Chaos, “the other of order,” is pure negativity. It is the denial of all that the order strives to be. It is against that negativity that the positivity of order constitutes itself. But the negativity of chaos is a product of order’s self-constitution: its side-effect, its waste, and yet the condition sine qua non of its (reflective) possibility. Without the negativity of chaos, there is no positivity of order; without chaos, no order.

—Zygmunt Bauman (1991:7)

Introduction
The nation-state is frequently cast as an entity in crisis, as a relic that cannot withstand the shock of globalization. Its viability and legitimacy are threatened by instant global communications, push-button investment strategies, outsourced manufacturing, increased international migration, and vociferous national minorities. Europeans, in particular, have challenged the nation-state through the deepening and widening of the European Union (EU). While far from denying the veracity of these observations, this article attempts to develop a more nuanced characterization of the relationship between the
nation-state and the threats it encounters from globalization. Focusing on the case of Soviet-era migrants and national minorities in Estonia, the article suggests that the key task is not determining the extent to which the state is (or is not) retreating from the pressure of globalization. This question ultimately reifies the state. Instead, favoring a performative approach, this article asks how the nation-state is constituted in the banal legal and diplomatic practices that reproduce, and are produced by, such binary oppositions as citizen/alien, majority/minority, security/crisis, safety/threat, and domestic/foreign. Performativity posits a radical negation of the autonomous actor. It focuses on how subject positions are constituted as effects of reiterative and citational practices that construct fundamental differences between subjects and conceal those subjects’ lack of ontological foundations. As such, that which the nation-state (or, more accurately, the individuals authorized to act in its name) identifies as an objective, external intrusion into its territorial/cultural space, performativity sees as a discursively-produced encounter that generates the effects of pre-given and mutually exclusive “sovereign nations” and “immigrants.” Each subject position—nation-state and migrant—is only viable and intelligible in relation to the other. Thus, the “crisis” resulting from the latter’s entry into the former’s sovereign space is, counter-intuitively, essential to the nation-state because its identity can only be articulated in relation to the differences (i.e. threats) that it inscribes in its own bureaucratic practices. Far from inducing the nation-state’s demise, “crisis” (and globalization by extension) is the condition of its possibility.

This article focuses on international migrants and national minorities for two inter-related reasons. First, despite the decomposition of the Weberian state in Europe brought on by neoliberalism, global capitalism, and an increased European integration, citizenship remains firmly in the competence of EU member-states. Relinquishing this prerogative would deprive the state of the legitimacy to speak in the name of the nation for which it exists. This legitimacy depends upon the state’s ability to control the distinction between “national” and “non-national.” International migrants—justly or unjustly—intrude upon the intimate relationship between the citizen and the nation-state. Even if they are welcome, immigrants always leave the state vulnerable to the charge that it is failing to prioritize its own nationals. Second, and closely related, within this logical frame immigrants constitute an inherent national security risk insofar as they wedge themselves between the nation and the state. This problematic continues into the next phase of an immigrant’s life: the acquisition of citizenship and the subsequent attainment of national
minority status. According to European minority rights agreements, only upon
gaining citizenship—after they have naturalized the identity of the nation-
state—are immigrants eligible for national minority rights, which themselves
are subordinated to the nation-state’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and
requirements for public order (cf. Council of Europe 1995a, preamble, 1995b,
para 44). As such, the immigrant-minority’s presence in the territorial state is
also perceived through the lens of crisis and national security. Diplomacy and
international law likewise assume that inter-state relations are facilitated
when each participating state represents a clearly established national major-
ity. International minority rights agreements are instruments to this end.
Even though these agreements support multiculturalism and integration,
 intra- and inter-state security practices start from a culturally fundamentalist
premise: that individuals are carriers of a national culture, that national
groups exist ontologically, and that these groups are inherently prone to con-
flict (Stolcke 1995). Indeed, policymakers in Europe are increasingly framing
cultural politics in terms of national security, a trend that is tied to the neo-
right’s success in placing immigration into mainstream political debates.
Therefore, this article acknowledges “internationalism” as an important
object of anthropological and historical study (Malkki 1994:41, 1995a:41)
because national security is no longer conceived only in explicit military terms
but rather in vaguer, softer “cultural” terms.

The article firstly argues for the importance of a performative approach to
studying power relations. Developed primarily in the context of gender rela-
tions, performativity offers crucial insights into the modes in which actors
(states, nations, immigrants, and minorities) are constituted as political sub-
jects in relational practices. This differs from much of the anthropological lit-
erature on relations between the state and the immigrant-minority as the lat-
ter often obscures the politics of subjectification—or the processes whereby
individuals are constituted as social beings—in favor of investigating the shift-
ing dynamics between these ostensibly autonomous actors. Next, I rely on a
performative approach to examine how Estonia’s trajectory from its 1991
break from the Soviet Union to its 2004 accession to the EU was enabled
through the construction of Russian-speakers as security threats by virtue of
cultural difference. Such a construction was integral to the reification of the
Estonian nation and to international efforts to consolidate the Estonian state
so that the state could effectively manage this “alien” population. To accom-
plish this task, the article first explains the European legal and diplomatic
logic through which the more radical of the two Estonian independence
movements succeeded in denying citizenship to Soviet-era Russian-speakers. They achieved this goal through a western-recognized argument for the restoration of the pre-Soviet Estonian Republic that enabled them to clearly articulate a legal distinction between “citizen” and “alien” that corresponded to ethnic Estonian and Soviet-era Russian-speaker respectively. The article then shows how western and Estonian officials framed Russian-speakers in Estonia as a “security problem” that should be mitigated by transferring their loyalty to the Estonian state through their integration into Estonian cultural space. It lastly highlights the western diplomatic community’s pro-active role in achieving this objective through its support for an Estonian integration policy that, ironically, aims to establish the “Estonian cultural domain.”

The Estonian case is significant not simply because of its dramatic tale of independence regained for Estonians, of citizenship lost for Russian-speakers, and of subsequent western-supported efforts to establish Estonian cultural hegemony. Instead, this drama brings into relief the mundane role of cultural fundamentalism in shaping relations between the state and the immigrant-minority across Europe, and the broader European link between security and minority demographics. The Estonian nation and state certainly suffered a “crisis” by virtue of illegal Soviet annexation in 1940 and of subsequent waves of immigration from other Soviet republics that radically altered Estonia’s demographic balance. (Among EU member states, only Latvia has higher percentage of minorities and non-citizens in its total population.) The point here, however, is not simply to detail Estonia’s particular historical path. Rather, it is to illustrate how the culturally fundamentalist assumptions inherent in diplomacy and statecraft allowed the identification of “crisis” both to justify post-Soviet Estonia’s restrictive citizenship and integration policy and to facilitate its accession to the EU in May 2004. The broader application of the Estonian case to the European nation-state becomes evident if we investigate, not only Estonia’s particular national history, but also the ways in which the discursively produced opposition between “national” and “Other”—and “security” and “crisis”—perpetuates of the nation-state as form of macro-political organization in Europe. For this opposition has done much to channel separate historical processes in similar ways among different nation-states. Thus, while politics of Estonia’s current demographic situation results from a significantly different set of historical circumstances than Denmark, for example, the relations between the state and the immigrant-minority still occur through a similar process of mutual constitution. Be it Spain, Denmark, or the UK, a tension always exists between the extent to
which the state officially permits minority culture to develop and the extent
to which it pressures minorities to conform to the culture in whose name the
state exists. A mundane assumption of European statecraft remains that an
(inter)national security crisis results from the unmanaged interaction
between putatively discrete national groups within a single state’s territorial
space. A performative approach shows that “crisis” is not an objective condi-
tion that threatens the viability of the nation-state per se, but rather an
ascriptive category that generates the identity of the actor that does the actual
ascribing. The state and “crisis”—like the “nation” and the “immigrant-
minority”—are the mutually dependent products of discursively produced
binary oppositions.

**Toward Statecraft as a Relational Practice**

During the 1990s it became commonplace to argue that the traditional
nation-state was in crisis by virtue of internal fragmentation resulting from
excessive heterogeneity and of blurriness and dislocation resulting from
intensified global flows. For example, Nagengast (1994:109) sets up an analy-
sis of anthropological research on the state and violence by pointing to the cri-
sis resulting from the contradiction between the state and the demands of
peripheralized peoples. In rethinking the relationship between globality and
modernity, Appadurai (1996:19) argues that not only is the nation-state in cri-
sis, but the very system of nation-states as each state is only sensible in refer-
ence to the others (Appadurai 1996:19). In arguing for a macro-anthropology
that would examine how clusters of meaning are pulled out of global cultur-
al flows, Hannerz (1992:22) de-emphasizes how the state (and the inter-state
system) engages with those flows. He cautiously suggests elsewhere that the
state can survive the decline of the nation by invoking less exclusive forms of
identity (1996:81-82). From this vantage point, one might conclude that the
state would adapt to the times by promoting either a multicultural identity
(Kymlicka 1995) or a postnational identity (Soysal 1994) rather than cling to a
discrete national identity. All of the above suggests that as the nation-state
declines so should the amount of analytical attention it receives.

More recently, however, anthropologists have come to rethink the decline
of the nation and state (Aretxaga 2003:393-95). Some have examined the
strengthening of state borders in an otherwise globalized era (Weldes et al
1999, 8; Wilson and Donnan 1998), while others have focused on the growth
of the state violence (Sluka 2000, Skidmore 2003, Nordstrom and Martin
In the European context, many anthropologists are focusing on the rise of neo-nationalism and xenophobia which constructs otherness through alleged fundamental differences in culture rather than old-fashioned racial hierarchies (Carter 1997, Cole 1997, Gullestad 2002, Hervik forthcoming; Holmes 2000, Linke 2004, Stolcke 1995). Other research shows how the state attempts to differentiate itself from neo-nationalists while retaining the centrality of the nation. Some European states now seek to incorporate, co-opt, and appropriate immigrants and minorities in order to close off national boundaries without crassly excluding “Others.” Two examples include Islam de France instead of Islam en France (Bowen 2004) and ‘neoliberal nationalism’ in Estonia (G. Feldman 2005).

While this work has come a long way in explaining the complex dynamics between nations, states, minorities, and immigrants, it can go further in interrogating the processes that constitute these actors in fields of power relations. Though they signify a shift in opinion, arguments about the nation-state’s durability do not alter the terms in which earlier arguments about the interstate system’s demise were made. In other words, analyses from either perspective implicitly start from the premise of coherent, a priori, inter-connected states that either withstand or give in to globalization. This is not to say that anthropologists reify the nation or the state. To be sure, the state as a social construction is a staple in the anthropological literature. Nonetheless, anthropologists have not fully demystified the processes that animate the state as a subject position in opposition to other positions such as the immigrant and national minority. As such, it leaves the impression that the state and nation are autonomous actors—even if socially constructed and changing through time—that exist independently of the external forces that intrude upon it. Gupta and Ferguson (1997: 12-13) call attention to this methodological issue when arguing that even though identity is historically contingent, it is important to note that identity is not simply affected by changing classificatory schemes (e.g. citizen-resident-alien-refugee). Such a claim still assumes an a priori subject. Without fully elaborating the means by which identities are rendered sensible in routine practices, then it is understandable that research on relations between the state and the immigrant-minority (and the state-globalization nexus more generally) fluctuates between the views that the nation-state is either declining or reconsolidating. An assumption persists that the nation-state is locked in zero-sum game with globalization. In contrast, the article attempts to reconceptualize the relationship between the state and the immigrant-minority as mutually constitutive. To understand the
current condition of the inter-state system the pivotal question is how that system “sees,” categorizes, and attempts to manage an otherwise illegible sea of humanity (Scott 1998). While the representatives of the European inter-state system conduct these practices differently—and certainly more liberally—than in years past, it does not appear that they have abandoned the basic culturally fundamentalist assumptions that sustain these relational practices.

The State and the Other: A Performative Encounter

If the aim is to demonstrate how “crisis” enables, rather than objectively threatens, the nation-state, then it is important to distinguish between a liberal and a performative approach to power relations. The basic question itself of whether immigrants and national minorities threaten the nation-state rests on liberal assumptions about pre-given, autonomous subjects who, at best, negotiate their disagreements in a neutral legal register or, at worst, violently confront each other. Starting from this point, one need only find a reliable technique to measure which subject (the state or the immigrant-minority) is gaining the upper hand and then proceed to theorize the change. This approach, however, narrowly portrays power in negative terms: as a zero-sum game between actors that will result in either victory for one and defeat for the other or compromise for both. It thus misses the politics of subjectification and contributes to the reification of social actors. As Foucault’s (1990:154-55) characterization of the relationship between “sex” and “power” has been instructive in understanding the mutual constitution of opposing subjects, it is worth reiterating here. Rather than see sex as an apriori, irreducible urge that power attempts to dominate and from which sex attempts to liberate itself, sex ought to be understood as the result of contingent practices of sexuality that have been constituted in relation to scientific practices claiming to identify deviations from that urge. In other words, the scientific claim of an a priori “sex” urge, to which specific sexual practices naturally or unnaturally correspond, “makes it possible to evade what gives ‘power’ its power; it enables one to conceive power solely as law and taboo” (155). Underwritten by scientific authority and cloaked in a veil of objectivity, this juridical notion of power effectively produces the same subject—sex—that it claims to neutrally identify in scientific practices. Accepting the juridical approach obscures the processes through which these actors—sexual deviants and authority—are cast in opposition and become subject to political contestation. Power operates in the constitution of subjects and not only after those subjects come into contact.
Likewise, the ideas that immigrants and minorities attempt to liberate themselves from the oppression of the state and that the state attempts to constrain them in order to protect the nation also evades the processes that render this opposition imaginable and prompt it into confrontation. This rendition of subjectivity fails to account for the discursive regime—or the productive aspect of power—that enables both the claim that distinct cultural groups ontologically exist and the exclusionist politics that subsequently follow. It also leaves scholars in the uncomfortable position of having to accept this essentialist conceptualization of the problem, when this conceptualization is precisely where the critique should begin. The operative question is how the deployment of the idea that cultures are discrete and originate from distinct territorial spaces generates opposing subjectivities whose unregulated co-existence in the same state constitutes a national security threat. Noriel stresses the importance of this point with regard to immigration in France:

History shows that when the criteria defining ‘immigration’ are transferred from the juridical to the cultural or ‘ethnic’ realm, the question of origins becomes a fundamental problem, one that has profoundly affected French political life since the late nineteenth century and that has harmed many people (1996:xxvii).

A crucial step in demonstrating the state’s dependency on its identification of external crisis is exposing the lack of an inherent connection between actors and actions. In other words, the act of identifying a crisis does not imply an a priori state that conducted the act, but rather the act itself constitutes the state. The state only exists insofar as actions are conducted in its name. By the mid 1990s, feminist anthropologists had usefully elaborated this perspective on subjectivity vis-à-vis gender identity with an approach developed by Judith Butler (1990, 1992, 1993) that became known as performativity (Morris 1995:569). Performativity has direct applications to the mutual constitution of the state and the immigrant-minority that can help us move away from the liberal, zero-sum game approach to the state/globalization nexus.

Regarding gender, feminist anthropologists demonstrated that sex and gender are not inherently linked so that gender can no longer be reduced to a mere cultural elaboration of biological sex (Mouffe 1986, Ortner and Whitehead 1981). This move demanded a theoretical explanation for the relationship between sex and gender (Collier and Yanagisako 1987, Morris 1995: 568). Thus, in a Foucauldian vein, the interpretation of biological sex as the
root cause of gender became recognized as a function, rather than a cause, of socially produced discourses of femininity and masculinity (de Lauretis 1987, Morris 1995:568-569). As such, Butler argues that gender is not as essence but rather a set of acts that produce the effect of a coherent substance and conceal gender's lack of a stable foundation (Butler 1990:145; see also Sedgwick 1990). Gender is not something that one has, but rather something that one does. It is “the stylized repetition of acts through time” (141) that sustain the idea that biological sex precedes gender. Repetition is crucial because the subject has “no ontological status apart from the various acts which constitutes its reality” (Butler 1999:173). It must therefore achieve such a substantializing effect through a regulated process of repetitive practices that inscribe differences between itself and other putatively autonomous actors (145). The line of argumentation ultimately derives from Nietzsche (1956:178-79) who famously wrote that “…there is no ‘being’ behind the doing, acting, becoming; the ‘doer’ has simply been added to the deed by the imagination—the doing is everything.”

Drawing explicitly on Butler, Campbell (1998:9-12) also demonstrates how the state constitutes itself through the repetitious identification of “threat” in foreign policy. He argues that the state’s identity is only intelligible in relation to difference, so the inscription of boundaries, outside of which “threat” is located, is a necessary condition of the state’s existence. The act of identifying “threat” plays a positive role in producing the effect of a pre-given state even though threat is negatively framed as an external intrusion that could induce the state’s demise. Moreover, if the act of identifying threat was to desist, then the state would desist as well. The state cannot legitimize itself as the protector of the nation without the idea of a threat, which is automatically invoked by the very idea of a discrete nation. Indeed, “for a state to end its practices of representation would be to expose its lack of prediscursive foundations; stasis would be death” (11). Fuglerud (2004:33) similarly notes that immigration officers in Norway liken the state to the king in chess, representing it as constantly under threat from a potential “flood” and “invasion” of asylum-seekers and only able to maintain sovereignty if it repositions itself to strike back through tighter regulations. Crucially, these practices of representation generate the very threat by which the state constitutes itself testifying to Butler’s point that it is the “reiterative power of discourse to produce the phenomena that it regulates and constrains” (Butler 1993:2). Therefore, an increase in international migration and vociferous minority politics—that which is conventionally identified as a source of potential crisis—provides the
state with vital opportunities to reiterate its identity against these “threats” that the state itself reifies and regulates through law and public policy.

Nonetheless, it is necessary but not sufficient to argue that the subject—nation, state, immigrant, minority, man, woman, etc.—is socially constructed through repetitious acts. More deeply, the subject is constituted by means of opposing or alternative positions, which also lack an a priori existence (Butler 1992:9, see also Lloyd 1999:195-198). With ontological foundations lacking all around, the question must focus on the discursive assumptions enabling specific relational practices embedded in institutional arrangements that construct essentialized subjects in reference to each other (Trouillot 2001:125-26). De Genova (2002:422) makes this point when noting that migrant “illegality” is a “social relation that is fundamentally inseparable from citizenship.” Grinker (1998) similarly argues that south Korean discourses of unification with north Korea, ironically, are essential to consolidating a south Korean identity against the threat of north Korean dominance. Again, the viability of one identity demands the inscription of threat in its putative opposite. The importance of relationality is most dramatically illustrated by Susan Buck-Morss’s (cited in A. Feldman 1991:7-8) commentary on a 1930s photograph of two policemen escorting a German Jew down a boulevard. The Jew has been stripped of his shoes and trousers, and he wears a placard on his chest reading “I am a Jew but I have no complaints about the Nazis.” This spectacle is a point of intersection among a multitude of actors, which generates social identities through the production of political oppositions and unequal power relations. The German policemen are not walking an individual per se down the street, but rather a social type. (The policemen and the onlookers are also social types.) This type, however, carries no inherent, a priori significance, but rather its significance is rendered in spectacle itself. The Jew constitutes what Allen Feldman (1991:8) calls a “surface of axial representation,” or a site where the crowd, the state, and the Jew exchange messages about otherness and community. The key point is that subjects only obtain significance in a complex web of contingent and relational practices. They are not the effect of an internal act of self-identification that reveals the true essence of their being, though a liberal approach to power relations would see it as such.

Performativity, then, is not simply about the social construction of subjects, but rather it is about the discursively-regulated practices that inscribe boundaries between subjects and reify them in that very process. To bring this point back to the study of minority-state relations in Europe, Stolcke notes how such that relational practices apply to the construction of cultural differ-
ences and the identification of threat that follows. In her comment on Grillo, she notes that

cultural fundamentalism/essentialism does reify culture, but it is in reality about relationships between cultures as understood as bounded, internally homogenous, integrated and exclusive sets of values, behavior and meanings which are thought to be inevitably threatened by foreigners who by definition have a different culture (2003:176, original emphasis).

Critical examinations of citizenship, minority rights, and integration policy—a pivotal location of the nation-state’s legitimacy and authority—must focus on how cultural fundamentalism underwrites these policies and generates the differences/threats that they claim to neutrally identify. These practices depend upon Malkki’s (1992:37, 1995b:5) notion of the “national order of things” in which the world is composed of territorialized and essentialized cultures. This metaphor creates a situation whereby the state’s legitimacy is predicated upon its ability to control the definition of immigrant and national minority. Otherwise, the state could not control the distinctions between either the immigrant and the citizen or the national minority and the national majority. This situation would moot the nation-state as it would terminate its most crucial practice of representation: the identification of non-nationals. Managing the potential crisis allegedly presented by the immigrant’s arrival is the state’s raison d’etat. Furthermore, it means that the identification of other peoples as carriers of other “cultures” renders national security as a practice conceived through the lens of cultural differences. It follows, then, that the nation-state’s identification of cultural difference as a source of threat is, again, the very precondition of its existence. This understanding allows us to invert the default mode of representing the “crisis” of the nation-state as a result of international migrants and national minorities bearing upon the nation-state: rather than “threaten” the nation-state, these subject-positions provide it with vital sustenance. Crisis is essential to the state, which itself essentializes national cultures in the act of identifying the immigrant-minority.

Restoring a Republic and an Idea
Performativity helps to explain how “crisis” functioned to re-establish (and to reify) the Estonian nation-state and to prepare it for EU membership between the years 1988 and 2004. The viability, safety, and security of the Estonian
state was routinely conceived in terms of the legal status of its large Russian-speaking population. This status, in turn, was continuously evaluated through the lens of (inter)national security. The security concern was not related to what these Russian-speakers had done, but rather to their legal classification as “aliens,” with a distinct Soviet mentality, after Estonian regained independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. From the start cultural fundamentalism deeply informed the subjectification of Russian-speakers and Estonians as logical opposites. It also structured political debates between two organizations—the Estonian Popular Front and the Estonian Citizens’ Movement—that competed as the legitimate representative of the Estonian independence movement in the late 1980s. The ultimate resolution of their differences pivoted on latter’s ability to clearly articulate an internationally recognized legal distinction between Estonians, who were entitled to citizenship, and Soviet-era Russian-speakers, who were not. This contest between the two organizations testified to the importance of such binary oppositions as citizen/imigrant, us/them, security/threat, and stability/crisis in performatively constituting the state and the Other.

Both the Estonian Popular Front and the Estonian Citizens’ Movement agreed that Soviet annexation of the sovereign Estonian Republic in 1940 violated international law. This argument also had the full backing of the US, UK, and most western governments as they all maintained that the 1939 Estonian-Soviet Mutual Assistance Pact, which led to the annexation, amounted to nothing more than a contract signed under threat of military occupation (cf Vizulis 1985, 1990). Nonetheless, the two movements differed on their preferred means of achieving independence and the status that they would award to roughly 500,000 Soviet-era Russian-speakers in Estonia. These individuals began arriving in Estonia shortly after the Second World War, primarily to work as laborers in the expanding industrial sector. They raised families and would come to regard Estonia as home. They also significantly shifted the demographic balance in Estonia. Prior to World War II, ethnic Estonians consisted of eighty-eight percent of the 1.1 million people. By 1989 that figure decreased to sixty-five percent of 1.5 million people with Russian-speakers comprising the remaining thirty-five percent. The population of Tallinn, Estonia’s capital, settled at fifty percent Russian-speakers in 1989. It reached ninety percent in the northeastern county of Ida-Virumaa in the same year.

In 1988, the Popular Front, which grew out of the liberal wing of the Estonian Communist Party, emerged as the first organization seeking greater independence for Estonia. It originally focused on increasing the Estonian
Soviet Socialist Republic's economic autonomy within the confines of the
Soviet Union. This aim included the legalization of private enterprise,
increased management of economic affairs, and—though it welcomed immi-
grant Russian-speakers into their cause—control over immigration policy
(Misiunas and Taagepara 1993:315). Within a year, however, the Popular Front
shifted its stance to full independence in response to Communist hardliners
who were pushing Gorbachev to repress autonomy movements sweeping
across the Soviet Union (Lauristin and Vihalemm 1997:89). Still, its proposed
method for attaining independence involved a gradual takeover and transfor-
mation of the existing Soviet institutions in tandem with a referendum on
independence that would signal the Soviet Union's lack of popular legitima-
cy. It remained ambivalent about calling for the full restoration of the inter-
war Estonian republic. It thus never fully relinquished the idea of seceding
from the Soviet Union, which would have meant in legal terms that post-
Soviet Estonia constituted a new state. Secession also would have entitled all
residents in Estonia to automatic citizenship, and, indeed, a strong contingent
in the Popular Front favored this so-called "zero-option" (97).

In contrast, the Estonian Citizens' Movement sought a more radical route
to independence. They dismissed the idea of a referendum, particularly one
that included Russian-speaking immigrants whom they regarded as occupiers
and colonizers. In their view, a referendum would only legitimize the 1940
annexation because sovereignty was not Moscow's possessions to hand over on
popular demand. Instead, Moscow should give sovereignty back on its own
accord because it never legally belonged to the Soviet Union in the first place.
They rejected any idea of secession from the Soviet Union because this also
legitimized the annexation. Instead, the Citizens' Movement sought the
restoration of the pre-war sovereign Estonian Republic in order to establish
legal continuity between the pre- and post-Soviet Estonian nation-states.
Dismissing the zero-option altogether, they called on de jure citizens of pre-
war Estonia, and their descendents, to register their names as supporters of
the restoration of Estonian independence. Between March 1989 and February
1990, over 790,000 adults registered in the citizenship list (Kelam 2001:17).14
Despite their more radical views, the Citizens' Movement's restorationist argu-
ment for independence was framed strictly in term of international law,
emphasizing the need to rectify the illegal Soviet occupation of Estonia in
1940 (Pettai and Hallik 2002:510). Thus, in contrast to their counterparts in
the Popular Front, the leaders of the Citizens' Movement rejected the idea
that independence should be bogged down with referenda, with discussions
about the viability of Soviet institutions, and with consideration of the messier secessionist route to independence (Kelam 2001:16).

Nonetheless, “culture” was central to the leaders of the Citizens’ Movement who emphasized the near death of the Estonian language and culture under Moscow’s Russification and immigration policies. One of their major arguments against automatic citizenship for Soviet-era Russian-speakers was that it would have further endangered the Estonian language. According to this view, if some 500,000 Russian-speakers held automatic citizenship then they could elect enough MPs to start the process of amending the constitution to declare Russian a second official language (Järve 1999). If this result materialized, then it would render Russian the sole official language by default as more Estonians spoke Russian than Russian-speakers spoke Estonian. Many leaders espousing this view also argued that Russian-speakers would be unable to orient themselves westward, so citizenship would allow them to keep Estonia tethered to Moscow after independence. These such arguments persisted well into the 1990s as shown in Endre and Laar’s 1997 comment that changes in the citizenship policy could have “unpredictable” impact on the “psychology of the indigenous people. It is unlikely that Estonian society will calmly look at the violation of its rights [because] Estonia is too small to accept the new citizenry overnight” (cited in Kuus 2002:402).15

The differences between the two organizations were ultimately resolved in favor of the Citizens’ Movement (renamed the Estonian Congress in 1990). After the failure of the Soviet military’s attempted coup on 19 August 1991, leaders from each agreed on a unified statement on Estonian independence. Fearing that another coup might succeed, they quickly moved to assert “the continuity of the Republic of Estonia as a subject of international law” and the “national independence of the Republic of Estonia.” Crucially, they also called for the “restoration of diplomatic relations” with other countries (cited in Pettai and Hallik 2002:512, emphasis added). Thus, the fundamental argument for independence was not merely an assertion of sovereignty. Rather it was a call for an unbreakable connection with the pre-Soviet Estonian Republic and a return to Estonia’s rightful place in the international community. This argument clearly favored the Estonian Congress’s agenda as the Popular Front never fully disassociated itself from the secessionist argument. The West quickly responded. Denmark recognized Estonian independence on 26 August 1991. The next day the Dutch Government, speaking on behalf of the European Community, announced that “The Community and its member States warmly welcome the restoration of the sovereignty and independence of the Baltic States, which
they lost in 1940” (Rich 1993:38, emphasis added). President Bush announced on 2 September the establishment of diplomatic relations with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania noting that this marked “the culmination of the United States’ 52 year refusal to accept the forcible incorporation of the independent Baltic States by the USSR” (cited in Rich 1993:38).

The restorationist principle would radically alter the relationship between Soviet-era Russian-speakers and the Estonian state. In November 1991, Estonian Congress leaders successfully pushed for the re-implementation of the 1938 citizenship law. This move, cast as a logical extension of state restoration, automatically rendered some 500,000 Soviet-era Russian-speakers as stateless. They would have to naturalize according that law, which both demanded a high level of Estonian proficiency and did not count years of residence in Estonia during the Soviet-era toward the five-year requirement for citizenship in post-Soviet Estonia. The argument for citizenship on the basis of residence on Estonian territory failed on the grounds that the Soviet Union illegally held Estonian sovereignty over that territory in abeyance when Russian-speaking immigrants arrived. Thus, they were never legally admitted by the internationally-recognized sovereign Estonian government. As Lieven (1993:276-277) explains, after it became apparent that neither Western diplomatic isolation nor Soviet military intervention was going to result from the restorationist position on citizenship, the case for the re-instatement of the 1938 citizenship law became insurmountable. In hindsight, Marju Lauristin—a founder of the Popular Front, an early supporter of the zero-option, and a prominent Estonian politician—explained that anyone not supporting a restorationist citizenship policy could be accused of betraying the national interest (Lauristin and Vihalemm 1997:97). By October 1991, she pragmatically reversed her position, “I now support going back to the naturalization law of 1938. We have no other choice, given the deep conflicts of this issue. We go back to the only law that is there, that has legitimacy” (cited in Lieven 1993:277). Thus, in 1991, Estonia re-entered the European inter-state system with roughly one-third of its population lacking citizenship of any state whatsoever.

Recounting this dramatic history, however, raises the question of what made this particular outcome imaginable, reasonable, and ultimately achievable. This question brings into relief the importance of performativity whereby identity is established through repetitive citational acts that constitute actors by inscribing the differences between them. To answer it, one needs to ask what, exactly, was the object of state restoration? Certainly not the Estonian
constitution as it had acquired mildly authoritarian features in the 1934 like so many other European countries at the time (Kasekamp 1999:120-131). A new constitution would be adopted by a referendum in July 1992 that incorporated post-War human rights provisions. It was modeled on the West German constitution and drafted in consultation with the Council of Europe. The only inter-war law that was resurrected was the 1938 citizenship law. This law, however, had to be modified in March 1993 so that the few individuals whose adoptive mothers had been Estonian citizens could claim citizenship in post-Soviet Estonia if their legal fathers had not been citizens (Müllerson 1994:147, n. 44). The object, furthermore, is not any specific political institution as none were resurrected exactly as they were at the end of the pre-Soviet republic. Instead, the object that was restored was the idea that distinct national groups exist, and this idea was constituted in post-Soviet Estonian citizenship policy.18

Fundamental to the task of restoring state sovereignty is identifying that nation in whose name the state exists. This task inherently depends upon a binary opposition between non-nationals who are external (and threatening) and nationals who are internal (and threatened). This very act of distinction underpinned the restoration of Estonian sovereignty and the re-establishment of a state (though not any specific state institution) to preserve it.

Indeed, one could argue that the principle of restoration was a mere cover to achieve ethnic purity and nationalist exclusion (Müllerson 1994:148). This reasonable position, however, proceeds from the juridical approach to relations between the state and the immigrant-minority that is under critique here: the Estonian state is discriminating against Russian-speaking immigrants, who are trying to protect themselves from oppression. This explanation fails to account for the productive role that cultural fundamentalism plays in constructing these actors as autonomous subjects in an inherently conflictual relationship. In contrast, the question here is how such an exclusivist agenda—the restoration of a state along with its pre-Soviet citizenship policy—can be achieved with such narrow and internationally-accepted juridical language. (Recall that the Estonian Congress's success occurred through strict legal logic.) The answer lies in the conceptual role of cultural fundamentalism in practices of diplomacy and (inter)state security. For the notion of inherently distinct nations—that are either represented by (the national majority) or regulated by the state (national minorities)—is essential to the management of the inter-state system. As such, the Estonian Congress's argument played directly into mainstream diplomatic assumptions about the relationship between culture, nation, territorial state, and sovereignty. The
argument for state restoration assumes nationalist exclusion and ethnic purity prior to the adoption minority rights agreements that, in any case, still contain minorities within the framework of the nation-state. The Estonian Congress could accomplish much of what it wanted through banal legal and diplomatic practice, whereas a secessionist argument for independence would have resulted in much more ambiguous, and less easily resolvable, debates about the status of Soviet-era Russian-speakers. Cultural fundamentalism facilitated the marginalization of the Popular Front’s inclusivist position and enabled the segregation of people along nationalist lines. For the Popular Front’s vision of post-Soviet Estonia could not adequately assert a viable Estonian identity to be secured by a sovereign state precisely because it did not define that identity in explicit opposition to the Russian-speaking population. It offered no “Other” against which to performatively constitute an Estonian identity. Finally, and as shown further below, the Estonian Congress’s vision of post-Soviet Estonia rendered Estonia “legible” (Scott 1998) to the western diplomatic community, which ultimately means that Estonian citizenship and integration policy must be situated in the pan-European context into which this state was restored.19

Monitoring Estonia: Threat, Culture, and Loyalty

To be sure, the western diplomatic community also imagined (inter)national security as a project premised upon the maintenance of national borders through state policy and law. It never challenged the Estonian Congress’s decision to deny citizenship to Soviet-era Russian-speakers. However, western officials were quite concerned about the protection of Russian-speakers’ human rights. In the early months of 1993, the United Nations (UN) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) dispatched delegations to evaluate the situation.20 Their conclusions reveal the pervasiveness of cultural fundamentalism in understanding nation, security, and individual loyalty to the nation-state. They saw a potential crisis arising in Estonia because of the state’s lack of support for reducing the number of stateless individuals. Their recommended policy solution would be to integrate and familiarize these individuals with Estonia-ness. In short, the “problem” of fractured Estonian cultural space was to be solved by orienting non-nationals to that space.

The UN conducted a four day fact-finding mission in February 1993 followed by a day of consultations with Russian Federation officials in Moscow. The mission detected no discrimination along ethnic or religious lines, but
noted “considerable anxiety” on the part of Russian-speakers about some Estonians wanting “to turn the clock back to the pre-1940 years” (United Nations 1993, para. 15). The UN report also noted Russian-speakers’ objection to the Estonian Parliament’s rejection of the zero-option (para 18), but it did not challenge Estonia’s citizenship law. In fact, the report supported the law by pointing out that Article 15 (1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights does not oblige Estonia to grant citizenship without conditions, even though it stipulates that “everyone has the right to a nationality” (para 3). The Head of the Russian Federation’s Committee on Human Rights agreed with the report’s observation that the Russian-speakers’ perception of discrimination posed “a danger to stability” (para 81). However, the Committee itself disagreed with the report’s legal conclusions. It argued that the classification of thirty-eight percent of Estonia’s population as foreigners and stateless persons “constitutes humiliating treatment and a denial of their dignity…” (para 83). It interpreted this situation as a violation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. However, the UN mission firmly denied the charge, and concluded instead that the Estonian Constitution is compatible with the Covenant (para. 87). The mission’s main concern was that Estonia’s citizenship and language law be worded clearly and implemented efficiently.

The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), Max van der Stoel, paid two-day visits to Estonia in January and March 1993. He also concluded that “there is no convincing evidence of systematic persecution of the non-Estonian population since the re-establishment of Estonian independence and that there have virtually been no incidents pointing to interethnic violence” (Secretariat of the CSCE 1993a). However, the HCNM pushed for an expedited integration process, which he linked directly to security in Estonia:

[A] deliberate policy of facilitating the chances of acquiring Estonian citizenship for those who express such a wish....would greatly reduce the danger of destabilization, because it would considerably enhance the chances of the non-Estonian population developing a sense of loyalty toward Estonia.

The HCNM’s recommendation certainly pressured the Estonian government to take action on the problem of statelessness. But the assumption behind his opinion is that Russian-speakers’ loyalty to the Estonian nation-state was the price for citizenship. The HCNM’s opinion proceeds from the premise that citizenship
without a proper integration and naturalization process would constitute a security risk because Estonian national values would not have been internalized by the alien population. (This view would be brought into full relief in subsequent years.) Yet a top Russian-speaking human rights observer in Estonia reversed this logic when asking “How can you integrate people without legal or political equality? That should happen first, then language training. After citizenship is granted, then people will have the means themselves to help the integration process.” After the HCNM defined the “problem” in Estonia, the western diplomatic community would push both Russian-speakers to become further acquainted with Estonian culture, history, and language and the Estonian government to support them in their efforts to do so. \(^{21}\) The Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs fully agreed with the HCNM’s reasoning and the value of such a policy. However, it noted that “these efforts are, regrettably, constrained by our limited financial resources,” and that they would welcome “suggestions or assistance which the international community might provide” (Secretariat of the CSCE 1993b). The HCNM replied that he was aware of the “willingness of a number of governments” that would help in these efforts (Secretariat of the CSCE 1994).

The western diplomatic community subsequently launched a series of initiatives that would institutionalize the integration process and presumably expedite naturalization. The Nordic countries were particularly active in this area, funding an array of projects from the training of teachers of Estonian as second language to the printing of residency permits for the Estonian government to issue to Russian-speakers. Overall, the governments of Finland, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway funded forty-six projects between 1993 and 1998. The Swedish government supported thirty-two of them alone. As one Nordic diplomat explained, “Stability is a major part of our policy, and integration is essential in that context.” These initiatives fell in line with those of Estonian liberals who were finding new breathing room to discuss integration as conservatives were scaling back their anti-Russian rhetoric. Rather than blatantly opposing integration, conservatives were now simply arguing that the integration problem would solve itself if Russian-speakers took the initiative to the Estonian language and about Estonian culture. This argument would become an effective strategy for minimizing the amount of money the government would invest in integration over the next decade. As a prominent Estonian NGO leader put it: “In the end, Russian speakers must help themselves. Then integration will work. People must first accept Estonia and cooperate.”

Still, liberal officials were rightly convinced that EU accession would require the government to demonstrate that it took integration seriously. The
Estonian MP Andra Veidemann, who became Minister without Portfolio for Ethnic Affairs, championed this cause. She explained in an interview that “If we leave non-Estonians on their own, it will take a long time. It will also obstruct European integration.” In 1997, she organized a committee to outline an integration program, a move which the western diplomatic community enthusiastically supported. Like the HCNM, the committee identified a fundamental link between national security and integration on the assumption that culturally alien(ated) individuals constitute security risk:

New integration-related problems have entered the agenda. On the national level, this involves, above all, the alienation of a significant number of non-Estonians from Estonian society and an isolation in a world of their own language and mentality. Sociological research conducted in the 1990s clearly points to the development of a model “two societies in one state” in Estonia. It is not difficult to see the danger of such development in the framework of both social and security policy. (Estonian Government 1998:1, emphasis added).

From this point forward, the phrase “two societies in one state” would circulate with particular expediency through integration policy documents and would form the explicit premise of integration projects. Security risks were thus located on the non-Estonian individual whose cultural disposition rendered him or her disoriented and threatening. This risk, then, should be mitigated by inculcating the Russian-speaker with the Estonian language and culture. This conceptualization of security remained the premise of western-supported integration as foreign aid was directed at establishing Estonian cultural hegemony over the territorial state. To be sure, Russian Federation officials in Moscow and Russian minority leaders in Estonia continued to argue that the security risk stemmed from the denial of citizenship and the conceptualization of integration in such blatantly mono-cultural terms. They also stressed that it did not result from psycho-cultural disorientation but rather from marginalization from the Estonian state and society through a restrictive citizenship policy. One minority leader cynically made this point when asserting that “civil wars [also] take place among people who speak the same language.” However, this perspective did not square with western and Estonian officials. They contended that the risk of un-integrated Russian-speakers could only be rectified through integration and naturalization rather than by awarding citizenship automatically. In sum, the prevailing view was that citizenship (and even legal residen-
cy) without integration would induce crisis. This meant that the Russian-speaking individual must internalize the national majority’s language and culture lest his/her (dis)orientation led to the disruption of an otherwise placid, homogenous society. Again, the survival, success, and coherence of the Estonian nation were premised upon the notion that Russian-speakers are threats by virtue of cultural difference. This conceptualization of security demanded that western efforts to stabilize Estonia focus on regulating the border between these two groups—and thus performatively constituting it in the process—so that Russian-speakers could smoothly transform themselves from disoriented aliens into trustworthy carriers of Estonian culture. This transformation became the state sponsored rite of passage that prepared Russian-speakers to align themselves the territorial nation-state.  

The Crisis of “Two Societies in One State” and the “Estonian Cultural Domain”

As Estonia’s links with western Europe strengthened, efforts to institutionalize the integration process also increased on the assumption that unintegrated “non-Estonians” constituted a security threat. The claim that a crisis would result with the presence of “two societies in one state” would ultimately be answered with the aim of re-establishing the “Estonian cultural domain.” This connection between problem and solution underpinned, implicitly at least, every major program document on integration in Estonia. The European Commission (EC), UNDP, or the Nordic countries were involved in all of these policies in one way or another as they were grooming Estonia for European integration (and for EU accession beginning in 1998). These officials saw an inextricable link between stable inter-state relations and stable intra-state relations, which would contribute to a stable security climate in northern Europe. Thus, they agreed that the solution to the “Russian question” could be found in an ethnic integration policy that would seek to secure Estonian cultural hegemony. The Nordic foreign ministries concretized this conceptualization when they combined their individual integration projects into a comprehensive three-year program named the Nordic/UNDP Project: Support to the State Integration Programme. UNDP would oversee it in conjunction with the Non-Estonians Integration Foundation, a new government-organized NGO that was to assume full responsibility for integration after UNDP closed its mission in Estonia in 2001. Nordic diplomats and Estonian officials would oversee the Nordic/UNDP Project from a steering committee. (Two Russian-
speaking leaders were also on the committee though they rarely attended meetings). When asked in 2000 how western diplomats perceive their role on the committee, one responded that “We see ethnic integration as one of the remaining problems Estonia has. It is a stability factor. There are also clear gains in having a Euro-friendly stable democracy next to Russia.”

Western and Estonian officials created the Nordic/UNDP Project in order to jump start the Estonian government's future state integration program, which Andra Veidemann’s committee outlined in the previous year. In the project’s justificatory statement, the committee linked national security to demography, “cultural anxiety,” social alienation, and distance from territorial homelands. A lengthy quote is warranted:

Post-Soviet socio-economic reforms have been a significant challenge for all residents of Estonia, yet Soviet era migrants have had a uniquely difficult time adjusting to a completely new and unfamiliar social setting.

Although progress has been made and many non-Estonians have by now adjusted to the new circumstances, a large portion are still formulating their new identities and dealing with practicalities like having to learn Estonian. Many non-Estonians still live in so-called micro-societies, the existence of which contributes to an undesirable social model of “two societies in one state.”

The populations of the countries of origins of the non-Estonians are on average 100 times the size of the total population of Estonians. Members of the non-Estonian population (or at least a significant portion of them), being aware of their numbers in Estonia and of the size of their countries of origin, have consequently been rather slow thus to accept changes to their way of life.

On the other hand, the Estonian population is also slow in terms of integration and suffers from a marked socio-psychological burden: being aware of its small numbers, it fears that its national values will be obscured and the Estonian culture weakened. (United Nations Development Programme 1998a:7-8).

The linking of national identity to notions of weakness, threat, and unfamiliarity are made possible through the notion that individuals are essentially cultural beings naturally aligned with a particular homeland (Malkki 1992). Crisis results from their dislocation and subsequent co-existence with another nation in the same territorial state. In this light, the Nordic/UNDP Project's
“development objectives” were “preserving both stability and a commitment to the protection and continued development of Estonian culture” (United Nations Development Programme 1998a:13). This rendition of the integration problem itself suggested the policy solution: assist the immigrant population to internalize the putative culture of their new homeland. Further testifying to the security importance of the Nordic/UNDP Project, one western diplomat working on the project saw it as an additional monitoring device “if OSCE does closes down, this is a tool give information to other embassies.” For the diplomatic community, relevant information describes how well the government is delivering “Estonia-ness” to the Russian-speaking population and how thoroughly the latter are accepting it.

The EC was also interested in security through Estonian cultural hegemony, which they sought to achieve by supporting Estonian language training for Russian-speakers. Through the auspices of the EU-PHARE programme, the EC's delegation to Estonia helped to establish Estonian language training centers wherever Russian-speakers were clustered in the country. Earlier they had funded the development of an Estonian language training strategy, which was designed by west European linguistic specialists and Estonian philologists. The EU-PHARE Programme also established a comprehensive program—the Estonian Language Training Programme (ELTP)—that would support the teaching of Estonian to Russian-speakers. This project was justified in light of three trends in Estonia: a decrease in the rate of naturalization since 1995; the decline in motivation among Russian-speakers to learn Estonian; and the retreat in Estonia into “civic compartmentalization,” which was cementing of “two separate societies in one state” (UNDP 1998b:7). Likewise, further re-affirming the link between security and integration, ELTP’s objectives were thus to:

Enhance the knowledge of Estonian among non-Estonian speakers, thereby facilitating social cohesion, strengthening national identity and increasing economic efficiency. By providing Estonian language skills to non-Estonian speakers, the project will help to transcend the linguistic segregation inherited from the Soviet era and thus contribute to social harmony (UNDP 1998b:10).

One EC official working on the ELTP highlighted the ways in which objectified national culture figures into analyses of Estonia’s “integration problem.” He explained that it resulted from
completely differently reference levels in their background....The Estonian would put forth the technical requirements, like language training and exam, but they won’t embrace the immigrant to take the initiative of going through the process. It is not in their culture. Russians are just the opposite. The immigrants are used to being guided through the process. They are used to hospitality and Soviet patronage.

The Nordic/UNDP Project and the ELTP would constitute the bulk of the Estonian government’s nascent state integration program, which the EC identified as a short-term priority for EU membership (European Commission 1999, sect. 3.1). Approved by the centre-right government in March 2000, the State Programme: Integration in Estonian Society 2000-2007 conflated integration policy and security policy. It posited that continued use of the Russian language would lead to the familiar “formation of a ‘two societies in one country’ model in Estonia, which may become dangerous both socially and from the point of view of security policy” (sect 3.1). To prevent this potential crisis, the State Programme put forth three goals: the creation of cultural pluralism, a strong common social core built around the Estonian language, and the development and preservation of the “Estonian cultural domain” (Estonian Government 2000, sect. 3.4). The implementation of the State Programme assured the EC that Estonia was sufficiently stable for EU membership. By 2000, the EC (European Commission 2000:18) declared that Estonia had fulfilled OSCE recommendations on naturalization and citizenship. The following year’s accession progress report similarly noted that Estonia’s Citizenship Law “is generally in line with international standards” (European Commission 2001:21) and that the rights of Russian-speakers “continue to be largely observed and safeguarded” (22). The report’s main concern was that the Estonian government continues “to devote adequate resources and give proper attention to all elements of the integration program” (23).

Though the western diplomatic community has always pushed it as a key stabilizing factor for Estonia, it is not surprising that Russian-speaking leaders in Estonia interpret the State Programme—and integration more broadly—as a cover for assimilation. One Russian-speaker who sat on the steering committees of both the Nordic/UNDP Project and the ELTP said that he was put there to do “decorative roles” only and that his proposals had no influence. A Russian-speaking MP calmly explained that “[w]estern and Estonian officials] are trying to construct one nation with different nations. It’s a new attitude. It has to do with European integration.” More forcefully, another Russian-speaking MP dis-
missed the Estonian State Programme “for a very concrete reason. [It] does not stipulate the existence of Russian-medium schools after 2007. This will reduce the number of intelligent Russian-speakers.” Nonetheless, Russian-speaking leaders in Estonia and officials from the Russian Federation could do very little to challenge the State Programme because the western diplomatic community endorses and funds it. In the words of one western diplomat, “Estonia as a concept now works” as a result of the State Programme. Estonia joined the EU on May 1, 2004 along with Cyprus, Malta, and seven other east European countries. At that moment, 101,000 Russian-speakers were legally resident in Estonia but holding citizenship in other countries, mostly Russia, Ukraine, or Belarus. An additional 160,000 Russian-speakers remain stateless; they hold no citizenship of any country whatsoever (Estonian Foreign Ministry 2004).

Conclusion

Estonia’s historical trajectory from the (re) independence movement starting in the late 1980s to EU accession in 2004 is not simply a tale of re-establishing a sovereign nation-state, but rather of re-ensconcing it in the European system of nation-states. Cultural fundamentalism informed this process, which western and Estonian officials had framed as a matter of securing the Estonian nation against the Russian-speaking population. Within diplomatic discourse this demographic situation amounted to a potential security risk by virtue of these national groups’ abstract cultural differences. It is telling that the Estonian state’s restoration did not involve the resurrection of particular laws or institutions exactly as they were in the pre-War Estonian Republic; these had to be revamped, written anew, or modified. Instead, it amounted to the re-instatement of a boundary between national groups, which was achieved through post-Soviet Estonia’s citizenship and integration policy.

The denial of citizenship to Soviet-era Russian-speakers and an integration program that seeks the establishment of the “Estonian cultural domain” were enabled by the proverbial equation of individual, culture, territory, and state. From this premise, the identification of Russian-speakers as culturally alienated, fundamentally different, and thus threatening underpinned pan-European efforts to re-assert Estonian cultural hegemony after fifty years of Soviet rule by re-orienting them into Estonian cultural space. This rendition of the “minority problem” structured western-funded aid programs ever since the re-establishment of independence in 1991. It also offered up its own policy solution of immersing Russian-speakers in the Estonian language and cul-
ture. It enabled a full state integration program that produced Estonia as a legible EU member state, thus testifying to the point that European diplomacy assumes cultural hegemony as a precondition for secure international relations. In essence, it depended upon the idea that the unmanaged co-existence of two national groups in a single state signified an (inter)national security crisis. From this point, it was an easy step for western and Estonian officials to decide upon the Estonian cultural domain as a reasonable answer to the problem of Soviet-era Russian-speakers.

The Estonian state's dependence upon the identification of Russian-speakers as a threat testifies to the value of a performative approach in understanding the processes through which the state is constituted through acts that both construct and regulate the boundary between the nation and the immigrant-minority. Rather than assume—or at least not fully question—an a priori subject, a performative approach foregoes ontological foundations in favor of repetitious and relational practices that create the effects of opposing and fundamentally different subjects. The continuous identification of these opposing subjects—and the security crisis that might ensue from their unregulated contact—is essential to the Estonian state’s performative constitution. The state’s legitimacy as the protector of “Estonian-ness” could only be established in reference to a foreign “Russian-ness” that it reified in its own bureaucratic practices. For the Estonian state—like any nation-state—amounts to a series of acts that regulate borders between other national groups and reify these groups in the process.

In conclusion, while it is important to grasp the changing strategies through which nation-states attempt to manage the immigrant-minority, this task should not come at the expense of exploring the many, subtle ways through which the former asserts itself in the act of identifying the latter as a threat. The nation-state and the immigrant-minority are not autonomous subjects that will likely disappear or transform beyond recognition. Instead, their social existence pre-supposes each other and thus neither can socially exist without invoking the other. More generally, globalization does not threaten the nation-state, or the inter-state system, per se. Instead, the threats identified in global processes serve as foils against which the nation-state constitutes its identity, testifying to the importance of examining the discursive formations that enable specific relational practices between putatively autonomous actors. From this perspective, “crisis” and “threat” do not jeopardize the state, but rather they provide the state with opportunities to assert its own ontological existence.
ENDNOTES

1 I would like to thank Merje Kuus, Bruce Miller, Vello Pettai, and Susan Wright for assistance and comments on this draft. All blunders are mine.

2 National minority rights refer to rights that individuals may claim as self-identified members of a national minority group. These rights pertain to the preservation of cultural identity, the right to learn his or her minority language, the right to assemble, the right to communicate in minority languages with other members of the minority group, the right to communicate with government institutions in places where minorities form a substantial number, and the right to education about minority culture, history, and traditions. The most important agreement on national minority rights in Europe is the Council of Europe's 1995 Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. This agreement derives mainly from the 1990 Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe. The nation-state retains the legal upper hand on minority issues because the Framework Convention because it does not compel states to fulfill any of its requirements but only urges them to create conditions for their implementation. Furthermore, the Framework Convention does not define "national minority," thus allowing the state to limit the amount of people to whom national minority rights apply. Most states define national minorities as citizens rather than legal residents. However, legal residents are usually eligible for social rights, which pertain to matters of health care, housing, employment, workers' rights, justice, and social security.

3 Except in cases of indigenous peoples, "national minority," like "immigrant," implies an origin in and natural affiliation with an alien homeland space regardless of how many generations a minority group has lived in the host country. I use the awkward term "immigrant-minority" to convey the shared conceptual premise underlying each category's different legal status.

4 Countries composed of linguistic or ethnic cantons united in federal or confederal system (e.g. Switzerland and Bosnia-Herzegovina) are not counter-examples of this point. Instead, they attach reified groups to substate territorial units in which the identities of each are still purportedly subordinate to a more inclusive territorial identity. Similarly, multi-culturalism within a nation-state is only possible after the secure establishment of the national majority, and, by extension, relations between states—diplomacy—can only proceed in an orderly fashion when each is secured in such a manner.

5 I hasten to add that the point here is not that diplomats, state officials, and officials from international organization are sympathetic to neo-nationalists in Europe, but only that they conceptualize citizenship and immigration policies from the same premise. According to the norms of European diplomacy and national minority agreements, non-citizens and national minorities are assumed to be capable of reproducing the national majority's culture even while retaining the integrity of their own culture if they naturalize into the host nation-state. Neo-nationalists strongly disagree on the claim that one's cultural disposition is immutable, thus rendering different cultures mutually exclusive. Both, however, agree that a secure state starts with the uncontested fusion of a single national culture onto a territorial state. Thus, national minority rights are subordinate to the state's integration policy (Council of Europe 1995a, sect. II, art. 5, para. 1 and 2).

6 "Russian-speakers" refers to individuals who migrated to Estonia from other parts of the Soviet Union after the Second World War. These individuals belong to a wide range of national groups, most of which use Russian as their first language. These groups include Russians, Ukrainians, Belorussians, Finns, Jews, Tatars, Germans, Latvians, Poles, and Lithuanians among others.

7 The analysis that follows draws upon insights gained from more than a year of ethnographic fieldwork in Tallinn, Estonia among an international community of officials, policy elites,
administrators, and politicians. This community studied, monitored, and solved the “problem” of ethnic integration in Estonia created by the denial of citizenship to Soviet-era Russian-speakers. They included Estonian politicians and administrators, western (primarily Nordic) diplomats, and officials from the European Commission Delegation to Estonia, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Russian-speakers were included in their work to the extent that they accepted the assumptions built into mainstream diplomatic practices and European agreements on minority rights.

8This point does not apply to anthropological work that explores how the state is constituted in intimate daily practice (Aretxaga 2003, Herzfeld 1997, Navaro-Yashin 2002) or how fear and secrecy mediate relations between the state and society (Taussig 1987, 1997).

9Similarly, Noriel (1996:xxvii) argues that the point is not whether one is for or against foreigners, but “why scholars feel authorized to employ terms that cause foreigners to suffer and, hence, contribute to their existence as ‘immigrants.”

10The “critical constructivist” camp in international relations has used performativity effectively to destabilize the assumption of an ontological state, and argue for the importance of analyzing specific practices that invoke the state through a myriad of acts conducted in its name. For additional examples see Ashley (1988), Walker (1993), and Weber (1995, 1998). Given performativity’s emphasis on practice, contingency, and the importance of locating the state in the ethnographic moment, it lends itself well to inter-disciplinary collaboration with anthropologists. An excellent example is Cultures of Insecurity edited by Weldes et al (1999, see pages 21-25).

11Mary Douglas (1985, with Wildavsky 1982) has, of course, pioneered the study of risk in anthropology arguing that what society identifies as such is selected through the cultural bias incumbent in its social organization. Therefore, as “common values lead to common fears,” all risk is constructed (1982:8). Douglas’s cultural theory of risk perception goes a long way in debunking the objectivist view that culture obscures ‘real’ risks. She argues that society agrees to weigh the bewildering array of risks that it confronts into a culturally specific classificatory system, thus valuing some risks over others. No way of knowing is free of cultural pressures (1985:3). Cultural theory does no go far enough, however, in stressing the importance of repetitive, relational practices in mutually constituting opposing subjectivities. The argument that cultures weight risks according to their own value system assumes a foundation for that system in an a priori society with its own culture. Despite claims to the contrary (1982:193), cultural theory still seems to locate risk as something external intruding upon that society, and neglects the constitutive role that the identification of risk plays in maintaining a subject position. If a given society ceased the practice of identifying risk, then presumably that society would still persist in its same form.

12Barth foreshadows performativity when arguing that “ethnic distinctions do not depend upon an absence of social interaction and acceptance [between groups], but are quite to the contrary often the very foundations on which embracing social systems are built” (1969:10). Similar to the point that the state can only construct national identity in the act of defining the immigrant-minority as different, Barth (10) posits that “interaction in such a social system does not lead to its liquidation through change and acculturation; cultural differences can persist despite inter-ethnic contact and interdependence.” However, it is unclear how far Barth’s model rides in the tracks of performativity. On the one hand, in a performative approach, complementary differences are not the foundations that reify ethnic groups. Rather, group-ness is constituted through the inscription of difference in social practice, which means that group identity vaporizes if the interaction ceases. This is not necessarily the outcome in Barth’s model as it seems that the identity of the ethnic group exists prior to their mutual contact. On the other hand, Barth (15-16, emphasis added) also argues that “ethnic groups only persist as significant units if they imply marked difference in behavior, i.e. persisting cultural differences.” This might suggest a group’s understanding of itself can only be maintained in the act of identifying differences in others.

Lauristin and Vihalemm (1997:89-90) put this number at 600,000.

Mart Laar was Prime Minister of Estonia on two occasions (1992-1994 and 1999-2002).


It is important to note that any individual who held citizenship in pre-Soviet Estonia, or descended from such an individual, could also reclaim it in post-Soviet Estonia. Roughly 75,000 Russian-speakers received citizenship on this basis along with ethnic Estonians. Thus, Estonian citizenship policy is technically not a question of one's ethnicity.

This distinction also underpinned Soviet bureaucratic practices as the Soviet Union institutionalized nationhood while vigorously suppressing nationalism (Brubaker 1998:284).

Shore and Black (1994) and Shore (2000) have addressed the difficult challenge that Brussels bureaucrats face in attempting to create a transcendent European citizenship, despite the fact that “European-ness” itself involves coherent national identities.

The Council of Europe (CoE) sent a Parliamentary Assembly to monitor Estonian parliamentary and presidential elections in September 1992. The committee identified no problems with the citizenship law and saw no human rights violations. Based on its report and the Estonian government’s expressed commitment to sign and ratify the European Convention on Human Rights, the Parliamentary Assembly noted the “readiness” of Estonia to guarantee the principles of the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms (CoE Parliamentary Assembly 1993). It therefore recommended that the Committee of Ministers invite Estonia to become a member of the Council of Europe and allocate Estonia three seats in the Parliamentary Assembly (CoE Parliamentary Assembly 1993). Estonia joined in May 1993.

Importantly, western intervention was crucial in ensuring that radical nationalists in Estonia did not dominate debates about citizenship and integration. If so, the citizenship law and aliens law would have remained excessive, and the bureaucratic channel’s for processing applications for residency permits and citizenship would have remained unnecessarily clogged. The Citizenship and Migration Board, the agency responsible for these applications, would have realized its attempt to “make life Russians’ life” in the early 1990s (cited Poleshchuk 2001, fn 6). However, the marginalization of radical nationalists did not mean the elimination of a moderate nationalism, which constituted common ground for moderate Estonian officials and the western diplomatic community. Unlike radical nationalism which maintains that one’s nationality cannot be transcended and that non-nationals and minorities cannot be integrated, moderate nationalism assumes that the “other” can conduct him/herself as a member of the national majority in public.

Simultaneously, the UNDP mission to Estonia also assembled a committee of Estonians and Russian-speakers to write up a report that identified the problems confronting integration and offered solutions as to how these could be overcome (United Nations Development Programme 1997).

See G. Feldman (2005) for an analysis of the subjectification of Russian-speakers in Estonian integration policy.

The United Kingdom joined the project in the spring of 2001, which led to its renaming as The Nordic/UK/UNDP Project: Support to the State Integration Programme.

The OSCE mission closed on 31 December 2001 concluding that its mandate was fulfilled.

“Cultural pluralism” is to occur under the conditions of the Framework Convention, which, according to the Council of Europe (1995a, sect. II, art. 5, para. 1 and 2), should not undercut the signatory state’s own integration policy. This tautology favors the nation-state over
national minorities. "A strong common core" is to be based upon the use of the Estonian language in the public sphere. The Estonian language is the tool by which society is to be united lest distinct linguistic groups lapse into conflict. In other words, public life is to be ordered through the use of the Estonian language. Hence, eighty-one percent of the 2000 budget for the State Programme was committed to teaching the Estonian language to Russian-speakers. The "Estonian cultural domain" refers to the top priority given to the preservation and development of the Estonian culture, a constitutional objective of the Estonian state.

More specifically, Russian-medium secondary schools are to conduct sixty percent of their curricula in the Estonian language by 2007.

REFERENCES


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