Marginality and Subjectivity in the Haitian Diaspora

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Collective subjectivity refers to the way that people define their group’s essence and represent it to others. Marginality is the predicament of ambiguous belonging. For members of transnational diasporas, subjectivity grows out of the experience of marginalization and unstable relations of difference in the dominant society where they currently, if temporarily, live. This article traces the marginalization of Haitians living in Guadeloupe, French West Indies, and the forms of subjectivity that they elaborate as a response. By contrasting the experience of Haitians living in Guadeloupe, the Dominican Republic, and the United States, it shows that diasporic subjectivity is locally produced. Guadeloupeans interpellate Haitians through a binary framework of citizen/non-citizen, which justifies legal harassment and violent extrusion. But they also regard Haitians as more authentic Caribbeans, in contrast to Guadeloupeans’ rapid assimilation to French norms. Haitians respond to their marginality through discourses of group identity which comment upon, resist, but also accommodate the ways they are interpellated. Comparisons with other expatriate Haitians shows that the subjectivity of this enclave is calibrated more to Guadeloupean realities than to the dislocated signs and practices of the Haitian diaspora. [Subjectivity, marginality, diaspora, Haitians, French West Indies]
What forms of subjectivity emerge in contemporary diasporas, and can anthropologists discern them through single-site ethnography? Diasporas are defined, of course, by the cultural connections and flows that knit together a single geographically dispersed group. The Jewish historical experience, regarded by many as an ideal type, involved a sprawling social world of interlinked practices, families, travel circuits, and dreams of return to the homeland. Contemporary diaspora groups, especially refugees or immigrants living in expatriate minority enclaves, constitute themselves through non-local configurations of people, media, capital, information, and political ideologies (Appadurai 1996, Rouse 1991). The phrases which appear again and again in this literature—"the cultural bifocality of displaced and mobile collectivities, spread across a variety of sites, and maintained by multi-stranded social relations"—imply two separate analytics about diasporic subjectivity.

According to one influential viewpoint, the tension of "living here and remembering/desiring another place" (Clifford 1997: 255) determines how people construct the identity of their diasporic group: how they map its boundaries, invest in it materially and emotionally, and construct its difference from other groups. Collective identity depends on the politics of location, and the location of diasporas is (by definition) plural, fragmented, dynamic, and open. In these circumstances, the structures of feeling about group affiliation differ fundamentally from those arising in geographically bounded settings. If culture is regarded as the property of a spatially localized people, its collective self-representation seems to emerge out of bounded, everyday, face-to-face interactions. By contrast, people leading non or supra-local lives organize their sense of collective identity in fundamentally different ways. They may cultivate a myth about their lost homeland, and on that basis generate the criteria for ethnic inclusion and exclusion (Safran 1991). They may travel back and forth in a transnational family network, pursue parallel life strategies in two (or more) places at once, and thereby refigure older notions of national identity (Schiller and Fouron 2001). They may find themselves thrown on the defensive by shifting politics in their homeland and forced to craft entirely novel and hybrid tropes of self-definition (Gross et al. 1996).

The second analytic about diasporic subjectivity situates it in people’s response to their present and immediate surroundings, instead of their globalized exchanges, memories and desires. It grows from the general insight that subject formation depends on processes of both exclusion and agency, both “othering” and self-fashioning. “There are two meanings to the word subject,” Foucault wrote, “subject to someone else by control and dependence, and tied to his own
identity by a conscience or self-knowledge” (1983: 212, see also Gupta and Ferguson 1997). The two meanings are intimately related to each other, since we arrive at self-knowledge through (and even in the same terms as) particular experiences of external control. Stuart Hall makes a similar argument in his parsing of the word “identity.” Dominant discourses and practices interpellate us—hail us into place as particular social subjects—and thereby produce our subjectivity. Identities are not the pure products of self-fashioning, but instead positions that we are obliged to take up in a determinate social world. We may know or suspect that they are representations constructed by others, but nonetheless we invest in the particular position, recognize ourselves in it, and identify with it (Hall 1996).

Members of a given diasporic enclave within a larger dominant society are both agents with the capacity to author their (dislocated) lives and “subjects” fixed into place by surrounding structures and discourses (see Mankekar 1994). Privileging their agency leads to the usual emphasis on globally-circulating signs and practices as the medium of diasporic subjectivity. (At worst, it leads to celebrations of hybridity and dislocated identity as ipso facto resistant.) By contrast, privileging the way people are forced to occupy determinate subject positions highlights the experience of marginality and exclusions where a particular group currently (if temporarily) resides. The first analytic about diasporic subjectivity is attractive because it promises a clean break with anthropology’s myopic focus on the local. It regards the production of subjectivity as itself a work of agency and imagination, which all members of a particular diaspora carry out in roughly the same way. According to the first analytic, Haitians in Guadeloupe, Santo Domingo, New York, or Montreal constitute themselves as a single social formation in supra-local terms. Their subjectivity emerges out of the same set of globally-circulating rhetorics, musical forms, religious practices, political projects, etc.

The second analytic, however, enables a different ethnographic analysis of diasporic subjectivity. For people who travel from resource-poor societies to the metropolises of the developed world, collective self-definition is often a practical response to concrete, near-at-hand experiences of subordination and marginality. It emerges in a particular place, even as it accommodates their global conditions of life (cf. Olwig 1997). Undoubtedly, the vehicles of diasporic subjectivity are ideas, people, money and media that circulate in transnational space. But people weave them into a singular rhetoric about their group’s identity chiefly when they confront the situation immediately at hand, and it is often a harrowing situation of marginality and racialized stigma. According to the
second analytic, Haitian migrants living in separate national societies develop significantly different notions of their groups’ essential characteristics.

This article follows the second analytic of diasporic subjectivity sketched above. I argue that the collective identity of Haitians living in Guadeloupe, French West Indies, emerges less from their travel across borders than from their daily experience of marginalization on the streets of Pointe-à-Pitre (the island’s main commercial city) and in the imagination of their literal neighbors, Guadeloupe’s Black French citizens. Recalling that identity is a relationship of difference, I situate the collective identity of this diasporic enclave in the ways Haitians engage Guadeloupean society and conceptualize their place in it. Viewed from the other direction (from the standpoint of the dominant society), Guadeloupeans fabricate their own collective self-representation by using Haitians as a foil. The Afro-Caribbean residents of Guadeloupe alternate between admiration and contempt as they discuss the attributes of the Haitians living in their midst. But in either case, they employ the category “Haitian” as an imagined locus of the cultural authenticity and pride which they are afraid of losing in their rapid assimilation to French norms. This article uses ethnography in single location to trace the origins of diasporic subjectivity in local processes of structural and symbolic marginalization. The conclusion demonstrates the local production of subjectivity by contrasting the discourses of identity developed by Haitians living in Guadeloupe, the Dominican Republic, and the United States.

Marginality of Haitians in Guadeloupe
About 24,000 Haitians live in Guadeloupe, an overseas department of France located in the eastern Caribbean (INSEE 1999). They constitute a small minority enclave that is subject to economic and legal discrimination. As non-citizens, they remain vulnerable to arrest and deportation under French immigration law. The constant threat affects their use of urban space, and it produces their residential and economic exclusion. Moreover, Haitians are stigmatized because of the place they occupy in the local social taxonomy: what they are made to represent in the collective imagination of Guadeloupeans. Their experience of state-imposed and discursive marginality is the grounds for their collective self-representations. At one level, they press claims to full legal incorporation as citizens or documented residents. At another level, however, they self-consciously elaborate the position of cultural outsider in order to defend against their symbolic denigration and to criticize the dominant exclu-
sionary norms. Although Haitian migrants wish to obtain the proper residency papers, they also stereotype their own cultural distinctiveness in order to underscore the cultural weakness of Guadeloupe and its dependency on France, and many Guadeloupéans agree with their critique. Out of these multiples responses to marginalization emerges a distinctive subjectivity in this node of the global Haitian diaspora.2

The importance of marginality to my argument demands a brief genealogy of the term. By definition, marginal groups occupy an unequal and disadvantaged position within common fields of knowledge and power (Tsing 1993: xi). They are excluded from full participation in social life despite their normative claims of equality and sentiments of belonging (see Germani 1980). The classic literature begins with the predicament of ambiguous belonging, but it then develops general models of marginality that are based on quite specific cases or historical types. For Simmel (1908/1950), traders who settle in a foreign society provide the core example of marginality: fundamentally mobile persons who are not “organically connected through established ties of kinship, loyalty or occupation” with members of the surrounding society (p. 404). From this single illustrative case, Simmel builds his theory of categorical strangers, their enlightened objectivity, their tendency to be treated as generic outsiders, and their vulnerability to scapegoating. Robert Park (1937/1950) favors a different definitional example: groups who live on the margins of two (often antagonistic) societies. His typical case is the hybrid individual (in his words, Eurasian, Mulatto, or partially assimilated Jew), a historical product of large-scale migration or imperialism, who is not “willing to break, even if he were permitted to do so, with his past and his traditions, and not quite accepted, because of racial prejudice, in the new society in which he now [seeks] to find a place”(p. 354). This ideal type underlies Park’s characterization of the generic ‘marginal man’ as a sophisticated cosmopolitan who is gripped by inner turmoil and distressing self-consciousness.

Mid-twentieth century American social science featured debates over another influential ideal type of marginality: traditional enclaves within modernizing cities which yet remain unintegrated with urban institutions and whose residents are politically apathetic, anomic, and socially disorganized (as evidenced by violent crime, family breakdown, etc.). Perlman (1976) criticized this “myth of marginality” by reference to poor rural-to-urban migrants living as squatters in Rio de Janeiro. Based on her intensive case study, Perlman argued that marginality in general is a form of material domination: a dependent position within hierarchically-ranked groups which is enforced by active rejection from
the labor market and other opportunities of city life. Several contemporary studies also rely on case studies of Latin American urban squatters to build general theories of marginality as enforced inequality and dependence (e.g., Vélez-Ibañez 1983; Byrne 1999 provides a recent restatement of this view).

Marginality clearly refers to several distinct but overlapping social conditions, some of which describe the Haitian diaspora in Guadeloupe. This group is the product of large-scale migration; Haitians are urban dwellers who yet do not benefit from local opportunities and are treated as disloyal outsiders; and they occupy a liminal position between their homeland, Guadeloupe, and the United States, the preferred next stage in their transnational trajectory. However, in the classic literature about settled traders, hybrid individuals, and urban squatters, marginal and mainstream groups belong to the same nation-state. Fundamental questions of citizenship or a shared future in the same national space are rarely raised, and therefore the classic models cannot fully account for the predicament of current-day transnational diasporic groups, especially migrants from developing societies now living in North American or European cities. Such groups are marginalized precisely because of their chronic state of divided allegiance, and their experience differs according to their histories of migration and incorporation into new societies.

The current global diaspora of Haitians began in the early 1960s with the exodus of the political enemies of ‘president for life’ Francois Duvalier along with other members of the middle and upper class. By 1972, a broader cross-section of Haitian society had begun to leave due to worsening economic deprivation and political repression. The second wave of migration has continued until today, waxing and waning in accordance with political events at home as well as immigration policies abroad. Haitian migrants typically face poverty, formal and informal discrimination, and outright hostility in the societies where they settle (Lawless 1992). Like other transnational groups, Haitians do not resemble immigrant minorities which have permanently ruptured with their collective pasts or labor migrants with ticket in hand for the return home (Basch et al.: 4).

They establish new enclaved communities at a symbolic distance from the receiving society, and they organize new forms of connectedness with kin, friends, and business and political partners throughout the diaspora.

The enclave in Guadeloupe resembles other Haitian transnational communities (see Stepick 1998, Laguerre1998). Of the approximately 25,000 Haitians now living in Guadeloupe, almost all were born in Haiti, the majority hope to move eventually to the USA or Canada, and those holding current visas and work permits travel in a wide circuit between Guadeloupe, Haiti, other
Caribbean nations, France, and the United States. The Haitian community in Guadeloupe has an ephemeral, unstable quality and a range of possible futures (cf. Glick-Schiller et al. 1987). It may persist in its present form as a loosely organized group of undocumented workers, continually replenished by new arrivals from Haiti. Segments of this population may eventually gain French citizenship or disappear over time through individual re-settlement in the USA or deportation back to Haiti (the fate in 1995 of the former Haitian community on St. Martin, an offshore dependency of Guadeloupe).5

The marginalization of Haitians in Guadeloupe dates from their arrival on the island in the mid-1970s. Haitians originally came as cane cutters in the midst of a bitter struggle over unionization in the declining Guadeloupean sugar industry (Hurbon 1983). Without their knowledge, Haitian men were used as strikebreakers by the owners of sugar plantations, and in 1975 they became the target of violent opposition (including lynch mobs) led by pro-union Guadeloupans. Although the violence was quickly quelled by progressive politicians and Catholic activists, it left an enduring image of Haitians as opportunistic foreigners opposed to the interest of the ordinary citizen of French Guadeloupe (and it also made many Haitians reflexively distrustful of Guadeloupans). In the 1980s, Haitian immigration increased from the relatively controlled deployment of poorly paid agricultural workers to a wave of small merchants and unskilled laborers who came without documentation or who remained after their visa expired. The majority of today’s Haitian community in Pointe-à-Pitre belongs to this migration wave.6 Most of the men work in the construction industry as masons or laborers, and most women become comerceantes (in Haitian Creole, madan sara): traveling vendors of agricultural produce, clothing, and household goods.

All the Haitians I spoke with in Guadeloupe would prefer to have their papers in order, but the twists and turns in French immigration policy create enormous difficulties (see Hargreaves 1995). Their first decade on the island gave Haitian migrants a false sense of security. The sugar workers of the mid-1970s had legitimate short-term labor contracts, and up until 1981, any Haitian with a valid passport and return ticket could legally enter Guadeloupe simply by leaving a cash deposit at the airport immigration office. They received a one-month visa, and through timely visits to the sub-prefecture in Pointe-à-Pitre, they could eventually renew it for periods of three months or one year. During this period, Haitians benefited from Mitterand’s general amnesty for immigrants who had illegally settled in France. Those with a steady job and proven date of entry could easily obtain ten-year residence permits. However, exclu-
sionary rhetoric started to rise in metropolitan France in the early 1970’s, and when the center-right took control of the government in 1993, Interior Minister Charles Pasqua promptly announced the goal of “zero immigration.” The “Pasqua laws” (les lois Pasqua) tightened entry requirements, increased identity checks, and sharply restricted access to residency permits. They also authorized deportations without judicial review on the broad grounds of threats to public order. In Guadeloupe, these deportations involve strong-arm tactics such as arrests at night and forced entry into private homes (GISTI 1996: 133).

How Haitians try to become regularized thus depends on how and when they entered Guadeloupe. Those who arrived before 1981, recalling Mitterand’s amnesty policy, feel entitled to legal residency. They carefully guard their Haitian passports and their receipts for visa renewals and asylum applications. With these documents in hand, they try continue to apply for residency cards at the immigration office in Pointe-à-Pitre, but are almost invariably turned away. Immigration officials tell them that an expired passport is insufficient, or that they must obtain their visa first from the French embassy in Haiti, or that a labor contract is needed, or that periods of undocumented residency disqualify them for regularization, etc. Haitians who arrived after 1981 or with false papers often follow up another provision in French law. They try to obtain a family residence card by marrying or having a child with a French citizen or convincing a citizen to adopt a child born in Haiti. Several people referred to this strategy with the popular saying ‘Every Guadeloupean has his Haitian.’

State-Imposed Marginality: Ethnography of an Immigration Raid

For the above reasons, between 60% and 80% of Haitians in Pointe-à-Pitre lack proper citizenship or residency papers, according to Haitian priests and activists as well as Guadeloupean lawyers and social workers. Their uncertain legal status creates a fundamental insecurity in everyday life, and it drives their political, economic, and residential marginalization. An immigration sweep I witnessed one evening suggests how such threats are the grounds for the group’s diasporic subjectivity. During research I joined the Church of God of Prophecy, an all-Haitian Pentecostal church in Pointe-à-Pitre (see Brodwin
2003). I attended worship services and frequently traveled to revivals co-sponsored with other local Haitian congregations. Arriving after dark at one revival in June 1996, our van pulled into a long gravel driveway already cluttered with parked cars and trucks. Members of three Haitian churches milled about in front of the revival tent waiting for the service to begin. The area was poorly lit by a single weak street lamp, and most people, preoccupied with greeting friends and watching over their children, initially did not notice the two Guadeloupean men, each with a side arm and a vest emblazoned “Police,” moving quietly but briskly through the crowd. They talked quickly to several people chosen randomly in the crowd, before beginning to interrogate Claude Antoine, a member of the Church of God who had driven with us. After a few questions, the police led Claude away, pushing to one side someone who tried to speak with him, and escorted him to the back of an unmarked car where two other Haitian church members were already sitting.

The police worked unobtrusively for a few more minutes, with no one raising their voices in question or protest. After they returned to their car and backed it onto the main road, one of the police got out and confronted the driver of our van, another church member in his mid-twenties named Marc Doricent. Speaking sharply in Guadeloupean Creole, instead of the official and more respectful French, he demanded Marc’s papers. Without emotion, Marc reached into his briefcase and handed over the passport, but then the police demanded his residence card. Marc gave it to him, and the policeman, still dissatisfied, asked to see his driver’s license, and summarily told him it was out of date and that he did not have the right to drive. At this point, Marc’s deference vanished and he started to argue, but the police simply raised their voices and repeated that he could not legally drive in Guadeloupe and must come to the police headquarters in two days at 8 am. Confiscating his license, the police drove away with the three Haitians they had arrested still sitting in the back.

Extremely shaken, Marc returned to the small group of us standing by his van, where one middle-aged woman was repeating that she had no idea what was happening until it was nearly over. Another said this was the first time she had seen such a thing with her own eyes, and then urgently asked in rapid succession, Why did the police decide to ask Claude for his papers? Why did they conduct their raid tonight? Did someone in the neighborhood tip them off? A young man related that a few days ago, the French immigration service had stopped Claude from boarding a flight to Montreal. He had a valid visa for Canada but an outdated Haitian passport, and he was forced to return to his house. Did the police put Claude’s name in a computer and then follow him
here? In lieu of an answer, the first woman simply said, ‘I always carry my papers with me! I never forget them!’

Marc and I left the heated discussion and joined the Haitian pastors standing with a few others on the edge of the crowd. Their mood was pained and dismayed as they struggled with people’s concerns. Will they return Claude? ‘Probably not,’ Pastor Cantave, the head of the Church of God of Prophecy, answered ruefully, ‘the guy’s not legal’ (msye pa an règ). Will the police come back after the service, now that they know where to find us? ‘No,’ said another pastor, ‘they’ve already had their full’ (yo deja pran manje yo). They vehemently objected to Marc’s treatment, asserting that the police can make him renew the license, but they cannot confiscate it outright. ‘But you know, this is France,’ said one pastor, shaking his head from side to side. Arresting people in front of their revival rankled the pastors even more. They don’t have the right to enter the church, said Cantave, so instead they come right up next to it. Yes, one woman bitterly agreed, they do this in front of the door of the house of God,

The speculations and anguished debates about these events ultimately lasted several weeks. To begin with, people were shocked that the raid targeted a meeting of Haitian Pentecostal churches. About half of all Haitians in Guadeloupe have become Pentecostal. These congregations offer the only formal institutional affiliation available to undocumented migrants. The pastors are all legally resident Haitians, and their churches are registered at the Prefecture. The pastors therefore have the right to visit their congregants who wait in jail before deportation, an opportunity denied to family or friends. Besides boosting morale, these visits address practical concerns about the recuperation of money and belongings. Moreover, because of the residential dispersal of migrants, Pentecostal churches are the only all-Haitian spaces in the city, and they offer a place to speak Haitian Creole freely and a source of job tips, friends, and even marriage partners. Because their parent denominations have implanted similar churches throughout the Caribbean and North America, Haitian missionaries and pastors routinely travel from Guadeloupe to Haiti and other transnational communities (For example, the Church of God of Prophecy has congregations serving Haitians in Miami, New York, and Boston). The regional Pentecostal network offers a low-cost and trustworthy conduit to circulate money, cassette tapes, and letters between dispersed friends and families and hence to maintain transnational linkages (see Richman 1992a: 67ff). Launching an immigration raid at a Pentecostal revival thus threatens one of the major staging grounds of the Haitian transnational community (see Brodwin 2003 and Stepick 1998: 85).
People’s reactions to the raid also emerged from their broad personal experience with legal marginalization. Most Haitians I spoke with knew a relative, friend, or neighbor who had been deported. People often described the difficulties faced by those without papers: the reluctance to seek official aid or even to enter a government office and the pervasive anxiety that makes them “sleep with one eye open.” The threat of deportation also alters how people inhabit urban space. The immigration police typically raid areas with a high concentration of Haitians, such as construction sites and outdoor markets. Consequently, Haitian migrants do not linger to socialize after work, and some people without jobs prefer never to leave the alleys near their home. Some people try to move every few months to avoid arrest. Summing up the situation, one man told me “It makes you never want to go outside,” and he illustrated his point by squeezing his shoulders together, arms held tightly to his sides, and glancing around him in a caricature of a hunted animal.

Haitians deeply resent their treatment, but they do not assert a blanket claim to rightful residence in Guadeloupe. I heard no one argue that their hostile reception in the 1970’s incurred a moral obligation to grant them citizenship, or that the sheer wealth of the French Antilles compels it to welcome migrants coming from a far poorer nation. People usually denounce not the injustice of deportations in the abstract, but rather the particular way they are carried out. The police take those arrested to a detention center at the central Raizet airport and then expel them within two days. Leslie Adrien, a 23-year-old Haitian man, provides the most common scenario: ‘They take you right to the airport, and you’re forced to leave in your dirty clothes. They don’t let you go back to your house to recover your belongings or to ask your boss for the money you’re owed.’ Pierre Salnave, a 42-year-old Haitian with a valid French 10-year residence card, explains the resulting stigma:

Haitians feel shame when they’re sent back from Guadeloupe. They arrive with an old pair of pants, a dirty shirt, they don’t have anything with them, and this is how they return to their family. What is their family thinking? That they spent so much time in the other country, and have only this to show for it?

The stigma of dirty clothes and meager belongings figured in every conversation about deportation because it threatens an important diaspora ideal. Deportation destroys not only one’s own economic prospects, but also one’s reputation as a solid provider and a bridgehead for other family members to
move abroad. In the ideal migration trajectory, one leaves the country poor but ambitious, finds work and supports dependents back home, and returns to Haiti for a visit with the visible marks of financial success (expensive clothing and gifts). Returning as ragged and penniless deportee demolishes this scenario; hence, virtually everyone singles out being denied showers and a change of clothes as the most objectionable aspects of deportation.

Depending on their economic circumstances, Haitians do not necessarily fear returning to homeland. Leslie Adrien explained the situation to me as we sat in his sparsely furnished one-room home in a popular neighborhood wedged between a busy road and a newly built apartment complex. The neighborhood, a remnant of early 20th Century Pointe-à-Pitre, consists of a few narrow alleyways lined by the wooden colonial-era *cases créoles*, a once-ubiquitous housing style occupied now by only the poorest Guadeloupans and migrants from Haiti and Dominica. The city already plans to raze this area and construct concrete public housing blocks (the *Habitations à Loyer Modéré* or HLM), typical of urban zones in metropolitan France. Without citizenship papers, Leslie will not qualify for an apartment in the HLM, and he will probably move to another part of the city or to a squatter settlement in the abandoned sugar fields on the city’s edge. Arriving in Guadeloupe during the economic downturn of the mid-1990’s, Leslie has never been able to count on construction work more than a few days per week (let alone a long-term labor contract), and undocumented workers like him do not dare protest low or withheld wages. After recounting his options, Leslie told me plainly that he would rather be in Haiti. He has entered a downward spiral of economic and residential marginality that benefits neither him nor his dependents in the homeland. In his case, structural marginality has become *de facto* extrusion, and no personal loyalties or dreams of assimilation impel him to stay in Guadeloupe.

To survive the interwoven forms of marginalization, Haitians learn how to gauge their vulnerability in different arenas of everyday life. The immigration raid at the Pentecostal revival confirmed people’s impression that police target them when their guard is down. In the summer of 1996, I heard of several Haitian men arrested as they arrived at construction sites in the morning or as they left after a full day’s work. Police also interrogate people on the streets near their homes, and those who have lived in Guadeloupe since the early 1980’s seem especially at risk. Such individuals have grown less vigilant over the years, and many of them (wrongly) believe that they are entitled to legal residence. Like the people arrested in front of the revival, they assume a level of protection they do not actually enjoy. The Haitian transnational community here has
not entered the middle-class; hence it does not have its own legal advocates or mass media outlets to educate people about immigration law. A state-regulated mutual assistance agency occasionally helps undocumented Haitian members gain residency cards, but only a few Haitians are willing to pay the membership fees. In the mid-1990s, Têt Kole, an advocacy organization founded in Haiti by supporters of then-President Aristide, had a small office in Pointe-à-Pitre, but many Haitians regarded its political activities as too remote from their daily lives.

The need for concealment creates a pervasive anxiety about personal security in everyday life. Migrants compared their plight to being caught in a well-laid trap. They know that despite all precautions, they can easily be arrested and deported without appeal, and they describe the risk in tones of resigned inevitability. In the weeks following the arrests at the Pentecostal revival, church members privately criticized the police’s surreptitious methods and their habits of bending the law as they please. For these reasons, most people do not bother to contest expulsions. Occasionally, however, people do protests less extreme types of harassment and disrespect. For example, Haitian market women verbally resist the municipal police who force them to move the makeshift stalls they set up on the sidewalks in the downtown shopping district. One woman described what she typically tells police, “I say, give me a place to sell! I live here, I had my children here, now they’re at school. They [the police] say they can’t give me a place to sell my things. But if they let us in the country, they should let us work.” Her complaint not only makes the limited claim to pursue her livelihood in peace. It also points out the contradictions of Guadeloupean immigration policy that invited Haitian workers during the labor shortages of the late 1970s and 1980s, but then hounded them out in the tight economy of the 1990s. Indeed, Haitians have developed a good sense of the local and supra-local processes that maintain their marginality. Most people connect the shifting climate for undocumented migrants to both local economic forces and the policies of successive French administrations. They recall the immigration crackdown when Jacques Chirac took office in 1993 and compare their own situation to the widely reported expulsions of undocumented Maghrebian and Black Africans in metropolitan France in the mid-1990s (Freedman and Tarr 2000).

The French administrative apparatus in Guadeloupe interpellates Haitian migrants as disposable non-citizens who deserve neither a future nor a comfortable present on the island. Haitians’ collective self-representations are calibrated to this particular form of marginality. They diagnose their predicament through striking images of abject subjectivity: a hunted animal, caught in a well-laid trap,
or the failed transnational migrant who is sent back home dirty and shame-faced. The images recall one aspect of the definition of subjectivity from Foucault and Hall: the social position one is forced to occupy in dependence upon a dominant power. In response (but using largely the same political framework of identity as the French state), Haitians argue that they deserve citizenship because of their years of residence and productive labor. Even in resistance, therefore, Haitians remain in the subject position of immigrants to France. They draw the analogy between their marginality and that of north and sub-Saharan immigrants deported by police in Paris. Taking up this position recalls the other aspect of subjectivity: agency and self-fashioning which nonetheless partially accepts the imposed representations.

**Discursive Marginality: The Dilemma of Guadeloupean Subjectivity**

The marginalization of Haitians is produced by the French state as it inserts them into the category of non-citizen and then extrudes them. But it is also produced by the collective imagination of Guadeloupeans, as they insert Haitians into the local social taxonomy (cf. Derby 1994). Guadeloupeans construct the essential characteristics of Haitian migrants in the context of the political impasse and cultural malaise within Guadeloupe itself. Their denigrating stereotypes of Haitians emerge from the ambivalence over their own collective identity and the rapid social transformations on the island.

The collective self-portrait held by the majority residents of Guadeloupe combines the colonial history of racial hybridity with the present ambivalence towards metropolitan France. The current-day population includes descendants, in various combinations and mixtures, of African slaves, the French planter aristocracy, poor French indentured laborers, the 19th Century mulatto middle-class, East Indian cane-workers imported after abolition in 1848, Middle-Eastern trading families, and French civil servants (Abenon 1992). When Guadeloupe became a department of France in 1946, the entire population automatically became French citizens. As a result, the collective self-image of Guadeloupeans involves both a formal, juridical equality and the explicit acknowledgment of racial métissage (mixture). Contemporary residents refer to each other without malice as *bata-zendyen* or *bata-nèg* (the Creole words literally mean bastard-Indian and bastard-black), and individuals openly discuss racial mixing in their family lines. Even members of the white elite (the *beke*) say they are more comfortable in the presence of black Guadeloupeans than white Frenchmen (Besson
Leading intellectuals elaborate the same theme. The author Maryse Condé has declared that all of the island’s ethnic communities are “equally Guadeloupean,” and also that the typical islander resident is not racist (Condé 1989). According to the sociolinguist Dany Bebel-Gisler, the authentic culture of Guadeloupe will be created by individuals representing all possible combinations of class and race (Bebel-Gisler 1989: 14).

Haitians, however, remain locked out of this open-ended, syncretic, and definitionally “Creole” mixture, and the reasons lie in the deepening contradictions of departmentalization. Metropolitan administration paved the way for the penetration of Guadeloupean society by French products, media, educational practices, and, of course, the French language itself (Schnepel 1993, 1998). Residents have become eager consumers of French goods and dependent clients of the French welfare system, but they have also become enrolled in a new politics of difference. Departmentalization has valorized French identity more than ever before in the history of the island. By the 1990s, the local social taxonomy involved an intricate series of differentiations favoring French norms. For example, residents of Pointe-à-Pitre told me that the population of Marie-Galante—a nearby rural island where remnants of the old sugar economy still survive—was darker and more backwards than city-dwellers. They instructed me (a white American) to speak only French, not Creole, in downtown banks and government offices. A working-class Guadeloupean woman who I knew lamented that she was the only member of her family never to visit to France, and parents routinely urge their talented teenage children to seek higher education and professional training in France.

Departmentalization both intensified the cultural hierarchy of the colonial period and pushed it into a new, more dangerous phase. The long-standing hierarchy of the French Antilles split the society into a valorized French stratum and a rejected Afro-Creole stratum, and it gave the greatest esteem to practices which were the most foreign for the majority population (Burton 1993, Benoist 1972). However, the old elitist system at least allowed Creole practices (language, family organization, housing styles, etc.) to survive relatively undisturbed in the lower echelons of colonial society. By contrast, the post-1946 policy of assimilation, with its mass consumerism and urbanization, has left the majority of Guadeloupeans complaining of being cut off from the perspectives and habits of their Antillean past (Suvelor 1983: 22-23). Middle-class Guadeloupeans openly discuss the dislocation and its effects in daily life. People complain about having to live in apartment complexes built by French firms and designed for a cold northern European climate. They recount the loss of neigh-
borhood grocery stores and butcher shops, driven out by competition from the *grandes surfaces* and *hypermarchés*, the ever-growing shopping malls and supermarkets. They report that their children feel uncomfortable speaking Creole after a few years of higher education or job-training in France. Speaking about such losses led people to more general comments about divided identity such as the following: ‘We Guadeloupeans don’t know who we are;’ ‘We don’t know whether we are French or ourselves.’ Renée Gilles, a Guadeloupean social worker, explicitly connected people’s ambiguous and uprooted identity to the process of cultural assimilation.

People identify with what they see on television. There could be a weather report about snow in a certain region of France, and people start to get really interested in it. There is a whole generation of children here named Krystal and Bobby, after the characters in *Dallas* [the syndicated American series] that everyone watched on television... Assimilation is still going forward, and we in Guadeloupe don’t have any grounding. We are facing something that is moving very fast, but we are not in control at all.

The status of spoken and written Guadeloupean Creole encapsulates the problem. Various nationalist and pro-independence groups, fearing that the French language would eventually extinguish Creole, championed its use at labor rallies, in left-wing publications, and even a few schools from the 1960s through the 1980s (Schnepel 1993). But the reign of Creole as an anti-colonialist symbol was short-lived. While television and radio now feature more Creole than before, it is mostly for commercial jingles and folklore programs. As actually used in the media and public sphere, the language now carries Guadeloupeans’ nostalgia for their lost past; it threatens to become a commodity which island residents consume, but do not themselves produce (see Miles 1995). (In a parallel development, Marie-Galante has become a tourist destination which markets its sugar plantation and local rum distilleries to vacationers from Pointe-à-Pitre.)

The pressures for Guadeloupeans to assimilate to metropolitan norms consign Haitians into a particularly disempowered position. Insofar as Guadeloupeans embrace French identity and opportunities, Haitians are devalued according to the dominant axis of difference. Many Guadeloupeans told me that Haitians resemble the residents of Marie-Galante: physically darker and more African-appearing than themselves. Most people know that Haitians entered the island as sugar cane workers, the quintessential slave’s oc-
cupation that is geographically and socially distant from the urban French-orien-
ted worlds of business and administration. Haitian Creole is far less Gallicized
than Guadeloupean Creole, and people often parody the Haitian accent. Even
the homes of Haitian migrants announce their distance from French ideals. For
decades, municipal authorities in Pointe-à-Pitre have systematically demol-
ished the neighborhoods of tight-packed wooden cases Créoles, the vernacular
architecture of the French Antilles, and erected multi-story concrete apartment
blocks in their place. As mentioned above, undocumented Haitians cannot
rent the new apartments, so they by necessity occupy the remnants of the old-
er Antillean city. Urban renewal has created a moral topography which separ-
ates the national modern from the colonial past, metropolitan from local
architecture, and even the healthy from the sick. The first urban area to be
transformed was a malarial, swampy zone that is still called “l’Assainissement”
(the “cleaning up”). Almost all Haitians in Pointe-à-Pitre live in the socially low
(and disappearing) spaces left over by urban renewal.

Having constructed Haitians as the symbols of their repudiated colonial past,
Guadeloupans are afraid that Haitians will disrupt their proud achievement of
French modernity. According to one middle-class Guadeloupean woman

There is a fear of Haiti. People see it and they think it is like Africa. It can
make us regress—that is people’s fear. ‘We have already been emancipated
from Africa, from savagery, and we should continue to move towards
France’: this is people’s attitude.

Such sentiments capture the fear of Haitians who, in the Guadeloupean
imagination, will undercut their own tenuous European cultural citizenship. The
same cliché enters discussions about Guadeloupe’s future. The possibility of in-
dependence from France continues to generate debate, and a violent pro-in-
dependence movement enjoyed popular support in the 1960s and 1970s. The
opponents of independence still invoke Haiti as the best reason to remain a
French department. They raise the rhetorical question, what will we become as
a sovereign nation? The typical response is, another Haiti: poor, disorganized,
and politically corrupt; independent but at an unacceptable price. In the
Guadeloupean imagination, therefore, Haitians threaten what Guadeloupans
hope they have achieved.

However, insofar as people regard assimilation into France as a species of cul-
ture loss, Guadeloupans envy Haitians as bearers of a more potent Afro-
Caribbean authenticity. For example, Guadeloupans who parody Haitian Creole
for amusement have also told me that they are shocked when they hear Haitians use words that fell out of use many decades ago in Guadeloupe. 11 People recall that Haitian bands were the first musical groups billed as “local programming” on radio stations in the 1960s and 1970s, before the current wave of zouk and other Antillean popular styles. Haitians thus represent to Guadeloupeans a past phase of their own society, and they provoke an anxious self-recognition, because they remind Guadeloupeans of the Caribbean identity they have discarded. In the words of Renée Gilles,

If we had something of our own to preserve, it would be better. The Haitians have that. They want to preserve their history, their language. Every Haitian that I met knows the history of their country, its battles, and so on…. So, when faced with Haitians, they are the mirror that we don’t want.

Haitian migrants elicit envy and resentment because they embody what Guadeloupeans feel they have lost in the process of assimilation. They are an unwanted mirror because they reflect back not the Frenchified Guadeloupean culture of today, but the richer, more Antillean-based culture of the past. Guadeloupean attitudes towards Haitian healing power exemplify how the same interpellation. Many Guadeloupeans believe that the Haitian houngan, or Vodoun practitioner, is more powerful than local folk healers, called gadezafè, and I heard many stories of local residents who consult Haitian Vodoun practitioners: e.g., a university administrator who traveled to Haiti in order to rid himself of a chronic illness caused by a curse and a politician who sought an houngan’s help in winning an election. Some people explicitly ranked the spiritual potency of various types of healers. They placed Africans first, followed by Haitian houngans (who, as one friend explained, are more powerful because Haiti has preserved its African culture longer than the Antilles) Guadeloupean gadezafès, and finally folk healers from Martinique—the nearby overseas French department which people assert is even more assimilated to metropolitan norms than Guadeloupe.

Cultural Intimacy and the Play of Stereotypes
Haitians and Guadeloupeans rarely interact with each other outside the relation of laborer to boss or itinerant merchant to customer. Nonetheless, Haitians explain their symbolic marginalization in parallel terms as the Guadeloupeans quoted above. They know quite a bit about the layering of defensiveness and
nostalgia in Guadeloupeans’ stereotypes of them. Haitian migrants argue that their dishonor and marginality are an effect of local residents’ confusion over their own identity as both Black Caribbeans and French citizens. Guadeloupeans always try to imitate the French, Haitians believe, and hence they are both intimidated by and jealous of Haitians’ cultural autonomy and obvious national pride. This argument rests on a particular stereotype of the over-assimilated Guadeloupean who yet cannot quite shake off his Caribbean past. The stereotype pinpoints the “sore zone of cultural sensitivity” among Guadeloupeans (Herzfeld 1997: x). Haitians claim that their very presence disturbs the official ideology of French superiority by forcing Guadeloupeans to acknowledge that they acquired French citizenship at a high cultural cost.

Haitians believe that Guadeloupeans actually do recognize their commonality with Haitians, but are embarrassed by it, because it belies their formal identity as French; in the end, they disrespect and marginalize Haitians as a defensive maneuver. The most elaborate version of this argument concerns Guadeloupeans’ surreptitious use of Haitian Vodoun healing. In Haiti, people who suffer from humanly caused illnesses must seek out the healing power of neo-African Vodoun practitioners; Western biomedicine is regarded as ineffective in such cases (Brodwin 1996, Brown 1991). Haitian migrants assume that Guadeloupeans follow the same logic of medical decision-making. For example, I asked a Haitian friend in Pointe-à-Pitre what would happen if Guadeloupeans were afflicted with an illness sent by a human enemy (a pathogenic attack caused by jealousy or hatred). He replied, “They go to an houngan. They find one here or they go to Haiti.” Surprised, I asked whether Guadeloupeans believe in this sort of healing power. “They believe in it more than we do! But they won’t tell you. You can ask them, but they keep it hidden.”

The same theme appears when Haitians discuss the Guadeloupean gadezafè whose practices overlap those of Vodoun specialists. Like the houngan, these local healers perform exorcisms, lead prayer groups and specialize in illnesses caused by social conflict (see Bougerol 1993, Ducosson 1989, Benoit 2000). They emerge from the same historical matrix as Haitian Vodoun: plantation slavery, the centuries-long intermixing of West African and French Catholic religious practices, and suppression by the Catholic clergy. The folk healers of Guadeloupe are, in a historical sense, cognates of those in Haiti. However, Haitian migrants dismiss them as far weaker than their Haitian counterparts, and they also state that local gadezafè learn their trade through apprenticeships with Haitians.

The conviction that Guadeloupeans secretly acknowledge the superior power of Haitian Vodoun enters Haitians’ criticism of their employers. Certain
wealthy Guadeloupeans, I was told, owe their fortune to a Faustian bargain with a Haitian Vodoun practitioner. Furthermore, the same Guadeloupean boss who cheats Haitians on the job or disrespects them in the street will run to a Haitian *houngan* when biomedical treatments fail. As one Haitian man put it, Guadeloupeans “know that Haiti is the original. They know Haitians are born with it. They know it’s the African rite which is the strongest.” Set against the negative clichés attached to Haitians, this is a resistant and cynical counter-image which migrants hold of the dominant society. It asserts that despite their European Community passports and French cultural fluency, Guadeloupeans have ready recourse to Haitian healers with their neo-African practices.

What do Haitian migrants accomplish by such arguments? First and foremost, Haitians claim cultural intimacy with Guadeloupeans. Cultural intimacy refers to “the sharing of known and recognizable traits that not only define insiderhood but are also … disapproved by powerful outsiders” (Herzfeld 1997: 94). Haitian migrants claim they are the secret sharers of Guadeloupe’s deep cultural essence. Moreover, the traits the two groups share undercut the Guadeloupeans’ preferred, formal self-presentation, and Haitians criticize the hypocrisy of Guadeloupeans who, on these grounds, deny commonality with Haitians. Through the caricature of Guadeloupeans who secretly consult Vodoun healers and acknowledge their superiority, Haitians not only assert their own cultural vitality. They also point out the embarrassing self-recognition of Guadeloupeans and the ambivalence over their joint (European) French and (neo-African) Caribbean allegiances. After all, Haitians have many opportunities to learn the everyday dimensions of ambivalence as they observe, with an outsider’s eye, how the local society operates. The Creole language is still largely suppressed in schools and offices; the local media features endless debates over sovereignty while a large percentage of the island’s population depends on the French welfare system, and sanitized presentations of Antillean folklore on television are sandwiched between into programming from metropolitan France or the USA.

Noting Guadeloupeans’ ambivalent participation in French society, Haitians encapsulate the cultural politics of the island in their stereotype of its Black French residents who both repudiate and long for their Antillean past, and hence both denigrate and covertly envy the (Creole-speaking, politically independent, and culturally autonomous) Haitians in their midst. Stereotypes are discursive weapons of power, and Haitians use their stereotype of local residents to invert the power relations between them and the dominant society (compare Herzfeld 1997: 13). The caricature allows migrants to imagine their place in
Guadeloupe on more favorable terms. It negates the clichés of Haitians as rapacious, intrusive foreigners and substitutes an (equally essentialized) image of Haitians as more authentic and culturally self-assured Caribbeans. Haitians thus use their stereotype of Guadeloupeans in two ways: as form of discursive resistance (an accusation of hypocrisy aimed at the group that denigrates them) and as the grounds for their collective self-regard.

**Conclusion: Comparative Perspectives on Diasporic Subjectivity**

Contemporary diasporas are typically defined as novel social formations, constituted by signs and practices that circulate in transnational space. It is tempting to take the next step and assume that their supra-local orientation forms a fundamental aspect of their subjectivity, i.e., that the same global exchanges that produce a given diaspora are also woven into its self-definition and the way it marks its difference from other groups. The situation of Haitians in Guadeloupe, on the contrary, suggests that diasporic subjectivity is finely calibrated to the experience of marginalization in a specific time and place. Comparing the community in Pointe-à-Pitre to other Haitian expatriate groups reveals how subjectivity—as both a structured and structuring response to marginality—differs across several nodes of the same diaspora.

In the 1920s, large numbers of Haitians left their homes to seek work in Cuba and the Dominican Republic, and this wave of labor migrants shared certain traits with today’s Haitian transnational movement. For example, Haitians living in the Dominican Republic could easily travel back and forth to their homeland, and they pursued economic and social advance by drawing on opportunities in both places. Moreover, they occupied a fragile position on the margins of an inhospitable dominant society, and in October, 1937 they suffered the landmark case of violent extrusion in the history of Haitian expatriate communities when over 20,000 Haitians residing in the Dominican borderlands were massacred (Plant 1987). Derby (1994) has examined the precursors to the massacre in the micropolitics in the border region, and some of the qualities attributed to Haitians at that time resemble the stereotypes in current-day Guadeloupe. Dominicans construed Haitians as holding a monopoly on dangerous sacred power. They regarded Vodoun magic with awe and deference, and considered the Dominican *curandero* as weaker than the *houngan*. Dominicans imagined that Haitians’ control of Vodoun forces allow them to produce unlimited wealth as well as enjoy supernatural abilities.
In plural societies throughout the world, individuals project a nefarious sacred power upon ethnic others whom they perceive as monopolizing productive forces (see Taussig 1980). Haitian Vodoun is a prime target for such projections in Caribbean societies where African cultural practices are branded as dangerous and suppressed, since Vodoun contains the greatest number of explicit African components of all Afro-Caribbean religions. Consequently, attitudes toward Vodoun often serve to marginalize expatriate Haitians throughout the Caribbean, whether the migrant laborers in the early 20th Century or more recent transnational communities. Nonetheless, the details and consequences of their marginalization is not the same in all places, and the stereotyped projections about Vodoun differ significantly in the Guadeloupean and Dominican imagination.

In the Dominican borderlands of the 1930s, Haitian market-women and money-lenders actually did hold more economic power than local pastoralists. The mixture of awe and resentment of Haitians' spiritual potency dovetailed with Dominicans' fear of the new cash-based, competitive economy that was disrupting their lives. As a result, Haitians were perceived as quintessential strangers, consumed with self-interest, and they easily became targets of fear and envy (Derby 1994: 525 and passim). By contrast, Haitians in Guadeloupe clearly occupy the bottom rung of the island's economic hierarchy. Guadeloupeans regard Haitians not as quintessential strangers, endowed with a mysterious economic advantages, but as strangely familiar avatars of their own past, endowed with purely cultural potency. In both the Dominican Republic of the early 20th Century and current-day Guadeloupe, stereotypes about Vodoun have indexed wider and uncontrollable social transformations, yet Haitians have been inserted into fundamentally different roles in the local social taxonomy of each society. Dominicans regarded Haitians as the harbingers of new cash-based productive relations, and Vodoun as the source of their limitless economic success. Guadeloupeans, however, regard Haitians as possessing what departmentalization explicitly devalues, especially in symbolic terms. Sugar-cane workers, speaking the old-fashioned Creole, and practicing an “African” religion, symbolize the disruptive transformation of Guadeloupe, but Haitians are interpellated as representatives of an earlier cultural epoch, and not (as in the Dominican Republic) the vilified agents of change. Many Guadeloupeans, in their nostalgic imagination, also consider themselves to be left behind, so the transformation is especially poignant, and the essentialized image of Haitians all the more likely to endure. Contrasting the Guadeloupean and Dominican cases shows that the symbolic marginality of transnational
Haitians depends on the local contradictions and historical junctures in the particular dominant society where they reside.

The lived experience of marginality, and the subjectivity that Haitians craft in response, also differ between Haitians in Guadeloupe and the United States. In Guadeloupe, state-imposed marginality begins with the denial of French citizenship or other types of legal residence. Haitians' non-regularised status creates the more immediate types of marginality: their clandestine occupancy in condemned buildings, their exploitation on the job, and the everyday anxiety about deportation. Migrants they claim the right to stay in Guadeloupe not by elaborating their Haitianess, but by portraying themselves simply as hard-working, law-abiding individuals. In the face of state-imposed marginality, they have nothing to gain by drawing attention to their cultural distinctiveness.

In the larger and more well-established Haitian enclaves in the United States, state-sponsored marginality takes a different form, and so does the response. Once they arrive on U.S. soil, even Haitians without proper documentation enjoy a higher level of security, including the right to legal counsel and to appeal deportation orders (Smith 1995). Their marginality arises not because they are daily threatened with arrest, but because they are popularly and bureaucratically defined as Black, the nation’s most dishonored ethnic category. Haitians respond by elaborating their homeland identity and connections, a strategy that would not work for migrants in Pointe-à-Pitre. Many Haitians in New York City interviewed by Charles (1992), among other researchers, pointedly do not identify themselves as Black American, for the category symbolizes to them an unacceptable degree of subordination. They reject the lowest position in the US racial hierarchy, and instead privilege their Haitian nationality, particular class or political loyalties rooted on the island, or their similarities with other West Indian immigrants.

Moreover, Haitians in the United States have long been interpellated by influential organizations in their homeland as the “Tenth Department,” an offshore extension of Haitian political space (the country is divided into nine departments. Beginning the early 1990s, the populist leader and two-term president Jean-Bertrand Aristide aimed messages of inclusion at Haitians in New York, Miami, and Boston: by far the largest segments of the diaspora. He appealed to them to support the homeland with their remittances, to contribute to Aristide’s Lavalas party, and to visit for patriotic tours of the Haitian countryside (Richman 1992b). Many Haitians willingly enroll themselves in such long-distance nationalism (Schiller and Fouron 2001), and it fundamentally conditions their political allegiance, their membership in families and home-
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town associations, and their reactions to American racism. This sort of subjectivity heightens homeland-based assertions of Haitian identity, even as it transforms conventional meanings of nationalism. For Haitians in Guadeloupe, however, long-distance nationalism is essentially out of reach. Their group is too small and too poor to attract the same level of interest, and their undocumented status prevents most of them from traveling back home. Haitians there are more subject (in all senses of the word) to France’s policies towards its offshore dependencies (especially its efforts to tighten their borders and assimilate their residents) than to Haiti’s patriotic appeals to its diaspora.

These brief comparisons show that the marginalization of the same transnational group differs remarkably from site to site, in line with the historical contradictions and nationalist projects in each. The dialectic of subjectivity thus operates differently and with a different outcome in the separate communities of the same diaspora. It may still make sense, in order to break with the disciplinary fetish of spatially-bound identities, to speak of an overarching transnational social field encompassing all expatriate Haitians. But to explain how they counteract their marginality, we must also delineate the specific practices, calibrated to local processes of marginality, which produce distinctive subjectivities. After all, transnationalism does not occur in an abstract “in-between” or thoroughly de-localized space, but instead in particular places and social relationships (Guarnizo and Smith 1998). Diasporic subjectivity, as well, is locally inflected. Depending on how states control the terms of citizenship, and how local social taxonomies assign value to newly-arrived outsiders, transnational diasporic groups will be simultaneously included and excluded in distinctive ways, and they will embellish or resist their exclusion with different results. Their subjectivity, therefore, will depend as much on the states and societies that immediately surround them as on dislocated transnational processes.

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NOTES

1 In 1946, France’s three remaining Caribbean colonies (Guadeloupe, Martinique, and French Guyana) become overseas departments (“Départements d’Outre Mer” or DOM). In administrative terms, they are near-equivalents to the departments in metropolitan France; their residents are fully French citizens and now members of the European Community with EC passports.

2 By subjectivity, I mean how people portray their group’s essential characteristics, how they identify with such portrayals, and how they accommodate or resist the images imposed upon them by others. Subjectivity comprises both collective representations and personal sentiments of identification with (or rejection of) such representations. At the formal and public level, subjectivity is evidenced by self-conscious statements about group essence, its distance from other groups, its favored self-image, etc. At less formal levels, it emerges from bodily displays, practical choices about how to engage with dominant institutions, whom to befriend or shun, etc. (see Lave et al. 1992).

3 The structural origins of Haitian migration in the twentieth century are analyzed in Lundahl 1983 and Trouillot 1990. For the specific political and economic background of post-WW II migration, see Fouron 1993 and Catanese 1999, among others.

4 The 1990 census lists 12,000 Haitians out of the departmental total of 387,034 (INSEE 1992). However, most Guadeloupean and Haitian officials—social workers, lawyers, and pastors—estimated the real number as twice this official figure by the mid 1990s, and in 1999, the official number of foreigners in Guadeloupe (almost all Haitians) was 26,000 (INSEE 1999).


6 A sizeable number of Haitians also live in rural Guadeloupe, principally around Sainte Rose and Lamentin on the island of Basse-Terre, the site of most commercial sugar, pineapple and banana plantations. For logistical reasons, I limited my research to the Pointe-à-Pitre area, the commercial and industrial center of the department. About 125,000 people (35% of the entire population of Guadeloupe) live in this metropolis (which includes the communes of Pointe-à-Pitre, Les Abymes, Baie-Mahault, and Le Gosier). This is the most densely inhabited region in the French Antilles (Atohoun and Cazenave 1994:20).

7 The police apprehended a total of eight Haitians—three in one car and five in another. One was later released when a friend brought his identity papers to the detention center, and the rest deported to Haiti.

8 Although most Haitians in Guadeloupe do not personally experience the violence of deportation, it nonetheless helps constitute diasporic subjects in several ways. People easily recalled to me their relatives who have been sent back to Haiti; they must deal with the deportees’ personal effects and obligations left unfulfilled in Guadeloupe, and their strategies to avoid own deportation structure how they inhabit urban space (see Axel 2002).

9 Immigration raids are conducted by the federal and municipal police as well as the PAF (Police de l’Air et des Frontières, Air and Border Police) a service connected to the National Office of Immigration (n.a. 1987). In the mid-1990s, consistent with the anti-immigrant mood of President Jacques Chirac’s administration, the PAF was renamed the CILEC (Contrôle de l’Immigration et de Lutte Contre l’Emploi Clandestin, the Service for Immigration Control and the Struggle against Clandestine Workers).
At the time of fieldwork, Haitians in Guadeloupe did not have the right of appeal or even legal counsel (Amar and Milza 1990: 119).

Guadeloupeans cited the Haitian Creole word rad (clothes) which was replaced by the French-derived linge in the local Creole, and the Haitian kapon (cowardly) which in Guadeloupe gave way to lâche.

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