ECONOMIC ANTHROPOLOGY OF PRECOLONIAL SENEGAMBIA FROM THE FIFTEENTH THROUGH THE NINETEENTH CENTURIES

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INTRODUCTION

Historically, Senegambia extended far beyond the present frontiers of Senegal and included the two complete basins of the Senegal and Gambia Rivers from their sources in the upper plateaus of the Futa Jalon to their openings onto the Atlantic Ocean. It was a vast area with the northern boundary north of the Senegal river basin, the southern one at the Rio Grande, and the eastern one at the Euting. All aspects of the region have reached their present form with the influences of history and economics, and only by considering this great geographic whole can one today understand the problems of economic integration in relation to the present frontiers of Senegal, Gambia, Mauritania, Mali, Guinea Bissau, and Guinea Conakry. This region lies at the junction of two great historical fronts of West Africa: the Sahara and the Sudan. But it has also been strongly subjected to the effects of a third front, that of the ocean, with the arrival of Europeans at the end of the fifteenth century. This last influence, which without a doubt dominated the period of the fifteenth through nineteenth centuries, led to the establishment of European bases on the coast and to trading in slaves, gum arabic, leather, gold, and ivory. For that reason, the integration process of Senegambia into a capitalist economy was instrumental in the socio-economic and political evolution of this area.

The Atlantic slave trade that dominated the area in this period substantially influenced mainland population trends, leading to decrease rather than growth and showing westward and southward migratory movements. The trade also contributed to the physiognomy of the states, which were very fragmented, and to a regression in
economic production. In general, opposition between theocratic states that were multinationally oriented and militaristic monarchies hostile to militant Islam and dependent on the Atlantic trade constitutes the fabric of Senegambian history in the era of mercantile colonialism.

The aim of this chapter is to analyze the historical background of the area in order to understand the modern phenomenon of migration with regard to economic development. It was, in fact, during the course of this long period of time that present populations became established. We will retrace the production methods along the large commercial axes and explore the socioeconomic dynamics of the formation of the local states under the influence of the Atlantic trade dominated by France, Portugal, England, and Holland. This will enable us to understand better the various changes that the Senegambian societies endured during the initial long precolonial period and then during colonization and, finally, the questions posed today by the potential economic integration of the fragmented post-colonial nation-states with their artificial frontiers.

A study of this area's evolution, particularly in its economic and demographic aspects, is greatly limited by the scarcity of quantitative data in the archives and written documents for early precolonial Senegambia. Nevertheless, we have used numerous monographs covering most of the historical regions of Senegambia. There is still no historical synthesis for the whole area. The only regional study, that by Philip Curtin, for all its merits, aims on a very important point. This is that the author neglected, for obvious ideological reasons, to study and interpret all the consequences of Atlantic slave trade that dominated Senegambian societies.

SENEGAMBIA FROM THE FIFTEENTH TO THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

For a long time, practically up to the fifteenth century, Senegambia was a dependency of the Sudan and of the Sahara—before being subjected to the influence of the ocean with the arrival of the Europeans.

Sudanese and Saharan Dependency

As Yves Person has said in relation to the Sudanese world, Senegambia is a dead end, a cul de sac where cultural waves from the east, the epicenter of Sudanese civilization, come to expire on the beaches of an ocean that leads nowhere. But very soon, at least from the eighth century onward, innovations came from the north, from the Saharan front of Islam. Whereas the Saharan front, through trans-Saharan trade, assured an opening to the north for Senegambia (Tekur and Silla) toward the Mediterranean world, the Sudanese, with its Islamic elements, was felt essentially along the River Gambia.

In fact, the influence of the Sahara was confined to the northern region of Senegambia, in particular the Senegal river basin where sedentary people bartered their foodstuffs and slaves for horses, salt, and products made in Maghrib, which were carried in small lots by camel caravans. In this northern zone of Senegambia, a notable tendency was the gradual displacement of black people from the north toward the south as a result of progressive aridness in the Sahel zones and of pressure from the Arabo-Berber nomads of the eastern Sahara. Against this background in the eleventh century, the Almoravid movement took place, and its Islamic military left lasting traces on the banks of the Senegal River before embarking on the conquest of Morocco and the Iberian peninsula.

However, the major part of Senegambia remained a direct dependency of western Sudan, which had a marked influence until and even after the sixteenth century. This influence, particularly from Mali, was the origin of the transformation of lineage societies into states and of the insertion of Senegambia into the long-distance trade circuits of the Sudan.

In fact, the Mandinka who already controlled the gold mines of Bure and Bambuk, tried very early on to control the salt mines of the ocean coast. And so, at the height of its power, Mali began veritable colonization along the Gambian River. To the south, the Mandinka founded Gabu (Guinea Bissau), Niumi, Niani, and Wuli along the river by pushing back or assimilating the autochthonous peoples of the Bajar group. The Mandinka were also the ancestors of the Gulewar dynasty who founded the Sin and Salum kingdoms in Serer territory. To escape Mali hegemony, which spread to most of Senegambia, the Jola concentrated in the Casamance swamps. However, in the middle of the fourteenth century, a succession crisis following the death of Mansa Suleyman in 1360 led to the establishment of the Jolof Empire, which grouped together a rather loose federation of the Wolof kingdoms of Jolof, Walo, Kajer, and Bawol. Jolof, founded by Ndadyafrican Ndany, thus dominated most of Senegambia and made Mali retreat toward the south of the River Gambia.

However, Jolof hegemony burnt out quickly and broke up permanently in the middle of the sixteenth century following a Fulbe invasion led by Koli Tengena. This invasion completely overturned the political balance of Senegambia. Beginning about 1450, the Fulbe
of the Sahel had crossed the River Gambia to settle on the high plateau of Futa Jalon. From there, around 1490, the Denyanka, led by Tengela and his son, Koli Tengela, set off again. They crossed over the Gambia again and overthrew the Malinkes of Wuli and other dependencies of Mali; then they conquered Gajaga and the Tukular country, which became known as Futa Toro. This movement, well illustrated by Map 2.1, involved one of the largest population movements to our knowledge in the history of Senegambia since the fifteenth century. Alvares de Almada described this “Futa invasion, which crossed the River Gambia from north to south, razing everything as far as the Rio Grande where the Fulas were defeated by the Baofadas. The invaders filed in the River Gambia with stones at a place called ‘the Fula crossing,’ twelve leagues above Lame, in order to cross it.” The impressive number of Koli’s companions, which increased with the addition of local inhabitants along the way, is confirmed by Lemos Colho and Joao de Barros. In any case, because of its size, the invasion drastically changed the demographic map of the whole of Senegambia. The movement, which departed from the Sudan, affected successively Bundu, Futa Jalon, the Rio Grande, the Gambia, and the Senegal river basin, leaving behind at each step numerous of Koli’s travelling companions.

This vast population movement took place at a time when Senegambia was about to be involved in Portuguese trade, gradually putting an end to its dependence on the Sudan. But before launching into this new era dominated by the Atlantic trade, it would be best to describe the political, economic, and social structures of Senegambia, which were to be greatly changed during the course of the following centuries.

Political, Economic, and Social Organization of Senegambian Societies

Despite the diversity of population—Wolof, Tukular, Fulbe, Peul, Mandinka, Serer, and so forth—this area had a certain unity of social and political organization, due to having had the same influences over the centuries. The influence of the Mandinka and of Islam is evident in the transition of these societies from a lineage-based political organization into states. Thus the monarchical state confirmed the hierarchization of the society, which had been based either on a matrilineral (Wolof and Serer) or on a patrilinear system (Fulbe, Tukular, and Mandinka). In both cases, the social and political organization rested on a subordinate relationship between a free class and a nonfree class. The Sudanese influence introduced
a system of endogamous occupational castes, which ranked at the bottom of the freeborn. Oligarchical political structures were closely linked to the social system. Most of these were monarchies elected by a college of nobles (Seh Ak Baor in Walu, the Grand Jaraf in the Jolof and Sin). Power was greatly limited in practice by many rights to which the various social groups, even those in the servile class, were entitled.

Because of lack of documents, however, it is difficult to unravel the political, social, and economic dynamics of Senegambia before its contact with Europe. Senegambian societies were, in the large majority, essentially agricultural with a self-sufficient domestic economy, except for certain nomadic Fulbe groups that traveled down the banks of the River Senegal between the plateau of Futa Jalon to the Ferlo. The fundamental characteristic of this self-sufficient economy was, according to Claude Meillassoux,

the knowledge of agricultural and artisanal techniques in order to use a fairly high level of productivity to meet the food demands necessary to maintain and reproduce its members as well as to repeat the agricultural cycle. Using the land as a means of production, which yields its product at term due to the prior investment of energy. Using human energy as the dominant source of energy in agricultural and artisanal labor. Using individual agricultural production methods that need no more than the investment of individual labor. 6

Meillassoux continues,

Production was thus founded on a certain collectivism based on the lineage or its substitute, the extended family. The land, being indissociable from the relationship of production and reproduction which enabled its use, could not be subjected to 'appropriation' for itself by which it would be separated from the social context which gave it an economic use and worth. 7

Land was a patrimony belonging jointly to members of the domestic community in which the self-sufficient economy, far from being at a subsistence level, was integrated into regional and foreign trade.

First there was the exchange of agricultural produce with produce from animals. This complementarity was a permanent factor that ruled relations between the sedentary people of the River Senegal and the nomadic Berbers of present-day Mauritania. It was due to the Berbers that the river valley was linked to trans-Saharan trade, trading slaves for horses and also gold for manufactured products from the Maghrib. Although, since the rise of Mali, the River Senegal was slightly off the main trans-Saharan trade routes, its whole length did constitute an important trade axis. The inhabitants of the delta of the River Senegal traded salt from the rich salt mines of Ganjol and salt fish for millet with the people of Futa Toro and the upper river basin, as far upstream as Kayes. Similarly, the northeastern part of Senegambia was linked to the long trade routes, which ended at the trading centers of the River Niger, by the Soninkes of Gagejaja who monopolized the gold trade of Bambuk. The Soninke were spread throughout the area, and Gageja was the terminal for various trade routes supplied by horse from the east, by donkey from the south, and by camel from the north. At the same time, it was a distribution point for trade along the River Senegal. 8

The second Senegambian commercial axis was the River Gambia, dominated by the exchange of salt from Gahdi and the coast for the textiles of Mali and kola from the forests. This trade was the monopoly of Mandinka Jula and Jaxanke Jula, who came from Ja on the Niger River. They settled towns from the gold mines of Bambuk up to the Lower Gambia and along toward the forests in the south, in Sierra Leone. It was they who, along with the Soninke (in reality, western Jula), assured the liaison of the east-west route between the upper Niger and the upper Gambia and then the northsouth kola route across Futa Jalon. 9

This long-distance trading was limited to luxury products—salt, gold, kola, horses, textiles—and slaves. It reflected the complementarity of the natural zones of West Africa, that is, forest, savanna, and desert, in relation to which Senegambia was until then a sort of cul de sac and an outlet. This long-distance trading was monopolized by communities of specialist merchants often confused with the ethnic groups of the same names, the Zwaya Berbers, the Jaxankes, and the Soninkes. The trade was also associated with Islam. This is because there was a certain demarcation between the military-political groups that ruled countries and the Muslim trading communities that were semi-autonomous enclaves linked together across national boundaries. 10 This was the heritage of the merchant Islam of the medieval empires of the Sudan, which in Senegambia did not have the opportunity to change fundamentally the sociopolitical structures of the different kingdoms that were already established. So the absence of an important dynamic merchant class did not alter the mode of production of the domestic economies insofar as the only resource, the land, was the common patrimony of the various communities that had about the same level of productivity throughout
Senegambia. We should say that, with the exception of the River Senegal where the population density was high very early on, the question of land has never been a big problem because shifting cultivation, the model that predominated in the area, entailed the gradual displacement of population. Moreover, the fact that there was plenty of free land explains to a great extent the ability to absorb and integrate foreigners in the various communities of Senegambia. Thus the question of land was largely not involved in conflicts between communities or states, with the exception of the constant conflict between nomadic and sedentary people.

However, it is evident that well before the fifteenth century the Lamanté system, the earliest method of land tenure, had already been replaced by a system of fiefs and charters developed by the ruling monarchies of Walo, Kadjor, Sin, Futu, and so on, with the tribute due superiors becoming higher and higher. However, as suggested by Abdoulaye Bara Diop, monarchy does not fundamentally change the inalienable right to the land. Rather, the kings, while respecting the right of the Lamants, the landowners, took more and more of the free land to distribute to relatives and allies among their entourages (warriors, nobles, marabouts) and even to encroach on the land of the Lamanté. This gave rise to a system of fiefs and charters and led very quickly to the feudalization of tenure. But the pattern of land ownership did not alter under monarchies in one fundamental aspect, which seems to us to be the distinction between ownership and right of usufruct, so that eminent domain existed only when these two rights belonged to one and the same person. So, with this self-sufficient economy, as Pathe Diagne says,

The wealth is in the granaries, and in the herds, of course, but prestige is in the blood, in the birthright. For this peasant aristocracy which had not completely abandoned working the land, material equality was a fact. But hierarchical rank and status remained of foremost importance and explained, as Boubacar Ly suggested so correctly, that the feeling of honor was an essential stimulant to social dynamism.

However, the simple needs of the more privileged classes and the relative poverty of the aristocracies in power did not preclude the emergence, from this period on, of tensions and contradictions within the Senegambian societies based on inequality and the hierarchy of the various social groups.

The internal dynamics outlined here profoundly accelerated and reinforced from the end of the fifteenth century in the wake of Senegambia’s contact with European maritime powers. This external factor is important in explaining the political, social, and economic transformation insofar as the pre-capitalist Senegambian societies endured the assault of Europe while it was in full capitalist evolution and created locally a veritable economic and political domination, which radically altered the course of their destiny. From that time onward, the evolution of Senegambia could no longer be understood without considering this external influence. It was dominated by European trade, which conquered the international market by monopolizing trade with Asia, Africa, and America from the fifteenth century onward.

Atlantic Trade and Restructuring of the States

The arrival of Europeans on the coast, particularly the Portuguese at the end of the fifteenth century, radically changed the course of this area’s history. The maritime fringe became the principal front of acculturation. The installation of the Portuguese at Arguin around 1445 was the first victory of the boat over the caravan, which meant that trade was diverted away from traditional trading routes to the profit of Atlantic trade. The Portuguese, in their pursuit of gold, attempted to penetrate the Sudan by the waterways of the River Senegal and, particularly, of the River Gambia. Ultimately, the failure of an attempt to construct a fort in 1488 on the banks of the River Senegal, the difficulty of navigating the Felou Falls area of the Senegal River, and Mandinka domination in Gambia meant that the Portuguese had to trade on the coast and at the two deltas without acquiring a territorial base. This trade in gold, ivory, leather, and slaves marked the beginning of a profound remodeling of the political map of Senegambia.

In fact, during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Portuguese trade changed the destiny of this cul de sac; it became the main access of the whole hinterland of the Sudan toward the sea. From that time on, Senegambia would also be subjected to external demands and be somewhat transformed according to these demands, which would determine not only the internal evolution of the area but also the form European colonization would take.

Originally, the establishment of the Portuguese at Arguin and at the mouth of the Senegal and Gambia Rivers was intended to divert the gold from the Sudan toward the Atlantic. The River Gambia, specifically Kuntaur, was the principal outlet for the declining Mali empire. Nevertheless, it is difficult to evaluate the amount of gold traded from the mines of Bambuk (between the Falémé and the Bafing) and Bure (on the upper Niger) via Senegambia. Philip Curtin estimates, with every necessary reservation on his figures, that the export of gold did not exceed 35 kgs per year for the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, and that only in good years. We must also include in the Senegambian market the Arguin trading center that, through the nomadic camel drivers, would certainly be supplied from Bambuk. Vitorino Magalhães Godinho estimates the annual ceiling of receipts from Arguin during the last quarter of the fifteenth century and the first quarter of the sixteenth as between 20 and 25 kgs, that is, from 5,500 to 7,000 cruzados. He adds that from 1542 the trading station was utterly spoiled by illicit trading, the amount of which is difficult to assess, and also by the fact that the Portuguese could from then onward trade directly at the mouth of the Senegal and Gambia Rivers.

The arrival of the Portuguese by sea and river in Upper Gambia, not far from the foothills of Futa Jalon, represented a turning point in the history of Sudanese gold, which they poured into the Kuntaur market. This new commercial route gave access to the coast from the River Senegal as far away as Sierra Leone and was a contributing factor in the severance of the Bambuk and Bure regions from the Niger river basin and the Sahara to become a permanent part of Senegambia. Our research suggests that the trade of Senegambia has been underestimated and was in fact highly coveted by different European powers from the sixteenth century on.

Apart from gold, the leather trade was very important before the slave trade era. In the sixteenth century, Senegambia exported between 6,000 and 7,000 skins per year, reaching a peak of 150,000 skins in 1660 because of the high demand from Europe. Coelho notes that around 1660 from 35,000 to 40,000 skins per year were loaded at the port of Rufisque.

To this we must add the trade of beeswax and ivory. According to Coelho, the Afro-Portuguese dealing between Cacheu and Goree brought between 1,500 and 2,000 quintals of ivory and beeswax to the Dutch. In 1673, non-Portuguese trade represented about 3,000 quintals of beeswax and ivory per year. After 1685, the English companies became the principal exporters, with 20 or 30 tons of beeswax and from 20 to 30 tons of ivory per boat.

Lastly, there is the slave trade, and one often forgets Senegambia's importance in this during the course of the eighteenth and seventeenth centuries. As far as Curtin is concerned, Senegambia was certainly the first source of slaves shipped directly to Europe by sea and continued to be the principal source during the sixteenth century. But he estimated the number of slaves as between 250 and 1,000 per year for the period 1526-50, and two centuries later the figure was about the same for the coastal region encompassing the Wolof, Fulbe, Serer, and the Mandinkas of Gambia. So, as the overall volume of the West African slave trade toward America increased, the Senegambian proportion dropped from 20 percent to less than 1 percent of the total. It is evident that Curtin underestimated beyond measure the substantial demographic depression caused by the slave trade in Africa and, in particular, in the case of Senegambia. Larenzo Coelho told of a ship leaving Arguin in August 1513 that alone transported 145 slaves, and Godinho estimated the annual traffic at from 800 to 1,000 from this faraway Saharan locality, which had been established in order to divert trade from the caravan routes to the benefit of the Portuguese. Unfortunately, we lack figures for this trade, which was important during the early development of the Cape Verde Islands, of Madeira, and, later, at the beginning of the sugar economy, of the Antilles because of the geographic position of Senegambia. Pereira estimated Portuguese trade around 1500 at more than 3,500 slaves between the Senegal River and Sierra Leone, and the Portuguese authorities estimated trade at Cacheu before 1640 at 3,000 slaves per year. In 1660, pointing out the advantages of Portuguese trade in the Fleuve, Lavangha mentioned that slaves represented the essential part of the traffic. Moreover, trading with the Cape Verde Islands was possible because slaves had been transported there from Senegambia. In 1582, the population of Pogo and Santiago consisted of 1,608 whites, 400 free slaves, and 18,700 slaves who specialized in the cotton industry for the Senegambian market. These people would give rise to the Afro-Portuguese community (Lancados or Tangamoos), which played an important role in interregional trade in kola, textiles, and salt between Senegambia and the coast of Upper Guinea and linked the River Gambia by boat to the forest zone of Sierra Leone.

In exchange for gold, ivory, beeswax, and slaves, the Senegambians received European products from the Portuguese and, later, in the seventeenth century, from the French, the Dutch, and the English. These were mostly cheap jewelry, firearms, spirits, iron bars, and textiles that were mainly destined for the ruling classes, often to the detriment of local industry. Le Maire gives us an idea of trade in Senegal in 1682 in the following terms.

In exchange for these negroes one gave cotton material, copper, tin, iron, spirits, and some glass bangles. Profit on this trade was 500%. Leather, ivory and gum arabic was taken to France and the slaves were sent to the French islands of America to work on sugar plantations. The best slaves went for 10 francs each and could be sold for more than a hundred ecus, so the expense was less for the purchase than for transportation because of the high cost of ships.

This is not the place to give the exact amount of imports from Senegambia, but we want to show the unequal exchange conditions that
were established from the beginning between the Europeans and the Senegambians and, particularly, the consequences of this trading on the historical political, social, and economic development of this area.

First, concerning the political aspect, from the second half of the sixteenth century, under the influence of the Atlantic trade, a restructuring of the countries of Senegambia began. In fact, the Jolof empire was shaken up by the massive Fulbe invasion of Koli Tenga and disintegrated under the influence of the Portuguese trade that, by benefitting the coastal states, accelerated political fragmentation of Senegambia. Between 1530 and 1550, the coastal province of Kajor proclaimed its independence from the Jolof with Amari Ngone as first damel (king). This example was soon followed by Walo and Bawol, leaving the original Jolof isolated in the interior because of lack of a direct link with the Atlantic trade that had become all-important. It was this same process that brought about the independence of the Sin and Salum kingdoms during the sixteenth century.

After the breakup of this large Jolof region, the damel of Kajor, Amari Ngone, tried to impose his hegemony by annexing Bawol (he took the title of the Damel-Teh) and one part of Walo, the mouth of the River Senegal. But, very early on, the Damel-Kajor crisis at the turn of the seventeenth century led to the rising to power of the Denanke kingdom of the “Grand Ful,” which in its turn extended its domination over the major part of Senegambia. The Denanke dynasty reached its peak at the beginning of the eighteenth century under the reign of Samba Lamu. At that time, Futa Toro, by occupying the mouth of the river and a part of the Sahel, maintained its twofold orientation toward the Sudan and the Atlantic.

In the meantime, the magnificent Mali empire was in the process of collapsing, but it managed to maintain its authority over one part of the River Gambia after 1550 following the fragmentation of the Jolof. But, soon left to themselves, the Mandinkas of the west divided into small principalities on both banks of the Gambia: Niumi, Wuli, and Badiba. Only Gambia, in Guinea Bissau and the Casamance, were to have a large enough territory to attempt imposing their hegemony along the south bank of the Gambia. Political fragmentation was the most important occurrence in Senegambia in the second half of the sixteenth century. The Atlantic trade contributed to it up to the colonial conquest by accelerating the breakdown of the socioeconomic and political structures.

As for the socioeconomic aspect, despite its relative unimportance, the Atlantic trade was the object of bitter competition between the English, Dutch, and French, which directly threatened Portuguese monopoly from the beginning of the seventeenth century. Their arrival in connection with the development of the slave trade, which had become the cornerstone of colonial mercantilism, led to the partition of Senegambia into zones of influence, in each of which a fortified post was constructed. From 1621, the Dutch had been established at Goree, followed by the French at Saint-Louis in 1659, the English in Gambia in 1668, and, finally, the Portuguese who remained confined to Cacheu. The setting up of trading stations over all the coast linked by ports of trade completed the reorientation of Senegambian trade toward the sea. Moreover, from the end of the eighteenth century, the slave trade created an unstable atmosphere of wars and incessant organized uprisings, often by the aristocracies against their own subjects.

Directing the trading route toward the sea and intensifying the slave trade led to the beginning of a vast marabout movement from Mauritania, led by Nāṣir ad-Dīn, between 1678 and 1677. The movement embodied simultaneously the defense of the transsaharan trading interests and the desire to put an end to the human drain generated by the Atlantic slave trade. This vast movement encompassed Mauritania, Futa Toro, and the kingdoms of Jolof, Kajor, and the Walo. It was eventually reversed by a coalition of the French from Saint-Louis and the overthrown aristocracies. This victory prevented any possibility of creating a vast political whole and marked the triumph of Atlantic trade and the birth of military aristocracies engaged in the slave trade, which became the principal activity during the eighteenth century.

**IMPACT OF THE SLAVE TRADE IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY**

From the second half of the seventeenth century on, sugar cane development in the New World led to an increase in the slave trade, which became the mainstay of African trade during the whole eighteenth century. Since the sixteenth century, Senegambia had been a considerable source of servile manpower, and it would continue to steadily feed the market in the Antilles because of its geographic position. This trade was extremely important, although in the eighteenth century Senegambia became a smaller or even negligible source compared with the rest of the African coast, which saw “the biggest shipments of men that had ever taken place on the surface of the seas.”

**The Slave Trade Era and the Demographic Drain**

Because of lack of adequate documentation, it is unfortunately difficult to obtain an idea of the population of Senegambia in order to
measure correctly the extent of the demographic drain from this region with the slave trade. Apart from attempts by Curtin and Mbaye Gueye and the adjustments made by Charles Becker and V. Martin, there is no methodical study on the slave trade as to the number of slaves exported from the whole of Senegambia. At any rate, Curtin has attempted to give us a detailed study of the number of slaves, although his results are often incorrect because he omits numerous sources and because he is predisposed to lower the available figures considerably by not taking into account the illegal trade. According to Table 2.1, Curtin estimates the export capacity from Senegambia between 1681 and 1810 at 304,330 slaves, which for the eighteenth century gives a potential total of 258,900 slaves (between 1711 and 1810).\(^{31}\)

Thus, according to Curtin, during the eighteenth century the annual rate of possible slave exports from Senegambia varied between 1,000 for the period 1793-1800 and 4,090 for the period 1724-1725.\(^{32}\)

Curtin gives the data in Table 2.2 for actual slave exports between 1711 and 1810 from calculation of shipping data and reaches the overall figure of 181,800 slaves, 77,600 for the French trade and 104,200 for the English trade.\(^{33}\) The figures go from 259,000 to 181,800—or a difference of 78,200—slaves between the capacity estimates and the actual data for the period 1711-1810. Moreover, the annual average between 1721 and 1730 out of a total of 23,500, according to Table 2.2, would be 2,250 slaves. This reduces to almost half the forecasts of Table 2.1, which gave the figure of 4,090 slaves per year in 1730.

Jean Suret-Canale has already shown the merits of Curtin’s work and also his guilty silence on the slave trade and its effects on Senegambian societies.\(^{34}\) Better yet, Charles Becker has clearly shown the flimsiness of the figures put forward by Curtin from embarrassed of certain years. Thus, by using other available data for several years, Becker estimates about 500,000 slaves instead of the 304,330 slaves suggested by Curtin.\(^{35}\) Charles Becker thought it preferable to look for results from meticulous enquiries on the slave trade in the archives of port towns to obtain definite figures.

So far as I am concerned, it is obvious that the arbitrary choice of slave figures by Curtin, which reduced by almost half the estimates already calculated from the lowest figures, cannot contribute correctly to assessing the demographic drain that occurred with the trade.

The most important point is not, in fact, the number of slaves per se, but rather the consequences of this economy, founded on human hunting, that created a permanently unstable situation unfavorable to productive activities not to mention the effects of the demographic bleeding.
### TABLE 2.1

Consolidated Capacity Estimates for the Slave Exports of Senegambia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of Estimate</th>
<th>Saint-Louis</th>
<th>Gajaga</th>
<th>Goree</th>
<th>French Gambia</th>
<th>English Gambia</th>
<th>Total Applied to Years</th>
<th>Total for Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>1687</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>1,350</td>
<td>1681-89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1683</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>1690-1704</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1716</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2,380*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2,380*</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>3,120</td>
<td>1705-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1718</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>2,270</td>
<td>1717-23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1720</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,090*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>3,090</td>
<td>1724-35</td>
</tr>
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<td>1741</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>900*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2,140</td>
<td>3,040</td>
<td>1736-46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1753</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>2,590</td>
<td>1747-60</td>
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<td>1766</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,110*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,511</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>1768-78</td>
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<tr>
<td>1779-88</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>1785</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>1793-1800</td>
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<tr>
<td>1802-10</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>1801-10</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>306,500</strong></td>
</tr>
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</table>

*Only combined totals are available for those years.


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### Consequences of the Slave Trade

From the strong resistance of the slave traders to abolishing the slave trade during the nineteenth century, it is clear that this was very important throughout the eighteenth century, which was the basis of the slave trade era. In fact, this was another continent, which was free from the European powers and kept its autonomy. Study the Senegalese trade confirms this hypothesis. A look at French trade profits in Senegambia, according to the figures, gives the following data."
The company could make a profit every year of 2,268,600 livres from its business with Senegal. Deduct expenses for food and salaries for employees in the colony (estimated at 200,000 livres per year) and equipping seven vessels (200,000 livres per boat or 400,000 livres). These two items include the sum of 620,000 livres to be deducted from 1,833,600 livres of profit, leaving for the Compagnie des Indes 1,183,600 livres of profit in an ordinary year.

The estimates for the French trade alone clearly show the preponderance of the slave trade. Later in the century, Golberry, quoted fully by Becker and Martin, gave an idea of the whole Senegambian trade in 1786: slaves, 4,560,000 F; gum arabic, 2,000,000 F; gold, 94,000 F; other, 451,000 F.

It seems clear that slaves were the biggest part of the trade, for the total for both the English and French reached 8,000 quintals in 1786. Gum arabic played an increasing part in trade with Senegambia and particularly the Senegal river basin region. Gum production in the Senegal river basin toward the sea without compensation for Mauritania. The result of this was the profitable integration of the Maures into the Atlantic trade. Yet they were the ones who at the end of the seventeenth century had resisted violently against Saint-Louis' commercial monopoly, which drained all of the trade from the Senegal river basin toward the sea without compensation for Mauritania. With gum arabic, the Maures overcame the seventh-century crisis and their new power created a new conflict with the black countries of the River Senegal, which weakened gradually from the effects of the slave trade.

During the first half of the eighteenth century, the French made a considerable effort to direct the Moor caravans toward the trading posts on the River Senegal in order to end the large gum arabic trade that was taking place at the Mauritanian ports of Arqui and Portendick with the English and the Dutch. And so Moor pressure on both sides of the River Senegal was a constant factor in the second half of the eighteenth century. With their raids for their internal need for slaves and also because of the needs of the Atlantic trade, the Moors gradually pushed people south to take refuge on the left bank. This was significant for the Wolof kingdom whose capital, Jurbel, was located on the north bank until the seventeenth century and gradually moved over to the south bank, at Ndër, on the edge of the Lac de Guédiar.

Constant pressure also led to a Torode revolution in Futa Toro in the late 1770s, which fought against the effects of the slave trade and Moor domination. The success of the Torode revolution then created an atmosphere at Futa Toro that attracted neighboring people.

Schmaltz remarked that in 1819 the Isle à Morphil in the Futa was inhabited mostly by people from Wolof. Previously, the unstable atmosphere engendered by the trade had brought about the massive departure of Muslims from the Senegambian coast to set up the theocracies of Bundu and Futa Jalon in the interior at the end of the seventeenth century. These new theocracies reached at the beginning against the trade and became places of refuge in the plateau of Futa Jalon where population density was extremely high despite the poor quality of the soil. Although they protected their fellow Muslims inside these theocracies, these countries still turned against weaker peoples hunting humans, the ultimate merchandise of the slave trade (imposed from overseas). The wars conducted against the minorities—Tenda, Konagi, Jola, Balantou, and so on—meant that these people had to flee to the marshes or the hills in order to escape extinction.

In general, the slave trade had the disastrous consequences of diminishing the productive forces and weakening all the Senegambian societies. From a political aspect, fragmentation of the large mainland countries of the preceding period resulted from rebellion attempts by the provincial chiefs. Wars of succession, internal political domination by warriors called cadde (crown slaves), and the internecine wars often fostered by the managers of the European trading stations on the coast contributed greatly to general instability in the area.

Instability, destruction caused by permanent conflict, and natural disasters brought numerous periods of famine that dog the history of Senegambia. First mention of famine on the coast dates from 1669-72, reportedly caused by an infestation of grasshoppers. Then in 1673-77, after the war of the marabouts and the destruction of crops during this conflict, the river region suffered a general famine that Chambooneau described as follows.
During my voyage in Futa during July 1676, I saw whole families who offered themselves to me for slaves, as long as they could be fed. They were in such dire straits that they were killing each other to steal food... so much that we could have traded more than 600 that year if the boats—and myself the first—had not refused the merchandise.\(^59\)

Toward the middle of the eighteenth century, a drought, complicated by a civil war in Kajor and Bauol, brought about a great famine that spread from Bassau to Galam, paradoxically limiting even the slave trade because there was no grain to feed slaves. Thus, in November 1753, 'lack of food prevented Mr. Assano from trading more than 100 captives who were presented to him by kings of Kajor and Sol who were at war.'\(^40\) In fact, beginning in June 1753, famine covered all of Senegambia and the people of Jolof and of Kajor fled in 1754 to Walo, which was slightly less affected by the general disaster.

The certainty of being captured was not enough to prevent them coming to the only place where there was some slight relief from their destitution, and as they had no other alternative to death or captivity, it is presumed that the trade would not last up until the harvesting of the small millet, i.e., until the end of September; the harvesting of the large millet that is currently taking place along our river draws everyone from nearby.\(^41\)

In fact, during this period, it is difficult to decide which was worse, the natural disasters of drought and grasshoppers or the slave trade with its procession of civil wars. There was also the trade itself, which further depleted the self-sufficient economy by using its foodstuffs to feed the human cargo in the slave depots of the coast and during the long ocean voyage. So food production, already greatly diminished by instability, was also monopolized by the Atlantic trade. This loss was in no way compensated for by imports, which still in the eighteenth century were largely made up of firearms, spirits, cloth, and iron, without counting the cheap jewelry. Because of this, even more than during the preceding period, commercial exchange during the slave trade era dealt a fatal blow to all fields of artisanal production and also to interregional trade between Senegambia and the neighboring countries. Senegambia, weakened in the interior, was thus traversed by routes that were full of human cargo leading toward the coast. This great region was powerless against the readjustments of the European trading demands in the nineteenth century, with the abolition of the slave trade that would lead directly to the colonial conquest.

**SENEGAMBIA IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY:**
**READJUSTMENTS AFTER THE ATLANTIC TRADE AND THE COLONIAL CONQUEST**

From the end of the eighteenth century, there was a gradual transition from the European economy of commercial mercantilism to industrial capitalism, thus leading Europe to look for new forms of domination of precapitalist economies on the periphery. Under the new doctrine of free exchange advocated by industrial England, abolition of the slave trade was inevitable. It had already well played its role in the initial accumulation of capital. Thus, after three centuries of slave trade, black Africa would have a new role; to supply raw materials and agricultural produce to Europe and to buy, in turn, manufactured products from rapidly expanding European industry. But before this permanent integration into an absolute capitalist system, France attempted in Senegambia an agricultural experiment under a simple economic protectorate. Failure of the agricultural campaign, and particularly peanut growing, precipitated the colonial conquest that forcibly imposed economic and political domination to enable France to exploit Senegambian resources.

**Agricultural Campaign in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century**

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, industrial England forced its European partners to outlaw the slave trade, and, in order to adapt to this new situation, France undertook an agricultural colonization, with Walo at the mouth of the River Senegal as the center of the experiment. Because of a slave revolt in Santo Domingo that had ruined the sugar colonies for France, and particularly because of the advent of industrial capitalism, it became necessary to integrate Africa into the capitalist system as a directly dependent periphery of the European center.\(^42\) At first France had only limited means to implement this objective and began the agricultural colonization of the Walo with the intention of growing cotton, sugar cane, and tobacco. The idea was simply to use the servile manpower that had previously been transported into the New World over the centuries to work in agriculture on the spot in Africa.

Walo was chosen by Gov. Schmidt because of the proximity of this kingdom to the trading station of Saint-Leu and also because
this area, which had already been undermined by the slave trade and Moor domination, was incapable of opposing this policy. Thus on May 8, 1819, Gov. Schmalz signed the brak, Amur Fatim Mberro, the treaty of Njau, ceding France land for its agricultural project. It must be said that the Walo chiefs agreed to sign the treaty because they had previously been intimidated by the military uniforms of the Fleuris expedition in 1818, tempted by the promise of protection against the pillages of the Trarza Moors, and also attracted by the lure of new customs receipts offered in the treaty. Walo, which became a sort of economic protectorate, averaging annual customs of 10,556,640 F, suddenly tripled the income of the aristocracy in power thanks to its alliance with the trading station of Saint-Louis.

Schmalz immediately chose Dagana as the center of the agricultural colonization and undertook the construction of a blockhaus on the banks of the River Senegal to assure protection of the agricultural buildings. The ministry agreed to a credit of 11,223,358 F for the period 1818-24 to launch the project. Schmalz's successors, Baron Roger in particular (from 1822 to 1827), attempted to extend the crops on a large scale away from the research at Richard Toll, creating an agricultural and commercial company for this purpose. But the results from the experimental growing of cotton, tobacco, and sugar cane were not satisfactory, so that in 1831 France decided to put an end to this agricultural scheme. Failure of the agricultural program was due to several factors.

Pressure from neighboring people, Futa and especially the Trarza Moors, created an unstable situation that did not help the agricultural campaign. The Moors and Futa Toro both claimed sovereignty over Walo, and France had to negotiate treaties with them guaranteeing peace along the river; these were never respected.

The agricultural campaign also ran into the problem of land, which the inhabitants refused to give up despite the agreement with the aristocracy. In 1827, before the extension of the Saint-Louis land concessions, the people of Walo systematically broke the dykes constructed by the French.

It also failed because of difficulties in obtaining labor. Not only did the Walo-Walo refuse to work in the French concessions, but also there was practically no manpower in a country that had lost its people to three centuries of slave trading. The French had to resort to a system of contract labor, thus indirectly perpetuating the slave trade mode. During the colonial period, the institutional continuity was perpetuated by introducing forced labor.

Lastly, the agricultural campaign failed because of resistance by the traditional merchant class of Saint-Louis. The small traders of Saint-Louis and the slave traders had opposed the economic revo-

lution inherent in the agricultural colonization scheme, because they were worried that they would be eliminated with the advent of the big financial and industrial capital.

Failure of the agricultural campaign brought about speculation in gum arabic and also in illegal slave trading, through the middle of the nineteenth century.

Above all, this was a failure of the economic protectorate, by which the French had wanted to exploit the country by paying customs to the aristocracy. Learning from this failure, France decided on a policy of conquest to be realized when and as the means became available. Walo was thus annexed in 1855, and it became the principal support base for France's future colonial empire in West Africa. Meanwhile, however, after the failure of the agricultural campaign in 1831, Senegambia went through a long period of transition before becoming the first French area conquered at the end of the nineteenth century. The transition was marked by a deep crisis in Senegambian societies, because of attempts to restructure internal politics and economies after the end of the slave trade and also because of the reluctance of the colonial economy to look for new paths. The triumph of legitimate trading went along with armed conquest, thus increasing the troubles of this region before it was permanently integrated to an active capitalist system under colonial control.

During the first half of the nineteenth century, the gum arabic trade represented three-quarters of the exports from Senegal, which totaled 1,643,652 F in 1825 and comprised: beeswax, 88,425 F; leather, 255,894 F; ivory, 32,848 F; gum arabic, 12,227,029 F; 43

When agriculture failed, the gum arabic trade took top place and encouraged the return of wild speculation. Toward 1830, a real gum arabic fever took hold of the population of Saint-Louis. "Gum arabic has become the safeguard of Senegalese industry and trade: it wants extenuity and any other idea for enriching Senegal is a heresy."

In fact, trade as a whole suffered from the uncertainty of whether the policy should be to have exclusivity or free trade. This period of commercial uncertainty corresponds to the period of transition from a trading station economy to a colonial economy. This transition was dominated economically by the growing importance of peanuts in commerce during the second half of the nineteenth century and also by the political and military conflicts unleashed by the colonial conquest.

Advent of Peanut Growing and the Colonial Conquest

Following the decline of the slave trade and the general commercial crisis in Senegambia, peanuts became the "miracle" product
to get out of the impasse. The Portuguese introduced peanuts in the
fifteenth century to meet new demands from European industry for
lubricants and soap. From that time, production in Gambia in-
creased from 47 tons (200 pounds) in 1845 to 11,095 tons
(123,113 pounds) in 1865. The French in Senegal rapidly took
the British with exports that went from 1.2 tons in 1840 to 52,000
tons in 1870. Thus the combined production of Senegal and Gambia
had rapidly reached 60,000 tons by 1829. From then on, the future
of Senegambia was linked in a sort of economic fatalism to the grow-
ing of peanuts. Viewed by its promoters at the beginning as a means
of saving the colony of Senegal, the new product disrupted all the
trade routes and aggravated social tensions. In sum, it produced
the major transformations that were manifest during the period of
consolidation of legitimate trade in the years 1870 to 1890.45

The Senegambian peasant would henceforth be in direct con-
tact with the outside, and he would have as partners the European
businessman and the African or mulatto intermediary in the
context of a monetary economy. But the peasant who would produce
the export crop did not have time to assert his economic and politi-
cal independence vis-à-vis the former aristocracy. From the be-

ing, expansion of the peanut crop created a major contradiction
between the French or English economic interests on the one hand
and those of the aristocracies in power on the other. The prime de-
sire of the aristocracies was to control and benefit from the new profits
of the peanut world in growing peanuts and to restrict the demands
of French and English interests, which became more and more ex-
cessive, hastened the armed conflict that led to colonial conquest.
And so it was that the pillaging of the Ceded and the necessity of re-

storing general peace in order to grow peanuts was used as a pre-
text, throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, for the
conquest of the various Senegambian kingdoms.

The conquest was generally violent, and military victory over
individual kingdoms came, with some notable exceptions, fairly
quickly. The French and English did not encounter an organized
Senegambian-wide coalition capable of fighting the invader. Despite
their fierce desire to resist, one by one the Senegambian kingdoms
were defeated, revealing their main weakness: geopolitical frag-
mentation.

The wars of conquest and introduction of the peanut economy
would immediately, and for a long time, have a considerable influ-
ence on the evolution of the region of the Senegal river basin. The
whole of the basin was ravaged continuously by the conquest wars
from 1855 to 1890. Nevertheless, the central Wolof region was
easily able to recover because of the expansion of the peanut crop,
whereas the Senegal river valley lost its commercial vitality for a
long time and, up to the present day, has no new economic alternative.

The Casamance and the Upper Senegal-Niger River were con-
quered later than the central Senegambia and in a more gradual way
that did not generate large-scale migration, because the conquest
was at the village level. Moreover, these regions were underpopu-
lated and had limited economic interest during the precolonial period.
They were not exploited immediately after the conquest. In any

case, famine spread with the wars of conquest because of scorched
earth tactics and also because the retreat of entire populations
from one area to another became the most active form of resistance
that the Senegambian kingdoms made against colonial conquest.
Thus the people and armies, in great number, could not always find
the necessary food nor the time to grow crops in the regions where
they took refuge.

The Wolof kingdom of the Walo, at the mouth of the River
Senegal, was particularly affected by the wars of conquest that rav-
aged the country and by the exodus of the whole population toward
neighboring Kajor. Gov. Faucherbe discovered at great cost soon
after his arrival in 1854 that the Senegambian kingdoms could be
beaten on the battlefield, but they refused to submit to the conqueror
by fleeing en masse. And so the French, equipped with modern re-
peating rifles and their means of rapid communications, could very
easily beat the Moor, Wolof, and Tukulor armies, which were
equipped only with muskets and horses. But for reasons of health,
the French army had to evacuate the conquered land immediately,
famine during the 1860s. In 1871, the French defeat in the Franco-
Prussian War led to colonial retreatment. Kajor, which had been
annexed in 1865 but refused to submit, was again allowed official
independence. The people rapidly returned to the area and actively
developed exports of peanuts. But, in 1879, the new French gover-
nor decided to dominate this region economically and politically by
constructing a railroad from Saint-Louis to Dakar through central
Kajor. The railroad was to link these two administrative centers,
to facilitate the movement of troops for conquest and pacification,
and also to facilitate transportation of peanuts for French commer-
cial profit. The railroad was constructed between 1882 and 1886,
deprive with the opposition from the damel Lat Jor. Construction work
therefore had to be protected by troops, and no offensive expedition
was taken until the railroad was completed. But as soon as the
railroad was operational, in October 1886, both Damel Lat Jor and
the new damel, Samba Loohe, were killed by French troops, even
though the latter had ostensibly shown his support for France.47
From then onward, French merchants and their Lebanese agents
settled permanently in the various small towns along the railway
line to buy peanuts directly from the peasants, thereby eliminating
the former Wolof and Moor traders. From the beginning, the in-
digenous merchants were excluded from peanut marketing, long the
only wealth of Senegal, which was maintained as a French monopoly.

Meanwhile, the British, while not undertaking an aggressive
campaign of conquest, managed to carve out a colonial domain on
the banks of the navigable portion of the River Gambia. Rulers such
as Ma Baa and his successors in Salum, who came in conflict with
the French, were offered protection by the British. Because most
of the kingdoms along the river fall into both French and British
areas of activity, a border was negotiated by treaty in 1890, effec-
tively partitioning them into competing colonial political and com-
mercial spheres.

Futa Toro in the middle valley of the Senegal and the Soninke
kingdoms in the Upper River were first attacked in 1850, at the
same time as Walo. The last campaigns of conquest in the river
area occurred after the “pacification” of the Wolof and Serer king-
doms between 1888 and 1891. But already the river basin was ex-
periencing a progressive decline, due to the economic transforma-
tion brought by the Wolof kingdoms. Most of the young people had left Futa Toro in the 1850s to follow the armies of holy war leader, al-Hajj Umar Tal, in the Upper Senegal-Niger area. The opposition of the Futa Toro to the colonial conquest was
all the more fierce because the inhabitants, deeply Muslim and long
engaged in trade, had no other economic alternative capable of evok-
ing their adherence to the colonial order. An impressive number of

Futa Toro went to their deaths in the wars of al-Hajj Umar or in the
campaigns against the French. Some settled permanently in present-
day Mali, while a considerable number attempted to return to Futa
Toro in 1890 after the fall of Segu and Niore. Few Futa Toro who
had participated in the Umarian exode (ferro) survived, be-
cause they were met on their return by the last campaigns of con-
quest in Futa Toro. Also, an economic crisis was provoked by the
inclusion of colonial domination, as former agricultural systems
stagnated and offered the people no prospects of economic develop-
ment.48 From the beginning of colonization, this zone became the
first to have emigration directed toward the urban centers of Kaolack,
Dakar, and the towns along the railroad in the peanut basin. This
long tradition of emigration of the productive population profoundly
altered the social structures of this area, and the process was made
worse by the incompatibility of colonial policy with the former social
organization.49

The Upper Senegal-Niger area was first ravaged by the wars
of al-Hajj Umar and then by those of the French conquest. The rail-
road here also played a crucial role, because the Kayes-Bamako
line, constructed between 1883 and 1886, replaced all the former
commercial routes and encouraged a French monopoly trade to the
detriment of the Soninke and Mandinka merchants. The railroad
was also used to transport the troops who finally completed the con-
quest of the region. As in Futa Toro, the Soninke had a long tradi-
tion of trading. But the colonial conquest offered them no alterna-
tives to traditional agriculture or emigration toward developed areas
on the coast and in the peanut basin. This region became very early
on the one of great emigration. To this very day, it remains the
region of greatest emigration in Senegal, and the Soninke account
for the majority of migrant workers in France.50

Because of its relative economic and political importance be-
fore the colonial era, the Casamance was the last region to be con-
quered. French infiltration took place slowly between 1900 and
1920, although the River Casamance and certain commercial sta-
tions were occupied earlier. The kingdoms of Musa Mabo and Fode
Kaba, which were the large organized countries there, were con-
quered in 1905. But in the rest of the Casamance, because of the
existence of village democracies, the conquest took very long, as
the resistance had to be squelched village by village. The villagers
would constantly evacuate the entire region at the announcement of
a French expedition and would return after the danger.

When a head tax payable in French currency was imposed after
World War I, the people began to flee long distances and settled par-
ticularly in Gambia. There again the limited economy of the colonial
period led gradually to the people emigrating toward the coastal
towns and the peanut basin.51
Thus, at the beginning of the twentieth century, all armed resistance had been overcome by the French and British in their separate spheres; each imposed its economic and political domination throughout the colonial period. The present economic and political situation of Senegambia is, in many regards, the result of the continuation of dependence forged by colonization.

CONCLUSION

In order to understand all of the transformations involved in the progressive integration of the Senegambia into the capitalists' system and to find solutions to the number one problem of dependency, it is important to understand the steps in this process beginning in the fifteenth century. It was, in fact, during this long period of mercantile colonialism, which extended from the seventeenth through the beginning of the nineteenth century, that the relationships of dependency between Senegambia and European countries developed. The slave trade, due to its depredatory character, played an important role in the regression of productivity and was thus the source of economic and social stagnation that preceded the conquest. The conquest was intended to correct the destructive effects of the slave trade and to permit, in the context of colonization, a better system of exploitation adapted to the new needs of the center.

For Senegambia, colonization began with the development of peanuts, which were to become an important factor in the progressive dependence of peasants vis-à-vis the world market. The peanut economy inspired the migration of the population of the interior toward the coast, and, at the same time, the colonial partition not only destroyed the unity of this vast Senegambian region, but it also robbed it of its autonomy. In order to recover, Senegambia will have to overcome these artificial borders and perhaps turn its back to the ocean.

NOTES

1. See Bibliography.
7. Ibid., p. 61.
9. Ibid., p. 77.
10. Ibid., p. 66.
13. Curtin, Economic Change, p. 202. We will see the reasons for this reservation on slave trade figures.
14. Vitorino Magnanhaes Godinho, "Economics of the Portuguese Empire in the XVIII and XIX Centuries," SEYPEN (Paris, 1969), Page 185 says that the Arguin trading station reported an annual average of 4,709 gold doubloons between 1489 and 1501. One ship took away 2,000 gold doubloons in 1513.
15. Ibid., pp. 194-200, 203.
16. In Gambia, the Portuguese bought from 5,000 to 6,000 gold doubloons per year from 1496 onward. Later, when the Kuntur and Gambia River trade was leased out from 1510 to 1517, the lessee paid the Crown 45,400 reals per year. The Lisbon mint register listed the king's account for May 12, 1523, at 5,000 cruzados and 35 grains (ibid., pp. 202-3). Walter Rodney tells us that in 1551 a certain Captain de Santiago traded nearly 20 pounds of gold at Kuntaur, while a source in 1581 evaluated gold from Gambia at from 10,000 to 12,000 cruzados for that year. Finally, we must not forget that part of the gold from Senegambia (Bambuk-Bare) was sold on the coast of Sierra Leone to the extent of from 12,000 to 20,000 doubloons and even further along on the Gold Coast, where annual production during these first 20 years of the sixteenth century exceeded 410 kgs or more than 100,000 cruzados; Walter Rodney, A History of the Upper Guinea Coast, 1455-1550 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 153.
27. Ibid., p. 244.
32. Ibid., p. 164.
33. Ibid.
40. ANF, Col. C614, November 25, 1753.
41. Ibid.
43. Ibid., p. 93.

46. Archives Nationales de France, Section Outre-mer (ANF-OM) Sénégal 1, 43, Saint-Louis, May 13, 1858. Correspondence from Faidherbe.
51. For the conquest of the Casamance, see Christian Roche, *Conquête et résistance des peuples de la Casamance* (Dakar: Nouvelles éditions africaines, 1976).