies the weakness of the emerging literature on state-diaspora relations as a tendency to adhere to ‘methodologically nationalistic’ concepts of diaspora, state and citizenship, and consequently to assume that sending-states’ incorporation of emigrants is an anomaly in the international system. The central theoretical contribution of the thesis is to propose the concept of an emigration state system, defined as a portion of the state system dedicated to the management of emigration and diasporic membership. The novelty and significance of this approach lies in its combination of dynamic (rather than static) approaches to the main concepts of “diaspora”, “state”, and “citizenship”, and its emphasis on the regularity (as opposed to the widely assumed contingency) of sending-state diaspora policies as a standard type of political organization. The approach is elaborated in detail and distinguished from existing approaches in Chapter 2.

The thesis also makes substantial empirical contributions to research on state-diaspora relations, on the New Zealand diaspora, and on diaspora policies in New Zealand and Ireland – a
contribution indicated in part by several publications and invitations to present findings and concepts at significant international conferences (see Acknowledgements). Firstly, the thesis includes the results of an original comparative review of emigration state systems in 64 different countries – the largest attempted to date. Results from this review have been published and anthologised in several places (Gamlen 2008a, 2009b, 2006, 2009a). Secondly, the thesis provides the first full analysis of the largest ever survey of New Zealand expatriates, which the author had a hand in designing, and which has received a significant amount of scholarly and media attention nationally and internationally.9 And it draws together analysis from substantial amounts of archival and documentary research in addition to over 190 interviews, and fieldwork in eight countries.

Thirdly, the thesis constitutes the first attempt at an overarching analysis of New Zealand’s relationship to its diaspora, and one of only a few existing studies on political transnationalism in developed, multiethnic and liberal democratic states. I once had the opportunity to broach this latter topic with Alejandro Portes, a recognized expert on international migration, at a conference reception. I asked what questions he thought needed asking about social change in sending contexts. When he highlighted remittances, I asked, How about the impacts of emigration from developed countries, where remittances appear to be inconsequential? Professor Portes’s unhesitating reply was that developed countries don’t send migrants. I hope that, in a small way, this thesis questions that powerful assumption. Moreover, given that in 2006 some 35% of the world’s 190 million migrants originated in the Northern Hemisphere (Castles and Delgado-Wise 2008: 3), I am hopeful that there may be room for many more studies like this one.

**Overview of Methods**

The main aims of the thesis – to understand how New Zealand relates to its diaspora and to draw conclusions about how it should – are pursued by examining the New Zealand case in comparative context. The New Zealand case study is set alongside an original model of state-

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diaspora relations – referred to as the emigration state system – which is developed in two stages: first in overview, through the largest comparative survey of diaspora policies attempted to date, then by a concise analysis of the Irish case. This is followed by an extended analysis of the main case study, New Zealand. It is important to emphasize that the thesis does not attempt a straight comparative analysis of the Irish and New Zealand cases. Its focus is firmly on the New Zealand case; it discusses Ireland as a limited means to this end. The Irish case, coupled with the international survey, is intended to assist the development of a heuristic model, not to facilitate a critical cross-case comparison.

The main methods used in the research were documentary analysis, interviews, participant observation, and a questionnaire survey. The bulk of the qualitative research was carried out in 2007, but it began gradually during the process of planning and preparing for doctoral study in late 2004 and continued to some extent during the writing up, which was completed in 2009. Interviews and fieldwork took place in eight locations, chosen for convenience and comparability. Five of these were central to the analysis (London, Sydney, Paris, Tokyo, and Wellington). Over 190 people participated directly. Participants came from four key groups crucial to the emigration state systems of New Zealand and Ireland: migrants, migrant associations, policy makers, and business leaders who had influence in the policy process. They were recruited by referral from multiple starting points, both because sampling frames did not exist, and because personal referral was often necessary to gain access to senior officials and executives. Participant observation was carried out at over 80 events, in order to contextualize interviews and documentary analysis within a wider understanding of relations between officials and migrants, and of the policy processes involved. Media archives and documents obtained under New Zealand’s Official Information Act and Ireland’s Freedom of Information Act were also included in the analysis. The questionnaire survey was carried out in early 2006, led by an organization called Kea New Zealand, and yielded a snowball sample of 18,000 New Zealand expatriates in 155 countries.
OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS

The thesis is divided into two parts, each made up of five chapters. Part One sets out the conceptual framework of the thesis. Chapter 2 reviews the existing literature on sending-states’ diaspora policies, identifying and critiquing two main approaches: a resource approach where diaspora policies are seen as resource-maximizing state strategies, and a constituency approach in which diaspora policies are seen as part of a particular construct of the political community that contains emigrants. The chapter also introduces the alternative concept of an emigration state system, which is defined as the portion of the state system dedicated to managing emigration and relations with emigrants and their descendants. After an explanation of the methodologies used in the research (Chapter 3), Chapter 4 presents the results of an international survey of emigration state systems. The survey demonstrates that these systems perform two primary functions: diaspora building, and diaspora integration. Diaspora building is what happens when state institutions recognize and cultivate diasporic identities and organizations; diaspora integration is what happens when substantive membership rights and obligations are extended to emigrants and their descendants. The survey also identifies two different types of emigration state system: coordinated and uncoordinated. In uncoordinated systems, emigration and diasporic membership are managed in an ad hoc, evolutionary manner through a disjointed constellation of institutions and activities, often leading to inefficiencies and injustices. In coordinated systems, these mechanisms are ‘joined up’ so as to constitute and recognize some emigrants and their descendents as diasporic members, with associated privileges and duties. Chapter 5 presents the Irish case as a model of the latter type. Ireland’s emigration state system has been coordinated in a strategic and integrated fashion, leading to the reduction of inefficiencies and injustices in its relationship with the diaspora. Ireland’s long history of emigration has been an important factor in the development of this coordinated system.

Part Two of the thesis examines the New Zealand case in detail. It begins at Chapter 6, which analyzes what is known about diasporic New Zealanders, through the largest existing
questionnaire survey of New Zealand expatriates, analyzed using multivariate linear regression techniques. It finds that the formation of the diaspora is connected with the broad processes of decolonization and migrant adaptation, and notes inexplicable variations in transnational identity and activity among regions in the diaspora. Chapter 7 finds that these regional differences in identification and connection are partly connected with regional differences in aspects of New Zealand’s diaspora building mechanisms – the ‘discretionary consular functions’ carried out by New Zealand Government missions. These are examined across four different locations (London, Sydney, Paris and Tokyo). The chapter also finds that these regional differences are ad hoc and significantly dependent on factors unrelated to expatriate demand, such as foreign policy priorities and, crucially, the spontaneous private efforts of individual officials. From this consideration of diaspora building policies at the point of delivery, Chapter 8 moves to an examination of what is happening at the centre of policy formation in New Zealand, and finds further confirmation that New Zealand’s diaspora policies are ad hoc and uncoordinated rather than “strategic”, in contrast to some accounts. Chapter 9 moves to an analysis of New Zealand’s diaspora integration mechanisms – those which extend citizenship rights and obligations extra-territorially. It finds that New Zealand has historically maintained an array of mechanisms for extending membership rights and obligations to expatriates, but that expatriates’ entitlements have recently been curtailed at the same time as their patriotic and filial duties have been heavily underlined. The final chapter of the thesis weaves together the main conclusions that can be drawn from the findings, and points out avenues for future research. In all, it concludes that New Zealand’s emigration state system is inefficient and unfair, but that it should not be and it does not need to be. The relevance of these conclusions for state-diaspora relations more broadly are discussed, as are areas encountered during the research that invite further detailed examination.
2. CONCEPTUALIZING THE EMISSION STATE SYSTEM

INTRODUCTION
There is a growing literature on the diaspora policies of migrant-sending states, but the field remains underexplored. The purpose of this chapter is to map out the existing approaches to the topic, and to define the approach of this thesis in relation to them. The first part of the chapter introduces the two main theoretical approaches to understanding state-diaspora relations and discusses their limitations, while the second part introduces the new approach taken by this thesis. The final section discusses the normative implications of the model.

The two main existing approaches to state-diaspora relations are referred to here as the ‘resource’ and ‘constituency’ views. In the first, states see diasporas as strategic resources, while in the second, diasporas are seen as constituencies of the state. The weakness of both perspectives lies in their assumption of state-diaspora relations as a deviation from the ‘ideal’ model of modern political organization. This thesis offers an alternative understanding, based around the concept of the emigration state system, which treats institutionalized state-diaspora relations as a standard – if overlooked – type of political organization.

All three approaches depend on different understandings of diaspora, state and citizenship. Steven Vertovec (1997) delineates three meanings of diaspora found within a range of academic disciplines: “diaspora as social form”, “diaspora as type of consciousness”, and “diaspora as mode of cultural production”. While resource and constituency views of state-diaspora relations tend to view the diaspora, respectively, as a social form or as a type of consciousness, the approach of this thesis gives preference to the meaning of diaspora as a mode of cultural production.

Three of the most important theories of the state found in political geography, international relations and political science are realism, constructivism, and pluralism (see inter alia Taylor and House 1984; Agnew 2003). Realists conceptualize states as rational actors pursuing material
interests, while constructivists see the state as fashioned from ideas, the most basic of which is
the idea of the political community itself. For pluralists (or liberals, as International Relations
scholars tend to call them), the state is the product of competition for control of policy making
among unequally powerful groups. While resource and constituency views of state-diaspora
relations tend to view the state, respectively, as either a realist or a constructivist actor, this
thesis conceptualizes the state in more pluralist (or “liberal”) terms.

Within the extensive literature on citizenship, it is useful to distinguish between three
emphases: subjecthood, sovereignty, and process. All three emphases can be traced back to the
roots of the idea of the citizen, and are discernable in more recent theories, such as Rainer
Bauböck’s (2006: 15) statement of the core meaning of citizenship as “a status of membership in
a self-governing political community”, which has sometimes been reduced to “a formal legal
status with certain attached privileges or duties guaranteed or enforced by political
authorities”. Defining citizenship as a legal status places emphasis on the understanding of the
citizen as a subject, dependent on the will of sovereign power, while defining citizenship as
membership in a political community places emphasis on the citizen as a member of the
sovereign body. Indicating that these different concepts of citizenship arise and subside places
emphasis on the process through which citizenship is constituted. Whereas the resource
approach to state-diaspora relations tends to emphasize citizenship as subjecthood, and the
constituency approach emphasizes citizenship as a component of popular sovereignty, this
thesis highlights citizenship as an “instituted process” (Smith 2003b; Somers 1993; Polanyi
1957).

As already mentioned, this thesis aims to draw conclusions about how New Zealand, and other
states, should relate to their diasporas. Therefore, this chapter also highlights the normative
implications of all three approaches: the resource view, the constituency view, and the
‘emigration state system’ approach. Firstly, it argues that uncoordinated emigration state
systems exist by default, and tend to promote inefficient and unjust relations with emigrants
and their descendants unless deliberately designed not to. Secondly, it argues that migration,
diplomas and transnationalism present sending-states with certain imperatives to coordinate policy. Finally, it argues that the promotion of coordinated emigration state systems offers a middle way between ‘statist’ and ‘cosmopolitan’ approaches to the global governance of migration. The remainder of this chapter fleshes out these approaches in more detail.

**EXISTING APPROACHES: RESOURCE VS. CONSTITUENCY**

Several authors distinguish between two main existing theoretical approaches to understanding institutionalized relations between states and diasporas. In the first, diasporas are seen as strategic resources on which rationally acting states can draw in order to further their material interests. In the second, diasporas are seen as constituent elements of the idea of a political community upon which the state is constructed (see inter alia Bauböck 2003: 708-711; Levitt and de la Dehesa 2003: 598-601). Here, these two approaches are referred to respectively as the ‘resource’ and ‘constituency’ approaches.

**RESOURCE APPROACH**

The most familiar approach to understanding state-diaspora relations depicts sending-state policies as instruments for exploiting the economic, social, political and human capital resources of emigrants and their descendants. Portes (1999), for example, argues that sending-states’ provision of dual nationality and political voice for emigrants is directly linked to the importance of remittances in supporting their position in the world economy (also see Portes 2001). Castles and Miller (2003: 256-57) argue that sending countries are moved to cultivate relationships with citizens or subjects abroad by economic concerns (such as facilitating remittances), national security concerns (such as containment of political opposition abroad), and domestic political concerns (such as where expatriates can vote). Margheretis (2007: 99) argues that educated and affluent Argentineans in Spain make them “an important source of human capital and a potentially influential group as a constituency abroad, ambassadors/lobbyists in the host country, or potential returnees”. Koser (2003b) draws attention to states’ interests in the human capital resources of diasporas, suggesting this reflects general consensus that attempts to reverse the brain drain through return have failed,
and that engaging diasporas provides the possibility of an alternative solution (also see inter alia Kuznetsov 2006). Larner (2007) argues that sending states are strategically encouraging highly-skilled expatriates to think of themselves as members of a loyal diaspora, dedicated to helping build a knowledge economy. Xiang (2003: 21) argues that China’s policies towards the overseas Chinese are “inherently linked to China’s overall economic and social development strategy.” Common to all these studies is a view that sending-states’ policies reflect a self-serving view of educated, affluent and influential expatriates as sources of political, financial and technological support through domestic voting, overseas lobbying, remittances, investments, and knowledge transfers.

Studies taking this approach often see state efforts to incorporate emigrants and their descendants as reactions to the erosion of the nation-state through globalization from above and below (see Smith and Guarnizo 1998). For example, in their foundational study of transnationalism, Basch et al. (1994) account for diaspora engagement policies as components of “detrerritorialized nation-state building” projects: the strategies of nation-states peripheralized by restructuring to try and assert their continuing autonomy, despite increasing penetration by foreign capital and growing dependence (also see inter alia Glick Schiller and Fouron 1998; Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004). Guarnizo and Smith (1998) offer a similar explanation, depicting sending-state policies as the position-taking activities of states which, through global restructuring, have become dependent on foreign investment and remittances for economic and social stability, and therefore try to incorporate their nationals abroad into both their national market and their national polity in order to protect these flows. Brand (2006: 33) crystallizes this approach in International Relations terms, arguing that “states’ initiatives aimed at reincorporating expatriates (and their descendants) should be seen as a part of their efforts to assert or maintain authority in the ongoing processes of redefining and reconfiguring sovereignty in the international system”. Hollifield (2009) broadens the point, highlighting how “migration states”, including sending states such as the Philippines which manage labour export, are “maximizing strategic gains” from migration. Sherman (1999) takes a slightly
different angle on a similar line of argument, rejecting the idea that material incentives are instrumental in sending-states’ policies, but adhering to the basic narrative of diaspora incorporation as a strategic response to “crises of legitimacy” of various kinds in the sending state.

As indicated above, the ‘resource’ approach draws on particular understandings of diaspora, state and citizenship. Firstly, it is grounded in an understanding of diaspora as a social form. Such an understanding emphasizes diasporas as groups defined by specific kinds of social relations, political orientations and economic strategies that more or less approximate those of the Jewish archetype (Vertovec 1997). The current consensus is that the essential features of a diaspora group are dispersion, orientation towards a ‘homeland’, and group boundary maintenance over time (see Butler 2001; Brubaker 2005). As Vertovec (1997) explains, in this “social form” approach, diaspora can be succinctly defined as “an imagined community living away from a professed place of origin” (2009a: 5). This definition is broad enough to encompass both archetypal and more recent manifestations of diaspora, yet specific enough to preserve the term’s analytical value.

The importance of definitional criteria to this understanding of diaspora reflects a prolonged debate over whether the term has the connotations of a “catchall or [a] private club” (Dufoix 2008: 2). The word diaspora itself is very old, deriving from the Greek verb speíro (to sow) and the preposition dia (over) (Cohen 1997: ix). It has etymological links to the Greek diasperein: a scattering of seeds as from a bursting pod (Tölölyan 1996: 10). Over a period of centuries it became associated with the Jews, and by extension with a handful of groups who, although forcibly dispersed from their homeland in the past, have maintained real and symbolic institutionalized ties (Tölölyan 1996: 12-15). At one extreme, some theorists insist on reserving the term for these few archetypal exile groups (Safran 1991, 1999). However, with the expansion and intensification of globalization over the past half-century, the meaning of the term has transformed rapidly to the point where, at the other extreme, it has begun to be used to refer vaguely to “that segment of a people living outside the homeland” (Connor 1986) – a
usage that makes the term virtually synonymous with migration. Reaching a set of definitional criteria has therefore been an exercise in compromise over which particular social forms deserve the label “diaspora”.

The ‘resource’ view of sending-state policies is further grounded in an understanding of the state as a rational actor strategizing to further its material interests – a view central to the Realist school of International Relations theory. Robert Gilpin (1984: 290-91) defines realism as a philosophical disposition which sees conflict between groups (i.e. nation-states) pursuing power and security as the natural state of international affairs. Following this premise, the economic, social, political and human capital of diasporas can be seen as ‘low hanging fruit’: states can take advantage of the loyalty of emigrants and their descendants who retain affective ties to ‘home’, exploiting these resources in order to further their material interests.

Such an approach is also linked to the conception of the citizen as a subject of state power – a notion with roots in the Roman concept of citizenship as common subjection to the law (see Pocock 1998). This idea later found expression with Jean Bodin, for whom sovereignty was “untrammelled and undivided” power to make laws (Held 1989: 219), and was subsequently refined by Thomas Hobbes, who conceptualized the citizen as one who submits himself as a subject to the sovereign power of the state (Held 1989, 1995). As Castles and Miller (2003: 44) note, this “imperial model” of citizenship remained operational in the UK until the Nationality Act 1981. The notion of states making “conflicting sovereignty claims” over ‘their’ emigrants (De Haas 2007a), or reasserting sovereignty in response to the erosion of globalization from above and below, draws on this age-old concept of the citizen as a subject.

**Constituency Approach**

The second widespread approach in the literature on state-diaspora relations treats sending state policies as outcomes of a concept of the political community that contains extra-territorial members. Some studies focus on moderate versions of this idea, found in generally
peaceful contexts, while others focus on extreme versions, which are often found in war-torn societies.

In extreme form, the concept of the deterritorialized national group is a kind of radical right-wing ideology sometimes referred to as “long-distance nationalism” (Anderson 1992; Skrbis 1999; Glick Schiller 2005a). For example, Glick Schiller and Fouron (1999) understand Haiti’s efforts to incorporate its emigrants as part of an ideology of blood and descent that is not only dangerously exclusionary, but which also diverts attention from the crises causing emigration, by portraying the diaspora as the hope of the nation. This approach is sometimes used to understand the efforts of war-torn states to mobilize supporters and financiers in the diaspora, or alternatively, to reject the interference of diaspora groups with radical separatist ideologies (see inter alia Van Hear 2006, 2005; Koser 2003a).

However, in a moderate form the idea of a deterritorialized political community comes under the concept of “external”, “extra-territorial” or “emigrant” citizenship (see inter alia Fitzgerald 2000, 2006b; Barry 2006), which is not far from the approach of this thesis. For example, Bauböck (2003: 710) argues that “political transnationalism” – of which sending-state policies are one manifestation – involves not only the pursuit of interests but also “the idea of a political community that stretches across territorial boundaries”. For example, Bauböck (2008, 2007) offers a compelling theory of “stakeholdership” as the current international standard of citizenship law. This view finds support, for example, in Joppke’s (2005a: 88) explanation that, at least since the seminal Nottebohm Case of 1955,10 “it has generally been thought that

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10 The case of Liechtenstein v. Guatemala went before the International Court of Justice in 1955 and concerned the case of Friederich Nottebohm, a German Citizen who spent most of his life in Guatemala without ever acquiring Guatemalan Citizenship. He was granted citizenship of Liechtenstein under special circumstances and immediately returned to Guatemala, informing the authorities of the change. During the war he was regarded by Guatemala as an enemy national. He was refused entry, extradited and interned, and had all of his possessions confiscated by the Guatemalan Government. After the war, Liechtenstein asserted the right to protect Nottebohm and took his case against Guatemala to the International Court of Justice. However, the Court ruled that Liechtenstein’s claim to protect Nottebohm was inadmissible because he was not an “effective national”. The Court declared: “real and effective nationality ... [is] based on stronger factual ties between the person concerned and one of the States whose nationality is involved. Different factors are taken into consideration, and their importance will vary from one case to the next: the habitual residence of the individual concerned is an important factor, but there are other factors such as the centre of his interests, his family ties, his participation in public
nationality [i.e. citizenship] should reflect a ‘genuine link’ between an individual and a state”.

As discussed below, what distinguishes the approach of this thesis from the stakeholder view of citizenship is an emphasis on process rather than final form.

The ‘constituency’ approach is grounded in an understanding of diaspora as a type of consciousness, which emphasizes “describing a variety of experience, a state of mind and a sense of identity” found in diasporic people (Vertovec 1997). This type of consciousness is characterized by an awareness of multi-locality, and is constituted both negatively and positively, through exclusion and discrimination, and through positive identification with a particular heritage or with a cosmopolitan sense of “feeling global” (Clifford 1994: 311-12; also see Vertovec 1997). Thus, Clifford writes:

... diasporic consciousness ‘makes the best of a bad situation’. Experiences of loss, marginality, and exile (differently cushioned by class) are often reinforced by systematic exploitation and blocked advancement. This constitutive suffering coexists with the skills of survival: strength in adaptive distinction, discrepant cosmopolitanism, and stubborn visions of renewal. Diaspora consciousness lives loss and hope as a defining tension. (Clifford 1994: 312)

As Gilroy (1994: 207) puts it, “diaspora-consciousness...is focused less on common territory and more on memory” – a focus which, along with the contradiction of living in one place and belonging in another, is difficult to reconcile with the socio-political model of the nation-state, in which territory, identity and political organization are synonymous.

Whereas the resource view of state-diaspora relations could be derived from a realist understanding of the state, the ‘constituency’ view of state diaspora relations is grounded in constructivist state theories. Alexander Wendt (1995) explains that constructivism, in contrast to realism, emphasizes how world politics is “socially constructed”, in the sense that states'
identities and interests are constituted by the social environment (also see Checkel 1998: 325-26). Thus, the constructivist state is fashioned from ideas, the most basic of which is the idea of the political community itself. As Bauböck (2003: 710) puts it, "the nature and historic stages of domestic nation-building projects in countries of origin may be causally relevant for explaining different attitudes towards expatriates". Along similar lines, Gabaccia et al. (2007) discuss how emigration was bound up with nation and state building processes in Germany, Italy and Poland during the era of mass emigration from Europe. In the same volume, Weil (2007) finds similar processes in 19th Century France.

The constituency approach ties into a strand of citizenship theory that has emerged parallel to the notion of the citizen as a subject; one which places greater emphasis on concepts of popular sovereignty and rights. In contrast with the Roman model, the Athenian concept of citizenship emphasized membership of the law-making body based on civic participation – a concept encapsulated in Aristotle’s dictum that the citizen is both ruler and ruled (see Pocock 1998). Similarly, Hobbes later argued that sovereign authority should reside in the state, while Rousseau countered that it should rest with the people and be expressed in their “general will” – a formulation in which the citizen is more directly a member of the sovereign body. As David Held (1989, 1995) points out, Hobbes’ version raised the prospect of the tyranny of the state, while Rousseau’s raised the prospect of the tyranny of the majority. John Locke’s solution to this problem was to locate supreme authority in the people, to be delegated to government so long as it acted in the people’s interests (Held 1995: 44). As Biersteker highlights, the idea of the state as the embodiment of the political community became integral to Weberian and Marxist accounts of the state, which “regard it as a set of institutions and relationships of governance closely connected to, but analytically distinct from (and partially independent of) society” (Biersteker 2002: 159). Studies which trace diaspora policies back to a particular idea of a self-governing ‘people’ thus draw on this deep-rooted conception of the citizen as the indivisible unit out of which sovereignty is constituted. From this line of reasoning can be derived the conclusion that states incorporate diasporas to the extent that they are part of ‘the people’.
SHORTCOMINGS

The primary weakness of both resource and constituency approaches to understanding state-diaspora relations is their tendency to adopt the assumptions of what John Agnew (2003) calls “the modern geopolitical imagination” – an a-historical way of conceptualizing the spatiality of power, characterized by an idea of the world as an integrated whole, comprising advanced and primitive areas, in which the highest form of political organization is the territorial nation-state. In this view, the territorial nation-state is a discrete sovereignty unit that neatly seals ‘domestic politics’ – where a single rule-maker maintains order – from ‘external affairs’, where anarchy reigns and nation-states are pitted against each other in perpetual pursuit of primacy on a fixed, international playing field (Agnew 2001, 2003).

One of the central flaws of this way of conceptualizing the spatiality of power is its “methodological nationalism.” The term methodological nationalism was coined by Herminio Martins (1974) to draw an analogy with “methodological individualism” – Joseph Schumpeter’s term for the problem, originally identified by Schumpeter’s teacher Max Weber, of reducing the unit of social analysis to the individual (see Heath 2009). In a prescient articulation of the central concerns of current-day transnational theories, Martins wrote:

In general, macro-sociological work has largely submitted to national pre-definitions of social realities: a kind of methodological nationalism which ... imposes itself in practice with the national community as the terminal unit and boundary condition for the demarcation of problems and phenomena for social science.... International systems theory, even when informed by sociological concepts and perspectives, does not entirely run counter to the rule of methodological nationalism, rather it may simply reiterate it with nation-states interpreted as ‘punctual’ rational game-players or normatively oriented social actors also maximising or minimising something or other (‘atimia’ status-consistency, rank-order, etc.). The more usual objection to this general type of procedure is that it necessarily ‘brackets’ cleavages and contradictions within the units: the point under criticism here is the neglect of trans-national phenomena as such. (Martins 1974: 276-77)

The term methodological nationalism, while also used by Anthony D. Smith (1979: 191), has been highlighted and developed most fully by Wimmer and Glick Schiller (2002, 2003), who define it as “the naturalization of the nation-state by the social sciences.” As they put it, “Scholars who share this intellectual orientation assume that countries are the natural units for
comparative studies, equate society with the nation-state, and conflate national interests with the purposes of social science” (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2003: 576).

This static, a-historical view of the territorial nation-state unit can be traced to the static understandings of diaspora, state, and citizenship found in resource and constituency views of state-diaspora relations. For example, the notion of “diaspora as social form” (which characterized the resource view) has been criticized for treating diasporas as homogenous groups with static characteristics that do or do not meet academic criteria, and not paying enough attention to questions of how diasporas coalesce and dissipate (Dufoix 2008) – a similar problem to that of reifying ‘cultures’ and ‘ethnic groups’ in traditional Anthropology (see Vertovec 1996). Nor has the “diaspora as a type of consciousness” approach escaped similar criticisms. As Brubaker (2005: 12) puts it, “Diaspora can be seen as an alternative to the essentialization of belonging; but it can also represent a non-territorial form of essentialized belonging. Talk of the de-territorialization of identity is all well and good; but it still presupposes that there is ‘an identity’ that is reconfigured, stretched in space to cross state boundaries, but on some level fundamentally the same.” Brubaker’s point is perhaps illustrated, for example, by Paul Gilroy’s description of “black expressive cultures”, particularly musics, as manifestations of “a changing same” (Gilroy 1991: 126). Glick Schiller (2005b: 442-43) has referred to this type of reification of diasporas and transnational communities in place of nation-states as “transnational methodological nationalism”. As Appadurai and Breckenridge (1989: i) put it, “to speak of diasporas – if by diasporas we mean phenomena involving stable points of origin, clear and final destinations and coherent group identities – seems already part of a sociology for the world we have lost.”

As Agnew points out (2001), a similar problem of static analysis besets modern theories of the state, which reflect an assumption of symmetry between three main constituent parts: state, territory and population – the classical triad of political geography (see Gottmann 1973; Hartshorne 1950). On one hand, such a static conception of the state overemphasizes territory. Biersteker (2002) traces this emphasis from 16th Century absolutism through to the “balance of
power diplomacy” of European states in the early 20th Century, under which conflicts were routinely resolved through redistributions of territory. The emphasis on the territorial element of statehood was central to Hobbes’ notion of sovereignty as absolute subjection to the sovereign, and to the Peace of Westphalia, under which territorial control became the basic criterion of international recognition. Territorial control is also enshrined in Weber’s seminal definition of the state as an institution that possesses a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence within a given territory (Sharma and Gupta 2006: 22). However, as Martins warned, viewing the state as a unitary, territorially bound actor not only brackets the complex interactions of large numbers of domestic actors, but also blinds one to extra-territorial dimensions of state behaviour (see inter alia Sharma and Gupta 2006: 26).

On the other hand, modern state theories share an assumption of ‘the international’ as the fixed scale of world politics. Agnew shows how, despite their disagreements over the real or constructed nature of states, realism and constructivism have ontological roots in a shared understanding of the “nature of the international”. The classic constructivist critique of realism is its rationalist and materialist emphasis on agents rather than structures (see Wendt 1992). However, in correcting for the rationalist, agent-centred accounts of realism, constructivism overemphasizes structure at the expense of a theory of agency, and therefore has difficulty explaining why ideas change or come into being in the first place (Checkel 1998). Thus, just as realist accounts treat ‘the international’ as “set for all time as the dominant geographical scale of world politics”, constructionist accounts treat the international as “equally set for all time as we know it but purely an invention of textual authority” (Agnew 2001: 14). Both tend, therefore, to conceive of the state as an “abstract individual” (Agnew 2005); whether real or constructed, the monolithic individual state remains the unit of analysis. In place of both, Agnew proposes “a historical approach to geopolitics that endeavors to recognize explicitly the complex, intersecting effects of geographical representations and the spatial distribution of material conditions on political practices”. The modern geopolitical imagination, Agnew reminds, is only one possible way of conceptualizing the spatialities of power (Agnew 2003).
Static analysis is also problematic for the main concepts of citizenship (as subjecthood or sovereignty) that underlie resource and constituency approaches. The classic criticism of the social contractarian tradition out of which these concepts arise is the absence of a real historical contract. This leaves theories of the relationship between citizenship and sovereignty lacking a plausible account of the historical process through which citizenship arises (e.g. see Swift 2006: 28). Rather, one is forced to accept a view of citizenship as static and given.

In short, the weakness of both the resource and constituency approaches lies in treating state incorporation of the diaspora as a deviation from the standard model of political organization, where the people, the state, and the territory are static and symmetrical (Agnew 1994). Because diaspora incorporation retains the link between state and people but decouples both from territory, it is conceived as a contingent rather than a regular form of political organization. According to Schedler (2007), the hallmarks of contingency are indeterminacy (something else could have happened), conditionality (what happened was dependent on something specific) and uncertainty (what happened was “unanticipated … [o]r at least not predicted with certainty” (Shapiro and Bedi 2007: 7)). The crux of the problem with both resource and constituency views of diaspora is their assumption that, if the state of, say, Diasporastan11 had not been undermined by crisis, captured by a radical ideology, or stretched by unprecedented migration, it would have become or remained a territorially sealed nation-state unit – just like any other.

**AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: THE EMIGRATION STATE SYSTEM**

This thesis offers an alternative approach to understanding state-diaspora relations based around the idea of an ‘emigration state system’, that is, a portion of the state system dedicated to managing emigration and relations with emigrants and their descendants. In contrast to the resource and constituency approaches, the notion of an emigration state system is grounded in concepts of diaspora as a mode of cultural reproduction, the state as a pluralist institutional

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11 ‘Diasporastan’ is a name Nick Van Hear suggested for the archetypal dysfunctional ‘diasporic’ state I described during a memorable conversation in 2006.
complex, and citizenship as an “instituted process”. This approach places emphasis on the 
regularity of state policies towards the diaspora as a type of political organization.

**Mobilizing Diaspora**

The notion of an emigration state system employs an understanding of diaspora as a “mode of 
cultural production”. In contrast to understandings of diaspora as social form or type of 
consciousness, diaspora as a mode of cultural production is usually discussed in connection 
with contemporary processes of transnationalism, and globalization, and emphasizes the 
“fluidity of constructed styles and identities among diasporic people” (Vertovec 1997).

This approach partly reflects a concern among theorists to move beyond static, a-historical 
approaches to diaspora as a fixed type of social form or consciousness. Much of the debate has 
moved on to address questions of how and why diaspora communities emerge and dissipate, 
and why they have such diverse impacts across different settings. For example, Hall (1990: 235) 
describes diaspora identities as “those which are constantly producing and reproducing 
themselves anew, through transformation and difference”. Martin Sökefeld (2006: 280) argues 
that “diaspora identity and the imagination of a diaspora community ...[are] outcome[s] of 
mobilization processes. The development of diaspora identity is not simply a natural and 
inevitable result of migration but a historical contingency that frequently develops out of 
mobilization in response to specific critical events.” Brubaker (2005: 12) suggests that, in order 
to overcome ... problems of groupism ... we should think of diaspora not in substantialist terms 
as a bounded entity, but rather as an idiom, a stance, a claim.... In sum, rather than speak of ‘a 
diaspora’ or ‘the diaspora’ as an entity, a bounded group, an ethnodemographic or ethnocultural 
fact, it may be more fruitful, and certainly more precise, to speak of diasporic stances, projects, 
idioms, practices and so on. We can then study empirically the degree and form of support for a 
diasporic project among members of its putative constituency, just as we can do when studying 
a nationalist project....

This interest in the mobilization of diasporas is not new (see Armstrong 1976), but has become 
increasingly important with the expansion and maturation of the field of diaspora studies (see 
Dufoix 2008).
In light of these developments, the current study applies “diaspora” somewhat more broadly than classical purists might allow, as an umbrella term for the many extra-territorial groups that, through processes of interacting with their origin state, are in various stages of coalescence or dissipation. These include temporary or transnational migrants who spread their time between their sending state and elsewhere and fall more or less arbitrarily into one or other policy category of the origin state. They also include longer-term but still first-generation emigrants settled in another country, and descendants of emigrants who – in certain places at certain times – identify as diasporic or even as members of a fully fledged diaspora ‘community’. This leads into a discussion of a second central concept to this study: that of ‘the state’.

**Transnationalizing State Systems**

In contrast with the resource and constituency approaches, this thesis takes a broadly pluralist view of the state. Martin Smith (1990: 302-07) defines pluralism as the dispersal of power in modern industrial society among unequal groups, where the state is not neutral but rather a “condensation” of these groups (also see Smith 2006). This view is sometimes said to have evolved in two stages, sometimes called “Pluralism I and Pluralism II” (Manley 1983), but more usually referred to as “classical pluralism” and “neo-pluralism”. Classical pluralism was based around the notion that power in Western democracies is dispersed among a wide range of competing interest groups (Dahl 1961). The state was perceived as playing the part of referee in this mêlée, the result of which was a self-regulating “democratic equilibrium”, where policy emerged as a compromise among interest groups through the process of “partisan mutual adjustment” (Lindblom 1965). Neo-pluralism responded to Marxist and Elitist criticisms of classical pluralism for its failure to acknowledge structural inequalities in pluralistic societies. These criticisms were aptly summarized in Schattschneider’s complaint that, “The flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent” (Schattschneider 1960: 35). Neo-pluralists still maintain that power is dispersed more widely than Marxists or elitists allow. However, they acknowledge the preponderance of corporate
power in political agendas, and treat the state as a relatively autonomous institutional complex, whose various sub-units develop and pursue particular interests. As Smith puts it,

Different departments, agencies, politicians and officials have their own interests and so they desire to take autonomous actions and devise their own policies ... regardless of the wishes of pressure groups. The state is in a position to overrule outside groups or to co-opt them to ensure their compliance. (Smith 1990: 321)

Thus, for contemporary pluralists the state is – as Fitzgerald puts it – “a multi-level organization of distinct component units in which state incumbents and other actors compete for their interests” (Fitzgerald 2006a: 260). Although pluralist theory was developed with reference to the American political system, it is now often used much more broadly to refer to “Systems that permit a significant measure of autonomy to important units or subsystems”, including decentralized socialist systems (Dahl 1978: 192).

One advantage of a pluralist approach is that it more easily allows analytical separation between state, territory and population, which are elsewhere assumed to be isomorphic. As Sharma and Gupta highlight (2006: 22-24), analytically separating the “governance of a space or territory from the governance of a people” allows examination of the extra-territorial dimensions of state behaviour, such as “claiming and managing populations that no longer live, or have never lived, in their territories” (Sharma and Gupta 2006: 26). Thus, rather than a realist or constructed actor sealed within a territorial container, the state is conceptualized in this study as a pluralistic institutional complex – a system containing many subsystems – comprised of overlapping and competing agencies with different historical sources and trajectories, some of which spill beyond national borders.

Other approaches to “disaggregating” the state have informed several important studies of state-diaspora relations. For example, Østergaard-Nielsen (2003b: 760) draws attention to the “multi-level” nature of the political environment through which migrant political actors negotiate, in which there is no sharp distinction between the political institutions of the sending and receiving countries and the “global norms and institutions and networks of other
nonstate actors”. Similarly, Bauböck (2003: 708) highlights how “transnational politics proliferate across multiple levels” – including not only the national level, but also the local and regional levels – “and involve not only individuals and political organizations but also government agencies”. In keeping with this multi-level analytical approach, Shain draws attention to the role of diasporas in linking domestic and international political processes, and constituting “a distinct third level between interstate and domestic” (Shain 2002). Although this study focuses primarily on the national level, it does not aim to suggest that other levels are unimportant; rather, it simply chooses to focus primarily on horizontal rather than vertical disaggregation of the state.

With this pluralistic notion of “the state” in mind, the emigration state system is conceived as a subsystem of the wider constellation of relationships and processes that exist in the area of emigration and the diaspora. The wider system encompasses the interactions among a variety of diasporic networks and associations, business groups and government departments, agencies and factions. The “emigration state system” refers to the more or less institutionalized governmental subsystem of this wider constellation, and has at its centre the leadership of the bureaucratic hierarchies.

The concept of an emigration state system echoes and expands on James Hollifield’s notion of a “migration state” (see inter alia Hollifield 2009, 2007). Hollifield’s basic argument is that the management of migration has become an essential and pervasive feature of contemporary states – in much the same way that security defined the so-called ‘garrison state’ and population defined the ‘welfare state’. Migration is perhaps the only global flow which states still (almost) exclusively manage in a globalizing world, and unlike financial or trade flows, it tests what are thought to be the basic constitutional elements of modern states – their borders and their political communities. Against this background, the notion of a “migration state” succinctly captures how migration has become an element of “high politics”. This assertion rings true on one hand when looking at states such as Canada, which have been constituted by migrants, and on the other hand when examining countries such as the Philippines, for which
labour export is an essential feature of development strategy. This duality presents some problems for the concept, however. First of all, a concern with emigration management – a generally overlooked aspect of migration – was missing from Hollifield’s initial formulations of the concept of the migration state. Secondly, the management of immigration and the management of emigration involve different sets or systems of institutions performing different functions. Though both Canada and the Philippines could be described as “migration states”, the differences nominally subsumed by the one term are striking.

The notion of an emigration state system therefore contributes to a theory of the migration state in three ways. Firstly, it provides analytical tools for examining the less-understood aspects of states’ migration-related functions – those concerned with emigration and the management of transnational relations. Secondly, it suggests a slightly different understanding of the nature of migration states. Hollifield’s notion of the migration state is grounded in international relations theory, and conceives of migration states as realist strategic actors, minimizing the risks and maximizing the gains attendant on migration. The migration state presented in this thesis is a pluralistic institutional complex that has evolved through a particular historical and geographical experience of migration. Rather than a discrete actor to which migration flows are external, it is part of a “migration system” linking sending, receiving and transit countries (Castles and Miller 2003: 26-29). This relates to a third contribution envisaged for the concept of the emigration state system. Hollifield’s formulation tends to suggest the migration state takes two categorically different forms – the immigration state and the emigration state. This tends to support a view of migration as a one way flow from a source to a destination, whereas the acceleration of global population mobility means that an increasing number of states are experiencing a greater diversity of flow types, including receiving, sending and transit flows of a short or long-term nature (to say nothing of the diversity characterizing the composition of these flows). Perhaps the ‘true’ migration states are not those which manage either immigration or emigration, but those which manage both – such as New Zealand and Ireland.
THICKENING DIASPORIC MEMBERSHIP

This thesis emphasizes the need to understand citizenship as a dynamic process. One starting point for such an approach is Jürgen Habermas’ theories about the historical and geographical shifts in concepts of who is capable of participating in political deliberation, and in how such debates are carried out (Habermas 1989 [1962]). Nancy Fraser (2007), for example, points out that, although Habermas’ initial formulation of the public sphere was tied to a Westphalian understanding of political space, the concept can be usefully extended to account for the increasingly ‘transnational’ or ‘diasporic’ nature of political deliberation. Another starting point is T.H. Marshall’s (1950) work on the progressive acquisition of civil, political and social rights by different groups at different times. Bhagwati (2003), for example, evokes this progressive expansion in the scope of citizenship when he advocates a “‘diaspora’ model, which integrates present and past citizens into a web of rights and obligations in the extended community defined with the home country as the center.” A third starting point is the work of Margaret Somers (1993), who extends Karl Polanyi’s notion of an “instituted process” to an understanding of citizenship. Citizenship, she argues, cannot be explained as a status involving the granting of “ready-made” rights, but as a process arising through interactions between individuals and institutions (Somers 1993: 611). In all three accounts, the terms of membership are dynamic rather than static. Robert Smith (2003a: 726) weaves together all three approaches to explain the emergence of “diasporic membership”. Smith depicts membership as expanding and thickening extra-territorially through participation in public

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12 Fraser writes: “The ‘who’ of communication, previously theorized as a Westphalian-national citizenry, is often now a collection of dispersed interlocutors, who do not constitute a demos. The ‘what’ of communication, previously theorized as a Westphalian-national interest rooted in a Westphalian-national economy, now stretches across vast reaches of the globe, in a transnational community of risk, which is not however reflected in concomitantly expansive solidarities and identities. The ‘where’ of communication, once theorized as the Westphalian-national territory, is now deterritorialized cyberspace. The ‘how’ of communication, once theorized as Westphalian-national print media, now encompasses a vast translinguistic nexus of disjoint and overlapping visual cultures. Finally, the addressee of communication, once theorized as a sovereign territorial state, which should be made answerable to public opinion, is now an amorphous mix of public and private transnational powers that is neither easily identifiable nor rendered accountable” (Fraser 2007: 19).

13 For current purposes, the essence of Polanyi’s notion of the “economy as an instituted process” is that “Economic activities are shaped and coordinated by institutionalized rules”, where institutions are conceived as “structures, matrices of rules and procedures that give consistency and pattern to behavior” (Adams 1994: 338-340).
spheres. The “thickness” of membership is dependent on the degree of institutionalization of the relationships involved.

Drawing on Smith’s approach, this thesis takes the view that, through interaction with the institutions of their origin state, migrants become, to a greater or lesser degree, its members. If types of membership are imagined as falling along a continuum of thicknesses determined by degree of institutionalization, citizenship typically (but not always) refers to the thicker, more institutionalized end of the continuum. Legal status and territorial residence thus become two factors one would expect to involve a high degree of institutionalized interaction, which would generally lead to thicker forms of membership. However, it is important to note that this is not always the case: territorial membership is not necessarily thicker than its diasporic counterpart. As Smith (2003b: 303) points out, “Extra-territorial membership can be stronger than nation-state citizenship for some groups”. As Bauböck (2008: 7) puts it, migration “produces citizens living outside the country whose government is supposed to be accountable to them and inside a country whose government is not accountable to them”. In short, for migrants, membership and residence are not the same thing.

The corollary of this unevenly-textured diasporic membership is the emergence of a similarly uneven diasporic sovereignty, where the sending state may remain the highest authority in some but not all matters that concern the external citizen. To the extent that they remain members of their origin state, emigrants and their descendants remain both subject to its laws and participants in the process of law-making. It is in this context we find origin states not

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14 Given the variety in the thickness of formal citizenship within and among polities, it seems unnecessary to treat ‘citizenship’ and ‘membership’ as analytically distinct, as Smith does. To return to a distinction mentioned earlier, this is consistent with the Roman concept of citizenship as equality under a common law, but omits the Athenian concept of the citizen as participant in the formation of the law. Moreover, if the law itself is conceived as a kind of institution, the distinction between a legally defined status and a status arising from interaction with institutions loses analytical force.

15 Here it is useful to draw on Philpott’s distinction between “supreme” and “absolute” authority: the former refers to the highest authority on a given matter, while the latter refers to authority over all matters (Philpott 2009).

16 The extra-territorial or diasporic element of sovereignty can be seen, for example, in the Permanent International Court of Justice’s 1924 declaration, in the Mavrommatis Case, that, “By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own rights – its right to ensure, in the person of its subjects,
only extending social and political rights to ‘their’ diasporas, but also expecting them to fulfil the duties and display the virtues of citizenship. As Richard Black has succinctly put it, origin states frequently tell emigrants and their descendants, “you’re still one of us, so you still work for us” (Black 2006).

A main focus of the thesis is on understanding how the interaction of emigrants and their descendants with and within various state institutions brings into being various thicknesses of diasporic membership. To this end, the study distinguishes between two types of institution that comprise emigration state systems. Diaspora building institutions tend to confer thin forms of diasporic membership by cultivating diasporic identities and groups. They include inclusive governmental rhetoric, celebrations, events and media coverage aimed at including the diaspora in the imagined nation, as well as consular and bureaucratic infrastructures and practices such as data collection which formally recognize the diaspora as part of the national population. Diaspora integration mechanisms tend to confer thicker forms of diasporic membership, by regulating extra-territorial access to substantive entitlements and responsibilities. They include external voting and social security portability provisions, as well as mechanisms which cultivate and exploit the virtues and obligations of national membership, such as external tax collection mechanisms, and initiatives to maximize and channel the remittances, investments, knowledge and political influence of emigrants and their descendants.

As the analysis will show, the way these mechanisms operate is not necessarily uniform or symmetrical, but instead varies widely among locations, groups, and periods. By default, there is often a mismatch between rights and obligations – thick membership may involve many

\footnote{State-diaspora relations do not always or necessarily lead to the development of these types of institutions and to “diasporic membership” (Smith 2003a: 726-27). Diasporas and origin states may denounce each other, and origin states may actively thwart the mobilization of diasporas – particularly when both parties are embroiled in conflict situations (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004; Van Hear 2006). However, the important point is that these cases are contingent, whereas the emergence of diasporic membership is a regularity. As Chulwoo Lee has put it, “it may be that all states are, to a certain extent, deterritorialized” (pers. comm. 2006, also see Lee 2004).}
obligations and no rights, and vice versa. Much of the thesis explores situations in which such a mismatch exists. Moreover, it suggests that they arise by default in *uncoordinated* emigration state systems, where emigration and diasporic membership are managed in an ad hoc, evolutionary manner through a disjointed constellation of institutions and activities. By contrast, in *coordinated* systems, these various diaspora building and integration mechanisms are ‘joined up’ and balanced so as to reduce inefficiencies and injustices. This distinction invites a discussion of the normative implications of sending states’ diaspora policies.

**Normative Implications**

All three approaches outlined here – resource, constituency, and emigration state system – have a normative dimension that it is important to spell out here.

**Resource Approach**

The resource view of state-diaspora relations is directly linked to debates over the impacts of emigration. Some scholars see emigration as both a symptom and a cause of economic retardation, as people flee low wages and unemployment for better economic chances somewhere else, and the resulting mass exodus sets off a vicious cycle: a “brain drain” of skilled and entrepreneurial young people (see inter alia Adams 1968). Others see diasporas as potential “development agents” (Nyberg-Sørensen et al. 2002), who – under the right conditions – can bring about “migration and development”, a situation where migrants, receiving countries and sending countries all benefit from migration. There are two main strands to this thinking. Firstly, it is thought that remittances have “multiplier effects” which stimulate economic development even if initially spent on consumption rather than investment (Durand et al. 1996; Taylor et al. 1996; Massey and Parrado 1998; Taylor 1999). Secondly, it is thought that professional migration is often temporary and leads to return with higher skill levels and savings which can stimulate development. At the same time, those professionals who do remain abroad are able – due to advances in transportation, information and communication technologies – to form dispersed communities which can benefit their home countries through

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18 Parts of this section have been published in Gamlen (2008c, 2008b).
philanthropy, technology transfer and mentoring (Portes 2009: 14-16). However, such positive outcomes will not occur by themselves, it is argued; instead, the right policies are needed. As Portes puts it,

A laissez faire approach that merely waits for the market to work its magic through spontaneous remittances and knowledge transfers will not work. Governments must meet their half of the bargain because, in the absence of suitable conditions that only they can create, the best intentioned transnational projects cannot succeed. (Portes 2009: 16)

Thus, the ‘right’ conditions for migration and development are often depicted as those in which sending states actively ‘tap the diaspora’ for contributions to the national interest (see inter alia Ionescu 2006; De Haas 2006b).

Thus, the implications of the resource view for what states ‘ought’ to do are rationalist rather than normative. It would be irrational for states to extract benefits without offering anything in return – this would ‘kill the goose that lays the golden eggs’ (see De Haas 2006a). This political-economic calculus is expressed in a number of studies of sending-state diaspora policies. For example, Østergaard-Nielsen (2003a: 4) observes that “While sending countries are quick to call for their expatriate population’s economic and political contribution to development in the country of origin, it is clear that most expatriates and their representative organizations expect this to be a two-way deal.” Similarly, examining the Eritrean case in the same volume, Koser (2003a: 172) argues, “The lesson for sending states more generally is that overseas migrant populations cannot be viewed simply as a milk-cow. If long-distance nationalism is to be sustained, then sending states will increasingly face pressure to behave responsibly towards these populations”. In such a view, it is in the ‘national interest’ to take advantage of the material resources of expatriates, and therefore states should do so, extending rights as instruments if necessary. However, this is a conditional rather than a categorical statement; it refers to prudence, rather than duty. In this sense, it contrasts with the normative stance of the ‘constituency’ approach.
CONSTITUENCY APPROACH

As Bauböck (2003: 711-19) points out, although empirical questions dominate existing studies of state-diaspora relations, the less-explored normative implications of these interactions are equally important, and tie into core liberal debates about the justification of governmental power. The key question is whether or not sending-states’ incorporation of the diaspora constitutes a form of illiberal interference. Analytically, this question can be divided into three parts: do diaspora policies interfere with other, non-diasporic members of the origin political community? Do they interfere with the emigrants themselves, at least some of whom who have voluntarily exited the political community? And do they interfere with members of the self-governing political community in the migrant’s destination country?

All three questions are debated. Firstly, a number of scholars question whether diaspora policies ‘interfere’ with the rights of non-migrants at ‘home’ by diverting government efforts away from the people to whom they are directly responsible. As Glick Schiller and Fouron (1999: 358) write, “efforts to ... portray the diaspora as the hope of the nation channel energy and resources away from struggles for social and economic justice. These efforts also divert attention from the root causes of ... continuing economic and political crisis”. At the same time, diaspora policies are seen to give non-residents too much say in local decision-making, potentially violating Aristotle’s dictum that ‘the rulers should be the ruled’. As Fitzgerald (2006b: 116) writes: “emigrants make policies to which they are not as directly subject as resident citizens...[and] it is much easier for emigrants to claim rights of citizenship than for states to enforce the duties of emigrant citizenship”.

Secondly, scholars question whether diaspora policies violate the norm that dissenting citizens should be permitted to exit the state without interference. Basch et al. (1994: 269) warn of a situation in which “the nation’s people may live anywhere in the world and still not live outside the state...wherever its people go, their state goes too”. In some cases diaspora data collection and policy constitute unwanted and unjustifiable state surveillance and control. For example, De Haas (2007a: 17-18) shows that until the early 1990s, the Moroccan state attempted to retain
a close watch on ‘its’ emigrants in Europe through “a network of a control and spying networks consisting of Moroccan embassies, consulates, mosques, and government-controlled migrant associations such as the infamous Fédération des Amicales des Marocains, better known as ‘Amicales’”. Though they were nominally established “to help Moroccans abroad to develop social and cultural activities”, these associations in reality allowed the Moroccan Government to exert control over emigrants, preventing them from forming their own associations, and from voting or integrating into their host societies (also see Brand 2006: 17-18).

Thirdly, critics ask whether the cultivation of a diaspora by the home-state interferes in the domestic affairs of the host state, frustrating the integration of new migrants, undermining social cohesion, and even fomenting irredentism. For example, in a study of some 1,500 immigrants in Greater Vancouver, Hiebert and Ley (2007) found that, “Most transnational respondents experienced greatest barriers and disappointments in economic, social and cultural integration” – a finding which calls into question the legitimacy of sending-states’ promotion of transnational ties. Although he emphasises the opposite, Shain (2002) shows that diasporas can play a role in the perpetuation of conflict, highlighting how “communities wrapped up in an ethnonational conflict often extend far beyond the arena of fighting.”

These critiques of diaspora policies should not go unquestioned. Firstly, as the constituency view demonstrates, the interests of residents and non-residents are overlapping rather than conflicting: emigrants may remain “stakeholders” in the polity of their homelands (Bauböck 2007, 2008); to serve them is not necessarily to over-serve them. Secondly, to reach out to external citizens is not necessarily to interfere with them. On one hand emigrants have much greater freedom than non-migrants to disregard or protest against their origin state; as Smith and others have noted, diasporic membership gives greater freedom of choice among the options of what Hirschmann called “exit, loyalty, and voice” (Smith 1998a; Hirschmann 1974). On the other hand, a state that has provided (and may continue to provide) benefits to external citizens – in terms of social security and voting rights – may be justified in seeking something in return. As Kapur (2003) puts it, “rights without obligations are deeply problematic” (also see
Bhagwati 1976). Thirdly, to promote transnationalism is not necessarily to frustrate integration: a number of important empirical studies have undermined the idea that transnationalism and integration are mutually exclusive (Portes et al. 2002; Guarnizo et al. 2003; Snel et al. 2006). Some even suggest that sending-state involvement can reduce the risks of exclusion and separatism associated with failed integration. For example, Sheffer (1994: 77) argues that state-linked diasporas are less likely than “stateless” diasporas to harbour separatist ambitions, while Délanos (2009b) suggests that sending states’ diaspora engagement policies may assist migrants’ integration into their host societies.

**Why Engage Diasporas?**

Developing the distinction between coordinated and uncoordinated emigration state systems proposed above, this thesis develops an argument for coordinated systems. There are three different strands to the argument, referred to as obligations, interests, and cooperation.

**Obligations**

Sending-state incorporation of diasporas can be justified with respect to state obligations. As mentioned above, political theorists in the pluralist tradition have increasingly acknowledged structural inequalities arising from competition among interest groups. As Dahl (1978: 199) puts it, “A particular constellation of organizational pluralism can produce a stable system in which mutual vetoes prevent the reduction of inequalities and, more generally, structural changes in the status quo.” One commonly proposed solution to the problem of structural inequality is greater “centralization” in the policy-making process. As Dahl (1978: 201-02) explains,

> it is sometimes argued that because organizational pluralism leads to unacceptable inequalities and prevents the adoption of policies designed to reduce inequalities, the solution is to reduce the autonomy of organizations and to increase the control of a Center.... In relation to governmental organizations, the Center is usually the leadership of the governmental bureaucratic hierarchies.... Within the government, they [proponents of this solution] advocate greater centralization of control in the chief executive and a corresponding reduction in the autonomy of government bureaucracies.

The argument here is that greater centralization may help to reduce the inequalities characterising the ad hoc nature of emigration state systems. Whereas the constituency view
assumed that state incorporation of the diaspora was contingent and permissible only if it did
not ‘interfere’, here it is argued that emigration state systems exist by default and tend to
interfere unless deliberately designed not to. If a “policy of no policy” (Garcia y Griego 1988)
constitutes interference by default, deliberately coordinated policies of non-interference are
needed.

This is a kind of ‘no taxation without representation’ argument, which in its most basic form
proposes that expatriates who are taxed by their origin state are entitled to benefits in
proportion – a balancing act which requires careful planning and coordination. However, the
argument can be generalized: if a state ‘governs’ its citizens, it has obligations to treat them
fairly. Though much has been written about the sending states’ erosion through
transnationalism, such states still grant or withhold the means by which a person can exit one
country, enter another and access services while there. The argument here is that, to the extent
that sending states restrict the choices available to individuals, they still play a role in
‘governing’ them, and therefore have an obligation to do so fairly. This suggests that emigration
state systems should be coordinated so as to eliminate arbitrary injustices.

**Interests**

Coordinated emigration state systems can also be justified with respect to state interests. The
resource view held that it was in the interests of sending-states to ‘engage the diaspora’ in
order to exploit the resources of emigrants and their descendants. As discussed above, this view
was linked to the notion of ‘migration and development’. Here, the approach is slightly
different. Firstly, it emphasizes the **imperatives** rather than the **opportunities** that diasporas
present to sending-states, and secondly it emphasizes that interests other than the sending
states’ are a stake in the pursuit of migration and development.

**Imperatives:** The resource view underlined how globalization was undermining the nation-state
from above and below, and depicted diaspora engagement policies as a strategic response to
this dynamic. While it is premature to describe the nation-state as “on its last legs” (Appadurai
1996: 19), there are issues surrounding migration, diasporas and transnationalism that states – including sending-states – need to take seriously.

Firstly, the most up-to-date theory and evidence suggest that, unless skilled emigrants either return or remain productively involved in their origin societies, their departure represents a net loss to the sending country. The resulting unemployment relief alone is no longer thought to be conducive to “balanced growth” (compare, for example, Kindleberger 1965; and Papademetriou and Martin 1991). When the transaction costs of substituting emigrants with new immigrants are taken into consideration, it is dubious to posit a straightforward process of “replacement” migration (McNicoll 2000). There are limits to what migrant-sending countries can and should do to promote return migration: exit controls interfere with fundamental liberal rights (for discussion see Torpey 2007; Zolberg 2007), and economic incentives to return are unrealistic for the same reasons of economic underdevelopment that cause concerns over skilled emigration in the first place. Yet, as an increasing number of researchers contend, the ongoing involvement of skilled professionals in their countries of origin can offset the debilitating effects of “brain drain”. As Portes (2009: 8) puts it, “The sole silver lining in the consolidation of permanent expatriate settlements is the rise and growth of transnational organizations linking these settlements with areas of out migration.” His recommendation, therefore, is that, “For migrants who settle permanently abroad, facilities should be created so that they can transform their journey into a cyclical one themselves through transnational investments and philanthropic activities at home” (Portes 2009: 19). Similarly, De Haas (2005: 1273) explains that stopping professional emigration is difficult and counterproductive; the better option to counter brain drain is to promote brain gain by granting expatriates rights in order to increase their commitment and contributions.

Secondly, emigration and transnational involvement complicate the operation of public social security systems. Lunt (2006: 29), for example, highlights how social policy has to grapple with populations that are increasingly mobile and spread their lives across “two or more nation-states (and therefore welfare states, tax and fiscal systems)”. This raises important questions
surrounding the burden of care for children and the elderly: parents retiring abroad can leave increased childcare burdens on young working families, while young people emigrating can increase the number of elderly people with no family support – impacts which both have implications for public care provision (Lunt et al. 2006: 32-35). Thirdly, emigration may allow the deferral of difficult decisions that need to be made regarding basic social problems of inequality and discrimination. Emigration may provide an outlet for those whom the system has failed, but it does little to fix the system, and indeed it can falsely allay justified concerns and scupper worthy plans to address them through social programmes. This is part of a problem sometimes referred to as a misguided belief in “migration instead of development” (see inter alia De Haas et al. 2009: 43).

Finally, in the security realm, sending states also need to contain the interference of extremist elements in diaspora – not only in order to reduce threats to domestic disorder in their own territories, but to ensure that they are not creating a safe-haven for transnational criminal activity or extremist violence. It is not only the responsibility of host states to have proactive policies of this kind. In short, a “policy of no policy” towards emigration and the diaspora can be seen as a neglect of both domestic and international duties.

Opportunities: The resource view emphasized the unilateral interests of sending states in promoting development through emigration. In contrast, the approach here casts this as a relatively weak incentive, both because it is uncertain, and because it is not the central premise of ‘migration and development’ thinking.

Firstly, emigration does not necessarily cultivate development. The debate on the impacts of emigration have swung back and forth between pessimism and optimism for at least half a century (see Spaan et al. 2005). The current phase of optimism about “diasporas and development” (see inter alia Brinkerhoff 2008; Merz et al. 2007) was preceded by a period of pessimism in the 1970s and 80s about the “unsettled relationship” (Papademetriou and Martin 1991) between migration and development, which was in turn preceded by another phase of
optimism about the ability of migration to produce “balanced growth” (see Kindleberger 1965). Some scholars highlight that diaspora engagement is not necessarily always benign (Van Hear 2009; Kapur 2007, 2005), while others suggest that the current hype may be “a passing phase” (Skeldon 2008; Newland 2007; Faist 2008).

Secondly, there are more interests at stake than those of the sending state when it is argued that migration causes development. The main implication of the theory is not simply that emigration may be in the unilateral interests of sending countries, but rather that it may produce a ‘grand bargain’ among sending states and receiving states and migrants. For example, such a link would be especially convenient for wealthy receiving countries needing to simultaneously placate pro- and anti-migration groups (see Castles 2004): it allows the convenient (though dubious) argument that, by allowing migration to continue (thereby satisfying employers’ demand for cheap labour), migration will eventually be brought to a halt (thereby satisfying those who argue, for example, that migration undermines labour rights or “social cohesion”) as its primary cause – underdevelopment – is removed.19 In other words, to overemphasize the unilateral gains of emigration to sending states is to forget that, for the international policy makers and academics promoting migration and development, it is an instrument for international cooperation rather than for the pursuit of national self-interest per se.

**Cooperation**

The cooperation argument for coordinated emigration state systems is that they present a middle-way between extreme statist and extreme cosmopolitan approaches to “global migration governance” (Betts 2008).

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19 In fact, matters are somewhat more complex. For a start, the causal relationship between migration and development works in both directions and therefore it is misleading to see development as a ‘cure’ for the ‘problem’ of migration. See (see inter alia De Haas 2007b). For example, Martin and Taylor have identified a ‘migration hump’: a trend whereby, up to a point, development causes migration rather than vice versa (1996). They observe that, as incomes rise, the poorest of the poor gain the means to escape their predicament, and it is only when incomes cross a threshold of around $10,000 per capita that out-migration rates start to fall again. In short, the relationship between migration and development is not simple, nor is it a cure-all for development challenges, nor is development a cure for migration.

20 Parts of this section have been published in Gamlen (2008a).
Although, as Betts (2008: 2) notes, “International migration represents one of the most obvious contemporary manifestations of globalization”, in recent years, academic and policy debates have highlighted the absence of a multilateral framework for regulating migration at the international level (see inter alia GCIM 2005). Some suggest that this is because multilateral cooperation over migration is a lost cause: migration necessarily involves winners and losers. Others counter that, under the right conditions, everyone can win: receiving countries gain immigrant labour and human capital; sending countries relieve unemployment while capturing remittances and knowledge transfers from their diasporas; and migrants and their families benefit from voluntary movement to higher-wage areas. The argument for proactive diaspora policies to produce “migration and development” is by proxy an argument for cooperation, as a first step towards more comprehensive multilateral migration governance (see Jenny 2008).

Drawing on Chander (2001), it is useful to distinguish two main positions on what constitutes an ideal model of global migration governance: one based in the “statist” model of international law, and another based in the “cosmopolitan” model. The cosmopolitan model finds expression in the drive for more delegation of control over migration matters to a more robust international bureaucracy, while the statist model finds expression in the insistence on states’ rights to control borders and migration in line with national interests.

Advocating diaspora engagement policies represents a middle way between these two extremes. It addresses the problem that the statist approach allocates too much power over migration governance to receiving states, but instead of delegating power vertically upwards to an international bureaucracy, it redistributes power horizontally to migration sending-states. As Chander (2001: 1005) puts it, the diaspora model is a “hybrid solution .... [which] respects the sovereignty of the adopted country over matters of public concern while allowing the diaspora to choose the law of its homeland to resolve private disputes.”
**CONCLUSIONS**

This chapter has defined the approach of the thesis in relation to existing understandings of three central concepts – diaspora, state and citizenship. It has distinguished between two main approaches in the existing literature on state-diaspora relations: a ‘resource’ approach, and a ‘constituency’ approach. The first sees sending-states’ incorporation of the diaspora as a strategy to exploit the economic, social, political and human capital resources of emigrants and their descendants. Such approaches are grounded in understandings of ‘diaspora’ as a kind of social form, of ‘the state’ as a realist rational actor, and of ‘citizenship’ as subjecthood. The second type of approach sees sending-states’ diaspora policies as expressions of an idea of the political community that contains emigrants and their descendants. This type of approach is characterized by an understanding of diaspora as a type of consciousness, of the state as a socially constructed entity, and of the citizen as the basic unit of popular sovereignty. The weakness of both approaches is an attachment to the static, a-historical assumptions of what Agnew calls “the modern geopolitical imagination”, in which the standard model of political organization is the territorially sealed nation-state unit. Both approaches, therefore, are bound to treat sending-states’ diaspora policies as contingent rather than regular forms of political organization.

In contradistinction to both approaches, this thesis advances the notion of an ‘emigration state system’, defined as the portion of the state system dedicated to managing emigration and relations with emigrants. Current manifestations of this system can be broken down analytically into two functional components: diaspora building, which refers to the cultivation and recognition of diasporic identities and communities by state institutions; and diaspora integration, which refers to the ways in which state institutions draw ‘the diaspora’ into what Bhagwati (2003) calls a “web of rights and obligations” with the homeland at its centre. The concept of the emigration state system is grounded in understandings of diaspora as a mode of cultural production, the state as a pluralist institutional complex, and membership as an “instituted process”. The key innovation of subsuming these understandings under one concept
is to place emphasis on the *regularity* of sending-state diaspora policies as a standard type of political organization.

The normative implications of this approach draw on and develop those of the resource and constituency approaches. Firstly, the thesis argues that uncoordinated emigration state systems exist by default, and tend to promote inefficient and unjust relations with emigrants and their descendants unless they are deliberately designed not to. Secondly, the thesis argues that migration, diasporas and transnationalism present sending-states with certain imperatives to coordinate policy. Finally, the thesis argues that the promotion of coordinated emigration state systems offers a middle way between “statist” and “cosmopolitan” approaches to the global governance of migration.
3. **Methodology**

**Introduction**

This thesis uses a mixed methods research design, beginning with a broad overview which draws together a field of study under the concept of the ‘emigration state system’, and then drilling down into this concept through a detailed case study approach. As well as outlining the extent of the research carried out, this chapter discusses the practical strengths and weaknesses of the methods used, the ethical issues involved, and my positionality in the research process.

The methods used fall into three main groups. Firstly, the concept of an emigration state system is fleshed out through an international survey of over sixty states, based on a review of primary and secondary sources (Chapter 4). Secondly, the consolidation and characteristics of a ‘New Zealand Diaspora’ is explored with reference to a large-scale questionnaire survey (Chapter 6). The remaining chapters, which assess the emigration state systems of New Zealand and (to a lesser extent) Ireland, use qualitative case study methods – namely documentary and archival research, elite interviews, and participant-observation. These methodological orientations are discussed in turn below. The discussion is supplemented by Appendices at the end of the thesis, which fully list the research participants, fieldwork encounters, and primary documents consulted.

**Mixed Methods**

Geography has, since its inception, drawn on a wide variety of methodologies, often used in combination, and in that sense the discipline has a long tradition of “mixed methods research” (McKendrick 1999: 41). However, mixed methods as a distinct methodology unto itself is relatively new, and there are ongoing debates over the precise definition of the term (Tashakkori and Creswell 2007). There is broad agreement that they fundamentally involve a combination of qualitative and quantitative research, but there are differences of opinion over
the extent to which mixing methods requires comprehensive “integration” of two approaches (and over what “integration” means), or whether it merely requires the collection and analysis of two forms of data in a single project (Tashakkori and Creswell 2007: 3-4). Bearing in mind these debates, Tashakkori and Cresswell (2007: 4) broadly define mixed methods as “research in which the investigator collects and analyzes data, integrates the findings, and draws inferences using both qualitative and quantitative approaches or methods in a single study or a program of inquiry”.

McKendrick (1999: 41-43) highlights six main reasons for employing mixed research methods. Firstly, they are useful where no existing data or approach is ideal, but the strengths and weaknesses of some methods complement those of others. Secondly, mixed methods provide a “breadth of understanding” consistent with the “traditional academic ideals of scholarship”, which encourages exchange and cross-fertilization among different fields of knowledge. Thirdly, mixed methods may be tactically useful in broadening the appeal of research to audiences that may be sceptical of one or other research method. As an example, McKendrick notes that policy makers tend to be sceptical of in-depth qualitative research based on small samples, but may be more open to such work where it is carefully integrated with quantitative results. Mixed methods studies may also map out a field marked for more detailed future study, or provide an overarching model within which to situate existing case studies. Finally, the use of several methods may allow findings gleaned through each method to be independently verified.

Several of these reasons were factors in choosing to employ mixed methods in this research. Key findings, such as the difference in transnational engagement between UK- and Australia-based expatriates (see Chapters 6, 7, 8 and 9), are strengthened by having been “triangulated” through several independent approaches with complementary strengths. The wider aims of doctoral study, which include the pursuit of research training in addition to the pursuit of specialist knowledge (Pole 2000), have been furthered by gaining facility with a wide range of methodological techniques and approaches. Communicating with a key intended audience of
the research – national and international policy-makers – has been helped by the inclusion of quantitative research.

However, the most important reason for using mixed methods in this study has been to allow a two stage process of first taking a ‘macro’ view from quantitative research, and then ‘drilling down’ into this through qualitative case studies. This has proven particularly useful given the fragmentation of the existing case-study literature on diaspora engagement policies, which lacks overarching comparative and theoretical frameworks. The thesis first draws this fragmented field together and marks out unmapped areas within it, through an international survey of emigration state systems and a large quantitative survey of one diaspora. It then applies this model in a detailed analysis of two case studies.

**Quantitative Methods**

As outlined above, there were two quantitative components to the research: an international survey of emigration state systems across 64 countries, and an 18,000-response survey of the New Zealand diaspora. These are discussed in turn below.

**Emigration State Systems: International Survey**

The development of typologies through comparative empirical research is an important route to the development of social and political theories (see inter alia Peters 1998: 93-97). While several studies examine the diaspora engagement policies of migrant sending states through comparative case studies and advance typologies (see inter alia Østergaard-Nielsen 2003c; Smith 2003a; Barry 2006; Castles 2008; Levitt and de la Dehesa 2003; Dufoix 2008), a number of scholars highlight scope for further comparative work (see inter alia Østergaard-Nielsen 2003c: 4; Bauböck 2003: 700). In particular, typologies derived from comparisons involving a large number of case studies are relatively rare (for a notable exception see Barry 2006).

Chapter 4 of this thesis addresses such concerns through a typology of emigration state systems. The typology draws on a thorough review of secondary literature covering over sixty states, in some cases supplemented by primary research. Diaspora policies framed differently
across several smaller-scale in-depth studies were categorized, enumerated, tabulated and indexed. The strength of this method is that it brings together findings from fragmented studies, highlighting the existence of an overlooked phenomenon. Portes (1999) proposes five necessary conditions for the establishment of a new phenomenon: establishing it, delimiting it, defining the unit of analysis, distinguishing types, and identifying necessary conditions. Chapter 4 of this thesis pursues several of these aims. Firstly, it establishes the emigration state system as a durable, systematically overlooked phenomenon found in a large number of cases. Secondly, it delimits the phenomenon to a specific range of institutions and activities. Thirdly, it defines the unit of analysis as the migrant-sending state (in contrast to the bulk of studies which focus on the individual migrant and his or her support networks (Portes et al. 1999: 220)). And finally, it distinguishes different types of policy.

The constraints of this method reflect the time and budgetary constraints of the doctoral thesis. The limited availability of documentary sources made it impossible to look for all the target policies across all states. More time and resources would have permitted a review of more policies in more states. Similarly, the data are cross-sectional, though questions of historical development are crucial to a proper understanding (Sherman 1999; Thunø 2001; Cano and Délano 2007; Smith 2003a). The lack of historical perspective in the international survey is somewhat mitigated by the in-depth case studies of New Zealand and Ireland, as is the typology’s limited use in identifying the necessary conditions for the emergence of emigration state systems. Notwithstanding these limitations, the method has yielded the largest systematic comparison of diaspora engagement activities attempted to date, and provides a useful template for future comparative studies.21

**The New Zealand Diaspora: Questionnaire Survey**

Just as the model of the emigration state system was elaborated by zooming in from macro to micro scale, the case study of New Zealand begins with a macro view of the New Zealanders

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21 Research based on the survey and using this framework has been published in several places (Gamlen 2008a, 2009b, 2009a).
abroad and zooms in on the policies towards them. Chapter 6 of the thesis draws on a snowball survey of New Zealand expatriates conducted in 2006 by Kea New Zealand. The survey, called Every One Counts (EOC), was funded with project money from a range of New Zealand Government departments, and took place in March 2006 to coincide with the national census. It was disseminated by a ‘viral email’ with hyperlinks to an online survey form fronted by a sophisticated marketing campaign (see Chapter 8), sent to the then-approximately 5,000 members of the Kea database. The first half of the questionnaire asked respondents about the nature of their transnational involvements with New Zealand, in terms of activities such as conducting business, reading newspapers and belonging to associations, and maintaining contact with family and friends. The second half largely duplicated the New Zealand Census. The survey website was open for 69 days, from 1 March till 8 May 2006. During that time, the survey drew a snowball sample of 18,002 responses from 155 countries. The survey data was received in an Excel spreadsheet and transferred into STATA for recoding and analysis using descriptive statistics and regression techniques.

I was personally involved in this survey in three ways. Firstly, in exchanges with Kea’s CEO from late 2004, I was one of a number of researchers highlighting diaspora as a significant data blind-spot for New Zealand and drawing attention to the efforts of several countries at that time to collect more detailed data on their expatriates (Gamlen 2005). Secondly, in part as a result of these exchanges, I and several other academic and government researchers (Prof. Richard Bedford, Dr. Robert Didham, and Dr. Paul Callister) were approached in early 2006 to assist with the design of a questionnaire. I was responsible for the design of the survey’s opening question on citizenship status, and had input into other decisions about the ordering of the questionnaire and the wording of specific questions. Thirdly, our access to the data was made conditional on our assistance with preparing preliminary findings for media release, which we did in mid-2006.

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It is important to highlight limitations to the generalizability of inferences from the EOC data. Firstly, the data cannot necessarily be used to draw inferences for the New Zealand diaspora as a whole because the sampling was non-random (not all New Zealand expatriates had the same probability of selection). Probabilistic samples of the diaspora are currently – perhaps inherently – not feasible due to the lack of sampling frames. Secondly, EOC cannot yield information about the differences between people who do and do not identify as part of the New Zealand diaspora, because the latter were not sampled at all. Limited use has been made of other datasets during analysis, but extensive comparison of this kind was beyond the feasible scope of the project.

However, on the upside, findings from EOC, which select on the basis of self-ascribed identity, are in some respects more generalizable than alternative data sources on the New Zealand diaspora, most of which are compiled from 2000-round censuses in countries where New Zealand-born expatriates live and therefore sample on the basis of birthplace (Bryant and Law 2004; Dumont and Lemaître 2004; Migration DRC 2007). Because birthplace does not change through the individual’s life, it facilitates a more reliable (i.e. consistent and repeatable) measurement. However, because the key feature of diaspora is self-identification, not birthplace, and snowball samples are more self-selected than birthplace samples, snowball samples are comparatively valid – that is, they measure the concept they are actually supposed to. Generalizability is a function of both validity and reliability, not one or the other, and therefore snowball samples such as EOC may currently present the least worst alternative. EOC also has some strengths in terms of size, empirical richness and novelty, being the largest existing survey of New Zealand expatriates, and including questions on transnational connection that are not available from other sources. Chapter 6 represents the first detailed analysis of this data.
**Qualitative Methods**

Case study research was the main qualitative approach used in this thesis. This method was used to examine diaspora policies in two countries, New Zealand and Ireland, and to compare regions within the New Zealand study. Within this case study framework, the main research techniques used were elite interviewing, documentary research, and (to a somewhat lesser extent) multi-sited fieldwork. The approach and the specific techniques are discussed below.

Following Yin (2003), Robson (2002: 179) defines case study as “a strategy for doing research which involves an empirical investigation of a particular contemporary phenomenon within its real life context using multiple sources of evidence”. Expanding on this definition, he highlights that case study is a wider strategy rather than a specific method, and is associated with a broad range of types of empirical research. He also stresses that, to the extent that case study is concerned with the particular, it may not easily or necessarily lend itself to generalization.

Rather, it focuses on a phenomenon within its context, using multiple research methods. Case studies are often used comparatively – although different researchers sometimes understand “comparison” somewhat differently. For example, some use the term loosely to refer to the juxtaposition or sequential presentation of data on two or more situations, although more often it is insisted that comparative analysis involves the attempt to explain differences between situations (Pickvance 1995: 36).

Some geographers and transnationalism scholars have voiced important reservations about comparative case study methodology. On one hand, selection biases are a common problem in case study research. For example, Portes (2001) highlights how a proliferation of case studies of transnationalism has led to “sampling on the dependent variable”: cases involving the variable of interest are studied but cases where the variable of interest is absent are ignored. As a result, there has been a tendency to exaggerate the scale of transnational phenomena. On the other hand, the theoretical inferences derived from comparative analysis are not always universally valid. For example, Pickvance (1995: 37) argues that conventional comparative analysis
mistakenly assumes “universal causation” (that “causal processes are the same wherever and whenever a phenomenon is produced”), whereas “plural causation” is also possible (when different causes act on different occasions). As a result, he argues, comparative analysis is unable to resolve the theoretical impasse between Marxists and Weberians: both may be right. Taken together, such reservations highlight the limited extent of causal inferences that can be derived from comparative case study research.

However, it is important to note that when causal inference is not the only nor the primary aim of the research, such as is the case in this thesis, these criticisms carry considerably less weight. Rather than refining the explanatory power of an existing body of theory regarding a well-known phenomenon, this thesis aims to map out a novel phenomenon in a novel context. Scholars have long complained of an under-emphasis on emigration and the policies of migrant-sending states within the field of migration studies (see inter alia Martins 1974: 276-77; Green and Weil 2007: 1; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a: 3). However, few if any have noticed that the small number of publications addressing this imbalance are almost all studies of developing or somehow ‘dysfunctional’ states (for exceptions see Fullilove and Flutter 2004; Sriskandarajah and Drew 2006; Larner 2007). Studies of diaspora engagement policies in developed liberal democracies such as New Zealand and Ireland are indeed novel, and therefore the aims of this research are broader and more exploratory than those of studies criticized by Portes, Pickvance and others. As outlined in the previous chapter, there are three central research questions underpinning this thesis; one is descriptive, one is normative, and only one is explanatory.

The main body of the thesis is a single case study of New Zealand’s emigration state system. New Zealand works well as a single case because it challenges an existing theory (Yin 2003). Existing theories associate diaspora engagement policies with illiberal, conflict-riven, underdeveloped, and ethno-nationalistic states, and not with developed, liberal democratic nation-states exhibiting high levels of immigration and ethnic diversity – such as New Zealand. As well as studying diaspora policies at the ‘centre’ of policy formation in Wellington (Chapter 8), the research examines them at the point of delivery in four locations: the UK, Australia, France and
Japan. These “multiple embedded units of analysis” (Yin 2003) are treated comparatively in the
sense that attempts are made to explain variation through causation (see Chapter 7).

The locations fall into two pairs, chosen for comparability, contrast and convenience. Like New
Zealand, the UK and Australia are newly-multicultural nations with a shared colonial and
Commonwealth history involving Anglo-Saxon domination. New Zealanders move among these
locations with relative ease and in large numbers. By contrast, France and Japan are both old-
world societies characterized by less tolerance for ethnic diversity and more difference from
the Anglo-Saxon world. New Zealanders in these locations are few and far between, and face
greater cultural and linguistic challenges to integration. Feasibility was an important constraint
on the research: budget and time limitations prevented visiting the other main emigrant
destination (North America), while previous experience living in Japan and the fact that it is a
stopover destination between Europe and the South Pacific, made that a convenient choice for a
contrasting location. Similarly, proximity to France while based in Oxford allowed affordable
fieldtrips and easy contact.

An additional case study of Ireland plays a role in this thesis. The primary role of this case is to
provide a model of an emigration state system that is relatively efficient and equitable. Without
this counter example, the inefficiencies and injustices in the New Zealand case might appear
inevitable. This is a limited comparison because it makes only limited attempts to provide a
theoretical explanation for the differences between the two state systems. Indeed, the cases are
selected to minimize variation and maximize similarity. Both countries are insular territories
on the semi-periphery of the former British Empire, with similar population sizes and
distributions, and similar numbers of citizens abroad (although Ireland’s non-citizen diaspora is
massively larger than New Zealand’s). Both migration systems are in transition (see Fields 1994;
Findlay et al. 2002): Ireland has been shifting from consistent net emigration to episodes of net
immigration, whereas New Zealand has been shifting from consistent net receiving to periods
of net sending. Immigration has brought unprecedented ethnic diversity to both societies,
especially since the 1990s. Ireland is also a useful case to examine because it has sometimes
been cited as a model for New Zealand (e.g. see L.E.K Consulting 2001: 84-85).

In keeping with the overall mixed method approach of the thesis, the case studies employed
four main research methods: documentary analysis, multi-sited fieldwork, interviews, and
survey research. These methods were concurrent and intertwined, not consecutive and
separate. For example, interviewees were sometimes recruited during participant observation
at events. During interviews, participants would suggest documents to analyse, which would
lead to further documents, names of people to interview, places to visit and events to attend.

**Elite Interviews**

One of the most important techniques used in this thesis was the “elite interview”. Dexter
(2006: 19) defines an elite interview as one where the interviewee is given “specialized and
nonstandard treatment” in the sense that “the investigator is willing, and often eager to let the
interviewee teach him what the problem, the question, the situation is”. Elite interviews can be
contrasted with “focused interviews”, where “the investigator defines the question and the
problem; he is only looking for answers within the bounds set by his presuppositions.”
Although the method may be used with interviewees holding any status, it is particularly useful
for interviews with “people in important or exposed positions [who] may require VIP
interviewing treatment on the topics which relate to their importance or exposure” (Dexter

Dexter makes the obvious point that elite interviews should be chosen when they seem likely to
yield better or more data at less cost than other methods. In keeping with this simple dictum,
elite interviewing was selected as the central tool in this study for two main reasons. Firstly, the
research was exploratory, and concerned a range of policies dispersed across many government
departments. The form and content of policies varied widely across departments and typically
only a few individuals in each department were involved in relevant activity. More a priori
knowledge about diaspora policies would have been needed in order to design a useful
questionnaire survey, and more respondents would have been necessary for quantitative analysis of the resulting data. Secondly, I recognized that diaspora policy chiefly involved a limited number of policy makers interacting with a limited number of migrant associations, and that therefore it would be possible to speak with all or a large proportion of the key figures in the main regions of the study. This indeed turned out to be the case.

**Recruitment**

The participants were recruited from four main groups: policy makers involved in diaspora-related policy of some sort, business leaders involved in influential debates about the diaspora, migrant associations actively involved with diplomatic or consular posts to some extent, and independent migrants without strong ties to any migrant association. These groups were somewhat overlapping. Attempts were made to speak with all the key actors involved in state-diaspora relations in the regions under study; while this was not always possible, in the four main regions, a majority of the key people did take part in the study.

New Zealand interviewees were recruited through snowballing from three different starting points. The first was the Kiwi Expats Association (Kea), an organization discussed at length in subsequent chapters. In 2005 I posted an introduction to my research and an invitation to participate on the Kea website. In mid-2008 I included a notice in Kea’s global newsletter to some 25,000 expatriates in around 155 countries, inviting ‘second generation kiwis’ to contact me. A combined total of 78 people responded to these online invitations, around 20 of whom were eventually interviewed. (These twenty were essentially selected for convenience.) A second starting point was to cold-call and email New Zealand diplomatic posts and government departments to identify key officials. These led to meetings where I presented my work and responded to questions before asking questions of my own. Various events constituted a third starting point. For example, I held two seminars in Wellington in February 2007: one at Victoria University of Wellington, and the other in the Department of Labour. After presenting and discussing my work with the audience of academics and policy makers, I collected their business cards and followed up by phone or email to arrange interviews or get more referrals. I
also met interviewees while on fieldwork at diaspora events that were not specifically organized for me. For example, a New Zealand networking event at the residence of Oxford University’s then-Vice Chancellor John Hood led to a personal meeting and introductions to a number of senior businesspeople who, like Hood, have been important figures in New Zealand diaspora policy. These multiple starting points eventually reinforced each other: on one hand people began to contact me out of the blue having heard about my research, and on the other hand, certain key people began to be referred by several others.

Although there were significantly fewer of them, the interviewees for the Irish case study were recruited in a similar manner. I began with a focused review of the literature on Ireland’s policies regarding emigrants, and then began cold-calling or emailing key figures to request interviews. These people then referred further interviewees, and so on, until a sufficiently wide coverage was achieved.

Compensation

Institutional research-ethics guidelines for qualitative research often enjoin researchers to provide some form of compensation to research participants. For example, the guidelines of the Association of Anthropologists prescribe “fair return for assistance”. This means that there “should be no economic exploitation of individual informants, translators and research participants; fair return should be made for their help and services.” The obligation to ‘give back’ is interpreted differently across different fields of research. Some take a minimalist stance that compensation is a form of harm prevention, where others take a more proactive position, treating participant compensation as a way of providing benefits in return for those gained by the researcher (for discussion see Kopala and Suzuki 1999: 7071). Compensation may be seen as the market price of a commodity demanded by the researcher and supplied by the participant; as a form of wage-payment for the participants’ labour; as reimbursement for incurred expenses; or as a way of allocating a “fair-share” of research benefits to all the “partners” in a research project – including the participants (Dickert and Grady 1999). Some argue for financial
compensation of the research participant, while others argue that financial compensation can bias participant selection, and that researchers should ‘give back’ in other ways.

This doctoral research was founded on attempts to ‘give something back’ to the community of policy makers and migrants whom I was researching. My participants were not offered financial payment because it was not financially feasible within the constraints of my project, and because in any case it would have seemed naïve and futile for a university student to offer token payments to senior public servants, ambassadors, or business executives. However, I conceived the project with the explicit intention of finding policies that I judged would ‘improve’ relations between migrants and their home government. My initial thoughts on ‘improvement’ were that emigration constituted a form of social dislocation, and that policy in the sending country could help to remedy this, building what I (rather hazily, at that point) thought of as “transnational social cohesion”. These thoughts were my instinctive reaction to New Zealand’s prolonged debates over ‘brain drain’, which encompassed not only fear about loss of skilled and entrepreneurial young people, but about what mass exodus suggested about the viability of New Zealand society more generally. These thoughts were formed while I was living as an expatriate in Japan, and was struck by the way that simple provision of embassy space for workshops and rehearsals had facilitated the formation of a Māori performing arts group. On one hand, the group kept a number of young, skilled migrants connected to New Zealand and provided a valuable cultural element to New Zealand diplomatic events. On the other hand, performances gave group members benefits like financial payment, free international travel for performances, access to diplomatic and business elites, and most importantly, the foundation of a support network to help them function better in an often challenging cultural environment. My sense was that a relatively small amount of effort from the embassy resulted in a substantial benefit for New Zealand, for the migrants themselves, and for the host community. I hoped to see this model emulated in other contexts. I hope that my understanding of what constitutes ‘improvement’ and ‘benefit’ has developed through the
research, but this aim of giving back still informs one of the key questions of the thesis: How should states relate to their diasporas?

**Format**

The nature of the “elite interviews” varied in a number of important ways. In all, 194 participants are listed by name (see Appendix 1). The list does not include people met and spoken with informally, even though many such informal encounters did shape my understanding. Rather it includes only those with whom I met formally or semi-formally, and who gave permission to be listed. These encounters ranged from 20 minutes to 1.5 hours in length, though most were around 40 minutes long. In several cases they involved groups – usually because the person initially contacted invited a colleague they thought would be as or more interested or expert than they were, and sometimes no doubt (although this was never explicit) because the participant felt more secure with a colleague present. In a few cases it was necessary to meet with several people at once due to time constraints in a location (Paris, Hong Kong).

These formal participants can be divided into two main groups. There were 140 ‘formal interviews’ either with individuals or small groups. In these encounters there was a clear researcher / subject divide and the interview was typically recorded. There were also 121 ‘substantive exchanges’, where the participant was made fully aware of my role as a researcher and explicitly agreed to answer substantive questions and to be named as a participant. These differed from formal interviews in several important respects. The encounters were often information exchanges with officials who wanted to “pick my brain”, (as several of them put it), about matters relating to the New Zealand diaspora and to diaspora policy. I provided detailed explanations of my work and answered questions as part of a formal conversation, where both I and my interlocutor took notes. Because these encounters often involved exchanges of personal opinions, they took place under variants of the “Chatham House Rule”,\(^{23}\) where participants

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\(^{23}\) Under the Chatham House Rule, participants of “a meeting, or part thereof ... are free to use the information received, but neither the identity nor the affiliation of the speaker(s), nor that of any other
agreed to be named in the appendices of the thesis and for information from the meeting to be used in the thesis, provided that it was not possible to link their name to their information. To protect the anonymity of research participants, I have anonymized all interview references unless the interviewee was a prominent public figure and gave permission to be quoted personally. This is achieved by citing an interview code (e.g. “IV199”) for anonymous quotes. Codes are not cited where the interviewee is named in the text, and the key for the code is not included in the thesis.

**Data Collection and Analysis**

While most participants were encountered in person, almost 50 encounters took place by phone, and, in some cases, through detailed email correspondence, in order to reduce travel costs. Aural recordings were made of 120 encounters, using a range of electronic media (digital video, minidisk, analogue cassette and MP3). The remaining encounters were recorded in handwritten field notes. The notebooks and audio files were transcribed into MS Word files by myself and paid transcribers based in New Zealand. These files were then imported into NVivo software and analyzed. The main analytical approach was thematic: sections of text were coded and grouped according to themes relating to the research problems. While “narrative analysis” (see Wiles et al. 2005) was not a major feature of the research, interpretation and choice of quotes for use in the thesis was informed by efforts to interpret and understand how the interview context, the participant’s tone, tempo, style and body language – as well as what was not said explicitly – all added nuance to what was actually said.

**Multi-Sited Fieldwork and Documentary Research**

Multi-sited fieldwork, chiefly participant-observation, was an important tool for contextualizing and refining the interviews conducted as part of this research. Dexter (2006: 27) notes that the utility of interview methods are constrained by the interviewer’s understanding of context: “no one should plan or finance an entire study in advance with the expectation of participant, may be revealed”. The Chatham House Rule, http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/about/chathamhouserule, accessed 26 June 2009.
relying chiefly upon interviews for data unless the interviewers have enough relevant background to be sure that they can make sense out of the interview conversations or unless there is a reasonable hope of being able to hang around or in some way observe so as to learn what it is meaningful and significant to ask” [italics in original]. My own relative inexperience in policy circles made this particularly important for me, and I took a number of specific steps to achieve a better understanding of my subjects’ “frame of reference”.

Firstly, wherever feasible I conducted interviews in person in order to absorb as much contextual information as possible. This often allowed me spend time in the participant’s workplace, chat with their colleagues and get a sense for personal and professional relationships, look at documents that officials had on hand to illustrate what they were saying, read the participant’s body language and interpret what this said about the significance of the topics being discussed, and so on. These contextual clues were often very helpful in interpreting the explicit content of fieldnotes and interview transcripts.

Secondly, outside of actual research encounters, I immersed myself as much as possible in my participants’ environment. In-person interviewing necessitated trips to a number of different locations. In each location, I took accommodation as close as possible to my interviewees’ offices, had morning tea in the same cafes, criss-crossed the same roads among departments, traipsed through the same subterranean passageways through security checks, and looked down from the same high-rise offices. I met policy managers for interviews in street-side cafés, where other officials whispered conspiratorially in their own corners. Once, in New Zealand, I bumped into an MP on the street who helped me set up an interview with John Key, now the Prime Minister. Being immersed in those places for a time was an important step towards understanding the culture and organization of the local institutions whose members I was interviewing. This kind of immersion was greatly facilitated by Visiting Status at local universities. In New Zealand I was based in the Institute of Policy Studies (IPS) at Victoria University of Wellington for a month between February and March 2007. I arranged Visiting Status at Sydney University for a month in April the same year. For interviews in Ireland during
September, I was based at Trinity College, Dublin for a month. These affiliations also enabled me to attend and present at policy-focused conferences and seminars. For example, my IPS affiliation enabled me to present my work to a group of policy makers, where I gained valuable feedback and was also able to recruit interviewees. In Dublin my Trinity College affiliation allowed me to attend a conference on migration where both academics and policy makers presented. In Sydney, being based at the centrally located University of Sydney put me in an environment surrounded by business and policy decision makers.

Thirdly, I took every possible opportunity to be a participant-observer at events where my research subjects came together. Particularly important from this point of view were diaspora community events organized by or involving local diplomatic or consular officials. These ranged from informal gatherings, through meetings of migrant associations, to national events at New Zealand diplomatic posts. I was always open about my observer-researcher role, and wherever appropriate I obtained informed consent from organizers and/or participants before attending and taking notes. In total I filled 42 3B1 notebooks, which I selectively transcribed and analyzed thematically using NVivo software. Appendix 2 provides details of the main fieldwork events and these are referenced by number (e.g. “E52”). However, it must also be noted firstly that many of these were preceded or followed by less formal encounters – conversations on trains, in foyers, in pubs and the like. Often these serendipitous encounters provided valuable information or insights which shaped my thinking on particular issues. Wherever such encounters provide evidence used in the thesis, an agreement regarding use and attribution was reached with the individual concerned.

Finally, I attended a number of conferences on diaspora policies with policy makers, which gave me valuable insights into the policy process and fed back into my own research activities. I attended policy-oriented conferences and seminars on diaspora topics sponsored by UNESCO in Paris (2006), at the New Zealand Department of Labour (2007), at Mexico’s Foreign Affairs Secretariat (2007), at the UNECE in Paris (2008), and at the National University of Ireland (2009).

24 I am very grateful to Paul Callister, John Connell, and Melissa Butcher for hosting these visits.
These conferences and seminars helped me to understand the migration policy world much better, to ask more pertinent questions of my interviewees, and to interpret their responses more perceptively.

This research also drew on extensive documentary research. Primary documents consulted included electoral archives, newspapers, magazine and website articles, email newsletters and correspondence, as well as official documents and reports pertaining to aspects of diaspora policies in New Zealand and Ireland. Primary sources are listed in the Appendices. These are cited by number throughout the thesis; for example, OIA15 refers to the fifteenth listed document obtained under New Zealand’s Official Information Act, while FIA15 refers to the fifteenth listed document obtained under Ireland’s Freedom of Information Act. Primary sources (including those listed in the Appendices as well as specific newspaper and magazine articles, websites and documentaries) are generally cited in footnotes, while secondary sources are cited in text.

**Summary**

This chapter has explained my reasons for choosing a mixed methods research design, and has discussed the various methods used, their strengths and weaknesses, the ethical issues they raise, and my positionality in the research process. It has explained how mixed methods allowed this research to begin with quantitative overviews of ‘the emigration state system’ and the ‘New Zealand diaspora’, and then to ‘drill down’ into these frameworks through in-depth qualitative research. Beyond this, the chapter makes no overarching arguments, but rather advances particular arguments with respect to particular methods. For example, it argues that, despite their weaknesses in terms of reliability, snowball survey samples have some redeeming characteristics: namely, they allow selection of a sample that validly qualifies as ‘diasporic’. It also explains the choice of elite interviewing as a main method, and reflects on the motivations for the project, as well as the need to interpret interview content within a broader understanding of context, gained through fieldwork involving participation and observation.
4. **Emigration State Systems: An International Survey**

**Introduction**

The role of emigration states in regulating transnational relations has been a controversial topic in recent years. On the optimistic side of the debate, scholars and policy makers have argued that emigrants can help draw their origin countries out of economic, social and political backwardness. By ‘engaging the diaspora’, they argue, migrant-sending states can help to cultivate ‘migration and development’ – a situation where everyone wins through migration: receiving countries gain immigrant labour and human capital, sending countries relieve unemployment while capturing remittances and knowledge transfers from their diasporas, and migrants and their families benefit from voluntary movement to higher-wage areas (see inter alia Van Hear et al. 2004; De Haas 2006b; Ionescu 2006; Newland and Patrick 2004; Meyer 2001; Kuznetsov 2006).

On the pessimistic side, various writers have interpreted diaspora engagement policies as symptoms of backwardness itself. To some they are an overflowing of ethnic chauvinism (Joppke 2003, 2005b; Anderson 1992; Skrbić 1999; Glick Schiller 2005a; Glick Schiller and Fouron 1999: 358), or the long shadow of an authoritarian regime that tyrannizes those who attempt to escape it (Basch et al. 1994: 269). To others they are a symptom of weakness: a sign of a state’s failure to seal its internal nation-building processes off from external influences (Demmers 2002: 91-94), or of a state’s voluntary enslavement to capital (Larner 2007). To many, they are one more mode of transnationalism, which is supposedly facilitated by backward political conditions such as the absence of liberal democracy in the country of origin, a contentious minority politics, and obstacles to integration in the new society (Faist 2000: 198).

This chapter argues that both views are misleading because they portray institutionalized relations between states and emigrants as abnormal. This portrayal reflects what John Agnew
calls “the modern geopolitical imagination”: a vision of the world as an integrated whole, comprising advanced and primitive areas, in which the highest form of political organization is the territorial nation-state. In this view, the territorial nation-state is a discrete sovereignty unit that neatly seals ‘domestic politics’ – where a single rule-maker maintains order – from ‘external affairs’, where anarchy reigns and nation-states are pitted against each other in perpetual pursuit of primacy on a fixed, international playing field (Agnew 2001, 2003).

These assumptions condition the way the central questions of this thesis are conventionally answered. How do states relate to their diasporas? According to the conventional wisdom, under ‘normal’ circumstances they do not. Why do they do so in particular ways? In conventional thinking, this abnormal behaviour is caused by some form of ‘backwardness’, such as ethnic chauvinism, authoritarianism, underdevelopment, or incomplete state formation.

How should states relate to their diasporas? Assuming that to do so is abnormal, this question remains unresolved. Should these ‘new’ forms of behaviour be admitted to the liberal canon, or are they inherently illiberal?

If the assumption of abnormality were overturned, the answers to these questions would look somewhat different. This chapter therefore questions the common wisdom that diaspora engagement policies are abnormal. On the basis of a survey of 64 states, drawn from a review of secondary and some primary literature, the chapter maps out the full range of diaspora engagement policies, distinguishing between ‘diaspora building’ mechanisms which cultivate and recognize diasporic identities, and ‘diaspora integration’ mechanisms, which project various membership privileges and responsibilities into the diaspora. It demonstrates that these policies are found in a large number of states of many different types, suggesting that, far from abnormal, diaspora engagement policies are ordinary elements of political organization that have been overlooked by modern geopolitical thinking. As Chulwoo Lee has suggested, perhaps “all states are, to a certain extent, deterritorialized” (personal communication, 2006).
The data are presented in aggregate form in Table 4-1. Construction of the table began with a review of documentary sources on state-emigrant relations, which found fragmentary data on the institutions and practices of over 70 states. These mechanisms were tabulated by country, and then classified as either diaspora building or diaspora integration. The significance of each mechanism in each state was then indexed: where many mechanisms were present in a given state, the corresponding cell in the table was filled black. Where a few mechanisms were present, the cell was filled grey. Where there were serious proposals to create apparatuses, the cell was filled light grey field. States where little evidence was found were dropped out of the table, leaving the sample of 64 states presented in Table 4-1.

**Diaspora Building**

Some diaspora building mechanisms cultivate diasporic identities and community structures, while others formally recognize (or reify) existing diaspora communities. These two functions are discussed in turn.

**Cultivating a Diaspora**

Recognizing and celebrating the role of expatriates in the nation is one common way of cultivating diasporic identity. India’s Pravati Bharatiya Divas (Non-resident Indian Day) is perhaps the most famous diaspora celebration; its 2008 theme was “Engaging the Diaspora: the way forward”. However, it is normal practice for diplomatic posts to lead extra-territorial celebrations of national holidays, some of which are very large (for example Ireland’s St Patrick’s Day). On a smaller but still significant scale, New Zealand has its annual “World Class New Zealand Awards” for high-flying expatriates in strategically important industries. Armenia, Jamaica, Cyprus and many other countries convene regular diaspora congresses to discuss the role of the diaspora in the nation (e.g. see Østergaard-Nielsen 2003c). Several studies have identified a distinct shift, observable across a number of states, from denouncing emigrants as deserters to hailing them as heroes (e.g. see Martinez-Saldana 2003; De Haas 2007a; Nyiri 2004; Castles 2008: 271; Bakewell 2008: 289-90). A number of states have enshrined the
diaspora in statutes. For example, Ireland’s constitution declares a “special affinity” with the Irish abroad, while it is a constitutional objective of the Slovenian state to “maintain concern” for Slovene nationals living in other countries, and to foster their contacts with the homeland. Sometimes politicians make the bold rhetorical claim of representing or governing for the diaspora – as did Haiti’s Jean Bertrand Aristide (Glick Schiller and Fouron 1999), Mexico’s Vicente Fox (Martinez-Saldana 2003), and Ireland’s Mary Robinson (Levitt 2001).

Maintaining national culture abroad is another way of cultivating diasporic identity. The distribution or broadcasting of national television and print media abroad has always contributed to this; state sponsored web portals for expatriates are also now ubiquitous. Sometimes state agencies establish new migrant associations – whether they be the recent “diaspora networks” (Kuznetsov 2006) of South Africa, New Zealand, Chile and Scotland (among many others), or the earlier groups such as Morocco’s Amicales founded in the 1970s – with the expressed purpose of courting (and controlling) a loyal diaspora (Brand 2006; De Haas 2007a).

**Recognizing the Diaspora**

States have various mechanisms for recognizing diaspora communities. For example, they can treat diasporas as unitary populations to be discovered and described through aggregate statistics. Commissioning new studies or improving statistical procedures is often the first step taken by governments deliberately seeking to ‘engage the diaspora’. Sometimes this interest is unwelcome (for example, Morocco and Russia are often accused of spying on dissident emigrants), but often emigrant lobby groups try to quantify themselves when seeking recognition from their origin state. For example, India’s High Level Commission was a response to pressure from emigrant groups (High Level Commission on the Indian Diaspora 2001), as was Ireland’s Taskforce on Policy Regarding Emigrants (Cowen 2002). Similarly, Australia’s Senate Inquiry on the diaspora (Australian Senate 2005) was prompted by lobbying from emigrant lobbies like Southern Cross Group wielding academic and think-tank data and reports (Hugo et al. 2003; Fullilove and Flutter 2004). Pressure to recognize Britain’s emigrant communities was an important theme in a recent study by the Institute for Public Policy Research entitled Brits.
Abroad, which mapped the emigrant population and advocated more coherent policies towards it (Sriskandarajah and Drew 2006). Indeed, the Every One Counts survey analyzed in Chapter 6 of this thesis has been an important lobbying platform for the Kiwi Expats Association (Kea New Zealand).

Formally recognizing diaspora communities involves dedicated bureaucratic structures. The consular service provides one set of such structures: for example, Mexico’s network of around 50 consulates is crucial to its relations with Mexicans in the USA (González Gutiérrez 1997). Diaspora programs or offices are also common – typically within labour secretariats, foreign services and other agencies with an interest in emigration. These programs often coalesce into permanent units or dedicated ministries. Two famous examples are the Institute for Mexicans Abroad (IME) (Cano and Délano 2007) and the Irish Abroad Unit. However, 44 (76%) of the 64 states compared in Table 4-1 had some kind of bureaucratic structure for dealing with expatriates, and eleven of these were ministerial structures.
### Table 4-1: Emigration State Systems – An International Survey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States</th>
<th>Diaspora Building</th>
<th>Diaspora Integration</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Celebrating national holidays; honouring expatriates with awards; convening diaspora congresses; proclaiming affinity with and responsibility for diaspora; issuing special IDs/visas; national language and history education; extended media coverage</td>
<td>Permitting dual nationality, dual citizenship or external voting rights; special legislative representation; consulting expatriate councils or advisory bodies</td>
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<td>Argentina</td>
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<td>Pre-departure services; expanded bilateral agreements; intervening in labour relations; supplementing health; welfare &amp; education services support; upholding property rights</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Extending Rights</td>
<td>Extracting obligations:</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Political rights:</td>
<td>Taxing expatriates, customs/import incentives, special economic zones, investment services, tax incentives, matching fund programs, diaspora bonds &amp; financial products, facilitating remittances, fellowships, skill networks</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Social rights:</td>
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*Note: The table cells indicate the presence or absence of specific policies or practices.*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Key</th>
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<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Many activities: many nation-building activities, a bureaucratic unit, legislative representation, social justice focus, initiatives to leverage the diaspora</td>
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<td>Italy</td>
<td>Some significant, relatively recent activity, covered substantively in literature</td>
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<td>Japan</td>
<td>&quot;Under discussion&quot;: e.g. recommended by leading think tanks, significant academic literatures, and/or debated substantively in government</td>
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<td>Zimbabwe</td>
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</table>

**Key:**

- **Many activities:** many nation-building activities, a bureaucratic unit, legislative representation, social justice focus, initiatives to leverage the diaspora
- **Some significant, relatively recent activity:** covered substantively in literature
- **"Under discussion":** e.g. recommended by leading think tanks, significant academic literatures, and/or debated substantively in government
**Diaspora Integration**

This section examines the rights that origin states extend to diasporas and the obligations they attempt to extract from them. The ‘resource’ view of state-diaspora relations suggests that sending states grant political and social rights to emigrants instrumentally, so they can make a case for legitimately extracting political and economic benefits in return. However, as Table 4-1 shows, diaspora building efforts (which can be indicative of a deliberate strategy) are not always connected with diaspora integration mechanisms (e.g. see Haiti and Greece). The constituency view suggests that norms rather than interests are at stake in states’ reciprocal ties with their diasporas: the extension of rights and the extraction of obligations are both logical consequences of citizens’ integration within an extended political community with the home state at its centre (e.g. see Bhagwati 2003: 101; Bauböck 2003). This perspective often equates ‘deterritorialized’ political communities with dispersed but otherwise static ethnic groups, and therefore does not fit well with the more multicultural cases in Table 4-1, where states express a range of ethnicities and interests. In contrast, this thesis recognizes how sending-states’ diaspora policies accumulate through a kind of dialectic involving the accommodation of diasporic membership claims on one hand, and efforts to capitalize on diaspora resources through instrumental appeals to patriotism on the other hand.

**Extending Rights**

The basic right states extend to emigrants is the right to retain citizenship, or what Hannah Arendt called “the right to have rights” (Arendt 1958). In principle citizenship generally confers right of abode in the origin country, unimpeded travel, the right to do business, the right to pass on citizenship to children, and the right to vote. However, in practice states differ in their treatment of citizens. Moreover, individual states treat different citizens differently according to whether they live inside or outside the territory, and even sometimes according to which other territory they live in (for example in India (Dickinson and Bailey 2007) and South Korea (Lee 2004)). Although some countries do not allow emigrants to retain citizenship once they naturalize abroad (e.g. Denmark, India, Japan and Singapore) and others view it as a criminal
offence (e.g. Saudi Arabia), there is a general trend towards tolerance of dual citizenship (e.g. see Bauböck 2005a). The remainder of this section uses Marshall’s (1950) classic conception of citizenship as comprising civil, political and social rights as a scheme for categorizing the benefits states grant to diasporas.

**Political Rights**

As Rainer Bauböck (2003: 709) notes, disinterest is the default normative position of home states towards their diasporas. Some liberals object to extra-territorial political participation, arguing that emigrants lack the ongoing involvement and future stake in the polity required of those who take part in collectively binding decisions. Until recently these objections have gone relatively unquestioned. However, Bauböck and others argue that improved communications and transportation technologies allow involvement from afar, and that increasingly common transnational behaviour such as shuttle migration, remittances or investment, and commitment to return are indicative of a stake in the home society. As long as external voting rights expire with the first generation of emigrants, there are a number of principled arguments that may justify them (Bauböck 2005c, 2005b; Spiro 2006; Rubio-Marin 2006; Fitzgerald 2006a).

Leaving aside the question of whether they can be justified, expansive political rights as an empirical fact are neither new nor unusual: they are widespread and longstanding in states of all kinds. In a sample of 144 countries, Collyer and Vathi (2007) found that 115 (80%) allowed emigrant electoral participation in some form. They identify five different types of extra-territorial electoral systems: countries without elections (comprising 4.9% of the sample); countries with elections where emigrants cannot participate (13.3%); countries where emigrants must return to their district of origin to vote (9%); countries where emigrants can vote abroad as if they were in their origin district (61.8%); and countries where emigrants can vote directly for representatives (9%). The authors found that countries with proportionally large diasporas and remittance flows were no more likely to permit extra-territorial voting
than others. Rather than a single explanatory hypothesis for all forms of extra-territorial
voting, they suggested different sets of explanatory factors for each type of regime.

The geography of transnational political inclusion remains to be fully mapped. Rather than
viewing extra-territorial participation as abnormal and dubious, it may be more fruitful to
study and theorize it as a normal form of political organization. A first step might be to identify
a spectrum of inclusiveness covering all types of rights, as Collyer and Vathi have done for
voting rights. At one extreme would be states that try to shut out emigrants – such as in Sri
Lanka, Palestine, and Afghanistan, where the state is mired in conflict that encompasses parts
of the diaspora (Van Hear 2006). In the middle would be states such as Mexico and India, which
have made several historical transitions between “extension” and “introversion” with respect
to diaspora rights (Sherman 1999; Lall 2003; Cano and Délano 2007). However, the most
numerous would be those at the inclusive end of the spectrum; these include developed post-
imperial countries like Spain (Rhodes and Harutyunyan 2007), Canada and New Zealand, all of
which once regarded themselves as part of a wider transnational polity. It may be that
countries tend to move gradually towards the inclusive end of this spectrum – as emigrant
groups use any increased influence to lobby for still more (Smith 1998b; Smith 2003b) – until
some sudden event changes the composition of the polity.

Civil and Social Rights

Origin states have at least two main mechanisms for protecting the civil and social rights of
diasporas without infringing on host-country sovereignty: portable social security benefits, and
consular service. Migrant sending countries are often forced to compensate for inefficiencies
and injustices in the former through changes in the latter.

The social security portability arrangements of sending countries cover, to a greater or lesser
extent, the pension and healthcare entitlements of expatriate citizens. Portability is regulated
at both the national and international levels, through direct overseas payment of sending
country benefits and through reciprocal agreements between sending and receiving countries.
Some countries may pay pension entitlements directly to expatriate pensioners living abroad in countries not covered by a bilateral agreement. Most countries make an arbitrary reduction in overseas payments, if they allow them at all. For example, New Zealand reduces overseas pension entitlements by 50%, nominally to compensate for taxation and a means-tested surcharge that apply to resident citizens but not those residing abroad (although the surcharge has been removed and the discount remains – see Chapter 9). Germany applies a reduction of 30% to the pension entitlement of immigrants who retire in their country of origin (Holzmann et al. 2005: 15). As Gordon Clark (2002) shows, the UK does not index its overseas pension payments to inflation in countries not covered by a bilateral agreement, even though this results in the majority of expatriate UK pensioners watching their UK pensions inexorably diminish as they get older.

Such arbitrary discrimination is prevented by the “non-discrimination” clause in most reciprocal social security agreements (Holzmann et al. 2005: 15). A few of the older reciprocal agreements follow a “host country” format (such as that between New Zealand and the UK), whereby migrant origin and destination countries simply pay for each other’s migrants. More often, however, agreements specify a formula for determining each country’s liability for each migrant’s benefits according to the migrant’s contributions and/or time spent in each agreement country. Such agreements are “totalized”, so that a migrant’s time and contributions in one agreement country can be counted towards time and contribution criteria in the other agreement country. Bilateral agreements are currently considered “best practice” in social security portability (Holzmann et al. 2005), although they constitute an extremely complex and inefficient area of international regulation, largely because not all agreements adhere to a multilateral template such as those that followed by EU countries.

Holzmann et al.’s data (2005) show that bilateral agreements on social security portability are predominantly made between more developed countries. European countries had a total of 2,561 bilateral agreements, while African countries had 342 between them, concentrated in Algeria (30) and Morocco (58). Turkey and the Philippines had 59 and 21 respectively, while
Canada and the USA had 180 and 97 agreements respectively: more than all the countries in Asia put together (121) (See Table 4-2). The authors found that only 20-25% of migrants are covered by bilateral or multilateral social security agreements, and therefore most migrants face major obstacles in the portability of their pension and healthcare benefits.

**Table 4-2: International Social Security Agreements, By Region**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>No. of agreements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>2,561</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source data: (Holzmann et al. 2005: 68-71)

The explanations for the imbalance are relatively straightforward: on one hand, developed countries with advanced welfare systems are net receivers of migrants from countries with under-developed welfare systems. More developed countries therefore stand to lose fiscally from reciprocal agreements with less-developed countries, and therefore it is not in their material interests to sign such agreements. On the other hand, while such agreements would be in the interests of less-developed sending states, such states lack the power to challenge the interests of more developed states. The result is an increasing divide in access to portable social security between the more developed and less developed countries, and a system of regulation which is not only extremely complex and inefficient, but which leads to most migrants paying into systems from which they cannot benefit, and states paying for the social security of migrants who have only ever contributed to other systems.

Because it is not always feasible, in fiscal and foreign policy terms, for some countries – especially those with large diasporas and tight fiscal constraints – to provide portable social security benefits, migrant-sending countries sometimes patch over the gaps in social security portability through an expansion in the scope of their consular activities. The legitimate scope of consular relations, defined in the Vienna Convention, includes issuing passports and travel documents, acting as notary and civil registrar, safeguarding the interests of nationals in

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matters of inheritance, protecting unaccompanied minors, and arranging appropriate legal representation where needed (United Nations 1963). However, the Convention also permits what might be called ‘discretionary activities’ such as “protecting and safeguarding the interests of nationals”, or “helping and assisting” them. Within these broad limits, different states differ greatly in their treatment of diasporas, and individual states treat different regions in the diaspora very differently. At one extreme, states may not provide any consular service in a particular region, or they may provide the bare minimum service for the bare minimum group of people (i.e. all passport-holders without dual nationality). At the other extreme, they may open up palatial gated compounds to diaspora community activities, provide health and education services to all-comers, or send battleships in to enforce their views on their citizens’ rights – as the USA did in 1904 when a presumed American citizen was abducted by rebel tribes in Morocco (White 2007).

In the middle of this spectrum lies a range of consular practices that does not to appear to have been adequately mapped, studied comparatively, or theorized. Consulates may collect detailed diaspora data or lobby vociferously for the rights of prisoners from their country. They may provide special identity cards for non-resident nationals – both as a symbolic gesture to foster diasporic identity, and to facilitate access to consular services. For example, the Matricula Consular identification card helps Mexicans in the USA to access health and education services provided by the Mexican state, and is recognized as valid identification for services provided by some American states. Argentina, Colombia, El Salvador, Honduras and Peru all have similar cards, as do India, Morocco, Pakistan, and Turkey. The Philippines claims to protect the welfare of its emigrant workers from recruitment to return, even to the extent of intervening in labour disputes (Alcid 2003). Similarly, Ireland offers pre-departure advice (as does Germany), as well as support to front-line welfare-provision agencies abroad. Sometimes the services sending states provide include opportunities to study the national language, culture and history in the destination country – these are often seen not only as a means of fostering diasporic identity,
but as rights of cultural citizenship that the sending state is obliged to protect when host states do not.

**Extracting Obligations**

This section examines the mechanisms through which states instil or capitalize on feelings of responsibility, loyalty or obligation in their diasporas. This is more difficult than extending rights, because the extra-territorial coercive power of the origin state is severely restricted and usually relies on the cooperation of authorities in the host state. However, in lieu of legally enforceable citizenship obligations, state agencies often appeal to citizenship virtues, such as filial and patriotic loyalty, in order to extract benefits from the diaspora, through mechanisms such as targeted remittance capture and investment policies and the promotion of expatriate lobby groups. These are discussed in greater depth below.

Jagdish Bhagwati argues that an expatriate tax is one way of ensuring diasporic rights are balanced by obligations (Bhagwati 1976, 2003). However, only a few states, including the USA and Switzerland, levy taxes on all expatriates. A few more extract mandatory payments through less formal channels – such as Eritrea’s war-time “healing tax”, instituted as an emergency measure but enforced by social pressure thereafter (Koser 2003a). It is more normal for states to tax people who spend defined periods abroad, and to sign treaties with host countries to ensure their citizens are neither double-taxed nor able to evade tax completely. However, some states are unable to enforce tax laws at home, let alone abroad. Such states often attempt to channel the funds of non-residents into the national purse, coaxing and cajoling them to contribute through a mixture of economic incentives, patriotic exhortations, and marketing ploys – such as the “roots tourism” that is marketed by Ghana, Ireland, and Morocco. Even more importantly, numerous states have implemented policies to facilitate and capture remittances; this area of financial regulation is constantly evolving. Though space constraints prevent a full review, some of the best-known initiatives are: Mexico’s “Tres por Uno” (3 for 1) matching fund programme; the Philippines’ “balikbayan” box scheme; Pakistan’s free passport issuance for remittances over a certain amount; India’s preferential interest rates
for remittance senders; Nigeria and Ghana’s foreign-currency bank accounts; and the World Bank’s recommendations to governments to increase access to remittance infrastructure and open up competition in remittance-sending markets (World Bank 2005).

Many countries now target larger-scale expatriate investments as part of their development strategies. Various Irish state agencies assiduously courted expatriate skills and investments, and the role of the diaspora in Ireland’s “Celtic Tiger” economic boom of the 1990s has been widely trumpeted. Many states have supported diaspora business networks and advisory boards to mentor businesses based in the sending-country – such as New Zealand’s “Beach-heads” program. Israel and India amongst others have created targeted financial products such as foreign-currency-denominated “diaspora bonds” to encourage expatriate investors (Chander 2001). They have lured investors through initiatives like expatriate-seeded venture capital funds (Faist 2004), the creation of special economic zones (in China, Taiwan and India, for example), and the establishment of high-level investor-relations offices to woo angel expatriate investors and fast-track them through bureaucratic red tape (High Level Commission on the Indian Diaspora 2001).

It is increasingly common for sending states to encourage highly skilled expatriates and scientific researchers to contribute ideas and skills towards economic growth at home. For some the focus is on return and retention of human capital. For example, the “Jobs Ireland” campaign of the late 1990s and early 2000s (Hayward and Howard 2007), and the “New Zealand Now” campaign of 2005–2008 have both in the past targeted skilled emigrants with advertising campaigns along the lines of “come home, your country needs you”.

Australia has established a range of fellowships – including the prestigious Federation Fellowships – to retain or attract back top scientists on a temporary or permanent basis (Hugo et al. 2003). For others the focus is tapping into the skills and knowledge of expatriates while they remain abroad – for example by maintaining “skills banks” of emigrant researchers and entrepreneurs, fostering research and

commercialization collaborations between emigrant and locally-based researchers, and setting up “diaspora networks” (Kuznetsov 2006). Some states also see prominent or powerful emigrants as potential lobbyists or spokespeople for the national interest (e.g. see Demetriou 2003; King and Melvin 1999). Such émigré politics are anything but novel or abnormal: many of the world’s nation-states were born of them (see inter alia Douki 2007). A number of sending states openly aspire to cultivating an equivalent of the Israeli and Irish emigrant lobbies in Washington DC, and look for ways to deploy emigrants as good ‘ambassadors’ for the sending state. In short, a variety of state agencies routinely try – though not always successfully – to enforce contributions to the national public good from people who live abroad.

**Conclusions**

This chapter presents the largest cross-country comparison of emigration state systems apparently attempted to date, helping to map out the role of the state in transnational processes. The chapter distinguishes two types of mechanism through which migrant sending states relate to diasporas: ‘diaspora building’ institutions, which cultivate or formally recognize non-residents as members of a diasporic community, and ‘diaspora integration’ institutions, which project various membership privileges and responsibilities onto various extra-territorial groups. Interaction and participation with and within these institutions constitutes some emigrants and their descendants as members of a ‘diaspora’. Collectively, I refer to these institutions and practices as ‘the emigration state system’. These findings shed light on the main questions of the thesis, regarding how and why states relate to their diasporas and how they should.

Firstly, the study found emigration state systems are widespread enough to be considered a regularity, rather than a contingency, of political organization. They were not only found in states dominated by radical nationalist ideologies or authoritarian regimes, but also in liberal democracies such as New Zealand and Australia, which are ethnically diverse and tend towards multicultural models of citizenship. Indeed, it was often the case that developed liberal
democracies had stronger emigration state systems than developing countries; for example, most social security benefit portability is confined within the developed world, and conversely, more-developed states were more able to collect revenue abroad either through direct taxation or through taxation agreements. This finding makes it problematic to treat emigration state systems as illiberal per se, on grounds of ethnic discrimination or interference with freedom of exit. Rather, they appear to be integral elements of liberal democratic states. Because this finding has wide-ranging implications, it is worth examining in greater detail through in-depth study of two liberal democratic states with emigration state systems: New Zealand and Ireland.

Secondly, the diaspora and the emigration state system should be seen as co-constitutive. Existing ‘diaspora’ groups were not only recognized by, but also organized and maintained in various ways by various sending-state agencies. In recognition of influential diaspora groups, dedicated state bureaucracies and efforts to extend social and political rights came into being, and mechanisms such as extra-territorial voting and discretionary consular service brought new diaspora groups into being that had not previously existed. Put another way, it was not only the case that emigrants’ incorporation within the dispersed ‘nation’ defined their relationship to the state system, but also that their incorporation – however tangled or incomplete – within the state system defined the extent of their belonging to the ‘diaspora’.

Thirdly, the study found that emigration state systems were typically uncoordinated. Rather than overarching plans or rationales, they typically formed multilayered and multi-locational constellations of mechanisms performing similar or related functions, but in different ways, and as a result of different historical processes. Some strategizing often took place, but generally on a small scale within the context of a wider system of related activities which were essentially ad hoc and evolutionary. This finding lends support to Fitzgerald’s (2006a) approach to analyzing state emigration control from a neoplastic perspective, “disaggregating ‘the state’ into a multi-level organization of distinct component units in which state incumbents and other actors compete for their interests.” Lack of coordination frequently led to inefficiencies
and injustices, for example in the field of social security portability. As Chapters 7 to 9 will show, this characterization applies well to the New Zealand case.

Finally, however, the study found that, at specific moments, coordination of the emigration state system has emerged in a minority of instances. Neither the ‘resource’ nor the ‘constituency’ approach was fully equipped to explain this process: cases of coordination showed elements of both accommodating diaspora constituencies and strategizing to capture their resources. The next chapter will examine one such case, Ireland, in greater detail.
5. **Cherishing the Diaspora: Ireland and the Irish Abroad**

**Introduction**

The previous chapter showed that emigration state systems are widespread, generally articulated loosely across a range of different areas of government, but sometimes coordinated as part of an integrated, overarching governmental approach designed to reduce inefficiencies and injustices. This chapter presents Ireland as a case of the latter type. It is important to stress that the Irish case is not presented as a straight comparison with the New Zealand case. Rather, it plays a limited role within the overall thesis, serving the purpose of an exemplar.

This chapter therefore has two main aims. The first is to describe the main elements of Ireland’s emigration state system and analyze their purpose and structure. With respect to this aim, the chapter argues that Ireland’s system is coherent and fair: Ireland relates to its diaspora through a range of ‘joined up’ policies that avoid both obvious contradictions or incoherencies, and seek to promote fair and equitable conditions among the Irish regardless of location. In contrast, as later chapters will argue, New Zealand’s diaspora policies have been characterized by contradictory goals and ad hoc delivery, and that they have been unfair to emigrants in the sense of withdrawing their entitlements at the same time as stressing their duties.

A secondary aim of this chapter is to discuss how and why the Irish regime has evolved into its current form. To this limited extent, the Irish and New Zealand case studies are treated comparatively. Ireland makes a useful comparison with New Zealand, because the many similarities between the two countries draw attention to one important difference: their different migration histories. Both are insular territories on the periphery of the former British Empire, with similar sized populations, marked by rapid recent increases in ethnic diversity. Both countries have recently made a kind of “migration transition” (Fields 1994; also see Findlay et al. 2002); a key difference is that they are making the opposite kind of transition. New Zealand has traditionally been a country of immigration but is now faced with a persistent
pattern of high emigration. Ireland, which has traditionally been a country of emigration, has recently experienced substantial net immigration. Ireland’s long history of emigration helps to explain the attitude of inclusiveness towards the diaspora on which its policies are based. The chapter argues that, until recently, Ireland has been bound by conflict and lack of capacity to a ‘policy of no policy’ towards Irish emigrants, but that this has changed since the advent of prosperity and peace in the 1990s.

The chapter is arranged in five sections. After providing a very brief overview of the Irish abroad, the chapter describes the organization and function of the various elements of Ireland’s emigration state system, looking first at how some of Ireland’s public institutions have sought to include emigrants and extend various membership rights to them, and then at how other institutions within the same state system have systematically drawn benefit from the loyalty of emigrants. The fourth section evaluates the fairness and coherence of the Irish regime, while the fifth and final section of the chapter explains how the system has come into being.

THE IRISH ABROAD

About twenty percent of Irish-born people currently live outside the island of Ireland. As has been the case since the 19th century, they cluster in Britain, North America and Australasia (Walter 2002: 32-103). Over 75% of the Irish abroad live in Britain (Walter 2002: 37). In the 2001 Census, 1.3% of the population of England self-identified as ‘white – Irish’, making this the fourth largest ethnic minority in the country; they are concentrated in London, where they comprise (at least) 3.1% of the total population (Federation of Irish Societies 2007: 9). The population is older than in other regions, with relatively few surviving males, reflecting a preponderance of those who arrived in the 1950s, attracted by employment opportunities in the industrial West Midlands. Walter (2002: 37-38) notes that the geographical proximity of Ireland, the assumption of racial similarity with the British, and the Anglo-Irish conflict have together contributed to the marginalization of the Irish in Britain.
With its myth of Irish success and refuge from British control, America remains a magnet for Irish migration (Corcoran 1993). Some 22.7 million people claimed Irish ancestry in 1990, though the proportion of Irish-born there is much lower than in Britain (Walter 2002: 56). The Irish in America fall into three groups: Irish Americans descended from the arrivals of the 19th and early 20th centuries, elderly Irish-born who arrived in the 1950s and 60s, and younger Irish born from the 1980s and after (Walter 2002: 59). They are concentrated in managerial and professional occupations and are concentrated in the most heavily urbanised and earlier-settled North East states (Walter 2002: 58). Australia is also a traditional Irish destination, and was particularly important for first and third-wave migrants clustering in professional occupations. Walter (2002: 73-74) notes that Australia now has the third largest Irish-born population outside Ireland: in 1996, 6.7% (74,494 people) of all the Irish-born living abroad were in Australia (Walter 2002: 73).

**CHERISHING THE DIAPORA**

The next two sections set out the main elements of Ireland’s emigration state system in some detail. The first section, “Cherishing the Diaspora”, focuses on the ways that Irish state agencies have made efforts to recognize Irish emigrants through symbolic gestures of inclusion as well as the extension of substantive social entitlements. Conversely, the second section, “Cherry-Picking the Diaspora” (borrowing a phrase coined by Hayward and Howard (2007)), focuses on the ways in which state agencies have cultivated and capitalized on diasporic loyalties in the course of public service provision.

**MAINTAINING THE DIAPORA**

Commitment to creation, maintenance and wellbeing of a homeland is a defining characteristic of diaspora – one that governments of home states routinely exploit (Safran 1991: 91-95; Cohen 1997: 26). However, as the Irish case shows, home states may also make symbolic and substantive efforts to maintain the diaspora.
In her inaugural speech as President of the Republic of Ireland in 1990, Mary Robinson declared, “Beyond our State there is a vast community of Irish emigrants....I will be proud to represent them” (Robinson 1994). Alluding to the old Irish folk custom of placing a light in a darkened window to guide the way of strangers, she pledged to light the window of Áras an Uachtarán, the President’s official residence in central Dublin, for Irish emigrants around the world – an act made world famous when performed simultaneously over satellite link by Bill Clinton in the White House to commemorate the Irish Famine.27 She followed up with a second address to the Oireachtas (the Irish houses of parliament) in 1995, entitled “Cherishing the Irish Diaspora”:

I chose the title of this speech – cherishing the Irish diaspora – with care. Diaspora, in its meaning of dispersal or scattering, includes the many ways, not always chosen, that people have left this island. To cherish is to value and to nurture and support. If we are honest we will acknowledge that those who leave do not always feel cherished.... No family on this island can be untouched by the fact that so many of our young people leave it. The reality is that we have lost, and continue every day to lose, their presence and their brightness....As well as having to search for jobs, they may well find themselves lonely, homesick, unable to speak the language of those around them; and, if things do not work out, unwilling to accept the loss of face of returning home. It hardly matters at that point whether they are graduate or unskilled. What matters is that they should have access to the support and advice they need. (Robinson 1995)

Robinson’s vision of closer ties with the diaspora was formally recognized in the constitutional changes made at the time of the Good Friday Agreement of 1998. Irish citizenship became more inclusive of the Irish abroad, in a kind of gesture of compensation for accepting a territorially curtailed definition of the Irish state. The 19th Constitutional Amendment, made on 3 June 1998, abandoned the previous Constitution’s territorial claim on Northern Ireland but replaced it with a definition of Irish citizenship that would still encompass people who lived there. Claims that “The national territory consists of the whole island of Ireland, its islands and the territorial seas” (Article 2), and that Parliament had the right to exercise jurisdiction over the whole of that territory” (Article 3), were removed from the Constitution. Instead, it was declared that “the Irish nation cherishes its special affinity with people of Irish ancestry living abroad who share its cultural identity and heritage” (Article 2). As Ray Bassett, Head of the Consular Division of the Department of Foreign Affairs, explained, “If we stretch the definition

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of Irishness to include the Irish abroad it is less threatening to people who might think we are trying to territorially incorporate them” (Bassett 2009).

**The Irish Abroad Unit**

Particularly in recent years, state agencies have cultivated more than merely a thin, ideational form of diasporic membership backed up by inclusive rhetoric; they have increasingly sought to ‘thicken’ diasporic membership through the provision of substantive social entitlements to the Irish abroad. The main delivery mechanism for these types of services is the Irish Abroad Unit, housed within the Department of Foreign Affairs.

The Irish Abroad Unit works closely with Ireland’s embassies and consulates to manage the Government’s relations with Irish community organizations abroad. Its main function is coordinating government expenditures on emigrant services, which occur at a number of levels and are paid out and administered by a range of government departments. It focuses on providing a fairer deal for the Irish Abroad across three areas: welfare for vulnerable Irish abroad, services for emigrants returning or considering a return to Ireland, and supporting activities through which people can express the Irish dimension of their identity whilst living abroad.

The Unit provides second-tier welfare services such as information to assist people accessing their statutory welfare entitlements; counselling services to address alcoholism, mental illness and domestic violence; and help for the homeless (Bassett 2009). The Unit achieves this aim by providing grant funding for already-existing community organizations to employ professional welfare workers. Most of the Unit’s funds are spent in Britain (75%, or €10.2m in 2007), where most Irish-born emigrants live and where issues of socio-economic disadvantage, poor health, and old age are most pronounced. The main mechanism for addressing such issues has been the Dion Fund. The Dion Fund was initially founded in 1984 by then-Labour Minister Ruari Quinn. Despite the fiscal cutbacks of the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Fund was retained, with an

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28 IV172.
29 IV172.
expectation among NGOs that it would be increased if and when Ireland pulled out of the
difficult economic circumstances it was in at that time. The Dion Fund grew exponentially
from 2000.

![Figure 5-1: The Dion Fund, 1984-2006](image)

Source data: Dion Committee – Irish Government’s Advisory Committee on Emigrant Welfare: Strategic Plan 2007. Graph drawn by 
author. Note: 1999 Irish Punt conversion rate applies to all pre-2002 figures.

The Unit also provides services for Irish emigrants who are considering or undertaking the
return to Ireland. A considerable number of emigrants in both Britain and the USA retain
strong enough diasporic ties to Ireland to have treasured what diaspora theorists often refer to
as a “utopian” or “eschatological” ideal of return (Safran 1991: 91; Clifford 1994: 305) to Ireland:
“the phrase is ‘bás in Éirinn’”, an official explained to me, “which means death in Ireland”. The
Irish Abroad Unit supports a number of NGOs in Britain and Ireland that deal specifically with
this phenomenon, the most prominent of which is the Safe Home initiative. These aim firstly
to provide the information for elderly emigrants to distinguish between the myths and realities
of returning ‘home’. Irish Abroad Unit Founding Director Sean Farrell explains, “the first thing

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31 IV172.
102
they do is try to persuade people not to go, because the Ireland you left 40 or 50 years ago will not be the same.... If you’re going back to rural Ireland.... it won’t be like Luton, it won’t be like Birmingham, you won’t have a shop on the corner, you might have two or three miles and no public transport available – these are the realities that face people that want to go home....”

Only around a quarter of Safe Home clients eventually decide to return. The second aim of the service is to provide sheltered housing. Although the Unit has faced some resistance from local authorities who assert the prior rights of their own residential constituents to sheltered housing, the Unit has worked hard to secure the cooperation of most localities.33

The third primary function of the Unit is to support culture and heritage activities through which people can express the Irish dimension of their identity. For example, the Unit supports the Gaelic Games and Gaelic Football events organized by British branches of the Gaelic Athletic Association, in which around 8,000 children – most of whom were not Irish but Indian or African – participated in 2005.34 It has funded libraries, historical societies, cultural centres, festivals, sports tournaments and arts centres (Bassett 2009). The Unit also administers the Centenarian Bounty, a one-off gift of €2,540 to people who reach the age of 100, which was extended in 2007 to include people living anywhere in the world,35 and which now receives applications from both Nationalists and Unionists in Northern Ireland.36 On one hand, the rationale for the culture and heritage approach is partly to compensate for the difficulties associated with being Irish in Britain during the height of Anglo-Irish tensions. As Farrell explains:

[B]ack in the 70s and 80s when the IRA campaign was rampant in Britain, it was a very tough time for the Irish community. Take Birmingham for example.... You had the whole Birmingham Six business.... Very clearly there was no Birmingham Irish St Patrick’s parade in the 1970s and 80s. [But] there’s now one going: it has about 100,000 participants. It’s about the third biggest in Britain.....

33 IV172.
34 IV172.
36 IV170.
Consequently, the Unit is careful not to encourage the type of diasporic identity that is associated with ethnic chauvinism (Anderson 1992; Skrbis 1999; Glick Schiller 2005a) and an antagonistic relationship to the host society (Safran 1991: 85-86; Cohen 1997: 3-4). As Farrell puts it,

We don’t want them to be doing it in ways that are incompatible with being citizens of the country that they’re in. We don’t want a bunch of Irish wandering round waving tri-colours and shouting, “Hey, we’re Irish, we’re not Brits”.... What we do want to do is to give [support to] people, or ... groups anxious to express their Irish identity....

On the other hand, an increasingly important secondary rationale for this type of initiative is to maintain and enhance Ireland’s overseas image and connections. “It’s a sign that our culture has something to offer. You can [also] push that on in terms of music, [and] dancing”, Farrell explains. In this sense, the aim of the Unit is to recast experiences of exile and oppression into sources of cosmopolitan creativity (Cohen 1995). Though still a secondary activity for the Unit, according to Farrell, this is “undoubtedly where the future lies”, as will be discussed in the next section.

“Cherry-Picking the Diaspora”

Ireland extends rights to emigrants insofar as they are regarded as loyal members of the Irish nation who have performed duties for Ireland in the past and may be called on to do so again in the future. Father Paul Byrne, a former Director of the Irish Episcopal Commission on Emigrants, describes Ireland’s approach to the diaspora in recent years as having “two tiers”: one was “please come back because we need you, you’re the hi-tech people we want your brains”, then the humanitarian one ... was saying ‘come back you poor devil, you deserve it’”. There has at times been considerable tension between these “tiers”; Hayward and Howard (2007), for example, wryly refer to Ireland’s skills and training agency “cherry-picking” rather than “cherishing” the diaspora, suggesting that its initiatives recognized a skilled elite and ignored the rest. The recent massive funding increases for emigrant welfare must temper the cynicism of such views somewhat, but it is important to emphasize that various Irish government agencies have often taken advantage of the loyalty of the diaspora as a source of
philanthropic donations, access to influence, expertise, information, investment, and return migrants.

**Cultivating an Ethos of Giving**

The most significant global network of Irish philanthropists is the Ireland Funds. The Ireland Funds is the umbrella body for a worldwide network of philanthropic organizations that give to Ireland and Irish projects. Around a hundred of these Funds are based in the USA, while over 80 are in the UK and a further 21 in Ireland. The Funds focus on encouraging investment, organizing elite gatherings and exchanges, hosting fora and think tanks on policy issues, and showcasing the best of Irish culture (Aikins 2009). As Kingsley Aikins, President and CEO of the Funds, explains, since the organization’s inception in 1976, the Funds have contributed to thousands of projects and given over US$250 million. In 2008 alone they held 105 events in 39 cities across 11 countries, which were attended by some 40,000 people. Over a five-year period, the Funds raised US$111 million, US$56 million of which came from 25 individuals (Aikins 2009).

The Funds are not statutory agencies in any way, but work in synergy with officials in a range of the government agencies to take advantage of diaspora philanthropy. Aikins formerly worked for the Industrial Development Agency (IDA), and much of his work now revolves around “developing donors” by getting individuals “fired up” about giving to Ireland and Irish projects (Aikins 2009). As Aikins puts it, “if you get [affluent and influential Irish] people together, stuff happens”. The aim of fostering and tapping into a loyal diaspora has been in place since the Fund was founded in Pittsburgh in 1976 by H.G. Heinz CEO Anthony O’Reilly and Pittsburgh Steelers owner (and current US Ambassador to Ireland) Dan Rooney, with the vision of “doing for Ireland what the United Jewish Appeal had done for Israel” (Aikins 2009). One of the Fund’s earlier leaders quipped that it aimed to “look Irish, dress British, and think Yiddish” (Aikins 2009).

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**Cultivating Diaspora Networks**

A number of Irish statutory agencies help to build and maintain “diaspora networks” (Kuznetsov 2006) that allow them to access and exploit the knowledge, skills, influence and resources of expatriates. For example, Enterprise Ireland, the statutory agency responsible for developing and promoting indigenous Irish business, works with hundreds of Irish networks around the world, including more than 60 Irish business networks, 32 office networks and hundreds of cultural, sporting and community associations (Hughes 2009). Enterprise Ireland’s Northern Europe Director, Stephen Hughes, explains that these networks often help with access to buyers, decision makers and “market influencers”, as well as helping to generate or facilitate inward investment to Ireland, supply knowledge and capability to Irish firms, and provide connection to clusters of excellence (Hughes 2009). Enterprise provides considerable support to networks that deliver these types of benefits. It seeks out business-oriented networks to help with access to particular firms in particular sectors, and helps them to stay sustainable by delivering value to their own members. This involves financial, secretarial, secretariat and public relations support, providing access to Government and VIPs, assisting with project management, and facilitating access to technology, infrastructure, and connections with other groups.

In a similar vein, the Industrial Development Agency (IDA Ireland) uses expatriate connections and networks to access information about their clients. IDA Ireland CEO Sean Dorgan explained that the Agency’s business is “about getting to know companies ... and then over time building the relationship so that we can match our Irish capabilities to company needs”. To this end, the agency often finds that it is able to gain access to a particular company through an Irish person who is able to explain the company’s structure, geography and aims. For IDA Ireland, cultivating the networks that facilitate this kind of access is less focused on practical support for specific networks, and more about cultivating and trading on the romanticized image, the “mystique about Ireland”, which has been transmitted to the world through the Irish diaspora. For example, one of the agency’s key advertising campaigns, “the Irish Mind”, has used dense,
abstract paintings of Yeats, Wilde and other iconic Irish thinkers to market Ireland as magnet for foreign direct investment: “It is very much this Irish mystique”, Dorgan explained. “What we’re saying really is “the Irish Mind” has a way of turning a business [ideas] to real profit because we have a different way of doing things here.”

**Roots Tourism and Return**

This romanticized, diasporic mystique surrounding Ireland has also been an important element in the promotion of tourism and skilled labour recruitment. A significant portion of Ireland’s key tourism industry deals with “roots tourism” from second and third generation Irish living in the USA and elsewhere. As Irish Abroad Unit Director James Carroll put it:

> There’s a touch of wanderlust in the Irish genes somewhere, and they don’t necessarily intend to leave forever. [Many return] to say hello, and they want to see some cemeteries and photographs of houses - you know, roots. Roots are a very strong emotional thing....We do ask people to come on their holidays to Ireland.

Ireland’s Employment and Training Authority, FAS, also fuelled diasporic myths of Ireland as part of its “Jobs Ireland” campaign in 1999-2002, aimed at attracting migrants to meet skill shortages in Ireland’s booming economy (Hayward and Howard 2007). The programme targeted the highly skilled, focusing initially on the IT sector, but expanding to engineering, financial services, tele-services, tourism, retail and healthcare (Hayward and Howard 2007: 50). Through an interactive online jobs clearing house, an international road show and a sustained publicity campaign, Jobs Ireland initially targeted the young highly skilled emigrants of the 1980s. However, it soon expanded to include second and third generation Irish abroad (Hayward and Howard 2007: 53). On one hand the campaign specifically targeted aspects of the diasporic imagination of Ireland: its wild natural beauty, welcoming culture, and affinity with people of Irish ancestry (Hayward and Howard 2007: 54-55). On the other hand the campaign also implied emigrants could help their homeland by filling drastic skills shortages, thereby helping to sustain the Celtic Tiger (Hayward and Howard 2007: 57).
**Flying the Flag**

It is by now well established that diasporas play an integral role in international relations, impacting on the foreign and domestic policies of both home and host countries and contributing to both conflict perpetuation and peace-building (Shain and Barth 2003; Shain 2002). Ireland is no stranger to this process: some Irish Americans contributed to funding the Irish Republican Army, while others played a crucial role in bringing the Northern Irish Troubles to an end (Cochrane 2007). Since the cessation of the conflict, cultivating the diaspora as informal ambassadors and intermediaries in relations with host countries has become an important element of foreign policy. The presence of some 40 million people claiming Irish ancestry in the USA alone, is seen as a “foothold”, which it is in Ireland’s interests to retain. As one senior official put it,

it’s very important, the fact that Fifth Avenue goes green in March, or the president of the US sees our political leadership at that time of the year... That’s because our people are contributors around the world ... and it’s a gesture of recognizing their presence.

Consequently, the perception of a weakening in Irish diaspora identity and community has been viewed with some concern:

that element of Irish identity allows us a foothold that we might otherwise not have, and it’s a valuable resource for us and therefore should be maintained and should be protected... [T]he Irish community [abroad], as a cohesive unit, is dwindling. So the feedback we get is that they need assistance in retaining that sense of community.

In view of these concerns, as mentioned above, an increasingly important secondary objective of the Irish Abroad Unit is support for Irish culture and heritage activities (Goodbody Economic Consultants 2007). There are several facets to these activities, including support for Irish cultural centres and community organizations, development programmes for the Gaelic Athletic Association in Britain and the USA, support for Irish language, music and dance among emigrants, and oral history projects focusing on the diaspora (Bassett 2009).

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38 IV170.
39 IV177.
40 IV170.
AN EFFICIENT AND EQUITABLE SYSTEM

The activities discussed above have been performed by a range of different state agencies for different specific purposes, and not all have been linked by a deliberate, unified strategy. However, this section argues that the regime has been ‘joined up’, efficient and equitable in its aims and outcomes.

FAIRNESS

As discussed in Chapter 2, efforts to integrate the diaspora are sometimes criticized as unfair for three reasons. The first criticism is that such policies violate the liberal norm of freedom of exit, making illegitimate demands of those who have chosen to move beyond the home state’s jurisdiction. Secondly, they are criticized for ‘over-serving’ emigrants at the expense of those who live in the homeland. And thirdly, they are criticized for interference in the domestic affairs of the receiving country.

The first criticism, of making illegitimate demands, does not hold in the Irish case: the Irish Abroad Unit and the initiatives associated with it have been the direct outcome of attempts to give fair recognition and reward for the contributions and sacrifices made by emigrants for Irish households and communities. This process of recognition began with a commitment in the “Programme for Prosperity and Fairness”, an agreement made in 2000 between the Government, employers, trade unions, farmers and community and voluntary organizations, about how to distribute the benefits of the unprecedented economic boom of the 1990s. Under the heading “Commitment to the Wider World”, the Programme undertook “to address the special needs of those Irish emigrants abroad who are particularly marginalised or at greatest risk of exclusion” (Government of Ireland 1999: 127). In order to address this commitment, then-Foreign Minister Brian Cowen convened a Task Force on Policy Regarding Emigrants in December 2001. “[N]o Irish government has done enough to deal with the problem of emigration”, he declared. “With our recent economic development, the time has come to deal
with the issue in a new and more systematic and comprehensive way.” The Task Force concluded that Ireland had a moral obligation to help the vulnerable emigrants who had helped Ireland in difficult times:

We owe much to our emigrants. Many of them helped their families who remained behind through generous remittances…. Against this background, and taking into account Ireland’s recent prosperity the Task Force believes that the Government has a responsibility to assist Irish emigrants, particularly those who are vulnerable or in need of special support. (Cowen 2002: 22)

Neither is the second criticism valid – that Ireland’s diaspora policies “over-serve” the Irish abroad. On one hand, the flow of benefits between Ireland and the diaspora is not one way: as discussed above, a wide range of state agencies have systematically drawn on the diaspora as a resource in the course of public service. Moreover, welfare is not the only activity the Unit carries out: its culture and heritage activities aim to maintain and cultivate the diaspora so that it continues to deliver. Ireland’s emigration state system does not merely extend rights to emigrants, it draws them into a “web of rights and obligations” (Bhagwati 2003). On the other hand, it is dubious to link Ireland’s “special affinity” with the Irish abroad, expressed in the constitutional changes made with the Good Friday Agreement, to a restrictive ethnic definition of Irishness. Ronit Lentin, for example, posits a close connection between the 1998 change and another 2004 constitutional amendment which excludes the Ireland-born children of first-generation immigrants from acquiring Irish citizenship, referring to both shifts as aspects of “state racism” (Lentin 2007). This argument echoes Christian Joppke’s (2003) assertion that both are “re-ethnicizing” trends, characteristic of right-wing politics. However, it should be noted that the aim of “Cherishing the Diaspora” was first articulated by Mary Robinson, a Labour politician, for whom this was linked to an explicitly inclusive, cosmopolitan view of Irish identity. Robinson’s “Cherishing the Diaspora” speech began:

I was acutely aware of how broad that term the people of Ireland is and how it resisted any fixed or narrow definition. One of my purposes here today is to suggest that, far from seeking to categorise or define it, we widen it still further to make it as broad and inclusive as possible. (Robinson 1995)

It is not straightforward to equate the inclusion of emigrants with the exclusion of immigrants simply by suggesting that both trends reflect an illiberal ‘ethnic’ concept of citizenship. To do so ignores the fact that one type of “re-ethnicization” is more liberal than the other. The inclusion of stake-holding emigrants is consistent with liberal international standards of citizenship law (Bauböck 2008; Joppke 2003: 444), while the exclusion of stake-holding immigrants is not.

Finally, the argument that Ireland’s policies represent interference in the domestic affairs of host states does not hold. Indeed, in the context of Anglo-Irish tensions, the Irish Abroad Unit has had to walk a particularly fine line in this respect. One argument is that the home state’s claims to represent or take responsibility for emigrants are a violation of the host state’s territorial sovereignty. This argument was one of the most important reasons behind Ireland’s rejection of proposals to allow extra-territorial voting. In 2002, the All Party Oireachtas Committee on the Constitution concluded that allowing Northern Ireland politicians to participate in Southern institutions might infringe the rules agreed on Good Friday 1998 by implying an attempt to exercise jurisdiction over Northern Ireland (All-Party Oireachtas Committee on the Constitution 2002). The Committee also concluded that it would be unfair to treat emigrants from around the world differently from those in the North (p58).

A related argument is that Ireland should neither exacerbate divisions within British society by providing additional services to Irish emigrants that are not available to other British citizens, nor compensate for the failures of British society and state to adequately protect the Irish in Britain. However, the Irish Abroad Unit is strict about not providing front-line welfare services either in addition to or “in loco parentis” of the responsibilities of emigrants’ host states. Instead, it provides “culturally sensitive” second-tier services to assist Irish people to take up their existing statutory entitlements as British residents and citizens. As Irish Abroad Unit Director James Carroll put it, “We’re more an information and heritage-affinity support unit –

\[42\] IV172.
we are not a primary provider of support”. Father Paul Byrne, a member of the Task Force on Policy Regarding Emigrants, explained it this way:

the object of all of this was to integrate the Irish.... [T]hey didn’t want to ghettoize them, and they didn’t want to have them just assimilate [but rather] to keep their identity, because ... if they weren’t proud of their own and didn’t know it they weren’t going to succeed and survive .... There is an argument that they’re the host country’s people: once Britain agrees to accept somebody they have an obligation to look after them. The fact was, of course, there was a huge non-take-up of benefits among the Irish. Some of the British tabloids were saying these were scroungers. In actual fact, part of the work of the Irish centres was to get people to take up the benefits that they were entitled to.

**Efficiency**

The recent changes to Ireland’s emigration state system have also avoided major internal contradictions and inefficiencies. Here I focus on three key elements of the recent policy changes that ensured their efficiency: the Task Force’s delivery of a systematically formulated plan, key ministers’ willingness to drive the plan past bureaucratic turf wars, and the decision to retain public-sector control of policy coordination.

Firstly, the Task Force systematically investigated the issues surrounding emigrants and formulated a coherent policy approach. It brought together the key stakeholders and experts (government officials, church and civil society representatives, and academics), investigated emigration outcomes in the main destination countries (Britain, the USA, and Australia), identified the needs of vulnerable emigrants as the central issue, and formulated “a strategic and integrated approach to meeting the needs of the Irish Abroad which includes policy objectives, an action plan and the necessary structures and resources to achieve these ends” (Cowen 2002: 7). The approach was based around a range of policies to inform and prepare potential emigrants, protect them while abroad, facilitate their return, and support their expressions of Irish identity. This action plan hinged on increasing funding and staffing for emigrant services, particularly in Britain, consolidating responsibility for emigration policy within the Department of Foreign Affairs, and creating a new agency to coordinate service provision. These measures were intended not only to increase the resources dedicated to policy
regarding emigrants, but to ensure that different government agencies worked in concert to deliver these resources efficiently.

Secondly, government ministers responsible for implementing the Task Force’s recommendations were able to steer around bureaucratic turf wars. This became particularly important during the transfer of the Dion Fund for emigrant welfare from the Department for Enterprise, Trade and Employment (DETE) to the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA). By late 2002 it appeared as if the Task Force had raised high hopes only to have them dashed. The Celtic Tiger was slowing, necessitating a fiscal contraction. Under such circumstances, some of the agencies tasked with discussing implementation of the Task Force Report were incredulous at its expensive recommendations, which DFA officials had played a key role in drafting and costing. In particular, DETE – which controlled the €2.7m Dion Fund for emigrant welfare in London – had been hit by a higher-than-average 5.3% reduction across all its programmes. DETE had already marked the Dion fund for a 5% reduction, and proposed to transfer it to DFA €137,000 smaller than it had been the previous year – even though the DETE’s Finance Department had indicated that this funding shortfall could be covered from other Departmental programmes “with little impact”. In addition, key DETE officials were derisive of DFA’s “Grand Project”, describing it as “naive”, “woolly”, and a “non-runner”, and insisting the Dion transfer be “put to bed” by the end of November 2002 at the latest. Realizing the €137,000 cut would be interpreted as a betrayal of the Task Force and its vocal supporters, and that an immediate transfer of the fund would leave the blame for this betrayal at DFA’s door, key officials in the latter inferred that DETE was attempting to ‘pull a fast one’.

With huge costs projected for Ireland’s impending EU presidency, DFA was loath to cover the shortfall, and the Department – whose main negotiator was also one of the officials responsible for drafting the

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43 FIA12; FIA13.
44 FIA3; FIA26; FIA50.
45 FIA20–25.
46 FIA20–FIA25.
47 FIA20–FIA25.
48 FIA5.
49 See FIA51.
Task Force Report – took the stance that it would not accept transfer of the Dion Fund without guarantees that financing and staffing levels would be unaffected: “In my view, we should not take over the Dion Fund under these circumstances. I do not see how we could justify [to the public] a policy decision [i.e. reduction of the Dion Fund] for which we were not responsible and which we do not support”.

This bureaucratic spat was resolved quickly and pragmatically by the two Ministers heading the departments concerned. Predictably, the emigrant lobby’s reaction to the cut was vehement. The Irish emigrant press in Britain screamed of “Anger as Ireland slashes Dion Aid” and “Fury at Cuts to Dion Fund”. Migrant groups in London accused the Government of “turning its back on the Irish community in Britain”, and described the cut as a “slap in the face” to the Irish in London. Against this background of political pressure and bureaucratic conflict in late December 2002, Cowen wrote to the Tánaiste (Deputy Prime Minister) and Minister for Enterprise, Trade and Employment, Mary Harney, requesting DETE fund the shortfall. Harney declined, arguing that, because the fund would be spent in the UK, the then-favourable sterling exchange rate would offset the impact of the cuts, and that therefore there was no reason not to expedite the recommendations of the Task Force on Policy regarding Emigrants. On one hand, Cowen was at that time probably not well placed to dictate terms to the Deputy Prime Minister, nor to back out of implementing the recommendations of a task force he had himself instigated. On the other hand, the sterling exchange rate allowed him and his advisors to back down without losing face. Cowen acquiesced to the transfer in early February 2003, and this bureaucratic wrangle came more or less to an end.

Thirdly, the decision to retain policy coordination within the public sector ensured efficiency and public accountability. The Task Force had recommended delegating the coordination of

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50 FIA32; Also see FIA10.
51 Jackson, Catherine (2003, Jan. 18) ‘Anger as Ireland slashes Dion Aid: Politician demands Dublin reverse decision to slash aid to Britain’, The Irish Post.
52 FIA26.
53 FIA26.
54 FIA51.
55 FIA54.
56 FIA55.
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diaspora policy to a non-departmental body or “quango”. Task Force members, their supporters and Opposition politicians stuck by the recommendation of an initially non-statutory structure appointed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs from among “representatives of [relevant] Government Departments... statutory agencies... voluntary agencies, social partners and other sectors of civil society, in Ireland and overseas” (Cowen 2002: 58; Fine Gael and Labour Party 2006). The Agency’s secretariat would initially be housed in DFA, and it would have an initial annual budget of €1 million in 2003. However, the Government and senior public servants “rejected the quango option as wasteful”, arguing that, for efficiency and accountability reasons, the new structure should be housed within the Department of Foreign Affairs. This, the Government argued, would minimize bureaucratic costs, leverage the department’s existing infrastructure and networks, improve Government-voluntary sector communication, ensure accountability to the Minister and the Oireachtas, and channel the Unit’s resources to those for whom they were intended: the Irish abroad.

EXPLAINING THE SYSTEM

The preceding sections have argued that Ireland’s emigration state system is, in general, equitable and efficient – an assessment that concurs with an external evaluation of the Unit in 2007, conducted by Goodbody Economic Consultants, which found that “the original design of the Programme has proven to be efficient and effective, and there is no indication of a need for change” (Goodbody Economic Consultants 2007: 47).

This section now shifts to a discussion of how the system has come into existence. Firstly, it argues that widespread feelings of affinity and obligation towards the Irish abroad have developed in Ireland over the country’s long history of emigration, conflict, and economic depression, during which the economy and families have relied heavily on emigrant remittances in periods of upheaval. Secondly, it argues that the main constraints to fulfilling

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these perceived obligations to the diaspora were effectively removed with the advent of economic prosperity and peace during the 1990s.

**AFFINITY AND OBLIGATION, PEACE AND PROSPERITY**

Emigration from Ireland has traditionally been associated with experiences of exile for those driven away, abandonment for those left behind, and loss and guilt for both. Bronwen Walter (2002: 9) divides mass emigration from Ireland into three waves, all of which were associated to a significant degree with traumatic upheaval.

**Figure 5-2: Ireland’s Estimated Net Migration, 1945-2001**

The first wave peaked at the time of Irish Potato Famine of 1845-51, when around 250,000 people left in one year alone, and approximately one million in total, or 20% of the pre-famine population, emigrated. The second wave took place during the 1940s and 50s, as young, uneducated rural migrants fled poverty and moved to Britain to find unskilled industrial labour. The third wave took place during the 1980s, when skilled young people escaped lack of opportunities in Ireland to find work Britain, the USA and Australia. While some have portrayed recent emigrants as “winners” in the global economy, others highlight the ongoing significance of sadness, shame, lack of opportunity, economic backwardness and social exclusion in recent emigration experiences (Walter 2002: 21-25; also see Hayward and Howard 2007).
The silver lining to Ireland’s experience of emigration has been the formation of a large and loyal diaspora, which has sustained the Irish economy and families in times of economic and political difficulty through a constant stream of remittances. In the two decades from 1852 to 1872, emigrant remittances exceeded the Irish Government’s total poor relief budget by £1.75 million (Schrier 1958: 105). Over US$260 million (contemporary values) was remitted from North America between 1848 and 1900 (Schrier 1958: 105; also see Delaney 2007: 41). In 1880-85 alone, Irish emigrants sent home an average of £1.2 million pounds per year (Miller 1985: 293). Perhaps as much as £3 billion was remitted from Britain to Ireland between 1939 and 1969 (Delaney 2007: 42). During the early years of the post-WWII period, remittances – primarily from Britain and the United States – comprised around 2.7% of GDP, and even as late as the 1960s they still averaged around 1.6% (O’Hagan et al. 2000: 87). Commentators have pointed out that during the mid- to late-1950s, annual remittances equalled Ireland’s entire annual expenditure on pensions (Delaney 2007: 42), while in the early sixties remittances equalled the Irish national education budget. In 2001 the Mayo News reported that, “In the 1940s and 1950s hundreds and thousands of young men and women left Ireland....[They] contributed so much to the Irish economy when times were hard.... It is because of those remittances that we now have the Celtic Tiger economy” (Dunne 2003: 4).

Both empathy for the plight of emigrants and gratitude for their contributions have historically underpinned a strong solidarity between those in diaspora and those left behind, and have ensured that the diaspora remains a strong and vocal force in the development of Irish culture, economy and politics. Catholic priest Father Paul Byrne of the Irish Episcopal Commission for Emigrants explained, “everybody knows an emigrant.... Everybody in Ireland relates to emigration, and everybody in Ireland [thinks], ‘that could have been me, or could have been – or was my uncle....’ So it had a deep resonance for the Irish psyche”. Similarly, a senior official described recent diaspora policy shifts as, “primarily about the natural affinity that Irish people

58 All figures given in contemporary values.
59 IV168. The contribution of remittances to Ireland’s current account balance was substituted from 1972, when Ireland entered the European Common Market, by agricultural subsidies and Social Fund programme support for reducing unemployment and low education (O’Hagan et al. 2000: 97).
have.... I’ve got family in New Zealand, I’ve got family in Australia, I’ve got family in North America, I’ve got family in Britain.... It is ... the affinity, the pride – the Irish Nation is very, very old.  

For much of its history, however, Ireland has been bound by conflict and lack of capacity to a “policy of no policy” (c.f. Fitzgerald 2006a: 280) towards emigration. Ireland was the sick man of Europe for most of the 20th Century: partition worsened an already slow and uneven economic progress and a brief expansion in the 1960s was choked by the onset of the oil shocks of the 1970s and the spill over of the “Troubles” in the North. By the 1980s the Irish economy was in crisis, and political corruption and instability were rife, severely limiting the capacity of the Irish Government to develop a coherent policy towards emigrants. Moreover, in the context of tensions with the UK, any attempt by the government of the Irish Republic to mobilize the Irish abroad could all too easily have been interpreted as a part of irredentist ambitions. Thus, even though solidarity with the diaspora has long been a prominent feature of Irish society, lack of resources and fears of interference in the Northern Troubles constrained Ireland to a “policy of no policy” towards the diaspora.

With the growth of the Celtic Tiger economy during the 1990s, the tables turned and Ireland was suddenly no longer the diaspora’s poor country-cousin. The economy had been transformed by an injection of more than €10 billion in infrastructure subsidies from the EU, along with a low corporate tax rate which stimulated foreign direct investment. Growth during the 1990s averaged from five to six percent per annum, making Ireland one of the wealthiest countries in the world by the turn of the millennium. The feeling quickly developed that the fruits of peace and prosperity were not being fairly shared with the Irish abroad – who were not only among the main ‘victims’ of Ireland’s historical difficulties but also among those who had done most to get the country through. The emigrants of the 1950s and 60s had begun to age and there was a growing sense that Ireland had allowed its emigrants to fall into the cracks between

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60 IV177.

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the welfare states of their home and host countries.\textsuperscript{61} For example, in her book \textit{An Unconsidered People: The Irish in London}, Catherine Dunne (2003: 6) wrote:

\begin{quote}
From having been ‘doubly invisible’ as young men, [Irish immigrants] now feel ‘doubly marginalised’ in their older years; they feel that the British state doesn’t want them and, even if they could make it home, it would appear that the Irish state doesn’t want them either. Despite years and years of sending home the weekly postal order – the so-called emigrant remittances – they now rightly feel that their contribution is unconsidered.
\end{quote}

At the same time, white ethnicity was being “discovered” and “unpackaged” by British social scientists (Peach 2000), revealing previously overlooked disadvantages of being Irish in Britain (see inter alia Hickman et al. 1997). When combined with popular sentiment, this helped to precipitate the formation of a vocal Irish lobby, which conveyed through research and sustained publicity that Irish emigrants were in dire need of help. The barrage of reports of the 1990s on Irish emigrants (see inter alia Corcoran 1993; Hickman et al. 1997; Harvey 1999) were released to media, generating headlines such as “Exiled orphans return to seek lost families”, \textsuperscript{62} “Forgotten People”, \textsuperscript{63} “Irish illegals face crackdown in US”, \textsuperscript{64} “Emigrants buried in paupers’ graves”, \textsuperscript{65} “Emigrants suffering”, \textsuperscript{66} “Despair of Irish living in cardboard city hell”, \textsuperscript{67} “Irish in England are still typecast”, \textsuperscript{68} “Young exiles left behind by economy”, \textsuperscript{69} and “Two in three London homeless are Irish”. \textsuperscript{70} Against the background of the Celtic Tiger boom, there was a growing realization not only that there was more to give, but of how widely the plights of those who had left and those who had remained now differed. \textsuperscript{71}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{61} Also see Corcoran (1993).
\item \textsuperscript{62} The Guardian (1997, May 29), ‘Exiled orphans return to seek lost families’, p9.
\item \textsuperscript{63} Leslie, Neil (1998, Aug. 4), Forgotten people; three in four victims living rough on the streets of London are Irish; Irish exiles now make up three-quarters of the homeless population of London, \textit{The Mirror}, News, p.7.
\item \textsuperscript{65} Brophy, Karl (1999, Mar. 16), ‘Emigrants buried in paupers’ graves, \textit{The Mirror}, News p.4.
\item \textsuperscript{69} Moonan, Niall (2001, Jul. 12), ‘Young exiles “left behind by economy”’, \textit{The Mirror}, News p.5.
\item \textsuperscript{70} Tallant, Nicola (2000, Nov. 21), ‘Two in three London homeless are Irish; 1,200 sleeping on streets’, \textit{The Mirror: Eire Edition}; News p.23.
\item \textsuperscript{71} IV172.
\end{itemize}
The cessation of conflict in the North and the Good Friday Agreement of 1998 removed the final obstacle to redistributing the fruits of the Celtic Tiger with the diaspora. The core of the Good Friday Agreement was a consensus that the constitutional status of the North should be determined by a peaceful and democratic process. This resulting decrease in bilateral conflict created more room for manoeuvre in the Irish state’s relations with the Irish diaspora. From this point, the emigrant lobby, particularly in Britain, stepped up its activities, arguing that emigrants were owed a fairer deal because of the contributions made in previous years through remittances. One of the most prominent lobbyists, Father Paul Byrne, explained: “One of the lobbying platforms we used was the remittances. You know, we were saying that this is unjust”. As an official noted, “the driver of it [the policy shift] was ... our economic success and our Irish groups abroad saying ‘well what about us?’” This was the context out of which the Programme for Prosperity and Fairness, the Task Force, and eventually the Irish Abroad Unit would emerge.

**Conclusions**

Ireland’s emigration state system consists of diaspora building and diaspora integration mechanisms that have come into being at different times for different reasons, but have evolved into a coherent and equitable regime. On one hand, recent years have seen the emergence of a coordinated effort to recognize many emigrants’ past contributions to, and ongoing membership within, Irish society. This has involved largely symbolic gestures such as President Mary Robinson’s speeches on cherishing the diaspora and a constitutional amendment declaring a “special affinity” with the Irish abroad, as well as more substantive efforts to assist vulnerable Irish emigrants to access their statutory entitlements in their host countries. This portion of Ireland’s emigration state system has been built systematically and is now coordinated by a dedicated bureaucratic entity, the Irish Abroad Unit.

On the other hand, a range of Irish Government organizations systematically draw on the resources of the diaspora in the course of public service. Of note are efforts by the Skills and

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72 For a detailed discussion of similar factors in Mexico’s relationship to Mexicans in the USA, see Délanò (2009a).
73 IV170.
120
Training Authority and the Industrial Development Agency to promote a romanticized, diasporic view of Ireland, as well as Enterprise Ireland’s efforts to cultivate and sustain Irish business networks. All these activities have sought to generate a sense of diasporic belonging and subtly encourage feelings of filial and patriotic obligation towards Ireland. While not coordinated systematically, these activities are ‘joined up’, and complement efforts made by other agencies to extend rights to the diaspora. The aggregate effect of these activities, which are dispersed across the state system, is to draw emigrants into “a web of rights and obligations” with the homeland at its centre (Bhagwati 2003).

The inclusive aim and overall coherence and efficiency of Ireland’s policies reflect the country’s long history of emigration. On one hand, Ireland has always drawn on the contributions of emigrants fulfilling what they saw as their filial and patriotic duties – particularly in times of economic crisis. On the other hand, although political conflict and economic paucity have prevented Ireland from reciprocating, the unprecedented peace and economic prosperity of the 1990s made it possible for Ireland to meet what were seen as its obligations to the Irish abroad. It was the aim of righting this historical wrong that underpinned Ireland’s recent attempts at a “strategic and integrated” approach to emigrant services. Nor has the story finished: since the research underlying this chapter was carried out, there have been further moves amongst senior Irish academics and Government officials to increase the coherence of Ireland’s emigration state system through the formulation of an explicit “diaspora strategy” (Boyle and Kitchin 2008; Ancien et al. 2009).

Studying the Irish case can help to understand how New Zealand relates to its diaspora, why it does so in particular ways, and how it should do so better. Firstly, as subsequent chapters will argue, Ireland’s efforts to ‘join up’ its various diaspora-related activities, and to launch new initiatives in synergy with them, contrast markedly with New Zealand’s fragmented and contradictory approach to the diaspora as a policy issue. Secondly, the different migration histories of the two countries help to explain their different approaches to managing emigration and transnational relations. Ireland’s approach to the diaspora is born of a long
history of emigration, while New Zealand’s reflects relatively recent attempts to grapple with the phenomenon. And finally, the equitable aims of Ireland’s regime – which cultivates a form of diasporic membership involving both rights and obligations – offers some insights into how New Zealand should develop policy approaches towards its diaspora.
PART TWO:

NEW ZEALAND
AND ITS DIASPORA
Concerning Godwits

But many people do not know what a godwit is. And the dictionary says sourly, a kind of marsh bird. Of the immense northerly migrations that yearly in New Zealand, when summer is gone, shake wings into the sky as if from a giant’s salt-pot, nothing is told. But this is true: every year, from sandy hollows in the north of the northernmost of those three islands, the godwits set out on a migration beside which the swallow’s blue hither and yon is a mere stroll with wings.

And it is true, too, that the godwits, flying north, never go near England. They fly to Siberia. But to a child in this book, it was all more simple. A long way was a long way. North was mostly England, or a detour to England.

Later she thought, most of us here are human godwits; our north is mostly England. Our youth, our best, our intelligent, brave and beautiful, must make the long migration, under a compulsion they hardly understand; or else be dissatisfied all their lives long. They are the godwits. The light bones of the mother knew it before the chick was hatched from the eggshell.

England is very beautiful, she thought, staring at a tree whose hair ... not properly flowers ... was the colour of fire. And this also is very beautiful.

"Where is Mowbray? Where is Mortimer?" whisper the old leaves of their history. "Nay, and more than all these, where is Plantagenet?" But ours, darker, might cry, "Where is Selwyn? Where is Rutherford? Where is Katherine, with weeds on her grave at Fontainebleau, when what she really wanted was the dark berry along our creeks? (Don’t you remember? We call them Dead Man’s Bread.) Nay, and more than all these, where are our nameless, the beautiful and intelligent who went away and died, in wars and otherwise, the beautiful and intelligent who went away and hopelessly failed, or came back and were never themselves any more?"

Passing judgements on any circumstance, compulsion, fate, is no use at all, she thought. England is beautiful: this also is beautiful. They are the godwits. Still, I think it odd, because I know this country. Think not without a bitter price... That’s for the easy brittle plough, that wants our hills.

We are old and can wait, said the untamed soil against which she pressed her fingers; although it, more than anything else, was awake and aware of its need to be a country... the integration of a country from the looseness of a soil. Maybe, responded the girl; though logically, living or dead, they ought to have the same compulsion to come back... the godwits, I mean. And, of course, there’s something fine, a King of the Castle feeling, about having the place almost to oneself. Fine but lonely... .

Only fools, said the sparse-ribbed rock, are ever lonely.

By Robin Hyde (Author’s Foreword, in The Godwits Fly, London: Hurst & Blackett, pp7-8)
6. FROM SETTLER SOCIETY TO SENDING STATE: ORIGINS OF THE NEW ZEALAND DIASPORA

INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter presented the Irish case as an exemplar of an efficient, equitable emigration state system. The aim of the rest of the thesis is to examine the New Zealand case, discussing the extent to which it approximates this model. This is achieved across four chapters. Following the same ‘drilldown’ methodological approach outlined earlier (see Chapter 3) of broad overview followed by detailed case study, the first of these four chapters maps out the ‘New Zealand diaspora’ through a new survey of 18,000 New Zealand expatriates, raising questions of how and why this diaspora has emerged. The remaining three chapters then zoom in on New Zealand’s diaspora building and integration policies, contrasting them with the Irish model.

Future generations may see 2004 as a defining year in New Zealand’s history: it was the year the OECD confirmed that, at minimum, around a quarter of all skilled New Zealanders lived abroad (Dumont and Lemaître 2004). Until this point, New Zealand was imagined as a “classical country of immigration” (Castles and Miller 2003: 7). After this point, it became recognized also as a migrant-sending country, with one of the world’s largest per-capita diasporas. Fears of brain drain had been raised before, but brushed aside with reference to return and replacement migration (Lidgard 2001; Glass and Choy 2001; Bushnell and Choy 2001a; Rapson 1998). OECD’s figures showed that, irrespective of the offsetting of emigration through replacement and return migration, emigration has left its mark (for further discussion see, inter alia Bedford 2001; Sanderson 2009).

The current chapter provides an overview of how the New Zealand diaspora has emerged, discussing how New Zealanders have come to be dispersed around the globe, how they have come to identify as a distinct collectivity, and how they remain transnationally orientated towards New Zealand. Through it draws in parts on data collected in national censuses and on
airport departure and arrival cards, its main data source is a survey of 18,000 New Zealand expatriates conducted in 2006 by an organization called Kea New Zealand, which is discussed in some detail in subsequent chapters (especially see Chapter 8). This chapter argues firstly that the wide dispersion of New Zealanders reflects a kind of “migration transition” connected with the disintegration of the British Empire. Secondly, it argues that patterns of ethnic identity both affect and reflect migration experiences, in the sense that they arise both from pre-migration historical experiences of colonization and decolonization, and from post-migration patterns of inclusion and exclusion of migrants in their host societies. Thirdly, the chapter poses a problem: what could account for the strong observed relationship between place of residence and transnational connection, which could not be explained by the demographic characteristics of respondents or by their mode of insertion into the host society? This problem is then explored further in subsequent chapters.

**The Data Set**

The main dataset used in this analysis is Every One Counts survey (EOC) of 18,000 ‘kiwi expatriates’ in 155 countries. EOC was conducted over a period of 69 days between 1 March and 8 May 2006 by Kea New Zealand (short for Kiwi Expats Association – see Chapter 8). It was designed to coincide with the national census, and was supported with project funding from a range of New Zealand government departments. The questionnaire was disseminated by a ‘viral email’ (Figure 6-1) initially sent to 5,000 Kea members for onward referral, which contained hyperlinks to an online survey form fronted by a sophisticated marketing campaign. The first half of the questionnaire asked respondents about their social and economic connections to New Zealand, and the second half largely duplicated the New Zealand Census. The survey drew a snowball sample of 18,002 responses in 155 countries, which were anonymized by Kea and supplied to me in an Excel spreadsheet, then transferred into STATA software for recoding and

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24 Full details of the questionnaire schedule and summary results are downloadable in .pdf format from www.keanewzealand.com/news/eoc-summary.html

128
analysis. I was given full use of the data in return for helping to design parts of the questionnaire and analyse the results for media release (see Chapter 3 for further discussion).

Figure 6-1: Viral Email, Kea Every One Counts Survey 2006

One million Kiwis missing!

1 message

Kea New Zealand <info@keanewzealand.com> To: Alan Gamlen <alan.gamlen@gmail.com>

Kea's global census of expats

Kea New Zealand has launched the first global census of expatriate New Zealanders - Every One Counts at www.everyonecounts.co.nz - aimed at tracking down the estimated one million Kiwis living overseas.

One of our keenest supporters has put together a home movie explaining what we're up to!

http://s012v49q9274945486821552667864a499a4c

This is Kea's biggest global project to date. It promises to be of practical use to the country, as well as building Kea's profile at home and around the world.

Kea's expatriate members can help make Every One Counts a success by:

- telling every overseas-based New Zealander about the Kiwi expat global census
- completing the survey form themselves.

When you fill in the survey - and when you refer friends and family to the Every One Counts website http://s012v49q9274945486821552667864a499a4c you are automatically eligible to win a range of prizes, including All Black test tickets and VIP viewing tickets with Emirates Team New Zealand at this year's pre-America's Cup regattas in Spain.

Please do your part to make sure Every One Counts!

http://s012v49q9274945486821552667864a499a4c

Ross McConnell
Chief Executive
Kea New Zealand

P.S. Don't forget to look at our home movie. It tells you everything you need to know!

http://s012v49q9274945486821552667864a499a4c

EOC has certain strengths and weaknesses as a source of data on the New Zealand diaspora. On the down side, it cannot necessarily be used to draw inferences for the New Zealand diaspora as a whole because the sampling was non-random (not all diasporic New Zealanders had the same probability of selection), and secondly that it cannot yield information about the differences between people who do and do not identify as part of the New Zealand diaspora, because the latter were excluded from the sample. These constraints place clear limitations on the chapter’s discussion of why people identify and behave as diasporic New Zealanders. Such limitations could be mitigated somewhat in future studies by more extensive comparison with national data in New Zealand and in receiving countries. However, only a limited amount of such comparison was feasible within the scope of this project.
On the up side, findings from EOC, which select on the basis of self-ascribed identity, are in some respects more generalizable than alternative data sources on the New Zealand diaspora, which are compiled from 2000-round censuses in countries where New Zealand-born expatriates live (Bryant and Law 2004; Dumont and Lemaître 2004; Migration DRC 2007). There are two main aspects to generalizability: validity, and reliability. A valid measure is one that measures the concept it is supposed to. Birthplace is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of diaspora membership: not all New Zealand-born people identify with or remain oriented towards New Zealand, and some foreign-born people do. In short, self-identification is the key feature of diaspora, birthplace is not, snowball samples only select those who self-identify, and therefore snowball samples are a relatively valid measure of diaspora.75

Census estimates trade off validity for a putative gain in reliability, which refers to the consistency and repeatability of a measure. However, on one hand, it is important not to exaggerate the reliability of census-based counts of expatriates: as Hugo (2006) and others note, censuses systematically undercount immigrants for various reasons, and the definition of “immigrant” is not consistent across all censuses. On the other hand, consistent and repeatable measures of dynamic properties such as personal identity are by definition extremely difficult if not impossible to achieve. In other words, the reliability gains of census estimates come at a high price in terms of validity, and in this sense snowball samples may represent the least worst alternative for diaspora researchers. In this sense, there are compelling reasons for using EOC data in addition to, if not instead of, alternative sources as baselines for comparisons between diaspora and non-diaspora groups.

EOC also has some strengths in terms of size, empirical richness and novelty. Firstly, EOC drew enough respondents to allow statistically robust comparison among groups within the sample. Thus, even though they do not on their own allow examination of why people are or are not

75 For an example of a valuable contribution using this method see Inkson et al. (2004), who collect a sample of over 1,000 expatriates by snowballing through various expatriate organizations. On the downside, in a sample of this size it is inevitable that some groups are too small for statistically robust comparison (Inkson et al. 2004),
diasporic, the EOC data can and do facilitate a discussion (below), of why some groups in the sample are more diasporic than others. Secondly, EOC includes questions on transnational identity and connection which are not available elsewhere. And thirdly, EOC is the largest, most recent survey of New Zealanders abroad ever conducted, and this chapter represents the first detailed analysis of the dataset.

**Figure 6-2: Kea Every One Counts Website, May 2006**

**Demographic Characteristics**

Expatriates in the sample differed significantly from the resident New Zealand population in terms of age-sex profile, number of children and skill level. Respondents came from a total of 155 different countries but were concentrated in the UK & Ireland, Australia, and the USA &
Canada.\textsuperscript{76} While the resident population had coffin-shaped age-sex profile indicating gradual ageing, expatriates had a 'spinning top' profile: virtually all the expatriates in the sample were adults,\textsuperscript{77} and most were concentrated in the 25-39 age range. Expatriates were less likely to have children, and more likely to have tertiary qualifications than resident New Zealanders. These findings are consistent with conventional "age migration schedules", according to which migration rates in post-industrial societies peak in the 20s-30s age bracket, as extended education delays entry into the workforce and prompts migration (Boyle et al. 1998: 110-14).\textsuperscript{78}

\textbf{Figure 6-3: Population Pyramids, New Zealand Residents vs. Expatriates}

Source data: New Zealand Census 2006; Kea New Zealand, Every One Counts 2006. Author’s analysis.

\textbf{Figure 6-4: Number of Children and Highest Qualification, Residents vs. Expatriates}

Source data: New Zealand Census 2006; Kea New Zealand, Every One Counts 2006. Author’s analysis.

\textsuperscript{76} For the bulk of the analysis, individual countries were recoded into six main regions: UK & Ireland (43%), Australia (26%), USA & Canada (14%), Asia (7%), Europe & Central Asia (6%), and Other (3%).

\textsuperscript{77} Sampling error may be a factor here: children and the elderly may have had less access to the Internet, which was the only place to access the questionnaire.

\textsuperscript{78} It is not possible to corroborate this interpretation with reference to reasons for departure, which were not measured. However, the main reasons for “living outside NZ” were general career prospects (37%), enhanced lifestyle (30%), and family or marital connections (17%).
**Identity and Integration**

Expatriates in the sample were broadly similar to the resident population in terms of ethnic identity. European, Māori, Asian, Pacific People, and “Other” were the largest ethnic groups in both EOC and the 2006 Census, and represented roughly similar proportions of both samples (although EOC contained a significantly higher proportion of Europeans and significantly lower proportions of Māori, Asians and Pacific People). The composition of these main groups was also comparable; for example, 42% of those who identified as Māori in the Census population

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79 Respondents were allowed to choose more than one ethnic designation, and choices were not ranked.
also identified as European,\textsuperscript{80} compared to around 40% of those who identified as Māori in EOC.

Similarly, the largest share of the “Other” ethnic group came from those who voluntarily referred to themselves as “New Zealander”. These comprised around 11% of the Census (see inter alia Kukutai and Didham 2007; see Callister and Didham 2008; Didham and Callister Forthcoming)\textsuperscript{81} and 7% of EOC respondents, making them the third-largest ethnic group in the sample. New Zealander EOC respondents often wrote a complaint, such as the one below:

\begin{quote}
Regarding the NZ Census Ethnicity questions, as an 8th generation New Zealander on both sides, I find it irritating that I have to describe myself as NZ European. There is nothing European about me at all and nor do I have any family connection with Europe. I am a New Zealander - where is that box?

Male, aged 34, Australia
\end{quote}

Each of the three main ethnic groups in the EOC sample had a significantly different demographic profile. As the largest ethnic group by far, New Zealand Europeans closely approximated the sample mean on most demographic measures. Around 51% were female – the same proportion as in the overall sample. Their average age was just under 35.7 (vs. 35.5 overall), and on average they had 2.2 children each (vs. 2.5 overall). Over 62% had a bachelor’s degree or above (the same proportion as in the overall sample). Māori and New Zealanders were both demographically distinct. Both groups were younger than New Zealand Europeans – especially New Zealanders, at an average age of just 33.1 years, while the average age for Māori was 34.8. New Zealanders had similar education levels to New Zealand Europeans (62% bachelor’s degree or above), but they were more likely to be male (55%) and to have fewer children (1.6). Māori were significantly less educated than New Zealand Europeans (41% bachelor’s degree or above), and they were more likely to be female (56%) and to have more children (2.7).

\textsuperscript{81} Around 20,000 people identified as “New Zealander” in the 1986 New Zealand Census. By 2001 the figure had risen to around 89,000 (approx. 2% of the population), and in 2006 it leapt to around 430,000 (some 11% of the population), partly due to an email protest campaign prior to the Census (see Callister and Didham 2008: 39-43; Kukutai and Didham 2007). Also see New Zealand Herald (2009, Apr. 29), http://blogs.nzherald.co.nz/blog/your-views/2009/4/29/should-you-be-able-describe-yourself-new-zealander-census-forms/?c_id=1501154&commentpage=5, accessed 25 May 2009; and Easton, Brian, ‘On being Pākehā: Some thoughts of a New Zealander, http://www.eastonbh.ac.nz/?p=685.
Region and ethnicity were highly correlated: over 51% of New Zealanders lived in the UK & Ireland, 44% of New Zealand Europeans, and only 31% of Māori (vs. 43% of the overall sample). Conversely, 44% Māori lived in Australia, but only 26% of New Zealand Europeans and 20% of New Zealanders lived there (vs. 26% overall). These findings interestingly complement Kukutai and Didham’s (2007) observation that New Zealander identity in the 2006 Census of New Zealand residents was “especially appealing to middle aged men residing in the South Island”. EOC suggests that New Zealander identity also has a younger, more cosmopolitan face, appealing particularly to young, university-educated males in the UK & Ireland.

In terms of national identity, most respondents were New Zealand Citizens by birth (88%), although there were also significant numbers of citizens by descent (5%) and citizens by grant (5%) – that is, first generation migrants to New Zealand who re-emigrated after ‘naturalizing’ there. The New Zealand Census does not collect data on citizenship status, so it was not possible to compare these figures with the resident population. Indeed, although more extensive

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*Note: Multiple ethnic choices are allowed, so totals exceed 100%. Not all groups coded in the 2006 Census are included here. The “Other” category in EOC includes groups that have been coded into other groups in the 2006 Census output; for example, “European” in the Census output includes “New Zealand European” and “Other: European”, while the later remain coded as “Other” in the analysis of EOC presented here.*
comparison between EOC and the resident population was beyond the feasible scope of this project, this is an important avenue for future research.

Different measures of integration in the host country told different stories. On one hand, roughly half had a local-citizen spouse, and roughly a quarter had at least one local-citizen child. The median pay category was NZ$70-100,000, around three times the national median of NZ$24,400 for people over the age of 15. However, only a third of respondents lived in their own home (compared with 55% of the resident New Zealand population), and only around a quarter held local citizenship. Around a fifth of respondents were locally educated. An additive integration index (index – comprising education place, home ownership, local citizenship, and family’s citizenship), was used in some parts of the analysis.

All these factors of integration were strongly related to settlement time. The median period of time spent in the country of residence was 3-5 years. The sample can be divided into three departure cohorts corresponding to the three main emigration surges (1970s-80s, 1990s, and 2000s). Chart 6-7 shows wide regional variation in departure cohort composition, and an overall attrition in cohort size over time, most likely owing to a range of influences including temporal shifts in the direction of flows, regional differences in rates of return and onward migration, rates of assimilation and so on.

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82 “Local citizens” are defined as those who indicated a second citizenship corresponding to their region of residence. Those who received their highest qualification outside NZ are assumed to have obtained it in the country of residence. Where spouses and/or children are indicated as dual NZ or Other citizens, it is assumed that their second or other citizenship is that of the region of residence. Pay is measured in 2006 New Zealand dollars.
**RETURN**

Almost exactly half of respondents said they would either definitely or probably return to New Zealand, but the most common single response category was “undecided”. Moreover, the indicated timeframes of planned returns suggested plans being made long in advance: more than a third of those 'likely' to return, and almost three quarters of the 'undecided', indicated a planning timeframe of five or more years. Plans can change a lot over such a length of time. For the analysis of return, plans and timeframe were combined in an index of “return inclinations”, on which 0 indicated “definitely not returning” and 6 indicated “returning imminently.”

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*Several types of index were experimented with. In the initial index, each interval in the 'plans' scale was divided by 'timeframe', rather than staggering the two variables. This index was unevenly distributed and many results were insignificant. In the next attempt the variables were staggered, but missing 'timeframe' values were still coded as missing for the index as a whole, substantially reducing the total number of observations and therefore the explanatory power of variable. After recognizing that it was primarily those undecided, unlikely or planning not to return who failed to specify a timeframe, these values were treated as an additional category of 'timeframe'. The final version of rindex was constructed as follows: the value 0 was assigned to all those who indicated they planned not to return, whether or not they also (inexplicably) gave a timeframe for their unplanned return (only 40 respondents made this error). Those who combined “probably not returning” with “5+ years” or with no response to the timeframe question were coded as 1. “Probably not” with “1-5 years”, “undecided” with “5+ years”, and “undecided” with missing timeframe were all coded as 2. “Probably not” with “1 year”, “undecided” with “1-5 years”, and “likely” with “5+ years” or missing timeframe were coded as 3. “Undecided” with “1 year”, “likely” with “1-5 years”, and “will return” with “5+ years” or without specific timeframe were coded at 4. “Likely to return” with “1 year” and “will return” with “1-5 years” was coded.*
mean value of the index was 3.5 – right on the halfway mark, in the category corresponding to “probably not within 1 year”, “undecided within 1-5 years”, and “likely within 5+ years or unknown timeframe”. More than a fifth of the sample fell into this category, while roughly a quarter fell below and the remainder above.

These are highly ‘diasporic’ results: they suggest a desire to return that is being postponed, or what diaspora scholars refer to as a “myth of return” (see King 1986: 12-13) – a commitment that is never relinquished but always deferred (Safran 1991; Cohen 1997: 146-48). This frustrated longing to return was prominent in many qualitative comments left by respondents, of which the following is indicative:

I will always call New Zealand home but after almost 10 years here in the UK don’t see what it has to offer to me now. … I’m sure if I’d never left it’d be ok [but] the only way I can see myself living back in NZ now is when I’m retired…. Although I would never of thought it 10 years ago, my children will not be born or raised in New Zealand. This said, NZ will always be home in my heart and I’ll NEVER stop supporting the All Blacks! NZ is a fantastic place for some - but not for me.

Female, 30, London

Enhanced lifestyle was the main reason for wanting to return to New Zealand, chosen by 45% of those considering return, followed by family and marital reasons, chosen by around a third. Around an eighth of respondents planned to return ‘to retire’ – which, for most of them, was still a long way off.

**Transnational Connection**

Kea respondents were asked what level of economic and social connections they had to New Zealand, and instructed to select all the responses that applied from a list of options. They were also asked about how they kept in touch with current affairs in New Zealand, and these responses were categorized as “civic” linkages. Overall, social connections were strongest and economic connections were weakest. The most common type of social connection was having parents in New Zealand, while the least common was having children there. The most common

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at 5, and “will return” with “1 year” was coded at 6. Cases where values were missing from return plans were coded as missing in *rindex*. 138
economic connection was maintaining a New Zealand bank account,\textsuperscript{86} while the most common way of keeping in touch with current affairs was through parents (although more than half of respondents regularly viewed New Zealand media for this purpose). In order to give a sense of overall connection to New Zealand, additive indices were constructed for social, civic and economic connections (\textit{sindex}, \textit{cindex}, and \textit{eindex}).\textsuperscript{87}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{fig68.png}
\caption{Expatriates’ Transnational Connections}
\end{figure}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{fig69.png}
\caption{Average level of connection (max. 10)}
\end{figure}

Source data: Kea New Zealand, Every One Counts 2006, author’s analysis.

\textsuperscript{86} The survey did not ask anything about remittances to New Zealand, although there appear to be conflicting reports on the significance of such flows. For example, in 2005 the International Organization for Migration reported remittances to New Zealand for the year 2003 at US$1.313 billion (2.24\% of New Zealand’s GDP), and in 2006 the United Nations calculated New Zealand’s remittances receipts at 3.1\% of GDP in 1995 and 1.2\% in 2004 (IOM 2005: 494; UNDESA 2009: 251). However, New Zealand officials question these figures and the definition of remittances on which they are based. Personal correspondence with officials in the Department of Statistics suggested money sent home by permanent and long-term migrants is recorded as ‘transfers’ and not remittances in New Zealand (although I have yet to receive an official reply to my request for clarification on this point). If indeed the case, though technically correct, this definition of remittances is at odds with an increasing number of studies which tend to count such transfers along with remittances. Remittances to New Zealand do not appear to have received any serious study. Discussion of “cultural remittances” to New Zealand – a term with similar connotations to Levitt’s “social remittances” (Levitt 1998) – can be found in Didham and McGregor’s (2008) work on “reverse remittances.”

\textsuperscript{87} The more options the respondent ticked, the higher the score on the index for that type of connection. ‘Less than 10 Friends’ was given a weighting of one, while ‘more than 10 friends’ was given a weighting of 2. The same weighting was applied to regular vs. irregular media viewing. I then multiplied each index by a coefficient so that their maximum value was 10, making them all comparable. It is difficult to justify weighting each component of the index equally; for example, on what grounds should business travel be weighted the same as property ownership? Any construction is bound to be arbitrary. However, the results of regression estimates using the indices were not radically different from those in which individual components of each index were substituted into the model. Therefore, the indices were retained on the basis that they were more parsimonious without causing serious distortions.
Explaining the Kiwi Diaspora

The remainder of this chapter seeks to explain how and why the expatriates in the EOC sample were 'diasporic', and proceeds in three sections examining geographical dispersion, collective identity, and transnational orientation.

Dispersion

This section discusses three aspects of the dispersion of New Zealand expatriates in the sample. Firstly, it explains the build-up of significant expatriate stocks with reference to long-term outflows of New Zealand citizens. Secondly, it describes the geographical distribution of respondents in terms of their demographic characteristics. And thirdly, it tentatively suggests that the differences between the distribution of EOC respondents and the distribution of New Zealand-born expatriates captured in overseas censuses can be partially explained by geographical differences in expatriates’ level of identification and connection with New Zealand. This leads to a fuller discussion of transnational identity and activity in subsequent sections.

No other OECD country has a higher proportion of skilled expatriates than New Zealand (24%), and only Ireland has a larger per capita expatriate population (Dumont and Lemaître 2004). Lower-bound estimates of New Zealand’s diaspora range from 459,322 (Bryant and Law 2004) to 528,597 (Migration DRC 2007). Various scholars estimate between 600,000 and 850,000 (Bedford 2001; Hugo et al. 2003). Estimates of 1 million or more regularly appear in the media.88 In sum, around 850 New Zealanders emigrate in the average week, and up to one in five New Zealanders now lives abroad.

Political rhetoric surrounding migration often wrongly assumes its causes. Critics of governments often blame them for emigration. For example, in early 2007, then-Opposition Leader John Key asserted that emigration, brain drain and the diaspora were “a symptom of [the Labour-led Government’s] policies and the failure of their policies to retain some of the

best and brightest in New Zealand....”98 Beneath the political rhetoric, however, lies a long-term trend that cannot be attributed to any single administration.

In reality New Zealand’s diaspora has accumulated gradually through net outflows of New Zealand citizens since its split from Britain in the early 1970s. Britain’s 1973 decision to join the European Economic Community, which ended the preferential access to British markets previously enjoyed by New Zealand’s primary exports, marked a watershed in New Zealand’s history not only from a social and economic standpoint (Belich 2001a), but also from the standpoint of migration flows. Prior to this, New Zealand was a “classical migration-receiving country” (Castles and Miller 2003: 7); afterwards, it both received and sent large numbers of migrants. Compiling net migration totals for the period since 1900, Richard Bedford and Elsie Ho (2006) show that, apart from a short period in the 1930s, New Zealand net migration was consistently positive until the late 1960s, after which it became more erratic, with large and consistent net losses in the late 1970s and early eighties, and periodic net losses occurring thereafter.

The final disintegration of the British Empire catalyzed a significant transition in New Zealand’s migration system, and this structural shift has been a central factor in the dispersion of New Zealanders throughout former British territories and beyond. Between 1979 and 2006 there was an annual net emigration of 20,578 New Zealand citizens (Gamlen 2007: 12).99 As Figure 6-99 shows, a steady trickle of returning New Zealand citizens has not offset larger, more erratic surges of New Zealand-citizen emigration. Figure 6-9 shows peaks of emigration during the

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98 While Labour did indeed consistently deflect blame for emigration by talking up return, “replacement migration” and “brain exchange”, Key’s subsequent adoption of a similar strategy must also be noted. Though his first few months as Prime Minister coincided with the highest net outflows to Australia ever recorded, and while return levels remained as stable as ever, he announced a turning of the tide from “anecdotal information and official advice” (see New Zealand House of Representatives (2008) Parliamentary Debates 648, 17317; also see inter alia Rapson (1998); McNicoll (2000); Bedford (2001); Glass (2001); Bushnell (2001a); Lidgard (2001); Lidgard (2002); Boland (2009)).


99 Figure 6-9 omits short-term mobility and breaks down gross permanent and long-term flows by citizenship for the most of the post-World War II period (March years). I am very grateful to Richard Bedford for sharing the raw data for this graph.
profound and prolonged economic shock that followed cutting economic ties to Britain in 1973; during the shock of neoliberal reforms in the mid-1980s, implemented as emergency measures to unburden the sinking economy; and during the resumption of the downward slide from the mid-1990s, when it became clear that these measures had been insufficient (also see Cately 2001).

**Figure 6-9: New Zealand’s Permanent and Long-Term Migration by Citizenship, 1971-2007**

Analysis of the EOC data shows significant regional variation in the demographic characteristics of expatriates. Bearing in mind that demographic differences both influence and are influenced by choice of migration destination, below I construct a typology of regional expatriate populations from the results of multinomial logistic regression analysis of regional differences in demographic characteristics (Figure 6-10), and highlight important factors determining each type.

The reference category for analysis in Figure 6-10 was the UK & Ireland region, which was characterized by ‘rite of passage’ migrants acquiring cultural, human, social and financial capital. They tend to be young, tertiary educated, and childless. There is a noticeable split
between a large female-dominated, bachelor-educated and lifestyle-motivated 25-34-year-old group and an older, male-dominated, post-graduate educated and career-focused group.

**Table 6-10: Multinomial Logistic Regression on Expatriates’ Residence Region**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region of residence (compared to UK &amp; Ireland)</th>
<th>Summary Statistics</th>
<th>Australia</th>
<th>USA &amp; Canada</th>
<th>Asia</th>
<th>Europe &amp; Central Asia</th>
<th>Other regions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Predictors (unless specified, binary: 1=yes, else=0)</td>
<td>Mean SD</td>
<td>Coefficients (multinomial logistic regression)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (years)</td>
<td>35.39 10.31</td>
<td>0.011 *** 0.032 *** 0.024 *** 0.020 *** 0.034 ***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex (0=male, 1=female)</td>
<td>0.51 0.50</td>
<td>N/S -0.336 *** -0.341 *** -0.481 *** N/S</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of children (interval)</td>
<td>0.68 1.14</td>
<td>0.399 *** 0.252 *** 0.413 *** 0.176 *** 0.362 ***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education level (compared to ‘Secondary school only’)</td>
<td>Tertiary diploma or certificate</td>
<td>0.21 0.40</td>
<td>-0.269 *** N/S N/S N/S N/S</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor’s degree</td>
<td>0.34 0.47</td>
<td>-0.953 *** N/S 0.461 *** N/S N/S N/S</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honours degree</td>
<td>0.15 0.36</td>
<td>-0.928 *** -0.563 *** 0.249 * N/S N/S N/S</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masters or MBA</td>
<td>0.10 0.30</td>
<td>-0.964 *** N/S 0.515 *** 0.291 * N/S N/S</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PhD</td>
<td>0.03 0.18</td>
<td>-0.988 *** 1.208 *** N/S 0.749 *** N/S</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reason for living abroad (compared to ‘Family / Marital connections’)</td>
<td>Opportunity for other family</td>
<td>0.05 0.21</td>
<td>0.753 *** N/S 1.494 *** N/S 0.630 *</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sent abroad by employer</td>
<td>0.02 0.15</td>
<td>0.973 *** 0.518 ** 1.897 *** N/S 1.212 ***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New job offer abroad</td>
<td>0.06 0.25</td>
<td>0.968 *** N/S 2.142 *** 0.409 ** 1.790 ***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General career prospects</td>
<td>0.37 0.48</td>
<td>N/S -1.089 *** 0.530 *** -1.438 *** N/S</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study</td>
<td>0.02 0.14</td>
<td>0.949 *** 0.772 *** 1.195 *** N/S N/S N/S</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lifestyle</td>
<td>0.31 0.46</td>
<td>-0.746 *** -1.938 *** -0.267 * -1.510 *** -0.687 ***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retirement</td>
<td>0.00 0.05</td>
<td>0.611 *** -1.962 ** N/S N/S N/S</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reason for wanting to return (compared to those not planning to return)</td>
<td>Family / Marital connections</td>
<td>0.29 0.46</td>
<td>-0.919 *** -0.641 *** -0.500 *** -0.317 * -0.400 *</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family opportunities</td>
<td>0.03 0.17</td>
<td>-1.425 *** -1.024 *** N/S N/S N/S</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seconded</td>
<td>0.01 0.08</td>
<td>-0.709 * N/S N/S N/S</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General career</td>
<td>0.02 0.15</td>
<td>-0.331 * N/S 0.597 ** N/S N/S N/S</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study</td>
<td>0.00 0.07</td>
<td>-1.198 *** N/S N/S N/S N/S</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lifestyle</td>
<td>0.39 0.49</td>
<td>-1.515 *** -0.781 *** -0.463 *** -0.331 ** -0.442 **</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retirement</td>
<td>0.11 0.31</td>
<td>-0.468 *** N/S 0.323 * 0.311 * N/S</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship (compared to ‘New Zealand citizen by birth or descent’)</td>
<td>NZ citizen by grant or perm.</td>
<td>0.06 0.23</td>
<td>N/S N/S</td>
<td>N/S N/S</td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity (compared to ‘New Zealand European’)</td>
<td>New Zealander</td>
<td>0.07 0.25</td>
<td>-0.298 ** N/S N/S N/S</td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Māori</td>
<td>0.08 0.27</td>
<td>0.699 *** 0.282 ** 0.296 * N/S N/S</td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>0.03 0.16</td>
<td>0.491 ** 0.755 *** 1.459 *** N/S 0.596 *</td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific</td>
<td>0.01 0.12</td>
<td>0.839 *** N/S 0.808 ** N/S 0.902 *</td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.01 0.07</td>
<td>N/S 0.685 * N/S</td>
<td>N/S 1.197 **</td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.569 *** -0.812 *** -3.206 *** -1.565 *** -3.915 ***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Base outcome: UK & Ireland; Number of observations: 16876; Pseudo R-squared: 0.13; Significance level: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001. N/S: variable included in regression, but result not significant.

Description: In this regression, the variables in the left-hand column predict the likelihood of living in the column region as opposed to living in the UK & Ireland.

Source data: Kea New Zealand, Every One Counts 2006, author’s analysis.

These patterns reflect shifts in the significance of rite of passage migration to the region.

Traditionally this rite of passage, referred to colloquially as ‘the big OE’ (overseas experience),
has mimicked the contemporary British ‘Gap Year’ and the ‘Grand Tour’ undertaken by aristocratic young European men in the 18th Century, insofar as it constitutes a period of self-exploratory ‘roots tourism’ involving travel and work between graduation and settling down into a job and family life. The traditional flow is sustained by cultural norms; as New Zealand poet Robin Hyde eloquently put it, “our north is mostly England. Our youth, our best, our intelligent, brave and beautiful, must make the long migration, under a compulsion they hardly understand; or else be dissatisfied all their lives long” (Hyde 1938). However, in recent years rite of passage migration has assumed new significance as a period of acquiring savings, skills, and contacts in a world city in order to facilitate further travel or investment, to launch a “global career” (Carr et al. 2005), or to “spiral” (Fielding 1992) up the career escalator on returning to New Zealand. As Carr et al. put it: “As the OE proceeds ... some travellers find, serendipitously, that what was initially thought of as a temporary odyssey of cultural consciousness-raising can become a focused exercise in career development” (Carr et al. 2005: 392).

The Australian sample is characterized by what might be called ‘Internal’ migrants. Like the UK & Ireland flow, this is part of a mature migration system, reflected in a high proportion of females, a higher average number of children per family, and a relatively high proportion of middle-aged and well-settled respondents. Respondents in Australia were far less likely to have tertiary qualifications than expatriates in other regions: almost 55% did not have a bachelor’s degree, compared to about 38% of the whole sample. Indeed, the results from Table 6-10 indicate that even after controlling for a range of other characteristics, being better educated reduces the probability of migrating to Australia rather than one of the other regions.

No discussion of migration from New Zealand to Australia would be complete without mention of Sir Robert Muldoon’s infamous dictum that it “raises the average IQ of both countries”. However, it would be mistaken to suggest that migrants to Australia come from the lower end of New Zealand’s skills spectrum. Rather, respondents in Australia had similar skill levels to resident New Zealanders, while expatriates in other regions had abnormally high levels of education (also see Bushnell and Choy 2001a; Glass and Choy 2001). Indeed, the overall
similarity of the Australian sample to the New Zealand resident population reflects the two countries’ geographical proximity, densely structured migration system, and – above all – the absence of obstacles to movement under the 1973 Trans-Tasman Free Travel Arrangement, which formalized traditional free travel arrangements between the two countries. Though passport controls have been introduced for some time and skills criteria now play a role in New Zealanders’ eligibility for Australian social security (see Chapter 9. Also see Birrell and Rapson 2001; Bedford et al. 2003a; Sanderson 2009), the international border remains relatively ‘thin’ (Devoretz 2009), and therefore admits a relatively undifferentiated flow of people in search of better weather and wages across the Tasman. Geographical and cultural propinquity and low obstacles to settlement in Australia may also help to explain why, after controlling for a range of factors, New Zealanders who wanted to return were less likely to be in Australia than any other region (Table 6-10, Column 1): few cultural or legal barriers discourage settlement, and there is less need to return permanently if ease of travel allows frequent visits home.

The North American sample is characterized by a ‘highly skilled’ expatriate population. Almost 24% of respondents from this region held postgraduate qualifications (compared to 13% of the overall sample), and almost 10% had PhDs (compared to 3% of the total sample). Table 6-10 (Column 2) shows that, after controlling for a wide variety of factors, having a PhD markedly increased the probability of migrating to the USA & Canada instead of one of the other regions. Study and professional secondment both significantly increased the probability of choosing the USA & Canada over other regions. Respondents’ high skills reflect the selectivity of immigration policy in the USA & Canada (which favour immigrants with skills and a job offer), the high premium on skills in the North American labour market, and the presence of a large proportion of the world’s most prestigious and well-resourced universities in the region.

A disproportionate number of respondents in this region arrived in the 1970s and 80s and are now middle-aged, married to local citizens, living in their own homes, and raising children. For example, Table 6-10 (Column 2) shows that wanting to return to New Zealand for family reasons considerably decreased the probability of selecting North America over most other regions. The
importance of family reasons seems to reflect the high rate of marriage to local citizens, while the durability of New Zealand identity among the 1970s-80s departure cohort is consistent with both countries’ acceptance (and in Canada’s case, encouragement) of multiculturalism.

Respondents in Asia, Europe & Central Asia, and ‘Other’ regions are fewer and further between and therefore more differentiated, making generalization more difficult. Salient groups in these regions, however, include ‘first movers and returnees’. These populations are part of incipient migration systems – a fact once again reflected partly in a high proportion of males and career migrants and a low proportion of females and lifestyle migrants. For example, almost 60% of respondents in Asia were male and around 58% were there for either a specific job offer or general career prospects. Proportions were broadly similar in Europe & Central Asia and Other regions. Table 6-10 shows that professional secondment or a new job offer both strongly increased the probability of migrating to Asia or “Other” regions, even after controlling for a host of other variables (columns 3 and 5 respectively). Returnees (first-generation migrants to New Zealand who have returned to their origin countries) are also a small but salient group amongst respondents from these regions. One indication of this is the high proportion of New Zealand Citizens by Grant in these regions: while less than 5% of the total sample held this status, the proportion was 6.5% in Europe & Central Asia and 7.5% in Asia and Other regions. Similarly, Table 6-10 shows that, controlling for various factors, Asian ethnicity markedly increased the probability of migrating to Asia rather than anywhere else, just as “Other” ethnicity markedly increased the probability of migrating to “Other” regions.

A final point to note is that the geographical distribution of EOC respondents differed from that predicted by census-based estimates. Census figures suggest two-thirds of expats are in Australia, while just over one in ten reside in the UK and Ireland, and around one in twenty live in USA and Canada (Bryant and Law 2004). By contrast, 43% of EOC respondents lived in the UK and Ireland and only 26% lived in Australia, while 14% lived in the USA and Canada. The other main regions were Asia (7.5%), Europe & Central Asia (6%) and Other regions (3%). Leaving aside sampling error, an important factor in this difference is that, as discussed above, census
and snowball samples measure two different things: the former measures the number of New Zealand-born expatriates, the latter attempts to measure those who identify as New Zealand expatriates, and is therefore closer to a measure of diaspora. One reason why more EOC respondents were in the UK than were in Australia, whereas census figures suggest the opposite, could be that respondents in the UK identify more strongly with New Zealand than those in Australia (also see Callister 2006). This hypothesis is examined in greater detail below.

**Figure 6-11: Geographical Distribution of New Zealand Expatriates**

![Bar chart showing geographical distribution of New Zealand expatriates](chart.png)

Source data: 1) Global Migrant Origin Database, Migration and Development Research Centre, University of Sussex. Accessed 2007;
2) Kea New Zealand, Every One Counts 2006. Author’s analysis.

**Boundary Maintenance**

Theorists generally agree that diasporas are characterized by the maintenance of group boundaries over a substantial period of time (Cohen 1997; Brubaker 2005; Butler 2001). This section examines the transnational identities of EOC respondents, including through probit regression analysis of respondents’ ethnic identities. EOC indicates the existence of a bounded ‘Kiwi Expatriate’ identity, but it is one with porous external borders and strong internal distinctions, and its durability is uncertain. The self-selected nature of the EOC sample ensured that respondents all self-identified as Kiwi Expatriates. However, this was not an exclusive group: ‘friends of New Zealand’ were also invited to complete the survey, and around 1% of...
respondents were neither New Zealand citizens nor New Zealand permanent residents.

Moreover, it was not a homogeneous group, but one characterized by important internal ethnic boundaries.

Some of the most important ethnic differences visible in the sample influence migration, while others appear to have been discovered or constructed through it. This is illustrated by looking closer at differences among the three main ethnic groups in the sample: New Zealand Europeans, Māori, and New Zealanders. Together, these groups constitute some 96% of the sample.

The existence of these ethnic categories itself reflects processes of identity formation associated with colonization and decolonization that influence emigration experiences. The designation “Māori” applies to the indigenous people of New Zealand, who arrived in New Zealand through Polynesia and Melanesia in successive waves beginning somewhere between the latter eleventh and thirteenth centuries AD (King 2003: 48-60; Belich 1996: 13-36). Although relatively linguistically homogenous, New Zealand’s indigenous peoples were tribally organized, and there seems not to have been a strong pan-tribal identity until colonization gave rise to a countervailing nationalist movement in the latter 19th Century. In some contexts the word “Māori” (with a lower case “m”) has a similar meaning to “ordinary,” and its use as an ethnic label probably derives from the designation of “ordinary people” as distinguished from white European colonists, or “Pākehā”.

The origins of the term “Pākehā” are obscure, although the 1966 Encyclopaedia of New Zealand suggests several possibilities:

From pakepakeha: imaginary beings resembling men.
From pakehakeha: one of the sea gods.
From keha: a flea.

---

92 The tribal system has been maintained and in some instances reasserted in recent decades.
From poaka: a pig.\textsuperscript{94}

It is now often used synonymously with the ethnic label “New Zealand European”, for example in the New Zealand Census. In the post-colonial period, the binary Māori-Pākehā implied by these labels has become increasingly sensitive for at least three reasons. Firstly, though Pākehā and New Zealand European are not usually or inherently derogatory terms, many descendants of early ‘non-Māori’ settlers are sensitive to the implication that they remain colonists rather than indigenous in their own right – especially as an increasing number of such people have Māori ancestry but do not culturally identify as Māori. Secondly, many settler groups are sensitive to the way the Māori-Pākehā binary either fails to recognize non-European settler groups altogether or homogenizes them under a term originally assigned to white colonists, even though New Zealand has been receiving increasing numbers of migrants from Pacific and Asian countries since the 1970s (Bedford et al. 2002a). Thirdly, the disintegration of Britain’s empire has forced a re-examination of colonial identities and the emergence of a stronger independent New Zealand national identity (Spoonley et al. 2003). Insistence on the ethnic label “New Zealander” in censuses is thus a refuge for those who do not fit “Māori” and need an alternative to the unsatisfactory labels “Pākehā”, “New Zealand European”, and “non-Māori”. The EOC results show how increasing ease of migration and communication has carried these preferences and projects abroad.

Some of the characteristics associated with ethnicity precede migration and influence choice of destination. For example, holding anything other than New Zealand citizenship by birth decreased the likelihood of identifying either as Māori or as a New Zealander. It seems likely that this effect is mainly independent of emigration (although it is possible that travelling on a non-New Zealand passport may have some influence on the way one identifies or is identified). Similarly, a range of demographic characteristics associated with Māori and New Zealander identity are probably endogenous. In a similar vein, the likelihood of identifying as Māori was

diminished by being tertiary educated, earning more, owning a home and holding local citizenship. These characteristics are suggestive of disadvantages associated with Māori identity in New Zealand, traceable ultimately to colonialism, which have been carried over into expatriate populations. Likelihood of identifying as a New Zealander was diminished by education place (but not by education level): overseas education decreased the likelihood of identifying as a New Zealander, suggesting that New Zealander identity depends in part on socialization through the New Zealand education system. Some of these endogenous characteristics probably influence choice of destination: for example, the relatively low education level of Māori respondents may make emigration across the open border to Australia easier than migration to regions with skilled immigrant selection policies, and indeed Table 6-10 showed that being Māori significantly increased the probability of migrating to Australia rather than another region.

More interestingly, other characteristics of ethnic identity are likely to have arisen through the experience of migration. For example, after controlling for all the variables mentioned above, the longer the respondent had been in the residence country, the less likely they were to identify as a New Zealander and the more likely they were to identify as Māori. In the case of New Zealander identity, the results in columns 2-4 (Table 6-12) support the assimilationist notion that increasing settlement in the migrant’s destination country decreases identification with the origin country. Without controlling for age or time, having more children (an indicator of settlement) decreased the likelihood of identifying as a New Zealander (Column 2). Column 3 shows that the impact of having more children was accounted for by age (another factor of settlement): that is, respondents with more children were less likely to identify as New Zealanders because they were older. Controlling for time (Column 4) made both age and number of children insignificant as predictors of New Zealander identity, indicating that older respondents with more children were less likely to identify as New Zealanders because they had been in the destination country for longer. In other words, respondents who were more settled
(older with more children) were less likely to identify as New Zealanders, and they were more settled because they had been in the country for longer.

Table 6-12: Probit Regressions on Māori and New Zealander Ethnicity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictors</th>
<th>Coefficients (probit regression)</th>
<th>Māori (8% of sample)</th>
<th>New Zealander (7% of sample)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Without Age or Time</td>
<td>Without Time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex (binary, 0=male)</td>
<td>0.094</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>-0.169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of children</td>
<td>0.162</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>-0.058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (years)</td>
<td>-0.017</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>excluded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time in the residence country</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>excluded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lives in own home (binary)</td>
<td>-0.143</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>N/S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income (2006 NZS)</td>
<td>-0.011</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>N/S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Place of highest education (binary, 0=in NZ)</td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qualifications (compared to ‘Secondary school only’)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undergraduate</td>
<td>-0.280</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>N/S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postgraduate</td>
<td>-0.551</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>N/S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship (compared to NZ citizen by birth or descent)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZ citizen by grant or perm. resident</td>
<td>-1.276</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>-0.400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holds local citizenship (binary)</td>
<td>-0.082</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>-0.094</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spouse’s citizenship (compared to those not in a relationship)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZ citizen or dual NZ citizen</td>
<td>0.169</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>N/S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-NZ citizen</td>
<td>0.077</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>N/S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region of residence (compared to UK &amp; Ireland)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>0.334</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>-0.180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA &amp; Canada</td>
<td>0.131</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>-0.119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td></td>
<td>N/S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe &amp; Central Asia</td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td></td>
<td>N/S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other regions</td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td></td>
<td>N/S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.893</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>-1.246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of observations:</td>
<td>15,427</td>
<td></td>
<td>15,879</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R-squared:</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Significance levels: *p<0.05; **p<.01; ***p<0.001. N/S: variable included in regression, but result not significant.

Description: In these regressions, the variables in the left-hand column predict the likelihood of identifying as Māori (column 1) or as New Zealander (columns 2-4) compared with the likelihood of identifying as any other ethnic group.

Source data: Kea New Zealand, Every One Counts 2006, author’s analysis.

The persistence and intensification of Māori identity over time is less easily explained by the EOC results alone. There are at least two possible explanations, which have to do with timing of migration, and the self- and other-defined character of ethnic identification. Firstly, the apparent persistence of Māori identity may be a cohort effect: Māori may have formed a larger proportion of earlier departure cohorts, resulting in a relatively large proportion of Māori who have been abroad for longer. It is not possible to verify this hypothesis with reference to EOC data alone because it lacks a longitudinal component; it is not possible to distinguish age and
cohort effects using cross-sectional data. However, the results of other studies tend to discount this hypothesis. For example, Hamer (2007: 41-42) found that Māori emigration rates to Australia between 1956 and 2006 “largely match known trends”, and, to the extent that there were differences, that Māori “were slower to join the 1970s exodus than other New Zealanders.”

An alternative, and more likely, explanation for the persistence and intensification of Māori identity over time relates to the way ethnicity arises through a combination of “internal” and “external” definition (Barth 1969). Internal definition refers to the way that “actors signal to in- or out-group members a self-definition”, either through an “ego-centred, individual process or a collective, group process”. External definition refers to the way “one person or a set of persons defines the other(s) as ‘X’, ‘Y’, or whatever” in a way that either validates the individual’s internal definition or imposes a categorization onto them (Jenkins 2003: 60).

On one hand, the self-defined characteristics of Māori identity are more likely to persist through time and dispersion to some overseas regions. Whereas New Zealand nationality – as expressed in New Zealand citizenship law – has a ‘civic’ bias, emphasizing residence over ancestry criteria for membership, Māori identity has an ‘ethnic’ bias, emphasizing characteristics such as whanau (extended family), hapu (kinship group), iwi (tribe), and whakapapa (ancestry) as membership criteria. Such criteria are inherently more durable. On the other hand, the externally defined characteristics of Māori identity are also more likely than those of New Zealander identity to persist and intensify over time. To the extent that Māori identity carries phenotypical markers, it is possible that racism plays a part in this persistence. That is, while ‘white’ expatriates may gradually “melt in” (as a number of participants put it), brown expatriates may become gradually more aware that they ‘stand out’. The impact of region of residence is consistent with this interpretation: residence in Australia and North America strongly increased likelihood of identifying as Māori, and strongly decreased likelihood of identifying as a New Zealander. Both are regions where a racial divide between a dominant ‘white’ group and a disadvantaged ‘black’ group remains a particularly strong social
cleavage, and it seems likely that, in these contexts, some Māori may seen by others as being ‘black’.

**Homeland Orientation**

Orientation towards a homeland is one of the defining characteristics of diasporas (see inter alia Cohen 1997; Safran 1991; Brubaker 2005; Butler 2001). Homeland orientation denotes transnational ties to a real or idealized homeland. It is useful to distinguish between transnational identities and transnational activities (see Snel et al. 2006). Identities were discussed in the previous section, while this section focuses on transnational activities, which are perhaps even more central to the processes of ‘mobilization’ that underlie the formation of diasporas (see Chapter 2). Respondents’ return intentions, as well as their social, economic and ‘civic’ ties to New Zealand, and their perceptions of New Zealand’s past and likely-future progress were analyzed through ordinary least squares (OLS) regression (see Table 6-13).

**Demographic Factors**

The significance of demographic factors for transnational participation are generally consistent with the expectations of a conventional patriarchal divide between a male-dominated public sphere of economic and civic association, and a feminized private sphere revolving around reproduction and care for the elderly. Middle-aged white males were more economically and civically connected to New Zealand, while females were more socially connected with family and inclined to return. Although return inclinations decreased with more children, reflecting increased migration costs, social connections actually increased, suggesting perhaps that children brought transnationally stretched families emotionally closer. In youth and old age, when one would generally expect less career focus and earning power along with more family orientation, economic connections were weakest and return inclinations were strongest.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictors (unless otherwise specified, all binary variables: 1=yes; else=0)</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean of index (max. 10) - whole sample</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex (binary, 0=male)</td>
<td>0.191</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>-0.185</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (years)</td>
<td>-0.098</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>0.059</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age squared</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of children</td>
<td>-0.117</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>-0.036</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highest qualification (compared to ‘Secondary school only’)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undergraduate</td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td>0.189</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>N/S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postgraduate</td>
<td>-0.334</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>0.195</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reasons for living abroad (compared to ‘career migrants’)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lifestyle</td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td>-0.104</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>N/S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family</td>
<td>0.156</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>-0.069</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specific purpose</td>
<td>0.241</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>0.383</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country of residence (compared to ‘UK &amp; Ireland’)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>-1.750</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>-0.102</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA &amp; Canada</td>
<td>-0.860</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td>-0.119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>-0.896</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>0.348</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe &amp; Central Asia</td>
<td>-0.761</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>0.092</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other regions</td>
<td>-0.522</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>0.183</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity (compared to ‘New Zealand European’)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealander</td>
<td>0.237</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td>0.300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Māori</td>
<td>0.141</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>-0.111</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td>-0.217</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific</td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td>-0.295</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>0.299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td>N/S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship status (compared to ‘NZ citizen by birth or descent’)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZ citizen by grant or perm. Resident</td>
<td>0.415</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td>-0.941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spouse’s citizenship (compared to the unpartnered)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZ or dual citizen</td>
<td>0.649</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>0.157</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-NZ citizen</td>
<td>-0.372</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td>N/S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child(ren)/s citizenship (compared to those without children)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZ or dual NZ citizen</td>
<td>0.144</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td>N/S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-NZ citizen</td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td>-0.210</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>-0.339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holds local citizenship</td>
<td>-0.264</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td>-0.145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settlement time (see definition below)</td>
<td>-0.041</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>-0.078</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Place of education (binary, 0=IN NZ)</td>
<td>-0.209</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>-0.086</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lives in own house</td>
<td>-0.399</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>0.107</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment status (compared to not employed)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employee</td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td>N/S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed</td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td>N/S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employer</td>
<td>-0.320</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>0.280</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family business</td>
<td>-0.623</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>0.549</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average working hours per week [see definition below]</td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td>N/S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income (see definition below)</td>
<td>-0.024</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transnational connections</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return index (0=never returning; 10=imminently)</td>
<td>excluded</td>
<td>0.066</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>0.090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reason for wanting to return to NZ (compared with those not planning return)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family or marital connections</td>
<td>excluded</td>
<td>0.292</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>0.144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opportunities for family member</td>
<td>excluded</td>
<td>0.249</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>N/S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employer will want me back</td>
<td>excluded</td>
<td>0.427</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>N/S</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This last result also points to the threshold costs to some transnational activities. As Portes et al. (1999: 220) point out, intensive and sustained border-crossing activity depends on transport and communications technology, and therefore people with the resources necessary to access such technology are more likely to behave more transnationally. The results are generally consistent with this expectation, particularly with respect to economic and civic connections.

The two ethnic groups which experience most disadvantages in New Zealand, Māori and Pacific peoples, were relatively disconnected economically from New Zealand, while career-focused expatriates and those with higher incomes were more economically and civically connected.
Those with postgraduate qualifications had substantially more social, economic and civic connections than those with only secondary school education. On the other hand, stronger connections did not necessarily translate into stronger return inclinations. Higher affluence and education corresponded to lower return inclinations, reflecting the greater career opportunities and higher financial rewards available outside New Zealand to skilled and entrepreneurial people.

**Integration**

Transnationalism is often presented as an alternative to the model of assimilation through shedding old identities and networks and adopting those of the host society. On one hand, traditional assimilation theories tend to predict that migrants’ ties to their homelands will diminish over time as they gain status in the host society, and that their adoption of local citizenship will occur as a result of discarding an old singular national identity and adopting a new one (see inter alia Alba and Nee 1997). On the other hand, some transnational theories (e.g. see Portes et al. 2002: 293) highlight that sustained and intensive cross-border activities may be unrelated to “recency of arrival or with marginal economic status” (also see Itzigsohn and Saucedo 2002; Guarnizo et al. 2003; Snel et al. 2006: 285), and that migrants may maintain dual citizenship and hybrid identities (Vertovec 2009b). Both approaches can be politically inflected: assimilationists often argue that immigrants ought to assimilate while transnationalists often argue that they ought to be permitted not to. The core disagreement in this sense is over whether transnational identities and activities actively impede migrants’ ability to adapt successfully to life in the host country. In order to shed further light on this question, I used interval and OLS regression models to examine the relationship between indicators of integration and transnationalism in the EOC dataset (see tables 6-13 and 6-14).

In contrast with the expectations of some transnational theorists, I found that transnational connections were weaker among those who had been settled for longer. Transnational social connections were negatively associated with holding local citizenship or a local qualification. The same was true of return inclinations, which were also negatively associated with home or
business ownership, income and marriage to a local spouse. These observations are consistent with the expectations of assimilation theories.

However, the findings did not provide much support for the view that transnational ties actively frustrate the process of integration. Rather, the results indicate that people with more transnational connections were indeed less integrated, but this was true mainly to the extent that more connections resulted from less time to settle in. For example, before controlling for time, transnational connections of all types were negatively related to index, but after controlling for time, civic and economic connections were totally insignificant, and the impact of social connections almost halved. The amount of settlement time therefore explained both a migrant’s integration level and their level of connection to ‘home’.

Time played a slightly different but equally decisive role in the relationship between transnational connection and income.\textsuperscript{95} Without controlling for time, unit increases in return inclinations and social connections corresponded to income drops of NZ$874 and NZ$463 respectively, but when controlling for time the negative impact of return inclinations decreased, and that of social connections became insignificant. Conversely, without controlling for time, unit increases in economic and civic connections corresponded to income increases of NZ$4,099 and NZ$883 respectively. These increases were compounded when controlling for time, indicating that it was the time-invariant elements of these connections – such as personality and prior resources – which had the most positive impact on income.

\textsuperscript{95} The income variable discussed was measured in 2006 New Zealand dollars. An additional variable measuring relative affluence was constructed by calculating the respondent’s pay as a percentage of GNI per capita in the residence country (using 2006 figures and exchange rates), and multiplying the result by New Zealand’s 2006 GNI per capita. However, results were generally not significant. Indeed, the pay variable itself was problematic because, due to the weakness of the New Zealand dollar relative to currencies in the main expatriate destinations, a disproportionate number of respondents were in the top pay category.
## Table 6-14: OLS and Interval Regressions on Expatriates' Integration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome variables</th>
<th>Integration Index (defined below)</th>
<th>Income (defined below)</th>
<th>Settlement time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OLS regression</td>
<td>Interval regression</td>
<td>Interval regression</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Without Time</td>
<td>With Time</td>
<td>Without Time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>With Time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transnational connections</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return inclinations index</td>
<td>-0.165 ***</td>
<td>-0.130 ***</td>
<td>-5874 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social connections index</td>
<td>-0.124 ***</td>
<td>-0.080 ***</td>
<td>-5463 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic connections index</td>
<td>-0.025</td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td>883 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic connections index</td>
<td>-0.089 ***</td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td>4,099 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive about NZ’s past (vs. no opinion)</td>
<td>-0.222 **</td>
<td>-0.188 *</td>
<td>N/S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative about NZ’s past</td>
<td>-0.410 ***</td>
<td>-0.256 **</td>
<td>N/S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Optimistic about NZ’s future</td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td>0.150 *</td>
<td>N/S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pessimistic about NZ’s future</td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td>$8,113 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Integration</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration index</td>
<td>excluded</td>
<td>excluded</td>
<td>$1,873 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income (2006 NZ$)</td>
<td>0.074 ***</td>
<td>0.042 ***</td>
<td>excluded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time in host country (years)</td>
<td>excluded</td>
<td>0.420 ***</td>
<td>excluded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average weekly working hours</td>
<td>-0.099 ***</td>
<td>-0.069 ***</td>
<td>$9,930 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employee</td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td>$10,053 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed</td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td>$8,900 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employer</td>
<td>0.801 ***</td>
<td>0.439 **</td>
<td>$19,449 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family business</td>
<td>0.798 **</td>
<td>0.604 *</td>
<td>N/S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Demographic characteristics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex (Male=0)</td>
<td>-0.292 ***</td>
<td>-0.303 ***</td>
<td>-59,390 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.208 ***</td>
<td>0.138 ***</td>
<td>$5,390 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age squared</td>
<td>-0.002 ***</td>
<td>-0.002 ***</td>
<td>$59 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of children</td>
<td>0.511 ***</td>
<td>0.315 ***</td>
<td>-$879 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Region (compared to UK &amp; Ireland)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>-0.470 ***</td>
<td>-0.533 ***</td>
<td>-$18,479 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA &amp; Canada</td>
<td>0.183 ***</td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td>-$7,918 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>-1.114 ***</td>
<td>-0.874 ***</td>
<td>-$18,690 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe &amp; Central Asia</td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td>-$14,340 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other region</td>
<td>-0.577 ***</td>
<td>-0.227 *</td>
<td>-$14,362 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reason for living abroad (compared to ‘Career migrant’)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lifestyle migrant</td>
<td>-0.424 ***</td>
<td>-0.268 ***</td>
<td>-$10,385 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family migrant</td>
<td>1.310 ***</td>
<td>1.131 ***</td>
<td>-$14,429 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specific purpose (job, study, retire)</td>
<td>-0.480 ***</td>
<td>-0.247 ***</td>
<td>-$2,972 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Highest qualification (compared to ‘Secondary school only’)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undergraduate degree</td>
<td>0.304 ***</td>
<td>0.424 ***</td>
<td>$6,500 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postgraduate degree</td>
<td>1.104 ***</td>
<td>1.202 ***</td>
<td>$10,522 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Self-ascribed ethnic group (compared to ‘NZ European’)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealander</td>
<td>-0.301 ***</td>
<td>-0.227 **</td>
<td>-$4,162 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Māori</td>
<td>-0.261 ***</td>
<td>-0.317 ***</td>
<td>-$4,158 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td>-0.250 *</td>
<td>N/S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific</td>
<td>-0.381 **</td>
<td>-0.481 ***</td>
<td>N/S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td>N/S</td>
<td>-$11,535 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Citizenship (compared to ‘NZ Citizen by birth or descent’)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZ Citizen by grant or perm. Res</td>
<td>0.619 ***</td>
<td>0.829 ***</td>
<td>-$5,036 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.794 **</td>
<td>-1.075 ***</td>
<td>-$90,151 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of observations</td>
<td>14937</td>
<td>14610</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R squared</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Significance level: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. N/S: variable included in regression, but result not significant.

Integration index: Additive index local education, local citizenship, local spouse, local kid(s), live in own house. Values 0-5.

Income: 14 categories. 1=loss; 2=0; 3=$1-5,000; 3=$5,000-10,000 ... 14=$100,000+. Measured in NZS 2006.

Settlement time: 1=1-3yrs; 2=1-2yrs; 3=2-3yrs; 4=3-5yrs; 5=6-10yrs; 6=11-15yrs; 7=16-29yrs; 8=21-30yrs; 9=30+yrs.

Description: In this table, the variables in the left-hand column predict differences in the outcome variables in columns 1-5.

Source data: Kea New Zealand, Every One Counts 2006, author’s analysis.
Thus, the findings are consistent with assimilation theories insofar as they predict a gradual decline in transnational activity over time, but not insofar as they may posit a causal relation between transnationalism and failed integration. Transnational connection was indeed associated with recency of arrival, but the latter also accounted for most of the negative associations between transnational connection and integration. Moreover, the relationship between transnationalism and integration was not uniformly negative. Although those with stronger transnational social connections and return inclinations were less likely to hold local citizenship, transnational economic and civic connections were associated with higher levels of economic integration. There was little evidence to suggest that discouraging expatriates’ transnational connections would have any substantial impact on their integration in their region of residence – a finding which has significance for some objections to sending states’ incorporation of emigrants (see Chapter 2).

Region of Residence

Some theories of transnationalism posit that cross-border activities decline over distance. Portes et al (1999: 224) posit that, “if a ... necessary condition for [transnational enterprises] is the establishment of networks across space, it follows that the more distant the nation of origin is the less dense the set of transnational enterprises, other things being equal.” This expectation is also found in some work on New Zealand migration. For example, Sanderson (2009: 294) argues that the “physical and political closeness that make it easy for New Zealanders to migrate to Australia also makes it easier for them to maintain an ongoing relationship with New Zealand, and makes return migration less costly.” She further predicts that, as New Zealanders move onwards from Australia “to more distant destinations, [their] connections can be expected to decline.”

Analysis of EOC confounds these expectations. Although residence region was the single most important predictor of transnational orientation, respondents in neighbouring Australia scored lowest on all measures. Moreover, respondents in the UK & Ireland, on the opposite side of the planet from New Zealand, scored higher than those in Australia on all measures of
transnational connectedness, and higher than respondents in any region on return inclinations and social connectedness. Factors studied in the survey cannot explain the marked differences in homeland orientation by region, and therefore this problem is taken up in the qualitative research presented in subsequent chapters.

CONCLUSIONS
While the OECD’s 2004 analysis of the world’s censuses counted a large number of New Zealand expatriates, Kea New Zealand’s Every One Counts survey of 2006 highlighted the existence of a New Zealand diaspora – a dispersed population that identifies with and is oriented towards New Zealand. Though the Kea sample is not fully representative of this diaspora and gives few clues as to its full size, when supplemented with data from census stocks and migration flows, the Kea dataset can add significantly to existing understanding of how the New Zealand diaspora has emerged and persisted. On the basis of such data, this chapter has offered three arguments.

Firstly, a migration shift connected with the disintegration of the British Empire has led to the dispersion of New Zealanders around the globe. As a part of Britain’s seamless imperial territory, New Zealand captured a portion of the massive European outflows of the 19th and early 20th centuries, and was connected to other parts of the ‘New World’ through large circulatory and shuttle flows. The moment of rupture from the British Empire was also a turning point in New Zealand’s migration system. After Britain joined the EEC in 1973, crimping intra-Commonwealth economic flows and cutting the preferential trading ties sustaining New Zealand’s agricultural-export-oriented economy (Belich 2001a), New Zealand began to periodically experience unprecedented net migration losses. These losses were the tip of an iceberg: even in years of positive net migration, large numbers of new arrivals were offset by large numbers of departures. Though erratic, departures of New Zealand citizens have been particularly pronounced, and have not been offset by the steady trickle of returnees. As a result, the OECD estimates that some 16% of all people born in New Zealand – and some 24% of the highly skilled people born in New Zealand – currently live abroad (Dumont and Lemaître 2004).
Secondly, the impacts of decolonization on New Zealand identity and the related patterns of inclusion and exclusion within emigrants’ host societies help to explain respondents’ patterns of ethnic identification in diaspora. The long-standing ethnic divide between colonized “Māori” and colonizing “European” has eroded somewhat with decolonization. As New Zealand has assumed its own place in the world independently of Britain, a still-small but increasingly strident “New Zealander” ethnicity has emerged, partly as a white backlash to the increasing diversity brought about by Asian-Pacific immigration (see Didham and Callister Forthcoming) and to a post-colonial Māori renaissance, and partly as elements of “European” identity are increasingly fused to elements of Māori, Pacific and Asian culture. All of these identities persist amongst those who identify as “New Zealand expatriates”. However, they do not persist equally or with equal consequences: for example, the historically imposed disadvantages experienced by Māori are not fully eroded through settlement abroad, while new patterns of discrimination in emigrants’ destination countries seem to reinforce Māori identity long after “New Zealanders” have chosen to identify in other ways. Understanding of New Zealand’s ethnic development trends need to take such factors into account.

The third main finding of this chapter raises a problem to be addressed: expatriates’ levels of transnational involvement varied strikingly by region of residence, in ways that were not easily explained. Whereas theory predicts that the intensity of transnational involvement will drop off with distance (Portes et al. 1999: 224), the Kea data suggest that expatriates in the UK & Ireland were more transnationally connected to New Zealand than those in any other region, while those in Australia were least connected. These differences were not explained by demographic characteristics or by patterns of inclusion or exclusion in the host society.

Perhaps these regional differences might be explained with reference to a final factor influencing respondents’ identification – a factor that was fundamental to this chapter but not explicitly discussed in it: the impact of the Every One Counts survey itself, and the policy context out of which it emerged. In one sense, it was the survey itself, spearheaded by the Kiwi Expats Association and funded by an array of New Zealand’s public agencies, which first
constituted ‘New Zealand expatriates’ as a discrete, coherent group – making some parts of ‘the diaspora’ visible, and helping to imagine other parts into existence. Perhaps other New Zealand policies also play a role in reproducing the inexplicable regional variations observed above. Much of the remainder of the thesis explores this hunch more fully, by zeroing in on New Zealand’s diaspora policies.
7. **Inconstant Agencies: Diaspora Building from Abroad**

**Introduction**

From an examination of what is known about New Zealanders abroad, the next three chapters move into a study of policies towards them. Chapters 7 (this one) and 8 focus on diaspora building policies – first from the point of delivery in four locations (London, Sydney, Paris and Tokyo), and then from the centre, in New Zealand. Chapter 9 looks at diaspora integration mechanisms. The broad argument across these three chapters is that New Zealand’s emigration system is uncoordinated, leading to inefficient and unfair processes and outcomes. In this respect New Zealand contrasts with Ireland, whose emigration state system was presented as a model of coordination in Chapter 5.

This chapter focuses on a particular type of diaspora building mechanism, namely ‘discretionary consular functions’ carried out by New Zealand Government missions, which cultivate and recognize diaspora identities and communities *in situ*, in various offshore locations. These include efforts to monitor expatriates, to support their media outlets and cultural activities, to provide public space for their associations, and to provide support for their events and celebrations. The chapter discusses each of these functions in turn, showing how they act to constitute diasporic attachments and comparing their character at the point of delivery across several different migrant destinations.

The chapter demonstrates that these variations are ad hoc rather than coordinated, and can be explained by a combination of four main factors: 1) the size of the local expatriate community, 2) the intensity of demand for services from local individuals and expatriate groups, 3) the resource constraints arising from foreign policies toward the region, and 4) the spontaneous efforts of individual officials. An additional variable to consider is the different institutional composition of government posts in different regions. As different configurations of these
factors emerge and dissolve in different places at different times, new layers of local practice develop in sedimentary fashion, and distinct local ‘cultures’ of engagement between the government mission and local diaspora groups gradually evolve. Because of the range of factors underlying their development, these cultures often reflect neither government policy nor expatriate demand.

As mentioned previously, the chapter shows how these cultures of engagement play a key role in both recognizing and constituting diasporic attachments. It also shows that regional variations in ‘cultures of engagement’ are highly correlated with the regional variations in diasporic attachments observed in the previous chapter. Diasporic attachments were particularly strong in the UK & Ireland, where New Zealand’s Government missions were most active in expatriate communities, and particularly weak in Australia, where they were least active. One factor determining the development of thicker diasporic membership in a particular region appears to be the extent of proactive involvement from the local overseas Government mission. In this sense, the chapter picks up where the previous chapter on New Zealand’s diaspora left off, providing a plausible explanation for what could not be explained with reference only to the Every One Counts data.

The data for this chapter were collected through in-depth interviews as well as online and in-person participant observation with migrants, migrant organizations, and government officials in the ambit of New Zealand Government Missions in London, Sydney, Paris and Tokyo. The fieldwork locations were chosen for various similarities and contrasts which facilitate comparison. London and Sydney contain the largest concentrations of New Zealand expatriates, and are linked to New Zealand by shared imperial heritage, a common language and ethnicity, and a long history of population exchanges and economic integration. By contrast, Tokyo and Paris are centres for smaller, more dispersed expatriate populations living in culturally and linguistically foreign environments. All four countries have different significance to New Zealand’s foreign policies. London and Paris were New Zealand’s cultural metropoles in colonial times, while Sydney and Tokyo are hubs of the Asian-Pacific system towards which New
Zealand is geopolitically reorienting. These variations in the character of the expatriate community and the nature of New Zealand’s international stance towards the region are helpful in explaining differences in approach to the diaspora among the four locations.

In addition to this introduction and a conclusion at the end, the chapter has three main sections. The first section introduces the concept of ‘discretionary consular functions’ and defines their scope. The second section presents the main findings, analysing the provision of discretionary consular services comparatively across the four main regions: London, Sydney, Tokyo and Paris. The final section discusses the findings, teasing out the main variables and characterizing the ‘culture’ of engagement in each location.

**Discretionary Consular Functions**

A debate has recently begun to spring up surrounding the proper extent of consular service. On one hand, increasing numbers of migrants are holding the consular institutions of their home-state up to the light, and demanding more equitable and efficient services. For example, in response to a call for submissions on a European Union Green Paper on consular service (European Commission 2006), the group Fair Trials Abroad (FTA) expressed disappointment that, “The offer of consular assistance is ... a matter of discretion, not one of legal obligation, and receiving assistance is tantamount to a privilege and not a right” (Fair Trials Abroad 2006: 3). “FTA believes that the right to consular assistance should be defined and protected by relevant legislation at a UK and an EU level, and we strongly support the creation of a legally binding, common EU consular code that defines the scope and limits of a citizen’s rights to consular assistance” (Fair Trials Abroad 2006: 4).

On the other hand, overstretched diplomatic and consular officials are increasingly complaining of unreasonable requests made by unthinking expatriates. For example, *The Independent* recently reported that consular officials were “growing exasperated” at requests made by Brits abroad, including such gems as “Can you get me out of prison – I’m a British
national”, “Can you help my teenage son pack his suitcase?”, and “How do you make jam?”. Consular officials were routinely asked to help find missing sunglasses, pay bills, and make naughty children behave. One consular official was reportedly “asked for advice by a woman still unhappy with her breasts after she had surgery to enlarge them”. As a result of such enquiries, the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office is calling on travellers “to be better informed about the role of the embassies.” Britain is not the only country grappling with similar problems. For example, White (2007) observes that “helping Australians in trouble abroad is perhaps the single most demanding and time-consuming responsibility of the [Australian] Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.” Relatively little published research exists regarding the geography of consular service, despite that it is increasingly relevant to an increasing number of people.

It does not help either side of the debate that the role of embassies is not very strictly defined. In order to illustrate this point, the term ‘discretionary consular functions’ is used here to refer to the elements of consular service that are permitted but not mandated by international convention. In one sense, all consular services are discretionary. They are governed internationally by the Convention on Consular Relations, a multilateral agreement concluded at Vienna in 1963 (United Nations 1963) under the auspices of the International Court of Justice. However, actual consular relations are negotiated bilaterally, and while they place obligations on sending states to consider requests for consular service, they do not entail obligations to meet these requests. Nevertheless, there are a set of defined functions that are generally recognized as the core of consular service; these are explicitly referred to by the Vienna Convention, and include issuing passports and travel documents, acting as notary and civil registrar, safeguarding the interests of nationals in matters of inheritance, protecting unaccompanied minors, and arranging appropriate legal representation where needed (United Nations 1963). In addition, however, the Vienna Convention refers to a number of non-specific

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consular functions that might be thought of as ‘discretionary’, such as “protecting and safeguarding the interests of nationals”, or “helping and assisting” them. These provisions permit anything that is not illegal in the receiving state or prohibited by other conventions, and are therefore open to discretionary interpretation (Gamlen 2008a: 848; for related discussion, also see Délanio 2009a). As discussed in Chapter 4, wide variations can indeed be found not only among different states, but among different consular postings of the same state.

It is intuitively predictable that the actual scope of discretionary consular service in any particular case will depend on the foreign policy of the origin-state towards the region in question, and on the number of its nationals residing there. Having more posts of a larger size ensures that expatriates have easier and fuller access to both core and discretionary services. Countries with constrained resources can only afford limited numbers of posts. The placement and resourcing of these posts is likely to depend on regional priorities set in foreign policy, as well as demand for consular services from large concentrations of expatriates. However, do these factors in fact explain variations in discretionary consular service provision? And are they the only explanatory factors, or are other less obvious variables also significant? The remainder of the chapter addresses these questions.

‘New Zealand Inc.’: An Overview of Selected Missions

Individual offshore Government postings are loose composites of agencies rather than homogenous units. At the core of each post is the diplomatic delegation reporting to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, led by the highest ranked diplomat (Consul General, Ambassador or High Commissioner). Clustered around this are the offshore postings of various New Zealand Government agencies, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the New Zealand Immigration Service, New Zealand Trade and Enterprise, Tourism New Zealand, Passports and Citizenship, as well as Customs, Police, and Defence. Each of these is a separate statutory body with independent priorities and reporting lines. The role of the most senior diplomat is therefore a somewhat ambiguous combination of day-to-day operational manager, figurehead,
and 'chairman of the board'. The semi-official umbrella term for one of these composite organizations is "New Zealand Inc".  

The composite or plural character of offshore missions leads to different institutional configurations in each location. In London, where discretionary consular service is relatively intensive, New Zealand Inc. is a relatively closely-linked organization that meets regularly for coordination purposes and plays a pivotal role in the local expatriate community. In recent years New Zealand Inc. London has comprised some 100-150 officials, perhaps half of whom are responsible for passport and document related services or with the Immigration Service. New Zealand Inc. London is largely housed within New Zealand House, an iconic 18-storey skyscraper on the corner of Pall Mall and Haymarket in central London. In Sydney, where discretionary consular functions are noticeably thinner than elsewhere, New Zealand Inc. is a somewhat more loosely linked set of offshore delegations located in a shared office block in downtown Sydney. These delegations meet monthly or fortnightly, chaired by the Consul General, for updating and coordination purposes. Sydney’s largest delegation is that of the Department of Internal Affairs (23 staff vs. six in Immigration and three in the Consulate General itself), reflecting high demand from New Zealand migrants for services related to passports, citizenship, and births, deaths and marriages. New Zealand Inc. Tokyo is set in a gated compound near the top of a hill in one of the wealthiest neighbourhoods of Tokyo’s Shibuya district. The compound contains several main buildings – a large ambassador’s residence with a gym, squash court and swimming pool in the basement, and further blocks containing both spacious modern residences and offices. Officials from a number of agencies live and work on site, making the compound a rather a tight knit community. As will be seen, the personal enthusiasm of individual officials was relatively high here, despite contraction in

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98 IV17.
99 New Zealand House was completed in 1963 to replace the New Zealand Government Offices at 415 The Strand, and sits on the site of the old Carlton Hotel (IV17).
100 E59, E60, E62.
101 IV130.
102 IV131.
103 IV136.
official time dedicated to discretionary consular functions. The New Zealand Embassy in Paris is located in the 16th Arrondissement, in the vicinity of the Arc de Triomphe and the Champs Elysées. However, most of what little interaction exists between the Embassy and local expatriates occurs at the Ambassador’s Official Residence, a stately home gifted by the French Government in recognition of New Zealand’s sacrifices during the war.104 It is worth noting that in London, New Zealand Inc. was relatively cohesive as an institution, whereas in Sydney it was more diffuse.

**PUBLIC SPACE**

Providing public space for associational activity is a key discretionary consular activity through which state agencies help to cultivate and maintain diaspora communities. Provision of public space allows expatriates to encounter each other, facilitating the formation of shared identities and interests. In this sense, public space is an important element of the “transnational public sphere” (Fraser 2007; Smith 2003b). As Mitchell puts it, public space provides a “material location where the social interactions and political activities of all members of ‘the public’ occur” – albeit a public that is “carefully selected and homogenous in composition”, consisting of “those with power, standing and respectability” (Mitchell 1995: 116). Public space provision also allows specific existing expatriate groups to hold the meetings and other activities necessary to keep their organizations sustainable. The extent of public space made available by New Zealand’s offshore delegations, and the diversity of groups it is made available to, varies widely by region.

**LONDON**

New Zealand’s Government Offices in London began providing public space for expatriate community activities when they were first established as centres for coordinating the colonial connection between Britain and New Zealand. In the first half of the 20th century, the New Zealand Government Offices at 415 The Strand acted as a kind of clubhouse for expatriates, and

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104 IV162.
came to be seen by expatriates as a place to meet, relax, read New Zealand newspapers, and even have one’s mail collected and held. In the mid-1960s, after the offices had moved to the newly built New Zealand House in Piccadilly, the High Commission began to provide storage and rehearsal space to the local Māori performing arts group, Ngāti Rānana, in return for free performances at official functions – a practice that continues today.

This pattern of close engagement was interrupted somewhat during the 1970s, 80s and 90s as the process of de-colonization unfolded. Britain’s reorientation away from the Commonwealth during the 1970s shrank the NZ-UK bilateral relationship, reducing the diplomatic importance of the London High Commission. Loss of its main export market also precipitated financial crisis in New Zealand, and ‘corrective’ neoliberal reforms during the 1980s and 1990s involved the selling off and downsizing of offshore posts. The London High Commissioner’s high-profile Chelsea Square residence (which had been acquired cheaply decades earlier but had since greatly appreciated in value), was sold off – even though the impressive short-term profit from the sale was offset within a few years by the cost of renting a suitable High Commissioner’s residence. Market rents were imposed on government departments using space in New Zealand House. Finding these prohibitively expensive, the departments in question simply downsized their London delegations, leaving most of New Zealand House empty. Desperate for tenants, the Government leased out much of the space cheaply to outside businesses: the ballroom, for example, went to a Canadian brewery and now houses a sports café. The Prime Minister intervened to prevent Treasury selling off the entire building.

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105 IV17.
106 The name “Ngāti Rānana” roughly translates into English as “the London tribe” – Ngāti being the prefix for “tribe” and Rānana being a transliteration of “London”.
107 IV101.
108 E47.
109 IV79.
110 IV95.
111 IV79.
112 IV95.
during the early 2000s. 114 Commonwealth Secretary General Don McKinnon, who was New Zealand’s Foreign Minister during much of the reform period, gave an assessment of the implications of the asset sales:

I think we made some errors there. And I was probably part of it too as Minister.... When you are a small country like us if you really want to fly your flag you have got to work quite hard at it.... To have them all under one roof in New Zealand House [rather than “scattered over town”] probably would have been better, even if you had to do a few deals on the rental cost.... The Australians were going to sell their [High Commissioner’s] residence ... along from Hyde Park Corner. And Bob Hawke told Margaret Thatcher ... and she said “where are you going to go?” And he said, “so and so.” And she said, “Well don’t expect me to go have dinner there”. And so straight away they took it off the market. They stayed with the more prominent address. That’s the nature of the city of London and you can’t ignore that sort of thing. 115

With increasing ‘rite of passage’ migration from New Zealand to the UK, particularly since the mid- to late-1990s, the High Commission’s reduced space has been in increasing demand from a growing range of diaspora groups. Various government agencies within New Zealand House routinely make their boardrooms available for committee meetings, and the High Commission rents out the Penthouse Suite of New Zealand House at reduced rates for activities with a New Zealand connection or which advance New Zealand’s interests (See Figure 7-1). 116 Professor Robin Clark of the New Zealand Graduates Association explained, “...the pivot [of the expatriate community] is the High Commission, triggered partly by the fact that it’s got such a wonderful place.... It more or less overlooks the Royal Society, Buckingham Palace, the Wheel [London Eye]... it’s a great view.” The Penthouse has become the closest thing local expats have to a New Zealand ‘town square’, and many refer to it affectionately as “the ghetto”. 117

115 Interview with author (see Appendices).
116 IV101; OIA35.
117 E74.
Demand for space in some instances now outstrips supply. For example, the Ngāti Rānana Māori Club has outgrown its small allocated space on the building’s fourth floor and is now forced to practice on the marble floor of the lobby, under a staircase.\textsuperscript{118} New groups are also asserting ‘rights’ to use the space: for example, a London-based New Zealand playwright requested permission to use the Penthouse to stage an original work about a European poet. The request was refused on the grounds that the High Commission was “simply unable to accommodate” all such proposals.\textsuperscript{119} The playwright protested that the terms and conditions for hiring the Penthouse “clearly set out that it is available for hire to: … ‘organisations and groups with a New Zealand connection or which by association advance New Zealand’s interests’”.\textsuperscript{120} In her view, the decision not to host her production reflected what she considered to be the misguided view that it is “unethical for New Zealanders living outside of New Zealand to apply for funding as they are not paying taxes to the New Zealand Government.”\textsuperscript{121}

Excess demand for public ‘New Zealand’ space has partly been met through other initiatives, such as the establishment of a New Zealand Memorial at Hyde Park Corner. The Memorial was dedicated on Armistice Day 2006 in a ceremony with 500 invited guests, including the British Royal Family, the Prime Ministers of New Zealand and the UK, and approximately 2,000 members of the public, many of whom were expatriate New Zealanders. The Memorial’s

\textsuperscript{118} IV101; E40.
\textsuperscript{119} OIA35.
\textsuperscript{120} OIA35.
\textsuperscript{121} OIA35.
primary purpose is as a focal point for annual ANZAC Day commemorations, which attract increasing throngs of New Zealanders to pilgrimage sites across Europe. However, as the programme for the opening ceremony of the Memorial explained, it also has a wider function:

In our increasingly globalised world, people need to be able to express their own national identity.... There is also a growing demand by young New Zealanders, particularly when they are travelling overseas, to express their national identity on occasions such as Anzac Day and Waitangi Day. The New Zealand Memorial in London will give the many thousands of New Zealanders living in the United Kingdom a place to do just that.122

In this sense, the memorial provides a respectable alternative to Kiwi events involving disorderly crowds and large amounts of alcohol – such as the wild “Waitangi Day Circle-line Party,” during which thousands of New Zealanders take over parts of London’s public transport system before gathering in an unruly mob outside Parliament buildings in Westminster, where hundreds of inebriated young men strip to the waist and attempt a massive, disjointed rendition of “Ka Mate”, the Ngāti Toa haka popularized by the national rugby team. The New Zealand memorial, with its outdoor setting, military aspect, and prestigious public (but out-of-earshot) location, provides a space where New Zealand identity can be performed and practiced legitimately in the UK.

**Sydney**

In contrast with New Zealand Inc. London, the New Zealand Government offices in Sydney did not provide any space for migrant associational activities. On one hand this was due to what was perceived as weak demand among individual expatriates, owing to Sydney’s geographical and cultural proximity to New Zealand. Migration to Australia does not have the same ‘rite of passage’ character as that to England and Europe. As one official put it, New Zealanders “slot in” to Sydney society, and therefore there is no “gravitational pull” to the Consulate General.123 Even so, the large number of New Zealanders based in the city ensures that there enough organized groups to place a high aggregate demand for public space provision on the Consulate

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123 IV130.
General. The limited amount of space available partly reflects that the post exists to maintain an already-established and strong bilateral relationship, to which resources are allocated more sparingly than in newer or more sensitive areas. As a result, demand for space inevitably outstrips supply. For example, many participants highlighted a chronic lack of public space for Māori community activities (also see Hamer 2007: 79-86), and a number of officials and migrant-association members I spoke to believed that the Consulate General should do more to assist with the provision of public space for New Zealand-related activities in general. According to one migrant association leader, the Consulate General is “uninviting, impersonal and has never done anything for us”.125

**Tokyo**

Expatriate groups in Tokyo have often gained access to space for community activities through personal connections to individual officials, provided this is not at odds with the disposition of the ambassador at the time. During my fieldwork in Tokyo in late 2004, a local Māori culture group, Ngā Hau E Wha, was holding semi-regular workshops and other activities at the Embassy. The arrangement had come about partly through the group’s ability to provide a cultural element to Embassy-related functions, but largely due to the individual generosity of individual diplomats, who provided space in their own homes and made space requests to the Ambassador on the group’s behalf, partly due to their own personal connection to members in the group.126

**Paris**

The role of the New Zealand Embassy in the Parisian-Kiwi expatriate community is minimal. As one authoritative source put it, the Embassy “exist[s] to promote bilateral relationships with the French Government”, it does not “exist to look after NZ expatriate communities.”127 For this reason the Embassy does not host or assist with Waitangi Day or similar celebrations – “and if

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124 For example IV143; IV149; IV151; IV164.
125 IV154; IV165.
126 IV29; IV30; IV35; E4; E10; E12; E18.
127 IV68.

174
they did it would be about getting bilateral contacts and diplomatic colleagues along, not a party for expatriates”, one diplomat explained. “Imagine if it got onto the front page in New Zealand: ‘New Zealand embassies overseas throw expatriate parties’”. Some New Zealanders in Paris suggested that discretionary consular services have diminished somewhat since France’s bombing of Greenpeace’s anti-nuclear protest ship, the Rainbow Warrior, in Auckland Harbour.

The Embassy does have a long-standing relationship with the France New Zealand Society, a local group established by Embassy officials in 1981. In recognition of the Society’s work fostering links between the French and New Zealand communities, the Ambassador usually hosts the Society’s annual general meeting (AGM) at the official residence, a stately home gifted by the French Government in recognition of New Zealand’s sacrifices during the war. Access to this space boosts AGM attendance by making members feel special and treasured. Beyond this, different ambassadors have different levels of warmth and interest towards the group, and this can make things easier or more difficult for the Society to operate.

During my visit to Paris there was increasing demand for a more specifically New Zealand-focused organization in France. Set up by people already well-integrated into French society, the France-New Zealand Society deliberately focuses on cultural exchange rather than on offering a cultural safe-haven or reception point for new arrivals. However, an increase in numbers of New Zealand migrants on shorter term stays, along with a thawing of bilateral relations between France and New Zealand, has boosted demand for venues to express and share New Zealand identity in France, and for services to help new arrivals. Many of my informants looked to “New Zealand Inc.” to fulfil this role – or at least to attempt to keep track

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128 IV68.
129 IV162.
130 IV62.
131 IV62.
132 IV62.
133 IV62.
134 IV62, IV64.
of how many New Zealanders were in France, where they were, and what they were doing.135

These people were disappointed that the Embassy has minimal interest in local New Zealanders, which shifts with foreign policy priorities or the disposition of individual ambassadors.

I think that’s been the problem with Kiwis here ... that there’s no meeting point except the Embassy.... it’s somewhere that identifies, “hey, that’s New Zealand”, but there’s nothing there, there’s no heart there. So we haven’t got a heart, Kiwis in Paris.136

Some looked longingly towards New Zealand House in London and the New Zealand Consulate in Shanghai, where monthly meetings convened by New Zealand Inc. officials led, for example, to recruitment and cross-pollination between commercial projects.137 By contrast, some had found New Zealand Inc. officials who passed through France to be disinterested and even obstructive in their business activities.138 One businessperson complained, “What we’re ... doing here in France, it’s ... in spite of the Government, not because of the Government. Not grâce à, in French, which is ‘thanks to’. It’s in spite of: malgré”.139

**DEDICATED OFFICIALS**

Provision of space and support for expatriate community activity requires the time and energy of officials. Beyond the basic logistical chores required for making official space useable to groups – gaining permissions, setting out and clearing up facilities and so on – officials often volunteer or are called on to provide more intensive secretariat and secretarial support for expatriate organizations that have a close relationship to the post or are organizing activities that complement the work of the mission. Officials can also provide information and access to Government decision-makers and VIPs who can give kudos to group activities and draw in new members. They also often help to publicize expatriate groups and their activities, and to coordinate connections among various groups (see Hughes 2009). These types of services, which officials are uniquely able to supply, are essential in allowing the small organizational cores of

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135 IV65.
136 IV56.
137 IV58.
138 IV58.
139 IV56.
176
expatriate groups to attract, maintain and mobilize wider memberships around specific activities or issues. It is through such mobilization that expatriates gradually come to identify and act as a collectivity.

In most areas, important existing expatriate associations have been established, nurtured and shaped by individual officials who have taken an interest in specific periods. Sometimes dedicated official time has been formally provided within the constraints of a post’s resources and individuals’ official workloads – although sustained, formal interest from the diplomatic or consular institution as a whole was relatively rare. More often, officials were able to share some of the fringe benefits of their jobs with groups to which they were personally affiliated in some way.

**London**

The London High Commission provides a relatively large amount of direct support to expatriate civic activity by establishing groups, through formal and informal involvement of officials from various agencies, by providing information and networking opportunities, and (sometimes) by providing secretariat support for specific initiatives. Migrant association leaders unanimously agreed that this role has been crucial in sustaining the expatriate community.

Several of the longest-standing expatriate groups in the UK were either established or supported at key moments by officials from New Zealand House. For example, the New Zealand Cricket Club, which has facilitated networking amongst senior military officers and banking executives, and helped to integrate newly arrived New Zealanders, was founded in 1951 in large part through the efforts of Trevor Campbell, then New Zealand High Commission Public Relations Officer (Gaffikin 2002: 11-17). The New Zealand-UK Link Foundation, formed in 1990 to counteract drift in the post-1973 NZ-UK bilateral relationship, owes its existence to then-High Commissioner Bryce Harland, who convened a group of City financiers under the guidance of former Lord Mayor Sir Allan Trail. More recently, High Commission officials played roles in

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140 IV100.
securing New Zealand Government support for a Centre for New Zealand Studies at Birkbeck
College, University of London, in 2007.\textsuperscript{141}

Officials have also been intricately involved in the ongoing governance and administration of
many existing expatriate associations, on a formal and informal basis. For example, former High
Commissioner Public Diplomacy Officer Rachel Broadmore served as a member of the Committee
of the New Zealand Society, a 500-strong dining club founded in 1927 (the High Commissioner
is, by default, the Society’s Vice Patron).\textsuperscript{142} The High Commissioner also serves as Patron of the
New Zealand University Graduates’ Association, and the Deputy High Commissioner serves ex
officio on the Association’s committee\textsuperscript{143} – roles which involve, for example, attending and
speaking at functions. Officials working in the Immigration Service and other departments have
participated actively in groups such as the London branch of Maramara Totara, a Māori
weaponry school, and Ngāti Rānana, the London Māori Club.\textsuperscript{144}

Officials also supply New Zealand clubs and societies with the information they need to sustain
membership and activities. As part of her official role, the Public Diplomacy Officer at New
Zealand House generally helps keep the various groups informed of each other’s activities, and
passes on information about and access to visiting delegations from New Zealand and new
appointments of New Zealanders to senior posts in the UK, so that groups may invite such
people to join up.\textsuperscript{145} Sometimes this extends to inviting senior members of certain groups – such
as the Lawyers’ and Accountants’ societies – to receptions and business lunches to provide
feedback on aspects of Government policy.\textsuperscript{146} Officials from various agencies occasionally offer
limited secretariat-type support for specific initiatives – particularly where they link to specific
departmental objectives. However, with the expansion of the New Zealand population in
London, the finite time and efforts of dedicated officials are coming under increasingly

\textsuperscript{141} IV66; E53.
\textsuperscript{142} IV21.
\textsuperscript{143} IV21.
\textsuperscript{144} E40; E74.
\textsuperscript{145} IV21; IV90.
\textsuperscript{146} IV90.
178
unrealistic pressure from individuals and groups seeking engagement. The UK chapter of Kea (see next chapter), with its paid regional manager and online platform, is increasingly taking up the slack by acting as a kind of umbrella organization for New Zealand groups (although not all groups were happy about the new network suddenly assuming this role).\textsuperscript{147}

\textbf{Sydney}

In Sydney, relatively few officials dedicate time, formally or informally, to engagement with the local expatriate community. Several New Zealand organizations have been founded or given substantial support by officials in the past, including the Australia New Zealand Business Network and the Australia New Zealand Business Council,\textsuperscript{148} and there are some attempts to maintain periodic contact with community leaders.\textsuperscript{149} However, most informants reported that this type of interaction had declined in recent years and during my visit there were apparently no staff officially tasked with community relations.

Migrant leaders reported different official attitudes in different periods. In some periods agencies such as New Zealand Trade and Enterprise had been relatively open-handed with support for business networking initiatives, but in recent years they were harder-pressed to justify each dollar spent with each dollar earned. This shift has made some groups unsustainable, bringing an end to social networking activities that officials could not justify this to their superiors, even when such activities led to many valuable business relationships.\textsuperscript{150}

Some officials suggested that the Government’s relative lack of interest in New Zealand groups in Sydney reflects foreign policy priorities. For example, Sydney had a discretionary budget of some A$1,500 for supporting arts groups and other initiatives, while Washington DC reportedly had a discretionary budget of perhaps 20 to 30 times this amount.\textsuperscript{151} Others argued that the New Zealand Government does not have a mandate to help New Zealanders outside New Zealand’s

\textsuperscript{147} IV166.
\textsuperscript{148} IV146; IV157.
\textsuperscript{149} IV162.
\textsuperscript{150} IV146.
\textsuperscript{151} IV162.
tax net,\textsuperscript{152} and therefore it is up to individual officials to use their status to assist local communities if and when they feel personally inclined.\textsuperscript{153}

\textbf{Events and Awards}

Observing national holidays, celebrations and commemorations abroad, and celebrating expatriates as model New Zealanders are also important public rituals through which New Zealand’s offshore delegations contribute to cultivating and maintaining diaspora identities and communities. Such activities form the basis of a civic engagement which, as Itzigsohn and Saucedo (2002: 788) put it, “create a field of sociability and identification among immigrants and people in the country of origin”. The number, range and level of formality/institutionalisation of these types of activities vary widely among New Zealand’s overseas missions.

\textit{London}

In London, the New Zealand High Commission plays an active, central role in national celebrations and events of various kinds involving expatriates. It takes turns with the Australian High Commission to organize ANZAC Day services at Westminster Abbey in alternate years, meeting the costs of any related functions or receptions.\textsuperscript{154} It plays an important role in annual Waitangi Day celebrations in early February, endorsing and attending formal events including a Waitangi Day Ball hosted by the New Zealand Society, and helping to identify and select between candidates for the award of “New Zealander of the Year”, which is presented at the dinner.\textsuperscript{155} It also sends representatives to community Christmas events such as the Ngāti Rānana Christmas Concert in central London.\textsuperscript{156} It publicizes events such as the cuisine and music festival Toast New Zealand on its website,\textsuperscript{157} and sometimes jointly organizes and hosts

\textsuperscript{152} IV129.
\textsuperscript{153} IV130.
\textsuperscript{154} IV101.
\textsuperscript{155} IV20.
\textsuperscript{156} E27.
\textsuperscript{157} IV101.
180
seminars and events with various New Zealand clubs and societies – such as a seminar given by Air New Zealand CEO and jointly hosted with the Institute of Chartered Accountants in 2006.

Crucially, the High Commission also convenes, on an approximately annual basis, a combined meeting of the heads of New Zealand clubs and societies in London. The Public Diplomacy Officer is the official who puts the most official time into convening the event, which normally takes the form of a round-table meeting where issues can be aired and brought to the High Commission’s attention. This is generally followed by a reception in the Penthouse.  

This custom has been in place since at least the mid- to late-1990s, when then-Deputy High Commissioner Susan Blumhardt set up a website listing all New Zealand associations, convened several meetings in the High Commission Boardroom, and set up a diary of New Zealand events.

For several years in the late 1990s this type of activity carried on under its own steam in the form of a “New Zealand Club” consisting of the combined heads of New Zealand Associations, who met regularly at the New Zealand High Commission. However, without the active coordination of an official at New Zealand House, this club gradually dissipated into its constituent groups.

**SYDNEY**

The Sydney Consulate General plays a relatively peripheral role in national events and ceremonies in Sydney. For example, Waitangi Day celebrations are mainly large-scale commercial or semi-commercial operations run by private individuals or collectives. The Consul General occasionally attends these events, although several community leaders reported not having seen or heard of this happening for a long time. Some informants suggested more events bringing together prominent expatriates and high-level New Zealand Government figures. For example, a senior corporate executive in Sydney suggested that the Prime Minister could meet with influential New Zealanders when visiting Australia, to discuss ways they could

158 IV101.
159 IV66.
160 IV66.
161 e.g. IV143.
contribute to New Zealand. “People will self select. You either will think that’s important to you and you will take the time out to do that and feel special about that, or if it’s of no interest at all, then fine.”

Tokyo

For many years, the main event on the Kiwi expatriate calendar in Tokyo has been the annual Waitangi Day celebration – typically a drinks reception held on the ground floor of the Ambassador’s official residence within the Embassy compound. Most participants believed that this event performs an important function in the community, acting as a catalyst for useful academic, business and personal relationships to assist with life and work in Japan and connection to New Zealand. In previous years, this event has been supplemented by regular weekly or monthly receptions at the Ambassador’s residence. However, during the time of my fieldwork these events had been curtailed for a number of reasons, including concerns about alcohol in the Embassy grounds, as well as the personal disposition of the current ambassador, and the need to justify expenditure on events by demonstrating a “tangible” benefit to New Zealand. As one diplomat explained, “the Government is only interested if the New Zealanders in question have something to offer. If they’re just looking for a monthly drinks or social events, then, the government is really not that interested....”. The most important reason underlying these decisions, however, was an underlying foreign policy shift away from Japan and towards China. As one official explained, “There have been a lot of demands in other bilateral relationships which has sucked resources away from [Japan].... Other relationships are growing at a much faster rate, notably China.... [T]he resources that were going to Japan a couple of years ago are now going to China”. Lack of resources not only means that staff are too overstretched to be involved with events and activities to bring expatriates together, but also that the Embassy is reportedly not able to “pull its weight” in the Australia New Zealand

162 IV145.
163 e.g. IV29.
164 IV104; IV37.
165 IV50.
166 IV37.
182
Chamber of Commerce of Japan. “We get used, basically”, commented one member, noting that New Zealand is behind Australia on the negotiation of a free trade agreement with Japan, and finds it difficult to identify and mobilize on anything below the biggest, most pressing issues in the bilateral relationship.167

Increasing demand for New Zealand events has partly been met by a relatively new initiative, the New Zealand Ball, organized by and aimed at New Zealanders and other expatriates working in the Tokyo offices of multinational corporations. The inaugural New Zealand Ball took place in November 2004 at the Hyatt Hotel, and featured a black-tie dinner with New Zealand food and wine, preceded by a Māori welcome and followed by New Zealand-music, at a ticket price of ¥25,000 (around US$250). Organizers highlighted how the Ball has raised the profile of various exporters, and facilitated connections between New Zealand companies and New Zealanders working in Japanese corporate finance. They were adamant that social events were instrumental to bringing about these types of benefits. One of the Ball Committee’s founding members explained, “What we really wanted to do was have a social event for New Zealanders to get together, because there’s not really anything like that…. The New Zealand Embassy used to [hold events] but over the past few years it’s kind of slowed down and apart from the Waitangi Day function in February every year, they don’t really have any kind of social networking”.168

MEDIA

State support for the distribution or broadcasting of national media is also a way of sustaining identification with and engagement in homeland affairs among expatriates, by helping to construct and shape what Appadurai (1990: 9) refers to as a “mediascape”, containing the “repertoires of images, narratives, and ethnocapes” with which disparate individuals gradually come to collectively identify, and within which they begin to position themselves.

167 IV102.
168 IV34.
Government support for expatriate media is often carried out through local-level interactions between diplomatic and consular postings and expatriate media outlets, but also increasingly through locally and centrally controlled websites. The degree to which state-supported media respond to local needs appears ad hoc and in some cases arbitrary. In particular, while London expatriates are served by a relatively well-maintained and interactive High Commission website, New Zealanders in Sydney are generally referred to external information sources.

**London**

The High Commission projects itself into the London Kiwi community through various media and public relations channels, including Government-maintained websites as well as community-run publications where Government agencies advertise.

The High Commission’s local website contains a substantial section with information for and about the London New Zealand community. Firstly, the site hosts detailed sections on basic consular information such as driver licensing, educational exchanges, overseas voting, accommodation, banking, employment, details of bilateral agreements on healthcare and social security, advice on mail service, police checks, obtaining visas for the UK and Ireland, meeting student loan obligations in New Zealand, taxation in both countries and how to access New Zealand legislation. Secondly, in addition to this basic information there are special sections on clubs and associations for New Zealanders in the UK, Māori and Pacific groups, buying New Zealand products in the UK, on attending royal events, sport, travel advice and job vacancies at the High Commission, and links to NZ media both in New Zealand and in the UK. The site hosts some 30 factsheets on various topics, and provides hyperlinks and contact details for a huge network of useful organizations. Various government agencies also support privately owned publications such as the long-running *New Zealand News UK*, which for a long time had a ‘migration’ section funded by the Immigration Service.

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169 A small team at MFAT central in Wellington overseas 35 diplomatic posting websites run locally in their respective host countries, as well as maintaining three permanent domestic websites: mfat.govt.nz, safetravel.govt.nz, and chinafta.govt.nz.

New Zealand News UK has always maintained a close cooperative relationship with New Zealand Inc. London. The paper began in 1927 (the same year as the New Zealand Society) as a fortnightly glossy “church magazine” with a subscription of around 1,100 New Zealanders involved in the shipping lines, banks, freezing works, meat companies and primary producers involved in the imperial trade and governance connecting New Zealand and the UK.\footnote{IV79.} The readership of the magazine expanded significantly from the 1950s with the advent of Government-assisted emigration to New Zealand, and revenues were given a major boost from sales of advertising to public and semi-public organizations such as local tourist boards in New Zealand.\footnote{IV79.} However, when the stream of emigrants to New Zealand dried up considerably with the end of assisted migration and the UK’s switch to the European Common Market, subscriptions to the paper dropped from around 10,000 to around 2,000. At this point it became a free publication, and its offices moved into the third floor of New Zealand House. Fortunes revived again when the demand for migrants travelling in the other direction increased during the 1970s and 80s, with the upsurge in demand for skilled New Zealand labour in the UK. The establishment of a bilateral Working Holiday agreement between the UK and New Zealand also opened up a stream of young New Zealand migrants on ‘overseas experience’ in London. The paper was soon carrying some £80,000 per week of advertising.\footnote{IV79.} Though it has now shifted to online format, the news outlet still exists, in part due to long-term support in various forms provided by New Zealand Inc. London.

**Sydney**

New Zealand Inc. Sydney has very little involvement in news publications aimed at New Zealanders living in the city. The Consulate General’s website is maintained by the High Commission in Canberra and, unlike the London site, is aimed at introducing aspects of New Zealand society and culture to non-New Zealanders, rather than providing information for

\footnote{IV79.}
\footnote{IV79.}
\footnote{IV79.}
expatriates. Officials generally refer information requests to externally maintained websites.\textsuperscript{174} Officials suggested that it is not the consulate’s role to compete with private-sector websites supposedly containing similar information.

However, there was strong evidence of demand for more ‘London-like’ information services, such as a community notice-board in the passport office, a directory of services for new arrivals, and a New Zealand business directory.\textsuperscript{175} For example, new arrivals are often unaware that they are now ineligible for state health and welfare services (see Chapter 9), let alone that there are supplementary services, such well-resourced migrant centres and a range of Australian Government grants, that they can access instead. Consequently it is relatively common for migrants in unexpectedly difficult circumstances to end up falling back on unprepared family and friends.\textsuperscript{176} Non-governmental organizations can help these people access their statutory entitlements, but most migrants do not know about these services, in part because they are not widely publicized. Information about such services needs to be set up independently of the Consulate General, which is unwilling to be seen supporting non-government organizations.

**Diaspora Data**

Discovering and describing expatriates through statistics is an important way of representing and constituting them as part of a defined diaspora population. Some form of monitoring or surveillance of this population is necessary for the exercise of the “diasporic sovereignty” discussed in Chapter 2.

New Zealand’s offshore postings each have their own ad hoc methods of collecting data on local expatriates, most important of which is usually a confidential local consular database that can only be used in emergencies. Even consular databases, however, are far from complete: they rely on voluntary registrations among a highly mobile population, not all of which wants to be

\textsuperscript{174} IV162.  
\textsuperscript{175} IV129.  
\textsuperscript{176} IV150.  
186
on the New Zealand Government’s radar. These lists are generally supplemented by
diplomats’ personal and professional contact databases, and the contact databases of migrant
associations with a close relationship to the post. Officials and migrant associations who
participated in the research were unanimous that better and more accessible data on
expatriates would assist considerably with their work.

In the absence of more robust data, New Zealand Inc. London is able to monitor the more
engaged New Zealand expatriates through multiple overlapping but incomplete databases and,
crucially, through migrant associations. The High Commission receives frequent requests for
information about how many New Zealanders live in the UK, but is able to provide only rough
estimates that vary widely from those of local census data. For example, in late 2004 the London
High Commission estimated some 150,000 New Zealanders were present in the UK at the height
of summer, even though only around 65,000 New Zealand born people were recorded in the
2001 UK Census. In addition to the emergency consular database and officials’ professional
contact lists, agencies are able to draw on the membership contact lists of clubs and societies by
being in touch with the heads of the various groups. In this way New Zealand Inc. is able to
monitor the local expatriate population even though it lacks the capability to collect robust
statistics.

New Zealand Inc. Sydney makes few efforts to maintain systematic data on the tens of
thousands of New Zealanders in its district. Some officials believed this to be an important
function that the New Zealand Government should help to fulfil, particularly due to weaknesses
in Australian data. For example, some migrant association leaders, particularly in the Māori
community, object to being counted as Pacific Peoples in Australian national statistics – a
categorization that lumps them into the same funding category as Pacific groups, which often

177 IV36.
178 IV17.
179 IV101.
180 IV129.
have stronger Church-based institutions and representation in local government bodies.\textsuperscript{181} New Zealand Government researcher Paul Hamer notes that failure to count Māori as an independent ethnic group in Australian national statistics leads to difficulties both with understanding the profile and needs of Māori in Australia, and with addressing these needs (Hamer 2007).

The New Zealand Embassy in Japan draws on two main forms of data in addition to consular and professional databases. Registering with the local Ward Office is a requirement of legal residence for “aliens” living in Japan, and the New Zealand Embassy is therefore able to establish an arrangement with its Japanese counterparts to receive annual updates about the numbers of New Zealanders registered. While only around 1,200 New Zealanders were registered on the Embassy’s emergency database in 2004, Japanese Ministry of Justice figures were able to show that over 4,000 New Zealanders were officially registered as resident in the country.\textsuperscript{182} A second way of maintaining contact with the relatively dispersed New Zealand population is an email list for an annual newsletter and announcements of events such as the annual Waitangi Day function, which expatriates are given the option to sign up for when registering on the consular database.

\textbf{Discussion}

New Zealand’s offshore posts varied widely in the extent to which they monitored expatriates, provided public space for community activity, dedicated official time to community outreach, got involved in events and awards, and supported New Zealand media. Predictable factors outlined at the outset, such as foreign policy towards the consular district and the number of expatriates residing there, were factors in the variation of discretionary consular services. However, they were neither the only nor the most important factors. As important and sometimes more so were less predictable factors such as the perceived ‘strength’ of expatriate demand and, even more importantly, the personal enthusiasm of individual officials. The

\textsuperscript{181} IV153.
cohesion of the local post also appeared to be related, although it is less clear exactly how. In London, New Zealand Inc. was involved in a dense web of activities that cultivated and sustained local diaspora groups, whereas in Sydney it played a peripheral role in the community, and in Paris and Tokyo its role fell somewhere in between these two extremes. In addition, it was clear that the role of each post with respect to local expatriate communities had changed significantly over time.

These variations were dependent on four main factors. Two of these factors were predicted at the outset: on the supply side, it was expected that foreign policy priorities would determine local resources and by extension the scope within which the discretionary consular functions of a particular mission could vary; on the demand side, the extent of service provision within this scope was expected to depend on the size of the local expatriate population (see Chapter 6, Figure 6-11). These expectations were to some extent borne out by the analysis. For example, public space provision and dedicated official time tended to depend on the availability of diplomatic and consular resources, which was a function of historical and current foreign policy priorities. As a long-term high priority location, London had more discretionary resources that could be used to cultivate the activities of a local expatriate community; as de-prioritised regions, the remaining locations had fewer discretionary resources. Similarly, the size of the local expatriate community was an important factor determining the extent of official involvement in community events and awards, expatriate media, and data collection. This was once again particularly evident in London, where there are many New Zealand expatriates.

However, two equally (and sometimes more) important factors were somewhat less expected. On the demand side, the level of diasporic organization in the locality was sometimes more important than expatriate population size in determining the local ‘culture’ of discretionary consular service. This was often linked to the degree of cultural propinquity or difference between expatriates and the host society. For example, despite being home to the largest concentration of expatriates, discretionary consular service in Sydney district was almost non-existent, in large part because of the (perceived) ease with which New Zealanders “slotted in”
to Australian society, as signalled by the relatively low proportion of organized New Zealand
groups (even though the absolute number of such groups was relatively high). Perhaps even
more importantly, on the supply side, the willingness of individual officials to dedicate their
own time and effort effectively determined whether local discretionary resources were actually
made available to expatriate groups. For example, the historical importance of the bilateral
relationship with Japan had endowed the local diplomatic compound with considerable space,
but this was only accessible through personal connections and the generosity of individual
officials. Officials with personal interests or affiliations in the expatriate community were able
to informally draw on the resources available to them in their professional lives in order to
provide support to migrant associations they were affiliated to. As former Foreign Minister Don
McKinnon put it, the culture of engagement in a particular region was “often determined by the
commitment and the enthusiasm of the head of mission”.\textsuperscript{183} As another senior diplomat
explained, sometimes the departure of one active individual – whether senior or junior –
brought an end to any engagement.\textsuperscript{184} As a result, most posts go through periods of being active
with expatriate groups, and periods of not wanting busy staff “acting as a \textit{de facto} secretariat for
people who want a good time”.\textsuperscript{185}

The strength of all four factors is particularly noticeable in London. The city has been high on
New Zealand’s diplomatic priority list historically, firstly due to its status as New Zealand’s
imperial metropole, and later as a global city where it is important for New Zealand to “fly the
flag”. Over a long period of time, New Zealand Government agencies have made significant
infrastructure investments in the city, much of which is still in place even after reductions
during the neoliberal downsizing of the 1980s and 90s. A portion of this infrastructure is
accessible to semi-official or unofficial New Zealand users such as migrant associations. London
is also a major destination for young, ‘rite of passage’ migrants, for whom a visit to London is an
integral part of understanding New Zealand’s colonial heritage and what it means to be a New

\textsuperscript{183} Interview with author (see Appendices).
\textsuperscript{184} IV107.
\textsuperscript{185} IV107.
190
Zealander. There was a strong need among expatriates here to explore and express their New Zealand identity, in part through engagement in organized groups with an established relationship to New Zealand House, at the same time as dependence on “friendship networks” (Conradson and Latham 2005) of people on similar journeys who can help with accommodation, job-hunting and getting settled. In addition, the expatriate community is relatively large and organized. As a result, there are constantly expatriate events taking place in the city. Event organizers often draw officials into playing a part, or put pressure on them to provide access to public resources. Through close contact with migrant associations, officials were able to monitor the community in the absence of robust population data, and to communicate with expatriates through a lively local media. Individual officials – many of whom see themselves on similar rites of passage as those of local expatriates – were particularly willing to spend time outside working hours organizing New Zealand community events, and this had historically been a key factor behind the large number of community events on offer, and also in the establishment and survival of many of the expatriate clubs and societies. This convergence of factors helps to understand the particularly strong transnational identifications and activities observed among UK-based respondents to the survey discussed in Chapter 6.

In stark contrast, all four explanatory factors were particularly weak in Sydney. New Zealand’s bilateral relationship to Australia, although close and important, is – as one official put it – more or less on “autopilot”.

Coupled with the fact that Sydney is not the main diplomatic post in Australia, this helps to explain why there is little in the way of spare Government-owned space, or flexibility in official workloads, to accommodate discretionary activities such as engagement with local New Zealand community groups. Although there are many more New Zealanders in Sydney than in London, they are motivated by a wider range of reasons, and tend not feel the same “gravitational pull” to New Zealand groups or to the Consulate General as a site to express their difference from the local population – or rather, those who do feel this need represent a smaller proportion of the overall expatriate population. On the other hand,

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186 IV37.
the sheer numbers of expatriates mean that even the minority of expatriates who would like more engagement constitute a demand that overwhelms the efforts of individual officials. These findings add depth to those in Chapter 6, where quantitative data revealed New Zealanders in Australia to be the least transnationally involved of all survey respondents.

The cultural dissimilarity of Paris and Tokyo makes New Zealanders living there conscious of their distinctness, and often gives rise to quite strong needs to express New Zealand identity, or to develop support networks in order to adapt to the often challenging local environment. This was even more the case in Japan, where assimilation is virtually impossible for most New Zealanders, than in France, where assimilation is strongly encouraged. Both locations have slipped down New Zealand’s diplomatic priority list in recent years – France, as a result of the cooling of relations following the Rainbow Warrior bombing, and Japan due to the prolonged economic recession and the rise of China as a major Asian trading partner. As a result, staff numbers are small and there is little time in official schedules to spend on engagement with local expatriate communities. However, in both locations, where officials had personal interests and connections in the community, they were able to secure access to resources on which the survival of expatriate groups largely depended. For example, in Japan, the individual generosity of diplomats willing to let expatriates into their homes was a significant factor in the expansion of a local Māori culture group which not only helped newly arriving New Zealanders to adapt to Japan, but also provided assistance at official Embassy functions. Similarly, the warmth and interest of New Zealand ambassadors in France had a considerable influence on how difficult or easy the France-New Zealand Society found it to operate.

**Conclusions**

This chapter has examined the role of New Zealand’s state institutions in recognizing and constituting migrants as members of a diaspora, by examining the ways that diplomatic and consular postings monitor and collect data on the diaspora, support New Zealand media outlets
and cultural activities abroad, provide public space for migrant association activity, and
organize national celebrations and New Zealand-focused events.

The findings support the conclusion that the role of New Zealand’s offshore postings within
expatriate communities is ad hoc, evolutionary, and critically dependant on individuals, to the
dissatisfaction of many expatriates and officials. These conclusions have implications for the
central research questions of the thesis.

Firstly, these findings help to understand how New Zealand relates to its diaspora. They suggest
that New Zealand’s diaspora policies are uncoordinated – a hypothesis that is examined more
closely in the next chapter. Rather than following a comprehensive plan regarding the
diaspora, New Zealand relates to communities of expatriates through an ad hoc range of
institutions and practices that have evolved in different locations, for different reasons, and at
different times. To paraphrase one senior diplomat, there is no one mode of diaspora building
across offshore posts; rather, the approach of each individual post is ad hoc, evolutionary and
resource-dependent.187

The findings provide a different perspective on the results in Chapter 6 regarding regional
variation in expatriates’ transnational identities and activities. A closer look reveals that New
Zealand Government missions play an important role in constituting and sustaining these
‘communal’ identities and activities. The causality of this relationship runs in both directions;
that is, Government activities do not merely respond to the development of transnational
behaviour (Portes et al. 1999), but also play a role in catalyzing it. Moreover, it seems likely that
this is a factor in explaining why the regions where New Zealand Government institutions
played a particularly active community role were also the regions where diasporic identities
and activities were strongest.

Secondly, the findings help to understand why New Zealand relates to its diaspora in this
disjointed, ad hoc way. The development of local ‘cultures’ of engagement was an evolutionary,

187 IV107.
path dependent process reflecting the historical experiences of the specific post. The main factors influencing the role of the government post in expatriate communities in the four areas studied were, on one hand, the size and level of organization found in the local expatriate population, and on the other hand the resource constraints set by foreign policy priorities and the spontaneous willingness of individual officials to spend their own time and effort on the expatriate community. Different configurations of these factors over different time periods have led to the evolution of very different ‘cultures’ of engagement in different missions.

This leads to a final point about the significance of the findings for an understanding of how New Zealand should interact with the diaspora. Arbitrary regional variation in discretionary consular provision was frequently a source of frustration for both officials and expatriates, and these frustrations influenced how expatriates felt about New Zealand. Many expressed frustration at the ad hoc differences in attitude from different ambassadors in different locations. As one expatriate businessman put it,

'It should ultimately not depend on the changing ambassador or the changing staff, it should be a policy... if they want to get something back for it then they've got to put something in.... [It should not] be dependent on a friendly ambassador and a cold ambassador and temporary people.'

The policy lesson is that if New Zealand policy makers want more positive involvement from the diaspora, more proactive and consistent policy is one way of getting it.

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188 IV57.
194
8. Tactics without Strategy: Diaspora Building from Home

Introduction
From an examination of diaspora building policies at the point of delivery, which suggested that New Zealand relates to its diaspora in ad hoc ways, this chapter shifts focus to the centre of policy-making, in New Zealand, scrutinizing the notion that New Zealand’s diaspora policies are uncoordinated.

New Zealand’s diaspora building attempts have been the subject of a recent study by Wendy Larner (2007), who sets out to examine the “governmental discourses and techniques through which the [New Zealand] diaspora has been named and constituted” (2007: 334). In her reading, “The New Zealand Government launched a formal diaspora strategy ... in 2003” – part of a recent proliferation of such formal strategies around the world (Larner 2007: 331-32). This strategy, Larner argues, aimed to construct emigrants and their descendants as knowledge-bearing subjects, as part of a globalizing project:

In the policy documents of a myriad of international organisations, national governments and economic development agencies, diaspora strategies are now an integral part of a governmental imaginary in which entrepreneurial, globally networked, subjects create new possibilities for economic growth and in doing so contribute to the development of a knowledge-based economy.... in the case of New Zealand, diaspora strategies aim to mobilise and connect expatriate experts in the name of international connectedness, economic development, entrepreneurship, and innovation rather than trying to convince them to return home. (Larner 2007: 334)

Although Larner’s analysis is penetrating and persuasive, this chapter offers a different reading, arguing that the notion of a formal diaspora strategy is somewhat misleading in the New Zealand case. Rather, New Zealand’s approach to the diaspora has been one of ‘tactics without strategy’ (see Gamlen 2007: 15-17). In a review of documentary evidence including policy documents and newspaper articles, over 160 in-depth exchanges with key New Zealand politicians, bureaucrats, lobbyists, business-people and migrant associations, I found very little that could be described as a “diaspora strategy”, in the sense of an overarching plan of action or a rationale to justify the status quo. Rather, my findings consistently point to the fragmented,
non-strategic way in which the diaspora has impinged on activities at different points and levels within the state system. If there was a diaspora strategy, most people were either unaware of it or unable to specify what it entailed or should entail.

In short, the new ‘strategies’ were not as strategic as they may have appeared. The diaspora-related initiatives implemented by successive Labour-led coalition governments from 1999 to 2008 were characterized by conflicts between rhetoric and reality. Firstly, there was a contradiction between the rhetoric of promoting connection and the reality of preferring return. Secondly, there was a conflict between the rhetoric of interagency coordination and the reality of bureaucratic incoherence. And thirdly, there was a conflict between the rhetoric of grand plans and the reality of small projects. Taking into account these conflicts, it begins to appear that New Zealand, like most states, continues to relate to non-residents through an ad hoc constellation of institutions and practices that have come into being at different times, for different reasons, and in different locations and levels of the state system. New Zealand has elements of an ‘emigration state system’, but there is little within it resembling a “strategy”.

The chapter is in two sections. The first provides an historical overview of the initiatives captured by Larner’s notion of a diaspora “strategy”, tracing their emergence from a third wave of strategies to cope with New Zealand’s post-colonial economic decline. The second section discusses the three main conflicts between rhetoric and reality inherent in the initiatives, which show them to be less significant and coherent than the label “strategy” tends to imply.

**Diaspora Strategies?**

Near the end of its first three-year term in office, which began in 1999 after 15 years of neoliberal restructuring, Prime Minister Helen Clark’s Labour-led coalition government announced a range of initiatives aimed at plugging the ‘brain drain’ of young, highly skilled New Zealanders. An important theme in this campaign was the idea of ‘harnessing the diaspora’. The Government’s 2002 Growth and Innovation strategy, out of which these initiatives emerged, explained the idea succinctly as follows:
There are estimated to be 600,000 New Zealanders currently living and working overseas. Many of these are potentially both ambassadors for this country and/or sources of information or expertise that might be usefully harnessed to assist in the growth of New Zealand firms. (Office of the Prime Minister 2002: 43)

This strand of thinking eventually precipitated into two main initiatives, rolled out over Labour’s next two terms in Government: the World Class New Zealand Programme headed by New Zealand Trade and Enterprise, and a public-private partnership, Kea New Zealand (short for Kiwi Expats Association).

The Government’s Growth and Innovation strategy itself represented a third wave of attempts to cope with New Zealand’s post-colonial economic decline. In the first wave, soon after the loss of Britain as a major trading partner and the oil crisis of the 1970s, Prime Minister Robert Muldoon (1975-84) implemented a wave of Keynesian, pump-priming infrastructure projects, financed by overseas borrowing and dubbed “Think Big”. Subsequently, with the state facing bankruptcy, David Lange’s Fourth Labour Government (1984-1990) was elected in a landslide, and unleashed a second wave of coping strategies, based around radical neoliberal restructuring (which became known as “Rogernomics”, after Finance Minister Roger Douglas). This programme was expanded by successive National Party Governments between 1990 and 1999, particularly under Finance Minister Ruth Richardson (whose policies earned the label “Ruthenasia”). The electoral swing back to the Left in 1999 ushered in a third wave of strategies modelled on Clinton and Blair’s “Third Way” between free markets and state interventionism, and aimed at transforming New Zealand from an imperial hinterland that had lost its empire – an economy dependent on low value-added primary exports to distant and declining markets – into a globally integrated “knowledge economy”.

The Growth and Innovation strategy came into being through a process of re-negotiating the Government’s alliance with business elites. Having campaigned on a platform of return to state intervention, retention of public assets, and full employment, the incoming Left-wing

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190 McLoughlin, David (2001, Feb. 17), ’The elusive path to prosperity’, The Dominion (Wellington), Features, General, p23. Also, IV98.
government soon set new terms for its relationship to business: hard-line government
detractors of older generations, grown mighty in the years of deregulation, were marginalized
(for example, the Prime Minister publicly called for the sacking of the chair of the Business
Roundtable), while a new and younger ‘ginger group’ of business leaders was wooed through a
charm offensive of smoked salmon lunches, seminars and think shops with government
ministers. This “smoked salmon offensive” culminated in a three-day conference in August
2001, conceived and launched by then-Auckland University Vice-Chancellor John Hood and the
Prime Minister under the banner “Catching the Knowledge Wave”. The conference aimed “to
involve a broad cross section of the community in informed debate about future directions for
New Zealand.” Around 450 participants registered, among them some 30 international leaders
in the fields of business, politics and academia, and the conference was acknowledged as a
formative influence on the government’s Growth and Innovation Framework released the
following year (Office of the Prime Minister 2002).

It was within the wider context of this business-government rapprochement, and the
formulation of a wider strategy to cope with long-term economic decline, that the idea of
harnessing the diaspora emerged. Though injected at various points into the dialogue, many
remembered McKinsey and Company’s Andrew Grant, a central figure on the business side of
the smoked salmon offensive, as one of this idea’s key proponents. Using Ireland as an example
of how the diaspora could be leveraged to increase flows of talent and foreign direct
investment, and thereby to boost economic growth, Grant and others put the case to
government ministers that “we’re just not proactive enough around the New Zealand
diaspora”.

191 IV88; IV97; IV98.
Appealing in its simplicity, the idea that expatriates did not have to be a brain drain and might instead be a brain gain, caught on and became a prominent talking point at the Knowledge Wave conference. Co-convener John Hood called on the conference to engage “members of the Kiwi Diaspora” in developing a vision of New Zealand’s path to prosperity. Historian James Belich questioned whether the diaspora was “a brain drain or ... a New Zealand world-wide web, a well-placed global network ready to help New Zealand” (Belich 2001b). Expatriate scientist Jilly Evans pleaded, to rapturous applause, for New Zealand to “reincorporate [skilled New Zealanders] into the fabric of the New Zealand society.... Like a reverse brain gain” (Evans 2001). London School of Economics Professor Robert Wade recommended the formulation and coordination of “diaspora policy” by the Ministry of Science and Technology (Wade 2001), while Berkley business Professor David Teece argued that New Zealand should “harness the expatriates”, beginning with attempts to trace them through a comprehensive database of names managed by a not-for-profit entity (Teece 2001). Along with retail magnate Stephen Tindall, Teece seized the moment by announcing the founding of the Kiwi Expats Association – an idea the two philanthropists had come up with during a tea break at the conference. The Association, which would come to be called “Kea” for short, would be established with seed funds of NZ$100,000 each from the founders’ own pockets.195

By the time it was finalized and made public the following year, the Government’s Growth and Innovation strategy had taken on board some of the thinking outlined at the conference, and set out several initiatives aimed at harnessing the diaspora. These included plans to build a network of talented New Zealanders abroad and use it to set up internships, business exchanges and mentoring; to arrange in-bound and out-bound visits to share thinking and develop partnerships; and to develop an online portal for expatriates. Moreover, government would look into recommendations regarding public-private partnerships over expatriate recruitment, regarding the need to celebrate talent, and regarding the idea of establishing a worldwide network of “Kiwi clubhouses” (Office of the Prime Minister 2002: 43). In the final analysis, two

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195 IV113.
recognizably related initiatives materialized. One was the World Class New Zealand programme (which was already launched by the time of the Knowledge Wave conference). The other was a series of ad hoc cash injections into Kea New Zealand, which was by now branding itself as “New Zealand’s global talent community”.

**WORLD CLASS NEW ZEALAND**

In early 2001, during the height of the “smoked salmon offensive”, Economic Development Minister Jim Anderton announced the launch of the World Class New Zealand programme, an initiative aiming “to harness the connections and goodwill of those Kiwis who choose to live abroad.”

> [T]he most exciting parts of the budget were those in the economic development area targeted at the diaspora, those New Zealanders who no longer live in their own country. The key programme I announced is called “World Class New Zealanders”, and is a ‘brain gain’ initiative designed to identify and network with New Zealanders who are world class thinkers. This ... initiative [is] aimed at lifting the level of business expertise in New Zealand, sharing innovative ideas and exposing New Zealanders to international best practice. It will expand the availability of world class technology and help to attract new investment to New Zealand. I want to see more profile for role models and examples of kiwis as world leaders for our young people. Real and virtual networks will use existing business connections and New Zealanders overseas to access international markets and promote New Zealand. How is this going to work? ... I believe that New Zealanders, wherever they are in the world, are always New Zealanders. They retain a commitment to their homeland and identify themselves as New Zealanders. We need to network and keep our people contributing. I can see New Zealand as a nation with, in at least one sense, no frontiers. (Anderton 2001)

Initially, the two main pillars of the World Class New Zealand Programme were its International Business Exchanges and its Business Growth Service. Eventually, however, the focus of the programme was to shift towards the World Class New Zealand Awards and the World Class New Zealand Network managed by Kea.

**International Business Exchanges and Business Growth Service**

The original core of the World Class New Zealand programme was a fund for International Business Exchanges and a Business Growth Service. The Business Growth Service aimed to assist businesses with significant growth prospects by offering guidance and know-how backed up

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with grants of up to NZ$100,000. The exchanges – which later came to be referred to as “active engagements” – involved funding and facilitating visits between expatriates (plus high-flying “friends of New Zealand”) and New Zealand firms, in order to provide “entrepreneurs and high growth New Zealand industries and businesses the opportunity to learn from the world’s best companies and brightest talents.” The exchanges were expected to allow these industries to “improve capabilities critical to competitive growth, learn skills from top offshore businesses, establish networks with overseas experts and strategic partners linked to capability improvement, and access international expertise not readily available in New Zealand”. The basic set-up was a “Dragon’s-den”-type honorary (expenses paid) panel of famous people, to whom New Zealand firms would pitch ideas for panel members to mentor. Initially the spotlight was on the ICT sector, but it broadened to include innovations across a wider range of sectors. For example, speaking at the second Knowledge Wave Conference in 2003, the Prime Minister described how the programme had allowed a timber company to send two employees to the United States on a business exchange in order to develop its production capacities, and how, as a result of the exchange, the company signed a major US distribution contract. However, notwithstanding such successes, after Anderton moved on to other portfolios it was decided that the business exchanges had under-delivered. They were cut from the programme, halving the overall budget to NZ$1.17 million.

**World Class New Zealand Awards**

A central goal of the World Class New Zealand programme was to celebrate the successes of talented New Zealanders through an awards scheme. Jointly convened by New Zealand Trade and Enterprise and Kea, the World Class New Zealand Awards aimed to “recognise an expatriate

200 Dragons’ Den is a British reality television program where entrepreneurs pitch for investment from leading British business people. See http://www.bbc.co.uk/dragonsden, accessed 27 April 2009.
201 IV116.
202 Clark, Helen (2003, Feb. 19), ‘Address to the Knowledge Wave Conference’.
203 IV116.
who has made an outstanding contribution to New Zealand’s economic development, by actively assisting New Zealand industry and building our global connections.”

After its establishment in 2003, the initiative gradually grew and shifted focus. The recipient of the inaugural award was Andy Lark, a global communications and marketing professional based in the USA. One award in 2003 grew to seven in 2006, each targeted at key players in strategically important sectors identified by the Government: Information and Communications Technology; Creative Industries; Biotechnology; Manufacturing; Research, Science, Technology and Academia; and Finance, Investment and Business Services. A lavish ceremony developed around the Awards, involving television personalities, speeches from the prime minister, and a black-tie dinner for the Who’s Who of New Zealand business and politics.

In recent years the awards have gradually shifted away from celebrating expatriates to celebrating successful New Zealanders regardless of location. In 2006, all seven prize winners were expatriates. At the 2007 awards, two high-achieving residents were honoured along with five expatriates. By 2008, only two of the seven winners were based abroad.

**World Class New Zealand Network**

The winners of the World Class New Zealand Awards are the top tier of a wider pool of influential expatriate movers and shakers who the programme identifies as being capable of making a difference. This wider pool forms the World Class New Zealand Network – “a global network of New Zealanders and ‘New Zealand-friendly’ industry experts committed to helping New Zealand’s development, international competitiveness and economic growth.” The invitation criteria are for individuals who have achieved global success, have contributed to

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206 E34; E58.
New Zealand’s development or have the potential to contribute by engaging with the network, and have the willingness to provide time and advice to contribute towards New Zealand’s growth.\textsuperscript{210}

The Network is managed by a full-time staff member in New Zealand, who fosters relationships and identifies synergies between members where potential collaborations may lead to benefits to New Zealand.\textsuperscript{211} The network revolves around regular in-person summits; in 2008 these were held in Auckland, London and New York. The summits entailed discussions both around the role and possible contribution of members, and around the creation of a 20-year vision for New Zealand. Feedback and discussions were compiled and delivered to government ministers,\textsuperscript{212} though it is uncertain to what extent these were taken on board, if at all.

\textbf{Kea}

The World Class New Zealand Awards and Network were delivered by Kea New Zealand, the public–private partnership that was coming to be seen as the primary ‘representative’ of the New Zealand diaspora. Kea’s goals were wider than just the Awards: its central project was organizing and mobilizing a “global talent community” consisting of an online database and physical Kea chapters in key locations around the world. With this aim, it was founded in late 2001 by David Teece and Stephen Tindall in the closing moments of the Knowledge Wave Conference. Though Teece and Tindall fronted the seed capital, they aimed from the outset to draw interest and funding from government agencies and private-sector sponsors. As Tindall put it, “We want this thing to, I guess, become its own market. That’s the idea of it”.\textsuperscript{213}

Teece and Tindall’s seed funding was used to begin organizing affluent, influential and enthusiastic expatriates in key regions into volunteer “local chapters”. The first of these was established in 2002 in the San Francisco Bay area, close to Teece (a Berkley Business School professor) and Silicon Valley. A chapter in London was soon established, and was gradually

\textsuperscript{210} IV190.\textsuperscript{211} IV190.\textsuperscript{212} IV190.\textsuperscript{213} Interview with author (see Appendices).
followed by start-ups in the Netherlands, Los Angeles, New England, New York, Washington, Toronto, Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, Singapore, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Dubai and Paris over the next few years. The aims of individual chapters were often loosely defined and fluid, but revolved around linking up existing pockets of expatriate activity, largely through organizing events such as receptions for visiting New Zealand entrepreneurs, business leaders, politicians and cultural icons.

Meanwhile, government agencies had begun to inject funding (see below) into Kea’s efforts to sign expatriates up to an online database. This funding facilitated the establishment of a website that allowed users to create a profile listing their location and their areas of interest and expertise, and to sign up to newsletter mailouts from the head office and the various Kea chapters around the world. In addition to free basic membership, the site offered various levels of sponsor membership, which came with privileges such as advertising on the site or in newsletter mailouts. Members could search the database by keyword to find individuals, as well as read news and information for and about New Zealand and New Zealanders abroad.

Kea’s first few years of operation were marked by a number of prominent successes. Firstly, in 2006 it implemented a highly successful marketing campaign funded using a portion of an earlier Ministry of Economic Development grant and led by CEO Ross McConnell: the Every One Counts “Global Census” (see Chapter 6). For the first few years of its existence Kea’s database had contained around 5,000 profiles – not all of which were up-to-date or active. The low level of membership uptake during these early years made it difficult for the organization to be taken seriously by large corporate sponsors and government agencies. Meanwhile, various academic and policy researchers had long been complaining about the lack of data on emigration and New Zealanders abroad (see inter alia Bedford et al. 2002b; Bedford et al. 2003a: 61). In late 2005, McConnell hit on the idea of an expatriate survey piggy-backing on the national census. Resistance from some parts of the bureaucracy eventually gave way, particularly when Statistics New Zealand backed the initiative. The survey questionnaire was disseminated by ‘viral email’ in March 2006 (see Chapter 6). The email contained hyperlinks
taking recipients to a webpage decked out in the iconic black and white of New Zealand’s All Black rugby team, which featured a movie parodying the New Zealand accent and various iconic New Zealand styles and products. The response was impressive: the survey drew a snowball sample of 18,000 responses from 155 countries. By including the spouses and children of respondents, Kea was able to proudly declare that Every One Counts reached a total of some 29,000 New Zealanders abroad. The marketing campaign involved television appearances and numerous articles in top newspapers and magazines not only in New Zealand but further afield, for example in *Time Magazine*. In all, the initiative was a clear success: it succinctly conveyed the message that expatriates were still New Zealanders, as well as providing valuable data for policymakers, and massively boosting Kea’s membership database.

In the lead up to the 2008 general election, Kea implemented a second major muscle-flexing campaign, “Every Vote Counts” (EVC), aimed at increasing expatriate voter enrolments. EVC had been a year or more in the planning, and drew on the successful “Every One Counts” brand, as well as its winning strategy of piggy-backing on a major public campaign: where EOC had leveraged the organization and publicity surrounding the national census, EVC piggy-backed on the frenzy of publicity and activity leading up to the 2008 General Election. EVC opened on Monday 25 August 2008 with another viral email, this time encouraging expatriates to enrol to vote, sent to the approximately 27,000 New Zealanders now on the Kea database. Within four days about a third of all hits on the official Elections website were coming from overseas – almost double the usual proportion. In these four days 2,400 overseas-based New Zealanders reached the official web page to check their electoral status – more than quadruple the rate of the previous week (a 337% increase). Half of those came directly from the www.everyvotecounts.co.nz website. Though inherently more political than Every One Counts

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215 IV193.
had been, Every Vote Counts once again managed to convey Kea’s central message, that the
diaspora remained a powerful part of New Zealand society.\textsuperscript{217}

By contrast, some of Kea’s early initiatives were somewhat less successful – specifically its
attempts to build a “Global Talent Centre” funded and used by private sector recruitment
companies, and to establish a “Venture Mentor Network”, whereby expatriates would agree to
advise New Zealand entrepreneurs and businesses. On one hand, competitively oriented
recruitment companies could not see an interest in funding a recruitment database that would
also benefit their competitors.\textsuperscript{218} On the other hand, public agencies found it difficult to justify
seed funding an initiative that would compete with better equipped private sector business
consultancies.\textsuperscript{219} Indeed, there was some concern that both of these initiatives overlapped
somewhat with New Zealand Trade and Enterprise’s International Business Exchanges and
Business Growth Service, and with a Department of Labour effort to set up an online jobs
clearing house. These overlapping and competing efforts by Kea and various Government
agencies all fizzled, and Kea faced a considerable amount of criticism. An evaluation of Kea in
early 2009 found that even though Kea had reached the critical mass to make a contribution to
New Zealand (Moore and van der Scheer 2009), “services such as an employment website and a
mentoring program have been less than successful” (Moore and van der Scheer 2009: i), and
that “there is a real risk (legally and reputationally) in Kea independently entering into
anything but a light-touch approach to service delivery without a great deal of thought and
careful planning” (Moore and van der Scheer 2009: iv). Although Kea thus bore the brunt of
criticism, the real lesson from the disappointments was that there were significant risks to lack
of coordination among various Government and quasi-government initiatives surrounding the
diaspora. As one figure at the centre of the mêlée put it, “I am going to be pretty frank with you
and say we probably need our heads knocked together”.\textsuperscript{220}

\textsuperscript{217} IV192; IV193.
\textsuperscript{218} E36.
\textsuperscript{219} IV116.
\textsuperscript{220} IV142.
206
Tactics without Strategy

Did the initiatives outlined above amount to what Larner (2007) refers to as a “strategy”? This section argues that, although the Government’s glossy Growth and Innovation Framework at times gave the appearance of a coherent and harmonious strategy to harness the diaspora, the reality was a much more complex and messy process characterized by conflicts between the rhetoric of promoting connection and the reality of promoting return, between the rhetoric of interagency coordination and the reality of bureaucratic incoherence, and between the rhetoric of big plans and the reality of small projects. The remainder of the chapter argues that, rather than a strategy, the approach of successive Labour-led administrations to the diaspora might be better described as one of ‘tactics without strategy’.

Return vs. Connection

The official policy for most of the period between 2002 and 2008 was one of encouraging return where feasible, and transnational connection where not. Accordingly, a series of initiatives aimed at retaining and repatriating talented New Zealanders was rolled out alongside efforts to engage the diaspora in situ. These retention and return policies included fiscal incentives such as an interest write-off on student loans for those remaining in New Zealand, and an “Expatriates Programme” that encouraged return migration through an offshore marketing campaign. While official policy asserted that the retention and return programmes were perfectly compatible with initiatives to ‘harness the diaspora’ in situ, in reality it was difficult for politicians and policy makers to reconcile the two approaches, because one assumed that the diaspora was part of the problem while the other assumed it was part of the solution.

The idea that the diaspora constituted a problem to be solved is encapsulated in longstanding fears of ‘brain drain’. In times of political conflict, for example during election campaigns, the

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221 IV101.
diaspora has been used as evidence of the failure of government policy. Such accusations of causing a brain drain were levelled at the new Labour-led Government. During what became known as the “winter of discontent” in mid-2000, the country’s business establishment, fearing the end of its neoliberal free reign, launched sustained attacks against the new Left-wing administration. One of its weapons, covertly financed by the Business Roundtable, was a full-page advertisement entitled “A Generation Lost?”, blaming Labour’s policies for an exodus of skilled young people, several hundred of whose names were listed (Figure 8-1). The resulting furore ensured that the topic of brain drain and expatriates were central themes in the government-business rapprochement that followed. In a similar manner, brain drain concerns were brought to the fore by Opposition parties during the 2002 and 2005 election campaigns, as part of attempts to discredit the Government.

Through skilful rhetoric the Government was initially able to deflect some of the political heat from the topic of emigration, but it eventually yielded to sustained pressure for tangible action. In the early years of Labour’s rule, much was made of research that seemed to indicate expatriates were returning (Lidgard and Gilson 2002; Lidgard 2001), and research showing that emigrating New Zealanders were being “replaced” by immigrants with the same or higher qualification levels (Glass and Choy 2001; Bushnell and Choy 2001b). While the Government continued to hold this line whenever the topic came up in the debating chamber, it was not able to alleviate persistent concerns, voiced in a constant stream of criticisms in the newspapers and magazines, and over the airwaves. In response to these constant pressures, the government began to demand “decisive action” from bureaucrats to attract back the expatriates.


223 IV 117.
208
Figure 8-1: Richard Poole’s “Generation Lost” Advertisement, 2000\textsuperscript{246}

To All New Zealanders

We are a group of young New Zealanders who care deeply about our country and its future and are seriously concerned about its current economic direction. It simply isn’t working.

Our concerns are shared by many other motivated and passionate Kiwis who have left our shores in favour of other countries that offer a brighter future. The reality is that the big CE has now become a long-term tax which the country’s decision-makers simply cannot ignore.

We wrote to today’s leaders to express our concerns, however, their response did not encourage us. We then asked ourselves for their thoughts and the responses from both New Zealand and overseas has been overwhelming. All the people listed here have contributed to the funding or even awareness of our shared concerns.

Our message to all our political leaders is this: New Zealand must stop drifting backwards. Our leaders need to set an environment that inspires our young people to remain here and attract those who have left. We must change those things that are discouraging investment, hard work and job creation and are contributing to the generally negative feeling about New Zealand both here and abroad.

Unless we act to turn things around, New Zealand runs the risk of permanently losing the best of our next generation.

Let’s make sure our decision-makers get the message.

We ask for your support and your thoughts on where we should go from here.

www.youngnewzealanders.b.net.nz


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One such initiative, established in the run-up to the 2005 election, was the “Expatriates Programme” in the Department of Labour, the parent department of the New Zealand Immigration Service. The Expatriates Programme revolved around a marketing campaign which aimed to “capture the essence of New Zealand” and package it as “a premier destination in which to live and work”. Branded “New Zealand Now”, the campaign emphasized factors such as quality of life which were known to be important in expatriates’ return decisions (Inkson et al. 2004; Lidgard and Gilson 2002), and aimed to update expatriates who may have been put off return by outdated negative views of the country. As the campaign planners put it, “it is about a national cause i.e. NZ competing internationally for the right people (and winning). It is important that New Zealanders believe they have a ‘brand’ – NZ and its lifestyle – they can be proud of and that they can promote.” A range of marketing tools were employed, including targeted newspaper articles, a viral email launch and advertisements on high-impact websites such as NZHerald.co.nz, Stuff.co.nz and Allblacks.com, as well as more traditional outdoor advertising in transit points (for example, on bus interior posters and rear panels) and around sports events (especially Tri-nations rugby matches). But the heart of the campaign was an in-house managed website offering everything from access to recruitment and moving companies through to sound-bites of popular New Zealand music and quirky video clips about New Zealand culture. In its first 12 months of operation the website received 22.8 million hits from 119,000 unique visitors.

However, the most decisive and significant actions aimed at bringing back the expats were several new fiscal incentives. A five-year tax holiday on foreign income sources for returning long-term expatriates was drawn up, and expatriates with student loans were offered a “fresh start” amnesty on missed-repayment penalties. But the biggest deal sweetener for graduates considering emigration and expatriates considering return was the government’s abolition of interest on student loans for people who remained in New Zealand. Announced late in the 2005

225 OIA9.
226 OIA9.
227 OIA15.
228 OIA1-OIA2.
210
election campaign and timed perfectly to upstage the Opposition’s tax cut policies, which
looked meagre by comparison, the announcement helped swing the polls back in Labour’s
favour, from where they went on to win decisively.

Although portrayed as perfectly compatible in policy rhetoric, at both the ideological and the
operational levels it was difficult to reconcile the retention and repatriation drive with the
drive to engage the diaspora in situ. At the ideological level, the World Class New Zealand
programme and Kea upheld the idea that emigration was irrelevant as long as New Zealand
could successfully integrate its borderless “global talent community”. Meanwhile, the
Expatriates Programme and the fiscal return incentives stood for the idea that emigration
constituted a negative brain drain that needed to be stopped. While the World Class New
Zealand programme and Kea portrayed emigrants as heroes who could ensure New Zealand’s
future prosperity, the Expatriates Programme sent the message that they were deserters who
were partly responsible for its current predicament. As Chapter 5 indicates, Irish policy makers
avoided such an obvious ideological conflict through a rhetorical approach of explicitly
emphasising what Ireland could do for expatriates (for example, through Robinson’s
“Cherishing the Diaspora” speech, and the Jobs Ireland programme), acknowledging what the
diaspora had already done for Ireland (for example, through the Task Force on Policy Regarding
Emigrants), and avoiding the implication that expatriates were responsible for Ireland’s
problems. New Zealand, by contrast, explicitly emphasised how problematic emigration was,
and what New Zealand needed from its diaspora – an approach that was somewhat less
effective. Many expatriates resented both the insinuation that they were ‘rats leaving a sinking
ship’ (Belich 2001b), and the patronizing undertones of being told “come home: your time is
up”.229

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‘Come home, Kiwis, your country needs you!’, BBC News Online, Magazine,
The tension between these two policy aims often flared up when public officials visited expatriate groups. For example, when Foreign Minister Winston Peters addressed a gathering of expatriate association leaders in London in November 2005, urging them in scolding tones to return (“I’m just saying come home sometime”), High Commissioner Jonathan Hunt, knowing the strength of local resentment about such finger-wagging, stepped forward to clarify that it was OK for expatriates not to come home, but that they should feel welcome to return and stay involved from afar. Similarly, when outgoing Governor General Dame Sylvia Cartwright, addressing expatriate dignitaries at an NZ-UK Link Foundation seminar in London in June 2006, was asked by an New Zealand Trade and Enterprise official how expatriates could be encouraged to relocate back to New Zealand, a senior diplomat invited the Kea UK Chair to explain why expatriates resented being told they had the obligation to return. The Kea Chair then explained her concern about encouraging people to relocate, suggesting it was unwelcome

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231 E26.


212
to ask people who have settled in the UK to return to New Zealand in order to contribute. Instead, more creativity was needed to find ways of using their contributions from afar. 233

COORDINATION VS. CONFUSION

If the aims of return and transnational connection were hard to reconcile at the ideological level, they also spawned bureaucratic turmoil at the operational level. What was portrayed as a coordinated and cooperative approach across different agencies was in reality a confused process marked by interagency conflicts that were never fully reconciled.

Firstly, the agencies tasked with implementing government policy in this area soon divided into two camps: one surrounding the Ministry of Economic Development, New Zealand Trade and Enterprise and Kea, and another surrounding the Department of Labour’s Expatriates’ Programme. At best, the two camps were disconnected: when asked what was the rationale for initiatives like Kea and New Zealand Now, Economic Development Minister Trevor Mallard simply replied, “Well, to start with I’m going to plead guilty about not being across the top of New Zealand Now, so I’m not going to talk about it.” At worst, the two camps descended into bitter competition, pursuing overlapping functions and thwarting each other wherever possible. When the government announced its drive to attract return, Kea immediately called for a public debate over the strategy. 234 When Ministry of Economic Development officials sought approval for their rationale to engage Kea in 2006, the Department of Labour would not agree to the proposed approach, because “Government’s interest in this area has shifted substantially since Kea was established and it is important that the government’s objectives are clarified before any changes are made to the relationship with Kea”. 235 The proposed framework itself recommended that the minister “Note Kea is not the only element of diaspora policy nor the single source of contact with expatriates and that, at times, the policy objectives may

233 E39.
235 OIA12, p11
conflict and this will need to be managed through the joint agency working group”.236 However, in reality the working group referred to only ever met a couple of times and broke down quickly.237 This seems to have been due on the one hand to insoluble differences of approach between the Department of Labour and the Ministry of Economic Development,238 and on the other hand because of a rapid turnover in the Ministry of Economic Development staff who were nominally leading the coordination effort.239

Secondly, the core government agencies necessary for a diaspora strategy were sceptical about the idea itself, and remained peripheral in the implementation of all the initiatives mentioned above. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade played a secondary rather than leading role in the development of diaspora policy, despite that the Ministry’s overseas diplomatic and consular infrastructure and networks are fundamental to the way all government agencies project themselves offshore – including into the diaspora. Officials from the Treasury and the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet – two core strategic agencies which would need to be involved in the formulation of any whole-of-government strategy – made it completely clear that no government strategy regarding the diaspora existed. One senior official in a unit responsible for government strategy stated, “there is not an overall strategy, or policy at all, but glimmerings of one”. Instead, the diaspora was “very dispersed as an issue. There is no lead agency with clear responsibility for it. There is lots of interest as it impacts on core business of each agency, but nothing central”.240 When asked why this was the case, a senior official from another high-level strategy unit replied that no one had thought of putting a strategy together. Moreover, this official was not alone in being unconvinced that a strategy was necessary, saying that the analysis had not been done and they had not seen a diaspora policy or the case for one.241 If New Zealand had a diaspora strategy, Treasury, the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade would have at least known about it

236 OIA12, p14.
237 IV53; IV116.
238 IV51; IV52.
239 IV119.
240 IV160.
241 IV120.
and been involved at some level; however, the reality is that all three agencies remained on the sidelines in a relatively low-level turf war among second-tier agencies. The Minister of Economic Development himself, when asked why there was no diaspora strategy, replied, “I’m not absolutely certain that you need a major strategic plan to get on with doing some things...”242 This contrasts markedly with the picture of Ireland’s emigration state system presented in Chapter 5, in which there have been significant efforts to create a “strategic and integrated” policy approach to the diaspora.

**Big Plans vs. Small Projects**

However, perhaps the biggest conflict between rhetoric and reality regarding the New Zealand Government’s diaspora initiatives was the gap between ambitious large-scale plans and small-scale, time-limited budgets. The World Class New Zealand initiative was signed off in the May 2001 Budget, with annual funding of NZ$2.25 million from the Ministry of Economic Development’s NZ$96 million Vote Industry and Regional Development fund.243 By 2007 this annual budget had been halved to just NZ$1.17 million.244 By the same time, around NZ$2.4 million in infrastructure grants for Kea had been approved, covering the eight-year period from 2002 to 2008. These modest commitments were made on an ad hoc, piecemeal basis over the course of several years – in sharp contrast to the funding of policy regarding emigrants in Ireland at an annual level of around €16 million (see Chapter 5).

Firstly, funding for Kea has been ad hoc and reactive rather than systematic. Kea began experimentally, relying on limited seed funding from private individuals.245 As the initial wariness amongst politicians and bureaucrats began to subside, Kea began to attract funding from a range of government agencies. In addition to a contract of around NZ$1 million over the three year period from July 2005 to deliver the World Class New Zealand Awards and Network (see below), Kea received a number of government grants and contracts. The first injection

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242 Interview with author (see Appendices).
244 IV116.
245 IV113.
came in June 2004, with a grant of NZ$200,000 from the Ministry of Economic Development’s Sector Initiatives Fund in order to strengthen its organizational capability, the main products of which were a revamped online database of expatriate details, fronted by a slicker website and brand presence, and development of the Every One Counts expatriates survey implemented in early 2006. In 2006 an additional fixed-term staff member was employed, with financing from the founders in addition to a NZ$48,576 grant from the Foundation for Research, Science and Technology for the establishment of a global research, science and technology network. With the expanded membership, the organization was then able to make the case for government-funded regional managers in key offshore locations. The Ministry of Economic Development gave NZ$250,000 to maintain three core Kea personnel, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade gave NZ$40,000 to employ a regional manager in China for a seven-month trial period. A longer term solution was achieved in 2007, when the Ministry of Economic Development granted Kea NZ$630,000 (excluding GST) per year for the three years to June 2010 in order to maintain existing operations and allow the appointment of regional managers in several more key locations. These funding injections were ad hoc, reactive and experimental rather than strategic. Insiders pointed out that no-one knew how to measure the benefits of these investments, and the only way to proceed was simply to monitor them and see how they worked out.

Secondly, the total outlays for Kea and World Class New Zealand detailed above were minor in comparison to major funding for efforts to retain and repatriate New Zealanders. The Expatriates Programme alone drew around as much support as Kea, even though it was similarly experimental: though New Zealand has always used ‘boosterism’ to promote the country as a migrant destination, it has not previously targeted returning citizens. Consequently, there was scepticism about the feasibility of the concept, and challenges with “market segmentation” given the lack of research on expatriates. Most importantly, the

246 IV119.
247 IV52.
248 See OIA8, p1; OIA9, p3; OIA15; IV43; IV44.
programme had to justify an unprecedented funding model: immigration marketing is normally funded by fees charged for issuing visas and work permits. Because returning New Zealanders do not require these, the Immigration Service was unable to fund marketing aimed at expatriates. Nevertheless, against the background of election campaign pressure for decisive action on emigration, there was sufficient political will to compel the Treasury into releasing some NZ$3 million over three years, which was signed off by Cabinet on 15 June. Though roughly equal to total government support for Kea, this represented a tiny investment when compared to the government’s tax incentives and student loan interest writeoff aimed at encouraging New Zealanders to return or forego emigration altogether. The five-year tax holiday for returnees alone had projected administrative and operating costs of approximately NZ$1.1m in year one and NZ$330,000 per annum thereafter, and estimated fiscal costs of NZ$10-13 million per annum. Meanwhile, the projected annual cost of the zero interest student loan policy came in around NZ$300 million, and many commentators and critics argued that real costs would work out much higher. Piecemeal efforts to mobilize the transnational connections of the diaspora were completely dwarfed by these efforts to retain and repatriate New Zealanders abroad. The interest and investment in the idea of constituting the diaspora as part of the globalizing, knowledge economy project were essentially peripheral; the real efforts went (unsuccessfully) into attempts at dissolving the diaspora through retention and return migration.

**Conclusions**

On the face of it, Larner’s analysis of New Zealand’s diaspora engagement policies under successive Labour-led coalition governments between 1999 and 2008 reveal a “formal diaspora strategy” – a coherent attempt to constitute and harness the diaspora as part of a globalizing project. However, putting this “strategy” under the microscope, through documentary

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249 IV160.
250 OIA4.
251 OIA1–OIA2.
research, in-depth interviews and participant observation, reveals something much more
diffuse. What appeared to be formal, coherent and strategic was in reality a complex process
fraught with conflicts between rhetoric and reality.

These conflicts undermined the purported strategy at every level. The official policy of
simultaneously promoting return and transnational engagement proved difficult to reconcile:
the former portrayed the diaspora as part of the fundamental problem of relative economic
decline, whereas the latter portrayed the diaspora as part of the solution. Despite the rhetoric
of compatibility between the two approaches, they were in reality disjointed at every level,
leading to overlaps and conflicts. At the political level, ministers in charge operated largely in
separate silos, disinterested, sceptical or unaware of each other’s activities. At the bureaucratic
level, the programmes tasked with implementing these strategies competed to fulfil similar
functions and blocked each other’s progress along the way, forming rival camps and sidelining
the agencies best placed to formulate and implement a diaspora strategy: the Treasury, the
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade.
Moreover – partly due to the political and bureaucratic turf wars surrounding it – the big idea
of harnessing the diaspora has never developed through anything more than reactive project
funding at a small scale with strict time limits. Rather than developing a formal or coherent set
of activities, politicians, bureaucrats, businesspeople and migrants carried out cautious
experiments, without a clear sense of purpose or impact. If there was a diaspora strategy, those
who should have known about its existence did not.

The Chinese philosopher Sun Tzu is said to have written, “Strategy without tactics is the
slowest route to victory; tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat.” The second part of
the old adage seems particularly apt to New Zealand’s orientation towards the diaspora
between 1999 and 2008. Though there were tactical moves to ‘engage the diaspora’ under
successive Labour-led administrations over this period, it would exaggerate the significance
and coherence of these initiatives if one were to describe them as part of a major “diaspora
strategy”. The Chinese proverb also contains what followed: Labour’s nine-year rule came to an
218
end in November 2008, after an election campaign in which the politics of emigration and diaspora were once again prominent (for more on overseas voting, see Chapter 9).

Taken together, the evidence and arguments presented in Chapters 7 and 8 support the conclusion that New Zealand’s emigration state system is uncoordinated, leading to inefficiencies of various kinds. The next chapter will shift from considering coherence and efficiency to considering the question of fairness in New Zealand’s emigration state system.
9. Friends in Need or Friends in Deed? Diaspora Integration

Introduction

Whereas the previous two chapters argued that New Zealand’s ‘diaspora building’ policies have been less coherent and efficient than Ireland’s, this chapter will argue that its diaspora integration mechanisms have been considerably less equitable. Chapter 5 argued that Ireland’s policies have been informed by a holistic view of engaged emigrants as members of Irish society with concomitant privileges and responsibilities. The same cannot be said of New Zealand’s policies. This chapter shows that, at the very moment of begging more from expatriates, the New Zealand Government allowed the statutory entitlements of most expatriates to be withdrawn at a stroke, and deliberately withheld those of many others.

This argument has two parts. Firstly, the chapter shows how New Zealand has historically maintained an array of mechanisms for extending membership rights and obligations to expatriates. Secondly, it explains how the New Zealand Government restricted and withdrew the entitlements of New Zealanders abroad at the same time as talking up their patriotic duties. The chapter finishes by suggesting that this approach may not be possible indefinitely, if current trends in overseas voting and the mobilization of the increasingly vocal ‘Kiwi Diaspora’ continue.

Extending Citizenship Rights and Obligations

Historically, New Zealand has maintained an array of mechanisms for extending membership rights and obligations to expatriate citizens and permanent residency permit holders (“permanent residents”). This section begins by discussing the definition of New Zealand citizenship and who it encompasses, and goes on to discuss which New Zealand citizenship rights and obligations extend extra-territorially.

Castles and Miller (2003: 44-45) identify five models of citizenship: an imperial model defined in terms of “being a subject of the same power or ruler”; an ethnic model defined by “common
descent, language and culture”; a republican model defined by adherence to the culture and
values of a constitutionally and legally defined political community; a multicultural model
defined by adherence to the rules but not necessarily the culture of such a political community;
and a transnational model defined by “multiple and differentiated forms of belonging” which
“transcend national boundaries”. These different models are useful for understanding the
evolution of New Zealand citizenship, the meaning of which has evolved through several stages
since the country’s inception.

New Zealand citizenship came into being on New Year’s Day 1949 through an Act which
formally split the British Empire into independent nationalities. Prior to this, New Zealanders
were “British Subjects” – a legal status defined by British Common Law and imperial statutes
which applied to inhabitants across Britain’s imperial realm.253 For the first few decades of the
post-war period, access to New Zealand citizenship was relatively restricted to migrants from
“traditional” (i.e. white) source countries (Bedford et al. 2002a; Bedford et al. 2003b), reflecting
an ethnic conception of national belonging. However, since this time the passage of New
Zealand citizenship by descent has gradually been generally restricted to the first generation
born abroad, in order to comply with the international standard practice of ensuring
citizenship status reflects a genuine, direct link to the country of origin (also see Chapter 2).254
These shifts in the meaning of citizenship reflect on the one hand New Zealand’s evolution from
a colonial dominion into something approaching an independent republic, and on the other
hand its increasing tendency to define itself first as a bicultural nation (from the 1970s), and
increasingly as a multicultural nation (especially from the 1990s).

The republican and multicultural strands within New Zealand citizenship are somewhat in
tension with the bicultural strand (Spoonley et al. 2003). Māori tend to define belonging in more
ethnic terms than those of New Zealand citizenship law, emphasising ties of whakapapa
(ancestry), whanau (family), hapu (kinship group) and iwi (tribe) as preconditions of group

253 OIA16, p.5. Also see Green, David, ‘Citizenship’, Te Ara: The Encyclopaedia of New Zealand, available at
254 OIA16, p.11.
membership. Partly in order to account for such differences, the Minister of Internal Affairs has discretion to grant citizenship to a person born to a New Zealand citizen by descent who meets the character requirements and has a "demonstrable, ongoing link with New Zealand" [italics in original], for example in the form of longstanding familial ties to New Zealand, a period of residence there, or having family members who are New Zealand citizens living there. In every case between 2001 and 2006 where an applicant could demonstrate genealogical and/or tribal relations, the Minister approved the special grant.

The remainder of this section looks at the content of extra-territorial New Zealand citizenship. The rights and obligations of diasporic New Zealand citizens are somewhat ‘thinner’ than those of resident citizens. Resident citizens are obliged to pay tax and enrol as voters, and in return they may vote, may hold public office, own land, compete for various educational scholarships and awards, and represent New Zealand at sport. In contrast, though diasporic citizens may hold a New Zealand passport and re-enter New Zealand at will, the protection they may receive abroad is limited, their voting rights expire after three years, and they may be ‘non-tax resident’. That said, New Zealand has traditionally extended a range of external entitlements and duties that is broadly similar to many developed countries (although New Zealand has relatively few social security portability arrangements – see below). The remainder of the section outlines these entitlements and duties, focusing on visa free movement afforded by the New Zealand passport, social rights including healthcare and pension portability, and double

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255 OIA16, pp13-14.
256 OIA11, p15. Two pieces of evidence from my fieldwork seemed to contradict this official statement. I encountered two issues surrounding the transmission of citizenship by descent to Māori. Firstly, a Māori woman born and living in a major European city complained of being denied New Zealand citizenship by special grant because her Māori mother had also been born abroad and was not a New Zealand citizen. The woman felt that she had demonstrable, ongoing links with New Zealand, such as active membership of a local Māori performing arts community, in which her mother was a prominent elder. Secondly, the Department of Internal Affairs officials in Sydney reported frequent cases of New Zealanders in Australia not realizing the law has changed since their arrival so that they need to register their children for New Zealand Citizenship by Descent. This was particularly difficult when travel had been planned for an occasion such as a wedding, funeral or festival, and/or when tickets have already been purchased (IV132-IV136).
258 OIA16, p4.
taxation agreements. Discussion of external voting rights is reserved for the final section of the chapter.

**Visa-Free Travel**

New Zealand citizens have visa-free access to some 150 territories – a number comparable to the citizens of most developed countries. The bulk of these agreements offer New Zealanders visa-free access for up to 90 days, but a significant minority allow between two weeks and two months, and some offer visa-free access for six months or more. In addition, since the 1970s New Zealand has entered into a number of Working Holiday Schemes allowing young people to live and work in the agreement country for up to a year.

![Figure 9-1: Visa-Free Access, by Country of Citizenship](image)

Source: Henley Visa Restrictions Index - Global Ranking 2009. (Selected countries. Graph by author.)

Most of New Zealand’s visa waiver agreements have been signed in two waves: one during the disintegration of the British Empire, and another during the current wave of globalization. As Bedford & Lidgard (1998: 94) explain, the division of British Subjecthood into separate national

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citizenships necessitated the signing of bilateral agreements to enable ‘intra-imperial’ free movement to continue. A few more visa agreements were signed during the 1960s and 1970s, with countries within New Zealand’s traditional European geopolitical sphere (Bedford and Lidgard 1998: 95-96). A new wave of agreements signed from the mid-1980s reflected New Zealand’s shift in geopolitical orientation away from Europe and towards other regions, particularly in Asia-Pacific (Bedford and Lidgard 1998: 96-98). The bulk of New Zealand’s visa-waiver provisions since the late 1990s stem from two multi-lateral arrangements: one with the six Gulf States (Oman, UAE, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Qatar) (1 July 1999), and another with the expanding “Schengen” region of Europe, which has made new European countries accessible to New Zealanders without negatively affecting previous bilateral agreements with other European countries.

**Figure 9-2: Timeline of New Zealand’s Visa-Free Travel Agreements**

* Visa-fee waiver only  
? Information not found

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The expansion of Working Holiday arrangements has also increased some (particularly middle-class) New Zealanders’ international mobility since the late 1970s. These schemes allow young people without children to spend a year working and travelling in the agreement country. New Zealand’s initial scheme with the UK, and schemes with Canada and Japan, were established in the 1980s. Since that time, the Working Holiday scheme has grown exponentially. At the time of writing New Zealand had 28 Working Holiday schemes either in place or soon to be concluded, and a range of additional agreements were also being planned (Bedford and Lidgard 1998: 101).

**SOCIAL RIGHTS**

New Zealand is sometimes referred to as the world’s first welfare state, owing to the wide-ranging labour and insurance legislation in place there by 1903. A means-tested non-contributory old age pension was established in 1898, and a widows pension a decade later (Brooking 2004: 88-89). State housing was made possible by the Workers Dwellings Act in 1905 (King 2003: 269-70). The Social Security Act of 1938 was a watershed in the development of New Zealand’s welfare system; prior to this, state benefits were restricted to “the aged, invalids, the blind, widows, and miners, with a limited system of family allowances”. The 1938 Act revised pensions and expanded the support available to families, invalids and unemployed people. A number of social security entitlements are now portable to some degree (see Figure 9-3) – particularly healthcare and pension benefits.

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Figure 9-3: New Zealand Social Security Benefits Payable Abroad through Reciprocal Agreements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agreement Country</th>
<th>Invalid's Benefit</th>
<th>Superannuation</th>
<th>Veterans’ Pension</th>
<th>Widows’ Benefit</th>
<th>Domestic Purposes / Widowers’ Orphans’ Sickness Benefit</th>
<th>Funeral Grant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jers. &amp; Guer.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>New Zealand Benefits are not payable into the UK, but New Zealanders may be eligible for the specified UK Benefits.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Healthcare Portability**

New Zealand’s only two healthcare agreements cover Australia and the UK, reflecting long-term connections among these countries originating in the colonial period. The Australian agreement, which was tightened in the late 1990s (see below), still allows migrants in either direction to receive emergency medical care at public hospitals – which may include subsidised pharmaceuticals (but not necessarily ambulance transportation). The UK agreement is broadly similar, providing treatment for New Zealand citizens who are ordinarily resident in New Zealand but experience a medical emergency while in the UK. General Practitioner visits, dental treatment and pharmaceuticals are not covered for those on a visitor’s visa valid for up to six months, but those living, working or studying in the UK for longer periods are entitled to the full range of National Health Service (NHS) treatments once they register with an NHS General Practitioner.

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267 UK Benefits are payable into NZ, and former UK Residents may be eligible for NZ benefits. "Dual entitlement" is therefore possible for some former UK Residents in New Zealand (IV126).


Pension Portability

Most countries now have defined contribution or “second tier” pension systems in which a retiree’s level of entitlement reflects their contributions to the system during their working life. By contrast, New Zealand retains a “first tier” system, under which a universal defined-benefit state pension is received on retirement, conditional on ten years of residence in New Zealand, five of which must be over the age of 50.269 In 2005, some 470,000 people were in receipt of New Zealand Superannuation payments of between NZ$187 and NZ$256 per week (depending on partnership status), at a net cost of NZ$5.4 billion per year to the Government.270 Since 2007, New Zealand has also had a second tier scheme, called “Kiwisaver”.

Historically, New Zealand’s philosophy towards portability of pensions, and social security more generally, has been that, “once a person left New Zealand’s shores they were not New Zealand’s concern”.271 In order to facilitate free movement in what was then still regarded as a seamless imperial space, “host country” agreements were formed with the UK and Australia in the 1940s, through which each country undertook to pay pensions to residents from the other.272 Beyond this, however, New Zealand did not recognize the portability of pensions until the late 1980s, when it began to concede to pressures regarding overseas payment of New Zealand entitlements.

During the 1990s, overseas payment of New Zealand Superannuation entitlements was made possible through three channels: bilateral agreements, general portability and special portability arrangements for people wishing to live in or return to Pacific Island countries.273 Non-host country social security agreements have been possible since 1990. According to official accounts, this was the result of pressure from the Dutch and Greek governments and from their respective migrants in New Zealand, some of whom wished to return 'home' to

269 OIA37, p11.
270 OIA37, p10.
271 OIA41, Annex 9, p8.
272 IV126.
273 OIA41, Annex 9, p8.
228
retire. The agreements with these countries, and the other agreements that followed, complement New Zealand legislation to allow eligible applicants to receive up to 100% of their entitlement in the agreement country. In general, entitlement is calculated as 1/45th of the full amount of New Zealand Superannuation for each year of residence in New Zealand between ages of 20 and 65. Applicants can apply for payment of New Zealand Superannuation from an agreement country, and residence in one agreement country can count towards any residence or contribution threshold in the other.

Pressure for parity from migrants originating in non-agreement countries apparently led to “General Portability” provisions in 1990, which made possible the payment of a 50% reduced entitlement into any non-agreement country. The original rationale for the 50% reduction was that overseas payments were not subject to a domestic surcharge or New Zealand tax; however, the surcharge has since been abolished. Since 2001, pensions have also been payable into Pacific Island countries through the “Special Portability” arrangement. This provision allows payment of 50% of New Zealand pensions after 10 years of residence in New Zealand, and 100% after 20 years. Special Portability was originally extended to Niue, Tokelau and the Cook Islands in recognition of special ties with these countries (whose citizens are automatically New Zealand Citizens at birth). However, Special Portability has since been extended to cover 22 Pacific countries.

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274 IV126; OIA41. Some sources question the veracity of official explanations for the changes to portability arrangements in 1990 (IV194).
275 Reflecting the still-predominantly European composition of New Zealand’s migrant stocks, these agreements with Greece and the Netherlands were soon followed by agreements with Ireland (1993), Jersey and Guernsey (1995), Canada (1996), Denmark (1997), and Italy (yet to be ratified by the Italian Government).
276 IV126.
277 Covers New Zealand Superannuation and Veterans Pensions.
278 IV126; OIA41. Official sources admit some uncertainty about whether General Portability or Agreements came first (e.g. see OIA41, Annex 9, p8), and other sources have suggested that General Portability preceded agreement formation (IV194).
### Table 9-4: Recipients of Portable Pension Entitlements, by Average Weekly Rate and Annual Cost

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Payment Arrangement</th>
<th>Number of recipients</th>
<th>Gross weekly rate of New Zealand Superannuation</th>
<th>Annual Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social Security Agreements</td>
<td>6,357</td>
<td>$122.58</td>
<td>$41.423m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Portability Arrangement for the Pacific</td>
<td>454</td>
<td>$248.82</td>
<td>$5.874m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Portability</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>$124.98</td>
<td>$1.231m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7,001</td>
<td></td>
<td>$48.528m</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Redrawn from OIA37, p11.

In 2005, around 7000 people were being paid overseas at an annual cost of NZ$48 million, more than 85% of which was accounted for by people living in eight countries covered by social security agreements. The majority of these (4,651 superannuitants) were in Australia, where New Zealand made pension payments of just under NZ$30 million per year.279

Pension entitlements accrued in other countries are also paid to New Zealand residents, either through an agreement or through the other country's own portability provisions. However, these payments are subject to New Zealand's unilateral "direct deduction" policy (Section 70 of the New Zealand Social Security Act 1964). Through other sections of the same Act, New Zealand forces superannuitants to apply for any overseas entitlements and subtracts these dollar-for-dollar from their New Zealand Superannuation entitlements. The policy, which is internationally unusual and contentious, was adopted in 1938 to ensure all New Zealanders received the same level of public pension.280 New Zealand has also come to see the policy as a way of "sharing" the burden of social security costs between New Zealand and any other country in which an individual holds entitlements.281 Direct deduction normally applies to overseas entitlements from "first tier" and some "second tier" systems ("basic, universal, flat-rate state pensions" and "contributory, earnings related state pensions").282 Some "private" pensions paid into individualized accounts are not deducted; others are deducted, regardless of

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279 OIA37.
280 OIA37, p2.
281 OIA38, p6.
282 OIA37, p13.
whether such individualized contributions are made compulsory by a state owned enterprise or a foreign government. For example, direct deduction applies to migrants from the UK who are part of the UK state earnings-related pension scheme, but it does not apply to those who chose to “contract out” of the state system into an occupational scheme after 1978.\footnote{OIA37, p15.}

In 2005 around 51,000 New Zealand residents had overseas entitlements directly deducted from their New Zealand Superannuation. Some 85% of these had been in New Zealand for over 30 years (seven percent were New Zealand-born) and most were on low incomes. The main countries from which pensions are deducted are: the UK (43,736 pensions annually totalling NZ$143 million); the Netherlands (3,754 pensions totalling NZ$14.3 million); Australia (2,832 pensions totalling NZ$8 million); the USA, Canada, Ireland, Germany, Jersey and Guernsey, Switzerland and Fiji (with a combined total of 1,446 pensions totalling around NZ$7 million).\footnote{OIA37, p14.}

At this time, the direct deduction policy saved the New Zealand Government around NZ$174 million annually.\footnote{OIA37. These figures include neither savings on entitlements for which New Zealand residents have not bothered to apply, knowing their foreign entitlement will cancel out the New Zealand one, nor on suspension of pensions due to exchange rate and/or annual adjustments or supplements to the overseas entitlement (IV194).}

**OBLIGATIONS**

As in most countries, the key concept in determining the tax liability of New Zealanders abroad is “Tax Residency”. A person is Tax Resident if they “are in New Zealand for more than 183 days in any 12-month period, or have an ‘enduring relationship’ with New Zealand.”\footnote{Inland Revenue website, ‘For non-residents & visitors: tax residency’, http://www.ird.govt.nz/yoursituation-nonres/tax-residency, accessed 4 May 2009.} An enduring relationship refers to maintenance of a “permanent place of abode” in New Zealand – a concept covering “all...social, physical, economic or personal ties and links with New Zealand.”\footnote{Inland Revenue website, ‘For non-residents & visitors: tax residency’, http://www.ird.govt.nz/yoursituation-nonres/tax-residency, accessed 4 May 2009.} “Tax information exchange” and “tax recovery” agreements with several countries allow New Zealand’s Inland Revenue Department to obtain tax-related information directly from the
agreement government and to enforce tax obligations in the agreement country. Enforcements of other tax-like obligations are also sometimes covered; for example, recovery arrangements with Australia in part reflect concerns regarding student debt and child support obligations amongst New Zealanders moving across the Tasman. A child support agreement – the world’s first – came into force in July 2000, allowing both countries to enforce each other’s child support assessments.288 Recent Treasury work has also flagged up plans to tighten up student loan recovery across the Tasman (Blakeley et al. 2009).

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**Figure 9-5: Timeline of New Zealand’s Double Taxation Agreements**

- **1963**: Japan
- **1964**: France, Italy, Sweden
- **1965**: Canada, Denmark, Netherlands, Philippines, Switzerland
- **1966**: Belgium, Korea
- **1967**: Finland, Norway
- **1968**: UK, USA
- **1969**: China, India, Ireland
- **1970**: Indonesia
- **1971**: Australia
- **1972**: Taiwan
- **1973**: Thailand
- **1975**: South Africa
- **1976**: Chile, UAE
- **1977**: Poland, Spain
- **1978**: Austria, Mexico
- **1979**: Czech Rep.

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Because it is possible to be classified as tax resident in more than one country, a bilateral agreement is needed in order to prevent taxation by both countries and to determine which country’s tax claims take precedence.\textsuperscript{290} Agreements are made when significant benefits are likely to result from the removal of impediments to international trade and investment, and are therefore in place with New Zealand’s large trading and migration partners.\textsuperscript{291} Political factors can also be important – such as lobbying by businesses, or foreign policies aimed at expanding trade with particular countries.\textsuperscript{292} As an OECD member, New Zealand generally follows the standard OECD double taxation agreement template, but each agreement has unique features arising from individual negotiations with specific countries.\textsuperscript{293} New Zealand has 35 double taxation agreements, negotiated since the 1960s – although the bulk of the agreements were signed in the 1980s, during New Zealand’s abrupt neoliberal re-opening to the world.

**STRESSING OBLIGATIONS while WITHHOLDING RIGHTS**

In the absence of coercive means to enforce membership duties extra-territorially, one alternative for the migrant-sending state can be to encourage social means of enforcement, appealing to the virtues of the good citizen and stressing expatriates’ moral duties to nation and family. Prominent appeals of this kind were made from two angles under Labour-led Governments between 1999 and 2008 (see Chapter 8). Firstly, in the lead-up to the Knowledge Wave Conference in 2001, a discourse of “harnessing the diaspora”, by directly appealing to a sense of neglected patriotic duty among expatriates, became a prominent theme in government rhetoric. In May 2001, Economic Development Minister Jim Anderton announced,

\begin{quote}
... we have been looking at ways to ensure that the talent and skills of New Zealanders are not lost to us. In some cases the best and the brightest have left, many, of course, to return later, but in the meantime we are not getting the advantages of their knowledge and experience. ... I believe that New Zealanders, wherever they are in the world, are always New Zealanders. They retain a commitment to their homeland and identify themselves as New Zealanders. We need to network and keep our people contributing. I can see New Zealand as a nation with, in at least one sense, no frontiers. We can bring people back to temporarily work with local enterprises,
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{292} IV189.

\textsuperscript{293} IV189.
link local business people with mentors using internet and satellite technology, develop think tanks with kiwis around the world and have scholarships and programmes to help New Zealanders to learn from our successful ex-patriates. New Zealanders can be urged to send back good ideas of their successful ventures overseas and where possible connect opportunities arising from their businesses to New Zealand. (Anderton 2001)

The subtext to Anderton’s dictum that ‘New Zealanders remain New Zealanders wherever they are’ was not that they could always count on New Zealand’s loyalty, but rather that they would not be let off the hook that easily – the message was (to borrow from Richard Black, cited earlier), if you are still a New Zealander, you still have to work for New Zealand. Such exhortations to harness the diaspora and “build a powerful global community” (L.E.K Consulting 2001: 80-88) were echoed ad infinitum by politicians, policy makers, businesspeople, academics and consultants over the next few years.294

Secondly, as issues of “brain drain” became increasingly linked to concerns surrounding New Zealand’s ageing population (Bedford et al. 2003a: 61), and continued to enter political debates, the Government introduced programmes appealing to expatriates to return and fulfil neglected family duties. There were concerns regarding parents retiring abroad and increasing the burden on young families working and caring for children. Conversely, there were worries about young emigrants leaving behind elderly people with no family support. Both situations could lead to increased pressure on the public purse (Lunt et al. 2006: 30-35).295 In the context of such concerns, Government Ministers set out to appeal directly to “families here [in New Zealand] – particularly grandparents – to encourage their offspring to return.”296

Some expatriates may well have been amenable to such appeals to family and nation, but others were certainly not. When a 2005 campaign to attract back expatriates was announced, the New Zealand Herald reported one expatriate complaining, “That sense of loyalty has gone for many of

295 I am grateful to Dr. Sally Keeling for sharing her insights surrounding the linkage between these issues. Also see “Skilled Ambassadors or Brain Drain? New Zealand’s Diaspora in an Ageing Population”, IPS Seminar, 20 Mar. 2007, Institute of Policy Studies, Victoria University of Wellington.
us.... We've been chased away by low salaries, higher taxation and crippling student loans, and feel a bit cynical when the cry to return is shouted from the rooftops. Moreover, as well as feeling “pushed” away from New Zealand, many expatriates had reason to feel poorly treated by New Zealand while living abroad or on returning – as is discussed in greater detail below.

The Government’s failure to account for such reluctance and cynicism in its rhetorical approach to expatriates was imprudent to the extent that admonishing such people was unlikely to have the desired effect. But to the extent that some expatriates had legitimate grounds for resenting the New Zealand Government, such an approach was also unfair: it implied that expatriates retained moral duties that were not reciprocated. The remainder of this section expands on this point more fully, demonstrating that New Zealand has talked up the filial and patriotic duties of New Zealanders abroad at the same time as substantially curtailing their entitlements. Firstly, the discussion notes that New Zealand institutions have seen benefits in engagement with the diaspora, without taking genuine steps to reciprocate. Secondly, it shows how the discourse of “harnessing the diaspora” emerged at exactly the same time as the welfare entitlements of New Zealanders in Australia were being abolished. And thirdly, it explains how New Zealanders’ access to pension portability was disregarded at the same time as appeals to the diaspora were increasingly being linked to issues of ageing and expatriates’ duties of care.

**What Does the Diaspora Have to Offer?**

A senior official explained to me that the main question surrounding the diaspora in policy makers’ minds is, “What does the diaspora have to offer?” Expatriate New Zealand businessman Chris Liddell, Chief Financial Officer of Microsoft Corporation, explained what the diaspora has to offer New Zealand in this way:

> ...there’s out to a million [expatriates] outside of New Zealand, and a reasonable proportion of those still have an interest in New Zealand. Generally speaking they’re all reasonably talented people, reasonably wealthy to some degree – they represent a ... resource ... an asset for New

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298 IV108.
Zealand if you like, which is reasonably intelligent and got some resources and they’re willing to contribute to New Zealand. They’re also not a drain on New Zealand, so it’s a relatively free resource which could have a relatively high impact if focused in the right fashion.²⁹⁹

Some of this value is already being captured by New Zealand institutions in various ways. The Inland Revenue, for example, maintains an interest in expatriates’ financial resources, and monitors their whereabouts and tax-residency status accordingly. Although the personal data from Kea’s Every One Counts survey remains strictly private, it is no coincidence that a number of survey questions collected information that would be directly relevant for determining tax residency.³⁰⁰ In this sense, expatriates may be gone but they are certainly not forgotten: every possible attempt is made to ensure they comply with their obligations to New Zealand.

The social networks of expatriates are also a source of value for New Zealand Government agencies and their clients. For example, expatriates’ local knowledge is often instrumental in supporting government representatives acclimatizing to a new overseas posting, assisting New Zealand firms to enter a new offshore market, or helping visiting academics to get established quickly. As one former diplomat put it, “the diaspora gives you a tremendous hinterland, and an understanding of the country in which you are representing your [own] country”.³⁰¹ Access to influence – whether in the form of buyers, decision makers or market influencers – is often crucial for offshore New Zealand government officials and businesses. As former Economic Development Minister Trevor Mallard put it, “some people can make an enormous contribution and getting them identified and working with them is important”.³⁰² Similarly, connections to engaged expatriates can facilitate access to knowledge and capability needed by New Zealand officials and firms, and give New Zealand policy makers access to a wider pool of expertise to consult when designing policy. For example, politicians visiting the UK often draw on the advice of expat chartered accountants on new policies in areas such as tax and international

²⁹⁹ Interview with author (see Appendices).
³⁰¹ IY99.
³⁰² Interview with the author (see Appendices).
trade, with whom they make contact through the UK Branch of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of New Zealand.\textsuperscript{303} New Zealand universities often use their contacts with leading expatriate academics in overseas centres of excellence to get advice on appointments and promotions at home.\textsuperscript{304} Senior members of London’s New Zealand University Graduates Society are often called on in this regard.\textsuperscript{305} Expatriates can also provide invaluable advice on international best practices for firms. As one influential public policy expert put it,

\begin{quote}
[The diaspora] have got the New Zealand perspective, they’ve got the international perspective, and they understand how the two relate... Engaging the diaspora gives you a sense of benchmarks that enable you to calibrate how we’re doing compared to other countries and given our physical distance from other markets, having a steady source of ideas and opinions and perspectives is really quite important to give us a sense of how we’re travelling,...\textsuperscript{306}
\end{quote}

Expatriates are often able to act as informal ‘ambassadors’ for New Zealand, lending credibility to officials and firms in offshore settings. As former Foreign Minister and Commonwealth Secretary General Don McKinnon put it, “when you are a small country like us if you really want to fly your flag you have got to work quite hard at it”,\textsuperscript{307} and key expatriates can help significantly to do this. As one diplomat based in Asia put it,

\begin{quote}
We know our resources are limited and that we want to increase our profile.... People don’t know who the [chief diplomat] is, they don’t know who I am – do they care who we are? Probably not, but they might care, for example what the chairman of [X Bank] says ... he received a postgraduate degree in New Zealand and he’s a person who wields extraordinary influence here, probably more than the [chief diplomat] and myself. And things he will say will have a greater bearing on what people will think than what we say or the messages that we have.\textsuperscript{308}
\end{quote}

In a slightly different way, overseas groups of New Zealanders – particularly Māori culture groups – are frequently called on to add the appropriate cultural tone to events for embassies or New Zealand corporations. For example, the Ngāti Rānana Māori Group in London has had a small space in New Zealand House for at least the past 15 years, largely in return for their

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{303} IV90.
\item \textsuperscript{304} IV21.
\item \textsuperscript{305} IV21.
\item \textsuperscript{306} IV138.
\item \textsuperscript{307} Interview with author (see Appendices).
\item \textsuperscript{308} IV45.
\end{itemize}
“assistance in terms of Māori protocol and presence at various functions.” 309 Similarly, the Ngā Hau E Wha Māori Group in Tokyo has developed a close relationship with the Embassy, partly through providing traditional Māori welcomes for incoming JET (Japan English Teaching) program teachers and cultural performances for large New Zealand companies in Japan (see Chapter 7). 310

Expatriate organizations can also provide valuable services in addition to or in lieu of those provided by consular posts. By providing social and cultural activities for their members, expatriate groups keep a functioning community alive, which then becomes a support network to supplement or replace the consulate in times of distress. 311 Indeed, in some places this community was called on to perform functions that officials recognized as extremely valuable but could not perform themselves, whether because of resource constraints or lack of credibility. For example, after the New Zealand Embassy in France cut its budget for socializing and reaching out to New Zealanders through social networking events, much of the work of holding together the support networks needed to help New Zealanders integrate into French society fell to groups such as the France New Zealand Society, despite the fact that they were not necessarily set up to perform this type of function. 312 In Japan, the Embassy’s resources prevented it from “pulling its weight” in the local chamber of commerce, according to several members. As one put it, “we get used basically.... New Zealand rides on Australia’s back in terms of contributions”. 313 In Sydney, the Māori Women’s Welfare League performs a key consular function of visiting New Zealand prisoners. 314 In some cases the non-governmental status of expatriate groups made them able to perform governance functions that officials could not. As one senior Kea member in the UK put it,

There are certain forms of activity that work really well if you can be seen to have Government support, and there are certain things that the Government wants to achieve that they will not be able to achieve if it’s seen as a Government initiative. I don’t know how much you can generalise,

309 IV101.
310 IV36.
311 IV146; IV89.
312 IV62; IV63.
313 IV102.
314 IV156.
but New Zealanders who are outside the country have left for a combination of reasons. Among those reasons may well be not feeling particularly kindly disposed towards New Zealand at the time they leave. They may be leaving in a mood of dissatisfaction, and to have engagement from the New Zealand Government that's kind of wagging its finger and saying “it's your duty to be involved with New Zealand” is just not going to work. So I think where the relationship works well, Kea and New Zealand Government departments can use that to their own advantage.\footnote{IV89.}

However, it must be noted that awareness of what the diaspora offers is not well balanced by an appreciation of what the diaspora wants or needs. Expatriates’ entitlements came up very little in discussions about “harnessing the diaspora”. A few preliminary ideas were floated around increasing expatriate electoral participation and providing pre-departure and re-integration assistance for potential emigrants and returnees (e.g. see L.E.K Consulting 2001: 83),\footnote{Also see OIA10, p4, p11.} but none of these discussions ever really got off the ground. The idea of increasing expatriate voter registration, and possibly even creating an expatriate electorate, was introduced early in pre-Knowledge Wave discussions, by a number of people including McKinsey and Company Consultant Andrew Grant and colleagues (L.E.K Consulting 2001).\footnote{Also IV98.} It was picked up by then-Economic Development Minister Jim Anderton during the launch of the World Class New Zealand programme (Anderton 2001), and later raised by officials looking at ways of harnessing “talent” from overseas.\footnote{OIA10.} However, proposals regarding expatriate voting have been unsuccessful, reportedly for at least two reasons: firstly, due to strong objections among senior officials in at least one agency that this would encourage 'representation without taxation';\footnote{IV117.} and secondly due to political concerns about the way expatriates might vote.\footnote{IV98.} The idea was later taken up by Kea using purely private funds.

The idea of reintegration assistance for returning expatriates met with a similar fate. For a brief period, the Department of Labour’s Expatriates Programme provided an information portal for expatriates considering return. The programme’s website (www.nznow.govt.nz) offered content and links to help expatriates reconnect with New Zealand social, cultural, economic

\footnote{IV89.}
\footnote{Also see OIA10, p4, p11.}
\footnote{Also IV98.}
\footnote{OIA10.}
\footnote{IV117.}
\footnote{IV98.}
and political life, as well as helping plan the logistics of return. However, the site has since been overhauled to cut content targeted specifically at returnees. A more lasting policy, implemented in mid 2007, was the removal of the cap on residence places for spouses and children of returning New Zealanders, which reduced visa waiting times and gave returning expatriates and their families more certainty about their immigration status. Beyond this, however, the idea of reintegration assistance does not appear to have been given serious consideration in frequent discussions about attracting expatriates back to New Zealand.

Similarly, pre-departure or new-arrival information, though mooted by officials from several agencies based offshore (particularly in Sydney), has not been mentioned in mainstream policy discussions about emigration and the diaspora. A number of research participants in migrant associations and offshore government postings suggested that better information prior to departure or soon after arrival could prevent many of the difficulties experienced by expatriates. However, their proposals had typically been rejected by their superiors. For example, in response to considerable demand from migrants and migrant associations, an official in one location proposed a community notice-board in the foyer of a passport office, but the idea was reportedly rejected because the post did not want to be seen as supporting non-Government organizations.

Failure to back up appeals to expatriates’ senses of duty with appeals to their interests was imprudent in the sense of being unlikely to have the desired effect. However, it was also unfair in the sense of having an inequitable aim: the aim of exploiting a group towards which the state had disregarded its obligations. One senior official noted that, although there were some concerns about the fiscal implications of a possible mass return, there was no concern about extending rights to expatriates, because they had “chosen to stop contributing” to New

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322 E.g. IV 129, IV 150.
323 E59, E60, E62, E68.
Zealand. This view that (as another policy analyst put it) “policy goes in some funny directions” if the welfare of an external population is considered, was expressed by policy makers of all levels of seniority in virtually every agency I had contact with. As another official remarked, the common view of expatriates from a welfare standpoint is “goodbye and good luck – and shouldn’t we wash our hands of them”. The issue is not simply that New Zealand policy makers gave very little genuine consideration to what they could or should offer in exchange for the extra benefits they began to seek from the diaspora, it was that they effectively withdrew substantive existing entitlements from expatriates at the same time as admonishing them to give more to their families and to their country. This is demonstrated below through a discussion of the withdrawal of social security coverage for New Zealanders in Australia, and the rejection of proposals to improve New Zealand’s pension portability coverage.

TRANS-TASMAN SOCIAL SECURITY WITHDRAWN

The approach of trying to “harness the diaspora” while discounting expatriates’ welfare became starkly evident in 2001. Deputy Prime Minister and Economic Development Minister Jim Anderton’s comments about ‘New Zealanders remaining New Zealanders’ (see above) were made at the end of May (Anderton 2001), at the exact moment when the welfare entitlements of New Zealanders in Australia were being abolished (Sanderson 2009). At the time the change was announced, some eight months earlier, Prime Minister Helen Clark had commented that New Zealanders who have “turned their backs” on New Zealand “should not get a bean” (Alley, 2000).

While it is true that the abolition of welfare entitlements for New Zealanders in Australia was in the final analysis a decision made by Australia, it is simplistic to suggest that New Zealand’s role in the negotiations was merely obstructive and/or passive. The background to this policy change requires explanation. New Zealand’s close and long-standing social, cultural, political

324 IV108.
325 IV121.
326 IV126.
and economic ties to neighbouring Australia have been formally recognized in a number of agreements collectively known as the Trans-Tasman Travel Arrangement. The most important of these were a 1973 agreement allowing citizens of both countries to move freely between each others’ territories and work in both, and a reciprocal agreement on social security concluded in 1948 and covering almost all educational and welfare benefits (Birrell and Rapson 2001; Sanderson 2009: 300). Concern amongst Australian policy makers increased during the 1980s as migration from New Zealand to Australia outpaced flows in the opposite direction, and fears regarding “backdoor” migration from third countries became a particularly sensitive issue. In 1986 and 1994, stand-down periods for Australian welfare benefits were introduced, alongside a reimbursement scheme whereby New Zealand paid for some of ‘its’ beneficiaries in Australia.327 For similar reasons, General Practitioner visits were excluded from the bilateral healthcare agreement in 1998, saving Australia some A$3 million per year.328

However, matters came to a head when the Australian Government, still dissatisfied with the arrangement, claimed it was costing the Australian taxpayer A$1 billion per year, and put pressure on New Zealand to bear a larger share of this burden.329 When New Zealand refused, the Australian Government announced unilaterally on 26 February 2001 that if New Zealanders arriving in Australia failed to meet the criteria for Australian permanent residency imposed on

citizens of all other countries, they would no longer be eligible for Australian social security even after the existing two-year stand-down period.

As a consequence, New Zealanders are still encouraged to take advantage of their unique freedom to enter and work in Australia without special permission, but now they do so – often unknowingly – without a social safety net (Birrell and Rapson 2001: 61; Sanderson 2009). There is no small risk that this may consign some low-skilled migrants to a position of “denizenship” (Hammar 1990) not unlike that of the “temporary guestworkers” brought to post-war Europe. They too were invited to work without citizenship rights. When they failed to return as expected, they were not integrated “as equals, but as economically disadvantaged and racially discriminated minorities” (Castles 2006: 743). Some findings in Chapter 6 add to existing evidence (Hamer 2007: 63-64) that Māori may be particularly vulnerable to such an outcome.

Indeed, one Māori researcher in Australia described the changes as creating a “poverty trap”. Similarly, a consular official explained, “We find that a lot of New Zealanders over here get caught between a rock and a hard place .... It’s simply because they’re not aware of what they are entitled to and what they’re not entitled to over here in Australia ....the onus is on them ... to be aware”.

It is misleading to argue, as do some accounts, that the changes to trans-Tasman social security resulted from a unilateral decision by Australia, which New Zealand’s negotiators valiantly but unsuccessfully resisted. A more accurate analysis acknowledges that the New Zealand Government saw important interests served, not thwarted, by Australia’s decision to cut New Zealanders in Australia loose. Firstly, the decision served the New Zealand Government’s interest in dis-incentivizing emigration to Australia, which was a source of considerable domestic political pressure. Birrell and Rapson (2001: 70-71) hypothesize that the New Zealand Government

330 IV163.
331 IV162.
Government wanted to “put the brakes on the outward movement of its citizens”; an interpretation that finds support with Bedford (2003a: 61), who – writing from a perspective of intimate knowledge of the migration policy process in New Zealand – notes that, “[t]he New Zealand Government does see a benefit in stauning the flow to Australia”. Secondly, Australia’s decision allowed the New Zealand Government to continue the practice of using emigration to reduce its social security burden. A proportion of those who ended up in Australia on benefits would, but for the free movement encouraged under the Trans-Tasman Travel Arrangement, have remained in New Zealand on benefits paid for by the New Zealand Government. However, as Birrell and Rapson (2001: 73) note, New Zealand “was not paying labour market benefits under the old agreement and this continues to be the case under the new one”. At the direct expense of New Zealanders in Australia, who are the “emphatic losers” from the changes, the New Zealand Government managed to “deflect pressure from the Australian Government to ... make a contribution to the bill for future labour market payments made to New Zealand citizens in Australia” (Birrell and Rapson 2001: 73). Before the changes, emigration to Australia allowed New Zealand to transfer a portion of its social security bill to the Australian Government; after the changes, it was able to simply write that portion off altogether. In an important sense, New Zealand’s stance reflected an interest in continuing to externalize some of its social problems.

Moreover, the New Zealand Government disassociated itself from New Zealanders abroad at the same time as insisting that they needed to be kept contributing to New Zealand society. With one breath, the Prime Minister expressed “abhorrence at the possibility of having to pay compensation to the Australian Government for social security payments made to New Zealand citizens who had ‘turned their backs on New Zealand’” (Birrell and Rapson 2001: 73). With another, the Deputy Prime Minister asserted, “I believe that New Zealanders, wherever they are in the world, are always New Zealanders. They retain a commitment to their homeland and identify themselves as New Zealanders. We need to network and keep our people contributing” (Anderton 2001). The timing of the New Zealand Government’s rhetoric of “harnessing” the
diaspora seems at best somewhat insensitive – perhaps even exploitative, as the following section on pension portability discusses further.

**Pension Portability Disregarded**

Even though population ageing and the diaspora have been linked in such a way that emphasizes expatriates’ neglected duties, problems with expatriates’ own pension portability provisions have remained unaddressed, perpetuating a system that arbitrarily penalizes people both for retiring abroad and for having lived abroad at some stage in their earlier lives – even if they are fully eligible in every other respect.

New Zealand’s pension portability arrangements exemplify the ad hoc character of the country’s emigration state system, and the inefficiencies and injustices that result. A series of internal Government reports between 2001 and 2005 (as part of a comprehensive review of pension portability that concluded in 2008), found that current arrangements were “out of date and inequitable.... significantly out of step with ... other countries overseas ...[and involve] considerable administrative problems”. As a direct result of having “developed in an ad hoc manner in response to specific pressures”, “with the system as a whole never having been reviewed”, arrangements had undergone “various policy changes which have not only made them depart from their original principles, but have also made them inconsistent with one another”.

Fairness and efficiency concerns about the system centre firstly on the direct deduction policy which sees overseas entitlements paid into New Zealand but not received by the pensioner, and secondly on the morass of portability provisions which discriminate arbitrarily among pensioners based on their choice of retirement destination. Between them, the direct deduction policy and restrictions on portability penalize New Zealanders for mobility, discourage other

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333 OIA36-OIA41.
334 OIA36, p10.
335 OIA41, Annex 9, p7.
336 OIA41, p7
337 OIA41, p3.
countries from signing social security agreements with New Zealand, and result in unnecessary administrative and opportunity costs.

**Direct Deduction of Overseas Entitlements**

The review of pension portability arrangements found that people with overseas entitlements are treated inequitably by the direct deduction policy. On one hand, people with overseas entitlements are not treated the same as other applicants for New Zealand Superannuation, even if they are the same in every other respect. For most applicants, New Zealand Superannuation is provided as a non-means-tested and non-contributory pension: entitlement is affected neither by work history nor by receipt of additional sources of retirement income. However, the direct deduction policy subjects those with overseas entitlements to a principle of ‘one pension for one contribution period’,[338] a principle which denotes a means-tested, contributory pension. Consequently, Person A who has never worked in New Zealand and subsists comfortably on income from overseas investments may be entitled to a full New Zealand Superannuation entitlement, while Person B who has worked in New Zealand for 45 years and has no other income except a small overseas pension may not receive a full New Zealand entitlement. Moreover, Person B will be forced by the New Zealand Government to apply for two or more separate pensions in order to receive the same weekly payment as Person A.[339] This is because an applicant for New Zealand Superannuation is legally obliged to undergo the (often complex) process of applying for any overseas entitlements, even though these entitlements will be directly deducted and of no benefit to the applicant.[340] Thus, many critics of the policy assert that “superannuitants with overseas pensions have qualified for [New Zealand Superannuation] just as other recipients have and should therefore receive the full entitlement.”[341]

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[339] IV126.
[341] OIA37, p2.

246
On the other hand, the direct deduction policy does not treat the same kinds of overseas pensions in the same way. In practice it is often difficult to accurately classify overseas pension systems, with the result that even some types of contributory pensions are deducted.342 For example, people with UK pensions – the majority of those affected – complain of unequal treatment because those who remained within the UK state earnings-related (i.e. contributory) pension scheme after 1978 are subjected to direct deduction, but those who “contracted-out” into a contributory occupational pension scheme escape direct deduction.343 For similar reasons, those with Canadian entitlements complain that their second tier Canada Pension Plan or Quebec Pension Plan entitlements are unfairly targeted by New Zealand; people who have lived in Germany complain that they are unable to protect entitlements that were accrued when working for German Government-owned factories; and former Dutch civil servants and veterans complain of “pension abuse.”344 Thus, many critics of the policy argue that the New Zealand system and overseas systems are “fundamentally different, and therefore consider that entitlements in one system should not affect entitlements in the other”.345

Secondly, direct deduction is seen by other countries as an unfair cost-sharing mechanism; a way for New Zealand to reduce its pension liabilities by free-riding on other countries’ systems. The policy allows New Zealand to avoid paying a proportionate share of social security costs for migrants.346 For example, as a 2004 report noted, a pensioner who lives in Sweden for 30 years and in New Zealand for 15 years is entitled to a Swedish pension of NZ$280 per week, which is directly deducted from his New Zealand Superannuation entitlement of NZ$300. In the final analysis, New Zealand ends up contributing only NZ$20 per week – a share of the burden for the pensioner’s social security that does not adequately reflect 15 years of residence in New Zealand. A number of countries (including Germany, Austria, Sweden, Switzerland and Finland) refuse to negotiate a social security agreement with New Zealand because of the unfair cost-

342 OIA37, p13–14.
343 OIA37, p15.
344 IV194. Also see http://www.nzpensionabuse.org/
345 OIA38, p4.
346 OIA36, p11–12.
sharing implications of the direct deduction policy. 347 This limits the number of countries that can be covered by agreement, so that, by comparison with other developed countries, New Zealand has relatively few reciprocal social security agreements (Holzmann et al. 2005). 348 Consequently, those who move internationally are forced to rely on portability arrangements, which, in New Zealand’s case, are inadequate (see below).

Thirdly, the direct deduction policy was found to result in a number of serious inefficiencies in the form of opportunity costs and administrative overheads. On one hand, because New Zealand’s legislation precludes receipt of entitlements from some countries either through portability or through an agreement, New Zealand is often forced to pay a full New Zealand Superannuation entitlement that would otherwise have been partially offset. 349 Moreover, because pensioners stand to benefit nothing from their overseas entitlements under direct deduction, there is no incentive to apply for them. Even though this is legally required, officials claim there is widespread “evasion”, at an opportunity cost estimated at NZ$100-150 million per year to New Zealand. 350 On the other hand, direct deduction carries a high administrative overhead. It is often complicated to determine whether an overseas pension meets the criteria for direct deduction; close calls are ultimately the responsibility of the Chief Executive Officer of the Ministry of Social Development, resulting in many complaints, reviews and appeals, which form a significant proportion of all correspondence to the Minister of Social Development and Associates. Complaints are also often received by the Minister of Finance. 351

347 OIA41, p3.
348 Also see IV126.
349 In this context, the “frozen” rates of pension paid by the United Kingdom are “topped up” to the NZS level, at the New Zealand taxpayer’s expense (IV194).
350 OIA41, p2; OIA36, p11. Some migrant advocacy groups reject this estimate, pointing out that many of those who “evade” have simply not bothered to apply for New Zealand Superannuation in the knowledge that they will not receive it, and that such arguments unfairly “criminalize” migrants (IV194).
351 OIA36, p12-13; OIA37, p15. This argument is offset by the fact that direct deduction nets the New Zealand Government hundreds of millions in overseas pensions per year, and that alternatives to the direct deduction policy – such as a proportionalized pension system – would also carry an administrative overhead (IV194). In other words, in light of the profitability of the policy, it may be economically worthwhile to pay administrators to fend off complaints of injustice.
Restricted Portability of New Zealand Entitlements

The existing morass of provisions governing the portability of New Zealand pension entitlements has also been found to arbitrarily discriminate among pensioners on the basis of their choice of retirement destination. There are several arbitrarily different formulae for calculating level of entitlement depending on where the applicant chooses to retire. For example, a 2004 report noted that after 20 years of residence in New Zealand a person’s Superannuation entitlement would be 100% if they retired in New Zealand; 100% if they retired to a Pacific Island country (provided they were resident in New Zealand when they applied); 20/40ths or 20/45ths if they retired to one of eight countries covered by a reciprocal agreement; 50% if they retired anywhere else in the world (provided they were resident in New Zealand on application); and zero if none of these circumstances applied. The result of this tangle of legislation is, a) that those who wish to retire abroad are systematically disadvantaged against those who wish to retire in New Zealand, and b) that the level of discrimination among those retiring abroad is unequal and depends arbitrarily on which country one retires to.

Several specific restrictions on portability within this muddle are also widely seen as unfair to migrants and to other countries. For example, New Zealand’s General Portability reduction rate of 50% is high by international standards; though reduction rates on overseas payments are also found in other countries’ systems, a rate of 30% is more typical (Holzmann et al. 2005). In New Zealand’s case, the 50% entitlement level “provides insufficient income to allow a reasonable standard of living in retirement in most countries”, and consequently there is an extremely low uptake rate in proportion to the number of eligible people living in non-agreement countries. In 2005, only 190 people took up general portability (NZ$1.2 million per year) – a remarkably small proportion of the estimated 150,000 New Zealanders living in non-agreement countries. Moreover, the requirement to be resident in New Zealand on application for portability means that those who emigrate to a non-agreement country prior to retirement lose

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352 OIA36, p11; OIA41, annex 9 pp3-4.
353 OIA37, p18.
354 OIA37, p17.
355 OIA41, p9.
the whole of their New Zealand pension entitlement. This was particularly restrictive for Pacific people wishing to return ‘home’ prior to retirement. However, the fact that entitlements are tied to a single country of retirement, precluding long-term travel to other countries, is more broadly problematic. The USA, for example, refuses to pay pensions into New Zealand as a result of the residence and reduced rate restrictions on the New Zealand entitlements of US citizens. Moreover, because New Zealand “double social security taxes” US Citizens (by not allowing them to opt out of a component of general taxation which funds the only-partially portable New Zealand social security entitlements), the USA refuses to enter into a reciprocal agreement with New Zealand. As a result of these two sticking points with the New Zealand system, pension portability is not possible between New Zealand and its third-largest emigrant destination country.

**Pension Reforms Rejected**

Successive reports to the Minister of Social Services and Employment have found that these portability arrangements are also out of date. The original rationale for the unusually high General Portability reduction rate is no longer valid; it had been calculated to account for a means-tested surcharge on New Zealand Superannuation which was abolished in 1998.

Although Special Portability provisions were specifically made for Niue, Tokelau and the Cook Islands in recognition of colonial ties to these countries, it has since been extended to cover 22 Pacific countries, including territories of France and the USA, obscuring the policy’s original intent. The residency requirement applications for both general and special forms of portability had originally been introduced to ensure that New Zealand Superannuation was

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356 OIA41, p3; IV126.
357 Agreements Negotiation and Analysis Team, Office of International Programs, U.S. Social Security Administration, personal email correspondence, 1 Sep. 2009, Also see OIA40.
358 OIA41, p3; IV126. Obstacles to portability of New Zealand citizens’ US entitlements can be summarized as follows: If New Zealand’s General Portability provisions imposed no reduction rate or residence requirement, New Zealand citizens’ US entitlements would be portable under Section 202(o)(2) of the US Social Security Act; if New Zealand Superannuation were means-tested, these entitlements would be portable under Section 202(o)(4) of that Act; and if New Zealand exempted US citizens in New Zealand from social security taxation, an agreement with the USA would be possible, allowing portability in both directions.
359 OIA41, p2.
360 OIA41, p8.
361 OIA36, p11.
250
only paid to long-term residents,\textsuperscript{362} on the assumption that those who had left had already severed their ties to New Zealand and formed new attachments to another place. However, with the growth of transportation and communication technologies facilitating transnational migration of a shuttle or circulatory nature, this view of migration as a one-way journey between two points is no longer valid. Similar comments could be made about the current restriction on long trips outside the retirement ‘destination’ country, given that retirement has increasingly become a period of heightened mobility (King et al. 1998; King et al. 2000).

The internal Government reports of 2001 to 2005 also found that New Zealand’s pension portability arrangements promote outcomes that conflict with the Government’s own stated aims and interests. For example, the ad hoc portability arrangements restrict migration in ways that are inconsistent with the government’s own principles of “positive ageing”, designed to “empower older people to make choices about where they live”,\textsuperscript{363} and with its policies on facilitating skilled migration flows, which aim to remove disincentives (such as double social security taxation or lack of social security portability) for skilled migrants.\textsuperscript{364}

Initially, the review of portability arrangements advocated comprehensive reform based on a philosophy of “consistent rights that are fair and equitable for all people who move in and out of the country”.\textsuperscript{365} Reports delivered to ministers between 2001 and 2005 involved the development of a variety of reform packages, of which one – “Package A”, refined across three reports in 2003, 2004 and 2005 – was most preferred by officials. Package A proposed changes needed to build a system that would be compatible with international practice, under which direct deduction would be abolished and superannuation would be paid at a rate proportional to the number of years lived in New Zealand between ages 20 and 65, with a safety net for those with insufficient entitlements as a result. The advantages of the proposed system, according to officials, were that it “achieves equity”, “provides a single portability system”, “is simple to

\textsuperscript{362} OIA41, p8.
\textsuperscript{363} OIA36, p12.
\textsuperscript{364} e.g. see OIA36, p12.
\textsuperscript{365} OIA41, Annex 9 p10.
administer, resolving existing administration difficulties”, “generates significant savings for Government” (NZ$230 million per year by 2010/11), “establishes genuine cost-sharing between New Zealand and other countries”, “assists New Zealand to negotiate social security agreements with other countries”, “resolves obstacles to [a] US social security agreement and portability of US benefits”, “better facilitates inbound and outbound migration flows” and “is fiscally acceptable to Government”.

However, in the final 2008 report at the conclusion to the seven-year review of the portability system, the Government rejected these recommendations, deciding that the existing system’s inconsistencies were philosophically justified and politically sustainable, while the worst of its fiscal inefficiencies could be overcome through some minor tweaking. The first of the original Terms of Reference for the review had been, “with respect to portability of New Zealand superannuation, [the achievement of] consistent rights that are fair and equitable for all people who move out of the country”. However, by the time the review was concluded in 2007, this aim had been changed; the objective was instead “to ensure that the treatment of overseas pensions paid to New Zealanders is equitable for New Zealanders who have lived and worked in New Zealand all their lives” (emphasis added). The Minister for Social Development decided that the changes proposed in Package A and related options would,

provide more generous provisions for migrants or for New Zealanders who have had the opportunity to work in another country than for lifelong New Zealand residents. People with an overseas pension entitlement would be financially advantaged in comparison with people who lived all their life in New Zealand....

In my view there is insufficient evidence to suggest that we should take the step of establishing a less equitable and more complex [sic] system to improve the international interface of NZS [New Zealand Superannuation], when this interface affects only 10% of superannuitants.

In other words, the current ad hoc policies have been retrospectively justified because their inconsistencies tend to favour lifelong New Zealand residents and New Zealand’s pension

36 OIA41, Annex 9, p10.
36 OIA38, p2.

252
system at the expense of emigrants and other countries’ pension systems, and emigrants do not constitute a large enough group to effectively mobilize against this. The earlier reports were withheld from the public and from Parliament for as long as possible, and the final outcome of the review is that “on the whole, the current policies operate well. The policies reflect the universal nature of the New Zealand system and provide very good protection for most New Zealanders.” The existing ad hoc and arbitrary system has been justified to the extent that it maintains the philosophy that “once a person left New Zealand’s shores they are not New Zealand’s concern”.

Thus, while exhorting expatriates to remain loyal to their homeland, the New Zealand Government was – and is – deliberately maintaining a pension system that will discriminate against them in their retirement. As the next section discusses more fully, this state of affairs may be unsustainable.

**OVERSEAS VOTES THROUGH EMPIRE, DECOLONIZATION AND GLOBALIZATION**

New Zealand’s approach of stressing obligations while withholding rights may not be sustainable indefinitely. If current trends in overseas voting continue, New Zealand’s legislators may be bound into serving expatriate electors. This section discusses the dynamics and impacts of New Zealand’s overseas votes to date, and reflects on how these dynamics and impacts may affect future governments’ orientations towards expatriates.

External voting behaviour has expanded during periods of globalization and contracted between them. The first two major peaks in overseas voting occurred when New Zealand was taking part in world wars as part of the globe-spanning British Empire; a third steep rise has accompanied the current wave of globalization. Between times, few overseas New Zealanders voted, and those who did made little impact. During peak times, overseas votes have had three main types of impact on New Zealand elections: the swing effect, the interregnum effect, and

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371 OIA38, p.1.
372 OIA41, Annex 9, p.8.
the self-fuelling effect. Swings have occurred when overseas votes, counted days and weeks after ordinary votes, have been numerous enough to overturn election night winners in particular seats. Interregnums have occurred when the bargaining power of political parties in coalition negotiations has been distorted during the wait for the overseas vote count. The self-fuelling effect refers to the way that perceptions about the importance of the overseas votes prompt overseas vote chasing among political parties, which in turn draws in more expatriate voters and increases their aggregate impact.

New Zealand uses the most internationally widespread form of external voting system (Collyer and Vathi 2007), whereby one can vote from abroad if enrolled and either a) a New Zealand citizen who has visited New Zealand within the last three years, or b) a permanent resident of New Zealand323 who has visited in the last 12 months. By the time of the 2008 Election there were four options available to external voters. Firstly, they could cast an advance vote (at any advance voting place) at any time starting two weeks before Election Day. Secondly, enrolled voters located abroad could download their voting papers over the Internet from two weeks prior to the election. These could then be faxed or posted back to the electorate where the voter was enrolled. Thirdly, they could apply to have their voting papers posted to them from approximately three weeks before Election Day. Finally, it was possible to vote in person at one of around 64 overseas posts, including New Zealand diplomatic posts.

323 The New Zealand equivalent of the UK’s “Indefinite Leave to Remain” or “Right of Abode” status.
Although New Zealanders have always enjoyed relatively open overseas voting rights, external voting behaviour has expanded during periods of globalization and contracted between them (see Figure 9-6). The first period of expansion was during the period of globalization that historian James Belich refers to as “recolonisation” (Belich 2001a: 29). “Recolonisation” is Belich’s term for a period of “renewal and reshaping of links between colony and metropolis after an earlier period of colonisation”. In New Zealand, the re-colonial period began in the 1880s, reached full fruition in the 1920s, and began a long, slow decline through the 1950s and 1960s. A new wave of globalization gathered momentum during the late 1970s and continues to the present day. Once again, this pattern is reflected in the steady expansion of overseas voting activity since this time.

574 The 1914 estimate is based on the assumption that overseas votes in the general election comprised the same proportion of overall votes as they did in the Māori election (1.9%). In 1954, the overseas postal votes were recorded separately from both domestic postal votes and military votes by returning officers in 66 of 80 electorates. In the remaining 14 seats (17.5%), all postal votes were combined (sometimes along with military votes). Therefore to arrive at an estimate for the total overseas postal votes (excluding military) in 1954, in each of these 14 seats I substituted the average number of overseas postal votes per seat for the other 66 seats (which was 26).
**Empire and the “Khaki Vote”**

During the imperial or “recolonial” period, New Zealand’s overseas votes spiked three times: in 1914, 1919, and 1943. These were the votes of New Zealand servicemen and women, fighting two world wars on the other side of the planet in order to protect the British Empire and New Zealand’s privileged place within it. Although ‘home’ was not New Zealand but Europe for most New Zealand voters in 1914 (Gustafson 1980: 85-86), soldiers fulfilling their duties to New Zealand could not be stripped of their voting rights in its elections, and therefore special arrangements were made in late 1914 for members of the New Zealand overseas Expeditionary Forces to vote at the General Election in December, resulting in a turnout of an estimated 9,845 military voters.

The overseas military votes first swung the results of an election in the April 1919 referendum on the consumption and sale of alcohol. During the First World War, temperance came to be seen by many as a patriotic duty, and the issue dominated New Zealand politics coming into the 1919 election (see Atkinson 2003: 129). Once again, special legislation enabled the 42,632 soldiers in camp and abroad fighting the Great War to participate in the referendum. At first the prohibitionists seemed to have won with 246,104 votes to 232,208. However, when the ballots of 39,704 soldiers were factored in, the balance tipped against prohibition. Some 86% of these ballots were from soldiers stationed abroad or at sea, and almost 32,000 were against prohibition (see Atkinson 2003: 129).

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376 *AJHR.*
377 Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives of New Zealand (hereafter AJHR) 1919, H-33, p6.
256
Table 9-7: Valid Overseas Military Votes, New Zealand’s 1919 Liquor Licensing Referendum

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Continuance</th>
<th>Prohibition</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>15,875</td>
<td>3,955</td>
<td>19,830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>491</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>1,853</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>2,297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samoa</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>3,886</td>
<td>1,482</td>
<td>5,368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On board troopships</td>
<td>9,825</td>
<td>1,758</td>
<td>11,583</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>31,981</strong></td>
<td><strong>7,723</strong></td>
<td><strong>39,704</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overseas only</strong></td>
<td><strong>28,095</strong></td>
<td><strong>6,241</strong></td>
<td><strong>34,336</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Election night result 232,208 246,104
Final result 264,189 253,827

Source: Based on the New Zealand Gazette, 26 June 1919, p1949. Author’s analysis.

The overseas ‘khaki vote’ also swung the 1943 General Election. This election had been postponed for two years, during which time the special bipartisan War Cabinet had collapsed and conscription had become a central political issue (Bassett and King 2000: 246). Against this background, an immense effort was made to facilitate overseas military voting, involving advertising campaigns wherever New Zealanders were likely to be stationed.378 Hundreds of polling stations were set up worldwide, including in Honolulu, the Bahamas, Alexandria, New Delhi, Fiji, Britain, and on board naval vessels.379 Party manifestos and nomination lists were distributed to individual voting posts, of which there were 89 for the 2nd Infantry Division alone.380 Coordinating the Pacific Area vote involved weeks of island hopping among remote bases. The Special Returning Officer for the Middle East set up a postal voting scheme which received 396 votes from locations as widely scattered as Gibraltar, Malta, Algiers, Durban, India, Aden, Iraq, Iran, Nairobi, Tripolitania and Pantellaria.381 He also appointed two mobile polling booths. One of these drove two-thousand miles in 11 days across Syria, Palestine and Egypt to collect 41 votes; the other collected 98 votes while road-tripping from Cairo to Port Said and Suez. The Special Reporting Officer reported, perhaps with a hint of wryness, “These mobile booths provided a very valuable service.”382 Overall, the effort did pay off, yielding the highest

378 AJHR 1944, H33c p7.
379 AJHR 1944, H33c. Also see Atkinson, 2003: 154.
380 AJHR H33c p9.
381 AJHR 1944, H33c, p10.
382 AJHR 1944, H33c, p9.
overseas voter turnout in New Zealand’s history. In total just under 93,000 military votes were cast, almost 53,000 of which came from overseas.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Electorate</th>
<th>Winner</th>
<th>Winner’s party</th>
<th>Winner’s overseas votes</th>
<th>Winning margin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Otaki</td>
<td>Lowry, Leonard</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palmerston North</td>
<td>Hodgens, Joseph</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>496</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wairarapa</td>
<td>Roberts, Benjamin</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oamaru</td>
<td>Nordmeyer, Arnold</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>627</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eden</td>
<td>Anderton, Bill</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>449</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marlborough</td>
<td>Meachen, Edwin</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>475</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motueka</td>
<td>Skinner, Clarence</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raglan</td>
<td>Coulter, Robert</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waitemata</td>
<td>Morton, Henry</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Plymouth</td>
<td>Aderman, Ernest</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nelson</td>
<td>Atmore, Harry</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>429</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source data: Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives of New Zealand, 1944, H33. Author’s analysis.

These votes were to have a decisive impact on the election. Late on election night, Labour still only had 35 of 80 seats (Bassett and King 2000: 255-56). However, 73,000 more military votes came in during the course of the evening, swinging several seats back to Labour. In the coming days, the counting of a further 60,000 specials and 20,000 servicemen’s votes propelled Labour to a win by 45 seats to 34. In the resulting parliament, at least eight Labour MPs relied on overseas military votes for their seats (see Table 3), prompting Prime Minister Fraser's famous quip that “it was not only North Africa that the Second Division had saved” (Bassett and King 2000: 255-56; also see Atkinson 2003: 154).383

Overseas voting activity contracted sharply after the Second World War, when the British Empire splintered into different national units following increasingly divergent trajectories. Though provisions were once again made for overseas military votes at the 1946 election, more than 18 months after V-Day in Europe (8 May 1945), most troops had already been sent home. Only 4,773 servicemen, stationed in Australia, Japan, the UK and on board the HMNZS Bellona,

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383 Bassett and King (2000: 256) and Atkinson (2003: 294, citing Bassett and King, 2000) note that military votes were decisive in five seats. My own further analysis of AJHR 1944, H-33 shows firstly that the overseas military votes were a decisive factor in each case, and secondly that at least six further MPs relied on overseas military votes for their seats (see Figure 9-7).
voted in this election. In 1954, the overseas postal votes hit a low of just over 2,000.\textsuperscript{384} Through the 1960s and early 70s, the overseas turnout increased at or below the rate of increase in the overall turnout (see Figure 9-6). This freeze in the overseas voting between waves of globalization occurred despite the fact that the overseas voting rights of civilians were equalized with those of military personnel in the 1956 Electoral Act (see Atkinson 2003: 166-67).\textsuperscript{385}

\textbf{Globalization and the Kiwi Diaspora}

The second period of expansion in overseas voting began during the renewed period of globalization from the 1970s, an era which has seen increasing emigration of New Zealand citizens. Overseas voting rights, behaviour and impacts have all expanded in this period. The overseas franchise was extended to permanent residency permit holders from 1975. Within a few years, overseas votes began increasing at a much faster rate than the national average (21% per year vs. 5% over the 1975-2005 period).\textsuperscript{386} The switch to proportional representation in 1993 amplified the electoral significance of small voting blocs (such as expatriates).\textsuperscript{387} Except for a dip in the early 1990s, overseas voting has increased sharply since this time; in the 2008 election, more than 32,000 overseas votes were cast – as many as swung the vote against prohibition in 1919.

The first sign of the shift came in 1993, when the special votes (including the overseas votes) swung an election-night tie in favour of the incumbent National Government. The most significant impact of the overseas votes in this election, however, was not a direct swing but an interregnum. After the ordinary ballots were counted, New Zealand faced the prospect of its

\textsuperscript{384} Overseas votes were not counted separately during the 1949 and 1951 elections. However, in 1954, “Absent votes”, “Declaration votes”, “Postal votes”, “Overseas postal votes”, “Servicemen’s votes” are all itemized separately for the first time. In the results, the Overseas postal votes were combined with postal votes (and on two occasions, with the servicemen’s votes also) in 14 of out 80 seats (17.5%). In order to estimate the total number of Overseas postal votes, the number of voters in these 14 seats has been estimated at the average number of Overseas votes per electorate for the other 66 electorates (26.51). This gives an estimated total overseas vote of 2,068.

\textsuperscript{385} From this point onwards overseas voting was explicitly reported under the heading “Overseas votes including servicemen / service personnel” in official records. AJHR 1957.

\textsuperscript{386} Author’s calculations based on AJHR data.

\textsuperscript{387} In 1914 an Act was passed to provide for Legislative Council elected by Single Transferable Vote (STV), but this was never implemented.
first hung parliament in 65 years. However, nine seats were being held with majorities of under 400 votes. The average of 2,000 special votes per ward could change the seat count dramatically. Though only 9,889 valid overseas votes had been cast (3,000 of which came from Britain), as always, they came in last and the country awaited them with bated breath. During this pregnant pause, power was balanced finely among the parties. The two minor parties held the balance of power between them, but intense mutual dislike disinclined them from teaming up as part of a majority coalition with either the incumbent National Party or the Opposition Labour Party. Nevertheless, National recognized that a shared “change” agenda might still draw the minority parties to Labour – a risk it sought to avoid at any cost. Forced to consider coalition options from this apparently weak bargaining position, National Party leader Jim Bolger offered compromises on core policy, dropping his unpopular Finance Minister and even offering to negotiate on his party’s union-neutering Employment Contracts Act of 1990. This move was heralded as a precursor to the era of proportional representation: “the beginning of the end” of two-party politics and one-party government that had dominated the previous century. It must have chafed National to find that its sacrifices during this interregnum were ultimately unnecessary: the postal and overseas votes swung Labour’s 126-vote election-night lead in Waitaki to National, with a 52-vote majority, giving National an overall parliamentary majority of one seat, with the non-voting Speaker of the House yet to be appointed. Back in the driving seat, National shrewdly invited an Opposition MP to be the Speaker (for the first time in New Zealand history) – thus appearing to embrace the new era of co-operation, while actually increasing its own governing majority. Thus, the key impact of the overseas votes in

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387 The Herald (Glasgow) (1993, Nov. 9) ‘Votes from UK could hold key to New Zealand election’.
390 Mead, Chris (1993, Nov. 17) ‘Votes in Britain Help Swing Down Under Poll’, Press Association. Postal and overseas votes tipped Labour’s 126-vote election-night lead in Waitaki to a 52-vote victory for National. Although some contemporary media commentary attributes the swing to overseas votes, the actual data does not appear to have been analyzed and this hypothesis must be treated with caution. The data for 1993 needed to examine this hypothesis was missing from the Rhodes House archive and therefore not available during this research.
1993 was the interregnum they enforced, during which National, when stared down by the minority parties, blinked first.

The overseas votes also contributed to an infamous interregnum in 1996, the first election under the new Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) electoral system. On polling night, neither Labour nor National could govern without going into coalition with Winston Peters’ New Zealand First Party (dubbed “Winston First” by his detractors). However, all the parties hoped that the special votes might give them a little more leverage in what would inevitably be complex and unfamiliar coalition negotiations. After a fortnight of stalling while the overseas votes came in, talks sputtered on for a further six weeks: Peters held the major parties to ransom until his archenemy, National leader Jim Bolger, offered him the role of Deputy Prime Minister and Treasurer. \(^{393}\) Though subsequently forgotten, the return of the overseas vote had prolonged Peters’ hostage drama for a fortnight, contributing to the public’s disillusioned turn towards the centre-Left at the next election.

The overseas votes appeared to cause swing and interregnum effects in the 1999 election, but in fact their most important impact on this occasion was indirect: the appearance of swing and interregnum effects drew attention to and exaggerated the importance of the overseas votes, making them appear more attractive to the political parties in future elections. This was a case of the ‘self-fuelling’ effect referred to above, whereby vote chasing activities eventually make parties dependent on overseas votes. On election night (27 November 1999) the newly independent Green Party hovered around 4.9%, below the 5% parliamentary threshold, while Party Co-leader Jeanette Fitzsimmons lagged 114 votes behind National’s Murray McLean in Coromandel. This gave Labour and the Alliance a comfortable combined majority of 63 out of 120 Parliamentary seats, and the confidence to sign a coalition deal excluding the Greens even before the announcement of the final results. However, the special vote count ended in a dramatic turnaround: Fitzsimmons took Coromandel with a majority of 250 votes, bringing five

MPs into Parliament along with her, while her party lifted its share of the total party vote to 5.16%, thus securing a seventh seat at Labour’s expense. With the Labour–Alliance coalition reduced to a shaky minority of 59, the Government was unexpectedly faced with a “juggling act”.

**Table 9-9: Composition of Parliament before and after Special Vote Count, 1999 General Election**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats on Election Night Results, 27 November</th>
<th>Seats after the Counting of Special Votes, 10 December</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACT</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand First</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour-Alliance</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour-Alliance + Greens</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre-Left Majority</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Number of Seats</strong></td>
<td><strong>120</strong></td>
<td><strong>120</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Redrawn from (Boston 2000: 243)

The Greens maintained that the overseas votes had swung them into parliament too late to enter Government. This ‘late arrival’ narrative contained two assumptions: a) that the Greens needed their overseas votes to achieve a seventh seat, and b) that they would have been included in the coalition deal if they had won enough votes on election night. As Party co-leader Rod Donald remembered it, “the overseas special votes (at 5.65 percent, compared with 5.06 per cent for the total New Zealand vote) guaranteed us our seventh seat (Donald 2000: 56)”. Moreover, as Jonathan Boston (2000: 252) notes, the Greens seemed “plainly frustrated” that they had been excluded from coalition negotiations by what one commentator called an “accident of history”. However, closer analysis rules out the ‘late arrival’ narrative. Firstly, analysis of the election results proves that, although they did perform better overseas than at home (partly, no doubt, because they ran a London-based candidate), the Greens reached 5.16%...

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of the party vote even without their 652 overseas votes.  

Secondly, Labour and Alliance – not to mention the Greens themselves – may well have rejected going into coalition together in any case (see Boston 2000). Nevertheless, the Greens’ ‘late arrival’ narrative stuck, fuelling perceptions of a vast, untapped overseas electorate. This in itself had a palpable impact on the extent to which political parties chased overseas votes in subsequent elections.

**Figure 9-10: Onshore vs. Overseas Votes, by Party, New Zealand’s 1999 General Election**

Incentives to tap the overseas electorate compounded in 2002. On one hand, the ongoing ‘brain drain’ debate kept politicized expatriates in the front of politicians’ minds. On the other hand, the rapid rise of the Internet gave expatriates a voice and dramatically reduced overseas campaigning costs. Together, these factors combined to create what Fran O’Sullivan called an “e-lecition”.  

Six years earlier, Internet technology had been barely capable of supporting a live results service watched mainly by people in New Zealand. In 2002, the Chief Electoral Office announced that overseas voters could actually download their ballot papers on the Internet and

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397 Overall, the Greens took 106,560 (5.16%) of the 2,065,494 valid votes cast in the election. In all there were 11,482 overseas votes of which the Greens took 652 or 5.68%, and 2,054,012 onshore votes of which the Greens took 105,908, or 5.16%.


return them by fax or post to New Zealand; they would no longer be legally required to complete a full re-enrolment every three years. Overseas enrolments doubled from 18,000 to 36,000, raising the prospect of a significant increase in the overseas vote.400 One commentator complained, “There’s no point in fleeing the country to escape the election campaign. You just can’t hide.”401

Analysis of the election results shows that those parties who campaigned hardest abroad did best there, fuelling the impression of a potential overseas vote bonanza. As figures 9-10 and 9-11 show, overseas campaigning reflected the 1999 results, and affected the 2002 results.402 Buoyed by strong 1999 results, ACT predicted a ten-fold overseas-vote increase and launched an aggressive offshore strategy, delivering their manifesto online, and planning campaigning activities during overseas visits by senior MPs.403 By late June they were boasting of around 250,000 weekly website hits, half from overseas,404 and in the end they took a hefty 11.28% of the overseas vote (vs. 7.11% of onshore votes). Similarly, convinced they owed their 1999 redemption to expatriates, and optimistic about tripling their overseas vote-share by targeting “young, disenchanted Kiwis who have been driven out of New Zealand”,405 the Greens ran candidates in London (again) and in Sydney (for the first time). They took a whopping 14.28% of the overseas vote, more than doubling their 1999 share. National, whose 1999 showing suggested minimal payoffs for sending MPs abroad,406 campaigned using a website and permission-based email lists.407 They performed moderately better overseas than onshore (see

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Figure 9-10). Meanwhile, Labour, who had performed poorly offshore in 1999, shunned new media and stuck to limited campaigning through affiliates in Australia.408 Once again, they underperformed overseas. To New Zealand First, which bombed offshore in 1999, the overseas vote-grapes looked sour: they would focus on generating support in New Zealand.409 Their share of the 2002 expat vote dropped accordingly. Overall, the 2002 campaign boosted the overseas turnout by 47% to 16,789, and in the process demonstrated that there were overseas votes out there for those who chased them.

**Figure 9-11: Onshore vs. Overseas Votes, by Party, New Zealand’s 2002 General Election**

![Graph showing percentage of vote for different parties in onshore and overseas votes.]


This self-fuelling effect fed into the 2005 election campaign, when New Zealand politics turned still more transnational, against a background of ongoing brain drain bickering and feelings of disenfranchisement amongst expatriates.410 Building on their previous successes, the Greens ran

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another door-kicking campaign in Australia, but were later ambushed by a smear campaign originating there. By exerting pressure through the Australian trade unions, the Labour Party – traditional champions of the Māori vote – beat back an aggressive Australian campaign from the newly formed Māori party, and increased its overseas vote by 40% over the previous election. Following Australian media interest, a Christchurch firm ‘podcasting’ interviews with party leaders notched up 80,000 website hits within a few days. Letters advising how to vote from abroad went to out to locations as diverse as Switzerland, Sweden, Taiwan, Yemen, Slovenia, Slovakia, Azerbaijan, Bhutan, Botswana, Mongolia, North Korea and Guatemala. The overall size of the overseas vote increased by more than 62% to 28,145 – making overseas voters considerably more numerous than those in any single Māori electorate, and almost on par with numbers in general electorates like Mangere and Taupo. Moreover, as Table 9-12 shows, the number of votes cast in person at overseas polling booths rose considerably between 2002 and 2005.

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47 For discussion of in-person voting patterns, also see Hamer (2008).
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Table 9-12: Largest Overseas Polling Booths, New Zealand’s General Elections 2002 and 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Polling booth</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>% rise</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td>2,881</td>
<td>4,602</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melbourne</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>732</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brisbane</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>559</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sydney</td>
<td>790</td>
<td>775</td>
<td>-2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>351</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apia</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rarotonga</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paris</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>126%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canberra</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perth</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>154%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suva</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>117%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tokyo</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>166%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vancouver</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangkok</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>150%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berlin</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source data: Unpublished tables supplied by the Chief Electoral Office, May 2007. Author’s analysis.

In 2005, the overseas votes once again contributed to a kind of interregnum. Behind 49 seats to Labour’s 50 on election night in a 122-seat Parliament, National Party leader Don Brash announced, “We cannot yet claim a victory, but I am certainly not conceding defeat.” Rather, he planned to drum up a coalition deal while the overseas votes wound their way home. Labour leader Helen Clark had the same idea, declaring “I’m humbled that we have the opportunity to begin negotiations to form a new government.”

Figure 9-13: Onshore vs. Overseas Votes, New Zealand’s 2005 General Election

Transnational political participation increased still further in the lead up to the 2008 election, against a now chronic background of political debate over emigration. Increased overseas campaigning boosted enrolments. The Greens launched a YouTube broadcast encouraging expatriates to vote, and ran two candidates in London, one in Melbourne, and one who appears to have campaigned while backpacking through the Americas. For the first time, Labour ran as a list candidate in London, while National added an “Internats” section to the Party website and placed senior MP Murray McCully in charge of spearheading an overseas campaign effort involving coordinators and campaign visits in most expatriate capitals. In late August Kea New Zealand launched an non-partisan initiative called Every Vote Counts (EVC) (see Chapter 8), involving a website, media campaign and a viral email encouraging Kea’s

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421 IV 179.
25,000 or so members in 178 countries to enrol (backed by statements of encouragements from all the parties).\textsuperscript{424} In the first four days of the campaign, 2,400 people checked their enrolment details online: more than four times the number in the previous week.\textsuperscript{425} Enrolments continued to rise as the campaign unfolded, for example through a prize draw for free tickets to All Black rugby matches, open to people who emailed an enrolment reminder to an expatriate friend.\textsuperscript{426}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure914.png}
\caption{Onshore vs. Overseas Votes, New Zealand’s 2008 General Election}
\end{figure}


Even though EVC’s expectations of a high turnout were not fully met, and National’s majority was large enough to minimize horse-trading after the election, the overseas vote did directly swing an extra seat to the Greens at Labour’s expense (Figure 9-14). Moreover, in 2008 the overseas electoral activity may have reached a critical mass. Levels of party campaigning and media attention aimed at the overseas votes were also unprecedented in 2008. Over 32,000 expatriates voted – roughly as many people as voted in each of New Zealand’s territorial electorates, and a peak topped only by the overseas military turnouts in 1919 and 1943.

Table 9-145: Effect of Overseas Votes, New Zealand’s 2008 General Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Official results</th>
<th>Overseas votes</th>
<th>Total without overseas votes</th>
<th>Net effect of</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Votes</td>
<td>Effective %</td>
<td>Seats</td>
<td>Votes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green Party</td>
<td>157,613</td>
<td>7.19%</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4,487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour Party</td>
<td>796,880</td>
<td>36.37%</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>8,782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Party</td>
<td>1,053,398</td>
<td>48.08%</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>16,548</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All other parties</td>
<td>336,675</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2,644</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2,344,566</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>32,461</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Table by Kea New Zealand. Used with permission.327

Thus, the most far-reaching impacts of overseas voting in the current era of globalization have not been direct vote-swings or even interregnusms, but rather a “self-fuelling” effect. Political parties have raced each other to capture ‘free’ overseas votes, thereby bringing new votes into play. Once brought into play, these votes must be retained at the next election through further campaigning. What starts as a thrill becomes an addiction. If this trend continues, the 2008 headline, “Overseas votes could make the difference”,428 may eventually turn out to be a self-fulfilling prophecy. If this is the case, New Zealand’s current approach of stressing obligations while withholding rights from the diaspora may become unsustainable: politicians voted in by expatriates will avoid being voted out by them.

Conclusions

This chapter has described the various strands of policy concerning New Zealanders’ external citizenship rights and obligations. It is these strands that, collectively, enmesh expatriates into a “web of rights and obligations” with New Zealand at its centre, constituting them as members of a diaspora, with duties and responsibilities to the wider “New Zealand” community.

However, as the chapter has demonstrated, in recent years successive Labour-led New Zealand Governments have stressed expatriates’ obligations while withdrawing many of their rights. On one hand, New Zealand has for much of its history maintained a conventional array of unilateral, bilateral and multilateral mechanisms for extending membership rights and

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obligations to expatriates. Either by virtue of their British Subject status or through an array of international agreements, New Zealanders have enjoyed as much visa-free international movement as citizens of almost any country. New Zealanders living abroad have enjoyed the same external voting rights as those of other countries. And an extensive network of bilateral agreements has protected many expatriate New Zealanders’ social rights and ensured they meet their tax obligations. On the other hand, New Zealand substantially curtailed the entitlements of New Zealanders abroad at the same time as talking up their filial and patriotic duties. Just as talk of “harnessing the diaspora” permeated policy discussions leading up to the Knowledge Wave conference in 2001, New Zealand allowed Australia to unilaterally cut back the social welfare entitlements of New Zealanders in Australia, even though Australians in New Zealand continued to enjoy uninterrupted entitlements. Even as New Zealand policy makers tried to find ways of leveraging the talents of expatriate New Zealanders, they turned a blind eye to concerns about unfairness in New Zealand’s pension portability regime, openly and arbitrarily penalizing international movement, free-riding on the pension systems of other countries, and admitting the diaspora as a policy issue only insofar as it had something to offer.

This chapter also suggested that such an approach may not be indefinitely sustainable. Extraterritorial voting has been on the increase in recent years, and if this pattern continues, New Zealand’s elected representatives may become increasingly beholden to expatriate electors. Overseas votes have had three main types of impact on New Zealand elections: the direct swing, the interregnum, and the self-fuelling effect. Direct swings have occurred when overseas votes, counted in the election’s aftermath, have been numerous enough to overturn election night winners in particular seats. Interregnums have occurred when the bargaining power of political parties in coalition negotiations has been distorted during the wait for the overseas vote count. The self-fuelling effect refers to the way that political parties chasing ‘free’ overseas votes draw in more voters, and in the end come to rely on them. If this third dynamic continues, New Zealand politicians may well end up institutionalizing some of the promises they make to expatriates in return for their votes.
10. CONCLUSIONS

This chapter draws some final inferences from the findings discussed in the preceding chapters, discusses the wider significance of these inferences, and points out some avenues for future research.

FINDINGS AND INFERENCES

The central conclusion of this thesis is that New Zealand’s emigration state system is unnecessarily incoherent and unfair. This breaks down into three main sets of conclusions, regarding how and why New Zealand relates to its diaspora, and how it should. These conclusions also provide grounds for some more general statements surrounding state-diaspora relations in other contexts.

The first set of conclusions concerns how New Zealand relates to its diaspora. Chapters 7 and 8 called into question the notion that New Zealand has “strategically” tapped the diaspora as a resource, and Chapter 9 showed that the ‘constituency’ view of state-diaspora relations does not quite fit the New Zealand case either. Nevertheless, together these three chapters demonstrated that there is a considerable amount of institutionalized activity concerning emigrants in New Zealand’s state system. In short, although it does not have a clear diaspora strategy, and although the diaspora is not strongly imagined as a constituency, New Zealand has an emigration state system – a subsystem of the wider state system that is dedicated to emigration and relations with the diaspora.

On one hand, New Zealand’s overseas Government missions perform a range of discretionary consular functions, including provision of public space for diaspora community events, dedication of official time and resources to establishing and sustaining diaspora organizations, supporting expatriate media, and maintaining data on expatriates. In addition to such long-standing activities, a number of initiatives concerning expatriates have emerged more recently. Under successive Labour-led coalition governments between 1999 and 2008, the idea of
“harnessing the diaspora” captured the public imagination, and this precipitated into several small-scale, time-limited initiatives to recognize and organize “talented” expatriates. These initiatives have compounded the number of state institutions interacting with emigrants and recognizing or constituting them as members of a ‘diaspora’. On the other hand, New Zealand has gradually accumulated an array of mechanisms for extending substantive citizenship duties and privileges to expatriates, in the form of electoral legislation permitting overseas voting, and an assortment of bilateral and multilateral mechanisms concerning visa-free international mobility, social security portability, and overseas taxation. In sum, New Zealand interacts with emigrants and their descendants through a plurality of institutions that have come into being at different times, for different reasons, at different levels and locations within the state system.

Neither the ‘resource’ nor the ‘constituency’ approach to state-diaspora relations (both discussed in Chapter 2) fully captures what is going on here. On one hand, the largely unplanned and contradictory nature of New Zealand’s various institutions and activities relating to the diaspora undermines the notion that New Zealand is maximizing strategic gains by exploiting its relationship to the diaspora as a resource. On the other hand, policy makers have openly discounted expatriates’ entitlements while expressing interest in their resources. This suggests that the diaspora is not seamlessly integrated into the political community in the manner suggested by the constituency perspective. Instead, it is more useful to think of New Zealand as having an uncoordinated emigration state system.

This lack of coordination is directly related to inefficiencies and injustices in the way New Zealand relates to its diaspora. Firstly, New Zealand’s diaspora policies were formed ad hoc at the point of delivery in four locations: London, Sydney, Paris and Tokyo. There was no single approach to engaging with expatriates, either in principle or in practice, but rather different approaches in different places at different times, which typically – in the locations studied – neither reflected local expatriate demand nor any centrally planned strategy towards expatriates in the region. Moreover, New Zealand’s diaspora policies were contradictory at the
centre of policy formation, in New Zealand. Rather than a “diaspora strategy”, there was a complex policy process fraught with incoherencies at every level. The aim of capitalizing on expatriates’ being overseas was contradicted by the aim of encouraging them not to remain there. The rhetoric of a coordinated approach belied a reality of bureaucratic fragmentation and conflict. And supposed ‘grand plans’ often belied reactive, small-scale, time-limited and disjointed diaspora-related projects.

Secondly, lack of coordination resulted in perceived and actual injustices. The arbitrary differences in cultures of engagement in different overseas missions were frequently a source of frustration for officials and expatriates who took part in the research. More importantly, there was an underlying unfairness in the New Zealand Government’s decision to emphasize expatriates’ filial and patriotic duties while remaining indifferent to their entitlements. Soon after assuming office in 1999, various members of the Labour-led Coalition Government were caught up in an enthusiastic discourse of “harnessing the diaspora”, and began addressing concerns surrounding brain drain and New Zealand’s ageing population by appealing to expatriates to keep contributing – or preferably return – to New Zealand as a patriotic and filial duty. However, only a few months before Economic Development Minister Jim Anderton declared that ‘New Zealanders remained New Zealanders wherever they were’, the New Zealand Government saw its interests served in the withdrawal of social security coverage for most emigrating New Zealanders. The Prime Minister added insult to injury by suggesting these people had “turned their backs” on the country and therefore “should not get a bean”. Moreover, extensive concerns about the ad hoc, outdated and inequitable nature of social security portability arrangements were disregarded on the grounds that arbitrary discrimination against New Zealanders who have lived abroad amounts to positive discrimination in favour of those who have not.

Although this state of affairs is undesirable, for reasons discussed in greater detail below, it does not appear to be unusual. The evidence presented in the thesis as a whole supports the inference that emigration state systems are a regularity of political organization as opposed to a
contingency, contrary to the assumptions of most existing approaches. An international survey of over sixty states in different geopolitical regions and with different government and citizenship types uncovered evidence of emigration state systems in many more states than is conventionally expected. These systems were typically uncoordinated, like New Zealand’s, resulting in a range of inefficient and unjust outcomes. However, some states had coordinated emigration state systems, which managed to improve the coherence and fairness of the system as a whole. As discussed below, Ireland was such a case.

This connects to a second set of conclusions concerning how New Zealand should relate to its diaspora. On one hand, the models explored in Part One of the thesis suggest that New Zealand did not need to relate to the diaspora in an inefficient, unfair way. A number of countries were found to relate to their diasporas in a coordinated fashion, characterized by relative efficiency and fairness. Ireland, for example, systematically went about the development of a “strategic and integrated” policy approach to the diaspora, appointing a Task Force of key stakeholders and experts to investigate the issues and deliver a systematically formulated plan. Key ministers were willing to drive the plan through to an efficient bureaucratic solution which ensured control of costs and public accountability. Moreover, the policy approach that resulted has avoided the illiberal interference that on occasion raises concerns about extra-territorial policies in other contexts. Firstly, Ireland’s recent diaspora policy initiatives do not exploit the diaspora: they are founded on a push for fair recognition of emigrants’ ongoing contributions, sacrifices and commitments to Ireland. Secondly, these policies do not ‘over-serve’ the Irish abroad at the expense of those in Ireland. While settlement of an historical debt to emigrants through welfare-based initiatives is currently the central aim of the Irish Abroad Unit, it also takes an interest in the maintenance and cultivation of Irish culture and heritage activities, with a view to the long-term benefits of maintaining a sympathetic and supportive community around the world. Moreover, a range of state agencies beyond the ambit of the Unit routinely and systematically draw on the diaspora as a resource in the course of public service, in ways that are consonant with the Unit’s activities. In short, a range of measures are in place to ensure
the flow of benefits is not one way. Thirdly, Ireland’s diaspora policies are carefully calibrated so as not to interfere in the domestic affairs of emigrants’ host states. Overseas voting arrangements have been rigorously evaluated to ensure they are consistent with the commitments and sentiments underlying the Good Friday Accord with Britain, and the Irish Government’s funding of second tier welfare services is explicitly designed so as neither to exacerbate divisions within British society (by providing additional services to Irish emigrants that are not available to other British citizens), nor to compensate for any failures of British society or state to adequately protect Irish immigrants.

On the other hand, there are good reasons why New Zealand – and by extension, other states – should develop more efficient and equitable ways of relating to the diaspora. Firstly, uncoordinated emigration state systems may interfere unjustifiably with non-migrants, emigrants and emigrants’ host states. For example, New Zealand’s ad hoc, inequitable and outdated portability restrictions arbitrarily discriminate against and among New Zealanders with overseas entitlements, and among people wishing to take their New Zealand entitlements abroad. These people remain legitimate stakeholders in their country of origin and deserve just treatment. Moreover, these same provisions impose unfair costs on the pension systems of countries that have negotiated social security agreements with New Zealand, and deter many other states from entering into such agreements in the first place. Such injustices are in themselves justifications for change. Emigration state systems, including New Zealand’s, should be deliberately designed to reduce arbitrary and unfair outcomes. As the example of pension portability illustrates, making emigration state systems more equitable and efficient is not achievable only through the design of international instruments such as social security agreements, but must also be effected through the re-design of domestic legislation to appropriately incorporate stake-maintaining emigrants and their descendants. As elaborated below, this entails slightly revised understandings of ‘global migration governance’: ‘global’ entails not only ‘international’ but also ‘transnational’.
Secondly, emigration and transnationalism present sending-states with certain imperatives. On one hand, without either return or ongoing contribution, large-scale skilled emigration represents a serious loss to the source country – a loss that can be counted in human capital or in social costs such as care that expatriates cannot provide, and the unpaid for care that they may one day require themselves, if they return. There are limits on New Zealand’s ability to restrict emigration or to attract expatriates back. From 2005 to 2008 the New Zealand Government made a number of attempts to encourage return migration, through a marketing campaign, a tax holiday and a student-loan interest write-off, but numbers of returning New Zealand citizens have remained stable as ever, and late 2008 witnessed the highest net outflows to Australia ever recorded. In view of these limits, the promotion of positive transnational involvement among emigrants and their descendants is a least worst alternative for offsetting the losses associated with mass emigration. Initial experiments with encouraging positive transnational involvement, such as the Kea initiative, have yielded promising results in terms of building an overseas network of those willing and able to keep contributing to New Zealand society. However, it is unrealistic for New Zealand to continue to expect something for nothing from emigrants, taking an interest in them only insofar as they have something to offer but not genuinely considering their welfare or entitlements. Such an approach is imprudent in the sense that it is unlikely to produce the desired effect.

On the other hand, by providing a safety valve for social problems, emigration can misleadingly appear to remove the imperative to find solutions. Free migration across the Tasman may provide an outlet for those whom New Zealand’s system has failed, but it does not fix those failures. It may merely provide vulnerable New Zealanders with a path to precarious labour in Australia, unprotected by welfare entitlements from either country. This is a situation that the European ‘guestworker’ schemes of yesteryear should have taught policy makers to avoid. Findings from Chapter 6 of this thesis add to growing evidence (see Hamer 2007, 2008) that Māori in Australia are particularly vulnerable to this trajectory, bearing marks of historical disadvantage carried over from New Zealand and being subject to new forms of discrimination
in their destination. Labour-led governments between 1999 and 2008 certainly never tried to ‘close’ this ‘gap’. New Zealand cannot hope to address social problems, such as inequality and discrimination, by exporting them. In an increasingly interconnected world, such problems tend not to just ‘go away’.

Thirdly and finally, by systematically developing a relationship with its diaspora, New Zealand can contribute to the development of more equitable and efficient forms of what Betts (2008) terms “global migration governance”. Expanding while clearly defining the role of sending states in the management of international migration represents a middle way between a global migration governance characterized (or rather proscribed) by dogmatic adherence to the notion of absolute and inviolable state sovereignty, and one defined by the submission of states to an overweening international bureaucracy. Systematic acknowledgement that states and diasporas can and should, within clearly agreed and understood limits, maintain legitimate stakes in each other, offers a viable route to peacefully integrating diasporas within the international system, to which they must otherwise continue to represent an anomaly and a threat.

From these general conclusions there flow a number of specific implications for how New Zealand – and by extension, other liberalizing states – should relate to their diasporas. These normative claims concern both the aims and the implementation of policies concerning emigrants and their descendants. Firstly, the thesis argues that New Zealand should relate to its diaspora in a coordinated fashion. Responsibility for ‘joining up’ the existing activities of different agencies and designing new initiatives should be concentrated in one properly resourced, empowered, and accountable state agency. Secondly, the thesis argues that the underlying aim of New Zealand’s policies should be to be to avoid unfair interference with migrants, non-migrants and host-states. The existing ad hoc approach constitutes interference with expatriates by default. As part of a coordinated approach, the duties and privileges of New Zealanders abroad should be fairly balanced with those of resident New Zealanders. Just as expatriates’ rights must come with proportionate obligations, it is neither fair nor realistic to
impose (or imply) duties without consistently defending expatriates’ entitlements. New Zealand’s emigration state system needs to better integrate the concerns of diasporic and other citizens on the same issues. This is not to say that all in the diaspora should necessarily have exactly the same rights and obligations as other members. Rather, the level of privilege a person – resident or expatriate – enjoys should be better matched to the differential level of duty one has accepted. Thirdly, New Zealand’s formal policies towards the diaspora should be sensitive not to intrude in the domestic affairs of migrants’ host countries, for example by frustrating the integration of migrants into their host society or free-riding on their pension provisions. As Chapter 6 reinforced, all available evidence suggests that transnationalism and integration are compatible. If it has been possible for countries like Ireland and Mexico (Délano Forthcoming) to “engage the diaspora” against the historical background of testy bilateral relations, it should be possible for New Zealand.

The final set of conclusions drawn from the thesis begins to explore the implications of and explanations for the current state of affairs. On one hand, the findings support the notion that entanglement within New Zealand’s web of extra-territorial institutions cultivates and sustains diasporic attachments of varying thickness. There was a strong correlation between the historically contingent regional variations in New Zealand’s discretionary consular services and variations in expatriates’ diasporic attachments. Notwithstanding limitations on the generalizability of the Every One Counts dataset, analysis strongly suggests that diasporic membership is relatively ‘thick’ in distant UK & Ireland and relatively ‘thin’ in next-door Australia – an unexpected result that contradicts conventional theoretical expectations. This thesis has not set out to examine the full range of explanations for such variation, and cannot therefore explain it conclusively. However, one factor was the role of regionally different diaspora policies in recognizing and constituting diasporic identities. For example, Chapter 7 showed that provision of public space and official time to migrants and their associations varied widely among overseas government missions, and that such services were often crucial to the establishment and sustainability of expatriate ‘civic’ organizations. Chapters 6-9 showed how
interaction among expatriates and New Zealand’s public institutions has taken place relatively uninterrupted over a long period in the UK & Ireland, whereas in Australia, New Zealand’s public institutions have been progressively withdrawn from expatriates.

On the other hand, comparison between emigration state systems in New Zealand and Ireland begins to suggest explanations for how New Zealand’s system has come about. In Chapter 5 it was shown that the coordination in Ireland’s system has come about through a long experience of emigration and transnational connection, in which recent peace and prosperity have permitted the belated settlement of an historical debt to the diaspora. By contrast, for New Zealanders, migration has traditionally meant immigration, and migration policy has meant immigration policy. Against this background, it is often forgotten not only that every immigrant is also an emigrant, with ties of some description to a place of origin, but that New Zealand has emigrants at all. Indeed, mass emigration has taken off only relatively recently, and there has not been time for an institutionally thick form of diasporic membership to accumulate. However, it may not be long before New Zealand’s state system begins to bear the imprint of an increasingly numerous overseas electorate, and stronger diaspora organizations such as Kea New Zealand which lobby on the diaspora’s behalf. New Zealand and Ireland’s historically different experiences of migration help to explain why the two countries relate to their diasporas in different ways. Moreover, they also suggest that the two countries may have lessons for each other: New Zealand’s long experience of immigration management may help Ireland to arrive at ways of managing its recent unprecedented population inflows, while Ireland’s long experience of relating to its diaspora may provide lessons for New Zealand in developing relations with its numerous expatriates.

**Contributions**

This thesis makes two sets of contributions to the literature on migration, diasporas and transnationalism; one is empirical while the other is more conceptual. On one hand, the thesis presents a large amount of new, hard-to-access empirical data on a highly relevant topic, through analysis of a novel case. Over 190 policy makers, business leaders, migrant association
leaders, and independent migrants participated in the research. It was carried out in eight
countries and it involved detailed field-notes covering over 80 events, as well as the
examination of a substantial number of previously unpublished official documents. The thesis
also contains the first detailed analysis of the largest ever survey of New Zealand expatriates,
which was designed with the author’s assistance. The thesis presents significant evidence and
insights from this substantial body of qualitative and quantitative empirical research.

On the other hand, the thesis makes three main conceptual contributions, two of which can be
described as essentially positive (regarding how, and to a lesser extent why, states relate to
their diasporas) and the other as more normative (regarding how they should).

Firstly, the concept of an ‘emigration state system’ highlights processes that are obscured by
the static approaches of most previous studies of state diaspora relations. Existing studies focus
on the few states with coordinated diaspora engagement policies, approaching them from
either the ‘resource’ or the ‘constituency’ angle, based on relatively static understandings of the
concepts of ‘diaspora’, ‘state’ and ‘citizenship’. This thesis shows that, even when there is no
state-wide "diaspora strategy”, and even when the diaspora is not considered an integral
constituency of the state, there may be an emigration state system. Beyond the relatively rare
coordinated diaspora engagement efforts of a few states lies an unexplored realm of institutions
and practices through which relations between diasporas and homelands are formalized. The
emigration state system is a noteworthy form of political organization whose different
geographical manifestations are yet to be fully mapped out. The thesis is significant in the sense
that it provides an analytical framework that can be applied to many more states, opening up a
major new comparative research agenda.

Secondly, the concept of an ‘emigration state system’ makes specific contributions to emerging
theories of the “migration state” (Hollifield 2004, 2007, 2009). It widens the concept of the
migration state beyond international relations theory, opening the ‘black box’ of the realist
state to reveal a more complex set of processes involved in the management of different types
and aspects of migration. It provides analytical tools for examining the most overlooked aspects of migration management: emigration management. And it suggests that, rather than thinking of migration states as either managing immigration or managing emigration – through examples such as Canada and the Philippines – it may be more useful to think of migration states as simultaneously managing both immigration and emigration. From this perspective, cases like New Zealand and Ireland, which are increasingly faced with managing inflows, outflows and transit flows all at once, may more closely approach the concept of the “migration state”.

Finally, the thesis also makes contributions to normative theories regarding the relationship between states and emigrants. These contributions are specifically relevant to New Zealand, but also have broader application to liberalizing states. Emigration state systems are not only characteristic of states spilling aggressively beyond their borders, dominated by radical nationalist ideologies, or gripped by authoritarian regimes. They are also found in liberal democracies such as New Zealand, which are ethnically diverse and adhere to more or less multicultural models of citizenship. This makes it somewhat problematic to treat emigration state systems as illiberal. Indeed, they appear to be integral elements of liberal democratic states. This subtly changes the modern concept of the liberal democratic state as one which adheres strictly to a symmetry of state, nation and territory. The territorial dividing seems less reliable as a rule of thumb for deciding who is a consenting citizen and who is a dissenting exile, and consequently what distinguishes the legitimate and the illegitimate exercise of governmental power. In this type of analysis, the model established at Westphalia is held up to the light.

Thus, the concept of an emigration state system has significance as a lens through which to analyze the changing relationships between migration and the nation-state. It brings into focus one of the most significant manifestations of contemporary transnationalism, and allows analysis to reach past ‘methodologically nationalist’ assumptions about the symmetry of state, nation and territory. In this sense, the concept provides access to debates about relationships between globalization and political organization more generally, inviting alternatives to the
“modern geopolitical” way of imagining world politics. For example, it invites questions about the place, scale and structure of governmental mechanisms for managing not only migration but other global flows as well.

**Future Research Directions**

This thesis comes at a time when researchers are intensively developing analytical tools to understand the relationship between globalization and the nation-state. The thesis has begun to contribute to this work, by looking at how processes originating within the nation-state system (the institutional incorporation of emigrants and their descendants) help to constitute global phenomena (transnational identities and behaviour). However, out of necessity owing to the constraints of a doctoral project, it also bypasses or skims over lines of inquiry that ought to be pursued in future research.

Firstly, there is a need for more extensive and rigorous analysis of how and to what extent diaspora policies constitute diasporic identities and activities. When studying the determinants of diasporic attachments, it is necessary to more rigorously address questions such as, How important are diaspora policies relative to other factors such as inclusion and exclusion within the host society? How is the institutional ‘cohesion’ of overseas Government missions related to its ‘culture’ of discretionary consular service provision? As the analysis in Chapter 6 has hinted, there is more to be mined from the Every One Counts survey that may help to address these questions, particularly if combined comparatively with other sources of data. For example, more extensive comparison of Every One Counts data with national data in New Zealand and in migrants’ countries of residence could lead to further insights into the causes of diasporic attachment. In addition, further work on the development and activity of migrant associations will help to clarify and deepen understanding of their relationship to government institutions.

Secondly, there is a need for more rigorous analysis of how this relationship works in reverse; that is, how does the thickening of diasporas – and indeed the expansion, intensification and acceleration of globalization in general – feed into the formation of emigration state systems?
Both geographical and historical approaches are needed to explore this question more fully. On one hand, more geographical explorations are needed to investigate how emigration state systems vary from place to place. More rigorous comparative research, developing the initial explorations presented in Chapter 4, is needed to understand how the formation of emigration state systems is affected by political processes at various scales. This thesis has focused at the transnational scale – but more attention to the international scale – to discussions on migration and development and global migration governance going on, for example, in and around the United Nations system – is needed in order to better understand how emigration state systems are currently being constituted by processes at the ‘global’ level. On the other hand, more historical explorations are needed in order to understand how the formation and dissipation of emigration state systems has been affected by earlier waves of globalization. This thesis has uncovered evidence that the older elements of New Zealand’s emigration state system flourished during an earlier wave of globalization on different terms, under the British Imperial system. More historical research on the development of particular state institutions could help to understand whether emigration state systems resemble configurations found in earlier systems of government, or whether they are unique to the current wave of globalization.
## APPENDIX 1: PARTICIPANTS

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**APPENDIX 2: EVENTS**

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<td>Hyatt Hotel, Roppongi, Tokyo</td>
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<td>Ngā Hau e Whā Māori Club Workshop</td>
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<td>Diaspora Knowledge Networks Conference, Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<td>Combined NZ Groups Leaders lunch seminar with Finance Minister Michael Cullen</td>
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<td>Metropolis Plus Conference</td>
<td>Te Papa Tongarewa, Wellington</td>
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<td>Diaspora Strategy Workshop, National University of Ireland</td>
<td>Maynooth</td>
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## APPENDIX 3: ONLINE AND OTHER DOCUMENTARY SOURCES

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| **Membership-based email lists** |                  |              |
| Kea Netherlands                 | 67               | 17/11/05     |
| Kea New York                    | 55               | 27/10/05     |
| Kea China                       | 83               | 25/04/06     |
| Kea North America               | 18               | 16/05/08     |
| Kea Australia                   | 65               | 30/05/07     |
| Kea UK                          | 80               | 25/11/05     |
| Kea New England                 | 45               | 13/10/05     |
| Kea Los Angeles                 | 42               | 11/10/05     |
| Kea Silicon Valley/San Francisco| 4                | 18/10/05     |
| Kea New Zealand - Global Updates / Opportunities Updates | 46 | 08/11/05 |
| Kea Sydney                      | 26               | 21/12/05     |
| Kea Middle East - Occasional Mailouts | 1 | 23/04/06 |
| Kea Melbourne                   | 3                | 15/02/07     |
| NZ High Commission (London) Information Mailing Lists (for media and NZ Groups) | 163 | 02/11/05 |
| Oxford University Australia New Zealand Society Mailing List | 283 | 17/10/05 |
| New Zealand London Connections Mailing List | 18 | 07/12/05 |
| **Total**                       | **999**          |              |

| **Subscription News Services**  |                  |              |
| Mailert-in-oz.com Mailing List  | 20               | 30/03/07     |
| New Zealand News UK (Newspaper Archive, and KiwLink email list) | 27 | 25/11/05 |
| New Zealand Inspired            | 113              | 17/04/07     |
| North & South Magazine          |                  |              |
| New Zealand Listener            |                  |              |
| New Zealand Herald              |                  |              |
| Leaafs Nextra News Searches     |                  |              |

| **Websites regularly consulted** |                  |              |
| www.kea nz.com                  |                  |              |
| www.newzealand.gov.nz           |                  |              |
| www.workandlive.govt.nz (International Agreements) | | |
| www.mfat.govt.nz (Treaties and International Law) | | |
| www.taxpolicy.ird.govt.nz/international/OTA/index.html | | |
| New Zealand High Commission, London | | |
| New Zealand High Commission, Canberra and Consulate-General, Sydney | | |
| New Zealand Embassy, Paris      |                  |              |
| New Zealand Embassy, Tokyo      |                  |              |
| www.safetravel.govt.nz          |                  |              |
| www.moh.govt.nz (Bilateral Healthcare Agreements) | | |

| **Government Archives**         |                  |              |
| Appendices to the Journals of the House of Representatives E9 | | | 1914 |
## Appendix 4: Documents Obtained under New Zealand’s Official Information Act

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<td>OIA1</td>
<td>Cabinet Economic Development Committee Paper</td>
<td>28/02/05</td>
<td>Department of Labour</td>
<td>Temporary Exemption from Tax on Foreign Income for New Migrants and Certain Returning New Zealanders</td>
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<td>Cabinet Economic Development Committee Paper</td>
<td>02/03/05</td>
<td>Department of Labour</td>
<td>Temporary Exemption from Tax on Foreign Income for New Migrants and Certain Returning New Zealanders</td>
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<td>OIA3</td>
<td>Cabinet Policy Committee Paper</td>
<td>09/06/05</td>
<td>Department of Labour</td>
<td>Keeping in Touch: New Opportunities for Expatriate New Zealanders</td>
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<td>OIA4</td>
<td>Cabinet Policy Committee Minute</td>
<td>15/06/05</td>
<td>Department of Labour</td>
<td>Keeping in Touch: New Opportunities for Expatriate New Zealanders</td>
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<td>Cabinet Minute</td>
<td>20/06/05</td>
<td>Department of Labour</td>
<td>Keeping in Touch: New Opportunities for Expatriate New Zealanders</td>
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<td>OIA6</td>
<td>Briefing Paper</td>
<td>15/12/05</td>
<td>Department of Labour</td>
<td>GIF Report Back: Supporting ‘Top Talent’</td>
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<td>OIA7</td>
<td>Department of Labour Briefing Note Tracker 05/52720</td>
<td>15/12/05</td>
<td>Department of Labour</td>
<td>GIF Report Back - Supporting Top Talent</td>
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* Given in person by Wynn Olsen, Department of Internal Affairs. Cited with permission. 

** Supplied by email by the requester and used with permission.
### Appendix 5: Documents Obtained under Ireland’s Freedom of Information Act

Note: All the documents listed below were obtained by Dr. Paul Rouse through Official Requests under Ireland’s Freedom of Information Act, and are used here with Dr. Rouse’s explicit permission. Individual names (except those of elected politicians) have been replaced by departmental designations in order to protect individuals’ privacy (DETE: Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment; DFA: Department of Foreign Affairs, FIN: Finance). The number of recipients per department has also been indicated (e.g. DFA x 3).

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<td>12/12/2001</td>
<td>Statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Brian Cowen T.D. At the press launch of the Task Force on Policy regarding Emigrants</td>
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<td>FIA61</td>
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<td>31/05/2002</td>
<td>Comments and Suggestions on “Cherishing the Irish Abroad” Draft Report of the Task Force on Policy Regarding Emigrants</td>
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<td>FIA64</td>
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<td>Vote 34 - Enterprise, Trade and Employment, Appropriation Account 2001, Subhead V - DION - Emigrant Welfare Services Grants</td>
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