INTRODUCTION
Yunnan: Ethnicity and Economies–Markets and Mobility
Nicholas Tapp

Geographically, the province of Yunnan is extraordinarily diverse. It borders within China on Tibet, Sichuan, Guizhou and Guangxi, and beyond China on Burma, Laos and Vietnam. It is larger than Germany and has a population in excess of 45 million. The province ranges from the snow-capped Himalayan peaks of the Tibetan areas in the north-west to the irrigated wet-rice fields of the Dai people in mountain valleys and subtropical forest bordering Laos and Vietnam to the south and has several distinct ecological zones. Although conquered by the Qin Emperor’s armies as early as the second century BC, and further ‘pacified’ by the statesman Zhuge Liang in the third century AD, Yunnan was not properly incorporated into the Chinese Empire until Kublai Khan’s Mongol invasion and conquest of 1253. From a Chinese point of view, Yunnan has always been seen as a wild and peripheral area, inhabited by strange beasts and peoples, ghosts and miasmas (Schafer 1967).

Eileen Walsh (2009) remarks in a recent review article on how, when she was applying for graduate programmes in anthropology in the US in the early 1990s, she was told by several departments that Yunnan was not really a part of China. This is a consistent perception, despite the very clear administrative, political and cultural incorporation of the province into the modern nation-state of China (Fitzgerald 1972). George Skinner (1977) grouped the Yunnan Plateau, encompassing Yunnan and parts of Guizhou, as one of the nine distinctive socioeconomic macroregions of Han China, which he called ‘Yun-Gui’ (Skinner 1977a, b, c). Recently, Bin Yang (2009a), on the history of Yunnan, is determined to consider Yunnan in its proper context as a part of world history and, for most of history, not really forming a part of China. Further, James Scott (2009) considers most of south-western China as part of ‘Zomia’, a vast ‘area of refuge’ from the state stretching from Bangladesh to Malaysia, as indeed does Jean Michaud (2000, 2006) in his references to the ‘Southeast Asian Massif’ (cf. van Schendel 2002).1

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This view that Yunnan is somehow not properly a part of China has persisted not only because of the region’s non-Han ethnicities, some of whom are considered in this issue, but also because of its very real historic economic and trading relations with parts of central Asia, south Asia and south-east Asia. Many of the ancestors of today’s minorities were involved in such trading relations (Fiskesjö; White in this issue) and, to some extent, they may be seen to be returning today under China’s current policies of economic reform and ‘opening up’ (kaifang) to the outside world. Cross-border economic and social ties were facilitated by the fuzziness of traditional borders in this frontier ‘middle ground’ (White 1991; Giersch 2006). In many cases, cultures cross-cut the borders of Yunnan into ecologically similar parts of Burma, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam, as Leach (1954) showed for the Kachin and Shan. More wide-ranging historical trading routes stretched up to Tibet and into India, as well as through Burma and Thailand to the Indian Ocean, so that Yunnan was connected simultaneously with east, inner, south and south-east Asia. In addition to ongoing cross-border trade by local peoples and the attractions of mining resources, such as tin and copper, for Han settlers in the more marginal areas of Yunnan (Wang in this issue), the caravans of Muslim traders, the Hui, were crucial in the long-distance trading networks. Muslims settled early in Yunnan, particularly since the thirteenth century, and their caravans crossed ‘from the eastern frontiers of Tibet, through Assam, Burma, Thailand, Laos and North Vietnam, to the southern Chinese provinces of Sichuan, Guizhou and Guangxi’ (Forbes n.d., 1986; cf. Atwill 1997). Yunnan was a medium of inter-regional traffic and enjoyed a considerable degree of autonomy. For two millennia, cultural influences came not only from China, but also from Tibet and south-east Asia, with independent states of considerable importance, with their own cultures, rising and becoming established in the region. These states included the early polity of Dian, the kingdom of Nanzhao (which, from the eighth century, controlled parts of Burma, Laos and Thailand) and the state of Dali, which succeeded the kingdom of Nanzhao and flourished until the thirteenth century.

The geographic diversity of the Yunnan region is matched only by its sociocultural diversity. Over the past decade, there have been explicit attempts by researchers and international organisations, reflected in a growing number of conferences and publications, to link biological and cultural diversity (Xu et al. 2000).² Tibeto-Burman, Miao-Yao, Tai-Kadai and Austroasiatic (Mon-Khmer) languages are spoken in the province, and it is hard to deny the range of cultural and social diversity there has always been in Yunnan, from the stone-walled fortresses of the slave-based Nosu (Yi) in the Liangshan Mountains bordering on Sichuan to the matrilineal society of the Mosuo (Mattison in this issue), from the shifting cultivators of Hmong (Miao), Yao, Hani, Lahu and Lisu groups to the settled agriculturalists of the Tai (Dai).³

Yunnan is no stranger to anthropology. Owing to its very diversity it has perhaps disproportionately contributed to Chinese anthropology since that subject was introduced into China in the early twentieth century. Throughout the 1930s and 1940s, a new generation of anthropologists, many trained overseas, worked in Yunnan
and produced major monographs on minority peoples and local cultures there, such as Fei and Chang’s *Earthbound China* (1945), Tian Rukang’s (1986) work on the Tai or Francis Hsu (1948). Fei Xiaotong, doyen of Chinese anthropologists and sociologists, who had studied with Malinowski and Firth at the London School of Economics, directed the Rockefeller-assisted Yanjing-Yunnan Research Station for Sociological Research in Yunnan’s capital, Kunming. This was a collaboration between Yunnan and Yanjing Universities, where the Harvard-trained Lin Yaohua also wrote on the Yi people (Lin 1961). Kunming became the centre of anthropological studies following the evacuation of Beijing, Qinghua and Nankai Universities to Kunming to form the National Southwest Union University in 1938, after the loss of Nanjing in 1937 and the relocation of other famous universities such as Zhongshan from Guangdong (Lemoine 1986; Guldin 1994). At the same time it became a centre of international strategic operations.\(^4\) During the Sino-Japanese War (1937–45), Kunming was an important back-up capital for the Nationalist government at Chongqing and an air base to which American and British pilots flew supplies ‘over the hump’ from Assam.

Yunnan’s outwards-turned face has continued to be expressed in the fate of its capital in Kunming. With China’s economic reform policies since the era of Deng Xiaoping, Kunming has again become a thriving international capital with a myriad of five-class hotels, Wallmart, MacDonalds etc. The same is now occurring in smaller cities throughout the province, such as Jinghong, the sleepy capital of a Tai princedom in Sipsong Panna (Xishuangbanna)\(^5\) until the 1950s, which, since the opening of its international airport in 1991 and its integration into the ‘Greater Mekong Subregion’, has become a ‘boomtown’ (Evans 2000; Wasan 2007; White in this issue).\(^6\)

Yunnan’s modern relations with the wider world are long standing and date back to the closing years of the nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth century, the long years of the opium trade between the First Opium War of 1839–42 until the virtual ending of the official trade by international treaty in 1917. From 1856, a major revolt of the Muslims in Yunnan, known as the Panthay Rebellion, established an Islamic Sultanate with its capital at Dali, which only failed in 1873 after negotiations between the Sultan and the British broke down.\(^7\) The British and French vied for control in this resource-rich region as the borders of colonial Burma and Indochina were formed, whereas to the north the ‘Great Game’ of diplomacy and espionage, which culminated in Francis Younghusband’s notorious incursion of 1903–4 into Tibet, was being played out between Britain and Russia. The new railway between Kunming and French Indochina was finally opened in 1910. Yunnan was a very-nearly colonised place and areas like Muang Singh on the Lao border, Kokang and the Wa states on the Burmese border, even Jinghong (Keng Hung) in today’s Sipsong Panna, could have gone either way (and indeed did). During the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s, Joseph Rock, the famous Austrian–American naturalist and ethnobotanist, lived in state near Lijiang (Mattison; White in this issue), collecting samples and writing on the customs and rituals of the Naxi people (Goodman 2006). Thus,
Yunnan was, in fact, an only-just-not-colonised space and these close relationships with the outside world continue to affect it beyond the national borders of China.

After the Chinese Revolution of 1949, one of the most extraordinary social and ethnographic experiments ever undertaken in the history of the nation-state took place in China. This was the minzu shibie or ‘ethnic classification’ project of the 1950s, under which trained teams of anthropologists, linguists and historians were sent to every part of the country to research and interview local peoples in order to establish their official ‘nationalities’ (White in this issue). Anthropology, soon to be banned with all social science, seemed to come into its own during this period as a willing servant of the state; Fei Xiaotong himself led the expedition to Yunnan, which included among many others, Lin Yaohua and Wang Ningsheng, one of the contributors to this issue. Each citizen of the New China was to be allotted an ethnic status, such as Han, Dai or Tibetan, based on the four criteria outlined by Stalin for a ‘nationality’: common territory, language, economy, and psychological makeup ‘expressed in a common culture’. So much has been written about this project that it is almost unnecessary to rehearse its details again, yet continuing research means that new evidence is constantly coming to light (Yang 2009b; Mullaney et al. n.d.). Mullaney, for example, has shown how the project was a direct response to the needs of the new Chinese Constitution, according to the 1953 Election Law, for the representation in the National People’s Congress of each ‘national minority’ (minzu); the Congress was due to convene for the first time in late 1954, but could not until the number of such minzu in the country had been established (Mullaney 2004). Preliminary investigatory teams were sent to Yunnan in 1950 before the project officially began in 1954 (Yang 2009b). By May 1954, as many as 400 ethnonyms had been put forward for China as a whole, and it is significant that 260 of these came from Yunnan alone (Fei 1961; Lemoine 1989). These were eventually whittled down to only 55 nationality identities for the whole of China (to become 56 with the addition of the Jinuo in 1979), with the Han as the largest. But even today there are many smaller, unrecognised groups or people who are officially ‘waiting for classification’, numbering 880,000 in 1988 (Heberer 1989; Lemoine 1989).

This ethnic classification project signified a kind of contradiction at the heart of China’s minority policy itself. On the one hand, classic theories of social evolutionism embedded in Marxian-derived Stalinist schemes of the inevitable progression from primitive, slave, serfdom and three kinds of developed feudal modes of production have been applied to the different nationalities (so that the matriliney described by Mattison (in this issue) for the Mosuo, for example, is taken as evidence of a ‘primitive’ form of productive activity). Conversely, there has been a more neutral, relativistic demarcation of boundaries between different groups based on ethnological criteria of the type represented by the ethnic classification project itself (Tapp n.d.).

Paralleling this, policy since 1949 has wavered between phases of liberalism in which economic priorities have been paramount and phases of radicalism in which
political concerns have come first. During radical periods, such as the Great Leap Forward (1958–9) and the Cultural Revolution (1966–76), the languages, costumes, rituals and social customs of minorities were violently attacked and prohibited as vestiges of feudal or prefeudal practices. Since the ‘Open Door’ policy in 1978, China is in a phase of marked liberalism (despite temporary relapses, such as after the Tiananmen massacre in 1989 or during the run-up to the Olympics in 2008). This is linked with the attempt to create a Chinese ‘socialist market’ economy. One major aspect of this, which has affected all the peoples considered in this issue of TAPJA, has been the impact of the tourist industry, which, in 2006, accounted for 30 per cent of total foreign currency earnings in Yunnan, with related services, such as telecommunications and transport contributing to 38.5 per cent of Yunnan’s GDP (compared with 42.7 per cent from industry and 18.8 per cent from agriculture). With tourism, both domestic and international, has come a new commodification of minority culture and a new significance to being classified as the member of an ethnic minority, as we see below (Fang; Mattison in this issue).

Notions of internal colonialism and self-Orientalism have often been applied to state policy towards the minority peoples in China (Gladney 1994; Schein 2000). There are certainly senses in which the past and present of Yunnan can be seen as a vast ‘civilizing project’, as Stevan Harrell (1995) put it, in which the civilising discourse of Confucianism was succeeded by one of communism and in which the majority Han Chinese have sought to subjugate, control, educate and transform into willing subjects the members of very different societies, economies and cultures in the region, and to find in these ‘internal others’ some reflections of their own other selves.

Han immigration has been occurring into the region for a thousand years since the Ming (1368–1644) and Qing (1644–1911) dynasties and the massive explosion of the Han Chinese population from the eighteenth century (Wiens 1954; Lee 1982). It expanded through military colonies and positive policies as a way of pacifying the borderlands and exploiting the area. Individual Han men settled in minority villages in Yunnan, married minority women and started minority clans, as shown in the legends of descent from a Han father in several Hmong clans today or as Wang (in this issue) shows for the Han settlers in Wa mining districts (White in this issue). In some cases, Han settlers have perpetually married the members of other ethnic groups while retaining their sense of a Han identity and yet becoming, to the eyes of modern Han, a kind of minority themselves, as in the classic case of the Chuanqing ‘blacks’ (Fei 1961; cf. Beaud 2008). Fang’s report in this issue examines one such case. In other cases, a population of non-Han descent has become almost indistinguishable from the Han while retaining peculiarities of speech and custom, as was the case with the Min-jia population of Dali (known today as the Bai), whom Francis Hsu studied in the 1940s as a paradigm of rural Chinese identity (Hsu 1948; cf. Fitzgerald 1941).

Han immigration into minority areas was explicitly encouraged under the Guomindang (KMT) authorities who preceded the socialist revolution and, since
1949, there have been several periods when mass immigration into the area was encouraged, from the pioneer settlers of the 1950s to the urban intellectuals of the 1960s (Hansen 2005). In other formerly non-Han areas, such as Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang, this has resulted in the previous majority becoming a minority within their own terrain, and it has been said that the past of Inner Mongolia and the present of Xinjiang is the future of Tibet (Thierry 1989). In Yunnan this can be seen most clearly in the case of the Sipsong Panna (Evans 2000; Wasan 2007), until 1949 an area almost exclusively occupied by the Tai (Dai) and other ‘minority’ peoples. Whereas the Han accounted for 2.3 per cent of the population in 1950, now at least one-third of the population is Han, with the Dai accounting only for another one-third and other peoples for the remainder (Evans 2000).

Although there was an inevitable historical process of Sinicisation as local southern people adopted Han customs and manners (Schafer [1967] claimed the entire population of southern China was of aboriginal descent), at the same time some Han merged into local populations and became closely allied with, or indeed indistinguishable from, them. Into this historical long-term process of a gradual blending and incorporation of distinct cultural influences came the explicit minorities policy of the Chinese Government, formalised in the Regional Autonomy Law of 1954 and reaffirmed and expanded in 1984 (Tapp 1995). This policy had the effect (like other colonial interventions) of freezing and rigidifying long-term processes of ethnic assimilation and accommodation. This official policy guarantees the integrity of minority languages and scripts, makes special provisions for autonomy in areas (regions/provinces, cities, counties or rural townships) where a minority population accounts for a certain percentage and allocates special funds for relief to areas categorised as ‘backward’ or impoverished. Yet, as is often remarked, these policies are laxly implemented and real autonomy is hard to find. A process of political and cultural Chinese domination continues as minorities have tended, overall, to reject their traditional languages and customs and adopt the emblems of modernity instead.

However, recent work (Blum 2001; Hansen 2005; Beaud 2008) has placed more emphasis on understanding the details of these processes of Han immigration into minority regions, not seeing the Han as a monolithic entity or as necessarily representatives of the state, examining important differences between different kinds of settlers.10 Research on the minorities too has tended to move away from an exclusive focus on state–society oppositions, as indeed from ‘Han/other’ dichotomies, towards a more nuanced understanding of the complexities of identifications in localities and the interrelations formed between local people without necessary regard for state intervention (Conference on Ethnicity, Politics and Cross-Border Cultures in Southwest China: Past and Present, Lund University, 25–28 May 2000; Hansen 2005; Guo 2008; Fang; Wang in this issue).

The problems inherent in past approaches of focusing on officially demarcated ‘ethnic minorities’ in an isolating way have been matched in the development of Chinese anthropology itself by a sharp split between a sociology that has specialised
in the study of Han society and *minzuixue* or ethnology that has remained almost entirely focused on the study of minority peoples (despite voices raised against this from within China since the early 1980s); these divisions are academically deeply embedded and instituted and it is hard to overcome them. Nevertheless, after the burgeoning of minority studies in China over the past 22 years (Blum 2002), and as several of the articles in this issue of the Journal show, there is more and more interest in the hybridities and complexities of ethnic identification in the province and the category of ‘Han’ itself has recently come under severe historical interrogation (Rawski 1996; Mullaney et al. n.d.).

Under the policy of positive discrimination towards minorities, the perceived advantages of being a minority led to many claims and registrations of minority identity by the children of mixed marriages or Han. Minority population increased by 68.6 per cent, as opposed to 43.8 per cent for the Han, between 1964 and 1982 (Aird 1983; Hsu 1993), and from 67 million in 1982 to 91 million by 1990; there is no doubt that false claims of identity, adoptions and mixed marriages where parents chose the minority status for themselves or their children played a major part in what was taken to be this alarming rise (Gladney 2004, p. 22). It is fair to say that throughout the 1960s and 1970s the ethnic minorities were regarded as backwards and primitive and in need of assistance in order to progress according to the Han model of modernity, but with the impact of tourism since 1985 official state and non-state images of minorities have changed. They now display a deep contradiction between the need to paint the minority regions as backwards in order to attract development assistance from agencies such as the Ford Foundation and the Fupinban (Poverty Alleviation offices under the State Council), and new calls to preserve their ‘unique customs and culture’ in the manner of museum antiquities and, of course, for the purpose of attracting tourist revenues. Into this is now playing a new politics of national heritage, reported in Yunnan particularly well for Lijiang, Dali and Zhongdian (Hillman 2003; Notar 2007). A new exoticisation and sexualisation of minority representations has flourished (Gladney 1994; White in this issue) following the ‘culture fever’ (*wenhua re*) in China of the early 1980s as forms of cultural consumption challenge and vie with economic consumption. So, economic development cuts both ways for the *shaoshu minzu* (minority ethnicities); as MacKerras (2003) argues, in some ways globalisation is currently leading to a new strengthening of local minority identities and cultures, and yet this is often not within their own control.12

Local festivals have been entirely reinvented by officials to attract tourists (Hillman 2003), ritual forms, such as the Dongba pictographs and shamanism of the Naxi people, have been revived as objects of academic study and tourist attraction (Jackson 1989; Pan 1995; Hsu & Oppitz 1998; White in this issue) and whole localities have been refugured to accord with well-known movies and novels for the same purposes, as Notar (2007) shows most notably for the Bai region of Dali. As against the ‘freezing’ effects of previous minority policy and the general tendency to move away from particularistic local identities towards a more inclusive
modernity, this re-evaluation of ethnic and local cultural values is leading to the emergence of new forms of identity and more complex processes of ethnic interaction and rapprochement than were seen during the years of high socialism before the 1980s (Tapp 2002).

Yunnan remains one of the poorest provinces in China and social inequality there is increasing rapidly. Census data show strong correlations between low levels of literacy, income and health with the ethnic minority regions: 257 of 592 of the poorest counties were ethnic minority autonomous counties in 2005 (Bhalla & Qiu 2006). However, more than half of China's ethnic minorities never lived in the formally designated ethnic minority areas that are the main recipients of aid targeted at ethnic minorities (only 45 per cent of ethnic minorities lived in minority areas even in 1998; Bhalla & Qiu 2006). Moreover, a large proportion of the population of many of these areas were not ethnic minorities at all (much less than half in three of the five main minority autonomous regions). The 'floating population' of individual migrants in China now exceeds 150 million by some estimates and new processes of migration and mobility are drawing villagers from their rural homes across Yunnan and other parts of the south to the cities in search of mostly temporary work (Zhang 2003; Fiskesjö in this issue). As a result, officially designated minority areas become even more denuded of actual minority peoples. At the same time, the floating population includes more and more Han adventure-seekers attracted to the minority areas to look for work and status, leading to increased ethnic tensions and clashes, as seen recently in both Xinjiang and Tibet. Commodities in some cases can act as an index of these disruptive external influences, as in the case of hard liquor among the Wa (Fiskesjö in this issue).

The papers in this issue of the Journal, although by no means aiming at a comprehensive overview of ethnicity or the changing economy in Yunnan, all reflect and throw light on different aspects of this complicated relationship between economic development and ethnicity. They reflect on processes of cultural consumption, tourism, cultural commodification and trading relationships with others, internal solidarity, kinship networks and their changes, and show the symbolic importance of particular goods, such as beer or tea, in informing processes of internal solidarity and competition, as well as demarcating ethnic boundaries (Fiskesjö; Li in this issue). Economic flows of goods tend increasingly to define local places and groups, and the articles in this issue reflect that.

Two papers in this issue consider the Wa people and another the Ang, who are all Austroasiatic speakers. Two others consider the related Naxi and Mosuo peoples of the Lijiang and Yongning areas, whereas Fang looks at a border Han community that has intermarried extensively with Burmese, Dai and others (Figure 1 locates the study sites considered in the papers in this issue). Almost all the papers take as much account of historical circumstances as they do of current conditions. This reflects not only the general importance of historical understandings in anthropology, but also the deep appeals to history inscribed in the landscape of Chinese
society and the extraordinary rate of social change over the past century, which any contemporaneous account must incorporate. The male literati identity White talks of for the Naxi and their acceptance of a Confucian ideology, for instance, has parallels in Fang’s account of the people of Tongcheng. These are not just matters of history. We need to know that until the mid-twentieth century the tea trade was dominated by Dai villagers in Dehong and the Sipsong Panna who purchased it through instituted relationships with upland minorities, such as the Ang and Wa. It is helpful to know of the enormous and incessant interest of Chinese ethnographers throughout the 1950s and 1960s in the matrilineal customs of the Mosuo, which they saw as genuine proof of Morgan’s theories of social evolution, resulting in countless films and reports. Wang also shows the historic importance of Han economic relationships with the non-Han, reflected on also by Fiskesjö and Fang. The general interest in history by anthropologists of China’s periphery reflected in these papers has been matched by recent work by historians that has paid considerable attention to ethnic issues along the frontiers of the traditional Chinese state as part of a general movement to shake off previously Han-dominated paradigms of Chinese history (Rawski 1996; Lipman 1998; Elliott 2001; Crossley, Siu, & Sutton 2006; Giersch 2006; Leibold 2007). Altogether, the papers show something of the complexities with which ethnic minorities in Yunnan today engage with China’s rapidly evolving market economy in diverse ways within the overarching context of a socialist state.

While White shows how the petty and long-distance traders of the Lijiang region became mostly peasants after collectivisation, the same has happened for the Ang tea producers described by Li. Markets have now returned, with far-reaching implications for changes and new rapprochements in ethnic minority identities and interrelationships as ethnicity intertwines with class and locality. Under economic reform, the petty commodity economy that was such a striking feature of China’s rural past (Gates 1997) has been revived, and with it the activities of many ethnic minorities who were involved in trading activities and, importantly, maintained relationships with other groups through such activities. Markets mean movement; in traditional China, local villagers travelled to the periodic markets well described by Skinner (1964a, 1964b, 1965), whereas merchants and brokers travelled between them or further afield. In a way, the freezing isolating effects of a socialist policy of ethnic classification combined with collectivised production and a system of state distribution have been reversed by the new economic reforms that have allowed villagers to move again into the trading activities formerly disallowed or monopolised by state entities.

Notes

[1] Indeed, views of Yunnan should play an important part in historical efforts to link China’s history more firmly with that of world history, as in views of the Enlightenment revolution in consumption habits (Clunas 1999; Brook 2008).
I give official modern terms for groups in parentheses. In some cases, such as Miao for Hmong or Yi for Nosu, the official terms include a great number of other groups in addition to those referred to here. The older name for the Tai/Dai was Pai-I (Baiyi).

See also Tapp 2000.

See Chiao (1987) on Radcliffe-Brown's lectures at Yanjing, from where many of these scholars came.

I give the Tai pronunciation from which the official Chinese term derives.

Comprising China, Burma, Laos, Vietnam, Thailand and Cambodia.

In 1872, the Sultan dispatched a mission to London to plead for intervention with Queen Victoria after negotiations with the British in India.

These include more than twenty-two groups such as the Khmu, Mang, Kucong and Jews (see Heberer 1989; Lemoine 1989; Mackerras 2003).

See the 2008 Yunnan Statistical Yearbook, which indicates that tourism accounts for approximately 12 per cent of provincial GDP.

Even in the eighteenth century periods such distinctions were important; see, for example, Lombard-Salmon (1972) on the distinction in Guizhou between the earliest settlers (laohan, the 'old Han') and later ones (kejianmin, 'guest people')

Lijiang (Mattison; White in this issue) received recognition as a UNESCO world cultural heritage site. For an account of the legal controversy surrounding the attempt to list a kind of hybrid Naxi music as a 'living fossil' under the intangible heritage programme, see Doar (2005). See also Bai (2001) on Dali.

As Guo (2008, p. 156) notes, for example, 'Because ethnic tourism hinges on the Mosuo culture, the preservation of a woman-centered society is crucial for sustaining economic prosperity'.

References


Figure 1 Yunnan Showing Location of the Research Areas of Authors in this Issue. Prepared by Kay Dancey, CAP Cartography Unit, The Australian National University.