Money, the Mountain,
and State Power in a Naxi Village

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This a study of daily life in Yulong, a Naxi village, and the nearby market town of Lijiang in northern Yunnan Province. It is also a response to recent calls to put time and space at the center of social analysis (Giddens, 1984; Harvey, 1989). It concentrates on space, taking its production and manipulation in Lijiang county as fundamental to the daily experience of such varied phenomena as money, reciprocity, the power of the state, and the news of rebellion.

Social analysts who understand it as more than merely the environment of social action have generally followed one of two approaches to space. One approach identifies conceptual orders, cosmologies or ideologies embodied in space. Anthropologists often attempt to demonstrate that conceptual orders are built on skeletons of spatial metaphors and that these metaphors are embedded in the spaces of ritual action or daily life. For instance, basic attributes of the cosmos are represented in the architecture of shrines or churches (Middleton, 1960; Gossen, 1972), the structure of houses (Cunningham, 1972; McKhann, 1989), or the topography of mountains (Nash, 1979). The body is understood in terms of analogies to houses (Daniel, 1984) or

AUTHOR'S NOTE: This article is based on field research carried out in northern Yunnan Province between June and August, 1989, in the aftermath of the massacre of students in Beijing. The research was made possible by the generosity of the Program in Atlantic History, Culture and Society and the Department of Anthropology of Johns Hopkins University. I would like to thank Janet Brendlinger, Gillian Feeley-Harnik, Ashraf Ghani, Rosanna Guber, Emily Martin, Sidney Mintz, William Rowe, Steven Sangren, Michel-Rolph Trouillot, and Katherine Verdery for their observations on earlier drafts of this article. I am grateful to Norma Diamond, Charles McKhann, and an anonymous referee, who read this article for Modern China, for their very helpful comments.
mountains (Bastien, 1978). And social relations such as gender (Moore, 1986), hierarchy (Beidelman, 1986), or community (Ahern, 1973) are encoded in domestic spaces like houses, courtyards, and fields. One of the most sophisticated versions of this approach was developed by Pierre Bourdieu, who designed a theory of social reproduction around it. According to Bourdieu, people internalize the structures of their society or class through routine bodily activity in heavily encoded (usually domestic) spaces, and then reproduce those social structures, in part by externalizing them again in the spaces they inhabit (Bourdieu, 1977, 1984).

Sharply contrasting with the idea of spaces as embodying conceptual structures is that of the production and control of space as techniques of power. For Foucault, for instance, disciplinary power depends on the production of enclosed, cellular spaces like prisons, hospitals, and classrooms, where individual bodies can be observed, analyzed, and regulated. The dream of perfect disciplinary power, Jeremy Bentham’s Pantheon, is an infinitely generalizable mechanism in which the careful organization of space alone would assure disciplinary order, independent of any ideology or discourse, indifferent even to who occupies the position of power (Foucault, 1979). David Harvey demonstrates that, like disciplinary power, capital’s power over the circulation of money, commodities, and labor is dependent on the production of space. His descriptions of the sweep of capital through the urban landscape show how it continuously transforms space in struggles for control of labor, money, and commodities. For Harvey (1985), as for Foucault, power relies on the ability to appropriate space and rebuild it for one’s own purposes.

This article attempts to show that neither simply interpreting space as embodying conceptual structures nor merely analyzing its production and control as techniques of power is adequate for a full understanding of the quotidian experience of space. The former method, by emphasizing the identity and coherence of conceptual orders represented in space, obscures struggles over alternative ways of constructing and interpreting space, struggles that have everything to do with power. The latter approach fails to recognize that control of the representational content of space is as vital to power as is control of its instrumental functions. Neither method by itself can fully account
for daily practice, which involves a continuous "making do" with space, an incessant subtle reconstruction and reinterpretation, which complicates the most coherent embodiments of conceptual orders and frustrates the most utopian of panopticons.2

This account works toward a method that would synthesize these two approaches, combining attention to the production of space for purposes of instrumental control over labor, money, and commodities with attention to the inscription of space with meanings that support, reject, or redefine those purposes. Daily life in Yulong village involves a complex interplay between making do with the concrete dimensions of space and negotiating its representational content. Power in Yulong village, be it the power of the state or the various kinds of power worked out in the complexities of reciprocity and market exchange, involves strategies that work the imagined dimensions of space against its concrete topographies or vice versa. And resistance to power employs tactics that imaginatively confuse the lines, concrete and imaginary, that power etches into space in repeated attempts to finally appropriate it.

As a way of describing these processes, I identify three different modes of producing, inscribing, and interpreting space which, through their interaction, appear to shape Yulong villagers' daily experience. Each of these modes incorporates (1) a particular type of production and exchange of goods, money, and even talk; (2) an ideology or set of ideas organized through submission to a specific kind of logic; and (3) a characteristic strategy of power or tactic of resistance to power. Borrowing a label from the type of exchange characteristic of each mode I call them state redistribution, village reciprocity, and market exchange.3 None of these modes exists in itself; they appear only in confrontation with each other. This article describes a few of these confrontations.

This article begins with some brief proposals about the ideology and forms of power that sustain the state redistributive system, proposals that inform all of the subsequent arguments. It goes on to argue that this ideology and these forms of power have been complicated by the rise of market exchange in the post-Mao era and to show how one of the resulting conflicts is displayed on the streets of Lijiang town, where Yulong villagers do their marketing. The second section de-
scribes village reciprocity in Yulong as it confronts state redistribution, showing how this tension is displayed in contradictory representations of Jade Dragon Mountain. The next section argues that Yulong villagers' understanding of the market contrasts with their dreams of an ideal village and that this contrast informs their opinions of the Party-state and their explanations of rebellion. The final section shows how villagers' image of an ideal village is upset by the realities of monetary exchange and how a particular kind of space—bridges—mediates this disruption, allowing conflicting ideas about ideal social relations and money to coexist.

STATE REDISTRIBUTION AND THE MARKET

State redistribution in China involves an integrated body of institutions of production and distribution, the details of which, in principle, are subject to direct state control. To function, this body relies on a particular ideology and a characteristic strategy of power. Ann Anagnost has drawn on the theoretical work of Claude Lefort to outline the ideology that sustains state redistribution (Anagnost, 1988). In Lefort's terms, this ideology portrays the state as the materialization of the will of the people: The state incorporates every legitimate social interest into a single general interest and converts this general will into action. This ideology admits of no distinction between state and civil society and no separation between economic, legal, or cultural spheres of society. The state is seen not as an instrument operating on society from without, but as the principle of unity and progress within society and the agent of all social transformation.

According to Lefort, this ideology represents society as a total, integrated organization working for the general interest. Every social institution—every production brigade, factory, school, railway, or hospital—is seen as an organ of this integrated social body, working towards a single set of goals. "Finally," Lefort wrote,

"it is the very notion of social heterogeneity which is rejected, the notion of a variety of modes of life, behavior, belief and opinion, in so far as this notion radically contradicts the image of a society in harmony with itself. And the project of mastery, of normalization, of uniformization
is carried furthest at the point where the most secret, the most spontaneous, the most ungraspable element of social life is to be found: in customs, tastes and ideas [Lefort 1986:284].

Although Lefort developed these theses in his analysis of Stalinism, we can provisionally accept them as a partial description of a logic useful to the Chinese state.

The “project of mastery, of normalization, of uniformization” of which Lefort wrote has sometimes been seen as carried out through disciplinary techniques similar to those described by Foucault (Yang, 1989). Indeed, Maoist society in rural China appeared to be based on a disciplinary order, sustained by the state’s ability to control and distribute land. The basic units of this order, its cell-like enclosures, were production teams, in which individuals were subjected to intense disciplinary scrutiny. The work-point system through which production was organized required work-point recorders to count every load of fertilizer carried, every row of rice seedlings planted, every mud brick produced—“to weigh, count and measure every aspect of the work of team members that could reasonably be weighed, counted and measured, so that team members could be assured that everyone was doing a full share of work and being rewarded appropriately” (Potter and Potter 1990:101). It was not only the particulars of work that were surveyed and monitored in production teams, but also the more intimate details of daily life, such as dress, sexuality, diet, health, and spiritual well-being. During the Cultural Revolution especially, the organization of labor and distribution of work-points was tied to normalizing discourses on right and wrong which took into account sexual relations, family background, and personal morality (Yang, 1989).

But to understand Party-state power in rural China, even in the Maoist era, as oriented entirely towards instrumental discipline is to seriously underestimate it. From 1949 onward, the successive orders of production and distribution on which disciplinary power was based were repeatedly broken up by radicalizations of policy which mobilized peasants to carry out new sets of reforms. Skinner counts 11 policy cycles between 1949 and 1976, each set off by a radical phase which led, “in dialectical fashion, to a crisis phase followed by a liberal phase which was brought to an end by a new radicalization” (Skinner,
1985:397). These cycles bring out the other face of Party-state power. The social changes wrought by these vacillations of policy are made comprehensible to those who lived through them by the narrative the Party-state tells of itself as the master organ of a social body moving towards socialism. Each reorganization of daily life based on a reversal of policy from above reinforces the idea that the state is the organ of all social transformation — that the land occupied by each village or production team is a cell of a vast, integrated body, headed, coordinated, and set in motion by the Party-state. And, as the Party-state’s legitimacy among peasants depends on their understanding and accepting this ideology, discipline itself can be seen as necessary, not so much in order to increase production and improve the efficiency of distribution, but to continuously reproduce this logic in the context of the details of daily activity.

After the Maoist era, these two aspects of state power — disciplinary techniques and the dispersion of a particular way of imagining society and the state — were complicated by decollectivization and the rise of the market. After 1979, economic reforms gradually transferred much direct control over production and distribution out of the hands of the Party-state. Control over the details of production was turned over to individual peasant households, and control over distribution was partially transferred from the complex agricultural distribution system to rural markets. This reduced opportunities for disciplinary power by making the scrutiny of work no longer necessary to ensure production and the distribution of daily necessities no longer totally dependent on the state redistribution network. It also, I shall argue, produced a contradiction in the ideology that sustains state redistribution, a contradiction which has probably contributed to the growing economic and political crisis in China.

The complications introduced by the post-Mao economic reforms bring us to Lijiang county where, in 1989, production had been organized by the baogan daoahu (“contracting everything to the household”) system, which contracted land, draft animals, light equipment, and control over the production process to individual peasant households. In the Lijiang area, each xiang government distributes to village households the amount of land worked by the village’s production teams before 1979. This is approximately identical to the land
held by village members as a whole before 1949. According to villagers living between Lijiang town and the Jade Dragon Mountain to the north, the quantity and quality of this land depends on the village's proximity to the mountain; the closer a field is to the mountain, the rockier its soil and the colder the weather, but households closer to the mountain are likely to be contracted more land. For example, in Baisha village, ten kilometers north of town, households are granted three mu per member; in Yulong village, three kilometers further from town and closer to the mountain, it is four mu per member; in Yuhu village, at the foot of the mountain, where the land is poor and rocky, each household is granted eight mu per member; and in the Yi nationality hamlets high on the mountain, each household plants where it will and as much land as it can.

In Yulong village, most land is planted in wheat around the time of Spring Festival and, after the wheat is harvested, replanted in corn with soybeans between the rows. Household contracts include quotas of each of these three grains to be sold to the state. About 30% of the quota is sold at a low (tonguo) price and 70% at a higher (chaoguo) price. Payment is usually partly in fertilizer, partly in cash. Most of the grain not contracted for is consumed by the household or bartered, while some is sold on the free market. Most households cultivate a vegetable garden, and some land is planted in broadbeans and rape. Most households raise a few cattle, some pigs, some chickens, and a horse or two. Households consume some of their own vegetables and meat and use their cattle and horses as draft animals, but much non-grain production is expressly for trade on the lively free market in Lijiang town, the marketing center for much of the county. There are no markets in Yulong or nearby villages.

It is estimated that about 14% of rural households in China either grow a single cash crop or have left agricultural production to specialize in a lucrative line of commodity production (Nee, 1989). In Yulong and surrounding villages, there are few if any such households. Production for the market is a sideline which does not interfere with the business of raising grain for personal consumption and to fill quotas. In the late 1980s, in order to encourage small-scale local industry, the government relaxed the household registration system, allowing some peasants to leave the land. During the winter of
1988-1989, an estimated 50 million peasants migrated to cities looking for work. Again, villages in Lijiang county are an exception. Although a few households have a member who works in the market town of Lijiang, few if any have members who have gone further; few are willing to endure the loss of labor and three to eight mu of land that the formal move of a member away from the village would entail.

Although the transfer of control over production from communes, work brigades, and production teams to individual households has deprived state redistribution of many of its opportunities for discipline and normalization in the countryside, one foundation of such discipline remains intact. Peasants understand the land to be owned by the state (guojia) and available to peasants only by virtue of the state’s generosity. He Erxing,7 the head of a household of five in Yulong village, invariably refers to his 20 mu as “my land.” When asked why, he replies, “Well, we always say ‘my land,’ ‘our land,’ but it’s really the country’s land (guojia de). You know that. The government (zhengfu) gave it to us, and it can take it away. It does take some away if you have too many children or if someone moves.” The quotas of grain to be exchanged every year at low prices for cash and fertilizer are a reminder that to have land is to be in debt to the state. Because the amount of land contracted depends on the number of household members, every change in household composition means a change in the terms of the contract, calling for the state’s presence at every birth, every death and every negotiation for splitting a household. Population control is thus also grounded in the land; the birth of the first two children (most peasant Naxi are allowed two children per married couple) requires a refiguring of land distribution, and threatening the loss of a few mu of land if a third child is born is one way local governments try to enforce the two-child policy.

By retaining control of land distribution, then, the state preserved some opportunities for discipline and for the promotion a particular image of society and the state, even as it relinquished much control of the productive process. The rise of the free market that accompanied this change, however, created a paradoxical situation for Party-state power. Beginning in 1984, a dual system of agricultural marketing was created. The state redistribution system continued to handle most grain, buying it at fixed prices from peasants and distributing it to the
cities through grain rationing coupons. But quotas for non-grain products were abolished, freeing these products to be sold on the market and resulting in the rapid expansion of markets and rural fairs for agricultural products like vegetables, fruits, meats, oils, and eggs. Networks of wholesale markets developed, making possible large-scale, long-distance trade in these products. New regional marketing centers, not always coextensive with the official administrative centers, began to handle both local and long-distance trade, breaking down the state's rigid distinctions between urban and rural areas and recreating the traditional divergence between administrative and marketing centers (Watson, 1988).

These developments threaten the official ideology underlying state redistribution with a paradox. On the one hand, the Party-state continues to represent itself as the agent of social transformation in the name of the interest of a unified populace, the master planner that synchronizes every organ of society to work towards a single goal. On the other hand, in letting the market set prices and in granting control of much production and distribution to private interests, the state has admitted that the market, at least, lies partly outside of the total social organism. Karl Polanyi argued that "a self-regulating market demands nothing less than the institutional separation of society into an economic and a political sphere" (Polanyi, 1944:74). China's market is by no means self-regulating (no market is), but granting regulation of some production and distribution to the market has meant creating a fracture between political and economic spheres. While this fracture has made many cadres rich (officials at every level often use their political capital to obtain goods from state-owned factories at state prices, then resell at higher market prices), it has also damaged the image of the Party-state as the motive force of a total social organism. This image is now in competition with the image, more familiar to Westerners, of a state which regulates a partially independent market from the outside. Out of the bounded body of the total social organism, the market has been born as a separate entity which must be managed, contained, and stimulated by the state.

Several strategies have been generated for dealing with this contradiction. One is to deny that any fracture between the market and the state exists, repeating the rhetoric of the total social body even as the
market continues to operate. This was the strategy of the central government in the year after the 1989 Beijing massacre, as it re-emphasized Deng Xiaoping's “four principles.” Another tactic is to set aside regions where the world market is allowed to regulate many social forces, as in the “special economic zones” of Shanghai, Shenzhen, Xiamen, and Hainan Island, with hopes that, outside those zones, the image of the total social organism will continue to operate.

In Lijiang town, where much of the market activity of Lijiang county takes place and where most organs of state redistribution that serve the county are located, a daily confrontation is set into motion by the paradoxical status of the image of the Party-state. The town is divided into two halves. The “new” half of town is dominated by Xinjie (New Street), built in 1953 when the provincial road system expanded into the valley. It is a wide, straight thoroughfare, with a statue of Mao on one end and the county bus station on the other, lined with large, square cement buildings such as the grain and oil cooperative, state-run department stores, government travel hostels, and a huge new telephone and postal building. The county government complex and the police headquarters are on another wide street branching off of Xinjie. This is the hub of state distribution, transportation, and administration in Lijiang county. The discourses of the Party-state echo through the streets; in the summer of 1989, on every street corner a loudspeaker broadcasts “news” of the People’s Liberation Army’s “victory over counter-revolutionaries and hoodlums” in Beijing; daily newspapers from Kunming and Beijing are posted in the main square; and large glass cases up and down Xinjie sport photos and life stories of criminals recently caught and tried, maps ranking agricultural production and living conditions in Lijiang county by locality, and diagrams of female reproductive organs accompanied by instructions on how to assist in giving birth and how to use contraception.

The other half of town, which before 1953 was the entire town, is a maze of passages, streams, and bridges, surrounding Naxi-style mud or stone residences with tile roofs. On each of the main streets, which are too narrow for automobiles, the fronts of the houses become wine shops, clothing stores, tailor shops, noodle-making establishments, restaurants, and other small enterprises—all privately owned. These streets run like the spokes of a damaged wheel into Sifang jie (Four
Square Street), a complex of large market squares, one devoted to vegetables, another to meat, another to clothing and cloth, and another to manufactured goods. These markets all operate on periodic cycles, and every afternoon one square or another is aflood with townsmen, Naxi and Bai peasants from nearby villages, fruit vendors from the hotter, neighboring region of Yongsheng, and black-market entrepreneurs from Kunming reselling goods bought at subsidized prices from state enterprises.

One of the few corridors between these two halves of town is a short, narrow lane running directly from the small-commodity market to the main square of the new town. Recently, a mix of bicycle-repair enterprises, fruit vendors, and meat sellers have expanded into this lane and threaten to spill out onto the main square in front of the China Agricultural Bank. The police have drawn an imaginary line across the opening of this street and prohibited vendors to cross it. The vendors, mostly elderly peasant women, are not easily cowed, and nearly every hour heated arguments break out between young policemen and peasant women setting up shop on the square. Usually, the police manage to push the vendors back into the narrow market street, but as soon as the police disappear, the vendors carry their baskets into the square again and set out their produce and scales on the shady sidewalk next to the Bank.

Peasants who walk down Xinjie to deal with the grain and oil cooperative, apply for credit at the China Agricultural Bank, or go to a movie in the People's Cultural Center pass through a space where the structure of every transaction, the design of every building and the content of every newspaper, loudspeaker broadcast, billboard, and street display is organized through the image of the total social organism, integrated and controlled by the Party-state. To pass into the old town however, whether it be to buy a shirt, visit a relative, or sell a mule, is to enter a world where the Party-state is far less visible and where exchange, talk, architecture, and street displays are organized, at least in part, by a logic that is independent of state redistribution. The daily conflict at the intersection of these two spaces is the struggle of the Party-state attempting to preserve a place where its official image as the motive force of a total social organism can go on operating as if this other logic did not exist. But, just as to walk the
streets of the new half of Lijiang town is to participate in the reproduction of this image, to take part in the conflict in front of the China Agricultural Bank (as peasants from Yulong village often do) is to participate in a crisis in the way the Party-state is imagined.

These two terms powerfully organize the lives of Yulong villagers. On the one hand, state redistribution exerts control over daily practice through the array of institutions that oversee the distribution of land and regulate production, transport, and distribution of grain. On the other hand, the market, for which Yulong villagers produce pigs, calves, mule colts, and vegetables, and through which they obtain clothing, tools, and luxury items, frustrates this logic and confuses its reproduction. In Lijiang town, where Yulong villagers do their marketing, we can see how these terms both materially appropriate space and are symbolically inscribed in it. But this is only part of the picture. A third term, village reciprocity, provides a standpoint from which villagers criticize and reinterpret both state redistribution and the market.

VILLAGE RECIPROCITY AND THE STATE

The streets and courtyards of Yulong village are the location of an incessant and voluminous barter of daily necessities and of several systems of rotation of labor and material resources. These exchanges are distinct from the market in that they specifically do not involve money; they take place in Yulong and its neighboring villages instead of in the market town of Lijiang; and they are based on elaborate systems of formal rules and on the skilled manipulation of material resources and accumulated social capital. They are also distinct from state redistribution, avoiding its institutions and supporting images of local identity in tension with the image of the total social organism promoted by the Party-state. Village reciprocity is the very stuff of social interaction within the bounds of the village.

Some examples of reciprocity in Yulong village are the following:

1. The two threshing machines in the village are privately owned. During threshing time they circulate from courtyard to courtyard on a complicated schedule in which kin relationship, the calendar, and the
history of obligations owed to various households are all figured against each other. Because, at threshing time, the machines are subject to intensive demand, each household must thresh all of its grain in a day or, at most, two. Each household sponsors a threshing party on the day it has use of the threshing machine, drawing on its networks of neighbors, kin, and friends for labor. In this calculus, a few households without extensive kin networks or a history of obligations owed them end up threshing their wheat alone and by hand.

2. Wheat for daily use to make baba, the steamed bread which is the staple food in Naxi areas, is ground in three small grinding houses. These were once the property of production teams but are now privately owned. In Old He Mingyu's grinding house, He Mingyu's own household, his younger son's household, and the household into which his oldest grandson has married, all grind their wheat without exchanging anything at the time of grinding. A few other more distant kin with whom He Mingyu has special relationships also sometimes grind their wheat without "payment." From other households, He Mingyu asks a few jin (1 jin = 1/2 kilogram) of wheat every time wheat is ground; the amount depends on whether the household supplies a laborer to help with the grinding. Soybeans and rape seed are also ground in these shops by similar arrangement.

3. Ritual gift exchange at funerals, weddings, house-buildings, and feast days is one of the foundations of the village gift economy, but one which it will be impossible to do justice to here. Interestingly, these exchanges are the only gift exchanges that involve money. At a funeral ceremony, close kin present gifts of four kinds of grain (wheat, rice, corn, and beans) in four pans that are laid out at the foot of the coffin. Stuck into the top of each pile of grain is a 10-yuan note. Again, at a feast which follows the coffin's burial guests give donations of from 1 to 10 yuan to a bookkeeper who carefully records the name of the participant and the amount of his or her donation before he or she enters the courtyard in which the feast is held. Both the bookkeeper's record and the notes in the piles of grain are displayed publicly. The crucial difference between this money and the money of the market is that here money functions not as a universal equivalent, but as one gift among many, which at some deferred date will compel a return.
4. The web of reciprocity is made dense by a plethora of minute, informal daily exchanges of cigarettes between young men on the street, pipe tobacco between old men passing time on the bridges, seedlings between workers from different households in the fields, food between friends, labor between women washing clothing in the streams, handfuls of roasted soybeans between children going to school, and so on.

Village reciprocity is subject to a detailed texture of formal rules and schedules. Gender and kinship rules, for example, define how one stands in relationship to the house and all it contains and thus how free one is to offer or accept a meal, the use of the grinder, or a handful of seedlings. The elaborate traditional calendar cycle in which feast days vary not only according to the village of one’s origin and the position of one’s house at the north end (closer to the mountain) or the south end of the village, but even according to one’s lineage, determines on which days one visits kin and friends and accepts meals that imply further obligation. At play against these systems of rules is the constellation of every household’s accumulated debts and credits to every other, and the skill with which actors mobilize this constellation.

The way in which rules, social capital, and skill are played against each other can be illustrated in the arrangement by which cattle are grazed on the mountain. Each of the 80 households in Yulong village owns from one to five cattle, making a total of about 300. For nine months of the year, from two months after Spring Festival to one month before, the cattle are grazed in groups from about five to 100 on the foothills of the Jade Dragon Mountain. Each village has a traditional grazing area of several tens of square kilometers with rather indistinct boundaries. In theory, the cattle are grazed by a communal arrangement. Each household is required to send one person for every head of cattle it owns out for one day out of a period of about 32 days to tend cattle. Eight people are sent each day. Thus, He Sanxing’s household owns three cattle, so one person from the household is sent for three consecutive days. Yulong village is divided into four sections (cun) of about 20 households each. Households take turns providing labor, beginning with the two households at the extreme southern and northern end of each cun and moving gradually toward the center of
each cun according to a pattern with which, supposedly, everyone is familiar.

"If you have something you need to do, or if you are sick," says He Sanxing, "you trade your day with someone, or you can pay someone money. But you always have to complete your assigned number of days, even if someone dies." Sometimes a family will disagree with the choice of places to which the cattle are sent. "Maybe the grass is too wet or too dry, or the cow is sick, or the grass is better somewhere else that I know about but most people don't." Then one household might withdraw from the arrangement and send its cattle out alone, or three or four households might informally agree to graze their cattle together in an arrangement that varies from day to day. These informal arrangements may involve enough households and become permanent enough to be systematized in much the same way the village-wide arrangement is, or they might dissolve after a few days or weeks. Skilful household managers thus balance their knowledge of the mountain's grazing spots and the household's social capital against the advantages of the village-wide arrangement (it nearly always requires less labor), drawing the household's cattle out of the village pool at times and putting them back in at others depending on the weather, the places the village cattle are being grazed, the dates on which they calculate their household's turn will fall, and the amount of labor the household has free at a particular time.

If state redistribution is anchored in the land contracted to each peasant household, village reciprocity is oriented towards another, similarly powerful, signification: the Jade Dragon Mountain. The mountain is a supplier of wealth nearly as important as the land, but relatively independent of the state. From the mountain, villagers take all their firewood, most of the forage for cattle and horses, and all the timbers and mud used to build houses. The village's drinking water comes from a set of artesian wells at the foot of the mountain. To feed pigs, women cut the lush weeds from the foothills close to the village, then chop them and boil them with flour. The bulk of medicinal drugs used in the village are not bought from Lijiang town, but are herbs dug from the mountain either by knowledgeable peasants or by the local herb doctor; and indeed this doctor, Mu Weikang, claims that the mountain supplies many medicines that can be found nowhere else.
During the rainy season, the mountain provides a large variety of edible mushrooms, and after the rainy season, villagers take carts to the mountain and collect huge piles of twigs and leaves from a certain tree, then chop them up to be mixed throughout the year with waste from pigs and humans for compost.

In addition to providing for these prosaic daily needs, the mountain is a source of treasure for those with luck, wisdom, or eminence. It is said that where lightning strikes on the mountain during July and August, the famous songlong mushroom grows. Those lucky enough to find good specimens can sell them to a state corporation which sells them to Japanese businessmen for prices rumored to be as high as 200 yuan per jin. This is a dangerous activity because the mushrooms grow in high and inaccessible places, and stories are told of villagers hunting songlong mushrooms falling to their deaths. Older villagers tell stories of chests of silver and gold on the mountain; some say they were plundered a long time ago, but others, like Old He Mingyu, insist that they are still up there, their location forgotten. When asked about these stories, Dr. Mu Weikang comments,

It's not in chests—that's just a fairy tale for ignorant people—it's in natural deposits. In the past, during the kingdom of Mu, the Lijiang area was full of gold. We had plenty of gold everywhere. Why? Because the Mu king was a very wise man. He knew all about places on the snow mountain where there was gold, but he kept this all secret. His son was not very wise; he was a fool in fact, and so was his grandson, so they couldn't remember the secret places. Those deposits are still up there—there is a place called "gold chest" and one called "silver chest"; and the government would like to find them but it doesn't know where to look.9

The only person besides the Mu king who perhaps would know about the location of the gold, claims Mu Weikang, is Dr. Joseph Rock, who knew more about the mountain and the history of the Lijiang area than anyone before or since.10

Grazing cattle, which depends on secret or public knowledge of the grass on the mountain; gathering medicinal herbs, which, according to Dr. Mu Weikang, depends on expert familiarity with locations that give herbs even of the same species different qualities; cutting long, straight timbers for houses, which depends on similar knowledge;
searching for mushrooms and gold, which depends on wisdom, luck, and perhaps the kind of eminence possessed by such people as the Mu king and Dr. Joseph Rock; and even the traditional calendar, which arranges feast days in terms of proximity to the mountain, all contribute to orient the village economy toward the mountain. This orientation is a common feature of nearly everything that Yulong villagers find proper to their locality and even to “Naxi” identity. There is perhaps no better illustration of this than the voluminous and complex body of Naxi mythology in which the Jade Dragon mountain range is a prominent character. (The bulk of this mythology is written, contained in the 10,000 still extant dongba pictographic manuscripts used by dongba ritual practitioners during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.) I will very briefly mention two myths — those recalled most often by my informants. Both are about paradises.

After death, people like He Mingyu who have many descendants are said to walk north toward the xifang kuaile shijie, the Buddhist Western Paradise, which He Mingyu describes graphically as a place where “you dip your cup into the sea, and there is wine; any time you want to eat you reach out and take meat from the trees; if you want to go anywhere you climb on a horse and before you know it you are where you want to be; a grain of wheat is as big as a football.” In the zhi-ma funeral ceremony which, before Liberation, was performed at the funerals of people with descendants, dongba read long chants to guide the soul on its journey north. The chants named and described places and hazards the soul must pass through, beginning with places in the Jade Dragon mountain range and proceeding north toward Mount Kalias in Tibet. Although there will be no dongba at He Mingyu’s funeral, he insists that he will make this journey guided by the wailing of his descendants.

Before liberation, instead of going to the Western Paradise, young lovers who committed joint suicide were sent to the third country (di san guojia) by dongba performing the Harla luke rite. Lovers rarely commit suicide these days, says He Mingyu’s son, He Erxing, and even if they were to do so, there is no dongba around Yulong village to perform the rite, but his father still likes to talk about it. It is “a place where there is no food and no writing, only love,” says He Mingyu, “and it is located somewhere on the Jade Dragon Mountain.”
The mountain and the ordinary goods taken from it, the extraordinary treasures it hides, the stories that circulate around it, the road to paradise which passes over it, and the other paradise on it, lie outside the margins of state redistribution. Whereas the other source of value, the land, is regulated and controlled by the state, if there are regulations that pertain to the mountain, they are easily ignored. Even wood, that most precious of resources in China, is in many places cut from the mountain without concern for state regulation. Village reciprocity, oriented toward the mountain, thus preserves a realm of social production not fully transparent to the image of the total society saturated by state power. The social relations in this realm are doubly based on intricate assemblages of rules and schedules and the skilled manipulation of a household's material resources and social capital. And within this realm circulate stories about a distinctive local history, a sense of local geography, a dense body of mythology, and local medicinal practices based on a complex knowledge of local botany—everything that serves to distill the categories of "Naxi" and "Yulong villager" out from the image of a homogeneous social body permeated by the all-inclusive discourses of the state.

That the local identity reproduced through village reciprocity is a threat to the image of the total social body is clear from the long history of state-sponsored attempts to obliterate it. The landscape of the Lijiang Naxi Autonomous Region is littered with the residue of successive campaigns to wipe out a past not in harmony with the image of the integrated society moving toward a socialist future. The Cultural Revolution, of course, was the most radical, if the most chaotic and fragmented, of these adventures. During the Cultural Revolution, five of the six temples in the vicinity of Yulong village were destroyed, and one, the Wufeng Lou, was moved to Lijiang town; all dongba were forced to stop practicing, and most were sentenced to prison or forced labor; and thousands of dongba manuscripts were burned in bonfires in the village center.

Today, local religious practices, ethnic identity, and what in official discourse are called "natural" economic practices, rather than being subjected to campaigns of obliteration, are targets of a new strategy which attempts to neutralize them by absorbing them into the image
of the total social body. An example of this strategy is the Yuquan Gongyuan, or the Jade Spring Park, at the north end of Lijiang town.

The most ubiquitous photograph of the Lijiang region is a view of this park. This photo is the most common postcard sold in town; posters of it are plastered on the walls of the town’s restaurants; reproductions of it adorn the cover of every tourist pamphlet produced by the state-run tourism corporation; and it can even be encountered in Western scholarly publications participating in the mini-industry of Naxi studies (Jackson, 1989). In the foreground of the photo is the Black Dragon Pool, once sacred to dongba ritual practice. Across the pool is a new stone bridge in a Ming-dynasty style, complete with round arches and stone lions. To one side of the bridge is the Wufeng Lou, the Five Phoenix Tower, once the centerpiece of the Puchi monastery in the foothills behind Yulong village and the most important Gelugpa-sect Buddhist temple in the region. During the Cultural Revolution the monastery around the temple was destroyed, and the temple was dismantled and moved, stone by stone, to its present location, where it now houses a museum of Naxi dongba artifacts. Behind it is the residence of the state-appointed head of the Gelugpa Buddhist organization of Lijiang county. Just over the bridge shine the tile roofs of the Dongba Research Institute, where three of the few remaining dongba ritual practitioners help researchers translate manuscripts in dongba script into Chinese. Finally, towering over the Wufeng Lou is the nearly 6,000 meter height of the Jade Dragon Mountain, its glaciers in prominent display and wisps of clouds clinging to its tip.

The photograph contains all the elements of a typical Chinese nature scene: a foreground of placid water reflecting beautiful ancient buildings and bridges and a background of hills or mountains. Were it not for the height of the mountain, the snow on its slopes, and the dryness of the hills slanting into the sides of the photograph, this could be West Lake in Hangzhou, the prototypical Chinese tourist destination. Here, the most powerful religious symbols of the Lijiang Naxi Autonomous Region are gathered, framed, and domesticated. Gelugpa Buddhism and dongba religion are presented as projects of the state, and the Jade Dragon Mountain, the primary locus of local mythology
and local identity, is flattened and positioned in the center of this frame of state power.

Another representation of the mountain is encased in glass in a corner of the museum inside the Wufeng Lou. It is a scroll painted in the mid-nineteenth century during the height of dongba influence in the Lijiang region. It shows the path of dead souls over the mountain and to the north. Features of the Jade Dragon Mountain range are interspersed with hundreds of place names written in dongba hieroglyphic script and detailed drawings of monsters and spirits the dead encounter on their path. The scroll is a pictorial version of one of the manuscripts once chanted by dongba in the zhi-ma funeral ceremony, a list of place-names intended to guide the soul through the Jade Dragon mountain range and north to the Western Paradise. This scroll, presented as part of the state’s project to preserve remnants of a dying Naxi culture, captures a sense of the mountain that is alive and well in Yulong village. There, the mountain is seen as a multidimensional terrain, laced with routes walked by the living and the dead, layered with names mythical and real, and suffused with value, some accessible to everyone, and some only to the lucky, knowledgeable, or eminent.

In contrast, in Jade Spring Park and in the photographs that teach those who admire or buy them how to view it, the mountain is a two-dimensional aesthetic object, framed by the domesticated symbols of state-sponsored religious practice. The effects of the park and the photos do not depend on converting villagers from one view of the mountain to another. Like the temples being rebuilt with state funds in the hills; like the pageants staged at the annual Mule and Horse Fair in Lijiang, in which dancers imitate planting and harvesting wearing idealized velvet and cotton “Naxi costumes”; and, like the work of the Dongba Research Institute, the photographs are representations of the Party-state as that which has the power to represent. In celebrating “Naxi” identity in pageants on television and at the Mule and Horse Fair, in selecting “valuable aspects of dongba religion” to be “saved” from extinction through a project of research and translation, in “sponsoring the revival of Gelugpa Buddhism” through a controlled program of rebuilding and staffing temples, the Party-state shows
itself as that which has the power to recognize and present selected local differences. Each of these representations absorbs local differences into the total social body by converting them into state projects and re-displaying them through the lens of state power.

Yulong villagers are often acerbic critics of this endeavor. Just north of the village is the San Duo Ge, a temple that shelters a statue of General San Duo, an important local hero. The temple was recently rebuilt by the state after its destruction during the Cultural Revolution. He Erxing laughs as he says, “There used to be a huge incense burner there, made partly of gold, but it was taken out and melted during the Cultural Revolution. Now they have a little one, a fake one. The statue of San Duo they built, people say it’s not really San Duo. How could it be? It’s not nearly big enough. Some people say maybe it’s San Duo’s grandson!”

State redistribution, imagined as the circulatory system of an integrated social body, and village reciprocity, located at least partly outside the margins of that body, thus exist in tension with each other. It is a tension between the Party-state’s attempts to control the production of local social life by mastering and neutralizing local differences and local efforts to maintain at least fragmentary control of that production. But Yulong villagers’ relation to the image of the Party-state as the consolidating agent of a total social body is not fully defined by this tension. Other complexities enter this relation, complexities which spring in part from a particular way of imagining the market.

VILLAGE RECIPROCITY AND THE MARKET

Yulong villagers often speak of the market as if it enters the village, if at all, only as a disturbing influence from outside. Every household sells mule colts, pigs, calves, and sometimes vegetables on the market and buys clothing, tools, kitchen utensils, and other necessities there. Nevertheless, people speak of the market as an attribute of Lijiang town and larger cities that does not penetrate the village in any significant way. Even the use of money is seen as peripheral to village life. At lunch in his house, for example, Mu Weikang says, “We live
a very simple life here. In the city they always have to calculate money; for every little thing they have to use money. Here we don't always have to calculate; for example this *baba* is made from the wheat that we grow. The rice, well, we buy that, but that's OK." Mu Weikang and other Yulong villagers seem to imagine an ideal village where any use of money not bound by all the obligations of kinship, friendship, and ritual that bind all other gifts can be dismissed as easily as Mu Weikang dismisses the fact that he buys his rice.

To villagers, cities and towns — the places of the market — are places of entertainment and corruption where pleasures abound, but where one is always in danger of expending everything. And, for many villagers, the affliction of market exchange is specific not only to cities and towns but also to ethnic groups other than Naxi, especially Bai. Forgetting that the caravan trade to Tibet was once an important part of the Lijiang area's economy, Mu Weikang says, "You've been to Dali, you've seen how clever those Bai are. They're always setting up businesses, always making money. Dali is a very open place, and you know why? Because Bai live there. Naxi can't think like that. Look around you. Are there any businesses in this village? No one ever sets up businesses here because our history and our environment have made us unable to think about money."

If Bai are thought to be clever business people, they are also considered disorderly. On official holidays, thousands of young Bai from villages to the south flood Lijiang town. They cruise the street in long rows with arms linked, crowd the cinemas, and buy sticks of roast meat from street vendors. Nearly every Naxi I have asked about this scene is disapproving: "Those Bai have terrible customs. The young people are trouble makers; they have very bad relations with each other [that is, they flirt and maybe they have sex]. There they go, always walking around arm in arm, pushing this way, pulling that way, combing their hair back, all dolled up in those costumes. Naxi are not like that. Naxi don't walk around arm in arm; they ride bicycles."

If market exchange is associated with cities and with ethnic groups like Bai and Han, these, in turn, are associated with disorder and improper behavior. After the Beijing massacre, after asking me if I had been to Kunming and Guangzhou, people would often say, "those places are very luan [chaotic] right now, aren't they?" and add that the
Lijiang area is never luan. Early responses to my questions about the "counter-revolutionary rebellion"15 repeatedly stressed that, whereas such things could happen in cities, Lijiang county could never become luan both because of its isolation and because it is populated by Naxi. My informants were so committed to this idea that they routinely "forgot" that students from Lijiang's Television University had marched through the streets of the town in May in support of the students in Beijing. A young villager explained:

Lijiang county is very peaceful. There are few college students. In fact there are no universities at all, so we haven't had any kind of rebellion here. Naxi have always been a peaceful people because we've never had outside nationalities coming to Lijiang to make war. Naxi rarely go outside to study or work; there are very few outside working, very few. We've lived a long time in this area, very slowly, very peacefully.

The rapid flow of money in cities was central to villagers' explanations of the "rebellion." Although the economic reforms has been good to places like Lijiang, it was said, the free exchange they promoted had caused "inflation and chaos" in the cities. Always implied in these vague formulations was the idea that Lijiang was spared rebellion not only because Naxi love peace but also because, unlike Bai and Han, they are "unable to think about money."

In the thought of Yulong villagers, why does market exchange, or money used in such exchange, lead to the improper behavior of young Bai on the streets, chaos in the cities, and eventually, "counter-revolutionary rebellion"? The best answer I got to this question came one afternoon in Old He Mingyu's kitchen as I was asking Old He and his son He Erxing about a funeral I had attended the day before.

In Yulong village, the two men explained, the dead are buried in lineage burial sites in the foothills of the Jade Dragon Mountain. The county government has tried to discourage this practice and encourage cremation by declaring that the 100-yuan sum usually given to families who lose a male member will be paid only to those who cremate their dead. Still, Old He insists, most villagers would rather do without the money than burn their relatives. In the burial plot, each generation is buried side by side in a row, with their feet pointing toward a mountain top across the valley. Before Liberation the proper mountain was determined by a professional geomancer, but now old,
knowledgeable men in the family perform the task. The mountain must be neither too high nor too low. "It's like this," Old He said, putting his fingers together and pointing to his hand, "if you are one of these [middle sized fingers,] you have something to lean against. If you are this [the little finger,] you're nothing, and if you claim to be this [the longest finger,] then you are trying to be the emperor and you will be punished."

The corpse must be aligned precisely with the mountain on a line that vertically bisects the body. The spine must not be crooked, the limbs askew or the neck bent. To ensure this, a red thread is strung above the body but below the coffin lid, passing through holes drilled in the ends of the coffin. The body inside the coffin is aligned along this thread, and, when the coffin is placed in the ground, several careful sightings are taken to place the protruding ends of the thread and the mountain top in strict alignment before dirt and rocks are placed in the grave. On each end of the thread, outside of the holes drilled through the coffin, is tied a Qing-dynasty coin. The weight of the two coins serves to keep the thread taut as the coffin is carried to the burial plot and placed in the ground.

Why coins? "Ah," said He Mingyu, "good question." He drew four sets of characters in my notebook.

"These are the names of the Qing-dynasty emperors; one of these four names is on each coin. People say that the emperor is like a silk thread between heaven and earth. If you have the emperor in front of your coffin and the emperor behind your coffin, then he will connect the earth you are in to the heaven (tian) you are going to. The emperor helps you get from earth to heaven."

"What if you didn't have one of those Qing-dynasty coins. Could you use a modern coin?"

Stupid question. "Modern coins don't have a hole in the middle to tie the thread through," explains He Erxing gently, "Besides, they don't have an emperor's name on them. So how could they be effective?"

"But what if the coin had a picture of Chairman Mao on it?"

"Aha!" Both men thump the table and grin. "Now you're getting it! Chairman Mao would work just fine. He's as powerful as any emperor."
"And what if the coin had a picture of Deng Xiaoping instead of Mao?"

"No," says He Erxing after a brief pause, "that would be just like putting one of these little one-fen pieces on your coffin. Mao and Deng are not the same. Mao was like an emperor; he had power because people obeyed him. Deng has power because he has money; he's corrupt. He pays people to obey him. He has more money than Mao; even some businessmen in cities like Guangzhou have more money than Mao, and he drinks the best tea and eats the best food. But he doesn't have power like Mao . . . Deng is not powerful like an emperor, but Mao is."

Here, the Hes imagine two different kinds of money. In the first kind, Qing-dynasty coins, the power of the state, concentrated in the personage of the emperor, is represented as the emperor's name on the coin. It is a particular kind of representation; the relation between this signifier and what it signifies is not arbitrary; instead, the ritual efficacy of the coins depends on their indexical connection, through the name of the emperor, to the power of the imperial state. This ideal form of money corresponds perfectly with the ideal village economy; there, every exchange is like the transfer of the soul from earth to heaven effected by the Qing-dynasty coins, in that the consequences of the success or failure of a soul's journey to heaven are of the same order as the consequences of the skillful use of knowledge and capital in gift exchange. An improperly buried ancestor will become a ghost and cause no end of economic and social trouble for its descendants, while a properly buried one will be no less a source of good fortune than is the accumulation of knowledge, social capital, and material resources. (Note that this is not an argument about the relation between money and the state in Qing-dynasty China. The state that the Hes imagine when they talk about the ritual use of Qing-dynasty coins is an image of a possible state, perhaps the imagined memory of a lost state, not the memory of a state that need ever have existed.)

The second kind of money is modern money. Modern coins and bills also contain representations of the Party-state—not, to be sure, the name of an emperor or the image of a Party chairman, but symbols of the Party. In a sense, it is these representations which give money the power to effect exchange, for they signal its authenticity; only the
state can print money. Why, then, can modern coins not be used in funerals? Is it just that they are used for exchange, while Qing-dynasty coins are not? This is indeed one reason, but it is not the one mentioned by the Hes. To the Hes, the crucial difference between modern money and Qing-dynasty coins is the difference between Mao and Deng. The power the Hes imagine Chairman Mao to have possessed would flow directly into coins minted with his image, allowing them to effect the transfer of souls (and possibly of objects as well), whereas Deng’s power is diverted — by money itself. Deng “pays people to obey him”; he is corrupt. The power of the state does not saturate money as it would in a coin with the image of Mao; instead, money corrupts the state. This state, in which money replaces the personal power of an emperor or Chairman Mao, is precisely parallel to the market, where money replaces the networks of social relations that characterize the village gift economy. For the Hes, Deng’s failure to be an “emperor” is the failure of the Party-state’s power to fully saturate money, and evidence of this failure is found everywhere in the rapid growth of markets, inflation, and unemployment; and the effects of this second kind of money — disorder, improper behavior, and rebellion — are thus consequences of state corruption.

For the Hes, the second kind of money is the vehicle of a break with the kind of social relations that characterize both gift exchange in the village and the transfer of souls from earth to heaven. In the same way that money makes exchange possible in the absence of an unmediated connection between money and state power — severed by state corruption — it makes exchange possible in the absence of all the connections that gift exchange presupposes between villagers. With money, one can exchange anything with anyone, and thus enter social relations with anyone, without careful manipulation of obligations and relationships or knowledge of the land and the mountain. The social relations made possible by money are like the behavior of the young Bai villagers who crowd into Lijiang, pushing, pulling, flirting, and primping; they are promiscuous and indiscriminate. That the Hes blame the second kind of money, and thus the social relations of which it is the emblem, on state corruption is one expression of the general crisis, discussed above, which the economic reforms have created in
the image of the state as the unified motive force of the total social organism.

Even if the disorder of indiscriminate social exchange is seen as ultimately the fault of state corruption, it is still not clear why this disorder should lead to rebellion. The answer to this question emerged in another conversation, this one between a potential “counter-revolutionary” and her former classmate.

By August, 1989, most universities in China had been temporarily closed, in order to put an end to student demonstrations; natives of Lijiang county attending universities in Kunming, Chengdu, and Beijing returned home. When Yunhua, a computer-science student at Kunming Teachers University, returned to Lijiang, she ran into her middle-school classmate Xiaohong, now a middle-school art teacher, who was sitting in a restaurant talking to me. Xiaohong asked her friend whether she had participated in student demonstrations in Kunming. Yunhua admitted she had and tried to explain why, but Xiaohong was shocked, and the conversation grew increasingly heated. Finally Xiaohong turned to me to explain Yunhua’s behavior.

In Lijiang, if the police arrest someone, people will go his house and curse him. That is as it should be. That’s the way Naxi people are. But there are some Naxi who try to be Han and some Han who try to be foreigners. She doesn’t want to be Naxi; she wants to be a foreigner, an American. Here, everyone has a duty to their country. In your country you go to college just because you like studying, but here the government sends you to a university to study what is needed so you can perform your duty. Now university students have forgotten their duty.

Yunhua: That’s laughable, really. I haven’t yet discovered what my duty is. Erik (to Xiaohong): Have you discovered yours? Yunhua: Ha! Exactly!

Xiaohong: Yes, I have! I teach. Teaching is my duty. I didn’t necessarily want to teach, but I am needed to teach. And at home or when I am working, well, it’s different.

Erik (to Yunhua): Before you went to college, did you think like Xiaohong?

Xiaohong: Of course she did! She was just like us. Students go to college, and they don’t have to think about family or work, or how to get along in life. All they have to think about is books, so they can have whatever opinion they like.
Yunhua: No, not at all. They think I was like them, but I wasn't. It's not everyone who takes the exam to go to college, you know. Many people, even if their parents want them to, won't take it. You have to want to think and to study. And in college you learn to have your own opinion.

Xiaohong: But you shouldn't have your own opinion! Why should you think whatever you want to think? China is too big and has too many nationalities for everyone to think whatever they want. Or rather you can have your own opinion, but you shouldn't tell it to other people. That can be dangerous.

Yunhua: But I think you should say what you think. Even in Lijiang I'm not afraid to say what I think.

Xiaohong: How can you say that? There is always a difference between what you think and what you say. And there is always a difference between what you say and what is heard. That is unavoidable. So it's impossible to say what you think. You should say what is necessary to say, what is right to say.

The problem with the kind of indiscriminate social relations which money makes possible is that they undermine important distinctions, including those which, in Xiaohong's opinion, are essential to the well-being of the Chinese nation. In moving to the city, Yunhua has freed herself of all the networks of obligation, kinship, and accumulation of social and economic capital ("getting along in life") that define the village economy, leaving her free to promiscuously swap ideas and opinions. As a result, she has blurred the essential differences between Naxi and Han and between Chinese and foreigner; she has forgotten her identity and thinks she can be whomever she wants. And as Xiaohong knows, the integrity of the Party-state depends on the maintenance of clear distinctions between the inside and the outside of Chinese society (if not between Naxi and Han). Moreover, Yunhua has confused the differences between what one reads in books, what one thinks, what one says, and what people hear, acting as if each can be exchanged arbitrarily with the others. As a result, she has forgotten her duty, which would be not only to limit what she reads, thinks, and says to what the Party-state has assigned her to study, but also to distinguish clearly between the three activities, trying to think as she should despite what she reads or sees about her, and, above all, saying only what it is right to say. The disorder of indiscriminate exchange results in a disordering of Yunhua's proper relation to the Party-state;
and this disordering is rebellion. Just as money makes it possible to exchange any object for any other, the mode of exchange of talk and opinions, as well of as objects, of which money is the emblem, allows Naxi to be exchanged for Han, Han for foreigner, reading and observation for thought, and thought for talk. And this imaginary disordering of a world meticulously, even if unsuccessfully, ordered by a certain image of the Party-state coupled with a vision of the ideal village, a disordering which allows Yunhua stubbornly and perversely to "say what she thinks," is the stuff of "counter-revolutionary rebellion."

Xiaohong's vision of the Party-state and the vision of the present Party-state set forth by the Hes are, obviously, quite different. Xiaohong certainly believes that there is nothing in her argument that contradicts official discourse. She appears to accept the official version of the Party-state as the legitimate motive force of a total social body, and she blames Yunhua for divorcing herself from that body. The Hes, on the other hand, blame disorder on Party-state corruption. Although they do not approve of rebellion, they also do not accept the Party-state's image of itself so thoroughly as to condemn all rebels. After evading my questions about rebellion for two months, He Erxing came into a room where I was visiting his father one afternoon in August; he was visibly upset. He said that there was a rumor six students from Lijiang county attending school in Beijing had been shot in June. "What if you were one of those parents, what would you think? They can't even bury their children." These differences between Xiaohong's and the Hes visions of the state are in keeping with their social positions. As a middle-school teacher, Xiaohong has a responsibility to carry on the discourse of the state. As peasants, the Hes are not responsible to speak and thus have more freedom to think.

The differences between Xiaohong's view of the Party-state and the Hes vision of a past or possible state which would preserve the unmediated connection between money and state power, on the other hand, are not so pronounced. Both states are "totalitarian," in that the function of both is to integrate separate elements into a totality. Just as the total state envisioned by Yunhua unites the interests of all of China's nationalities, the state whose emperor is represented on the Qing-dynasty coins unites the world of spirits with the world of the living. The direct, unmediated connection Xiaohong appears to see
between Party-state power and "what is necessary to say" is similar in form to the unmediated, indexical connection the Hes see between state power and the first kind of money. Moreover, both of these states are disturbed when the second kind of money enters the picture. In Xiaohong’s vision, the social relations made possible by money lead to rebellion against the Party-state, and in the Hes’ view, the second kind of money corrupts the state.

The crucial difference between the Hes’ vision of a state where the power of an emperor connects the earth to heaven and the image propagated by official state discourse, which Xiaohong appears to accept, is that the latter state makes every connection except this one. Here, the ambiguities of Yulong villagers’ relations to the official image of the state are in full flower. On the one hand, the Hes liken Mao’s power to the power of an emperor and say that his image would be as effective as the name of an emperor in transferring a soul from the world of the living to the world of spirits; on the other hand, they often speak of attempts, inspired by Mao, to wipe out every form of ritual practice. He Mingyu often mourns the loss of a room-full of dongba manuscripts he inherited from his father and his uncle, burned by the cartload during the Cultural Revolution, but he has a statue of Mao in a place of honor in his house and has spent part of every morning since he became too old to work in the fields studying a copy of the Red Book.

These contradictions are informed by the tension described above between the image of the state propagated by official discourse, and a domain partly independent of that image in which ritual practice, local identity, and gift exchange circulate. That one of the constructions occupying this domain should be a vision of a state unifying heaven and earth, which includes Chairman Mao as a possible emperor, is curious. What is clear, however, is that the Hes are critical of the present Party-state and that their critique is founded on a distinction between the kind of practices that go on within an ideal village and those of the market, outside of that village. Like other Yulong villagers (and like Xiaohong) the Hes take the boundary between the networks of gift exchange and the indiscriminate exchange of the market to be the streams that divide the village from Lijiang town. But, when we look closer at this boundary, we will find that it, like the streams, turns
and cuts through the village. Just as the external boundary influences the way villagers talk about and interact with the market in Lijiang town, this internal boundary organizes certain kinds of talk and activity within the village.

BRIDGES

Contrary to Dr. Mu Weikang’s assertion, there are certain “businesses” in Yulong village. A small state-run store sells cigarettes, soap, pipe tobacco, and a few other necessities. There is a tailor shop where Cripple Mu mends torn clothing. And He Gang has a shop, open one morning a week, in which he makes copperware and mends pots. Curiously enough, though villagers buy few goods in the state-run store, nearly every hour of the day there is a group of men and women hanging out in the muddy square in front of the store window, smoking and chatting. Cripple Mu’s tailor shop is another favorite gathering place, and in the afternoon there is almost always a chess game being played on the ground under his window, with a crowd of commentators. Wherever money is exchanged, it seems, is a favorite place for people to gather and chat.

The only other locations in the village in which people gather casually and talk are bridges. Several streams, originating in springs on the mountain, have been directed through the village so that the front door of most houses opens onto a bridge, and bridges mark every exit to the village. The bridges are low and flat without sides, and they are not, to a stranger’s eye, choice places to sit and talk; but the sites I would find more comfortable—old mill stones placed by the side of the road or steps ascending to the doors of houses on the uphill side of the street—are nearly always deserted.

The bridges are also, sometimes, loci for moneyed exchange or for barter with strangers (as opposed to barter between villagers which takes place almost everywhere but bridges). After the threshing season, for example, peasants from villages in the southern part of the valley, where rice is grown, will show up in Yulong village with a cart full of rice to be bartered for wheat; villagers from Yuhu village on the
foothills sometimes bring baskets of mushrooms or wild sour apples, to be exchanged for wheat or rice; and sometimes people from Lijiang drive through the village with a truck full of baskets and noodles bought at subsidized prices, to be sold or bartered for wheat. In every case, these entrepreneurs stop to make their deals where people are gathered, which is inevitably on a bridge.

In several respects, the social intercourse on bridges is different from that which occurs elsewhere. Men or women on the way to the fields stop to rest their loads or light a cigarette; women participate in the conversation while washing clothes or rinsing vegetables by the side of the bridge; children on their way to cut weeds for pig feed set down their baskets until someone tells them to get on with it; old men looking after babies stroll by to find out what’s up; strangers (even foreigners) walking in the street are hailed and might end up sitting down to chat. Unlike visits to a house or a courtyard in which a gift is necessary, unlike encounters in the fields which are determined by labor arrangements subject to networks of obligation, unlike a meeting on the street which, between men, almost always results in the exchange of cigarettes, conversations on bridges neither require nor result in obligation. Whereas in a house, in the street, in a town restaurant, or in the fields, a man who takes out a cigarette offers one to each of his companions, on a bridge everyone smokes his own cigarettes or pipe, neither offering tobacco to nor accepting it from anyone else. Moreover, bridges are the only places in the village where unrelated people of different genders and ages associate freely. In Lijiang town, where bridges leading to the marketplace are the locations of similar gatherings, young men stop at the bridges to watch young women going past: “If you want,” I was told, “you can talk directly to a girl from here. You can’t do that anywhere else, not even in school. It’s very convenient.” In Yulong village, if similar opportunities exist at all, it is in a group of men and women chatting on a bridge.

Thus, the use of money or barter with strangers and a mode of social interaction relatively unencumbered by networks of obligation or social distinctions based on gender, kinship, or age are both characteristic of bridges. What unites these seemingly dissimilar activities is
a certain kind of danger. Conversations on bridges are almost always limited to topics like the weather and prices, which pose no threat to anyone if overheard. My efforts to talk about subjects that interested me more were met with jokes which immediately returned the conversation to trivialities. If social exchange on bridges is like the use of money, in that anyone can exchange anything with anyone else, it is also similar in that if it becomes too free it can ruin oneself or one's family (as saying too much ruined many during the Cultural Revolution). Inherent in both the use of money and talk on bridges is the danger that the transgressions of social distinctions they often entail will lead to misfortune.

Why are bridges privileged loci of these activities? In several ways bridges mediate between the world where all such normal social distinctions usually pertain and other worlds—the Western Paradise, the “third country,” and the underworld—where they do not. Bridges are places where one can slip abruptly from one world to another; in stories and in former ritual chants, they are often the sites of violent death. In death ritual, a “human bridge” (ren qiao) dramatically marks the passage of the soul out of the village and thus out of the realm of normal social interaction. After a funeral ceremony, the coffin is carried out of the courtyard and into the main square of the village where all the deceased’s kin assemble, the men in the square close to the coffin and the women in the adjoining streets. A funeral procession made up entirely of men accompanies the coffin from this square to its burial site on the mountain; the deceased’s eldest male descendent, the guide, walks in front of the coffin with a bamboo branch and two skin bags of food for the deceased, and a crowd of male kin trail in its wake. On the bridge at the exit to the village the female kin gather before the coffin arrives, the deceased’s sisters, daughters, and wife kneeling on straw in the center of the bridge and the others lining both sides. As the bearers carry the coffin over the heads of the kneeling women they collapse on the ground, thrashing their arms and legs, wailing their kinship designation for the deceased and stories of their past experience with him or her. The women lining the bridge rush to the center and hold the wailing women down, and then, supporting them by the arms, guide them off the bridge. After the procession has
passed the ren giao, the women return to the village, and the men go on to bury the coffin.

Of all the ceremonies that surround a death, this is the only one in which grief causes people to lose control of their bodies. And bodily composure, not only of the dead body in its meticulous alignment inside the coffin, but also of those participate in the burial, is essential to the success of the deceased’s journey. When I asked why the women do not accompany the procession to the grave site, I was told, “Women cry easily, and people here believe that if anyone cries while burying the coffin, the dead person will have bad luck in the other world. This is a superstition.” Later, when the coffin was being buried, the same man said, “See how everyone is cheerful and some are laughing? This is out of respect for the dead person.”

It is perhaps because of the mediating position of bridges, between the familiar world organized by obligation and social distinctions and other, less familiar worlds which potentially transcend that organization, that the transgression of the norms of bodily composure on the ren giao do not endanger the well-being of the deceased. The ren giao is between two worlds, not entirely integrated into either, so that the dangerous effects of the transgressions that occur on it need not ramify into either world. The symbolic privilege that allows the “human bridge” to contain the effects of excess grief makes bridges appropriate locations for other activities that transgress the social distinctions produced in ordinary social activity. Like excessive grief, moneyed exchange, barter with strangers, and casual speech between men and women or between strangers all invite calamity if their effects are not tightly contained, a symbolic task for which bridges are particularly appropriate. Bridges and shop windows are the sites where the indiscriminate exchange of the market and the indiscriminate social activity that is associated with it enter the village in their most visible form, upsetting the precarious conservative ideal of a village where money and the kinds of social interaction of which money is the emblem have no place. Because of their power to mediate between the familiar world and unfamiliar ones, however, bridges can contain the dangers of these transgressive activities, allowing the image of an ideal village, one that excludes money and its disturbing influences, to be sustained.
CONCLUSION

I have identified three different modes of organizing production and exchange that set the parameters of daily life in Yulong village. In each of these modes, a certain image of society sustains a particular strategy of power or tactic of resistance to power, and these images are generated through the production, manipulation, and inscription of space. The image of the Party-state as motivating organ of a total social organism is propagated through Party-state control of the land and through the construction of a new section of town. Local religious practices are reinterpreted in light of this image by moving a tower, building a park, and framing a mountain. At the same time, this image is confused as streets are reorganized by the logic of the market, and it is questioned through a vision of an alternative state that appeals to the routes, names, treasures, and paradises inscribed in a mountain. This alternative vision is supported by an image of the ideal village founded in the spaces of village and town and the streams that divide them. In turn, this image is threatened by the counter-image of a disruptive market, but this threat is contained in the symbolically loaded space of bridges. These ongoing struggles involve processes in which two aspects of space are worked against each other; its concrete topographies are manipulated in order to control its imaginary effects, and its symbolic properties are exploited in order to influence its instrumental functions.

NOTES

1. Around 300,000 people living in river valleys around the Jinsha and Lancang rivers in northern Yunnan, southwestern Sichuan, and northeastern Tibet are officially recognized as Naxi. All speak Tibeto-Burman dialects, some of which are mutually incomprehensible. Most Naxi groups have been heavily influenced by both Tibetan and Han cultures, although the wealth of written Naxi mythology testifies to rich indigenous cultural traditions. The Naxi of the relatively prosperous Lijiang Naxi Autonomous County, with which this article deals, have had long contact with Han culture and are perhaps the most sinicized of all Naxi.

2. See Michel de Certeau's lucid critique of Foucault and Bourdieu (de Certeau, 1984: 45-60).

3. Mayfair Yang has described three different "modes of cultural economy" in China, which she calls the "state redistributive economy," the "commodity economy," and the "gift economy" (Yang, 1989: 26). Although my analysis of state redistribution and the market is indebted to,
and indeed similar in many ways to, Yang’s, village redistribution in Yulong village is very different from the gift economy Yang finds in Beijing.

4. North of Lijiang in Yongning county, for example, the distribution of food was used in an unsuccessful attempt to reform the matrilineal kinship system of the Moso minority. Moso did not (and, now, do not) marry. During the Cultural Revolution, the leadership of the Yongning commune declared that all women who could not name their husband and the father of their children would not eat. As Moso people tell it, most women found a nominal husband and accepted a marriage certificate, but they used the communal living arrangements of the production teams to evade the spirit of the commune’s policy.


6. The government has defined specialized households (zhuanye hu) as “those in which family members spend at least 60% of their time in specialized commodity production and sell at least 80% of their products on the market. Specialized grain-producing households must sell at least 60% of their products. The income of specialized households is typically about three times higher than that of other peasant households” (Nee, 1989: 181). Another type of household specialization is the joint-stock cooperative, which is usually made up of three to five households and produces commodities for the market. Some households also specialize in transport and marketing (yunsiao hu).

7. All of the names of informants in this article are pseudonyms. Most people in Yulong village, as in most Naxi villages, are surnamed either He or Mu. It is said that these are the only “true Naxi” names. It is also said that when the former lineage of administrators of Lijiang, installed by Kublai Khan, took the surname Mu, they decreed that everyone else should be known as He. In keeping with this tradition, I have used the names He and Mu liberally.

8. Watson (1988) argues that the new market structure is very similar to that which existed before 1949 and was analyzed by William Skinner, and that the “misalignment between administrative and marketing boundaries which kept the interests of merchants and officials separate,” noted by Skinner, is being recreated. As a consequence, contends Watson, the Party and government systems must now change their structures to adjust to those of the market and develop “indirect methods of influencing market systems.” Otherwise, the state will continue to thwart the operations which it expects the market to perform by asserting its outdated economic powers over the market, “disguised as new forms of ownership, licensing and taxation” (Watson, 1988:27). It could be argued, however, that the more that production, distribution, movements of labor, etc. become subject to market forces, the more a state founded on the “fetishization of the plan” (Lefort, 1986:291) compromises its identity, making the contradictions between “free” markets and the state’s need to assert some control over production and exchange impossible to resolve without a thorough redefinition of the state, such as that sought by some of the students and intellectuals of the 1989 democracy movement.


10. Joseph Rock was an Austrian naturalist and self-styled ethnographer who lived in Nv-lv-ke (Yuhu) village and other places in the region for a total of about 25 years; he produced many volumes of geographical description, ethnography, and translations of Naxi dongba pictographic manuscripts. Dr. Rock (or Luo Boshi) is widely, and for the most part admiringly, remembered in the Lijiang area. In Yulong village, whenever I brought up dongba religion Luo Boshi was certain to be mentioned. Dr. Mu Weikang, whose recollections of his former teacher, Luo Boshi, verged on hero-worship, often advised me, “If you really want to know about Naxi
AHERN, ANAGNOST, student were...suicide...libraries...The...grandfather's...he...pushed...With...the...kicked...and...he...ran...away.

11. Most of these manuscripts (dongba jing), written in a pictographic script, are now in libraries outside of China. The greatest part of these were collected by Joseph Rock. At last count, there were 7,861 manuscripts in North America, at the Library of Congress, the Yenching Institute at Harvard, and the Rock Collection at Carnegie Mellon University; 1,493 in Europe; several hundred in Taiwan; 5,000-6,000 manuscripts remain in Lijiang in a library, a museum, and a research institute; and there are 4,000-5,000 in the Beijing library.

12. For a translation of the dongba manuscripts from which the zhi-ma ceremony chants were recited see Rock (1955).

13. In the nineteenth century, suicide of young lovers was common in the Lijiang area. The Harla luke rite was the longest and most important of Naxi dongba rituals. The rite portrayed suicide as a release from misery and hardship into a life of eternal bliss. Anthony Jackson (1979) suggests that both the common suicide of lovers and the dongba monopoly of the ritual system were results of Chinese attempts in the eighteenth century to sinicize Naxi society.

14. Anagnost quotes Stephen Greenblatt: "the quintessential sign of power is the ability to impose one's fictions on the world" (Anagnost, 1986:5).

15. fan geming baoluan. This was the term most often used in the media to describe the 1989 student demonstrations and ensuing events in Beijing and other cities.

16. Heroic stories told of ancestors are an example. The following story was told by a young man whose ancestors included some of Lijiang county's most interesting personalities.

My grandfather the spy was a very fierce man, even when he was young. One day, before he started to spy for the Guomindang, his older brother had a new watch that some foreigner had given him. Maybe it was Joseph Rock. He was showing this watch around in the street, and a big tough Tibetan pretended he wanted to see it. When my grandfather's older brother gave him the watch the Tibetan grabbed it and ran away. My grandfather's brother told my grandfather about this, and he was very angry. He ran out into the street to look for the Tibetan. When he found him, he was standing on this bridge [the one under our feet at the moment]. He asked, "Did you steal my brother's watch?" The Tibetan pushed out his chest and said, "Yeah, so what?" and drew his long knife from its scabbard. With one kick my grandfather sent the knife flying from his hand; then he picked up the knife himself and stabbed the Tibetan thirteen times. Thirteen, really. Then with another kick he toppled him into the water, and the water carried the body away.

REFERENCES


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