What’s new about new immigrants in twenty-first century Britain?

Rob Berkeley, Omar Khan and Mohan Ambikaipaker

In this concept paper, the writers compare immigration to the UK thirty years ago with that of now to find out what is really new about immigration in 2005.

The paper highlights the many continuities and changes in patterns and experiences of migration to the UK. The writers argue for race relations practices to be more inclusive of new immigrants, and they also suggest that the promotion of community cohesion needs to be faster in order to respond to the specific needs of new immigrants.
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Rob Berkeley, Omar Khan and Mohan Ambikaipaker
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1 Introduction

Immigration is a topic of political and social concern in the UK in 2006. The dynamics of immigration have changed over time, yet the contours of public debate indicate some remarkable consistencies. Through providing a framework for comparing contemporary immigration with that of 30 years ago, this paper offers a fresh approach for understanding immigration to the UK in 2006. All migrants are 'new' at the point of their entry despite the diversity of their experiences and backgrounds. It is therefore helpful to compare issues surrounding immigration in a different context (here the 1970s) with those of today within an analytic framework. This method will help to chart a response to the question, ‘What is new about the new immigrants to Britain?’

The framework provided here examines three categories today and in the 1970s: the conditions of exit, the characteristics of entrants and the characteristics of the receiving context. In considering the receiving context today and 30 years ago, it is particularly worthwhile to explore the role of the media in characterising immigration in Britain. Below, a detailed analysis of press clippings from the early 1970s and a few months of 2004 provide an insight into an important aspect of the receiving context, namely how the issue is perceived by and reported in the media.

There have been many changes in the past 30 years. Britain is a more ethnically diverse country, further removed from its colonial past and perhaps surer in its multi-ethnic composition. Many hold the anecdotal belief that immigration is somehow different today. Three particular issues might be mentioned since they seem widely held. First, there is less proportional ‘New Commonwealth’ immigration, namely immigration from the West Indies and South Asia. Second, there is increased migration from Eastern Europe and probably East Asia. Finally, there is greater scepticism about the legitimacy of many migrants today, who are often viewed as mere economic migrants, or, even worse, ‘bogus’ asylum seekers. The analytic framework developed in the heart of this paper provides an alternative way of addressing and thinking about these issues. Our conclusion provides a vision of multi-ethnic Britain that addresses the conceptual links between ‘race’, immigration and social cohesion.
2 A comparative and analytic framework

When people think about ‘new’ immigrants, they often rely on anecdotal personal experiences or articles and editorials read in newspapers or programmes seen on television. However, as a way of providing a more comprehensive and insightful account of immigration today, we propose to use a historical comparison with the 1970s within a framework adapted from recent research:1

1 conditions of exit

2 characteristics of entrants

3 characteristics of the receiving context.

The first category includes such details as the economic, political and cultural conditions in the countries of emigration. Understanding why emigrants leave their homes in the first place helps us to understand their motivations and prior experiences. It can also explain whether immigrants from particular countries are likely to continue settling in Britain or whether their residence is more transitory.

This paper puts immigrants at centre stage by exploring the characteristics of entrants. Relevant characteristics include the categories of entrants, such as skilled or unskilled, refugees, asylum seekers, students and dependants. Another group of characteristics focus on immigrants' legal status, for example their citizenship, residence status, right to work, and entitlement to welfare and social services. Here, our analysis of immigrant characteristics includes demographic information regarding country of origin and ethnicity, and three of the major routes of entry – labour migration, family reunification and asylum.

The third and final category – the characteristics of the receiving context – is perhaps even broader than the second. It includes characteristics of the existing immigrant and ethnic communities: their number in the UK, geographic distribution, segregation/concentration in specific areas, religion, community associations, leadership and social or political divisions. A complete list would include the nature of national receptivity (immigration suppressed, permitted but not encouraged, or welcomed and supported); type and extent of government policies (such as access to various legal statuses, assistance, English language training, induction packages); available housing stock; degree of physical segregation; nature of local labour
A comparative and analytic framework

market; school provision; availability of advice bureaux; history of same or other
group presence; public opinion surrounding stereotypes, prejudice, discrimination
and racist violence versus patterns of tolerance, co-operative activity and group
interchange. Two further considerations are EU policies on free movement and the
decreasing ability of all states to control their borders.\(^2\) Here, we focus on four
characteristics: race and demographics, politics and legislation, the labour market
and, finally, the influence of the media.

Of course we will not be able to explore each of these three issues for every
immigrant and immigrant community in Britain 30 years ago and today. In fleshing
out our framework, we have had to be selective, but the primary aim of this paper is
to provide new conceptual tools for thinking about immigration to Britain. We hope
that future research will focus more specifically on one or more of these issues and
explore different historical comparisons to provide an even fuller understanding of
immigration to Britain in the twenty-first century. Any understanding of what is new
about immigration in Britain must provide some sort of framework in order to ensure
that anecdotal conjecture does not replace robust empirical analysis and we believe
that our framework is a good starting point even if more focused research is
necessary to present the whole picture.

While there have undoubtedly been shifts in the form and nature of immigration in
the past 30 years, using a historical comparison helps us to grasp the nature of
immigration today, including how it is different and how it is similar. One of the
advantages of the comparative method is that it reveals features of a subject that are
occluded if the subject is examined in isolation.

The early 1970s were chosen for a variety of reasons: because the presence of
Commonwealth immigrants was firmly established, because immigration had
become a national political issue, because certain statistical measures were first
recorded and finally because 30 years is recent enough to share features with
contemporary Britain but long enough ago to expect significant differences.\(^3\) Again,
we accept that others will want to examine different moments of comparison in the
post-war period in order to provide a complete understanding of the issue, but our
concern is to stimulate thinking and provide conceptual clarity. By examining the
conditions of exit, the characteristics of entrants and the characteristics of the
receiving context, we ensure that our historical comparison does not become an
entirely selective or anecdotal process and provide some rationale for choosing and
explaining statistics.
What's new about new immigrants in twenty-first century Britain?

On statistics

In developing our comparison within the above framework, we will not use advanced statistical modelling but rather data to highlight the relevant differences and similarities between the early 1970s and today. We do not claim that these statistics are completely apolitical nor that they are wholly capable of explaining the full nature of immigration, either today or 30 years ago. Both ethnicity and country of origin statistics have been criticised for their selectivity and ideological nature, and we admit that they are incomplete and sometimes flawed measures.

Nevertheless, the figures we have chosen have some bearing on understanding immigration to Britain. They demonstrate that common-sense thinking on the form and nature of immigration is seriously inaccurate and, because we are comparing the data from 1971 and 2001, any errors or omissions are likely to be minimised. Because the discourse on immigration is often characterised by politicisation, and based less and less on thoughtful discussion, the statistics we have chosen can at least provide a starting point for those interested in reasoned debate.

As the Conservative Party recently highlighted the figure of 150,000 immigrants per year, it is perhaps helpful to indicate briefly why a broader understanding of the characteristics of immigrants is necessary for understanding the issue of immigration to Britain today. Since 1971, the number of people coming to settle in Britain has increased from 200,000 to 513,000 and, although numbers for nearly every country of origin have increased, their proportions have changed considerably. For example, while the ‘Old’ and ‘New’ Commonwealth accounted for 30 per cent and 32 per cent of the inflow in 1971, by 2002 these proportions were down to 17 per cent and 20 per cent respectively (see Figure 1). On the other hand, since 1971, the proportion of EU citizens among the inflow has increased from 10 to 17 per cent, while the proportion of ‘Middle East and Other’ has more than doubled from under 16 per cent to nearly 40 per cent.

However, it is important to remember that two-thirds of all immigrants living in Britain came before the 1990s. And so, according to 2001 census data, of the 4.6 million immigrants living in England and Wales roughly 1 million each were born in the EU (24 per cent), the Indian sub-continent (20 per cent) and Africa (19 per cent), but there are fewer than 100,000 immigrants (3 per cent) from Eastern Europe living in Britain (see Figure 2 and Table 1 in Chapter 4). While it may be possible to advocate increased immigration control without being overtly racist, these statistics point out that race, ethnicity and immigration are not as easily dissociable as certain commentators suggest.
Figure 1  Region of origin as percentage of inflow, 1971 and 2002

Source: Table 7.2 of Population Trends, which are in turn derived from the International Passenger Survey and other sources (see http://www.statistics.gov.uk/STATBASE/ssdataset.asp?vlnk=8688).

Figure 2  Place of birth of working-age immigrants, 2001

Source: Haque et al. (2002).
3 Conditions of exit

One of the most common ways of explaining immigration is to concentrate on ‘pull’ and ‘push’ factors. While this is probably an oversimplified picture, and one that we have replaced with a more complex framework, the conditions in a particular country often act as an incentive for individuals to leave. Indeed, when civil war or genocide breaks out, individuals are risking their lives unless they emigrate. In the early 1970s, such considerations brought East African Asians as well as Vietnamese and Bangladeshi refugees to Britain. More recently, the situation in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq and Sudan resulted in the emigration of large populations.

Even where the conditions of exit are not as bleak as during civil war or genocide, economic downturns can lead to large-scale emigration. For example, Ireland had net emigration from the 1840s until the late 1990s when its economy passed the EU average. Irish immigration to Britain has continued from the 1970s to today, though in smaller numbers, in more various labour sectors and with greater numbers returning home after shorter visits. But the lesson is that depressed economic opportunities have been perhaps the most historically important reason for migration, particularly to the settler countries such as the United States, Canada and Australia.

Today, opinion polls suggest there is little sympathy for economic migrants. Sceptical opinion was also voiced in the 1970s and stricter legislative controls were introduced. Yet it would be difficult to demonstrate that citizens in other countries are in greater need of economic opportunities than they were in the 1970s, so the current focus on economic migration is in need of some explanation. It is clear that there are global economic and social trends driving this increasing movement of people. One difference is that knowledge of the lifestyles in the West is more prevalent throughout the world. Furthermore greater numbers of people have the wherewithal to take advantage of expanded possibilities for global travel. In 1975 it is estimated that there were 84 million migrants worldwide, 175 million in 2002 and a projected 230 million by 2050. This estimate suggests that in 2002 one in every 35 people in the world was a migrant. It is also probably true that democratic values and indeed consumerism are more widespread particularly among middle-class and elite groups in the developed and developing world. This complex framework of motivations for migration is elaborated below, to include the influence of transnational communities, the impact of economic globalisation and worldwide telecommunications. Research will continue to explore the nature of the ‘conditions of exit’ in order to provide a full consideration of ‘the new immigrants to Britain’, not least because such conditions change their number and variety.
4 Characteristics of entrants

It is impossible to address all the characteristics of entrants to Britain today and 30 years ago. Therefore, this chapter will focus on two issues, demographics and legal matters. The first primarily compares statistics on country of origin for immigrants to Britain between 1971 and 2002. The second looks at the importance of the legal system for immigrants and asylum seekers, including their numbers and origin, and the form and nature of irregular migration.

Demographic comparison – 1971 and 2002

Historically Britain has been a country of net *emigration*. In 1971, net emigration was roughly 40,000, with large numbers of British citizens in particular leaving the country every year, a trend that continues today. However, since the 1990s, there has been increasing net immigration to Britain, with roughly 150,000 per year since 1998. As mentioned above, focusing on these numbers alone is insufficient for understanding the complexity of immigration to Britain today, and our historical framework is an attempt to provide more rigorous analysis and understanding of these numbers. We recognise the country of origin data can be controversial and do not mean to imply that it is the best way of discerning the full nature of the characteristics of entrants. We hope to have mitigated some of these concerns through the use of comparison and also because some of the most basic features of the current and historical situation are so comprehensively misunderstood.

Country of origin data in 1971

Throughout the 1970s, Commonwealth immigration remained above 50 per cent of the total inflow, though it had dipped from its high in the 1960s. Significantly, because of the 1971 Immigration Act, by the early 1970s most of the migrants to Britain were dependants of existing residents, as primary-purpose settlement nearly ceased. The 1950s and 1960s were periods of great West Indian immigration, such that they were the single largest minority ethnic group in 1971. However, in the 1970s, most Commonwealth immigration was from South Asia, with roughly 20,000 entering per year from India and another 10,000 from Pakistan.
The focus on ‘New Commonwealth’ immigration in the press and in politics (leading to the 1962 and 1971 Immigration Acts) continues to hide some important facts about the inflow to Britain in the early 1970s. First of all, 30 per cent of all entrants for settlement in 1971 came from Australia, New Zealand, Canada and South Africa, while over 10 per cent came from the EU and another 11 per cent from the United States. Thus, over half of all entrants came from ostensibly ‘white’ countries, 18 per cent arrived from ‘Other Commonwealth’ countries and another 15 per cent from ‘Other’ countries (including the Middle East). Only 12 per cent came from South Asia and only 2.5 per cent from the Caribbean. An evaluation of the issue of immigration 30 years ago would seem to suggest that the popular portrayal of it as mainly non-white is mistaken, with probably no more than one-third of immigrant inflow being non-white in any given year.

However, an examination of the balance of immigrants and emigrants reveals that only three regions – South Asia, Other Commonwealth and USA – had net immigration to Britain. What this means is that large numbers of Europeans, Australians, South Africans and even Caribbeans left the United Kingdom in 1971. These figures are important to keep in mind because the changing nature of British society is impacted more by the balance of population movement than by inflow statistics and because it illustrates the significance of transitory population movement. So, while 30,000 individuals from South Asia and the ‘Other Commonwealth’ were added to the UK population, individuals from all other countries were more likely to leave than to enter Britain.

Migration is very often assumed to be a male phenomenon and, as a result, data from the early 1970s on the gender of migrants is very sparse. This is problematic in that it obscures the analysis of patterns and trends in migration, and denies the complexity of the experiences of migrants. We provide some analysis of the issue under the heading ‘Family migration from 1971 to 2004’ later in this chapter.

**Country of origin data in 2002**

Comparing the 1971 figures to those for 2002 reveals that more than 2.5 times as many people are coming to Britain, from 200,000 to 513,000. And, while a larger number of people are also leaving (from 240,000 to 360,000), the net balance of those staying on was positive, 153,000. The most notable changes are the proportional decrease of movement from the Commonwealth (though it still constitutes over a third of the inflow), a significant increase among EU citizens, and a large growth of the ‘Other’ and Middle East population, from 31,000 in 1971 to 204,000 in 2002. Unlike in 1971, when the increase in population was primarily due to dependants from South Asia, nowadays primary-purpose immigration is more common.
Again, the figures for the balance of population movement reveal even more noticeable trends (see Figure 3). While the EU, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the USA all have significant outward population movement, South Africa, South Asia, the ‘Other Commonwealth’, the Middle East and the ‘Other’ population have significant net migration to the UK. The numbers for the ‘Other’ population, at positive 110,000 are notable and historically high, though the ratio of inward to outward population movement is larger still for the ‘Other Commonwealth’ and South Asia populations.

Figure 3 Immigration balance to Britain by region, 1971 and 2002

* Middle East included in ‘Other’ category in 1971.
Source: Table 7.2 of Population Trends (Office of National Statistics), which are in turn derived from the International Passenger Survey and other sources.

Comparing country of origin data for 1971 and 2002

On the basis of this brief analysis of the statistics, there are some continuities and some changes. There remains large movement between Britain and the EU, Australia, New Zealand and Canada, but as in 1971 the balance is negative. Migration levels from South Asia and other parts of the Commonwealth remain high, with a net balance of 36,000 in each of these categories – more than double the figures for 1971.

However, partially because of the large increase in overall numbers, the proportions of the various groups have changed (see Figure 4 and Table 1). The most notable change is in the number of ‘Other’ immigrants to Great Britain. Not only does it represent the single largest source of population inflow to Britain, but it also has the
greatest balance of migration. Yet it is difficult to offer further generalisations about this category, since it is both broad and vague. The ‘Other’ population includes East Europeans, but also South and Central Americans, non-Commonwealth Africans, South-east Asians, Chinese, Japanese and others. Without a breakdown of this category, the best we can conclude is that, while the populations that came in 1971 continue to be a major source of population growth via migration, a number of new groups have added to the diversity of immigrants to Britain.

Figure 4  Inflow to Britain by region, 1971 and 2002 (numbers)

Table 1  Inflow to Britain, by region, 1971 and 2002 (per cent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>1971 (%)</th>
<th>2002 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>17.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia, NZ, Canada</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Africa</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian sub-continent</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Commonwealth</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East*</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>33.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*  In ‘Other’ for 1971.

Source: Table 7.2 of Population Trends (Office of National Statistics), which are in turn derived from the International Passenger Survey and other sources.
We have some knowledge of the most recent immigrants from the 2004 accession states to the EU. Partly in response to pressure from the media and the opposition parties, the Government decided to allay fears of a large influx of immigrants from the ten new EU member states: Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. In order to do this it instituted ‘transitional’ arrangements, regulating the access of nationals of the accession states (except Cyprus and Malta) and restricting access to benefits. This data does not include students or those migrants who are moving for purposes of family reunification.

Between 1 May 2004 and 31 March 2005 there were 176,000 applications to the new Worker Registration Scheme. It is estimated that one-third of these applications were from workers already in the UK. The highest proportion of applicants was Polish (56 per cent of the total) followed by Lithuanian (15 per cent) and Slovak (11 per cent) applicants. Eighty-two per cent of those registered were between the ages of 18 and 34; 44 per cent were women.6

The legal status of migrants

There is some benefit in comparing the legal situation in 1971 with that of 2002. The 1971 Immigration Act extended restrictive governmental controls over immigration, removed most Commonwealth privileges and replaced employment vouchers with work permits. The 1971 Act was a political response to concerns over race relations which problematised the immigrant. It was based on the view that there was no longer any demand for large-scale labour migration and that family reunification rights could be made subordinate to the wider goal of restricting immigration. The 2002 Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act highlights a shift in the immigration debate as asylum occupies the forefront of the agenda and institutes a formal link between immigration and race relations in the form of ‘cohesion’ or ‘integration’, with the introduction of citizenship tests and a ceremonial oath of allegiance. The background to its enactment includes:

- a revival of the demand for large-scale migration, mainly arising from the growth of the service sector in deregulated labour markets
- increased opportunities for migration, as a result of cheaper transport costs
- improved communications in the ‘transnational communities’
What’s new about new immigrants in twenty-first century Britain?

- the standardisation of educational qualifications on an international basis
- the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the declining capacity of repressive states to halt outward migration.

In the Government’s five-year plan on asylum and immigration, published in February 2005, the issues of immigration and race relations also became tied to concerns about terrorism and security. Stung by criticism from the media and political opposition that they had lost charge of the immigration system, the Government was keen to show that it could exercise control over immigration, by enforcing a stricter regime of removals and monitoring, and restricting access to services and benefits. In his introduction to the plan, the Prime Minister highlighted three themes driving policy:

[Trad]itional tolerance is under threat. It is under threat from those who come and live here illegally by breaking our rules and abusing our hospitality ... unless we act to tackle abuses, it could be increasingly exploited by extremists to promote their perverted view of race.

Our country’s history and success would be very different without the enterprise and energy of people who, over centuries, have come to settle here. We would be poorer in every way without them.

There will be a new drive to prevent illegal entry, to crack down on illegal working and a tough policy of removals for those who should not be here. There will be on-the-spot fines for employers ... We will fingerprint visitors who need visas ... demand financial bonds from migrants in specific categories ... it becomes the norm that those who fail to be granted asylum can be detained.

(Home Office, 2005b)

Improving race relations, responding to the needs of the labour market, and restoring public confidence have become the avowed aims of government policy in this area.

With this in mind this section provides short comparisons of the main routes of migration – labour migration, family reunion, and asylum. The issue of asylum seekers dominates the discussion on immigration in the popular press. Furthermore, it is often argued that the legal regime in Britain, and Europe more generally, has contributed to the growth in asylum seekers as the only legal option for those who seek to migrate to Europe. The difficulty in entering legally also probably increases numbers entering Britain irregularly, many of whom end up working in variously exploitative conditions.
Labour migration from 1971 to 2004

Work permits provide the main mechanism for the control of labour migration to the UK. They were introduced to regulate the employment of non-Commonwealth foreigners in 1919. By the enactment of the 1971 Immigration Act, work permits were necessary for overseas workers from outside of the European Economic Community and were no longer issued for unskilled or semi-skilled labour from outside the EEC. For a permit to be issued, the overseas worker had to have a ‘specific job to come to and a skill or qualification that was needed’.11

The number of work permits issued had fluctuated considerably throughout the post-war period. Peaking at just under 70,000 in 1970, they fell until the late 1980s as a result of the combined effect of the 1971 Act and prolonged economic downturn. The 1990s saw significant increases in the number of work permits issued: 29,000 were issued in 1993 and 181,432 in 2004.12 In 2003 there were an estimated 1,396,000 foreign nationals working in the UK. The growth in the number of workers over the preceding decade was faster than the overall increase in foreigners living in the UK.13

The work permits system has changed considerably to reflect the Government’s policy on ‘managed migration’, which seeks to promote economic migration in order to meet skills gaps in the labour market. Work permits have been diversified to reflect this stated policy. The system currently has four main elements: the main scheme, seasonal agricultural workers, highly skilled migrants and sector-based schemes (quotas are set for hospitality and food processing industries).14

About four in ten migrant workers come from within the EU (before 2004 accession), with Ireland representing the largest group. The next largest groups are from the Indian sub-continent, the USA and Australasia.

Certain sectors rely heavily on recruiting staff from overseas to fill vacancies. The Learning and Skills Council reported an estimate of 679,000 vacancies in health and social work, business services, hotels and catering and construction in 2003.15 London Transport and the NHS advertised in the Caribbean, Ireland and India for staff in the 1950s. Fifty years later similar recruitment drives were being undertaken. As a number of the sectors with severe shortages, such as education and health, are female dominated, women have formed an increasingly important part of labour migration.16

Skills have come from a broader range of countries with, for example, the Philippines providing over 20,000 nurses to the UK between 2000 and 2004. Eight of the new
EU member states (as noted above) provided 176,000 workers between May 2004 and March 2005. The largest proportion of workers (22 per cent) are in general occupations classified as process operatives (and other factory workers), followed by packers (7 per cent) and kitchen and catering assistants (7 per cent). The immigrant workforce from these countries also included 65 beauticians, 50 senior executives, 365 flower pickers, five circus performers, and 75 dentists.¹⁷

**Family migration from 1971 to 2004**

There is little recent research into family migration. Government, however, continues to make policies that impact heavily on family migration – ‘family migration has emerged as the single most enduring, though also restricted, basis for entry of migrants to the UK’.¹⁸

The 1971 Act, in a similar way to the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act, had the effect of increasing the numbers of those seeking to migrate to the UK, before increasing restrictions made it impossible to do so. Workers who might have responded to the economic downturn brought on by the oil crisis by returning to their families abroad, decided instead to remain and to bring their spouses and children to join them. Though one of the consequences of the 1971 Act was that family reunification became more difficult, a much larger proportion of migrant workers decided to try and use its more limited provisions to bring in their spouses and dependent children. Many encountered severe difficulties, especially wives who were sponsoring their husbands to join them, and Bangladeshi and Pakistani families who were widely suspected of fraud. Campaigning groups, such as the Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants, organised around the ‘not related as claimed’ decisions. Technology now provides proof of relatedness through DNA fingerprinting, used to check claims in the 2000s.

By 1993, eight out of ten grants of settlement in the UK were for some kind of family reunification (34 per cent for wives, 22 per cent for husbands, 15 per cent for children and 8 per cent for other dependants). The economic upturn, more workers seeking to settle and the increased numbers of those granted asylum were jointly responsible for a drop in the proportion of grants of settlement given on the grounds of family reunification. Nonetheless, the numbers increased overall – more than doubling between 1993 and 2003.

Further longitudinal study into family reunification would be beneficial, as it remains an important source of migration. The Government has persisted in making policy even more restrictive, using its five-year plan to announce the end of ‘chain
Characteristics of entrants

migration’. Eager to appear tough on ‘burdensome’ immigrants, the Government has undertaken to stop family dependants apart from spouses and children joining their families. In 2003, these ‘other dependants’ amounted to fewer than 10,000 people, just 7 per cent of the total number given grants for settlement.

Asylum applications from 1971 to 2004

Until 15 years ago, there were few asylum applications to Britain. David Ingleby estimates that, during the 1970s, the average number of refugees accepted in Europe was around 30,000. In fact, because British nationality law was still based on a 1948 conception of Commonwealth residents as British subjects, the largest influx, that of roughly 30,000 East African Asians in 1972, is not strictly speaking a pure case of asylum. The other major populations were roughly 3,000 Chileans from 1973 to 1979 and about 24,000 Vietnamese from the 1970s to the early 1990s.

In the early 1990s applications for asylum across Europe expanded enormously. From 2,500 to 4,000 a year in the 1980s, the numbers for the UK in the 1990s ranged from 22,000 to 46,000, with even larger numbers seen in Germany and the Netherlands. Between 1999 and 2002 they increased further, from 70,000 to 84,000. However, the past two years have shown a noticeable decrease in asylum applications, to below 50,000 in 2003 and below 34,000 in 2004, mainly because of legislation passed in 2002 (see Table 2).

Another key shift is the number of rejected asylum seekers. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, roughly half of all claims were either accepted or granted exceptional leave to remain (ELR). These numbers have declined precipitously and the

<table>
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<th>Year</th>
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<td>1994</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>44,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>84,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>49,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>33,930</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: compiled from reports by the Home Office Research and Statistics Department.
noticeable growth of applicants in the early 1990s led the Conservative Government to introduce procedures (such as safe countries) that resulted in over 80 per cent of claims being rejected between 1994 and 1997. In 2002, at the highest point for applications but in advance of legislation concentrating on removals and prevention, only 10 per cent of applications were granted asylum, with a further 24 per cent granted exceptional leave to remain. However, this latter number is increased by Iraqi applications and, until 2003, rejections usually exceeded 70 per cent under the current Labour Government (see Table 3).

By 2003, as further controls were introduced, 6 per cent of applicants were granted asylum and 11 per cent granted humanitarian protection (HP) or discretionary leave (DL), numbers falling to only 4 per cent granted asylum and 9 per cent given HP or DL in 2004. Since the second quarter of 2003, 88 to 90 per cent of appeals have been rejected, and it seems that this is a target the Government is aiming to keep. Further discussion of these controls will be found in Chapter 5.

**Irregular immigration**

While legal routes of migration are the most obvious source of movement into Britain, in recent years there has been increasing concern about ‘illegal’ entrants. We use the term ‘irregular’ to refer to the variety of ways individuals enter Britain without the formal right of residence. This term is preferred because a number of irregular migrants have no intention of behaving in criminal or illegal ways and because immigration legislation has criminalised entire categories of entrants. So, while it may be technically true that a number of the migrants referred to below are ‘illegal’, this is often because the law has been developed with the intent of keeping as many out of the country as possible.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>% granted asylum</th>
<th>% granted ELR/HP/DL</th>
<th>% rejected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>52*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>66*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The relatively low numbers of rejections in 1999 and 2002 are explained in Home Office documents by the situations in Yugoslavia and Iraq respectively. It is notable that, whereas individuals from the former Yugoslavia were often granted outright asylum in 1999, Iraqis in 2002 were far more likely to be granted exceptional leave to remain.

Source: compiled from reports by the Home Office Research and Statistics Department.
In 1971 there seems to have been little irregular immigration to Britain, or at least relatively little concern about it. Two figures support this conclusion: the small number of deportations (usually no more than 200 to 300 per year) and the relatively small number of applications following an amnesty in 1974 (only 1,990 in two years). While there had been some concerns about false passports in the 1950s, by the early 1970s official worries were limited to the validity of certain dependants. Since immigration controls had limited primary-entry immigration, the main avenue of entry was through claiming dependant status on legally resident immigrants. However, because immigration officials were relatively wary of dependants’ claims and because they were better able to police border controls, there was probably less irregular migration at this time.

By the 2000s, however, irregular immigration seems to have become a major concern for the public and policy makers. Although precise numbers are hard to determine, cases such as the Chinese cockle pickers in Morecambe Bay have highlighted the role of illegal labour in certain sectors. While many associate such labour with criminality and the black market, a report in *The Guardian* revealed Poles in Exeter packing chicken for Sainsbury’s not directly ‘but subcontracted in a complex chain of labour agencies’. The report suggested that such labour is not unusual, and may even play a part in Britain’s economic competitiveness.

While Eastern and Central Europeans seem particularly prominent in discussions of irregular immigration, other well-known cases include Chinese, South American and even EU citizens such as the Portuguese. Given the numbers of rejected asylum seekers in Britain and given their inability either to work legally or to receive social services, it is not surprising that many have linked the two issues. Some attention has also been given to the number of women trafficked to the UK for sexual exploitation from Eastern Europe, West Africa and Asia, estimating the numbers to be as high as 1,420 each year. While gang masters in Britain are the most noticeable and perhaps exploitative of irregular labour, a recent report indicates that the use of irregular labour is far more widespread, extending to the NHS and elsewhere. It concludes:

Contrary to the idea of a social Europe, Britain’s economy is marked by the reality of a deregulated labour market and the super-exploitation of migrant workers.
5 Characteristics of the receiving context

For purposes of space, this paper will focus on four particular characteristics of the British receiving context. First is the question of numbers, particularly the numbers of black and minority ethnic populations. Linked to this is the issue of race and how it is understood in public policy. Our second concern is therefore the issue of politics and legislation. While the speeches of Enoch Powell influenced how race and immigration were understood in the 1970s, ‘disturbances’ in northern towns, and unexpectedly strong showings by the BNP in Oldham in the 2001 election and Barking in the 2005 election, show that the issue has not completely disappeared. On the other hand, there has been increased acceptance of Britain as a multi-ethnic country, whether in popular TV programmes, sport, public life, employment or indeed personal friendships.

The third characteristic explored in this paper is the development of the British economy. Whereas in 1971 immigrants could have reasonably expected to find manufacturing work, this sector is now weaker, with the result that more and more immigrants, like British-born residents, find themselves employed in the service sector.

Finally, a comparison of the way in which immigration is reported in newspapers is undertaken in order to highlight the prevailing themes in public debate and the pressures this places on policy development.

Race and demographics

Black and minority ethnic (BME) population and country of origin, 1971

Calculating the black and minority ethnic population for the early 1970s is complicated by the fact that, until 1991, the census did not collect data by ethnicity, but only according to place of birth. As we mentioned above, these statistics are controversial and many object to the methods of measurement employed by the Government over the past three decades, especially concentrating on the usage of country of origin. Nevertheless, there are many estimates throughout the post-war period and the best approximation for 1971, based in part on the census, seems to be 1.4 million, just 2.5 per cent of the UK population (see Table 4). Roughly 60 per cent of this population was born overseas and the British-born BME population was at that time very young.
Characteristics of the receiving context

In 1971, the proportions of various communities within the BME population were quite different from today. The West Indian population was probably still the single largest community, at around 500,000, though it would soon be overtaken by Indians. Pakistani, Bangladeshi and African proportions were much smaller than they are nowadays. In general, the BME population was less diverse, since the Commonwealth – and a few countries within it – accounted for the vast majority of net immigration.

Country of origin statistics are now often used to trace immigration figures, though in 1971 the legacy of the Commonwealth and white-born populations in South Asia and Africa probably complicated this linkage. In any case, in 1971, there were 3.5 million people born in a different country, of whom 1.2 million were born in the New Commonwealth, 710,000 born in Ireland, 630,000 born in the rest of Europe and 1 million born elsewhere. Given that fewer than 1 million of this population would have been ‘coloured’, it is obvious that large numbers of immigrants have been coming to Britain from a more diverse set of countries than usually recognised. For example, in 1971, there were over 150,000 Germans and 110,000 Italians and Poles resident in Britain, as well as 130,000 Americans and 50,000 Russians and Spaniards. As today, the majority of these immigrants were located in metropolitan areas, in particular London.

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BME population and country of origin, 2001

According to the 2001 census, there are 4.6 million black and minority ethnic Britons, the majority of whom were born in the UK. As a result of an increased number of categories, we know the breakdown of the population in far greater detail, but in any case it is more diverse than 30 years ago. Nearly half of the BME population is South Asian, with approximately one-quarter being black. Compared to 1971, there are many more African, Bangladeshi and Chinese residents, and there are also now 650,000 people of ‘mixed’ ethnic background.
What's new about new immigrants in twenty-first century Britain?

Country of origin statistics for 2001 reveal 4.9 million people born abroad, representing 8.3 per cent of the total population. Over the past 30 years, the migrant population has been very mobile, with half of all migrants leaving Britain within five years of entry. The regularity of transitory labour makes a huge impact on Britain, but it also probably skews public understanding of the numbers and form of settled populations in the country. In any case, of the migrant population, 2.6 million are ethnically white, but their origin is highly varied: although 21 per cent were born in Ireland and another 41 per cent elsewhere in Europe, ‘substantial proportions of overseas-born white people were also born in Asia (11 per cent), North or South America (11 per cent), Africa (10 per cent) and Oceania (6 per cent)’.8

Further data reveals that nearly half of immigrants are British citizens and that many have been here for decades.9 These statistics suggest that it can be inaccurate and unhelpful to juxtapose British and immigrant experiences. According to another Home Office study,10 of the 3.6 million immigrants of working-age population, 24 per cent are from the EU, 20 per cent from the Indian sub-continent, 19 per cent from Africa and 11 per cent from the Americas (see Figure 2 in Chapter 2). These findings suggest that only 3 per cent (i.e. 72,000) are from Eastern Europe, though the vast majority of this immigration has been in the past ten years. As these figures indicate, despite the increased number of categories on the census form,11 ethnicity in Britain today is far more complicated than it appears in government statistics, especially within ‘white’ communities.

The impact that the size of the receiving community has on the experience of immigration remains under-researched. Increasingly, research focused on the concept of ‘transnationalism’ is beginning to highlight the relationships that migrants may have across borders.12 Maintaining links with countries of origin, building business links and sending money ‘home’ are not new activities. What may be new are the ways in which new technologies can increase contact across national borders, the global remittance industry, increasing means of remaining politically active in more than one country, dual citizenship and the development of ‘cross-border multiple identities’ such as British-Pakistani or Mexican-American.

The ethnic diversity of the receiving context is related to the ways in which migrants can engage with the society in which they are settling. The knowledge, resources and networks shared across borders impact on the willingness to migrate and the qualitative experience of so doing. The development of identities that relate to Britain and to other national identities provides a means of maintaining links with countries of origin and may lead to greater return/circulation between countries. In purely financial terms it is important to note that the money sent home by migrants constitutes the second largest financial inflow to developing countries, exceeding
international aid. In 2001, it is estimated that money sent home by migrants to the UK exceeded £2.3bn (equivalent to 78 per cent of the UK’s total Overseas Development Aid).\textsuperscript{13}

**Politics and legislation**

**Race, politics and immigration in the 1970s**

In the 1970s the politics of immigration was usually the politics of race.\textsuperscript{14} Sometimes the discussion would proceed by proxy, with commentators loath to mention the issue of race in public, but Enoch Powell was not alone in discussing the question of race directly. Both Conservative and Labour politicians thought it imperative to restrict immigration precisely in order to maintain good race relations. Even in the 1970s, one can read Labour policy documents asserting the need for a ‘firm but fair’ policy.\textsuperscript{15}

In 1971 the Tories held a small majority in Parliament under the premiership of Edward Heath. While Enoch Powell had been sacked from the Shadow Cabinet over his speeches on immigration, his influence and popularity, though perhaps limited in the Conservative Party hierarchy, was relatively high. Some have argued that the immigration legislation passed in 1971 was in part a response to Powell’s claims and popularity,\textsuperscript{16} and it did reduce immigration compared to the 1960s. Although Heath accepted that Ugandan Asians had to be admitted to Britain, there was a growing sense that the notion of Commonwealth citizens as British subjects with the right of entry was an unwelcome residue of the Empire. Since 1962, legislation had been implemented severely (and successfully) restricting the rights of Commonwealth citizens to enter Britain; the 1971 Act was an extension of such restrictions.\textsuperscript{17}

It is clear from speeches at the time that the Tories linked immigration control to good race relations and frankly admitted that there was a limit to non-white population in Britain.\textsuperscript{18} We have termed such thinking the ‘control paradigm’, where the issue of immigration is perceived solely as a problem that needs to be controlled and where ‘race’ and immigration are conflated and confused, explicitly or not. When we consider how the 2.5 million white residents born in foreign countries were not part of the discourse on immigration and its control in the 1970s, the salience of race and ethnicity becomes even clearer. Of course the Labour Party shared this belief in the control paradigm,\textsuperscript{19} and was additionally concerned that race could be an electoral loser.\textsuperscript{20} And it was the Labour Party who in 1965 and 1968 introduced immigration controls that many commentators at the time and since saw as unduly restrictive.\textsuperscript{21}
Race, politics and immigration in the 2000s

Much has changed in Britain since the 1970s, including the now historic strength of the Labour Party in government. According to a recent MORI poll, 70 per cent agree it is a good thing that Britain is multi-cultural and 87 per cent agree that ‘you do not have to be white to be British’. While still under-represented, there are now 15 black and minority ethnic MPs in the House of Commons. The issue of ‘race’ is not as explicitly linked to immigration, or rather the concern is not on so-called ‘new Commonwealth’ immigrants. Furthermore, the passage and strengthening of the Race Relations Act and the establishment of the Commission for Racial Equality have given black and minority ethnic people mechanisms to assert their rights and challenge discrimination in public.

Being from a black and minority ethnic community is increasingly less likely to mean that you are an immigrant. The various ethnic groups have different percentages of foreign-born populations. While roughly half of the overall black and minority ethnic population is born in Britain, the figure for the White Irish, Other Asian and Black African categories is roughly one-third, and those for the Chinese, Other Ethnic and White Other groups is lower. The Asian or British Asian proportions range from 46 per cent for Indians and Bangladeshis to 55 per cent for Pakistanis. On the other hand, 79 per cent of the Black British, Other and Mixed categories were born in Britain.

There are still a number of familiarities with the 1970s, however. A Labour Party document from the 1970s entitled ‘firm but fair’ is an exact statement of current government policy, and there remains in official thinking a link between tight immigration controls and good race relations. Controls are indeed tighter today, especially with the passage of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act in 2002. The link between ‘race’ and immigration remains, effectively reasserted by its denial in the 2005 election campaign. The Conservatives, as part of their ‘Are you thinking, what we’re thinking?’ campaign, posted the slogan ‘It’s not racist to impose limits on immigration’.

Consideration of recent government legislation reveals not only the tightening of immigration controls but also that the focus of concern has shifted away from the Commonwealth to other areas such as Eastern Europe, Africa, China and even Latin America. While the link between tight restrictions and good race relations is still made, such claims are clearly greatly complicated by the large presence of white migrants to Britain. But newspapers and websites such as Migrationwatch make it evident that race is still playing a fundamental role in the popular perception of immigration, not least in the way that particular groups are ethnicised and thereby
Characteristics of the receiving context

become targets of hatred. Not all immigrants are equally vilified, but linking immigration with race relations is an incoherent basis on which to develop a democratic and human rights culture in Britain. One of the challenges is to produce an anti-racist and cohesive platform in a way that captures the diversity of these populations while challenging what are often confused assumptions about race, ethnicity and immigration today.

Economics and labour participation, 1970s to 2000s

The state of the economy and labour participation is our next consideration regarding the receiving context. In 1971, the British economy was just entering a manufacturing decline and many immigrants were still entering this sector. Many more were already among the over 7 million (or 30 per cent) employed in manufacturing jobs, which, though not necessarily highly paid, provided relatively stable and consistent remuneration.25 There were also many employed in local services, most famously perhaps the significant Caribbean employment in London Transport.26 And there were of course highly skilled labourers, such as doctors, nurses and proprietors of small businesses.

Compared to 1971 the variety of immigrant labour is much greater today. There are a number of immigrants involved in both the high and low end of the economy.27 Since the 1970s, over 2 million jobs have been added to the economy but there are now just over 3 million manufacturing jobs, representing 13 per cent of the total economy. Like British-born residents, immigrants are now much more likely to work in the service industry, a sector now employing 81 per cent of British labour (see Table 5).28

But perhaps the most important change over the last 30 years is the growth of irregular labour. While some of these employment opportunities may be relatively secure, many of them involve the exploitation of immigrant labour in woeful circumstances. The death of Chinese cockle pickers in Morecambe Bay has brought national attention to the issue, though some portrayals are more sympathetic than others. Although it is difficult to calculate the numbers involved in the illegal economy

Table 5 Employment, 1978 and 2004, millions (per cent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Manufacturing</th>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>6.9 (29 per cent)</td>
<td>14.7 (61 per cent)</td>
<td>24.2 (100 per cent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>3.4 (13 per cent)</td>
<td>21.1 (81 per cent)</td>
<td>26.1 (100 per cent)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from tables ‘Employee jobs by sex and industry 1978–2000, Social Trends 31 (ONS 2001), and Table 4.12, Social Trends 35 (ONS, 2005).
in general, the evidence suggests that there is a large amount of irregular immigration in Britain. Whether or not this has become a systemic aspect of the British economy – systematic even to its economic competitiveness – is a less central question than it should be, as it is crucial to ensuring that exploitation does not continue in the future. As recent research indicates, it is not only gang masters in the black economy who exploit irregular labour in Britain. Whether or not further immigration controls are the best response, the combination of the decreased cost of global travel, greater awareness of European wealth, rising inequality and limited opportunities will continue to support the conditions for large-scale immigration.

**Media portrayal**

The subject of immigration and asylum seekers occupies a prominent place in daily news coverage and is our fourth and most extended example of the characteristics of the receiving context in Britain. In many ways these public issues are not new:

443,000 moved in from ‘non-white’ Commonwealth. *(Daily Telegraph, 20 January 1970, p. 5)*

Coloured immigrants to Britain get a raw deal from the Home Office and immigration officials, says a report yesterday. Both seem to think their duty is to control the level of coloured intake rigorously. They rarely and reluctantly give any coloured immigrant the benefit of the doubt, the report adds. *(Wolverhampton Express & Star, 26 June 1970)*

The spectre of immigration raised populist alarm and fears in the 1970s and currently, and touches deeply on racial mythologies that have historically shaped British national identity. Indeed, commentators have cited a longer tradition of xenophobia in the British print media, pointing to the existence of ‘an underlying bias against migrants’. A narrative of so-called ‘indigenous’ cultural and material loss in the wake of immigration, played out repeatedly in the press, colours the tone of any debate in the media and more widely.

The frequency of immigration reportage (see Table 6), marked by a general tone of crisis and negativity, contributes to a receiving social context where constructive debate is difficult. An unquestioned tradition of constructing immigration stories around the common-sense need for tough controls and racially coded fears continues to mark editorial agendas and media frameworks of discussion.
Characteristics of the receiving context

Immigration was a topic of major concern in the 2001 and 2005 general election campaigns, and the opinion poll trends point to immigration and race relations being seen as ‘the most important issue’ by increasing numbers since the latter half of the 1990s, peaking in the run-up to the 2005 general election at four in ten of those surveyed. Further research from MORI suggests the impact that newspaper readership may have on attitudes, concluding that that ‘there are strong indications that it is on this issue [race/immigration] that newspapers have the greatest impact’.

### Table 6  Press coverage comparison on immigration and asylum seekers for 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>News</th>
<th>Times</th>
<th>Telegraph</th>
<th>Independent</th>
<th>Guardian</th>
<th>Mail</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Immigration</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asylum seekers</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**Immigration control**

Media coverage on immigration in the last 30 years shifts its attention from ‘non-white’ Commonwealth immigration to the anxiety over asylum seekers and migration from the new member states of the European Union and elsewhere. While the subjects of immigration debates have ostensibly changed, much of the negative tone and frameworks of discussion have not. The media discussion of immigration is still conducted within the framework of immigration control, assisted by an unrelenting staple of panics about mass influxes, criminal behaviour, welfare state crises and illiberal cultural difference.

This narrow set of news stories constrains the ability of the public to engage with debate about immigration and immigrant experiences within considerations of labour market economics, human rights, anti-racism or justice. Immigration control, fashioned through debates about numbers and quotas, constitutes the dominant policy concern for the media and drives policy monitoring and reform. While large circulation tabloids like the *Mail* and *Sun* constantly claim popular sentiments as a writ to express anti-immigration agendas, there is a broad-based media consensus on the primacy of control as the shared common sense, as illustrated in the following series of headlines and leads:

Government secretly admits: We can’t cope with huge Gypsy invasion. A massive invasion of poverty-stricken gypsies from Eastern Europe could lead to economic disaster, ministers fear.

*(Daily Mail, 1 January 2004, p. 1)*
Under new arrangements, the Home Office hopes to spot more bogus refugees before they leave France. Migrationwatch UK, a pressure group opposed to mass immigration, claimed yesterday that more than five million immigrants could enter Britain over the next three decades. (*Independent*, 2 February 2004, p. 6)

Asylum: we’re too damn soft! One in five flock here! (*Star*, 23 January 2004, p. 7)

Adequate controls can make migration acceptable. (*Financial Times*, 4 April 2004, p. 19)

Political parties, sensitive to the popularity of anti-immigration headlines and stories, compete for headline-grabbing proposals for ever tighter controls such as detention camps, abolition of judicial review for asylum seekers, annual quotas and withdrawal from the 1951 convention on refugees and the European Convention on Human Rights. While the introduction of an immigration tribunal in the 1970s was initiated over the panic about ‘ruses’ and ‘subterfuge’ carried out by Commonwealth dependants, in 2004 the right of asylum seekers to judicial review of their claims was threatened altogether. A similar anti-immigration process in the late 1960s and 1970s attacked the immigration of Commonwealth dependants and British subjects from East Africa until a series of immigration laws finally shut the door.

The impact of the media on policy is difficult to discern with any real certainty but to suppose some kind of relationship would seem reasonable. A report into the impact of the media on the image of asylum seekers suggests that ‘different communicators – large and powerful newspapers, officials, local audiences, political groups – respond to one another interactively’, leading to messages being amplified and reinforced. If one set of communicators has a xenophobic or racist message, this is amplified until others are forced to respond in similar terms.38

In direct contradiction of this media-assisted political dynamic are economic facts that point to the critical role played by immigrants in maintaining healthy labour markets, contributing much-needed skills for high growth, adding to the tax base and compensating for emigration. Thirty years ago, the fact of progressively declining rates of West Indian and South Asian immigration also did little to alter the selective media discourse on the impact of immigration.

Positive stories about economic contributions made by immigrants appear mainly in *The Guardian* and *The Independent*, and are generally infrequent. With the notable exception of the *Mirror*, the tabloid press often reacts to positive reports on
immigration with attacks on the credibility of such facts, a journalistic courtesy not extended to hyperbolic alarms about the detrimental effects of immigration or explosive population projections. There is also an over-reliance on organised anti-immigration research organisations such as Migrationwatch, which helps to shape a dominant theme that portrays immigrants as troublesome social elements, unsuitable for national integration and a threat to community cohesion.

The public consciousness of race has become more complex over the last 30 years. Colour in the 1960s and 1970s marked out non-white Commonwealth immigrants. New forms of racisms today, however, link and express themselves more explicitly through ethnic and cultural difference. Ethnicity, culture and religion are also racialised in the popular imagination. These new expressions of racism are seen in media stereotypes about hyper-sexualised African immigrants bearing HIV infections or the racial profiling of Asian Muslims as terrorists.

There has also appeared a contemporary media strategy of creating opportunistic distinctions between old immigrants and new immigrants in stories dealing with the Government’s policy of dispersing asylum seekers around ‘Middle England’ townships:

Peterborough has a proud history of immigrants integrating seamlessly with the community. Past arrivals – mainly Indian, Pakistani and Ugandan – gratefully accepted the opportunity to start their lives afresh. But the new influx is vastly different they say.  
(Daily Mail, 30 August 2004, p. 16)

The new race time bomb: For 150 years, Derby has successfully assimilated immigrants. But now, with thousands of Iraqi Kurds dumped in the city’s midst, tensions are at an all-time high. Racism? Well, look who’s protesting the most.  
(Daily Mail, 3 January 2004, p. 28)

The above feature-length article goes on to emphasise the protest by ‘hard-working’ Pakistani and Indian residents at the presence of the new immigrants. This rhetorical strategy works to revise the historical record of trenchant white racism to earlier black and Asian immigrants and mobilises race-blind arguments to express panics about ‘asylum meltdown’, ‘asylum turmoil’ and ‘migrant tension’ in what are perceived to have been racially integrated and cohesive neighbourhoods. The alarms are not unlike those sounded decades ago during the settlement of black and Asian communities:
Britain had to face up to the problem of integration of immigrants with the population, and avoid a build-up of big concentrations of coloured people in our big cities, said Mr Richard Wood, MP (Cons., Bridlington) in Hull yesterday … 'If we are not going to fail with integration, then I think we must take this problem of concentration very seriously indeed, and try and avoid the build-up of coloured communities in large areas of our cities,' he said.  
(Yorkshire Post, 15 November 1969)

Racist discourse, therefore, does not disappear but resumes in new forms and configurations. The coded discourse of race is especially present in the genre of human-interest stories that focus on crimes committed by immigrants, a large number of them from African and Asian backgrounds. In the first two months of 2004 there were over 60 articles in this genre. These stories far outnumber the dozen or so articles that cover racially motivated crimes, civil injustice or institutional racism experienced by immigrants in the same period. The newsworthiness of immigrant crime stories is critical to perpetuating racial stereotypes in the media and fuels further panics about the presence of new immigrants. The following headlines are representative of the tone pursued in immigrant crime stories:

- An asylum seeker from South Africa admitted malicious bodily harm by infecting a lover with the HIV virus.  
  (Times, 1 January 2004, p. 18)

- Killer asylum driver – A bogus asylum-seeker.  
  (Daily Express, 6 January 2003, p. 1)

- Congolese asylum seeker who is convicted of rape. HIV positive.  
  (Daily Mail, 15 January 2004, p. 52)

In stories covering similar crimes committed by white British suspects, the race, ethnicity, nationality and residency status of the perpetrator is irrelevant to the headlines or the main body of the article. The crime is reported as an egregious act committed by an individual.

Racism is also strongly evident in the media language about white immigrants. The protracted incorporation of the UK into the European Union began 30 years ago with its entry into the Common Market. This prompted adverse changes in rules concerning immigration from Australia, New Zealand and Canada. The media response to this growing tension between an emergent European orientation and the ‘Old’ Commonwealth affiliation was markedly different to the steady panic over the ‘influx’ of ‘non-white’ immigration.
The media in this instance employed a proactive role to advocate white immigration. A ‘kith and kin’ campaign emerged in the press, led by the *Daily Express* in 1972. Arguments were laced with sentimentality about primordial Anglo-Saxon and familial ties as well as friendly gratitude for contributions in the allied war effort. Arguably, these sentiments should have been extended to non-white Commonwealth families and the millions of West Indian, African and Asian soldiers who served in the British forces, but, as the article declared:

> Indeed Labour’s policy of confusing the 25 million overseas British with hundreds of millions of Afro-Asians who do not even know where Britain is, is both stupid and mischief-making. *(Daily Express, 22 November 1972, p. 10)*

The desirability of certain white immigration, especially from white imperial settlers abroad, is currently played out in the media over the issue of white Zimbabwean immigrants. Similar ‘kith and kin’ arguments and the absence of a panic over white immigration in the media render the issue uncontroversial and for the most part invisible.

The anxiety over the effects of European Union membership re-emerges in 2004, and this time the fear is over the potential of a mass ‘influx’ of Eastern European ‘Gypsies’. Media panics about Roma and poor white immigrants from the EU are

| Table 7  A historical perspective on moral panics in the media |
|-----------------------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Moral panic                                | Period 1968–72 | 2004                     |
| Folk devils                                | ‘Bogus’ dependants | ‘Bogus’ asylum seekers |
|                                             | ‘Sham’ marriages   | Welfare ‘cheats’         |
|                                             | ‘Bogus’ students   | HIV carriers            |
|                                             | TB carriers        |                         |
| Mass influx                                | Kenyan Asians      | Eastern European Gypsies |
|                                             | Ugandan Asians     | EU economic migrants and students |
|                                             | High birth rates of ‘coloured’ immigrants | Asylum seekers in ‘Middle England’ |
| Cultural pathology and illiberal differences | Under-aged marriages – *Sikhs, Muslims* | Gang masters – *Chinese Muslims* |
|                                             | Polygamy – *Sikhs, Muslims* | Terrorism and flag burning – *Muslims* |
|                                             | Turbans – *Sikhs* | Hijab – *Muslims*        |
|                                             | Sexual promiscuity – *West Indians* | Sexual promiscuity – *Africans* |
|                                             |                     | Indolence – *Gypsies*    |
| Welfare state crisis                        | Housing, hospitals and schools | Housing, hospitals and legal aid |
| Desirable immigrants                        | *White Old Commonwealth with ‘kith and kin’ rights* | *White Zimbabweans with ‘kith and kin’ rights* |
frequently deployed and, when policy changes emerge to restrict and limit benefits access for new immigrants, they are heralded.

A multiplicity of media panics about new immigrants maintains a public perception of perpetual crisis about immigration policies and social problems (see Table 7). As before, this perception of a perpetual crisis is reiterated in spite of facts that point to declining asylum figures or urgent labour market gaps in the UK, to say nothing of the positive social impacts of immigration. The prevalence of everyday racism, racial harassment, discrimination and major humanitarian crises driving refugees and asylum seekers do not appear frequently as topics for regular news or investigative journalism in the print media. This imbalanced media discourse of a perpetual crisis over immigration and immigrants continues to influence adverse policy changes and has social impacts for new immigrants.
# 6 Comparing then and now

## Table 8 Summary of comparative framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>1971</th>
<th>2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conditions of exit</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global trends</td>
<td>Conflict/strife</td>
<td>Conflict/strife</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>International economic inequality</td>
<td>International economic inequality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Improved communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Economic globalisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Characteristics of entrants</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demographics</td>
<td>Net emigration (40,000)</td>
<td>Net immigration (153,000 in 2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Estimated 65 per cent ‘White’</td>
<td>Estimated 60 per cent ‘White’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5,000 immigrants from Caribbean</td>
<td>5,000 immigrants from Caribbean (2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21,000 immigrants from EU</td>
<td>89,000 immigrants from EU (not including 8 new member states) (2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>31,000 immigrants in ‘Other’ category</td>
<td>172,000 immigrants in ‘Other’ category</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal status</td>
<td>No demand for large-scale labour migration means few work visas</td>
<td>Need to reduce the numbers of people seeking asylum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Family reunification rights subordinate to restricting immigration</td>
<td>Large-scale demand for labour migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Government must demonstrate control of immigration system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Immigrants must be stopped from abusing the welfare state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour migration</td>
<td>Tight restrictions on unskilled and semi-skilled labour</td>
<td>Managed migration seeks to promote economic migration to meet skills gaps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Work permits only issued on evidence of a specific job</td>
<td>Work permits issued for highly skilled and low-skilled workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No special preference for Commonwealth citizens</td>
<td>Recruitment to female-dominated sectors of health and education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>c 60,000 work permits issued</td>
<td>Close monitoring of impact of new EU member states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Broad range of countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>181,432 work permits issued in 2004</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 8  Summary of comparative framework (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>1971</th>
<th>2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Family reunification</td>
<td>Increasing numbers using the family reunification route before 1971 restrictions are enacted. In 1967, 50,083 dependants were granted settlement from the New Commonwealth alone, this number fell to 21,337 by 1970</td>
<td>94,945 grants of settlement based on family reunification awarded in 2003 – double the number awarded in 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tension between certain communities and immigration officials over 'not related as claimed' decisions</td>
<td>Government announced plans to restrict entry of dependants who were not children or spouses to 'crack down' on chain migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asylum</td>
<td>Estimated only 3,000 asylum seekers granted refugee status</td>
<td>33,390 claims for asylum (a decline from a peak of 71,100 in 1999)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30,000 East African Asians were granted citizenship as British passport holders after Idi Amin expelled them from Uganda. Legislation was passed to close this route of entry by creating new definitions of citizenship that did not include the right to residence in the UK</td>
<td>4 per cent granted asylum and 9 per cent exceptional leave to remain (ELR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Roughly half of all claims for asylum were accepted (or granted ELR)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irregular migration</td>
<td>Apparently little irregular migration</td>
<td>Cause of public concern</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Highly publicised tragic cases have highlighted the role of illegal labour and attempts to bypass the immigration system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Exploitation of migrant workers with irregular immigration status</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Characteristics of the receiving context

| BME population            | Estimated at 1.4 million                                            | 4.6 million (2001)                                                   |
|                          | 3.5 million born outside of UK                                      | Increased proportion of BME population, African, Chinese and Bangladeshi |
|                          | Majority located in metropolitan areas                              | 4.9 million born abroad (2.6 million ethnically white)                |
|                          |                                                                      | Increased diversity and complexity of ethnicities and identities      |
|                          |                                                                      | Majority located in metropolitan areas                                |
Comparing then and now

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>1971</th>
<th>2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Politics and legislation</td>
<td>Immigration clearly and explicitly linked to race in public debate</td>
<td>Over half of the BME population is born in Britain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Restricting immigration seen as key to managing race relations</td>
<td>Tight controls on immigration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>dvatique clearly linked to race in public and political debate</td>
<td>Increased frequency of legislative change on immigration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increased frequency of legislative change on immigration</td>
<td>Need for formalised link between immigration and community cohesion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Need for formalised link between immigration and community cohesion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economics and labour participation</td>
<td>British economy entering a decline</td>
<td>British economy experiencing unprecedented continuous growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>29 per cent of workforce engaged in manufacturing industries</td>
<td>13 per cent of workforce engaged in manufacturing industries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>81 per cent of workforce in Britain</td>
<td>Service industries now employ 81 per cent of workforce in Britain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Service industries now employ 81 per cent of workforce in Britain</td>
<td>Growth of irregular labour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>Immigration a key topic in the print media</td>
<td>Immigration and asylum key topics in the print media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Only 7 per cent (1974) identify immigration/race relations as the topic that most concerns them</td>
<td>Opinion polls point to increasing concern about immigration (40 per cent identify it as most important issue facing Britain) and evidence that newspapers have a great impact on these concerns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Concern expressed over 'non-white' Commonwealth immigration</td>
<td>Concern expressed over those seeking asylum and migration from new EU member states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Framework for discussion based on control, numbers and quotas</td>
<td>Framework for discussion based on control, numbers and quotas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Small number of supportive interventions</td>
<td>Small number of supportive interventions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Media maintains a public perception of perpetual crisis about immigration</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Multi-ethnic Britain and new migration

In the report of the Commission on the Future of Multi-ethnic Britain, the Runnymede Trust provided a vision of a good society based on a community of communities and a community of citizens. The first part of this vision recognises the diversity of the various groups in Britain and the importance of community for every individual within them. By also emphasising the notion of a community of citizens the report simultaneously appealed to the values of cohesion and human rights.

Some might wonder how this vision of multi-ethnic Britain ties in with the complex issue of immigration in Britain today. For many, there is either no link between discussions on race and immigration, or such links are exploited only by extremist organisations. In the earlier chapters, we noted the links made between the notions of ‘race’ and ethnicity and immigration. To imagine that the only ugly signs of discrimination attach to ‘race’, a concept with dubious heritage, is to ignore the face of recent sectarian hatred, whether in Iraq, Rwanda or the Balkans. Perhaps more significantly, it is to misunderstand the worst genocide that was the Holocaust, but also the more proximate and presumably familiar problem of Northern Ireland.

For these reasons, it is surprising that received wisdom sees little link between racisms and a discourse of immigration control that discriminates against people of certain backgrounds and emphasises their illegal or ‘bogus’ nature. But the dominance of the understanding that ever-stricter immigration control is essential to good race relations, at least as currently deployed in Britain, is quite simply out of step with the vision of Britain described above. In this context, it is important to remember that being committed to ‘good race relations’ is not merely to furnish a badge of tolerance or pay lip service to the current diversity of Britain. It involves a commitment to ideals, especially the ideals of equal respect and human rights at the heart of democracy.

It is clear that migrants arrive in Britain from a more diverse range of countries than ever. Their experiences and reasons for migration remain equally diverse, although they are increasingly influenced by economic globalisation, transnational communities, conflict, war and international economic inequality. Research is more confident than ever about the economic and social contribution made by migrants to the UK, yet public opinion remains suspicious of immigration. Policy and media debates urge ever tighter controls on entry and disproportionate responses to fears of abuse of the welfare state, security and acts of terror. Suspicion of the motives of
immigrants has led the Government to monitor exceptionally closely the work patterns of Eastern European workers and to boast of success in reducing the number of asylum seekers in the same months that it wages war.

Race relations and immigration seem to operate institutionally at arm’s length within Government and in the NGO sector. Refugee communities are building new infrastructures, as they have not found their needs met by networks within black and minority ethnic communities. The ‘new immigrant’ is defined as different to the ‘old’, yet, as can be seen from the data above, the continuities far outweigh the differences. In a community of communities and a community of citizens, it is not size that counts or length of ‘membership’; all communities have a valuable contribution to make and deserve the recognition of their human rights and identity. In new migrants we have the opportunity to challenge and to develop further our commitment to cohesion, equality and difference:

Cohesion in such a community derives from widespread commitment to certain core values, both between communities and within them: equality and fairness; dialogue and consultation; toleration, compromise and accommodation; recognition of and respect for diversity; and – by no means least – determination to confront and eliminate racism and xenophobia.

(CFMEB, 2000, p. 56)

The vision provided by the Parekh Report therefore suggests a new approach to immigration. Once we recognise the importance of democratic values, particularly human rights and equal respect, it becomes clear that both the portrayal of and policy towards immigrants is wholly inconsistent with our commitments. The increasing diversity of our population therefore becomes a challenge, but the challenge is to affirm the importance of human rights in the context of fears, lack of knowledge and continuing racisms. If we want to build on the long history of democracy and human rights that has been so important to the British identity, we should adopt a vision of multi-ethnic Britain that treats with equal dignity and respect not only our settled black and minority ethnic populations but those who want to settle in Britain too.
Chapter 1

1 For general studies on UK migration, see *The Impact of Immigration* (Panayi, 1999); *Immigration and the Nation-state* (Joppke, 1999); *On Immigration and Refugees* (Dummett, 2001); *Philosophies of Integration* (Favell, 2001); *Explaining Trends in UK Immigration* (Hatton, 2003).

2 It also gives us the opportunity to reconsider *Colour and Citizenship*, Jim Rose’s seminal discussion in the late 1960s (Rose, 1969).

3 Recently the former political editor of *The Sun* was one of three judges on a reality television show, *Vote for Me*, which apparently sought to bring more common sense to Parliament. To the consternation of many viewers and audience members, a solicitor and ex-convict won the competition on the basis of stopping all immigration and, further, deporting some current residents.

4 Though polls should perhaps be treated carefully, see www.mori.com/polls/2003/migration.shtml, according to which: ‘Most Britons (70 per cent) agree “It is a good thing that Britain is a multi-cultural society”, and even more, 87 per cent, agree that “you do not have to be white to be British”.’ See also reports by the Commission for Racial Equality (especially CRE, 1997, 2002). The VSO’s ‘Cultural Breakthrough’ programme further highlights changing attitudes at: www.culturalbreakthrough.co.uk.

5 See *The Future of Multi-ethnic Britain: The Parekh Report* (CFMEB, 2000); *Cohesion, Community and Citizenship* (Runnymede, 2002); *Developing Community Cohesion* (Runnymede, 2003); *Social Capital, Civil Renewal and Ethnic Diversity* (Runnymede, 2004).

Chapter 2

1 From *Integration: Mapping the Field* (Castles et al., 2002).

2 *Immigration and Fortress Europe* (Geddes, 2000).
The Runnymede Trust had also developed a substantial literature that helps reveal how the issue of immigration was then understood. Among others, see: *Immigration and Race Relations* (Nandy, 1970a); *How to Calculate Immigration Statistics* (Nandy, 1970b); *Control of Commonwealth Immigration* (Bottomley and Sinclair, 1970); *Commonwealth Immigration: The Economic Effects* (Jones and Smith, 1970); *Race and the Press: Four Essays by Clement Jones, Peter Harland, Hugo Young and Harold Evans* (Runnymede, 1970); *Race in the Inner City: Report from Handsworth, Birmingham* (John, 1970); *Here to Live: Study of Race Relations in an English Town* (Jenkins, 1971); *Attitudes of Young Immigrants: A Survey of Young Immigrant Males* (Evans, 1971); *Immigration Bill, 1971* (Bindman and Warren Evans, 1971); *Brothers to All Men?: Report on Trade Union Actions and Attitudes on Race Relations* (Meth, 1972); *Invisible Immigrants: Statistical Survey of Immigration into the United Kingdom of Workers and Dependents from Italy, Portugal and Spain* (MacDonald and MacDonald, 1972).

During the week of 23 January 2005.

Data from Table 7.2 of Population Trends, which are in turn derived from the International Passenger Survey and other sources (see http://www.statistics.gov.uk/STATBASE/ssdataset.asp?vlnk=8688).

The Old Commonwealth refers to Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Canada. New Commonwealth countries include the Caribbean, Asian and other African countries that were formerly part of the British Empire.

In 1971 the UK was still outside the EU and so some of the increase can be explained by its admission in 1973 when its border laws were made more consistent with those of the EU.

Data compiled by the Home Office (Haque *et al.*, 2002).

Chapter 3

For an overview of the Irish experience of discrimination in Britain, see *Discrimination and the Irish Community in Britain* (Hickman and Walter, 1997).

A poll conducted by MORI (9 April 2005) for *The Observer Sunday Mirror* found that 70 per cent of respondents wanted stricter immigration controls (see http://www.mori.com/polls/2005/obs050409.shtml).
Chapter 4

1 The figures for 1971 are not anomalous. In 1966 and 1969 the balance was minus 80,000, minus 60,000 in 1970 and minus 50,000 in 1973. 1983 was the first year net immigration was recorded in Britain, though figures remained barely positive until the 1990s. See ‘International migration 1990’ (Bailey, 1992). However, the numbers were nearly even in 1972 (minus 11,000) because of the numbers of East African Asians admitted as British passport holders. For contemporary accounts, see two Runnymede publications: *Citizens Without Status* (Lester, 1972) and *Brown Britons: The Crisis of the Ugandan Asians* (O’Brien, 1972).

2 On West Indian migration, see *Staying Power: the History of Black People in Britain* (Fryer, 1984); *Black Men, White Cities* (Katznelson, 1973); *West Indian Migration to Britain* (Peach, 1968); *Windrush: The Irresistible Rise of Multi-racial Britain* (Phillips and Phillips, 1998).


4 For further discussion of the gendered nature of migration, see *Gendered Migrations*, IPPR Asylum and Migration Working Paper 6 (Kofman et al., 2005).

5 Data from Table 7.2 of Population Trends, which are in turn derived from the International Passenger Survey and other sources. See http://www.statistics.gov.uk/STATBASE/ssdataset.asp?vlnk=8688.


8 *Controlling Our Borders* (Home Office, 2005b).

9 See *Blaming the Victim* (Kaye, 1998) and ‘What the papers said’ (Khan, 2001). See also the section on ‘Media portrayal’ in Chapter 5 of this paper.


11 Clarke and Salt (2003, p. 569).

12 *Control of Immigration* (Dudley, 2004); and Home Office press release (2005c).

13 *Labour Migration to the UK* (IPPR, 2004).

14 At the time of going to press, the Government was consulting on proposed changes to the system, see Home Office (2005d) *Selective Admission: Making Migration Work for Britain*.

15 *Selective Admission: Making Migration Work for Britain* (Home Office, 2005d)


17 See note 6 in this chapter.

18 *Selective Admission: Making Migration Work for Britain* (Home Office, 2005d).

19 *Asylum Policies: Part of the Solution or Part of the Problem?* (Ingleby, 2002). All statistics in this paragraph are from this document. According to Ingleby the numbers of asylum seekers to Europe peaked around 1992 at 700,000 and, by 1999, had decreased to 400,000, probably because of ‘the effect of the restrictive measures that had been put in place’. It may be that numbers coming to the UK declined at a later date, not only because of restrictive measures, but also because of a lag on overall numbers as they moved westwards. Many attribute the rise in asylum seekers to the fall of the Berlin Wall and Communism in Eastern Europe, which opened up borders. Not surprisingly, countries further to the east, most notably Germany, first received the bulk of such population movement, while numbers to Britain peaked only in 2002.
What’s new about new immigrants in twenty-first century Britain?

20 See note 1 in this chapter.


23 According to the ILO website, ‘of the 80 to 97 million migrant workers and their dependants now in countries other than their own, it is estimated that perhaps no less than 15 percent are working on an irregular basis. This development may, in part, be attributed to the increasing commercialization of the private recruitment process and the growing practice among developed countries of applying unduly restrictive immigration policies.’ (For resources on irregular migration see: http://www.le.ac.uk/law/celi/resource.html and www.migpolgroup.com).

24 After the 1965 Act, fewer than 5,000 voucher holders from the New Commonwealth were allowed in, though over 40,000 dependants were admitted in the late 1960s and early 1970s. See *Immigration from the Commonwealth: How Many Dependants?* (Runnymede, 1969) with data taken from *The Dependants of the Coloured Commonwealth Population of England and Wales* (Eversley and Sukdeo, 1969).

25 ‘Polish workers lost in a strange land find work in UK does not pay’, *The Guardian* (Lawrence, 2005a).

26 *Stopping the Traffic* (Kelly and Regan, 2000).

27 This report, ‘Forced labour and migration to the UK’, was jointly commissioned by the ILO and TUC but has yet to be published, apparently because of its sensitivity for the Government. The quote comes from a review of the report in *The Guardian* by Hsiao-Hung Pai entitled ‘Damning migrant report delayed: Government fears pre-election backlash’ on 3 February 2005.
Chapter 5


2 See citations in note 4 in Chapter 1.

3 This concern arguably extends to the use of the term 'black and minority ethnic'. Given the racialised or at least ethnicised description of asylum seekers and others from Eastern and Central Europe, the term ‘white’ is becoming more and more unhelpful for thinking about identity in Britain. A similar concern has been expressed in the past by the Irish population, whose history and experience of discrimination made many of them reject their categorisation as ‘white’. An obvious solution is to include such groups in the BME category, though this raises further difficulties.

4 This is given in Lomas (1973, p. 26). All statistics for this period are from this document.


7 See *Migrants in the UK* (Haque *et al.*, 2002). Today, 40 per cent of all migrants live in London, making up more than one-quarter of the capital’s total population.

8 All data in this paragraph are from National Statistics: http://www.statistics.gov.uk/cci/nugget.asp?id=767.


10 Haque *et al.* (2002).


12 For an overview of discussions on transnationalism and migration see Vertovec (2004).
What's new about new immigrants in twenty-first century Britain?


14 For explanations that focus on the importance of race in immigration policy see ‘The 1951-55 Conservative government and the racialisation of black immigration’ (Carter *et al.*, 1987); *The Politics of Immigration* (Layton-Henry, 1992); ‘The immigration issue in British politics, 1948–1964’ (Deakin, 1972); *British Immigration Policy since 1939* (Spencer, 1997). For a different account see *Citizenship and Immigration in Post-war Britain* (Hansen, 2000).


17 The creation of a separate form of British citizenship, finally ending the rights of Commonwealth subjects to enter, was completed only in 1981 with the passage of the British Nationality Act.

18 See speeches by: Rt Hon. Robert Carr, MP, to Conservative Party Conference, 10–13 October 1973; Home Secretary Carr to the Annual Dinner of the Diplomatic and Commonwealth Writers’ Association of Britain, 22 February 1973; David Lane, MP, 22 June 1974: ‘Immigration remained at a low level in the first quarter of 1974. It is essential that it should be kept down’; and many others during this period.

19 The influential Cabinet member Richard Crossman is on record as arguing that Jim Callaghan greatly assisted the chances of the Labour Party in elections from 1964–70 by stopping the immigration of blacks and Asians (see Crossman, 1977, p. 941). Crossman also expressed concern about the Labour Party being seen to let in a ‘flood’ of immigrants, and his views were widely known both inside and outside the Labour Party.

20 This sentiment increased following the 1964 Election, in which the Shadow Foreign Secretary Patrick Gordon Walker lost his seat in Smethwick, despite the fact that Labour came to power on a substantial swing. Peter Griffiths, the Conservative candidate, refused to distance himself from supporters who published the slogan: ‘If you want a nigger for a neighbour vote Labour’.

21 See, among many others, Bottomley and Sinclair (1970) and research cited in note 23 in Chapter 4.

23 For a sample of such thinking, see *Firmer, Faster, Fairer* (Home Office, 1998a); and the Home Office *Departmental Report* (2003b, pp. 92–102). Also Tony Blair’s ‘Controlled migration’ speech (27 April 2004). For an international perspective, see *Managing Migration* (Ghosh, 2000).

24 In its review of asylum seekers for 2003, the Home Office trumpets eight key changes that have ‘contributed to the fall in the number of asylum seekers’: (1) non-suspensive appeals, with 24 mainly eastern European countries listed as safe and from which asylum claims are assumed to be ‘clearly unfounded’; (2) new visa requirements for Zimbabwe and Jamaica; (3) the closure of the Sangatte reception centre in France; (4) new technology deployed in freight searches in France, Belgium and the Netherlands; (5) restricted access to support, requiring that asylum seekers must contact NASS within three days of arrival; (6) fast-track processing and detention; (7) extension of the requirement for airside transit visas when waiting for connecting flights; and (8) extension of juxtaposed border controls in Calais, Dunkirk and Boulogne. All of these measures match what we have termed the ‘control paradigm’.

25 Adapted from tables ‘Employee jobs by sex and industry 1978–2000’, Social Trends 31 (ONS, 2001) and Table 4.12, Social Trends 35 (ONS, 2005).

26 See the 1966 10% Sample Census, Special Tabulations Table 13 – Economic Activity Tables Part 1, quoted in *Colour and Citizenship* (Rose, 1969). This sample census estimates that up to a quarter of Caribbean immigrants working in London were employed in the transport industries.

27 Haque *et al.* (2002).

28 For further discussion see: *Young Caribbean Men and the Labour Market* (Berthoud, 1999); *We Regret to Inform You* (CRE, 1996); *Race Research for the Future: Ethnicity in Education, Training and the Labour Market* (Pathak, 2000); *Minority Ethnic Participation and Achievements in Education, Training and the Labour Market* (Owen *et al.*, 2000); *Moving on Up: Racial Equality and the Corporate Agenda* (Runnymede, 2000); *Trends in the Labour Market Participation of Ethnic Minority Groups* (Sly *et al.*, 1999).

29 In her article, ‘How many work illegally in the UK? It’s not easy to find out’, Felicity Lawrence (2005b) cites estimates ranging from 100,000 to 500,000 to 2 million, though higher estimates tend to include legal residents and British workers.
What's new about new immigrants in twenty-first century Britain?

working in the illegal economy. She quotes two experts on the subject, Bridget Anderson and John Salt, as being highly sceptical of any estimate. The IOM (World Migration Report 2000) estimates the upper limit of unauthorised migrants in Europe at 3 million in 1998, as compared to less than 2 million in 1991. The Home Office is undertaking some research to discover the extent of irregular migration starting with preliminary qualitative research, see *A Survey of the Illegally Resident Population in Detention in the UK* (Black *et al.*, 2005).

30 See note 24 in Chapter 4 and related text.


32 Statistics were compiled using the Lexis-Nexis Academic search engine for the broadsheet newspapers and the Daily Mail Online search engine. The search was conducted for general news items dealing with the subject of immigration and asylum seekers. If other categories had been included, the figures would have been higher. For instance, a search of all categories on Mail Online would yield 339 items for immigration and 180 items for asylum seekers in the past year. The CRE press clippings also provide an excellent resource for monitoring press views.

33 http://www.mori.com/polls/trends/issues12.shtml. In the earliest such poll undertaken by MORI in September 1974, only 7 per cent of those surveyed identified immigration/race relations as ‘the most important issue’.

34 *You are what you Read? How Newspaper Readership is Related to Views* (Duffy and Rowden, 2005).

35 See citations in note 2 in Chapter 3; and *Attitudes towards Refugees and Asylum Seekers: A Survey of Public Opinion* (MORI, 2002 online) and BBC’s online article ‘Media linked to asylum violence’ (14 July 2004).

36 *Folk Devils and Moral Panics* (Cohen, 1987).

37 One way the focus on immigration and its control is justified is by claiming that newspapers or politicians are only voicing the concerns of the general public. However, it is hard to generalise the idea that newspapers or politicians raise political issues solely or always on the basis of public attitudes. Consider the views on Iraq or even the death penalty.
Chapter 7


2. A recent opinion poll exhibits the lack of knowledge about asylum and immigration by the British public. Whereas less than 2 per cent of the world’s asylum seekers are in Britain, the public estimates the figure at 25 per cent. The young are even less informed, believing that 31 per cent of the world’s asylum seekers are in Britain (see http://www.mori.com/polls/2002/refugee.shtml).
Bibliography


What’s new about new immigrants in twenty-first century Britain?


Home Office (1977) ‘Immigration control must be firm but fair’, press release, 2 April


What's new about new immigrants in twenty-first century Britain?


What's new about new immigrants in twenty-first century Britain?


Speeches

Tony Blair, ‘Controlled migration’, speech at London Business School, hosted by the CBI, 27 April 2004. Available at http://www.labour.org.uk/tbmigrationspeech/


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