The countries bordering the Senegal and Gambia river basins, Senegal, Gambia, and parts of Mauritania, Mali, Guinea Bissau, and Guinea Conakry, belong to an historic economic region within which some extraordinary migration patterns are developing. The historically sparse population of the area, which remained stagnant while Europe went through a long period of population growth in the fifteenth through twentieth centuries, has recently entered a growth spurt that is still accelerating in intensity. The 1976 censuses, whose results are still only partially published, allow us to measure and map the dimensions of these population movements historically for the first time. They show that the long expanding agricultural frontier will close within the next decade or two as the sparsely populated peripheral border areas fill up and virgin land is exhausted. Urbanization, after a late and slow start, is proceeding at a pace unequaled in earlier historic waves, and in a context of severely lagging economic growth. Nomads are also sedentarizing at extremely rapid rates, as land and water resources critical to their traditional economy are exhausted by agricultural expansion and the growth of their own herds.

All previous planning for economic development, food needs, labor supplies, and social service demands, as well as for market potential, traffic intensity, and so forth, has consistently underestimated the dimensions of both overall growth and of urbanization in the area. The 1976 census results (in the Gambia, the 1973 census results) will require recalculation of the base statistics for all such estimates. Senegal's population appears to be growing at the rate of 3.3 percent average annual growth as against the 2.4 percent used in previous calculations. Mali's growth rate appears to be 2.9
percent per year as against the previous figure of 2.5 percent. Mauritania's rate is calculated at 3.0 percent as a result of the 1976 census, as against the 1.6 percent previously used. And the Gambia's 1963–73 growth rate was measured at 4.6 percent, about 3 percent of which appears to be natural growth. The population of Senegal in 1976 was enumerated at 5.1 million as against the 4.5 million expected. The population of Mali was 6.1 million as compared with the 5.5 million expected. The population of Mauritania was 1.42 million instead of the 1.26 million expected. And the population of the Gambia was 493,000, as compared with the 385,000 that might have been expected. Natural increase in the region as a whole approaches 3.0 percent per year.

**TABLE 13.1**


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1960/61 (estimates)</th>
<th>1976</th>
<th>Annual Average Growth (in percent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>3,109,800</td>
<td>5,085,388</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>3,714,500</td>
<td>5,908,000</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>923,100</td>
<td>1,407,042</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>318,000</td>
<td>548,600</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional total</td>
<td>8,065,400</td>
<td>12,949,030</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a The figures in this column include a net immigration of 126,000 Guinean, 78,000 Bissauan, and 60,000 non-Senegambian African immigrants in Senegal and Gambia (plus an undetermined number in Mali and Mauritania); they also include perhaps slightly more than 20,000 immigrants from overseas, most of whom are temporary. The figures exclude a net emigration from the region comprising an estimated 375,000 in Ivory Coast (mostly Malians) and 70,000 migrant workers in France (mostly Soninke from the Upper Senegal River homeland, parts of which are in Mali, Senegal, and Mauritania).

Sources: These figures were calculated from census figures cited in each country chapter, with figures reconciled to common dates by projection at the implicit rate of growth of each country.

The demographic situation in the Senegambia has been substantially influenced by the policies and practices of the colonial governments in the past and by independent governments over the last two decades. Policy decisions taken now will similarly affect the future. The current young population structure and socioeconomic situation virtually guarantee that demographic growth and urbanization will continue for the next 30 years at very high rates, whether or not family planning is introduced and whether or not there is economic development. But the local socioeconomic picture in three decades will be radically different, depending upon what is done now. And the political relationship between the developed and developing nations is likely to be substantially influenced by the success of present policies and programs.

The demographic dilemma of the area is that, despite the fact that the actual rates of growth are unmanageable, the total size of the countries' populations is relatively small. Balkanized colonial frontiers and earlier centuries of demographic stagnation have made these countries smaller than their leaders would like, limiting their diplomatic weight in international politics and their potential for industrialization. Their leaders have therefore wanted the population, as well as the economy, to grow as rapidly as possible. In the past, Senegambia had a predominantly agricultural economy, and a growing population was almost always a plus. Every new hand meant new land that could be brought under cultivation. But because of the unbalanced way in which the modern cash economy was introduced into this area under colonialism, rapid population growth in today's context means more dependents and more consumption for both nations and families. It does not necessarily mean more production. To keep demographic growth as an advantage in the process of modernization, the countries of the Senegambia need to transform the quest for cash in every sector of their populations into a quest for productivity.

Government planners should be encouraged to project some demographic scenarios for their countries in 30 years time, so that they can focus on imbalances between rates of growth of the population, productivity, and social services. Family planning, over the medium term (from 10 to 40 years), will mean the difference between Asian levels of overpopulation and the possibility of balanced production/consumption patterns. Yet it alone is neither an immediate answer nor a long-term panacea. It is not an immediate answer because of clearly foreseeable delays before it can have any nationwide statistical impact. It is only beginning to be considered as a possibility for government sponsorship in all of the countries concerned and is still illegal in Senegal and Mauritania. Mali is the only country with a national committee to consider population issues, and the
Family planning is not a panacea because it has to be accompanied by economic development. Both nations and families have to envisage a new role for themselves in an industrialized economy before they can make a commitment to family planning. It is only one aspect of control over one's life; if one has little control over the other life chances, there is little incentive to control reproduction. Over the short term, in the context of an expanding agricultural frontier and a bleak industrial prospect, both Senegambian nations and families could, and do, reason that there is greater strength in numbers.

Urbanization and sedentarization are also likely to continue at very rapid rates. We have concluded that these trends, like overall population growth, are irreversible and have to be incorporated into development planning rather than wished away. Moreover, they are on a scale and proceeding at a pace that require attention to macroeconomic aspects of policy with a potential for mass effect. These include price policy, tax structure, and a reorientation of economic goals toward production rather than exchange. The scale of the anticipated population growth means that a continuation of the present small development project approach with no change in the existing economic structure is hopelessly inadequate. On the other hand, feasible changes in policy in a wide variety of areas offer the possibility of both improving the economic/demographic structure themselves and of making it possible for development projects to work.

GEOGRAPHY

The geography of migration in the Senegambia shows a highly centralized regional pattern, with Dakar the dominant pole of attraction. Lesser poles, which are both attracting permanent settlers at rapid rates and serving as relays in the general movement toward Dakar, include the national capitals of Nouakchott, Bamako, and Banjul and the capitals of Senegal's seven predominantly rural regions. Peripheral areas of the region tend to be areas of outmigration, with a low proportion of working-age population in relation to larger dependent populations of children, women, and aged. The rural central area, by contrast, benefits from increased productivity due to the presence of working migrants with few dependents. Migrants tend to be seen as a burden in the cities, because of the larger problem of escalating urban growth without productive functions. But, in fact, new migrants are to some extent a benefit even to urban economies. They work at jobs the urban born tend to disdain, have a higher employment ratio, and express a lower demand for urban services. The crisis of the cities may be due primarily...
to escalating natural growth rates, in the context of postcolonial "parasitic" city roles.

Rates of out- and immigration in zones and countries within the region depend primarily on their geographic location. The peripheral countries, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Mali, and Mauritania, all show net emigration, while Senegal and Gambia experience net immigration. The border regions of each country tend to be areas of outmigration, while expanding cash-crop zones and cities are receiving migrants. Rural farming areas closest to the colonial capitals, which attracted dense populations during the 1920s through the 1950s, are the primary source of rural exodus toward each national capital today. In Senegal, this means the old peanut basin, along the Dakar-Saint-Louis road and railroad. In Gambia, it is the western division; for Mauritania it is the Sixth, Fifth, and Fourth regions along the lower and middle river; and in Mali it is the Bamako region.

The policy of centralization has contributed both to the rate of urbanization overall and to the pattern of primacy for Dakar and other regional capitals. See Map 13.1. A system of centralized decision making, government appointments, party structure, and education, health, and economic planning was both inherited from the colonial governments and felt as a need by the new governments in order to build coherent nations. This pattern has been illustrated in detail in Chapter 4, Table 4.7. France had a similar system at home and applied it directly to the colonies. Britain, although much less centralized at home, instituted centralized colonial administration for the sake of efficiency. And most leaders of new nations argued convincingly in the 1960s that centralization was the only means to both create a modern nation out of a disparate variety of traditional cultures and to bring about the economic development that was sought. An unwanted and largely unanticipated consequence of this policy of centralization was the attraction of unmanageable population concentrations at the center.

The creation of political frontiers during the colonial era and particularly since independence has made the border provinces of each country into neglected hinterland, last to be served by paved roads and modern marketing systems. (The only exception is the Senegal/Gambia border, where the natural barrier of the Gambia River has had more impact on rural settlement patterns than the international borders.) Outmigration from peripheral areas such as the Senegal river basin, the upper Falémé/Bafing area, Futa Jallon, and, more recently, the Casamance began in the colonial period and has become so solidly established a tradition as to pose serious obstacles to rural development efforts.
The regional geographic perspective has generally been neglected by planners and decision makers in the area. Preoccupation with nation building since independence has had priority over regional coordination. Policy and projects are made and implemented in a national framework, with customs, price policy, and, to a lesser extent, such areas as road building, educational systems, and rural development taking on a competitive rather than cooperative regional dynamic. The statistics that guide planners are collected according to national boundaries and planning cycles, so that even compiling a regional picture is an arduous time-consuming task.

Near the center, the oldest areas of intense cash-crop farming in the region are experiencing soil exhaustion and overpopulation, so that they also have high rates of outmigration. Most of those who leave go to the city; a small stream heads for the frontier. Rural receiving areas include the historic expanding frontier of the Senegalese peanut basin, which continues to attract settlers and client farmers (nawetani). It seems to be expanding today as rapidly as ever, and a second cotton frontier in the Casamance–Upper Gambia area is also developing. But the end is in sight. The hitherto sparsely populated “virgin” lands of Senegal Oriental are being settled, before the peanut/cotton frontiers reach them, by migrants from the still poorer, further out Futa Jallon area of Guinea and the Kayes province of Mali.

The “virgin” lands were not virgin either. Until the last decade they were pastoral grazing lands and drought refuge. Their increasing occupation by farmers has squeezed out pastoralists, who, since they occupy the land only seasonally and sparsely, can rarely persuade enroaching farmer settlers to respect their land and water rights. This trend, which also affects the Sahel zone of Mauritania, the Kayes province of Mali, and all of the river basins, is obliging pastoralists to abandon transhumance. The recent major drought escalated this tendency to a sudden mass movement, for most families a permanent one.

Mauritania is the only one of these countries to have published recent census statistics on nomadic pastoralists. There the pastoral proportion of the entire population has dropped from 75 percent to 35 percent in just 12 years. In Senegal and Gambia, which have long been primarily sedentary, nomadic pastoralism is virtually disappearing. In the Kayes region, it appears to be surviving better, mainly because government efforts to develop cash-crop agriculture have had so little success. Pastoralists from Mauritania and a few from Senegal are converging there.

The medium-sized family herds, which were ideally suited to transhumant pastoralism in the Sahel, are becoming untenable, even where pasture land is recovering from the drought. As the nomads sedentarize along the roads and around water holes, they can maintain only very small or much larger herds. The majority are being pauperized, and many are leaving, either for farming or for the cities. Government and donor intervention would have to come much more rapidly and massively than it has so far if this tendency were to be slowed. A more likely scenario is that intervention, when it does come, will aim at making livestock profitable and will assure an urban meat supply, but it will involve many fewer herding families than in the past. The majority of those forced out of pastoralism, like the other uprooted of the western Sahel, will drift to the cities, and a small minority will enroll in rural projects offering cash incomes.

One of the major questions this study originally posed for research was whether and how the virgin lands pioneer settlement might provide relief from overpopulation in the old peanut basin of Senegal. We conclude that it is currently an alternative for a very small portion of peanut-basin outmigrants and that it will continue to be so over the short term—for no more than two decades. Over the long term, perhaps as soon as a decade from now, it will cease to be an option, since all of the arable land will have been occupied. It is this perspective that obliges us to focus on the transformation of the cities to productive functions.

Nevertheless, over the next decade, Senegal may want to encourage a larger stream of migrants to choose pioneer settlement instead of the cities. It has, together with the World Bank, already invested substantial funds in the “New Lands” settlement scheme designed to do so. The project, while succeeding in planting the seed colony upon which an expanding migratory current is building, has been expensive and entirely inadequate in scale compared with the magnitude of the peanut-basin population. Perhaps its major contribution has been to involve the Serer in the colonization process and give them a foothold on the eastern frontier. Neighboring Wolof have historically migrated spontaneously, encircling the Serer homeland.

Now that both of these ethnic groups whose homelands face soil exhaustion problems have become involved in pioneer colonization, migration policy can look away from settlement projects toward large-scale intervention that will allow eastward colonization to expand. What might be appropriate is a “sites and services” approach to rural resettlement. The interventions that we conclude would facilitate this include

Paving of trunk roads and grading of market feeder roads. The current lack of roads is a major obstacle to settlement and the growth of production in all peripheral areas.
The provision of a rural water supply. Lack of roads and the necessity of beginning settlement by hand digging deep wells are the two main arders faced by pioneers. They are correspondingly top among the advantages rural residents in all areas cite for city life. The balance has to be equalized.

The implementation of a marketing system providing cash income.

The development of at least one outlying city in each area, with retail marketing, dry-season cash-income opportunities, schools, health care, and government services.

This sites and services approach should be the most cost-effective short-term means of accelerating the development of underutilized provinces. It must be stressed, however, that it can at best hope to attract a slightly larger proportion of the swelling stream of outmigrants from the old peanut basin than it presently does. This would be valuable over the short term, since the cities cannot presently absorb the flow of migrants or find them productive activities. Every migrant who chooses frontier settlement over urban drift contributes to national production and costs the country far less for services. But rural-rural division is only a partial solution, since a majority of outmigrants, even over the short term, will continue to choose the higher potential of city residence. And it is only a short-term alternative since the frontier areas will within the next two decades be filled.

Another important aspect of the regional geography is the system of paved roads. There is currently a spoke-type road network in the center, focusing on Dakar, and single-axis isolated segments in the other national and provincial capitals. The first semicircular connectors in Senegal have just been built, and two additional semi-circles are currently being paved. The road from Kaffrine to Tambacounda is being paved, and links south around the Gambia to Velingara, Kolda, and Ziguinchor are in the pipeline. The route chosen for this project is a good example of a competitive rather than cooperative approach to infrastructure within the region. Annoyed by Gambian delays in building a bridge on the trans-Gambia, the Senegalese are going around the Gambia. And since Mali, Mauritania, and Senegal have all been more interested in linking their provinces to their capitals than in linking to one another, no paved junction is planned to Mali or Mauritania. While the paving of a major road through this hinterland area is valuable in that it will permit expansion of the rural economy, that was not its main purpose. It was built to link the two cities of Dakar and Ziguinchor. And the opportunity to open up a much larger hinterland to rural development by building connections to neighboring provincial road systems of Mali and Mauritania has so far been ignored.

Road strategy in Mali and Mauritania has been similarly dominated by exclusively national concerns, adopted by donor-advisors as well as the governments. As an example, Mali wanted to open up its first (Kayes) region by paving the road from Kayes to Bamako. AID commissioned a consulting firm to evaluate the project in terms of current traffic levels, which, not surprisingly, resulted in a negative recommendation. No one argued that the road could and should connect to the rapidly developing Senegalese road network, as part of a regional strategy to improve Mali’s economic viability. Bamako is in a position to be a hub of West African interior communications if road and rail links were completed on its three most viable routes to the sea—Ivory Coast, Guinea, and Senegal. The route through Bamako would then be a viable option for trade and travel among these three countries, as well as bilaterally. This could enable Mali to overcome the awkward situation in which it finds itself today, with four zones of its rural economy oriented toward three different dynamic coastal areas—the center toward Ivory Coast, the west toward Senegal, the east toward Nigeria, and the north toward Algeria.

Mauritania similarly, in a narrow national perspective, decided to build the trans-Mauritanian highway through the sparsely populated pastoral zone of the Sahel rather than through the Tukulor/Soninke zone just to the south of it, with rich agricultural potential and strong historic ties to Senegal. The decision is understandable in terms of the defensive political situation in which the peripheral countries have found themselves vis-à-vis Senegal’s centrality, but it is economically less useful to the zone served, to Mauritania’s national production goals, and to the Senegambia region as a whole.

A priority for newly vital regional organizations such as the OMVS, OMVG, CILSS, and the Club des Amis du Sahel could be coordination of regional customs/tax/price policy. In this framework, a regional transport network could be developed, beginning with paved spurs to the two great semicircles that Senegal is now paving. Mali and Mauritania would both open access to potentially wealthy but currently isolated areas of their own countries by paving routes connecting to the Dakar-Tambacounda-Bakel-Podor-Saint-Louis circle, through Kenieba for Mali and through Sellababy or Kaedid for Mauritania. The mineral-rich upper Falémé area is likewise very attractive to Senegalese planners, but they are currently stymied by the inaccessibility of the area—again because they look at the utility of a road or rail link in a national framework.

The upriver provinces of the Gambia could benefit substantially by the very short paved road links necessary to join Georgetown and/or Basse to Senegal’s circling road. But again, so long as competitive national marketing systems and customs collection
persist, the government may prefer to keep the transportation system of the upriver provinces focused on Banjul. With the coordination of a regional transportation network, the governments will have to work toward coordinated economic policies.

Dakar serves as a port for Mauritania, Mali, parts of Guinea and Guinea Bissau, and, for some products, even for the Gambia, despite the natural harbor and port there. Tensions over port usage have contributed to both Mali's and Mauritania's determination to have alternative outlets to the sea. Food relief supplies during the recent drought were a focus of this issue. Senegal was unable to expand Mali's or Mauritania's portions of port capacity, despite the urgent needs there, without threatening its own drought-relief supplies. The already belated relief effort suffered more delays while Mauritania's wharf was adapted and an airlift to the landlocked countries was mounted. Mauritania is now building a deep-water port at Nouakchott despite strong ocean currents, which make it very difficult technically.

Mali had already reoriented much of its transportation toward Ivory Coast during an earlier crisis in 1960, but the arrangements are still far from satisfactory. When the Mali Federation, comprising Senegal and Sudan, broke up at independence in August of 1960, Mali and Senegal closed the border and the railroad between their two countries, thus cutting off Bamako from its only regular access to a port. At this time, much of Mali's foreign trade shifted to the Bamako-Abidjan route, and it has remained there. But the port of Abidjan is strained beyond capacity, and the long road link to Bamako is difficult to maintain.

In the context of a customs/marketing agreement, the river routes to the sea could also regain some of their historic importance in the area. The most viable potential river route for large areas of Senegal and Mali in the Gambia, but in the absence of customs coordination, colonial and postcolonial traffic has been deliberately routed to bypass it. Mali currently hopes to use the Senegal River as an outlet and has insisted on navigability as a priority in the OMVS scheme. If it proves technically feasible, unlike repeated colonial navigability projects that gradually silted up, it will require the negotiation of customs agreements that could serve as a model for the Gambia River route. If the Senegal route proves too difficult technically, transshipment arrangements to the longer and larger Gambia channel should remain an option.

In a still larger geographic perspective, Mali's fragmented polarization points to the need for coordination of Senegambian plans with the other two dynamic regional economies of West Africa, centered on Nigeria and Ivory Coast respectively. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) treaty offers a utopian

cover for all West Africa, but it is too abstract to have practical applicability immediately. And West Africa as a whole shows much less existing regional integrity than the smaller natural economic regions illustrated in this book (one centered on Nigeria, one on Ivory Coast, and the two smaller ones, Senegambia and Sierra Leone/Liberia). The economic and demographic statistics show real and current possibilities for regional development on the smaller scale presented in this book, which may in turn serve as components in a larger regional grouping.

THE ECONOMY

The primary cause of rural/urban drift on one level and of migration from less developed to developed countries on the other is the great disparities in income to be found between rural and urban areas and between developing and developed countries. Economic policy alternatives are therefore important to explore. If it would be a mistake, however, to rely exclusively on economic explanations and solutions. No known combination of alternative economic policies can be expected to equalize rural/urban or third world and industrialized country incomes. The most that can be envisaged over the short term is an amelioration of the extremes of rural poverty and urban/industrialized privilege. As in the case of the other major causal factor in migration, rapid population growth, short-term economic policy options can have only a limited impact.

The modern sector of the Senegambian economies is inherited directly from the colonial era. In all of the countries concerned, it depends heavily on import-export trade. Commerce and services dominate the modern sector of the economy, while production and exchange of foodstuffs and other locally or regionally consumed items are relegated to largely unregulated informal sectors of the economy.

Migration and its economic causes are linked primarily to the modern sector of the economy, to the quest for cash on the part of both migrants and government policy makers. Both are operating in a cash-scarce environment. Since the introduction of European currencies into circulation in the interior during the colonial period, production and exchange in the import-export sector of the economy have been the only means by which both government and peasant could get access to cash.

The leaders of government in all four of the Senegambian countries at independence recognized the essential exploitation involved in the colonial import-export economy, with low prices to producers and commercial exploitation of crop marketing and mining. They
therefore organized government monopoly marketing systems. While, in conception, the state marketing monopoly for each crop has the protection of the peasant as its purpose, in practice the govern­ments have found themselves in the same position as the colonial economy; that is, their revenues depend too heavily on the exploita­tion of this sector of the economy. Therefore, they continue to pay low prices to the producers and take a substantial proportion of gov­ernment revenues out of the margin between producer prices and world market prices.

One way to break this cycle of debt and dependence would be to reorient the economy away from the import-export exchange sector and toward production for local exchange. Such a rethinking and policy reorientation may be done at the national level, if that is the only forum at which it is feasible. It would be much more efficient, however, if it could be done at the regional level. Among its advan­tages, coordinated regional customs, price, and marketing policy could reduce the currently substantial expenditures on policing, smuggling, and debt collection.

One likely first step in such a reform would be a program of regular increases in producer prices offered by government mar­keting organizations for both export crops and foodstuffs. The second would be a diversification of government revenues, moving away from dependence on the import-export sector. Tentative steps have already been taken in both directions. The goals of any such re­forms should be to encourage both the bureaucracy and farmers to profit from production rather than exchange and to raise rural in­comes vis-à-vis urban ones.

Raising producer prices has the dual advantage of stimulating agricultural production and raising rural incomes. The increase in rural incomes creates a wider potential market for industrial pro­duce and encourages, or at least allows, rural residents to stay in rural areas. That producer prices directly affect the amount of a particular crop produced has been shown repeatedly in Senegambian and nearby Ivorian economies. In many cases, harvest prices are too low to justify farmer investment in fertilizer, traction, and other improvements. Even when the price is not raised, where the drought decreased the reliability of the groundnut crop, Senegalese farmers switched en masse to millet in 1969 and 1970 in order to ensure their survival.

The mode and timing of payments to farmers for their crops also alienates them from rural life. When their harvest is in they want to market it immediately, pay off their debts, and be able to use the rest during the dry season, often to make more money by trading. But the government agencies, to whom they are required by law to sell, are still bringing in much of the crop as the next rainy season approaches. Farmers and government marketing agents, in an atmosphere of mutual suspicion, are locked, much of the dry season, in haggling over who owes whom what. This means that some of the harvest rots in the field and that all of the farmers' dry-season projects are held in abeyance until they are again busy with the agricultural preparations for the new planting.

Efficient marketing of cash crops has been recognized as a priority by the governments of the Senegambia since independence. The granting of marketing monopolies to government agencies was supposed to assure efficiency and, at the same time, provide a sys­tem of price stabilization that would allow agriculture to grow.

Stabilization, however, has come at artificially low levels rather than in the form of price supports. And monopoly has reduced pres­sure for efficiency among the civil servants who operate the mar­keting system. If the stabilization funds were operated to truly sup­port producer prices, rather than to depress them, the monopoly provisions would not be necessary for their functioning. The exist­ing inefficiency and continuation of exploitative patterns within these marketing organizations suggest that smaller, nonmonopoly mar­keting systems should be encouraged. These may be government­sponsored, mixed corporations, or private enterprises. The im­portant factor is not their source of funding, but the fact that they are allowed to compete for a share of the market based on their ef­ficiency. Private credit and trade in foodstuffs, which currently operate clandestinely, could also be legalized and regulated. Sup­pression has only accentuated the cost to the peasant and contributed to the nonviable economic situation from which so many escape to the city.

A final recommendation in the area of economic policy con­cerns decentralization of employment opportunities. At present, government services, donor agencies and projects, and private firms all tend to recruit and hire their personnel in the capital, whether service is to be in the capital or in rural areas. Every agency could contribute to overcoming the problem of overconcen­tration of population in capitals if it recruited in local areas for local positions and nationwide for all positions. Centralized recruiting has historically been linked to a centralized educational system. Decentralization of the educational system is now considered.

EDUCATION

The step into the classroom is a sure first step out of the village and into urban life. Even the child who does not complete his first year in primary school is more likely to end up an urban resi-
dent than is his counterpart who never went to school. And, the higher a student goes in the educational system, the more likely he is to end up living in a city, particularly a capital city. Thus, while only 19 percent of the total population of Senegal lives in Dakar, more than 70 percent of the employed adult males who ever attended secondary school lived there. In the Gambia, 82 percent of the junior secondary school graduates lived in the Banjul-Kambo Saint Mary area, while that area represented only 18.5 percent of the total sample.

Educational data by residence for 1976 are not yet published for Mali and Mauritania, but similar patterns are believed to prevail. Total French literacy was only 2.9 percent in Mali in 1960/61 and 1.9 percent in Mauritania in 1965 (in Arabic it was 10 percent). Nearly all of those literate in French live in cities.

The only reason the educational system is not the major national contributor to migratory patterns is that it still affects only a small proportion of the population. Between 6 and 28 percent of a school age cohort in these countries enters primary school, and less than 1 percent enters high school. With independence, the countries of the Senegambia inherited colonial educational systems. Their first concern was to increase enrollment. Only later and more gradually have they considered alterations in the basic structure and orientation of the systems. The systems are highly centralized geographically and administratively. Planning, personnel, enrollment, and curriculum decisions are made in the capital cities for the entire country.

In the Francophone countries, French is the language of instruction at all levels, and the basic goal is to produce an elite of graduates comparable to those in France. Since independence, this assimilationist heritage has received increasing rather than decreasing emphasis. The ideal has been modified to allow Africanization of the curriculum content in primary schools and, to a lesser extent, in secondary and postsecondary institutions. And the products have changed slightly. In the colonial period, the system graduated clerks, interpreters, teachers, lower-level civil servants, and chiefs. Since independence, the products have become bureaucrats and teachers, with only a sprinkling of other professionals. Forty-five percent of the licences (bachelors' degrees) granted by the University of Dakar from its inception in 1968 through 1976 (109 of 245) were in law and economics, the direct line to the civil service. Many of the 80 graduates in humanities and 56 in sciences also found administrative jobs in the government, little related to their fields of specialty. Efforts to develop technical education to provide the skills necessary for Senegal's economic development have been frustrated by resistance among students, parents, educators, politicians, and French advisors. As of 1968, only 1,069 students were enrolled in technical lycées, about 3 percent of the total secondary school enrollment of 33,847.

Yet the formal educational system involves considerable unnecessary and unhealthy cultural uprooting. Students need not learn, for example, to despise manual labor and agriculture, simply because they attend school. That is a specific value that has to be taught. An alternative approach would be to begin decentralizing curriculum and personnel decisions through the creation of local school boards or consultation with existing rural councils. Educational administrators could consult such a local representative body as to the skills and even specific training programs most in need in their area. They could also seek specific information about local agricultural conditions to permit school calendars to be adjusted and allow students to participate in peak-season farm work.

The politically, socially, and economically most problematic school-aged population is not the vast majority who never attend but the ones who either drop out or flunk out. More than 95 percent of those who enter school never make it to high school. Thrust on the job market with only part of an elitist education, they enter the world of work with a contempt for manual labor but few skills. They swell the ranks of the urban unemployed, partially alienated from, but still dependent upon, the traditional kinship network. The modern sector has few places for them. This has created pressure to reduce the failure ratio in the secondary school entrance examination and high school graduation exams (baccalaureate and A levels).

Senegal has gone the furthest toward focusing on the problem of drop-outs, creating the enseignement moyen pratique program specifically to deal with it. In that program, drop-outs aged 12 to 14 are offered training in the skilled trades. But this program is also expensive and available to only a few. Relaxation of standards and retraining are "band-aid" reforms and do not deal with the basic problem that it is not feasible to educate the masses with an elite system.

A study of the age and geographic patterns of migration suggest that more radical directions must be taken to deal with this problem. One is that second-chance training for those who have failed in the formal school system target the age group 20-35 rather than 12-14. Even given an additional six months to four years of training, they still emerge from the system too young to be employed. Because of the young age structure of the population, there are also many more of them than of the older age group. They therefore swell the group of people seeking training and employment. It would be better to target training programs at the ages when men and women leave home to enter the cash job market in any case, that is, ages 20-40 for men and 15-30 for women.
A further criterion for the least uprooting educational programs would be that they be geographically decentralized, that is, available in a small city, in a relatively densely populated farming area, or in a rural area itself. This is because students tend to locate where they have been trained.

Senegambian countries also need to rectify the current sex imbalance in the educational system, not primarily because of their concern for human rights but because it offers the best hope of balanced population growth. It appears that the education and employment of women is essential to the success of family planning. It has already been shown that the educational level of the mother is the single greatest factor bearing on family size, in Africa as elsewhere. Our study suggests also that the independent migration of young girls to the city to seek paid employment also raises the age of marriage and reduces overall family size. Studies in high fertility populations elsewhere have indicated that while employment of women per se is a factor in reduced fertility, it is a much greater factor at the higher socioeconomic levels than at the lower. The implication of this for the Senegambia is that the education of women would have much more impact than a program to increase their employment, unaccompanied by education.

The final educational recommendation comes out of the question of scale that the study of migration raises. It is clear that the formal educational system cannot expand its scale rapidly enough to provide a literate population with whom economic development can take place. One has only to set side by side the pyramidal age structure of the population and the still more sharply sloping pyramid of primary school, secondary school, and university available in the Senegambia to realize that the formal educational sector cannot introduce mass literacy in the twentieth century. It serves an essential function in producing a few highly trained people. But, if mass literacy is to be achieved, it must be done through some type of mass rural education, perhaps on the model of Iran's teacher corps. The educational qualifications of the teachers would have to be substantially below those in the formal sector, perhaps at the junior secondary level and even including bright primary school graduates. The cost would also have to be substantially below that in the formal sector and could be if the idealism of both teacher and communities were called upon. A small cash wage could be provided by the government or by local communities when possible. Even if well below the urban minimum wage, it would be an improvement over urban unemployment for many such young graduates. And local communities may be willing, as they have been in Kenya and Tanzania, to house the teacher and build classrooms.

HEALTH CARE

Health care in Senegambian countries, like education, has involved the introduction of modern Western medical education and health care delivery institutions (hospitals, pharmacies, clinics) based on Western technology rather than a traditional health care system. Since independence, considerable cost and effort has gone into expanding those institutions to reach a larger population, but there has been little restructuring. Only in Mali has there been a national effort to bring together knowledge and practitioners from the Western and traditional health care sectors. The results of expanded health care over the last two decades have been primarily to accentuate the difference between urban and rural populations. Urban areas now offer health care even to the poor among them, while rural areas are seriously lacking.

The gap between the scale of population growth and the cost of elite curative medicine again leads to the conclusion that mass programs that reach rural areas and focus on prevention are needed. The Sine-Saloum health project in Senegal is among the first to adopt this orientation. Whereas preventative medicine in rural areas has, since the colonial era, been limited to epidemic control, the Sine-Saloum project offers more balanced medical care and on a continuing basis. Another branch of programs in which preventative medicine has been implemented is maternal and child health care. These have been inspired by a humane concern for the problems of infant mortality in Senegambian countries. From an econodemographic point of view, however, they take too limited a perspective. Men should also be offered medical care. And the women who benefit and succeed in bringing their children healthily through the dangerous years need to be able to regulate subsequent births. The woman whose several young children survive may still suffer deeply if her husband is sick or dies and is unable to support them. She herself may be unable to care for them if they are too close together in age. The extended family is indeed a refuge, but it is not an infinitely stretchable one. In fact, it is currently shrinking, in both rural and urban areas.

RURAL DEVELOPMENT

Nearly all analysts of the Senegambian economies conclude that the rural exodus stems primarily from lack of rural development. It has become common to assume that the converse is also true: rural development will stem the tide of rural exodus. There can be no quarrel with the general statement that the rural exodus
comes in response to the faster development of urban areas, but the conclusion that rural development is a sufficient answer to the problem does not follow. No economic scenario can be imagined that would realistically permit rural incomes to catch up to the urban average. Also, young people are currently reaching the age of independence in rural areas faster than new land can be distributed to them or in places where no new land is available for them. Thirdly, some of the advantages of urban life cannot be duplicated in rural areas. The liberating aspect of urban life derives specifically from the coming together of diverse populations into dense concentrations. And, finally, cities are necessary for the very process of rural development to take place. Many of the things farmers need can be provided more efficiently in outlying urban centers than in rural areas themselves, including retail market outlets, schools, dry-season employment opportunities, and many government services.

Rural development will nevertheless have a substantial impact on the rate of urbanization in the Senegambia and perhaps on the final proportion of the population that eventually stabilizes in rural as opposed to urban areas. In short, the way that rural development takes place and the amount that takes place will affect migrants and migration significantly.

The contribution to rural development that would have the greatest immediate impact on migration is the development of a universal rural water supply for people, livestock, and vegetable gardening. Most of the investment in rural development is currently being put into irrigation. Yet most of the people are living in areas where only rainfall agriculture is possible. Currently, wells in many areas run dry for at least four to five months of the year. The government well-digging program provides such villages, one at a time, with two-meter diameter concrete walled wells. Most of them are not fitted with pumps, in which case they are adequate only for people, not for animals or vegetable gardening. An estimate should be made of the cost and feasibility of alternative technology using narrow gauge bore wells and pumping through polyvinyl tubing, as has been done quite inexpensively in sparsely populated areas of the American west and southwest. The tubing is manufactured by a simple process from byproducts of petroleum refining and could therefore potentially be manufactured locally in Senegal.

An alternative to wood and charcoal cooking fuel must also be found if the denuding of the countryside of trees and resultant ecological deterioration is to come under control. Young women fleeing rural villages for a sojourn in the city cite the eternal quest for water and wood as being among the hateful burdens of rural life.

In the area of agricultural development, two different directions are currently being taken. The governments are investing primarily in cash-crop expansion, while AID and other investors are looking more exclusively at the development of food production. Both types of development sometimes ignore a basic facet of the migration process. That is, farmers have a legitimate need and a strong desire for cash incomes. Even when they are able to produce a cash crop, they are not assured cash income. And even when they are able to produce a food surplus, they still need cash income.

Dry-season work or trading may provide a substantial proportion of a farmer's income in the rainfall agricultural area. Development projects and planning could focus more on the provision of productive dry-season employment opportunities. One possible source is labor-intensive, low-capital cottage industries in outlying cities. Both donor- and host-country governments must recognize that, even currently, industrialization is the only alternative to the labor-surplus migration patterns revealed. In rural areas, existing industries in food processing, footwear, clothing, and building products need government and donor-agency encouragement.

A final aspect of rural development projects that relates to migration tendencies is the problem of social organization within the projects. Many of the migrants who flock to the cities are specifically seeking freedom, that is, escaping from autocratic rural social structures in which they are in a disadvantaged position. Yet some of the new rural development projects introduce new autocratic structures in which the opportunity for some groups is as limited or more limited than it was in the old structures. This is particularly visible for women; it may also be true for other groups whose existence is not generally recognized by outsiders: people from caste and slave-origin families, low-status ethnic groups, and even young people of the dominant strata.

URBAN POLICY

Cities in the Senegambia experienced bursts of growth in the immediate aftermath of World War II, with the coming of independence in the 1960s, and with the severe drought of 1968-73 (which still continues in some areas). After and even during each burst, planners had hoped that the end of the immediate stimulus would mean a leveling off of growth. This has not happened. There has been a steady urban growth in the Senegambia, and current population and economic structures guarantee that a high rate of growth will continue for at least several decades. Such rates of growth would cause social strains in any city. But in postcolonial societies in which cities are "parasitic" and not productive, it augurs national, family, and individual trauma.
It is urgent that each country work out a plan for giving its cities productive roles in the economy. The components would include industrialization, geographic balance, and cheap mass minimal urban services. A new overarching urban policy could aim at balancing urban and rural economies. The most effective policy tools lie in the area of customs, tax, and marketing, which have already been discussed in the section on economic policy. But some goals and plans of action must be set specifically for cities.

A key question that is already being explored in many countries is how productive jobs can be generated quickly and inexpensively. The informal sector of the urban economy (comprised of small enterprises organized spontaneously and largely outside government regulation) already generates employment at a fraction of the initial capital cost in private or government enterprises. It is the informal sector which currently absorbs most new migrants to the city, as well as employing the great majority of urban born. Incomes in that sector are comparable to those in the formal sector for similar work. Yet governments have tended to look with disfavor on the informal economy as unattractive, disorderly, profiteering, or competing with officially sponsored firms. One new focus could be how to encourage the informal sector to grow alongside the formal, rather than grant monopolies or regulate to drive small firms out of interesting lines.

Donor countries, particularly the United States, tend to look at the economic demographic problem of the Senegambia as being primarily an inability to produce enough food. This is not the central problem. The Senegambian countries currently produce an agricultural surplus. That it is not in foodstuffs is due to deliberate and historic economic policy, on the part of both government and peasants, aimed at meeting the other basic needs: for clothing, fuel, housing, medicine, and other necessities. A balanced aid policy would encourage local production to meet these needs as well as food production.

The balance between centralization and decentralization is another area requiring close study in each country. In Senegal, there is a clear problem of overcentralization, which has been recognized for a number of years. Mauritania and Mali have the opposite problem; major economic sectors located far from the central bureaucracy in the capital city, and, therefore, difficulties of coordination. The balance between centralization and decentralization has to be determined for each country in relation to its particular economic history and migratory patterns. This book can merely point out that for both migrants and the cities that host them, seasonal migration is considerably less strain than permanent migration, and migration to nearby outlying cities poses fewer problems of adaptation than the concentration of a large regional population of migrants in a single central place.

The irreversibility of urbanization also suggests that urban and national administrations need to explore the least expensive approaches to urban services. Critics of government investment, which is presently far too concentrated in capital cities, have sometimes gone so far as to argue that donors and host governments should stop investing in urban services, that each new investment merely encourages more migration. The urban services are not, however, major causes of migration, nor will ignoring them stop the migratory flow. The vast majority of the urban poor are urban-born, and new migrants are among the poorest of the poor in Senegambian societies. They have left the countryside because they have no possibilities there. If they cannot be wished away, yet monies must be freed for urgently needed rural development to correct the imbalance, the middle course is to seek mass urban services in the least expensive modes possible.

MIGRATION POLICY

Senegambia's current policies concerning migration are among the most open in the world. In keeping with strong local traditions of hospitality and with ECOWAS treaty provisions for free movement of people across borders within West Africa, the land borders are generally loosely patrolled and an identity card is sufficient for access. Periodically, the borders have been closed with either Mali or Guinea, but even then people pass around, sometimes even through border points, quite freely. Immigration from overseas has been more closely controlled since independence in order to promote Africanization of skilled jobs. Since 1973, expatriate workers in Senegal have been required to have an employment permit if they are recruited locally, and a tax is imposed on firms using them. The number of French co-operants, mainly teachers in Senegal, has been reduced from about 20,000 per year in the 1960s to the current level of 800. It has never been very large in any of the other countries. Yet the drought brought a new influx of technical assistants to every capital. These policies seem to have had some success in reducing numbers, although many would dispute any claim to reduced European influence. A 1976 census shows a total of 16,830 overseas residents of Cap Vert, down from an estimated 60,000-70,000 at independence in 1960. Of these, 10,690 are French and 4,150 are Lebanese (not including those claiming Senegalese nationality).

Local policies on emigration of citizens are fairly open across land borders and subject to exit-visa control for overseas emigration.
The current outflow of international immigration is part of the series of bureaucratic obstacles that have to be confronted by potential immigrant workers to France, Germany, or the United Kingdom. It eliminates adventurers who lack contacts in Europe but not those with either friends or jobs awaiting them.

Despite the openness of current emigration policy, there is beginning to be serious concern about current trends. The governments of all four countries want urgently to stem the rural exodus. In Dakar, as the economic situation deteriorates, there is also beginning to be noticeable complaint among the urban population that foreign emigrants take jobs that locals should have. A similar anti-foreign sentiment is emerging in the Gambia. The peripheral countries of Mali, Mauritania, Guinea, and Guinea Bissau are also concerned about preventing emigration. Guinea has launched a major campaign to persuade emigrants to return.

RECEIVING AREAS: POLICY ALTERNATIVES

Open borders are a source of pride to the governments of Senegal and Gambia, which have, through these last 50 years, received a steady stream of immigration with an adaptability and social harmony rarely matched elsewhere. In general, immigration seems to have been a plus in the development of the cash economy of the Senegambian peanut basin, allowing rapid expansion of the areas the government wanted to expand and filling labor needs in rural areas of labor shortage and urban occupations in low demand. Historical experience elsewhere, including Australia, parts of Latin America, and the United States, has shown that open immigration policies often accompany expanding agricultural frontiers. A corollary to this is that when the agricultural frontier closes or is filled up, the open immigration policy tends to end within a short time. There is nothing inherently right or wrong about this; it is merely observed that it happens. At the time, the decision to close the borders may be accompanied by xenophobic tendencies in the population as a whole and in the government. This situation may arise in Senegambia. It is worth noting, however, that closed land borders in the Senegambia have been more difficult to enforce and perhaps accompanied by some of the same abuses as attempts to limit immigration across the Mexican frontier to the United States. If a regional common market should by then become a reality, it would be possible to base population/migration policy on regional rather than national citizenship.

There is currently another flow of international immigration into the Senegambia, which is rarely discussed in studies of migration. It comprises an international elite of diplomats, expatriates, and "development assistants." Their numbers are small, however, their impact on the economy is substantial, both direct and indirect. The direct contribution comes largely through high quality housing, which either their governments or the Senegalese government has generally agreed to provide them. The general knowledge that some government will foot the bill has created a highly inflationary upper echelon of the urban housing market. This, in turn, draws up the value of all urban real estate, bringing middle-level housing out of the reach of middle-income Senegalese and lower-income housing out of reach of lower-income Senegalese. At all levels, it creates pressure for further government-subsidized housing. On what could be the positive side, it has created some small fortunes among Senegalese real estate holders, which could be the beginning of the capital accumulation needed for development. However, very little of it is currently reinvested in directly productive enterprises.

The indirect impact of the international elite is on consumption patterns and aspirations. The daily sight of a privileged class living in luxurious housing (some of it substantially above the quality the same individuals could afford at home), driving shiny cars excluded from the more than 100 percent duties Senegambians must pay, and otherwise engaging in conspicuous consumption is socially and economically unhealthy. It inspires both resentment and emulation, often from the same people and even from many members of the privileged group. It is fundamental to economic development theory that, in order for economic growth to reach a take-off point, there must be a margin of surplus, local savings, capital accumulation, and reinvestment in productive enterprises. At any stage along the way, conspicuous consumption detracts from the process, eating out of reach of lower-income Senegalese. At all levels, it creates pressure for further government-subsidized housing. On what could be the positive side, it has created some small fortunes among Senegalese real estate holders, which could be the beginning of the capital accumulation needed for development. However, very little of it is currently reinvested in directly productive enterprises.

The last group of migration policy options that has been used in some places includes various forms of legal and sometimes physical coercion. Governments that fail to deal with urbanization as
it happens or that try to attack the symptoms rather than the underlying causes of migratory trends, may in desperation adopt increasingly coercive policies. Legal coercion in some places takes the form of required work permits issued only in accordance with government preferences and/or residence permits similarly issued. Kenya has recently adopted such a system, but reports on its actual functioning are lacking. South Africa, of course, has long had such a system and is now using it as it grants "independence" to the Bantustans, to deprive most of the African population of its South African nationality. The governments of mainland China and the Soviet Union have long assumed the right to assign both work and residence to their citizens, but, again, not enough is known about the actual functioning of the systems or their success in controlling urbanization. The more drastic step of mass expulsions usually only comes in times of national crisis such as war or economic collapse. Ghana trucked masses of non-Ghanian African residents to the borders and dumped them in 1969 and 1970, when it was caught in such an economic and political crisis. But the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia was the first to turn such a policy on its own rural exodus, forcibly expelling most of the populations of its cities. The human costs of such massive and forcible techniques are invariably large. In the Cambodian experience, the death toll has been estimated at one million. So far, Senegal has used such expulsion techniques only on urban beggars and prostitutes. The Senegambian countries, including Senegal, are fortunate in not facing the kind of immediate overpopulation problems that afflict southeast Asia and have provided the demographic context in which war stimulated Cambodians' and, more recently, Vietnamese boat people's massive exodus. But sparse population is already a passing historical moment in the Senegambia; high population density is immediately foreseeable. Senegambian countries have a chance to develop balanced economic/demographic growth policies now, before the moment passes.

COPING WITH ECOLOGICAL- AND DISASTER-RELATED MIGRATION

Migration is the major safety valve that Senegambian societies have for coping with disaster, whether it comes in the form of ecological disaster or war. Together with organized fasting within households, it is probably the major reason that so few people died in the recent Sahelian drought. In countries such as Mauritania and Mali with large nomadic populations, the migrations were sudden, visible, and dramatic. In Senegal and Gambia and the sedentary areas of Mali, the total numbers of migrants were almost certainly greater, but the migration took place household by household and into the less visible outer rims of the cities, so that officials and planners were not immediately aware of it. It shows up, nevertheless, both in contemporary census figures and in a net increase in urbanization and sedentarization of nomads in those predominantly agricultural areas. Because of the universal use of extended family hospitality, suffering was minimized for the immediate victims and the organization of relief did not pose insoluble problems for the governments or the relief agencies.

Yet most of the urbanization and sedentarization associated with the drought has been permanent. The slight reduction in swelling in some outlying cities near the end of the drought and the years at the beginning of ecological recovery in fact reappears toward the center. There seems to have been a funneling of population from the less favored cities toward the center. Each migrant forced out of a productive role in a traditional economy by disaster has been attracted to the cities, initially because of the greater possibilities of consumption there. In the first place, it was essential for survival. But no plan has yet emerged to restore productive roles to those migrants. Instead they have joined the masses of the rural exodus whose search for cash and consumption has yet to be matched by productive opportunities.

Preliminary data on the war-related migration from Guinea Bissau into Senegal, primarily the Casamance, indicate that a substantial proportion of that migration will also remain permanent. The data suggest that most migration, particularly urban migration and sedentarization of nomads initially provoked by disaster, becomes permanent. This implies that the starting point for rehabilitation programs has to be in their new circumstances, not their old. The spiral of economic and demographic circumstances that set off and feed continuing high rates of migration in "normal" times suggests that, unless the economies are reoriented through balanced development, the next major disaster is going to be much more difficult for all concerned.

NOTES

1. Senegal, Bureau National de Recensement, "Recensement général de la population d'avril 1976," mimeographed, Dakar, 1979, tables 2-4-a and 3-01-a for each region.
