Building Trust: Managing Common Past and Symbolic Public Spaces in Divided Societies

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ABSTRACT  State- and nation-building historical policies clash with the perspectives of minorities. Negative group stereotypes affect the trust required for multicultural societies to function. How do groups mediate differences and cope with hate-prone interpretations of history? Linking the often separate literature on social capital, identity, ethnic conflicts and resolution, and on symbolic politics and historical reconciliation, this article develops a framework for intercommunity trust-building research. Observing controversies surrounding collective memories and memorials in Eastern Europe, it argues that integrative processes occur ‘from below’: when groups build mutual horizontal trust through common management of their shared past and landscapes; when the state participates, and does not impose.

Introduction

Many East European and Eurasian countries continue to celebrate 9 May to commemorate the day the Nazis capitulated to the Soviet Union in 1945, ending the so-called Great Patriotic War, as opposed to 8 May when they capitulated to the Allied countries in Europe; but there have been debates about the meaning of this day and how it should be marked. ‘Liberation–occupation’ dichotomy regarding the presence of the Red Army in the Baltics and in Ukraine, during and after World War II, is most publicized.1 In Ukraine, the debate has focused on the division between the veterans of the nationalist militias, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), which fought against the Soviets (as well as against various Polish forces and on occasion against the Nazi) in the western parts of the country, and veterans of the Soviet Army. In Soviet times, the militias were harshly punished after the war. Western Ukraine was occupied by the Red Army in 1939, and the brutalities of the Soviet regime during and after the war have not been forgotten. For the east of the country, the term ‘occupation’ is associated exclusively with the Nazi regime and the term ‘liberation’ with the Red Army. Western Ukraine considers itself a victim of both the Nazis and the Soviets, and situational collaboration with the Nazis is considered...
to have been the price for national independence. Most eastern Ukrainians perceive their past differently: they fought alongside the Russians and hence contributed to the victory over fascism (Zhurzhenko, 2002).

In this context, the establishment of the Museum of Soviet Occupation in Kiev, similar to the one in Estonia and Georgia, is controversial. In response to the state-nation-building policies, on 16 September 2007, in Simferopol, the capital of Crimea (eastern Ukraine), an anti-UPA monument has been erected. The monument’s inscription reads: ‘to the soviet citizens killed by the Nazi collaborators, members of OUN-UPA’. It is placed in a region where the UPA was absent and where the nationalist ideology was rather minimal and thus can be interpreted as a counter-monument, part of what journalists now call ‘war of monuments’.

In Estonia, one relic of the Soviet era was the so-called bronze statue: monument of a Soviet soldier erected in the centre of Tallinn in 1947. After Estonia became independent, an increasing number of the Russian minority began laying flowers at the statue every year on 9 May, Soviet Victory Day. In May 2006, the prime minister declared that the monument symbolized the occupation of the country and should therefore be removed. When the bronze statue was taken to a cemetery, riots against the dismantling of the Bronze Soldier Monument broke out in Tallinn. Over 1,000 people were detained and a Russian citizen died of a knife wound. Local Russians struggle for their right to be represented in the symbolic public landscape. The problem is that their symbols have been completely devalued with the collapse of the Soviet Union and contradict the new narrative of national history.

Although common, is the destruction, displacement, or substitution of conflicting symbols necessary? Is this the only—the best—way to cope with contested historical narratives? The example of the town of Goldapia, at the far end of north-eastern Poland in the Masuria region, indicates an interesting and intriguing method of managing symbolic public spaces differently. Goldapia’s local history is one of shifting borders and changing populations. Presently inhabited overwhelmingly by Poles, its population was composed of Germans (especially while part of Prussia), Jews and Poles. According to a sociological research conducted by Łukowski (2002, pp. 241–243), local authorities refused to appropriate the town’s landscape to the Polish group alone. On the contrary, they emphasized the diversity of cultures and the complexity of local history through retaining and erecting a diversity of memorials and symbols.

The following three monuments claim our attention. (1) In 1992, an obelisk ‘to the memory of sixteen generations of German inhabitants who lived, worked and created in the town of Goldapia’ (inscription in German) was put in place. For the present Polish inhabitants, the memorial reflects local history and is part of their local identification (Łukowski, 2002, p. 241). (2) In 2002, through a joint initiative with the descendants of Goldapia Jews, a monument was erected ‘to the memory of the members of the Jewish community of Goldapia, victims of Nazism in the years 1933–1945’, with the inscription in Polish, Hebrew and German. (3) Simultaneously, located in the centre of the town, on the Victory Place, is the Monument to the Brothers in Arms (Pomnik Braterstwa Broni) from 1970, erected to the glory of the Polish–Soviet comradeship. Instead of opting for a concrete set of national symbols, the locality chose to manage its symbolic public space by presenting the totality of its indivisible history. Eliminating the now ‘politically incorrect’ memorial and renaming the topographic name of the Place would contradict the chosen option. Goldapia is an example of the socially constructed ‘small homelands’.
Although rarely observed and studied, similar integrative mechanisms and initiatives can be detected throughout the region. This paper tries to fill the gap by turning the attention from conflict *per se* to the processes that attenuate it. The paper aims to understand the trust-building processes between otherwise divided groups, particularly in the context of post-Communist states, all consolidating their independence through (re)building national identity of the majority group. Their nationalizing policies clash with the identity of the minority groups; national heroes of the former often happen to represent executioners for the latter, and vice versa. How does one manage these ‘indivisible territories’ (Toft, 2003) in order to integrate the communities for the heterogeneous societies to function and survive?

The purpose of this paper is to explore the social science literature, looking for directions that would allow us to think about the possibility of integration and trust in divided societies and about the processes conducive to it. It is argued that relationships based on trust between otherwise hostile communities are built through mutual reimagining of myths constitutive of each group’s identity and the transformation of the associated symbolic landscapes. Contrary to the authors who pay attention to horizontal trust between individuals or to vertical trust in institutions, I propose to look into intergroup interactions and the possibility of constructing horizontal trust between groups, from below, in the context of weak states or states engaged in building national unity (excluding minorities).

In the next section, the context of this research and the gap to be filled in are presented. There is then a review of the literature from a variety of subdisciplines, from which a set of concepts and ideas is borrowed to construct an intercommunity trust-building research framework. This is followed by a section presenting three cases of integrative initiatives, taken from the sensitive, although not belligerent, relations between Poles, Jews, Ukrainians and Germans in Poland. Note that the objective here is to construct an analysis framework that would serve future case studies. The cases presented in the last section are only rough descriptions and brief illustrations of the framework. A comparative in-depth case analysis still needs to be undertaken.

**Heterogeneity, Trust and History: Research Context**

Most contemporary literature on democracy and democratization associates ‘good democratic governance’ with ‘good civil society’ and vibrant/robust social capital. Without social cohesion, that is, stability, intergroup cooperation, common identity and a sense of belonging, democratic institutions find it hard to work efficiently. At the same time, most studies agree that there is a negative relationship between social capital and heterogeneous societies (Hooghe, 2007). The common assumption is that trust in fellow citizens, which with reciprocity and closed networks forms social capital, is based on resemblance. Resemblance in turn is tied to cultural homogeneity. In the context of cultural diversity, institutions are thus said to provide the necessary integrative element. In what follows, it is suggested that we should pay more attention to trust-building between communities as opposed, or rather complementary, to trust between individuals and trust in institutions. Furthermore, it is put forward that intercommunity trust-building is based on reputation and stereotypes built on past events.

When arguing for the stability of democratic political arrangements, ‘institutional engineers’ concentrate on structures and institutions. Alternatively, philosophers and sociologists emphasize the necessity for trust (Inglehart, 1999; Hardin, 2002) and for the
appropriate patterns of social life’ (Fukuyama, 1995; Macedo, 1996). The salutary function of trust between individual citizens (Luhmann in Gambetta, 1988; Szitompka, 1996) is explained in terms of social capital (Putnam, 1993), of commodity (Petitt, 1995), or of resource (Good & Dasgupta in Gambetta, 1988; Szitompka, 1996; Offe, 1999). Trust relations, understood as faith in the good intentions of our co-citizens or at least the belief that they are ‘not ill-disposed’ towards us (Szitompka, 1996; Weinstock, 1999), are beneficial even if—by definition—they are risky (Baier, 1994; Tilly, 2005).

In modern, geographically stretched societies, horizontal trust, that is, trust between all citizens, is impossible and thus replaced by accountable democratic institutions (Dunn in Gambetta, 1988; Fukuyama, 1995; Szitompka, 1996; Offe, 1999). In the context of deficient trust at the individual level, it is necessary to implement institutions and laws to protect and balance the uncertainty of the intentions of the ‘other’. Authors turn their attention to the study of the citizens’ vertical relations of (mis)trust in state institutions (Braithewaite & Levi, 1998). In divided societies, the role of structures is seen as particularly important and necessary. Hooghe suggests that the negative relation between social capital—and trust by the same token—and heterogeneity is caused by segregation rather than by diversity as such. This mirrors Petersen’s (2002) ‘resentment’ in ethnic conflicts caused by structural frameworks, such as social mobility, linguistic and educational constraints, or (perceived as) unjust distribution of power between the groups. Hooghe argues that modifying institutional constraints to groups by adopting politics of recognition and minority rights may reduce segregation and resentment, opening up the possibility of developing social capital. Authors such as Offe (1999) and Williams (1998) remark, however, that political structures are insufficient, incomplete, ambiguous and contested. They recommend to the ‘institutional designers’ that trust should not be ignored—this ‘precious and fragile commodity’ (Petitt, 1995, p. 225) inherent to all efficient societies. Trust makes possible original solutions to conflicting interests and values (on trust and creativity, see Offe, 1999). Further, intercommunity trust is important if we consider that individuals often suffer prejudice as members of a stigmatized and marginalized group. There is a gap to be filled in: intercommunity trust.

I assume that, similar to the attribution of trust to individuals based on our knowledge of the persons and/or based on their reputation (past actions, Hardin, 2002), the attribution of trust to groups is based on the group’s reputation and the stereotypes associated with it (Hooghe, 2007, p. 716). Stereotypes are based, however, on generalizations ‘from the past to the future’ and are thus limited or deterministic. Instead, trust involves the knowledge and understanding of the present and past injustices as perceived by the groups. 3

A propos, Ross remarks that

the goal . . . is to . . . allow the groups not to feel threatened by differences in how they see the world. Paradoxically, doing this successfully often requires that these differences be acknowledged and explored rather than swept under the rug . . . When acknowledgment occurs, more inclusive, less threatening, and partially overlapping narratives and identities can arise from mutual listening and acknowledgment, and a politics that emphasizes possible benefits arising from respect and cooperation develops. (Ross, 2007, p. 47)

Taking into account diverging perspectives serves the integration of difference (Rauschenbach, 2000). Bridging conflicting collective memories in order to modify stereotypes
contributes to generating trust relations. Bazin (2000, p. 44) argues that ‘even if reconcili-ation looks into the past, it is a process fundamentally turned to the future because it has the ambition to allow the elaboration of a common vision of the common future or of a future based on common interest’.

The link between intercommunity trust and history sounds familiar to those acquainted with international relations literature, particularly with the social-psychological approach to conflict resolution and reconciliation (e.g. Kelman, 2004). Indeed, although strategic studies favour rational and instrumental accounts of identity conflicts, some authors consider affective elements as constitutive of inter- and intrasocietal wars. Recent work by Kaufman (2001) on symbolic politics, Ross (2007) on the role of culture, Crains & Roe (2003) on collective memories and Petersen (2002) on hate, fear and resentment resulting from historical myths are some examples.

Kaufman follows Murray Edelman in affirming that myths (in anthropology, ‘collective memories’ in sociology; Crains & Roe, 2003, p. 9) and symbols are central to understanding ethnicity (Kaufman, 2001, p. 16); they maintain the cohesion of the group (Crains & Roe, 2003, p. 11). Ethnic conflicts are thus a result of ‘each side’s goals, and expectations about the other, [which] came from hostile interpretations of history encoded in each group’s myth-symbol complex’ (Kaufman, 2001, p. 20). The latter are ‘[history] narratives as collective memories’ (Ross, 2007, p. 34) and take root in the concrete spaces, gestures, images and objects (Nora’s ‘lieux de mémoire’). Kaufman argues that for the conflict to emerge, myths justifying ethnic hostility and providing source to ethnic fears have to be present. These myths can constitute a powerful resource for ethnic leaders, for group cohesion, and for group mobilization against the ‘other’. Inversely, if a group’s myth–symbol complex encourages cooperation, the conflict will not arise (Kaufman, 2001, p. 39). Similarly, Petersen (2002, p. 2) found that resentment provides the best prediction of conflict emergence in Eastern Europe. Resentment between groups can be based, among other status-related indicators, on disregarded or hostile ‘symbols such as street names’ (Petersen, 2002, p. 42)—competing and/or unacknowledged myth–symbol complexes—which affect individuals’/group’s self-esteem (on the role of high esteem, see: Petersen, 2002, pp. 45–48; Ross, 2007 p. 37). Therefore, in an effort to bring groups together, ethnic conflict prevention has to take into account the underestimated peace-building (Kaufman, 2001, p. 40), that is, ‘changing the hostile myths and attitudes in the long run’ (Kaufman, 2001, p. 215; also Crains & Roe, 2003, pp. 176–180).

Most of this literature, however, is interested in the pre-agreement stage of intense conflict resolution: ‘getting to the negotiation table’ and ‘making a deal’ for the violence to come to an end. It is also concerned with mechanisms one can put in place ‘from above’ to facilitate problem-solving workshops as the track II negotiations ‘carried out by elites having access to top leaders’ (Kaufman, 2006, p. 208). This study is concerned mainly with the heterogeneity in democracies, and proposes an intercommunity trust-building research framework that will draw some insights from the mechanisms found for immediate conflict resolution, but which pays attention to the necessary initiatives from below.

Hints for Trust-building: Muddling through Social Science Debates

Through establishing connections between the often separate literatures, this section offers research directions for intercommunity trust-building. It addresses the questions
of whether these processes are possible, and how and by whom they are undertaken, and ends with an analysis framework—exemplified with case studies in the section that follows.

On the Possibility

Two conceptions of identity are usually opposed in the literature: primordialists consider identity as given and hardly mutable, even if Geertz and Shils talk about the perception of its primordiality and Van Evera states that identity is not a genetic condition but rather a social one (Hale, 2004, pp. 459–460); and instrumentalists, such as Laitin, who believe that shifting identity is possible, reasonable, and instrumental to an individual’s socio-economic material interests (Gilbert, 2000, pp. 23–26). The latter group maintains that individuals weigh the (dis)advantages of group membership consciously and that for practical reasons (such as job opportunities) it would be rational to abandon their mother tongue and cultural practices. The conflict thus evolves around the relative difficulty, not the possibility, of transforming identity. Safran (2004, p. 2) remarked that ‘minorities do not give up their linguistic heritage without a fight, even if the payoff is significant’. It is by now a widely accepted assumption, however, that identities are social constructions; they are ‘situational’ and ‘ever changing’ (Young, 2002; Hale, 2004, p. 466; May et al., 2004, p. 9; Máz & Requejo, 2005, pp. 2–5). I propose to follow the constructivist perspective, which draws upon both primordialism and instrumentalism (Hempel, 2004): identities are constructed and transformed through long-lasting cultural, historical and/or political processes that are based in large measure on the emotional and symbolic power of ethnic bonds (Kauffman, 2001; Ross, 2007).

Over time, identity groups are subject to transformations. Constitutive elements of an ethnic identity undergo mutations: culture, language, accounts of history, traditions and rites modify in response to external stimuli. The rapprochement of otherwise hostile communities is thus a possibility; the possibility of trust-building as proposed above is thus confirmed in the literature on identity. It is a process modifying the perception of the division between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Once this possibility is established, we turn to the question ‘how’.

On the ‘How To’ Process

In addition to the emergence of a set of literature on truth commissions and reconciliation in South Africa, Latin America and the Balkans, there is a debate in sociology, political philosophy and psychology on the political function of forgiveness and of historical reconciliation processes (see e.g. Derrida, 1999; Ricoeur, 2000; Lefranc, 2002; Labelle et al., 2005). According to the study by Crains & Roe (2003, p. 32), two views emerge concerning the need for remembering. On the one hand, following the suggestion by Devine-Wright (2003), all conflicting memories should be ‘forgotten’ and new constructions should be put in place. On the other hand, for the reconciliation to occur the need for preventing forgetfulness is underlined. I would like to stress an intermediary way between ‘tabula rasa’ and ‘catharsis’: appease conflicting memories through processes that transform myths.

The literature on post-conflict reconciliation offers some insights regarding the mechanisms of the process. Laderach (1999) considered four elements that constitute
reconciliation: truth, mercy, justice and peace. Long & Brecke (2003, pp. 28–31) identified similar features: truth-telling and apology for the harm done; forgiveness as a *sine qua non*; and partial justice as a compromise. Ross (2004) spoke of apology and forgiveness, followed by reparations. However, he found these elements rarely possible in the heat of the conflict and as an alternative considered acknowledgement of the ‘other’s sufferings’ as a necessary second best. Moreover, Ross put forward the necessity for reconciliation events such as ritual and symbolic actions and cultural performances. In their concluding remarks, Crains & Roe (2003, p. 180) established a threefold process for memory reconciliation: ‘(1) accepting responsibility for past actions of one’s own community; (2) seeking and granting intergroup forgiveness; and (3) appropriating the history of the other community to learn from its experiences’. Taking stock from a different set of authors, I will discuss these mechanisms and nuance some items (necessity for forgiveness; truth-telling).

According to Arendt (1958), to recognize collective responsibility for inflicted harm breaks the vicious circle of repetitive cycles of vengeance. Apologies express respect for the victims’ feelings (Funk-Unrau, 2004; also Tavuchis, 1991) and offer legitimacy for their interpretation of the past events (Schaap, 2005, p. 104). It opens a space for new relations. Conjointly, the reconciliation process needs a willingness to forgive because, as argued by Charles Taylor (1998, p. 155), ‘any parties to public debate that remain fixed in the role of victim will forever be engaged in what can at best amount to a preliminary operation, and can never be part of the actual creation of mutual trust and commitment’. The willingness to forgive is sufficient, as forgiveness itself is a function of the actions undertaken in the process; forgiveness can remain just a possibility for the trust-building (reconciliation) process to proceed in a constructive way (see Schaap, 2005, chapter 7). The force of apology is thus in redirecting attention to actions—actions that aim at getting to know and eventually understand divergent interpretations of the common past (Nobles, 2003, pp. 12–13).

As ‘each side in the conflict will tell a story that justifies its own violence and delegitimizes that of the other side’ (Biggar, 2003, p. 309), the reinterpretation of history conducive to integrating myths is needed. As Long & Brecke (2003) put it, there is a need for a redefinition of what it means to be a member of an identity group. So far there is little theoretical input on the management of the common past in divided societies. Interesting research directions can be found, though, in the writings on the construction of national identities in the post-Soviet space, for example, by Schöpflin (2000), and in Smith’s (1999) historic ethno-symbolism.

Smith explains the strength of the bonds between members of a nation through its myths, memory, traditions and symbols, which are constantly rediscovered and reinterpreted. Myths are narrations of a community’s history by the community itself. They are not historical truth. They are interpretations, not invented fictions, because they have to relate to facts and to collective memories (‘responsiveness’, Schöpflin, 2000, p. 87). Myths constitute a community’s integrative elements because they create a sense of belonging and pride. They account for ‘our’ territory, ‘our’ Golden Age, for the causes of a nation’s decline and victimization. Myths determine the borders of ‘us’ versus ‘them’, justify collective claims, and mobilize collective action. However, both Smith and Schöpflin regard myths as flexible. Nations—social constructions and imagined communities—are not static entities but rather imbued with fluidities and change. Myths adapt to the needs of the moment, to an external threat, and to structural changes. In fact,
‘different myths receive emphasis at different times to cope with different challenges’ (Schöpflin, 2000, p. 98; also Parekh, 2000, p. 203; and Renan’s ‘collective amnesia’, 1992, pp. 41–42).

As ‘the imaginative use of symbols, and myths, and of monuments, commemorations, and performances ... [are] all directed towards nurturing some form of identity’ (Osborne, 2001, p. 3), and because the role of politicians, priests, linguists, historians, and other public figures is to reinforce the sense of ethnicity, it should be possible to reinterpret and attenuate hostile stories and to place instead emphasis on those that bear witness to a common peaceful past and contribute to trust-building and to the reinforcement of integrative elements. As Wieviorka (1998, p. 881) stated: ‘cultural differences are not only reproduced, they are in constant process of being produced which means that fragmentation and recomposition are a permanent probability’. As myths have to be responsive to collective memories, we cannot invent them. Reinterpretation is about knowing and understanding, rather than about making and inventing. This process should thus conduct to the building of a shared identification, complementary to and inclusive of cultural diversity rather than to a unified whole (through assimilation or acculturation processes).

Symbols are tied to myths and serve to standardize them by forming a communication network, a language without words (Schöpflin, 2000, p. 81). Monuments, museums, graves, memorial stones, topographic names, flags, and others play a unique role in the creation and reimagining of collective identities. Symbols bring figures from the past to the present, putting forward specific myths and their protagonists as present-day heroes. These often conflict with memories of other groups for whom the presumed hero was an oppressor. Observing the objects of commemoration and even the location of commemorations is very informative of the ongoing identity-building (Forest & Johnson, 2002; Forest et al., 2003; Hoelscher & Alderman, 2004). Symbols serve to maintain a certain vision of the world and thus can integrate or divide further. As illustrated in the introduction of the article, the use of symbolic public spaces is subject to heated debates and tension in Central Eastern Europe where, following the fall of the Soviet yoke, each nation and ethnic group is (re)discovering its symbols, usually mutually exclusive. How does one manage these ‘indivisible territories’ (Toft, 2003)?

Similarly to the reimagination of integrative myths, symbols can take integrative forms. After all, ‘places, like persons, have biographies in as much as they are formed, used, and transformed in relation to practice’ (Tilley, 1994, p. 33); ‘the landscape is never inert, people engage with it, re-work it, appropriate and contest it’ (Bender, 1993, p. 3). Schöpflin (2000, pp. 81–82) maintains that it is not necessary for symbols to be interpreted in an identical way by all groups; what is important is that the symbol should rally. Alternatively, one can think of public spaces where different symbols coexist to form a whole. This would be the spirit acclaimed by Rauschenbach (2000, p. 24), who argues for an inclusive account of different perspectives instead of one integrative account. The case of the town of Goldapia mentioned at the beginning is one such example: a landscape reflecting the complexity of local history through the preservation of divergent symbols (‘small homelands’ in Łukowski, 2002), instead of the public space appropriated by one group’s memory. In his concluding remarks, Ross (2007, p. 325) wrote that ‘inclusion in the symbolic landscape offers legitimacy ... and is a powerful expression of societal inclusion that communicates a mutuality and shared stake in society. It renders the previously unseen seen, gives voice to those
once voiceless, and can offer powerful messages to young people and help to reshape relations between groups’.

On the ‘Who’ Question of Agency: Taking ‘From Below Actors’ Seriously

When studying identity-building processes most authors turn to analysis of state policies. This is quite apparent in the recent literature on state-building in the post-Communist/Soviet space. There is also abundant work in political philosophy identifying ‘national solidarity’ or political/civic identity as necessary for the modern state’s workings. John Stuart Mill emphasized the need of some form of cohesion/homogeneity for liberal democracy to function. In divided societies, thus, some sort of ‘no ethnic cohesion’ is argued for in terms of solidarity, common political identification and trust (see e.g. Taylor, 1998; Weinstock, 1999; Parekh, 2000; Gilbert, 2000; Gurpreet, 2002). These political communities are socially constructed, maintained and reinforced through state policies, whose aim is to assure state legitimacy and efficiency. Nora (1996) believed that commemorations were performed to make up for a lack of unity within societies (see also Osborne, 2001, p. 7). Appealing to common sentiments and/or interests, states involve themselves in historical politics and commit to a particular interpretation of history in textbooks or in their choice of memorials. In turn, Kymlicka (2001, p. 16) talks about the ‘myth of the neutrality of the state’.

In East European states, most notably Poland, a public debate was held with regard to a proposal by the Minister of Education, Roman Giertych (from League of Polish Families (LPR), a conservative-nationalist party), to introduce classes on national patriotism in the school curricula (Paciorek, 2006). Although the idea was abandoned altogether once the new centre-left, liberal government came to power in 2007, in the wake of an almost 2-year public polemic between historians, politicians and citizens, we can identify two camps or ways of thinking: those who favour the involvement of the state in these matters and those who are against (Bachmann, 2006). I suggest, however, that we need to consider the issue in another way. As the state is not neutral, in divided societies the question should concern the process of how to promote one myth over another, instead of being concerned about what should be taught. School curricula should reflect different perspectives and eventually their integration.

Thus, states (might) use myths instrumentally, in relation to current needs. This was the case of the Piast myth used by the Polish Communist government in opposition to the Jagiellon myth employed after 1989. The former refers to the Piast dynasty that reigned from 966 to 1370 more or less within the current Polish borders and the idea of ‘Poland for the Poles’ (Davies, 1997, p. 152). It served the Polish Communist state to justify the country’s territorial westward shift after World War II and the massive expulsion of the Germans (agreed by Allies in Potsdam; Włodarczyk, 2002). The latter refers to the Jagiellon dynasty (1386–1572) under whose rule Poland included territories that today form parts of present-day Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine, and had a reputation for being a tolerant multinational state.4

Putting forward of the multicultural inclusive myth was not an overnight decision. The modification, or rather the synthesis of the Piast and Jagiellon myths, took place some time before 1989, and was orchestrated by non-governmental initiatives. It was in the 1950s within the Kultura circles, a Polish historical review, published in France, that the process was undertaken (Włodarczyk, 2002). Over the years, the transformation of
myths culminated in a new conception of the Polish state: a harmonious multicultural society (Jagiellon) within borders (re)established after the war (Piast). This reimagined myth is helpful in Poland’s present Eastern foreign policies (no revisionist claims) and in the politics of inclusive citizenship. The use of the myth and state policies based on it is no guarantee of integration and trust: after all, Jagiellon Poland is not pictured as a ‘tolerant multicultural state’ by groups of Ukrainians, Jews, or Belorussians. The limited results of ‘from above’ integrative politics are most apparent in the case of Ukraine, where the state’s historical politics, aimed at the integration of the East and West—initiatives to reconcile the UPA and Red Army veterans, the renaming of Victory Day into Memory Day—receive a counter-response ‘from below’ that consists of writing alternative regional histories (Rodgers, 2006) and erecting counter-monuments (above).

The problem is in the instrumental ‘from above’ choice of myths from the repertoire. It does not result from an exchange of diverging interpretations. Such an approach tends to obscure differences instead of discovering and understanding them. It tends to impose one vision over another and in doing so maintains hostile stereotypes. Rather, trust-building is about a parallel reimagining process at the societal level. After all, Smyth’s and Schöpfflin’s ‘myths controllers’ are politicians, but equally priests, writers, historians and linguists. Citing Winter and Sivan (1999), Evans (2006, p. 325) suggests that the reformulation of narratives is the product of interconnected processes operating at the state level and within the society; after all collective remembrance is a product of people, proceeding from the bottom up. He then mentions that the dissident movements in Eastern Europe all called for history from below because of the psychological impact of an imposed official history that bore no resemblance to what people themselves remembered (Vaclav Havel’s letter to Gustav Husak in Evans, 2006, p. 329). The dichotomy between official and vernacular (from below) forms of memory is also undermined by Forest et al. (2004): ‘mutual interactions among multiple publics and elites … combine to form a complex pastiche of public memory … [through the] participation in the process of memory re-formation’ (p. 358); ‘public memory is a process rather than material object or outcome’ (p. 374).

Summarizing all of the above, I develop an intercommunity trust-building research framework (Table 1), which might be useful while observing and analysing responses to the management of history-based tensions.

Putting it All Together: Intercommunity Trust-building in Action

As the main objective of the paper is to construct a framework of analysis for future research, the following cases of Polish–Jewish, Polish–Ukrainian and Polish–German relations present possible research directions while simultaneously serving as illustrations. (The author is quite aware of the need for—and is in the process of—constructing a more in-depth analysis and a more systematic comparison.) Although minority groups represent a small fraction of the total Polish population,5 studying their interaction with the majority and the state institutions sheds a great deal of light on the political processes of identity transformation; because these are tiny/small groups, with no real economic or mass mobilization leverage, the importance of symbolic politics in interethic relations is clear. As Ross (2007, p. 37) stated, the latter is much harder to observe in the heat of a
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Table 1. Intercommunity trust-building research framework
Jedwabne: Anti-Semitism or Anti-Sovietism

On 10 July 1941, in Jedwabne, Poland, a group of Poles encircled Jewish residents of the village, hit them with wooden sticks while dragging them through the village, and set them on fire. There is no doubt regarding the participation of Poles in these murders. The controversy arises with regard to the interpretation and explanation of the massacre in the Jewish versus the Polish historiographies, and thus their respective construction of myths. With regard to the former, the killing reflects the general Polish attitude towards Jews; for the latter, it is related to the collaboration of these particular Jews following the occupation of the region by the Soviets.

The twentieth-century history of Polish–Jewish relations is subject to tensions as Poles interpret it through the stereotype of the ‘Communist Jew’—the heritage of an instrumental use of the Jewish question by the Communist government—and Jews through the stereotype of the ‘anti-Semitic Pole’ (see Wróbel, 1997). Consider, for example, the explanation provided in a Polish textbook by Roszkowski for the 1946 Kielce pogrom: it is placed in the context of the consolidation of Communist power when the Communists were discrediting the Polish resistance (Armia Krajowa) by associating it with anti-Semitism (see Blatman, 1997, p. 36). On the other side, the Jewish account of the history of Poland omits the context of the trauma of the Polish partitions, and of the Nazi and the Soviet occupations, to such an extent that young people in Israel wonder, in the words of a Jew interviewed in Poland while visiting for the March of the Living, ‘how humans can live in Poland’ (Rzeczpospolita, 2005a).

Since the publication of Neighbors, a highly contested book by Jan Gross, in 2000 (in Polish, in 2001 in English), we have been able to observe the beginning of a new process. Although highly controversial, I presume it to be part of the trust-building process. The publication recounts the Jedwabne events from an anti-Polish perspective—as perceived by Poles—and marks the beginning of a heated public debate. Numerous press articles, conferences, radio and TV programmes addressed the following questions: the number of victims, which is estimated by Gross to be 600 and by the Polish National Institute for Memory to be 300 (IPN, 2002); the role of the Nazis who had just occupied the area after the Soviets had retreated; the collaboration by Jews in the previous Soviet occupation of the zone; the status of the executioners (were they renegades or simple Polish citizens?); and the occurrence of similar acts (was it a unique event or a generalized hostility?) (Tymowski, 2002).

Although extremely controversial, by bringing it out into the open and by opposing the official version of the facts, the book unleashed an unprecedented debate concerning a common but conflicting past. One of the consequences was the apologies made by the Polish Catholic Church first and then by President Aleksander Kwaśniewski, in May and June 2001, respectively. These apologies resulted from the display of diverging memories and from debates ‘from below’. They legitimized a further reconciliation process even though the results of a 2002 survey in Poland revealed that the Jewish minority, which accounts for 0.0028% of the Polish population, is considered the most threatening minority group to the Polish state and to the Poles. The percentage of Poles feeling threatened by Jews jumped from 11 to 14% between 1992 and 2002.
As Jan Grabowski noted, the recognition of inflicted suffering legitimized the victims’ perspective and opened up a new space for Polish historiography (Rzeczpospolita, 2005b). This open confrontation facilitated the discovery and acknowledgement of divergent interpretations. This does not imply integration, but the process of trust-building is possible only if the perspectives are all ‘on the table’.

Some indicators of the ongoing process are apparent. The American Jewish Committee officially denounced the often used expression of ‘Polish concentration camps’, specifying that they were Nazi camps set up on the territory of occupied Poland (American Jewish Committee Declaration, 2005). In the Polish press, one can read articles by Polish Jews calling for a break from old stereotypes (e.g. Hartman, 2005). A university student’s initiative has resulted in annual student exchanges between Israel and Poland and in joint participation in the yearly March of the Living in Auschwitz. In so doing, young Polish and Jewish people ‘reappropriate’ this memory together. Today, the Centre for Civic Education (CCE), a non-governmental organization (NGO), runs an educational project that brings Holocaust survivors to primary schools to tell their story. Another constructive indicator of the trust-building process is the introduction in 2005 of a textbook—written by Engelking, Tych, Żbikowski and Żyndul in 2004—on the history of the Polish Jews into the school programme. The textbook is the result of the combined efforts of Polish and Jewish historians sponsored by the American–Polish–Israel Foundation Shalom, the Polish Ministry of Education, and the Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education and Remembrance and Research. It is complementary to a more general History of Poland textbook and is presented ‘on the side’, not yet as an integrated part of the whole. Although controversies surrounding the presentation of the facts in the publication continue (e.g. Toruńczyk, 2006), the debate has been transformed because the divergent interpretations have now been recognized and actions have been undertaken. These actions are mostly initiatives ‘from below’ with the state responding to public opinion and participating in the process through contributing, for example, to the funding of the Polish Jews’ Museum in Warsaw and the Galicia Jews’ Museum in Krakow. CCE’s programmes are partially funded by the state, but as one of the project managers told the author, this funding is subject to revision each time the government coalition changes, depending on which version of history and politics it embraces.

**Pawlokoma: The UPA–AK Controversy**

According to Bogumiła Berdychowska, history is the ‘only’ source of conflict between the Poles and Ukrainians (Maksymiuk, 2006). Between 1941 and 1944, the eastern part of pre-war Poland, including the Vohlyn region, which was overwhelmingly inhabited by Ukrainians, became the playground for four competing forces: the Germans, Soviets, the Polish resistance—particularly the Home Army (Armia Krajowa (AK))—and the Ukrainian nationalist movement, the UPA, and its political wing the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). The Poles fought against the Nazis while the Ukrainians aspired for independence with German help, which in general was not forthcoming. As enemies, the Poles and Ukrainians engaged in systematic attacks and extermination campaigns (Polska-Ukraina, 2003, p. 64). Violent incidents such as mass executions and the destruction of villages and monuments were common, resulting in the deaths of between 70,000 and 100,000 Poles and nearly 30,000 Ukrainians, between February 1943 and July
1944 alone (Chałubczak & Browarek, 2000, p. 87; Grott, 2004). After the war, Polish Communists proceeded with homogenization policies and targeted particularly the Ukrainian resistance to the Polish state in the south-east of post-war Poland. In 1947, the ‘Vistula Action’ forced Ukrainians to leave their homes en masse, with the huge majority of the Ukrainian population being dumped in the (former German) ‘recovered’ parts of western territories of Poland. Communist propaganda disseminated in school curricula presented Ukrainians as natural enemies of the Poles, ‘traitors’ or ‘fascists’ (Kiesielowska-Lipman, 2002, p. 139).

The interpretation of this shared history varies. The account of the Pawlokoma atrocities by the Polish historian Zdzisław Konieczny versus that of the Ukrainian historian (in Canada) Petro Potichny is but one example. In March 1945, the AK massacred the people of the village of Pawlokoma (some 40 km from the present Ukrainian border). Konieczny maintains that AK did not kill children and women, but ‘only’ some 150 men, and that the massacre was retaliation for a previous assault by the UPA upon Poles. Potichny claims over 365 dead and presents the incident within a larger context of the general Polish attitude towards Ukrainians during the period of Nazi occupation (Maksymiuk, 2006). Moreover, controversy emerges and tensions mount when the question of commemoration and enacting landscapes emerges. Such tension was particularly common in eastern Poland in the 1990s when the Ukrainian minority was illegally erecting UPA memorial stones (Malikowski in Szczepański, 1997, pp. 210–213).

Yet, when relations between Poles and Ukrainians are studied in depth, some initiatives of rapprochement surface. As just mentioned, in the early 1990s Ukrainians in Poland started erecting monuments commemorating the UPA. After numerous confrontations, there is now a joint commission for symbolic public spaces, which reached a compromise on the inscriptions allowed on UPA memorials (which now read: ‘perished for the freedom of Ukraine’, without mentioning UPA military grades and other details). At the base level, initiatives for common remembrance have been detected and supported by a variety of NGOs. For example, a primary school history teacher took the initiative to expose children to the different perspectives from which local history is taught. In September 2008, in Krasicyzyn near Przemyśl in south-eastern Poland, a cross on the River San commemorating all those who perished along the border between USSR and Nazi Germany (the Molotov–Ribbentrop line) was consecrated together by prelates from four different Christian denominations—Catholic, Uniate, Orthodox and Evangelical—according to their respective rites (Kisielica, 2008). In addition, a number of seminars have been organized between Polish and Ukrainian historians, each ending in the bilingual publication of documents and debates (Polska-Ukraina, 2003). The inaugural seminar was initiated by a non-governmental research centre KARTA, which edits a historical review (Traba, 2001, p. 350). Interrupted for funding reasons, the seminars resumed in 1996 following a joint—and quite unexpected—initiative of the Association of AK Soldiers and the Organization of Ukrainians in Poland. These initiatives ‘from below’ resulted in official gestures a few years later. For example, in 2002 President Kwaśniewski condemned the Vistula Action; and in May 2006, his successor Lech Kaczyński and his Ukrainian counterpart Viktor Yushchenko jointly inaugurated a memorial in Pawlokoma. Following the official reopening in June 2005 of the Polish Military ‘Cmentarz Orląt’ (Eagles cemetery) in the former Polish city of Lwów, now the Ukrainian Lviv, Polish and Ukrainian bishops published a letter of forgiveness. This reopening ceremony took place following almost 15 years of problems with regard to the Polish desire
to restore a public symbolic space dedicated to Polish soldiers who died fighting for the city against Ukrainian forces between 1918 and 1919. With a compromise having been reached regarding the inscriptions on the monuments, the reconciliation process seemed complete at last.

Initiatives from below have been sanctioned by both states, giving the reconciliation process a boost. Restoration of the Polish military cemetery in Lviv and the erection of the Pawlokoma memorial, among others, became possible because Poland emerged as the main ally of Ukraine during the Orange Revolution. However, inevitably trust-building processes encounter obstacles when the state chooses to sweep some facts and interpretations under the rug. A heated debate and anti-Ukrainian sentiments resurfaced when the Polish state in 2008 ignored the 65th anniversary of the aforementioned Vohlyn massacres. The trust-building process was compromised because Poles felt that there was a lack of reciprocity: they did acknowledge the sufferings of Ukrainians, but the victims were from both sides. The lack of apologies coming from the Ukrainian state together with the silence of the Polish state resulted in a slowdown of the reconciliation process. The immediate goal of the Polish state was not to undermine the already difficult state- and nation-building process in Ukraine; however, in so doing, the wider reconciliation process suffered. At the diplomatic level, Poland is ‘with’ Ukraine in her EU aspirations and against ‘Russian imperialism’. The trust-building process is tumultuous, long and prone to stalemate, but it may show positive results, similar to the reconciliation—still a never-ending process—between Poles and Germans. After all, conflicts of values and interests should be considered never-ending (Crick, 2002).

Germans: Enemies of the Polish People? Not Quite After All

The post-war process of trust-building between the Poles and Germans started with the memorandum ‘The Situation of the Displaced Persons and the Relationship of the German People to its Neighbours in Eastern Europe’ (the so-called Ostdenkschrift), issued in October 1965 by the Evangelical Church in Germany, which specifically recognized Polish suffering at the hands of the Germans during World War II. A month later, the Polish Catholic Church issued a letter ‘To our German Brothers in Christ’ (Holzer, 2000, p. 73) offering forgiveness and requesting forgiveness in return (Rauschenbach, 2000, p. 25). Despite tense relations during the Cold War, with the signing of the November 1970 treaty between the Federal Republic and Poland, in which the Bonn government tacitly acknowledged the legitimacy of Poland’s western border (the Oder-Neisse), a limited space for rapprochement opened up. In a spontaneous gesture of reconciliation, during his visit to Poland in 1970, Chancellor Willy Brandt knelt at the shrine to the Warsaw Uprising of 1944 (Rauschenbach, 2000, p. 22). In the wake of Brandt’s visit a commission was established for the revision of history textbooks.

During the 1980s, the idea of trust-building matured subsequently within the underground ‘Solidarity’ movement, as was evidenced by the publication of Jozef Lipski’s Dwie ojczyzna—dwa patriotyzmy (Two Homelands—Two Patriotisms) calling for reconciliation. It thus comes as no surprise to learn that the new post-communist elites promoted the wider reconciliation process and expressed their own regret for the sufferings of the expelled Germans (e.g. Bronislaw Geremek in the Bundestag in 1990, in Rauschenbach, 2000, p. 25). From the other side, in 1994 German President Herzog participated in the 50th anniversary of the Warsaw Uprising. Such examples can all be taken as indicators
of the willingness of both parties to acknowledge different perspectives and to understand divergent versions of their shared history. As we shall see, these initiatives ‘from above’ have long since been accompanied by numerous initiatives ‘from below’.

In 1991, a scheme for cooperation between young Poles and Germans was put in place allowing 5,300 teenagers to participate in exchanges. The number of participants reached 75,000 in 1995 and 130,000 in 2000 (Tomala, 2004, p. 141). The exchanges are organized thematically, of which exploration of common history is a part. Another joint initiative, coming from the Körber Foundation in Germany, the KARTA Centre, and the Stefan Batory Foundation in Poland, consists of organizing history contests at secondary school level. The aim is to encourage the students to research the account of a person or a family from a contemporary western part of Poland, with the objective of leading students on both sides of the border to re-evaluate their ‘givens’ and reflect upon the choices made by these inhabitants in the complex context of war. A compendium of the most interesting papers, published in 2003 (edited by Wancerz-Gluży & Bucher-Dinc), was organized on three themes: ‘side by side’, ‘one against the other’ and ‘together’. It is available in libraries across the country.

There have also been numerous meetings between historians. A commission was established in 1993 with a brief for solving tensions around memorials, erected in western Poland, for German soldiers who fought during World Wars I and II, and which exhibit iron crosses and Wehrmacht helmets (Suchoński in Halczak, 2006, pp. 147–155). Contested topographic names were also objects of the commission’s work. In order to avoid the locals attempting to restore contentious names such as Hitlersee (for Szczedrzyk in Opole Silesia, where nearly 80% of Poland’s German minority reside) to their villages a compromise was reached to exclude the names imposed during the period 1933–1945. Within this context it is worth mentioning the role of museums of memorial, proposed or otherwise. The most contentious example is that put forward by Erika Steinbach of the Federation of Expellees, Germany (BdV), to create a Centre Against Expulsions in Berlin, which its opponents argue would simply serve to highlight the suffering of Germans with little regard for the context of war and with disregard for other victims of similar policies (on the controversy, see, e.g. Heimerl, 2006). The BdV’s plans can be contrasted with the practice of two local museums—one in Rinteln, Germany, and the other in Środa Śląska, Poland—which organized an exposition on the entire pattern of expulsions between 1939 and 1949, which was presented in both localities. The idea was simple: to present the story of nine German expellees from Poland and nine Polish expellees from Soviet Ukraine. Furthermore, a bilingual book on the exposition has been published (Augustyn, 2005). Since 2005, there have been discussions on establishing a Museum of Western Territories in Wrocław, which would present the history of the region through the prism of various groups settled in the region voluntarily or by force after the war: the Polish survivors of gulags; survivors of the concentration camps; the massacres in Vohlyn; Ukrainians, Lemko and Roma deported to Lower Silesia during the Vistula Action; expelled Jews and Germans; as well of remaining Jews and Germans. Its construction needs European and governmental funds, and given the panoply of museum projects in Poland the competition for these scarce resources is fierce. Depending on whoever happens to be heading the Ministry of Culture, the Museum of Western Territories is either on or off the list and is still being discussed rather than being constructed (Losy Muzeum, 2008). Nevertheless, it is important to note that the project is a joint initiative ‘from below’ and is supported by
minority groups, of which the German and the Ukrainian organizations are a part (Miś, 2005). One measure of the extent to which these initiatives have had positive outcomes for establishing good relations between the groups is by comparing the results of the 2002 survey with its 1992 predecessor (Uhlig, 2005). Over the 10-year-period, the perception of Germans being hostile to the Polish interests and people dropped from 26 to 10%.

Again the process of building trust is frustrated each time there is ambiguity regarding the position of the governments. The Polish philosopher Leszek Kołakowski claimed that the BdV’s plan to construct the Berlin Centre Against Expulsions, where the suffering of Germans would be presented, was an attempt to construct a victimization myth and as such (Pätzold, 2004), was a deliberate threat to Polish–German reconciliation (Perret, 2006). Erika Steinbach, who might not be well known in Germany, is perceived by the Poles as the incarnation of the threat because she is a Christian-Democrat member of Parliament supported by politicians from the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) including the powerful former Prime Minister of Bavaria, Edmund Stoiber (‘Sojusznik’, 2005). Further, Chancellor Angela Merkel has never opposed the project and in 2008 gave her consent. The approval for the project, the place the President of the BdV occupies on the political arena, together with the continuous demands for reparations for the expellees from Poland coming from Preussische Treuhand (Prussian Claims Society), some of whose members are also BdV members—including the Treuhand’s vice-president, who is also vice-president of the BdV—add to the ambiguity of the situation and thereby to the Polish perception of threat, and as such revive frustration and anger among the Poles.

Conclusion

On the basis of reviewing different social science sub-fields, I have argued for intercommunal trust-building that incorporates affective historical elements into the framework of analysis and practice. This paper is a contribution to the wider debate surrounding heterogeneous democracies. The need for vertical trust in institutions should be complemented by horizontal trust between groups, whereby memory politics are introduced into debates on social capital. The paper has explored the question of ‘how to do it’ and a research framework has been proposed. In addition to cutting across the social science subdisciplines, more empirical, on-site research in different regions should be conducted in order to enhance the proposed framework and to understand better the interactions between communities and between groups and state institutions in heterogeneous democracies. Besides comparing cases between them, a comparison in time, whereby the from above and from below, domestic and external initiatives, and obstacles are put together as ‘action–reaction’ schemes, should be most fruitful. In order to evaluate changes in attitudes, surveys should be conducted and compared.

Trust-building between groups is a process of transformation of myths, not ‘truth-telling’ but rather a process of putting diverging perspectives on the table, as in the case of the book by Gross or the school textbook on Polish Jews. The coexistence of diverse interpretations of history and knowledge and understanding of them transform accounts of history, contributing to the alleviation of hostile stereotypes. The process comprehends apologies or acknowledgments, that is, gestures legitimizing the perspective as expressed by the victims. These gestures, such as those offered by the Polish President or the Catholic
Church, constitute a ‘moment’ of the process; they do not necessarily start it and they certainly do not end it. As accounts of national history are composed of a set of myths, rapprochement consists of their collective reimagining through sometimes heated debates. State historical policies often have an instrumental function and depend on the elite in government. The state can still contribute to the establishment of integrative myths but they have to be sustained through an anterior or parallel dialogue within the society—a public debate involving historians, journalists, public figures and artists, all from different generations; and a dialogue conducive to knowledge and understanding. Intercommunity trust-building is a process ‘from below’ where the state does not impose a particular vision but instead participates, sanctions, and supports the initiatives. Its participation is necessary. I argue that instead of the question ‘what’ historical politics to adopt, the state should look into ‘how’ to integrate the diversity of an indivisible history. The resulting enactments of landscapes are mostly compromises on the use of symbols. Examples of symbols being integrated are rare and occur when interpretations blend in to form an indivisible whole; where former hostile symbols form part of ‘our’ set of symbols. One such example is the ‘small homeland’ of Goldapia described at the beginning of this paper, where diverse memorials coexist, allowing the passerby to question his/her own convictions, to render them more flexible, allowing the observer to transform his/her perspective, and eventually to internalize the ‘other’. The willingness to understand is sufficient for the trust-building process. The integration process is served when divergent perspectives are considered.

Whereas most commentators are interested in conflict, this article invites researchers to see beyond protests to observe, in the heat of action, somewhat hidden initiatives ‘from below’ that are integrative in spirit, and encourage practitioners to pay attention to and promote the initiatives at the societal level. Therefore, matching the intercommunity trust-building framework developed in the paper and coming full circle to the ‘monument wars’ enumerated in the Introduction, I believe that the dispute over the Bronze Soldier might be an opportunity for Estonians and the Russian minority in Estonia to learn how to coexist. Tensions have resulted in the construction of forums for dialogue and in internet chat sites exchanging ideas for the most suitable future enactment of the symbolic space left behind after the displacement of the statue. Moreover, the Estonian Prime Minister placed flowers at the foot of the displaced monument, in a gesture of recognition, subsequent to the furor of 2007. Estonians, Russians and Russophones now need to speak openly about historical events such as the Great Patriotic War and the Soviet liberation/occupation.

Notes

1. I am enumerating here conflicts that have been largely mediated; see, for example, Euro Topics (www.eurotopics.net) and Eurozine (www.eurozine.com).
2. Studied in detail by Evans (2006), the corresponding Latvian ‘Museum of Nazi and Soviet Occupations’ tries, on the contrary, to show both as enemies and at the same time to explain the context of Latvian citizens joining either the Nazis or the Red Army. By rejecting the whole Soviet experience, however, the ‘Museum says little positive about either the Russian speaking minority or the experience of pro-communist Latvians who lived and built their careers in the system’ (Evans, 2006, p. 321).
3. Collective memory literature has been included in trust-building by Rothstein (2000), although the memory of past events is integrated here into vertical relations of trust granted by citizens to institutions (trustworthiness of institutions based on their past performance).
4. Note that for Ukrainians this period is instead associated with expansionist Poles.

5. Following the 2002 census, minorities represent 3.26% of Poland’s population; among them there are 153,000 ethnic Germans, 31,000 Ukrainians and 1,133 Jews (GUS 2002, National Statistics’ Office, http://www.stat.gov.pl/gus/6647_4520_PLK_HTML.htm).

6. In 2005, a memorial was erected in Wroclaw to commemorate the beginning of this process.

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